In 1945 the US army intelligence section compiled a manual for US troops going to fight in France. This detailed work gives us a fascinating glimpse into the Wehrmacht of 1945 as viewed through allied eyes. One particularly noteworthy section concentrates on German battle tactics. Although the manual was designed for the forces in 1945, these were the same operational principles which were drilled into the Panzertruppen in 1939. It is worth reporting a lengthy sequence here, as the overall objectives of the employment of armoured forces in World War II is well explained:
“The fundamental principle of German offensive doctrine is to encircle and destroy the enemy. The objective of the combined arms in attack is to bring the armoured forces and the infantry into decisive action against the enemy with sufficient firepower and shock. Superiority in force and firepower, the employment of armoured forces, as well as the surprise element, play a great part in the offensive.
Co-ordination between the combined arms under a strong unified command is, the Germans emphasise, an absolute requisite of these shock tactics. This has become more and more true as the Allies have developed effective anti-tank weapons and have adapted deeper defences, limiting the self-sufficiency of German tanks. To counter these measures the Germans have increased the mobility and armour protection of their motor-borne infantry, and have mounted a large proportion of both their direct and indirect heavy support weapons on self-propelled carriages.
In attempting thoroughly to paralyse the defender up to the moment of the tank-infantry assault the Germans realise that even the most formidable forces are never sufficient for overwhelming superiority on the entire front. They therefore select a point of main effort (Schwerpunkt) for a breakthrough, allotting narrow sectors of attack (Gefechtsstreifen) to the troops committed at the decisive locality. There they also mass the bulk of their heavy weapons and reserves. The other sectors of the front are engaged by weaker, diversionary forces. In selecting the point of main effort, the Germans consider weaknesses in the enemy’s defensive position; suitability of the terrain, especially for tanks and for co-operation of all arms: approach routes: and possibilities for supporting fire, especially artillery. Although the Germans select a point of main effort in all attacks they usually also make plans for shifting their main effort if they meet unexpected success elsewhere. To allow such shifts, sufficient reserves and a strong, unified command are organised.
An attack on a narrow front, according to German doctrine, must have sufficient forces at its disposal to widen the penetration while maintaining its impetus, and to protect the flanks of the penetration. Once the attack is launched, it must drive straight to its objective, regardless of opposition.
A Panzer II fords a river during the advance in Greece.