Editor's Foreword

To give a fair account and show a deep understanding of the Troubles in Northern Ireland and their origins requires historical interpretation and imagination of a high order. Dr Kennedy-Pipe has shown precisely that kind of interpretation and imagination in the writing of this book. She has managed to expound the ideas and the motives of the various parties involved in the dispute, and to show how these have changed with changing circumstances.

The book is the sixteenth in the series, and marks a departure in that it is concerned with neither an international, nor – in the strict sense – a civil war. To include it in a series of volumes on the origins of wars may be considered to make a statement of a political nature. Only the IRA and one small extreme section of the Loyalists would claim that the Troubles constitute ‘a war’. In International Law we are certainly not dealing with ‘a war’, and the editor, by including the volume in the series, equally certainly does not wish to make a statement of a political nature. The Troubles have been ‘a war’ only in the general sense, as one might speak of ‘a war against the drug traffic’, or ‘a war to defend the environment’. Yet some of the characteristics of a war have been present, even if two organized armies have not been consistently facing each other, as in the case of the American Civil War or the Spanish Civil War. Recently, for example, the term ‘cease-fire’ has been used. The term has in the past been used mainly with reference to international war. A cease-fire is followed by an armistice and, ultimately, by a peace treaty. It is unusual – perhaps unique – for two forces like those facing each other in Northern Ireland to be asked to grant a ‘cease-fire’, as though they both had armies permanently visible in the field.

If the scale of the conflict is to be considered an element in deciding whether we are dealing with a war or not, some statistics provided by Dr Kennedy-Pipe are relevant. From 1969 to 1972 the percentage of the population of Northern Ireland killed in the Troubles was twice that of Britain during the Boer War, and twice that of the USA in either Korea or Vietnam. For so small a country as Northern Ireland this was, indeed, a war. The argument was not purely an academic one; it had practical consequences. If it was ‘a war’ paramilitary prisoners would be treated as ‘prisoners of war’, rather than common criminals, though, of course, they would not be protected by the Geneva Convention, which relates only to international war. But even if it was not ‘a war’, paramilitary prisoners could be treated as ‘political offenders’, rather than common criminals. In the nineteenth century political offenders were usually treated better than ordinary criminals, not only in Britain, but, for example, in the Habsburg Monarchy and united Italy. But Dr Kennedy-Pipe reminds us that the Gardiner Committee reported, in 1975, that the distinction was a misapplied one in Northern Ireland, since it gave a certain prestige to Republican prisoners.

The general point emerging from Caroline Kennedy-Pipe's book is the immense complexity of the whole Irish question and the conflict in Northern Ireland in particular. For example, a point which may well be unfamiliar to English readers concerns Sinn Fein's attitude to the Republic, which it regarded as an illegal institution until the 1980s, but which it then decided to recognize, so that its members could stand for elections to the Irish Parliament. On the other hand, if Dr Kennedy-Pipe shows great familiarity with the history of Ireland as a whole, she is especially enlightening on the changing role of the British Army in Northern Ireland.

The scholarship behind this book makes it a safe guide to the tragic history of the Troubles of Northern Ireland and their origins.

HARRY HEARDER

Acknowledgements

To write a textbook on the history and politics of Northern Ireland is a controversial and difficult task. The story of the Province is one told in different forms and with competing voices. To attempt any judgements about the causes and longevity of the Irish ‘troubles’ is inevitably to question received wisdoms and undermine ‘accepted’ truths. A ‘neutral’ history of the Province may not be entirely possible but different interpretations are. This work attempts to understand the current ‘troubles’ through looking at how the British became and remained involved in the conflict between two Irish communities. In this endeavour I have many people to thank. Harry Hearder has always, as a teacher and friend been willing to ponder the nature of human conflict and the seeming inability of government to reconcile warring communities. Likewise Ken Booth as a teacher and friend has stressed the need to understand the causes of civil conflict. Colin Mclnnes has been generous in providing expertise and information on British strategy. My colleagues in the Institute for International Studies have provided great friendship during the writing of this book; Clive Jones in particular has proved an invaluable source of information on military behaviour in the Province. Both he and Lindsey Tarns have been a great source of support. Finally, the team at Addison Wesley Longman have been professional and generous with their time and advice. To all the above I remain grateful. Any faults or biases in the text are of course mine.

Abbreviations

In affectionate memory of

Harry Hearder

8 June 1996

Introduction: The British Army in Northern Ireland

Even as this work is completed, the British Army is still involved in fighting a conflict in Northern Ireland nearly three decades after the initial and ‘temporary’ deployment of troops in August 1969. This makes it one of the longest-running conflicts in twentieth-century European history and the longest counter-insurgency operation carried out by British troops. This book looks at the origins of this conflict through an examination of the British military role in Ireland. This is not a military history,¹ but an attempt to evaluate the strategies of the British Government in subduing violence against the state. Its central theme is that British military policies have altered the original parameters of the conflict, have prolonged and escalated violence, yet have also provided a necessary peacekeeping element in the turbulent affairs of Northern Ireland. There are many academic works on the problems of Ireland² but few that examine the role of the Army in its broad military-political context. This book therefore provides a new interpretation of the origins and evolution of the contemporary conflict in Ireland.

The British military involvement did not actually begin in 1969. It is often said by those involved in studying the politics and history of Ireland that one cannot understand the contemporary situation without understanding what has proceeded it, particularly the legacy of the Anglo-Irish relationship.³ Chapter One outlines some of the major developments in Irish history prior to the events of 1969 and describes the antecedents to the modern conflict. From the sixteenth century onwards, the British Government were engaged in the subjugation of the island and the imposition of an alien ruling class on the native Catholic peoples. In particular, large numbers of Scottish Protestants emigrated to Ireland in the so-called ‘plantation’ of Ulster to uphold British rule on the island. The rise in the eighteenth century of Irish nationalism, embedding a violent opposition to British rule, undercut British hegemony and, following the strains of World War I, by 1919 the British Government were prepared to withdraw from Ireland. The Irish Protestant ruling classes opposed such a move, seeking to keep Ireland within the United Kingdom. The subsequent division of Ireland was therefore designed to satisfy these two aspirations. The British Government withdrew its military forces from the southern part of Ireland, but only after a series of bitter and bloody military battles with Republican paramilitaries. The state of Northern Ireland was established, carving out a Loyalist Protestant enclave within a predominantly Catholic Ireland. A small military garrison was maintained by the British Government in the North, underwriting at least symbolically, the tie to the mainland.

Chapter One demonstrates that the division of the territory was a highly contested issue. In the south, the Irish Republican Army opposed the establishment of the new southern Irish Government, regarding it as illegitimate and falling a long way short of its ideal of a united Ireland. The Government in Dublin invoked repressive legislation against its opponents, using censorship and internment whenever necessary to subdue the IRA, yet the administration too supported the ideal of a nationalist republican Ireland.⁴ This support for unification caused tension with the state in the North, leading to friction throughout the inter-war period. In the North itself, the Protestants, through the institutions of the Province, not least through the police force, established dominance over the Catholic minority, establishing a sectarian state. Despite the nature of the Northern regime, until the 1960s the two states in Ireland co-existed, allowing the British Government on the mainland to believe that the ‘problem’ of Ireland had been finally resolved. The emergence of a Civil Rights movement within the Catholic community in 1968 posed the first real threat to the stability of the Irish settlement since partition. As Chapter Two illustrates, the Civil Rights protesters publicly exposed the sectarian nature of the Northern Irish regime. The abuse of power highlighted by Catholic demands for equality in employment, housing and education provided an impetus for reform of the Province.⁵ The subsequent bloody conflict between the Catholic and Protestant communities on the streets of Northern Ireland over these demands for political reconstruction threw the Irish question back on to the agenda of the British Government. In the first instance, it was this antagonism between two opposed communities that sparked conflict in 1969. The inability of the indigenous police force to control the violence meant that British troops were placed in Ireland to act as peacekeepers.

Chapter Three of the book analyses how, within a year of the deployment of British troops, the parameters of the conflict changed. In the first instance, British troops ‘policed’ the separation of the warring communities, controlling riots and defending Catholic communities against the attacks of their Protestant neighbours. The troops built so-called ‘peace walls’ between districts and replaced the police force as the enforcers of law and order. Not least, British troops attempted to control riots and demonstrations.⁶ These troops did not expect to be in Ireland longer than the few months it would take for the politicians on the mainland to hammer out some reforms of the Northern Irish institutions and so rectify the abuse of the minority population. The chapter argues that all of this changed with both the failure of the politicians to act rapidly to invoke reform and the emergence of the Provisional IRA (PIRA). The Provisionals, operating behind the facade of the Civil Rights movement, reignited the battle between the forces of Irish Republicanism and Britain. The PIRA presented itself as the true defender of the Catholic communities and began a campaign to drive the British influence out of Northern Ireland once and for all. The British Army became the target of paramilitary attacks. This in turn meant that British soldiers changed function from peacekeepers to a force engaged in counter-insurgency against the PIRA. In one twist of history, the British Army were turned from protectors of the Catholic communities into its enemy. This transformation of the conflict in 1970–71 is shown to have hinged around the question of the military response to that of the paramilitaries. The use of methods such as internment against the Catholic community meant an upsurge in support for the PIRA. The Irish conflict therefore became, for the British Government in the early 1970s, a question of subduing and eradicating the threat from the PIRA. This in turn raised a whole host of questions (examined in the chapter) about how democratic states should respond to the threat of political violence. From 1970–75 the British Government invoked a panoply of repressive legislation and military tactics, many derived from the experience in the colonies, to try to achieve a ‘victory’ over the paramilitaries. By 1975, the British military had, with the deployment of 22,000 troops, managed to contain the situation and, if not eradicate the PIRA, then at least drive them out of the cities of Northern Ireland. Yet, for the Army and indeed a wider audience, all of this begged the question of what the wider British political objective was in Northern Ireland. Would or should the British Army be deployed indefinitely to contain a small number of Republican paramilitaries? In lieu of any political solutions in the early 1970s, this appeared to be inevitable. British attempts to find political solutions to satisfy both communities in Northern Ireland had failed miserably. In 1974, for example, the British administration tried to impose a powersharing arrangement on Northern Ireland, through which the Catholics would have representation on the political institutions of the Province. The Sunningdale Agreement was, however, destroyed by the Protestant community, who organized a Province-wide strike against this new regime. In this, they had the acquiescence of the British military, who, during 1974, refused to break the strike. The episode demonstrated the key role of the British military in dictating the terms of the conflict. Their actions, or lack of actions, directly undermined this political initiative and raised the possibility of the military directing the future of the Province. Overall, Chapter Three looks at how and why the British Army became tied into Northern Ireland in the early 1970s and its critical role in redefining the terms of the conflict.

By 1975 the British Government was determined to redesign the security arrangements in the Province. This meant, at least in theory, a reduction of the British military role and a relative downgrading of British involvement. Hence, Chapter Four examines the policies of Ulsterization and criminalization, which were designed to allow withdrawal of some British troops and designate the conflict as a local one, which indigenous forces could control. Ulsterization and criminalization (also known as normalization) were attempts to depict the conflict as one in which the PIRA were merely violent criminals, who could be dealt with by the police. The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) were brought into a central role vis-à-vis the security of the Province and the Army handed over its leading role. Yet, these strategies were, as the chapter describes, deeply contradictory. At the same time as the PIRA were designated criminals, a whole host of ‘emergency’ and ‘special’ legislation was put in place to control them. The chapter analyses whether this approach was successful or if the incarceration of powerful members of the PIRA allowed Republicans to regroup, reorganize their strategy and enter the political arena. Indeed, the chapter also describes one of the central paradoxes of security policy in the period which was that alongside Ulsterization, the Army was involved in a counter-insurgency campaign of some ferocity. Running parallel to the increased activity of the RUC in policing the Province, the British Army was actually engaged in a ‘secret war’ on the border with the PIRA. British special forces were deployed to fight a rural guerrilla campaign in the Irish countryside. This was not ‘normal’. Indeed, the rural ‘conflict’ presented the British military with a series of challenges which broadened the conflict once again. How could the British troops deal with an organization whose members could not only seek ‘refuge’ in the south, but actually launch attacks on British military personnel from this refuge. As Chapter Four discusses, the rural campaign made it inevitable that the British military embark on concerted joint operations with the southern Irish. This meant the entry of the Dublin Government into formal discussion of the conflict.⁷

Chapter Five looks at the conflict in Ireland during the 1980s. It describes the way in which the British Government under Prime Minister Thatcher slowly recognized the importance of the southern Irish Government in underwriting any future peace settlement. It also raises the possibility, ignored in much of the literature, that the British Government was interested at this stage in a military withdrawal from Ireland. This, of course, had been part of the intention behind the Ulsterization process, but Chapter Five argues that the Government became more seriously engaged in pursuing some form of Irish settlement in the early 1980s for a number of reasons. The first was what might be termed the ‘internationalization’ of the conflict. After the deaths of several hunger strikers in Northern Irish prisons in 1981, international pressure, not least from North America, began to build for the British Government to end the conflict.⁸ Simultaneously, the evolution of the judicial institutions of the European Community provided a forum for open criticism of British behaviour in Ireland.⁹ The second imperative for change was that the PIRA was beginning to enter ‘normal’ politics through contesting elections. If they succeeded, the British Government feared a radical and hard-line Republican lobby could veto future political developments. Chapter Five argues that these considerations led Mrs Thatcher to sign the Hillsborough Agreement in 1985, allowing the southern Irish a formal voice in the affairs of Northern Ireland and thus, the chapter argues, paving the way for an eventual dilution of British influence. Throughout this political activity, the Army underwent perhaps its most controversial phase in Ireland, when the security forces were accused of operating a ‘shoot to kill’ campaign in the Province. The damage to the reputation of the RUC that inquiries into these allegations raised, meant that despite high-level discussions on a way to redesign the security arrangements and withdraw troops, the British Army was regarded as key to maintaining stability in an era of political transformation.

Not least, the British military had to bear the brunt of Protestant anger as the reality of the Hillsborough Agreement became clear. While British soldiers had always had to be prepared to face Protestant paramilitary forces, the activities of these groups became more marked towards the end of the decade. This theme of Protestant paramilitary violence is analysed in Chapter Six. Indeed, in many ways the British Government, through the Anglo-Irish Agreement, fuelled the extremists in both communities in Northern Ireland. While the Protestants objected to Hillsborough as a ‘sell out’ of British sovereignty, the Republicans claimed it represented an unacceptable Unionist veto over the future of Ireland and escalated activities. The continuing ability of the PIRA to operate, supported by external funding, not least through the Libyan connection, forms the core analysis of Chapter Six. British troop numbers in the Province were once again increased and, despite attempts by Tom King, the British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, to have ‘talks on talks’ with all parties involved in Northern Ireland, a violent stalemate was reached in the affairs of the Province.

The attempts to break out of this institutionalization of violence in Northern Ireland forms the basis for discussion in Chapter Seven. Throughout the 1990s, politicians in the United Kingdom and Ireland grew increasingly anxious to reach a settlement for the Province. Closer relations between the Governments on the mainland and in Dublin marked a determination to lower levels of violence and agree the future. In particular, the chapter looks at the new attempts to decrease British troop levels in the Province and reassert the authority of the RUC. It also looks at the attempts to decommission paramilitary arms within the Province. Overall, it points to the beginning of an endpoint in which the British Army presence will be decreased but soldiers not fully withdrawn.

Finally, Chapter Eight sums up the experience of the British Army in Northern Ireland. It discusses the difficulties encountered by a military force in first policing a ‘local conflict’ and then in trying to defeat an indefatigable paramilitary opponent. In particular, it outlines the constraints faced by British soldiers in trying to operate within a democracy and critically evaluates the strategies employed by the British Army, which, it is argued, in many ways strengthened the appeal of the paramilitaries. Yet, the chapter points out, more than anything else, that the British Army was fatally weakened by the lack of direction in British policy vis-à-vis Ireland in the early 1970s. The processes of Ulsterization and criminalization at least made it apparent that the Army would not be at the forefront of the conflict forever. Yet, until the 1990s, as the book demonstrates, the attempts to redraw the security equation in Northern Ireland to allow a permanent reduction of troops always failed. The tensions between the two communities, the strength of the rival paramilitary groupings and the inability of the RUC to combat the PIRA in the countryside meant that only the Army could perform multifaceted security duties in this complex environment. This meant that at times when political initiatives were invoked, the role of the Army was central to the success or failure of such endeavours. The British Army was and remains a key to any settlement of the conflict in Ireland.

1. For military histories of the conflict, see David Barzilay, The British Army in Ulster, vol. 1. (Belfast: Century Books, 1973, reprinted 1978) and Desmond Hamill, Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland 1969–1984 (London: Methuen, 1985).

2. One of the best works on Ireland is R.F. Foster, Modern Ireland 1600–1972 (London: Penguin, 1988).

3. See Nicholas Manseragh, The Irish Question 1840–1921; a commentary on Anglo-Irish relations and on social and political forces in Ireland in the age of reform and revolution (Third edition, London: Allen and Unwin, 1975), pp. 20–4.

4. Charles Townshend, Political Violence in Ireland: Government and Resistance since 1848 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 373.

5. On this issue, see Rosemary Harris, Prejudice and Tolerance in Northern Ireland: A Study of Neighbours and ‘Strangers’ in a Border Community (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1972) and R. Rose, Governing Without Consensus: An Irish Perspective (London: Beacon Press, 1971).

6. For a description of the initial duties of British soldiers, see ‘Report on the Study Period by the GOC Northern Ireland, HQNI, Held by the Tactical Doctrine Retrieval Cell’.

7. For a discussion of the position of the Dublin Government at this stage, see Padraig O'Malley, The Uncivil Wars, Ireland Today (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1983).

8. See S. Cronin, Washington's Irish Policy 1916–1986. Independence; Partition; Neutrality (Dublin: Anvil, 1987) and Jack Holland, The American Connection: US Guns, Money and Influence in Northern Ireland (New York: Poolbeg, 1987).

9. See Gerard Hogan and Clive Walker, Political Violence and the Law in Ireland (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989).