CHAPTER SIX
Flak Suppression Plan – ‘CARPET’
Enemy fighter capability had been attacked in the days prior to the crossing by concentrated attacks on airfields, especially those that the new Messerschmitt 272 jet aircraft where known to operate from in the area of Rhine. In the two weeks between the arrival of 21st Army Group on the banks of the Rhine and the assault crossing, there had been a significant increase in the number of flak guns in the Emmrich, Bocholt, Wesel area, to 712 light and 114 heavy (88 mm plus) anti-aircraft guns. Plans to knock out the flak before the drop and to suppress any site that opened fire during the fly-in was a key part of the plan.
83 Group, who had tactical responsibility for the whole PLUNDER area, were to oversee the destruction of enemy flak sites. Its fighter and fighter-bombers were to attack all identified anti-aircraft guns in the airborne landing area prior to P Hour. Cab ranks of aircraft dedicated to flak suppression would be operating over the DZs and LZs throughout the landing.
Second Army’s artillery, armed with up to date information, thanks to the eleventh hour capture of a German flak map from the local anti-aircraft HQ in Wesel, would also engage flak positions up to the check-fire just before P Hour, as follows in an extract from 1 Canadian Para’s war diary:
5.5 inch guns of 8 AGRA in action, targetting enemy flak.
P-2 hrs to P-1 hr Counter-battery and softening bombardment [BLOTTER]. P-30 mins to P-15 mins Anti-flak bombardment. P-15 mins to P hr Counter-battery and softening bombardment.
The most concentrated anti-flak fire plan would take place during the thirty minutes before P Hour and involve no less than eleven field and eleven medium regiments, plus several regiments of heavies, including three US long range 155 mm battalions. With a check-fire just before P Hour, as the aircraft approached, the numbing effect of the bombardment would be at its highest for the first part of the drop. Inevitably, the gun crews would recover and be able to take on later serials, with increasing effect, which accounts for the Airlanding Brigade’s fly-in casualties.
The Parachute Drop
At 0951 hours, the leading aircraft carrying 3 Para Brigade crossed the Rhine and started to drop their paratroopers. Lieutenant Colonel Hewson, of 8 Para, having survived the drop, started to orientate himself:
Despite the light hearted mood, most men would have been apprehensive.
Sticks of eighteen men each descend to the drop zone.
There seemed to be very little flak, bullets were whining across the DZ, nothing compared to the mental relief of landing safely. I landed 100 yards east of the wood. The initial briefing and air photographs left no doubt as to the RV, in addition the blue smoke was already visible, the officer in Number 1 plane had dropped a few yards from the RV.
With the American Dakota pilots flying a very concentrated formation, it took only ten minutes for the whole of 3 Para Brigade to be on the ground, with only a few of the Brigade’s sticks going astray. The aircraft were, however, flying at the highest possible speed for parachuting in order to present more difficult targets and this served to spread the dropping paratroopers across the DZ.
Looking up Colonel Hewson noted that there was still‘… very little flak. One or two planes were shot down. I remember as I was getting out of my parachute watching a Dakota returning with flames streaming out of the engine; probably No, 1 plane flown by the Colonel, which crashed west of the Rhine’. Meanwhile, on the ground, with the battalion rendezvous (RV) being marked by smoke:
There was now a considerable amount of shooting on the DZ, chiefly enemy, as at this stage of a drop it would be fatal for our own troops to open up. You can imagine the sight on the DZ, thousands of parachutes drifting slowly to the ground and on the ground. Men getting out of their harness and opening kit bags with feverish haste, talking to anyone within call about the ‘jump’, for at this stage in an operation to have landed safely is to be inoculated with 100% morale. Blue smoke going up from the east RV to guide in 9 Pars Engineers and Bde HQ. Yellow smoke from the Canadian RV to the west. A scene of indescribable chaos, yet rapidly men were moving off to the RVs and within thirty-five minutes 85% of the Brigade had reported in. Above it all a continuous stream of aircraft flying east, the scream of 88 mm shells, the puff’s of smoke in the sky, and the long lazy curves of tracer reaching at what looked a sitting target.
Once on the ground, the battalions set about completing the initial tasks Brigadier Hill had assigned to them. 8 Para secured the DZ and was then to hold the northern part of the Dieserfordterwald, 9 Para set out to seize the south-eastern part of the wood including the Schneppenburg feature, while 1 Canadian Para advanced through the trees to occupy the central area of the Forest.
As an aside, it is worth noting that the first member of 6th Airborne Division to cross the Rhine did so by LVT and that Colonel MacEwan’s RAMC, the divisional medical commander already well on his way to the DZs.
Prevented by my [Major General Eric Bols’s] order from travelling by air on this operation, he was the first member of the division across the Rhine bridgehead, and first to make physical contact with the troops who had landed by air.
8 Para
Even though 8 Para’s drop was well concentrated, several sticks went astray one of which was the Anti-Tank Platoon who:
… had jumped to the east of the DZ, owing to a failure in the light signals in the aircraft. Returning to the DZ, they had a short sharp engagement in a house and captured an officer and fifteen men of a German signal unit together with their 3-ton lorry. This vehicle was invaluable later when the DZ had to be cleared.
On DZ A, the enemy in the woods were quickly identified by 8 Para as Fallschirmjäger (The DZ was just to the north of the boundary between 7th Fallschirmjäger Division and 84th Division). Approximately two platoons of Germans, who were ‘prepared to and actually did make a fight of it’, occupied a tongue of wood (known as Axe Handle Wood) extending north from the Dieserfordterwald. This was B Company and the Machine Gun Platoon’s RV and objective. As is to be expected, with the aircraft travelling faster than normal for jumping, B Company’s sticks of paratroopers, though accurately dropped, were spread across the DZ. Releasing their parachute harness and recovering their fighting order and weapons, they headed towards their RV in small groups. Under fire from the Axe Handle, the first thirty or so paras to approach were gathered together by Major Kippen, who led them in an immediate and aggressive attack from the south. Both he and another officer were killed and several men were wounded in the fighting amongst the trees and trenches. Outnumbered, the remnants of the ad hoc platoon of paratroopers were temporarily forced back. Eventually, Axe Handle Wood was taken:
A panorama of DZA covering an arc east to north.
A contemporary picture of DZ A with Axe Handle Wood to the right and Wood B to the left.
… by a platoon attacking from the north-east using 36 and 77 grenades [high explosive and white phosphorous – instant smoke] and covered by the fire of the platoon which had earlier attempted an attack from the south. The last phase of the attack was a hand-to-hand fight down a trench, led by the platoon commander.
At least half the Fallschirmjäger were killed or wounded and one officer and twenty-six Germans were taken prisoner.
To the north-east, the tree line (Wood B) was also held and the orchards and houses to the north (Höfges) contained enemy mortars and an assault gun. Artillery and anti-aircraft detachments were scattered round the DZ and throughout the Dieserfordterwald to the south. Later an enemy officer taken prisoner told Colonel Hewson that they:
‘… expected airborne troops to be used for the RHINE crossing and it was appreciated that this DZ was one of the few places where we could safely jump. In consequence of this, it had been strongly held, but when no paratroops appeared, at 0900 hours most of them had been sent forward to counter-attack the troops crossing the Rhine. I was very glad to hear it!
This would also account for the distinct increase in tempo of German operations against the bridgehead’s both 15th and 51st Divisions at about that time.
Despite the presence of a slightly depleted enemy force on and around their DZs, 3 Para Brigade assembled promptly. 8 Para’s task to secure the area of the DZ was important, as the southern part of it would subsequently be used to land the Brigade’s heavy equipment in vulnerable gliders. Colonel Hewson recalled that on time:
The gliders began to arrive at 1100 hours. One of the first down, a 9th Parachute Battalion gliders, overshot the LZ but although it was badly damaged, there were no casualties … I was standing on the edge of the wood, briefing my Intelligence 0fficer to keep in touch with Brigade Headquarters on the wireless, … Suddenly, with a terrific crash, a glider came through the trees and I found myself lying under the wheel of a jeep. I managed to crawl out from the wreckage to find the glider, one of the medical Horsas of 9th Parachute Battalion, completely written off. The crew had been killed and my Intelligence Officer and two sergeants were also dead.
Colonel Hewson was very lucky to be alive. A witness said that he struggled out from under the wreckage ‘madder than hell and stiff as a poker, every bone aching, yelling his famous cry “How now you whorin’ bastard shite!”. No one who heard him was left in any doubt that the six foot three northerner was extremely angry!’
With the volume of flak increasing noticeably, another flight of gliders came in from the south west.
At 1115 hours, the battalion’s Hamilcar glider arrived, bringing in a very welcome load of a Bren carrier, spare 3-inch mortars, Vickers medium machine guns and some radio sets. Shortly afterwards, the enemy began to bring down shell and mortar fire on the drop zone. However, the battalion continued to clear it of equipment and containers, almost completing the task by 1200 hours at which time it was ordered into brigade reserve. It subsequently moved off from the DZ, leaving one platoon from C Company to finish clearing equipment from the DZ and to guard the equipment dump. En route to its new position, the battalion encountered two 88mm guns, one of which was firing into the trees and causing casualties from shrapnel bursts. Both guns, however, were attacked and knocked out.
Either hit on the way down or as he hung in one of the trees around the DZ, this paratrooper suffered a macabre fate.
Only two of the Brigade’s seven heavy Hamilcar gliders landed in the correct area, the furthest away coming down a mile north of 8 Para’s cordon. Leaving the platoon of C Company to hold DZ A for the supply drops, at 1500 hours, the remainder of the battalion went into brigade/divisional reserve in the area due east of the Schneppenberg feature. However, despite the best efforts of 8 Para and the Canadians whose objective they were, a group of Fallschirmjäger, with both machine guns and mortars, were still ensconced in Höfges to the north-west of the DZ.
1 Canadian Para
Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Nicklin, Commanding the Canadian Paras summarised how he expected his battalion to fight in his operation order:
· (a) SPEED and INITIATIVE on part of all ranks is the order of the day.
· (b) RISKS will be taken.
· (c) The ENEMY will be attacked and destroyed wherever he is found.
With these words, along with details of the task memorised by every man, the Canadian paratroopers flew across the Rhine in their Dakotas and started to jump onto DZ A, just four minutes after 8 Para. This was far from adequate for 8 Para to have cleared the area for the following waves. Flak increased significantly as the Canadians dropped and several of their aircraft were shot down, with some paratroopers managing to jump out of burning aircraft. Private Robby Robson was one of them:
At approximately 1000 hrs we parachuted under intense fire over the Drop Zone near a town called Wesel. My plane ‘The Red Dog’ was hit on the port side causing the engine to burst into flame making it quite ‘iffy’ as we had to jump through the flames of a plane out of control, and as I was second to last in the stick, I became quite anxious about getting out in time. ‘The Red Dog’ sadly crashed with its valiant crew.
An 88mm anti aircraft gun and crew in action.
Struggling from aircraft that the crew fought to control, left many Canadians coming down to the east of the DZ. C Company radio operator, Private Cerniuk, was one such soldier, who jumped out of a burning aircraft. Beneath his canopy, he could see the main DZ several miles distant but fortunately the enemy’s attention seemed fixed on it. He did, however, receive several bursts of machine gun fire, one of which cut the rope from which his container hung and down went the radio. He managed to pull down on the left riser of his parachute harness and, spilling wind, he steered into a patch of scrub. Landing and quickly out of his harness, he had only his pistol and grenades, with which to defend himself. According to the battalion’s historian, ‘He spent the rest of the day evading the enemy but… found himself caught up in a friendly creeping artillery barrage’ and surviving this linked up with the Scots who were following the barrage.
A map showing the well concentrated sticks of 3 Para Brigade on DZ A.
Leading the Canadian drop onto DZ A, was the main part of C Company, who also came under machine gun fire as they descended and suffered several casualties before they were on the ground. With the company commander wounded and the second-in-command killed, senior NCOs took the lead. Sergeants Saunders and Murray led members of their company in an immediate frontal attack on a fallschirmjager held group of houses on the edge of the DZ around a road/track junction (marked X on the map opposite). They organized:
A damaged US Dakota aircraft crashed west of the Rhine.
…a number of men that landed close to the C Company objective…into an attack formation, and charged directly into the enemy positions. The courageous attack completely routed the German gun crews, and the company objective was taken before many of the company could make their way from the Drop Zone to assist.
The enemy fire then redoubled from buildings further north in Höfges and it seemed that the attack was going to fail. Seeing this, Company Sergeant Major (CSM) Green organised some covering fire and then went forward with an assault group to the first house, which was cleared after some unpleasant hand-to-hand fighting. Further buildings were cleared of Fallschirmjäger in a similar manner, until the all the buildings had been captured but they were subsequently reoccupied by the enemy once the Canadians moved off.
During the drop, some Canadians were caught up in the trees surrounding the DZ including the Commanding Officer. The CO and his second-in-command Major Eadie, had arranged to jump as they crossed the Wesel-Rees road, aiming to land west of Axe Handle Wood. Major Eadie landed under fire from a group of five Germans in the edge of the wood and cutting himself out of his harness and rolling into a furrow in the field, returned fire with his Tommy gun, before making off to the RV. The Commanding Officer, however, was missing. Eventually it was discovered that he had landed in a tree at the edge of the wood, over a Spandau position and was shot as he struggled in his harness. With the CO missing, his second-in-command took over command of the battalion.
Major Eadie.
HQ Company mortarman Private Dafoe reached the Battalion RV where he found Brigadier Hill directing operations ‘like a traffic policeman’. The RV came under fire from an 88mm gun and Dafoe and Private King were ordered by the Brigadier to knock it out with their mortar. The bipod legs were, however, missing having gone astray in the drop but they had trained for this eventuality. ‘Private King acted as observer and ‘fire director’, while Dafoe operated the mortar … The first two rounds bracketed the German gun, and the third round silenced it with a direct hit.’
Despite having suffered significant losses of men and equipment during the drop, the Canadian paratroopers had assembled quickly along the northern edge of the wood bordering the DZ, and formed into viable sub-units, moved off the DZ, leaving 8 Para to deal with the enemy left in the area. They set off for their objectives a short distance to the south in the Dieserfordterwald, overlooking the Bislich-Hamminkeln road and the Wesel road, and the approach to be taken by 15th Scottish Division.
Corporal Tophan VC
Although 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion had set off from DZ A, they left elements of their medical detachment to clear casualties from the DZ, which 8 Para was still struggling to clear. The Canadian Medical Officer, appreciating the difficulties of casualty evacuation, had selected the biggest and strongest men to be trained as his medics; amongst them was Corporal George Topham, a pre-war miner from northern Canada. Assisting the Canadians was a section of medics from 224 Parachute Field Ambulance. Two of these men rushed out on to the DZ, where the majority of the Canadian casualties were to rescue a wounded man but:
A burst of enemy fire cut them down. He [Topham] ran past the mortally wounded medical orderlies to the man still lying in the exposed area. Shots rained about him as he tended the wounded soldier; one bullet ripped across his cheek and another through his nose.
Toppy refused to be evacuated. He went back out there again and again and continued evacuating the drop zone until he had cleared it. It wasn’t until then that he finally agreed to sit down and listen to reason and let the doctors work on him. Even then he refused to be evacuated.
Corporal Topham VC.
Later, having been treated for his face wounds, Corporal Topham was on his way back from the Regimental Aid Post and came across a knocked out Bren-gun carrier. Corporal Einarson, of the Machine Gun Platoon, was returning from Battalion HQ with fresh belts of ammunition at that moment:
I saw a man jump up on top of the carrier and literally lift the occupants out – the driver, the co-driver, and the people behind and hand them down. I thought the person was absolutely out of his mind, being up on top of the carrier when the thing was literally exploding and burning and popping underneath him. As I moved down the road, I looked back and saw him jump-off. Then the carrier exploded. The man was George Topham.
These acts of valour earned Corporal Topham the Victoria Cross; the first awarded to 6th Airborne Division.
Selflessness is a characteristic of the Medical Services but is a quality that was not confined to British and Canadian medics. Corporal Flynn was leading a clearance patrol in the woods when he was severely wounded in the thigh. He recalls:
I called for a stretcher-bearer and a German POW, a medic, came over to take care of me. He dressed my wound, gave me my morphine that I supplied to him, and then he got the guys to come and make a very quick litter to carry me back. We were going down the road when we were shelled by mortars. This German fellow threw his body right on top of me to protect me. He took me to 224th Field Ambulance and that was the last I saw of him; I guess he saved my life.
Dieserfordterwald
Meanwhile, Major Eadie was leading the Canadian paratroopers off to complete their tasks. The central area of the Dieserfordterwald consisted of the western edge of the woods, including the main road (now the B8) running north from the Wesel to Rees, and a number of houses. It was thought that this area was held by Fallschirmjäger, as the German’s inter-divisional boundary was in this area. The extract from the 1 Canadian Para’s Operation order gives the company tasks in this phase of the operation. The capital letters in brackets reference the map below:
Tasks
· 34. C Coy
o (a) Immediately on landing will rush, seize, clear and hold area rd junc 154478 (A) (one pl) and area corner of wood 155477 (B) (two pls). Success code word of this objective ‘HANSON’
· 35. A Coy
o (a) Immediately on landing will rush, seize and clear R.V. area edge of woods map ref 157477 (B).
o (b) On success word ‘HANSON’ being recd A Coy on orders of Bn H.Q. A Party will move through woods along edge to C Coy area, corner of wood 155477 (B).
o (c) A Coy will pass through C Coy area (2 pls) and move SOUTH in woods along edge of rd towards area houses 156472 (C) with object to clean and hold this area (156472) (C).
o (d) Consolidation - A Coy will consolidate area X rds 158473 (D) - houses area 156472 (C) – rd junc 156474 (E) - track and trail X rds 158474 (F).
· 36. B Coy
o (a) Immediately on landing will rush, seize and clear R.V. Area 158477 (A).
Brigadier Hill visiting his units at the dug-in on the edge of Dieserfordterwald.
o (b) On success code word HANSON being recd B Coy on orders of Bn H.Q. A Party will move SOUTH-WEST along track through woods to F.U.P. area X rds 158473 (D) in anticipation of flank attack on area bldgs 156472 (C).
o (c) One Pl B Coy will seize clear and hold area X rds houses 156472(C) on reaching F.U.P.
o (d) On area houses 156472 (C) being cleared by either A Coy or B Coy - B Coy will consolidate area 160472 - 159470 (G) - wood and junc 157469 - rd junc 156472 (C).
In summary:
C Company was first to clear the road junction and corner of the woods in the northern sector. A Company would then pass through C Company in order to clear and hold the area of the houses where Bn H.Q. would later be established. B Company was to move south-west through the woods to provide flank protection, to seize and hold the cross roads about which the houses were grouped, and to consolidate the southern sector. All companies would then carry out extensive local patrolling for their own protection and in order to attempt to establish contact with British and American troops.
Virtually all of A Company dropped east of DZ A and they duly moved south through the woods but not before B Company, commanded by Captain McGowan, had pushed through the woods and attacked a group of farm buildings and a wooded area from which the enemy was already bringing fire to bear on the company. Under covering fire from their Bren guns, B Company assaulted and overran the enemy positions, which included a trenches and bunker system. ‘The enemy were flushed out by a copious use of grenades’. CSM Kemp led an attack on the farmhouse itself under very heavy fire. In less than thirty minutes from the drop, B Company’s objective was secure.
The Battalion was reporting that it had secured its objective at 1130 hours. In the process of clearing their part of the Dieserfordterwald, the Canadians had destroyed several German artillery gun positions. Major Eadie recalled that:
B Coy took large numbers of prisoners, which constituted quite a problem because they numbered almost the strength of the Bn. It was fortunate that Germans were killed by the hundreds, otherwise it would have been impossible to corral and guard them in the early hours of the operation.
9 Para
After an uneventful flight, during which, Lieutenant Colonel Napier Crookenden was awakened by the cry of the crew‘twenty minutes to go’. At about 1015 hours, with a shout in of ‘Green on! Go!’ in my left ear [which] sent me out into the sunlight’. He was the first man of his battalion to jump.
The ground below was already covered with parachutes of the 8th Battalion and 1st Canadian Para and I could see them running to their objectives. There was a continuous rattle of machine gun fire and the occasional thump of a mortar or grenade during my peaceful minute of descent.
As the commanding officer landed, he heard the crack of two bullets; near misses. Forty-five minutes later he had collected about 85% of his battalion’s drop strength and moved off, at 1100 hours, with Major Parry’s A Company leading, to capture the Schneppenberg feature in the south-western part of the Dieserfordterwald. An hour later, the northern part of the feature had been cleared by A Company with only light opposition and twenty-two prisoners were taken. The southern part of the objective was clear by 1300 hours, with an enemy SP gun being knocked out and B Company attacking and capturing a battery of towed 75mm guns positioned on the edge of the wood who were firing at 15th Scottish Division. In the process of reaching and clearing their objectives, 9 Para took some two hundred and thirty prisoners.
Major Alan Parry.
9 Para had successfully established itself in the wooded area south of the Canadians by 1330 hours. In detail, A Company remained on the Schneppenberg, B Company was digging in covering the Wesel-Emmrich road, while C Company were in the wood to the south of the road. As with the Canadians, 9 Para had to hold this large and densely wooded area with patrols. Meanwhile, as already recorded, 8 Para moved from DZ A to a position in the wood to the east of the other two battalions. They reported that they were in their new location at 1500 hours.
At 1530 hours, 9 Para dispatched a patrol to contact 2/513 US Parachute Infantry Regiment whose objective were further to the south-west down the Wesel-Emmrich road. Meanwhile, 15th Scottish Division was securely across the Rhine and was holding a bridgehead approximately two miles deep but there was a gap of a mile or more of open ground to the Dieserfordterwald and 3 Para Brigade’s positions. Patrols were deployed by all three of 44 Lowland Brigade’s battalions to make the initial link up. 6 King’s Own Scottish Border, having least far to go, contacted 507 Parachute Infantry Regiment in the village of Dieserfordter at 1400 hours and further south, 6 Royal Scots Fusiliers joined the Americans at 1510. Yellow Celanese triangles were carried by all ranks of the assault brigades and radio contact frequencies were allocated to reduce the likelihood of ‘blue on blue’ or ‘friendly fire’ incidents. 8 Royal Scots reached 6th British Airborne Division near Bergen at 1515 hours, having secured the small Bridge A en route. The all important link up had been made. This enabled the airborne troops to concentrate on facing the threat of XLVII Panzerkorps from the east across the River Issel and for 15th Scottish Division to place their main effort further north with the aim of extending the bridgehead, keeping II Fallschirmjäger Korps at bay and closing up to the Issel.
A welcome sight, a jock from 15th Scottish Division.
