The world of the tank man is a world of very limited vision. With the hatches open, a tank commander can use the height advantage of his vehicle to scan the terrain for miles around. However, once the tank is threatened and the hatches have to be closed, the view of the world is through tiny vision slits, which makes visual recognition extremely difficult. There are a number of tasks which need to be carried out in the tank. Communication, both inwards and outwards, with other vehicles in the formation is absolutely essential and, with the rudimentary radio equipment of the period, this was really a full-time job. In addition to operating the radio, the commander had to be surveying the ground ahead for the driver, and in addition he was expected to operate the machine guns. In simple terms, this was far too many tasks for one man to hope to successfully master during the heat of an engagement. The Panzer 1 had already shown its limitations, and in fairness it was never really intended as a frontline battle tank. Its purpose, really, was as a training tank, and the numbers ordered were in response to the need to train a large number of men quickly. It was only Hitler’s ambitious brinkmanship that would propel the Army into having to press the Panzer I into a service for which it was plainly inadequate; even in 1936 this was obvious for all to see.
The cardboard tanks used to begin the process of training the future Panzerwaffe during the early 1920s. The three parts are about to be locked over the car frame to produce the pathetic vehicles seen at the beginning of the chapter.
The successor to the Panzer I in the reconnaissance role should of course have been the Panzer II. The Panzer II was therefore a slight advance on this sorry state of affairs in that it was a three-man machine which allowed for a driver as well as a gunner and the commander. Although this was some improvement it was still not a great advance on the Panzer I. The 20mm cannon could at least penetrate light tanks, but it really lacked the hitting power for serious tank-to-tank engagements. Above all, here were still too few men in the vehicle to conduct all of the tasks satisfactorily. Really, a four-man crew was the absolute minimum and events would quickly demonstrate that five was the number that should be deployed in a modem tank. As early as October 1935 General Liese, head of the Heeres Waffenamt issued a report which gave the limitations of the tanks. He noted that the MG Panzerwagen (Panzer I), although fitted out only with two 7.9mm machine guns, could be adapted to attack armoured cars and other light tanks if it was issued with special S.M.P. steel core ammunition. In the case of the MG Panzer II, it was noted that the muzzle velocity of the 2cm gun could penetrate up to 10mm of armoured plate at a range of up to 700 metres. It was therefore decided that the Panzer II could engage armoured ears with success, and was also fully functional for combat against tanks with approximately the same armour as itself. Liese noted that the tanks most likely to be encountered in large numbers in a war against the French were the light Renault Ml7 and Ml8 tanks, of which there were about three thousand operational in the French forces at the time. It was also thought that the Panzer 11 would be the equal of the Renault NC37 and NC31 tanks. Against the heavier French tanks, including the Char B, it was noted that the Panzer II was practically worthless. Despite these reservations large-scale delivery of the Panzer II was already in train and was expected to commence from 1st April 1937. As regards the new Panzer III, which was designed to be the main battle tank, it was obvious that Liese was already beginning to have reservations about the effectiveness of the 37mm gun. Originally the 37mm L/45 had been planned for this vehicle but it was urged that the experimental tanks be upgraded to include the L/65 version, which gave a much higher muzzle velocity and some real prospect of penetrating the 40mm thick armoured plate of the new French medium tanks. With this in mind it was obvious at this stage that a 50mm gun would be a better proposition for the Panzer III; however the addition of the larger gun would demand a significant increase in the diameter of the turret which would in turn mean radical redevelopment of the chassis. Given the pressures of time and the need to equip the formations quickly Liese came to the conclusion that the 37mm L/65 was the favoured route, although it is interesting that the limitations of its design had already been noted.
Despite the difficult conditions, the fledgling German tank Forces had managed to develop some innovations of their own. Influential sections of the officer corps could see the advantages that the tank could bring to the next war and they developed new theories that centred on the use of the tank, theories that would revolutionise the way wars would be fought. Despite the problems of convincing his superiors of the advantages of the tank, Heinz Guderian in particular stuck to his secretive task. With determined persistence, and the help of some impressive demonstration exercises, he finally convinced both the German General Staff and Adolf Hitler that the tank could help to win future wars.
Inside the German tank works in 1939. In the background are large numbers of Panzer IIIs under construction. The machine in the foreground is an experimental Nebau Panzerkampfwagen, not destined for active service. Its prominence is probably not accidental and may have been designed to confuse enemy intelligence services.
When Hitler precipitated the Second World War with his invasion of Poland in 1939, his tank forces were questionable at best, but the gamble succeeded by the application of a new tactical doctrine - championed by General Heinz Guderian - which was to become known as Blitzkrieg.
Blitzkrieg also evolved at least partially from a re-assessment of war tactics that took place not only in Germany, but in Russia and Britain as well. Two perceptive British military theorists. Major General J.C. Fuller and Captain B. Liddell Hart, understood that the introduction of the tank during the First World War had opened up hitherto undreamed of military possibilities.
As a result of Guderian’s efforts, in 1935 the first Panzer Divisions were formed. These revolutionary formations incorporated a Tank Brigade with 561 tanks to provide the main firepower. A great deal of accurate thought had gone into the development of the Panzer Division, which also included motorised infantry, reconnaissance and artillery. The resulting Panzer Division was a well-balanced force which could call on the support of any or all of the component parts to capture an objective. The purpose of the Panzer Division was to launch a speedy advance, break through into enemy territory and spread confusion, fear and panic in the enemy command and communication systems. One further innovation was the close link with the Luftwaffe, who could add even more firepower when needed.