Chapter Five
By the summer of 1944 the German army on the Eastern Front was fighting for survival. It was in the summer that the Soviets unleashed Operation Bagration – the Russian code-name for the 1944 summer offensive, which was to eventually lead to the wholesale destruction of the German Army Group Centre. This massive Russian offensive opened up three years to the day after Germany’s 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union. Fighting over many of the same battlefields, German troops found themselves battling to the death in a desperate attempt to prevent the mighty Red Army forces from re-capturing Byelorussia, the last bastion of defence for the Germans before Poland. The Bagration offensive which Army Group Centre was compelled to attempt to counter was a swift and bloodthirsty battle of attrition which resulted in a catastrophe of unbelievable proportions. For days and weeks German soldiers, still determined to fight to the bitter end, had to endure the constant hammer blows of ground and aerial bombardments plus endless armoured and infantry attacks. Although many German units continued to fight a grim defence, the Red Army had already punched a line allowing an almost seemingly unstoppable flood, pushing apart and encircling many vital German Panzer and infantry divisions. In the end Bagration cost the Wehrmacht more men and material than the catastrophe at Stalingrad sixteen months earlier. This shattering defeat of Army Group Centre saw the loss of over 300,000 men and resulted in Soviet forces pushing back exhausted German remnants out of Russia through Poland to the gates of Warsaw.
The destruction of Army Group Centre in the summer of 1944 has been completely overshadowed by the Normandy campaign, which was unleashed just three weeks prior to Bagration along the shores of northern France. The battle which the German forces endured on the Eastern Front that fateful summer was more catastrophic than that on the Western Front.
By the late summer of 1944 the military situation on the Eastern Front was calamitous and it was fast becoming clear, even to the least knowledgeable German soldier, how rapidly their army was diminishing. The absence of communications too made it impossible for the Germans to realize the full extent of the ongoing disintegration. There seemed no stopping the tide of the Russian advance, and as they remorselessly pushed forward German formations became increasingly confused and entangled in bitter bloody fighting. In some areas the fighting was so fierce that it was virtually impossible to distinguish between friend and foe. Engagements like this had been fought scores of times on the Eastern Front, but many believed never with such ferocity.
In spite of the terrible setbacks on the Eastern Front, the Pz.Kpfw III continued to prove its worthiness on the battlefield. However, it was too lightly armoured to do anything more than support defending front lines against the advancing storm of the Red Army.
In order to strengthen the diminishing Panzerwaffe the Germans went to great lengths to modify various Panzer chassis. Apart from the successful introduction of the StuG III, the Germans increased the use of self-propelled mounts on either the chassis of the Pz.Kpfw III or the IV. Back in 1942 there had been a drastic requirement for the need of motorized artillery to be deployed in action at a moment’s notice. For this reason the Germans adopted the concept of self-propelled artillery mounts such as the heavy field 15cm howitzer mounted on a tank. There was also the Flammpanzer III Ausf. M/Panzer III (F1), which was a flamethrower tank. Around 100 of these were converted from existing Panzer III Ausf. M, but did little in suppressing Red Army attacks. In addition to this there was the Bergepanzer III. In 1944 some Panzer IIIs were converted to armoured recovery vehicles. However, the majority were mainly issued to formations with Tiger I tanks. There was also the Artillerie-PanzerbeobachtungswagenIII, which was a forward artillery observer tank, and 262 of these were produced.
Although many of these variants saw extensive action, their success as a whole was very limited and localized and did nothing to avert enemy operations. Over the next weeks and months a dramatic decline in the Panzerwaffe continued as supplies and fuel became even scarcer. German units and stragglers tried in vain with varying degrees of courage and determination to suppress their foe. As they endeavoured to break out west the majority of troops were forced to abandon most of their heavy equipment and weapons. As a result there were frequent scenes of chaos and disorganization as they advanced westward along roads, paths and fields trying to escape from the jaws of the Red Army.
As for the Panzer III, by 1945 very few were seen in service as many of them had either been knocked out of action, were relegated into training, or had been simply transformed into up-gunned self-propelled artillery mounts in desperation to stave off the end of the war.
A whitewashed Pz.Kpfw III command vehicle with intact side-skirts advances across a frozen plain somewhere on the Eastern Front. While most Pz.Kpfw IIIs had been relegated to training duties or were modified into self-propelled vehicles, there were still some of the tanks found on the front. All of these vehicles would have to be irrevocably stretched along a very thin Eastern Front with many of them rarely reaching the proper operating level. Panzer divisions too were often broken up and split among hastily-constructed battle groups or Kampfgruppe drawn from a motley collection of armoured formations, but still these battle groups were put into the line operating well below strength.
Panzergrenadiers wearing their distinctive white snow suits use a knocked-out T/34 as cover in the open steppe of the Eastern Front. Bleak as the situation was, armoured units supported the Panzergrenadiers’ drive and quite often were compelled to try to fill the gaps left by the troops and hold the front to the grim death. Regularly-armoured crews fought well and at times even succeeded in surprising Red Army forces with a number of daring attacks of their own.
Infantry march forward supported by an armoured column. Note the Pz.Kpfw III which has had track links attached to its chassis in order to give it additional armoured protection against the often unceasing Red Army anti-tank attacks.
An assault gun during the last week of the war. The Sturmgeschütz was first constructed on the chassis of a Pz.Kpfw III with a 7.5cm short-barrelled gun. Additional space was achieved by not having a turret and attaching the gun on a fixed mount with limited traverse. However, later in the war the assault gun hulls were produced with 80mm bow armour. Pz.Kpfw III hulls were also used, but were fitted with heavier armour. This heavier armour and longer gun barrel made the newer StuG III variants some 2 tons heavier than those assault guns that entered the Soviet Union a year earlier. Although the Red Army found these new-generation variants more potent and harder to knock out, the crews found that their weight decreased mobility.
A StuG III Ausf. G moves along a road carrying a dispatch rider’s motorcycle on the near track-guard. Note the markings on the superstructure rear plate, which is a sign for a tracked, self-propelled Panzerjager unit.
Pictured conversing with some of his men is Field Marshal Walter Model. Model was a great tactician and his skills as a commander led to a string of successful engagements. In 1944 Model ordered his ‘Shield and Sword’ policy which stated that retreats were tolerable, but only if they paved the way for a counterstroke later. Out on the battlefield Model was not only energetic, courageous and innovative, but was friendly and popular with his enlisted men. Now commander of Army Group North, he was given the awesome task of trying to minimize the extent of the disaster that was about to loom along the Baltic. It was here in the north that Model had the greatest opportunity to display his talents as an improviser. He immediately sent out an order to all commanders in the field that they were not to step backward. They were also to uphold the Fuhrer’s demands that troops were to build defence lines where they stood and fight to the bitter end.
During the bitter defence of towns and cities in the East, Volkssturm units, Wehrmacht and Hitlerjugend were armed with the deadly Panzerfaust. During the last year of the war the Panzerfaust was used extensively to combat Russian armour. It was a hand-held rocket-propelled grenade which was effective at a range of about 90 feet. Panzerfaust literally means armour or tank fist. The weapon was an inexpensive, recoilless German anti-tank weapon that was mass-produced during the second half of the war. It comprised a small, disposable pre-loaded launch tube that fired a high-explosive anti-tank warhead, operated by a single soldier. Various models of the Panzerfaust remained in service throughout the latter part of the war. Pictured in this photograph troops are becoming accustomed to the Panzerfaust before going back into action.
Panzergrenadiers during operations on the Narva Front in Estonia in 1944. For months German troops and armour were employed on what became known as the Narva Front. Throughout early 1944 and into the summer German forces continued to hold as the Russians built up their reserves for a new offensive. The Germans were also trying their best to bring additional reinforcements to the area in order to try to contain their forces cohesively on the battlefield. Although the temporary lull had given the Germans time to build a number of new defensive positions, Army Group North was now exposed to an even greater menace that would then threaten Lithuania.
A soldier examines the war grave of the crew of a Pz.Kpfw III. They have been buried next to their knocked-out vehicle. Debris can be seen spread around the wreckage as a grim reminder of how powerful the anti-tank shell’s impact was on the vehicle. In spite of the massive losses sustained by tanks crews during the war, they had won a reputation for daring and professionalism in combat.