CHAPTER FOUR
Without the training machine, the front-line could not exist. This was admirably expressed by Harris in his Despatch on Bomber Operations: ‘It can be justly asserted that the success of the Bomber Offensive depended ultimately on the standard of training which could be maintained. It would have been easy to improve training at the expense of the front line by increasing the length of the courses given; by training Lancaster crews on Lancasters only; by ensuring that all the best aircrews were taken off operations early in order to fill the pressing need for instructor posts, and by introducing new equipment into the training units first, so that crews could have been provided fully trained in all new devices. It is believed that the best all-round result was obtained.’
In this chapter the focus will be on the later stages of bomber aircrew training, from the Operational Training Unit onwards, with little mention of selection or early stages of training such as Elementary Flying Training School (EFTS) and Service Flying Training School (SFTS) that all pilots underwent. By the time that aircrew had reached OTU they were already trained in their specialisation and the aim of the subsequent stages was to provide them with training on more appropriate types and with an emphasis on operationally-related activities – and the building of the crew co-operation that was vital to a multi-crew bomber.
The early years
In 1938 Air Chief Marshal (ACM) Ludlow-Hewitt, AOC-in-C Bomber Command, pointed out that, ‘One of the chief results of this year’s experience is that the work of the members of a modern bomber [by which he meant the Wellington] requires a very much higher standard of training and specialisation than has hitherto been contemplated.’
This was followed up by a proposal from one of his staff, Air Marshal Welsh in November for the establishment of one Advanced Flying Training Centre for each operational Group to, ‘Provide each one with a reservoir or pool from which replacement crews can be drawn and to train the output of the Flying Training Schools up to an operational standard before it passes to the operational squadrons.’
Thus was born the idea of additional training for qualified aircrew to make them better suited for front-line duties. In this chapter we are going to focus on this stage of training, from the arrival of the aircrew member into the Bomber Command training machine until his departure to join a squadron.
It was considered that six of the new Group Pool Squadrons would be able to feed the seventy-three operational squadrons, and as an interim measure a number of the non-mobilisable squadrons from the Bomber Command Order of Battle would take on this role. From these simple beginnings, the training machine would grow to one employing over 2,000 aircraft and thousands of personnel. First to take on the role was 75 Squadron at Honington, which was still equipped with Harrows in March when it adopted the new role, although these gave way to Wellingtons in July. Indeed it was to be the Vickers-Armstrongs Wellington that became the workhorse of the majority of the later Operational Training Units (OTUs).
Crew of a 115 Squadron Wellington arrive at their aircraft.
By June 1939 there were nine Group Pool Squadrons, but this interim measure had its detractors. Ludlow-Hewitt commented: Tt is most uneconomical in practice, even in peacetime, to make operational squadrons undertake the initial operational training of pilots and crews coming direct from the flying schools, and it would be quite impossible in wartime. It is necessary, therefore, to consider the extent of the training organisation required to undertake the whole of this initial operational training.’
At this stage the pre-squadron training course was notionally fourteen weeks long and included sixty-two flying hours, and it was suggested that a twenty-four-aircraft unit would be able to train twenty-two pilots per course. On 16 September 1939, it was agreed that the Group Pool squadrons would be concentrated into a separate training group, No. 6 Group, under Air Commodore Macneece-Foster.
Bomber Command had decided to allocate one operational type to each operational Group, the Wellingtons being concentrated in No. 3 Group and this was reflected in the establishment and syllabus of the appropriate training unit(s). In the case of the Wellington units, three squadrons had been transferred to No. 6 Group – 75 and 148 Squadrons at Harwell and 215 Squadron at Bassingbourn. Each unit was given an establishment of twelve aircraft, half of which were Ansons, although the latter were in short supply at this time and it was more usual for only three or four to be on strength per unit. The course included fifty-five flying hours and there were eleven crews per course. In the light of early operational experience a major change was proposed at the end of 1939 and this led to the creation of the Operational Training Unit. The initial part of the process was to bring together two squadrons at each of the training airfields, although this ideal was not always achieved. The final part of the process was implemented in spring 1940 by the simple expedient of combining Pool Squadrons and redesignating them as Operational Training Units within a new numbering system.
In February Ludlow-Hewitt had defined the role of the new training units: The proper role of the OTU is to convert otherwise fully-trained pilots, air observers and air gunners to the type of aircraft in which they will be required to operate and to give them sufficient operational training to fit them to take their place in operational squadrons. Obviously the first essential is to teach the new pilots how to fly a service type by day and night, which entails a considerable amount of local flying. Once a pilot has mastered the new type, he has to be trained in advanced instrument flying, and long-distance flying by day and night, but to enable him to do this the rest of the crew must have reached a satisfactory standard in wireless and navigation. Finally, the complete crew must be taught bombing and air firing.’
By April three of the eight OTUs had Wellingtons, two had Blenheims and one each had Battles, Whitleys or Hampdens. Standard aircraft establishment was seventy aircraft, 25 per cent of which should be Ansons, and the courses were set at six weeks to include fifty-five flying hours. Courses comprised 180 pupils: sixty pilots, thirty observers and ninety air gunners (i.e. thirty crews). Each OTU was meant to have one parent and one satellite airfield. Inevitably these paper numbers were not always adhered to in the real world and numbers and split of aircraft would vary, as would the number of pupils and airfield availability.
Operational training was initially conducted by a number of squadrons allocated the role of Group Pool Squadrons; 98 Squadron’s Battles performed this role.
At full output, the OTU organisation was able to provide 930 pilots a year, but Bomber Command was already predicting a need for 1,350 pilots. It is worth remembering that at this time each operational bomber had two pilots, and when OTU output is discussed it is usually crews rather than pilots that are referred to. However, it proved constantly difficult for the training units to match crew output to the requirements of the front-line – a problem that was affected by a great many factors, not least of which was the loss rate of crews on operations. The flow of crews could only be increased by either cutting the length of the course, with a consequent reduction in quality, or increasing the size/number of OTUs. Whilst the latter might appear an obvious choice, it was a struggle to find aircraft, airfields and manpower for any expansion – at a time when the front-line was also expanding. Two more OTUs were formed in June and the following month a new training Group, No. 7 Group, was formed.
The length of time that aircrew spent in training varied throughout the war because of the pressing need to keep front-line units at full strength.
On 16 July 1940, Bomber Command approved the employment of OTU aircraft on leaflet-dropping missions, although this was restricted to a limited area in France. Three aircraft took part in the first such ‘attack’ on the night of 18/19 July. The employment of OTU aircraft on operations became standard policy, the theory being that sending student crews to ‘easy’ targets was a means of increasing their experience and confidence. It was a philosophy that was to cause much argument and dissent, but one that appears to have been generally supported by the student crews, all of whom were keen to join in the offensive as soon as possible. The first loss occurred on 27/28 July when Wellington N3002 of No. 11 OTU crashed at Clophill when returning from a leaflet raid; four of the crew were injured.
Shortage of crews
By November, the OTU course had been lengthened to ten weeks with ninety flying hours, primarily because of a reduction in flying hours at the Service Flying Training School (SFTS) stage of pilot training. This had an immediate impact on output and it was decided that four more OTUs would be needed.
The changes made in the latter part of 1940 had the net effect that the training units were not able to produce enough crews for the planned expansion of the operational squadrons. Input of pilots was not expected to be a problem as the first pilots from the overseas SFTSs were starting to arrive. What was needed was an expansion of the OTU organisation itself. It was predicted that twenty such units would be required (there were ten at the end of 1940), along with 600 instructor pilots – at a time when there were only 1,120 pilots in the front-line. There was no simple solution to this apparent dichotomy of interests, other than to reduce the amount of training and thus speed up the flow of crews.
Hampden gunners with a gun rig used either for ground training or airfield defence. There is not sufficient space in this chapter to look at individual aircrew trades, such as Air Gunner, in any detail
By the latter part of 1940 the training organisation was unable to produce enough crews for the planned expansion of Bomber Command – a situation that would become worse as loss rates increased. Whitley aircrew of 58 Squadron at Linton-on-Ouse 1940.
In March 1941 it was decided that as an interim measure the course would be reduced to eight weeks, with fifty-five flying hours. According to ACM Sir Charles Portal, AOC-in-C Bomber Command: ‘It is of vital importance to obtain a greater output from the OTUs, since if we do not do so, I do not see how we are to produce the crews for our expansion and at the same time keep up our pressure on Germany.’
The reduced course would mean that a pilot would arrive on his squadron having flown 177 hours, comprising fifty hours at EFTS, probably on Tiger Moths, seventy-two hours at SFTS, probably on Ansons, and fifty-five hours at the OTU.
Although two more OTUs were formed in March, in the following month Portal agreed to further cuts in training with the proposal that … ‘The course should be radically cut and that trainees should go to squadrons for a short period as second pilots’. On 12 April the length of the course was set at thirty-two flying hours over six weeks, although this experimental system was to be trialled at a selection of OTUs before being universally adopted. Meanwhile three further units were formed, bringing the total to sixteen – nine were equipped with Wellingtons (which took up 40 per cent of the Wellington strength in the UK!), whilst the others had Whitleys or Blenheims, along with training types such as Ansons.
John Gee was introduced to the Wellington at No. 11 OTU Bassingbourn in April 1941. Tn the early months of 1941 the system of training was not the scientific procedure of the later war years and many of the instructors had not taken a flying instructors’ course. In addition, the aircraft were not fitted with a full set of dual controls; all of this made the first few hours rather tricky and a bit frightening. After five hours dual instruction I was allowed to go solo; I remember taxiing around the perimeter and praying that I had completed all the cockpit checks in the correct sequence. … On the approach I must have been a bit high or my speed too low, for suddenly we dropped, hit the runway and bounced back high into the air, then fell back to the runway with a resounding bang. The Wellington had clearly been built to withstand the efforts of heavy-handed sprog pilots!’
Philip Dawson was at Wellesbourne Mountford (No. 22 OTU) in May. ‘The aircraft were generally pretty clapped out having been taken from operational units. The first part of the course was general flying, circuits and bumps and familiarisation with the aircraft. The second phase was the more ‘advanced’ elements with navigation and bombing; the longest sorties were about five hours and often included visits to the ranges on the Isle of Man to bomb smoke floats. A crew on the course in front of us was killed in an accident and we were ‘accelerated’ to join this course, this meant flying eight trips day and night in one twenty-four-hour period!’
The shortened course was not proving a success, especially as the front-line squadrons were unable to provide the promised ‘top-up’ training. In October the old eight-week course was re-introduced for all OTUs, although the Command was requesting a twelve-week duration for the winter courses to allow for poor weather. In December the effects of the short course caused AOC Bomber Command to state: ‘I am under the impression that when it was agreed to reduce the OTU course, it was agreed by all concerned that the reduced course would be adequate to produce the necessary training. I understand that the course is being lengthened once more and I fully support this, but there arises out of these ideas a point upon which we must insist most firmly. It is the responsibility of Bomber Command, its Group and Station commanders to ensure that no crew is normally sent out on an operation if they are considered to be insufficiently trained … it is vitally important that the Command should not relax this standard simply because the Air Ministry have cut down the training course.’
The sentiments expressed by the Commander were all very well but the practicalities meant that the requirements for numbers invariably outweighed other considerations. After two full years of bombing attacks there was strong evidence that Bomber Command had reached a crisis point. However, 1942 was to see a major change in the Command’s fortunes and this was reflected in the training organisation.
In February 1942 Air Vice Marshal Arthur Harris had taken over as AOC-in-C and the following month the Command undertook a number of studies into aircraft crewing, the motivation for this being the continued high loss rate. Bomber Command had lost ninety aircraft and crews in the six-week period to the end of March, which had including a number of attacks where the loss rate was around 10 per cent. Inevitably there was a direct correlation between losses, the rate of expansion of the Command and the requirements from the training organisation. The studies focused on crew roles and the options for streamlining the system – in other words saving time and thus increasing the output.
However, the most significant decision was the removal of the two-pilot system that had hitherto been standard for medium/heavy bombers. Harris was also keen to maximise employment of his trained crews and overall expected two operational tours and two training tours before they could be released to any other jobs.
The change in crewing had a fundamental effect on the training syllabus, the core decisions being:
1.Only one pilot per crew to be trained.
2.Air Bomber added to crew, allowing navigator to concentrate on navigation – part of this decision was the problem of the bomb aimer keeping good night vision. The air bomber would also receive some air gunner training to man the front guns.
3.Only one Wireless Operator/Air Gunner per crew, the other being replaced by an Air Gunner with no wireless training. In the four-engined bomber two air gunners were added.
Staff of 21 OTU at Enstone (Ken Wallis).
Finningley was home at various times to 18 (Polish) OTU and 25 OTU.
According to Harris in his Despatch on War Operations: ‘These changes made it possible to give each member of the crew a full course on his own subjects, and, particularly in the case of the pilot, enabled a very much better course to be given, as it was no longer necessary to give a double number of circuits and bumps to each crew. This in turn relieved both the strain on the pilot instructors and the congestion around the OTU airfields.’
The lack of a second pilot was addressed by giving one of the crew members rudimentary training on the Link Trainer and in the aircraft to act as a Pilot’s Assistant (PA). This role was allocated to the Air Bomber, although with the later introduction of a Flight Engineer to the heavies, he took on the PA task.
It is worth noting that the Whitley flew its last operational bombing raid on 27/28 April 1942, although OTU Whitleys continued to fly leaflet-dropping missions for some time, so the type did not vanish completely from operations.
Choosing a crew
It was whilst at the OTU that crews were formed: Then they go to the OTU where they are formed into a crew and begin to learn team work. The duties of all members of the crew are carefully defined as far as the principal tasks are concerned, but the captain of each aircraft is responsible for arranging the duties of his crew and for seeing that they carry them out punctually and efficiently.’
A new pilot would start the trawl to find the rest of a crew, the decision being left to the individuals as far as possible rather than the ‘system’ just putting names together. It worked remarkably well and gradually the crew would come together.
This was outlined in the August 1944 Aircrew Training Bulletin: ‘The aircrew meet for the first time at the OTU and during the first two weeks of the ground course are given certain discretion in sorting themselves out into complete crews (with the exception of the Flight Engineer who does not arrive until later.)’
John Long went through the crewing up ‘process’ at Moreton-in-the-Marsh (No. 21 OTU): ‘On arrival we were directed to one of the hangars where the completely undirected process of crewing up took place. Pilots, Navigators, Wireless Operators, Bomb Aimers and Gunners all milled around, making their categories and names known to each other as the random selection went on. Having crewed up, through the rest of July and on into September we became a ‘unit’. We were learning not only how to operate our war machine but also about each other.’
Crew of 83 Squadron; bomber crews ‘assembled’ during the OTU phase – by mutual consent whenever possible.
Hampden and Hereford of 14 OTU, Cottesmore.
Reorganisation, growth – and operations
May 1942 saw a reorganisation of the training system with No. 6 Group becoming No. 91 Group, and No. 7 Group becoming No. 92 Group, the main reason being that the lower numbers were being allocated to new operational Groups, although in the event only No. 6 (RCAF) Group formed. This was to be a difficult year for the Command but also one in which it ‘turned the corner’ in terms of operational effectiveness; however, overall the Command contracted in size – with exception of the formation, in June, of a third OTU Group, No. 93 Group with its HQ at Burton-on-Trent.
At this stage of the war, it was taking an average of eighteen months for a trainee to get from ‘civvy street’ to a front-line squadron. After selection, the route started with three days at the local Aircrew Reception Centre (ACRC) where the main task was getting kitted out. Then came what many thought was the worst part, twelve weeks at an Initial Training Wing (ITW) which included intensive classroom work on technical and air-related subjects, but also far too much ‘bull’. This was followed by flying training through elementary/basic, advanced and finally operational phases.
From 1941 the training units had been participating in operational sorties, albeit only leaflet dropping over notionally easy targets. However, the Thousand-Bomber raids of early summer 1942 would not have been possible without the widespread use of aircraft and crews from the training units. Of the 1,047 bombers tasked to attack Cologne on the night of 30/31 May the two training Groups provided 365 aircraft. No. 91 Group sent 236 Wellingtons and twenty-one Whitleys, whilst No. 92 Group sent sixty-three Wellingtons and forty-five Hampdens. Two further raids followed whilst this massive force was available, Essen (1/2 June) and Bremen (25/26 June). The latter was a disaster for the OTU crews, with the force of around 200 Wellingtons and Whitleys suffering almost thirty losses, with 10, 11 and 12 OTUs each losing four aircraft. Regardless of such losses, it was not practical to keep the training units away from their primary task any longer and besides, Harris felt that he had proved the point that used en masse, the bomber weapon could be decisive. Despite the fact that the units were released from operational standby they were still liable to be called on whenever a Maximum Effort was planned. However, as losses began to mount – for example, No. 92 Group lost eleven of the 105 aircraft it sent to Duisburg on the night of 31 July – there was increased pressure to remove the OTUs from operations. Again there was no immediate change of policy and the records show heavy losses on other raids in 1942, one of the worst being five out of thirteen Wellingtons from No. 16 OTU over Düsseldorf on 10/11 September.
With the entry to service of the trio of ‘heavy’ bombers, the existing training organisation of the OTUs had to be modified in the light of experience. The comments that had been made when the Wellington was introduced of needing appropriate training for advanced aircraft, was even more appropriate for the four-engined types.
Heavy Conversion Units
When the Lancaster entered service in early 1942 the initial task of converting crews to the aircraft was undertaken by small Conversion Flights, usually two or three aircraft, within the individual squadrons. This is why you will see in the records reference, for example, to No. 106 CU – this being the conversion flight within 106 Squadron. A similar policy had been used for the other heavies. The decision was taken in September 1942 to combine the on-squadron Conversion Flights into special training units as Heavy Conversion Units (HCUs) equipped with Manchesters and Lancasters. Using the Lancaster example, by the end of October the following units had formed:
No. 1654 HCU at Wiglsey (ex 50 and 83 Squadron CFs)
No. 1656 HCU at Breighton (ex 103 and 460 Squadrons)
No. 1660 HCU at Swinderby (ex 61, 97, 106 and 207 Squadrons)
No. 1661 HCU at Skellingthorpe (ex 9, 44 and 49 Squadrons)
Of these, all except No. 1656 HCU, which was for No. 1 Group, were part of No. 5 Group. The initial establishment of sixteen Lancasters and sixteen Manchesters was almost immediately changed to twelve Lancasters plus twenty Manchesters of Halifaxes. With a desire to put as many Lancasters as possible into the operational squadrons even this ratio was soon changed.
The basic HCU course was conducted in a similar format to that of the OTU, albeit over a shorter time frame, and at this point the Flight Engineer was added to the crew. Eventually each of the three operational heavy Groups controlled its own HCUs, with an allocation of three such units per Group – a notional total of fifteen HCUs. By January 1943, with the formation of No. 1662 HCU at Blyton, the total number of units had reached eleven, with the plan being to increase this to sixteen by November. This policy of keeping the HCUs under the Groups for which they provided crews, gradually became more unworkable as the front-line expanded and the training organisation grew but it was not until September 1944 that their admin and control was brought together under No. 7 (HCU) Group, headquartered at Grantham.
By April 1943 Bomber Command was over 100 crews short of establishment and as a short-term fix it was decided to increase the intake of each OTU course from sixteen to eighteen crews every two weeks. The overall output requirement was set at 383 crews a month (from March) rising to 622 crews by December. The number of bomber OTUs peaked in December 1943 with a total of twenty-two and a half units, with a strength of around 1,300 aircraft, and thousands of air and ground personnel.
Lancaster crew, June 1943; it was essential for a crew to have confidence in its ‘skipper’ and to work as a team to operate the aircraft in the most effective manner. Initial crewing-up usually took place at the OTUs.
Bill Carmen arrived at Upper Heyford (No. 16 OTU) in July 1943: ‘Here at the OTU the aircrew came together to get to know each other and choose whom they would be happy to fly with, eventually being formed into a crew. The Wellington became our “chariot” and we realised that from now on we were at the start of a serious business. On one occasion our crew were grouped outside the Control Tower waiting our turn to take over a Wimpey from another crew. It pulled up by the Tower and suddenly its starboard engine burst into flames. The occupying aircrew evacuated at maximum speed out of the front hatch – they were like rabbits coming out of a rabbit hole ahead of a ferret. My crew were by then pelting around to the far side of the Tower out of harms way. The Station fire-engine leapt into action but for some reason couldn’t raise any pressure in their hose and the nozzle hung limp at the business end. This situation provoked some explicit ribald remarks from the aircrews. With bullets flying about in all directions as the ammunition belts “cooked” in the heat, the poor old Wimpey, its geodetic skeleton now exposed, sank to its knees. By this time we had all taken cover inside the Control Tower.’
Arthur Harris in his post-war Despatch on War Operations highlighted the problem of finding instructors: ‘… It was quickly found that only aircrew with operational experience could successfully train crews from the OTU stage onwards, but owing to the constant expansion of the front line, and the rate of casualties at the height of the war, which did not allow for a large number of tour-expired aircrew becoming available as instructors, there was always a lag in the number of pilot instructors. For a considerable period there was also a deficiency in the number of navigators and air bombers. In consequence of this, until well into 1944, training units had to struggle along with their strength of instructors well below establishment.’
Gunnery Flight 21 OTU, 1943 (Ken Wallis).
Reg White trained with 30 OTU at Seighford in mid-1943 and recalled one particular ‘hairy moment’: ‘We were stooging along over Dorset when the port engine failed (this supplied all the hydraulics for the wheels and flaps) so the pilot decided to lob down at an airfield whose Drem lights we could see below us – “Hello Darky – hello Darky this is E-Edward” – and all the bloody lights went out. We were still flying quite happily on one engine so the pilot decided to return to our own airfield at Seighford. Entering the circuit he called up and told them our problem and was asked whether he was going to land or bale out; he decided to land and the rest of us didn’t fancy jumping into the darkness either so the bomb aimer used the emergency reserve to pump the wheels down whilst the pilot took us well out to line up with the runway.
‘Sitting in the rear turret I could feel him literally lifting the aircraft over hedges as we came in on the long runway; as soon as we over the boundary he cut the starboard engine and we dropped onto the runway and ran and ran and ran until we rolled to stop. Looking out of the rear turret all I could see was trees on either side and as the pilot gunned the good engine the tail went onto rough grass – we had used the whole length of the 2,200 yards but we were alive. On reaching the crew room the tannoy was calling for F.S. McLachlan to report to the control tower. Someone left the switch down and we heard the pilot climbing the stairs and all the ensuing conversation. “Flight Sergeant what is the landing speed of a Wellington.” … “90 mph Sir.” … “What was your speed when you came over the hedge?” … “110 mph Sir.” … “What do you think you were doing at that speed.” … “Sir the aircraft was E-Edward, I have flown it several times and even with two engines the port wing tends to drop at the correct landing speed; if you think you can land it any better without the port engine then I am prepared to come up with you but I won’t take my crew.” … “Hand in your log book.” Two days later it was returned with a Green Endorsement.’
By 1943 a full-size OTU had an establishment of fifty-four aircraft and was capable of producing thirty-two crews a month in summer and twenty-two a month in winter. November brought another request for a slowing down of output as OTU crews were ‘clogging up’ the training system further down stream at the HCU stage. In general each unit now had seven courses at any one time, five in training, one on leave and one awaiting posting.
Wellington of 27 OTU airborne out of Lichfield on a practice bombing sortie.
Based at Wellesbourne Mountford, No. 22 OTU was typical of a bomber training unit in early 1944. Its aircraft strength comprised eighty aircraft, primarily Wellington IIIs and Xs, but with a number of Martinet Is for target towing (gunnery practice). The course size averaged twenty-eight to thirty crews, a total of 654 students, the majority of them Canadian. In a typical summer month, an OTU of standard size would expect to fly around 5,000 hours, just under half of which would be at night.
Lancaster Finishing Schools
With the Lancaster having proved the most effective of the Command’s bombers it had been decided towards the end of 1943 to equip as many operational Groups as possible with the Avro heavy. No. 3 Group was earmarked to join No. 1 and No. 5 Group as Lancaster operators and the only way to provide enough aircraft was to remove them from the HCUs.
The plan was to equip the HCUs within No. 3 and No. 5 Group with Stirlings and to give the other HCUs Halifaxes. However, it was recognised that crews would need some degree of Lancaster orientation and whilst at first it was believed that this could be done at squadron level, it was eventually decided to form specialist training units to carry out a short orientation course. Three Lancaster Finishing Schools (LFS) were formed, one for each of the Lancaster-equipped operational Groups and numbered appropriately – No. 1 LFS at Lindholme/Hemswell, No. 3 LFS at Feltwell and No. 5 LFS at Syerston, although 1678 and 1679 HCUs also kept Lancaster elements. The initial intention was that each LFS would train thirty-six crews per fortnight; thus the student pilot would have a four-week course, of forty flying hours, at the HCU followed by two weeks, with ten flying hours, at the LFS. John Gee, having completed a tour on the Halifax, was sent to No. 1 LFS in mid-1944, ‘As soon as one got into the seat one could feel that there was something different about this aeroplane. All the controls were easily to hand and the Perspex cover over the cockpit was slightly higher than the top of the fuselage, giving the pilot a commanding view. As soon as I took my first flight I could feel the difference, it was wonderfully balanced and light on the controls, it handled more like a fighter than a bomber.’
Bomb Aimer Don Clay was at the same LFS in August: The ground work consisted mainly of getting to know our various stations and equipment as well as escape procedures for baling out and dinghy drill. One of our final sorties at the LFS was fighter affiliation and by the end of the exercise our ‘lad’ left us in no doubt that, given the correct ‘gen’ by the gunners, no Jerry fighters would ever mark us down as a kill. With our last exercise at LFS we were sent home on leave for a week and told to report back before being posted to an operational squadron.’
As an example of how variable the training requirement was, there were three major changes in 1944. In April the Command was seeking to increase the supply of crews, primarily due to a period of heavier than expected losses. However, by July the War Cabinet was worried about an overall manpower shortage and was looking for reductions in the training system. The decision was taken to stop expansion of the bomber training organisation and to reverse the trend in order to have fifteen OTUs at the end of the year, further reducing to six by March 1945.
The August 1944 Aircrew Training Bulletin included an article entitled ‘Bomber Command Training’ and this provides a neat overview of the training system: ‘The training organisation is divided into five stages:
1.Operational Training Unit – ten weeks with forty day and forty night hours.
2.Air Crew School – two weeks with no flying.
3.Conversion Unit – four weeks with twenty day and twenty night hours.
4.Lancaster Finishing School – two weeks with five day and five night hours.
5.Squadron conversion – one with five hours day and five hours night.
The Bulletin went on to address the OTU phase in more detail:
The flying course starts with conversion to the Wellington aircraft, gradually progresses through various stages and ends up with a leaflet raid in a Wellington over enemy-occupied Europe. The syllabus includes the following exercises:
1.Synthetic training. Link trainer, AM Bombing Teacher, clay pigeon shooting, turret training.
2.Gunnery. Combat manoeuvres, air-to-sea firing, air-to-air firing, fighter affiliation exercise day and night.
3.Bombing. High-level bombing by day and night, bombing on cross-countries, infra-red bombing, demonstration of pathfinder technique and target indicators.
4.Navigation. DR navigation, cross-countries, radar training.
5.Operational training. Night exercises with night fighters, searchlight and anti-aircraft organisation in this country, leaflet raid over enemy territory.
6.Drills. Dinghy, parachute, fire, oxygen, crash drills.
7.Operational procedures. Darky, searchlight homing, SOS.
June 1944 was the highpoint of the training machine in terms of aircraft numbers, with a strength of 2,018 aircraft at forty-four units, comprising twenty-two OTUs, fifteen HCUs, three LFSs and four ‘miscellaneous training units’ such as the Pathfinder Navigation Training Unit (PFNTU). These aircraft were housed at fifty-nine airfields and employed thousands of air and ground personnel.
One final training role has yet to be mentioned: No. 8 Group’s specific requirement for Mosquito training. Initially this task was carried out by the Mosquito Training Unit (MTU) but as the number of squadrons increased (eventually reaching twelve squadrons) the MTU was incorporated into No. 16 OTU when this was re-equipped from Wellingtons to Mosquitoes.
Gunners played a key role in the survivability of a bomber – they needed to be alert to warn of enemy fighters, call for evasive manoeuvres and engage the enemy.
The final months and rundown of strength
Accident rates at OTUs were always a problem, as evidenced by the fact that over 8,000 Bomber Command aircrew lost their lives in training. Air Vice-Marshal J. Gray, AOC No. 91 Group, sent the following message to No. 22 OTU: ‘Congratulations on October’s 3,600 flying hours without accident, and this after four months of over 1,000 hours per accident.’ Sadly, the following month had its share of tragedy with two fatal Wellington accidents on 20 November with LN460 exploding in mid-air and MF509 crashing in Wales, both with the loss of their crews.
Pilots and Navigators for the Command’s Mosquito units went through a different training routine, culminating for most with time at the Mosquito Training Unit.
However, the predicted loss rates, and thus the expansion plans for the training machine, were amended during the latter part of 1944 as losses were generally lower than expected. On 29 September 1944, the War Cabinet had instructed that overall strength was not to exceed eighty-five heavy bomber squadrons by the end of the year and the number of training establishments should be reduced. It was proposed to run an establishment of seventeen OTUs, seventeen HCUs and four LFSs but almost as soon as soon as the ink was dry on a plan it was amended both in terms of the number and strength of units and the aircraft types allocated to each. The peak was achieved in December with eighty-five heavy bombers squadrons and seventeen Mosquito squadrons; falling loss rates and reduced aircrew wastage in training and through accidents brought about a rapid rundown of training units and a re-equipment programme.
Engine change on a 58 Squadron Halifax. This chapter has concentrated on aircrew training but they were only a small percentage of the total personnel on an airfield of Bomber Command.
Having been taken out of Main Force, the Stirling had been a key part of the HCU operation, but with an increasing number of Lancasters becoming available in the latter part of 1944 it was decided to re-equip each Stirling HCU with an establishment of thirty-two Lancasters and to incorporate within them the role performed by the LFSs. First to undergo this transformation was No. 3 Groups’ 1651 and 1653 HCUs, although three more Stirling HCUs had acquired Lancasters by January 1945. A similar re-equipment programme was also instituted for the Halifax-equipped training units.
The Operational Training Units were also undergoing change during this period and by the end of 1944, five OTUs had been disbanded – but four new ones had been created or re-equipped and expanded! This was, however, a short-lived ‘expansion’ and the overall trend was one of reduction – with spare aircrew looking for employment.
The final operational losses of OTU aircraft occurred on the night of 14/15 January 1945 when three out of a force of 126 aircraft never made it back to their bases (one from 27 OTU at Lichfield and two from 30 OTU at Hixon); the mission was an Operation Sweepstake, a diversionary flight over the North Sea that did not penetrate enemy territory but was classed as an operational mission.
By 1945 courses were being cancelled all the way through the training system, from basic pilot training onwards, and trained aircrew were being sent to holding units pending decisions on where they would end up. Many never made it to a squadron. The final fatalities during the wartime period occurred on 20 April 1945 when Wellington LP760 of 19 OTU took-off from Kinloss at 11.52 and appeared to explode in mid-air; all six on board were killed.
Armourers bombing up a Mosquito, 25 February 1944.
By May 1945 the rundown of operational squadrons had commenced and towards the end of the year Bomber Command was already a shadow of its former self.
Cold War
Specialist training units remained the primary training organisations for Bomber Command for the rest of its history; in the immediate post war period the OTUs and HCUs continued to operate, albeit a drastically reduced number of them and with far less aircraft – and students. With the Lancaster as the main equipment, rapidly being replaced by the Lincoln, the basic training changed little. On 15 March 1947 a wholesale change of designations took place with training units becoming Operational Conversion Units (OCUs), a designation still used by the RAF (although all now carry Shadow Squadron numbers).
There is not enough space to do more than touch on Bomber Command training during the Cold War and so three short examples will have to suffice: the B-29, Canberra and Valiant; plus a reference or two to other significant developments such as the demise of aircrew trades such as Air Gunner and Signaller and the creation of a new trade of Air Electronics Operator. Air Gunners had been a critical element of Bomber Command throughout the Second World War but with the plan for unarmed jet bombers to enter service from the early 1950s they had a final few years with the Lincoln and B-29 Washington before there was no longer a role for them within the Command. The AG brevet was still to be seen at bomber stations well after there were no longer any turrets to man.
On 4 September 1957 the last RAF Signallers course graduated from Swanton Morley bringing to an end the training of some 30,000 aircrew who had worn the WOP/AG, WOP or S aircrew brevet. The last course had only comprised six students and the trade had been in decline since before the end of the war, the need for air gunners vanishing overnight with the introduction of unarmed jet bombers. However, the previous year had seen the introduction, in March, of a new aircrew category of Air Electronics Operator (AE). The main reason for the new category was the increasing importance of electronic devices, especially counter-measures for the V-bomber force. The first of the new courses commenced in July.
The arrival of the first four B-29 Washingtons at Marham in March 1950 led to the creation of the Washington Conversion Unit (WCU) under Squadron Leader F. R. Flynn, with 115 Squadron being the first ‘customers’. The WCU ran courses for aircrew and groundcrew and also provided a ‘road show’ to visit units as required for further training or evaluation. The courses were typical of RAF courses with a ground school phase followed by flying, at first with an instructor and gradually as a crew. By the time that Ken White attended the course in December it was well established: ‘First flight as Radar Navigator was 13 December 1950 and we flew our first ‘crew solo’ on 22 January, with a final check ride a week later before we moved to our squadron, 15 Squadron, at Coningsby. The conversion course had included six flights totalling twenty-four hours thirty minutes.’
The introduction in the 1950s of a new range of jet types meant a major change of focus for the training organisation; each OCU specialised in one type and during this period of Bomber Command’s history the main types were Canberra (231 OCU), Valiant and Victor (232 OCU) and Vulcan (230 OCU).
Lancaster 230 OCU, Lindholme.
Students admire their new mount – Canberra conversion at No.231 OCU, Bassingbourn.
Conversion for the first few Canberra units was courtesy of the Jet Conversion Flight (JCF), which arrived at Binbrook to work initially with 101 Squadron. Most flying was done on the Meteor F.4 and T.7 to familiarise pilots as with jet engines – and the asymmetric thrust from having widely-spaced engines. The JCF later acquired a Canberra B.2, with the student pilot occupying the rumble seat to observe the instructor before places were changed. However, later in 1951 No. 231 (Mosquito) OCU and No. 237 (Meteor) OCU were in residence at Bassingbourn as the Canberra conversion units, although No. 237 OCU was absorbed into No. 231 OCU in December. Bassingbourn became the home of the Canberra, eventually operating a large number of aircraft of different variants and in its heyday flying up to 1,500 hours a month. The first student course arrived on 27 May 1952 – the Canberra era was about to be well and truly launched. Meteors continued to be used until the dual-control Canberra T.4 became available; over the next four decades the OCU turned out thousands of Canberra aircrew for the RAF and overseas air forces. Over that period of time there was no standard course as such, the course the author attended with No. 231 OCU at Marham in 1977 was very different to that of the early 1950s – although the ground-training aids, which might have seemed ‘state of the art’ in 1952 were decidedly antiquated. In the early 1950s the OCU ran three main course: the Light Bomber course, the ‘long’ course of conversion to type and weaponry, and the photo-recce course. An article in the RAF magazine Air Clues gave an overview of the training at the OCU and its comments on the Navigator training included: The navs will probably be found either navigating an aircraft on a 1,000-mile cross-country while firmly rooted to the earth in a cubicle in the DRI or lying full length on a mock-up bombing platform aiming imaginary bombs at a projected picture on the Earth’s surface which moves sedately beneath them. They may be in the radar demonstration room learning the art of manipulating radar devices; at the same time the PR navs, who, at heart, are quite snooty about this bombing business, will be learning about cameras and how to take pictures, and having taken them, how to interpret them.’ Bassingbourn remained at the heart of Bomber Command training throughout the type’s service with the Command.
A short article appeared in Air Clues in April 1958 entitled ‘Salute the Victor’ with the comment that, ‘The first real course has just started and the staff are just managing to keep ahead or our eager students.’ No. 232 OCU at Gaydon had formed on 21 February 1955 to train Valiant and Victor air and ground crew; it received its first Victors on 28 November 1957. Initial training of staff had taken place with Handley Page at Radlett and selection of aircrew for V-bombers was rigorous. The basic selection criteria for a Valiant 1st Pilot, for example, was a total of 2,000 flying hours as 1st Pilot, including 200 hours 1st Pilot on four-engined bombers and current flying experience on the Canberra. Before being posted to the OCU at Gaydon they had to attend a three-week ground school with Vickers-Armstrongs. Navigator plotters were selected mainly from Canberra squadrons on the basis of their results in their crew classification schemes. Navigator radars came from Canberra and Lincoln squadrons. Before joining the OCU course they went on a bomb-aiming course at the Bomber Command Bombing School (BCBS), Lindholme for a forty-two-week course in H2S and NBS equipment. Signallers came from a variety of backgrounds but required a minimum of 500 flying hours; the introduction of the AEO category provided trained AEs via the new sixty-week course run by Flying Training Command. It would be some time, however, before the ‘S’ brevet vanished from the squadrons.
No. 1 Vulcan course at 230 Operational Conversion Unit.
It was a similar picture for the other V-bombers, with the OCUs initially converting staff, often with the assistance of the manufacturer, before turning their attention to the first ‘real’ students. The OCU syllabi were designed to convert aircrew to the new type, the length of the course and its content varying depending on the aircrew trade, the longest courses being those for the pilots. After the basic conversion the students would progress to learning how to operate the aircraft systems in an operational scenario, including weapons and electronic warfare. The syllabus content and length also varied during the life of the aircraft within Bomber Command to reflect new roles, equipment and doctrine. Specialist training courses, from the radar bombing at Lindholme to Special Weapons (nuclear bombs) training, also varied during this period and there is not enough space in this short account to mention this aspect.
As can be seen from the OCU table above the arrangement outlined here remained in place beyond the end of the Bomber Command period.