A major difficulty experienced by the British tanks in the desert was the lack of a dual-purpose gun, one which could fire high explosives as well as armour piercing shells. The two-pounder anti-tank guns which were standard in British tanks could not fire the effective high explosive shells which were required to deal with anti-tank guns and infantry on the battlefield.
This problem had actually been foreseen prior to the Second World War and the interim solution was to provide two close-support tanks for each squadron, fitted with 3in Howitzer. Used mainly as a means of laying smoke screens, the close support tanks carried few high explosive shells on board. Generally, the Crusader was used in this role.
In the desert the battlefield was now dominated by the tanks; infantry were helpless without armoured support. The balance of power between the allied and axis forces was now measured by who could field the most tanks. Keeping these tanks in the held was another matter altogether. They required intensive servicing and repair. The harshness of the desert exacerbated this problem, and the supply line organisation assumed vital importance in bringing forward fuel, ammunition and spare parts. This over-extended supply line also dealt with the recovery of tanks from the battlefield, replacement vehicles and all of the myriad requirements for an army in the field. Attacking supply lines on land, sea or air became of crucial importance to both sides.
Not all tank knocked out by enemy fire were actually destroyed. Often, they were brought in to be repaired; those not immediately repairable provided much needed spares for others. At the same time the enemy had to be denied the opportunity to use the battlefield losses in this way. Repaired enemy vehicles could be pressed into service against their original owners, and enemy equipment salvaged from the battlefield provided intelligence on the latest vehicles, armour, weapons and ammunition. The recovery mechanics and tank transporter drivers of both sides often plied their trade under fire. For example, at the Halfaya Pass battles the British lost 91 tanks, which included 64 Matildas. A considerable number of these losses were due to mechanical breakdowns, but a combination of time and shortage of transporters meant most ended up being left on the battlefield. In this instance the Germans were able to utilise the captured vehicles, Rommel himself acquiring a British armoured command truck, which he named ‘Mammoth’.
Unloading the tanks of the Afrika Korps in Tripoli during May 1941. The allied interdiction campaign, although severe, was not as all-embracing as many sources would appear to suggest. More than 90% of the armoured vehicles dispatched to Rommel actually arrived safely in Tripoli.