Appendix 3
Contingency plans had been made and, when activated following the Argentine attack, worked well. A Naval Staff Advisory Group in Whitehall was in direct contact with the Commanders-in-Chief, while a Bath Support Group brought together the technical departments – Ship Department, Weapons, Stores, Dockyards, etc. There was plenty to do: the Falklands were 8000 miles away and many ships were needed to support a fleet so far from home. Ships Taken Up From Trade (STUFT) comprised 5 troopships, 3 troopship support, 1 hospital ship, 4 aircraft ferries, 2 repair ships, 1 MCMV mother ship, 5 trawler minesweepers, 24 tankers, 5 cargo, 3 solid stores, 3 ammunition, 2 despatch ships and 4 tugs.3
Twenty-five flight decks4 and nine VERTREP decks were fitted and most vessels needed communications and water plant. They transported 8000 men, 18 Harriers, 12 Chinooks, 32 Wessex, 13 Sea King, 216 Land Rovers, 110,000 tons of freight and 400,000 tons fuel, and carried out 1200 RAS operations – and much more. By far the greater part of the work was done in the Royal Dockyards (ironically, many of those working at Portsmouth had already received their redundancy notices). The majority of the vessels were in hand for less than a week, none more than 2 weeks; the work was often preceded by 2 to 3 days of preparation. It was common for a constructor to join a ship at its last port before arriving in the UK and chalk out the flight deck arrangements en route in the light of the steel available at the conversion yard.
One of the first – and biggest – conversions was that of Canberra to a troopship with two flight decks. It was decided to requisition her on Saturday 3 April 1982 and by Monday Vosper Ship Repairers had completed the drawings, approved by the PNO (Stephen Hunter) and the steel was ordered. Work started in advance of the ship’s arrival on Wednesday, 7 April and during the next 2½ days two flight decks were installed and communications and RAS arrangements fitted. Vosper put in 500 man-weeks of work, but a few men sailed with her to complete the work. The two flight decks weighed 150 tons and were high in the ship, adding to top weight, but partially offset by the removal of 95 tons of water from the swimming pool – it proved a good rule of thumb that the weight of a flight deck was equal to that of water in a pool. With 2200 troops on board, Canberra’s displacement had increased from 40,500 to 43,000 tons.
St Helena with her Falklands War helicopter deck lined by the crew as the ship left Portsmouth in June 1982. (Mike Lennon)
The flight decks of the early ships were designed without much regard to weight and were very heavy. That of the Norland was designed to save weight, but the extra labour involved was surprising and the remaining decks were designed for easy construction.
John Hannah has listed (see footnote 2) seven main problem areas which affected most conversions and these will be considered in turn.
Endurance. Many of the STUFT were cross-channel ships of limited endurance. Most had to be fitted to RAS and, as the normal refuelling point was low down, piping had to be installed up to the RAS connection. Tankers were vital, supplying up to 180,000 tons per month, resulting in a supply chain holding 400,000 tons. Pre-war plans existed for the conversion of BP ‘River’ class tankers to supply over the stern. The optimistic estimate for conversion was one day-during the war it was actually completed in 4 hours. Where possible, ballast tanks were converted to fuel stowage.
Fresh water was an even greater problem: a merchant seaman expects about 50 gallons per day; an RN sailor makes do on 25 gallons. Aircraft are even more demanding, since if stowed on deck they must be washed frequently in fresh water to remove salt deposits that would attack their alloy structure. It was decided to fit reverse osmosis plants, as they were easy to install and operate and made less demand on support services. However, there were only two UK firms making these plants, and they were not held in stock. Manufacture took 5 days and nights and installation 2 to 3 days – very often final installation and trials was on passage, with the company’s engineers retrieved from Gibraltar or Ascension.
Habitability. Liners such as Canberra, with peacetime passenger accommodation for 1750, had to carry 2200 troops. Camp beds made up the difference, whilst bathrooms and feeding arrangements were sufficient. Container ships, used as aircraft transports, were more difficult. Their peacetime complement of about 40 was augmented by 150. Containers and Portacabins had to be installed as accommodation.
Stability. Warships are designed to float with no more than moderate heel with three or four main compartments flooded and still withstand moderate weather. Merchant ships were designed to very much lower damage standards, set by international agreement through IMO: cargo ships would generally sink if any main compartment abaft the fore peak was flooded; passenger liners were intended to float with two main compartments flooded, though with a freeboard of only 3in.5 There was also a concession that some ships on short sea routes might only need a one-compartment standard, a concession that the author considers was granted too easily, particularly for ro-ro ships – remember Herald of Free Enterprise.6 The UK Department of Transport was rigorous in enforcing these rules, but some foreign-flagged ships had to be rejected as failing even these modest standards. Weight growth since completion and top weight added for the war made these problems even worse.
Everything possible was done to improve matters. One ship had two extra bulkheads fitted,7 some had solid ballast added, while limitations on the use of fuel were imposed on most. Care was taken to select the best ships (what were the others like?). Hannah concludes: ‘the use, of merchant vessels in an emergency, especially for the carriage of troops or vital equipment, is potentially very hazardous’ (Hannah’s italics).8
Firefighting. Merchant ship firefighting rules were strict and, in general, additional firefighting arrangements were needed only to cope with the carriage of petrol and ammunition. The loss of Atlantic Conveyor shows the dangers inherent in the carriage of flammable materials.
Aviation arrangements. A flight deck for a Sea King is 15m × 10m, with an area clear of obstructions two to three times that size, and weighs about 70 tons. The deck of a ro-ro ferry is usually strong enough and the only work is clearing obstructions such as bulwarks. Liners often had light aluminium superstructures, not strong enough to support such a deck. Poor Queen Elizabeth II had to have much of her superstructure removed.
On big container ships, such as Astronomer, it was possible to arrange makeshift aircraft shelters from containers. There were many details needed for aircraft operation – lights, holding down clamps, firefighting, non-skid paint, battery charging, etc – all of which was time-consuming to fit. After the war, Astronomer was purchased as RFA Reliant and given the USN ‘Arapaho’ containerised helicopter operating system. It was not a great success and the conclusion was that improvisation to suit individual ships was preferable.
Communications. A basic naval fit was needed. Usually, there was insufficient room in the wireless office and space had to be found nearby. A travelling team of MoD officers installed the gear and RFA radio officers were appointed to operate it.
Self Defence. Initially, weapons were not fitted but as the war developed, light anti-aircraft guns (old 20mm Oerlikons) were installed if possible. Barrels were scarce and some ships had mountings only, getting the barrels as they approached the war zone from ships going home.
Five trawlers were fitted out as minesweepers at Portland. During the war they were mainly employed as small transports, but at the end they cleared 20 mines.9
It was a shoestring operation but worked well thanks to the resources, men and stores, in the Royal Dockyards, now no longer there. Many people contributed, but it is proper to pay tribute to the late John Hannah, OBE, RCNC who masterminded the programme.
The oilfield support vessel Stena Seaspread in the Falklands where she served as a repair ship. An early Type 22 and an Oberon class submarine are alongside. (D K Brown collection)
2 J L Hannah, ‘Merchant Vessel Conversions: The Falklands Campaign’, Trans RINA (1985). John Hannah ran the Bath Support Group – callers were surprised when told his home phone number was Faulkland xyz. (Faulklands is a small village, just outside Bath, NOT the islands.)
3 The Task Force Portfolio, 2 vols, Liskeard (anon 1981).
4 Dr David Chalmers RCNC, who has been most helpful in the writing of several sections of this book, designed ten decks and received the OBE for his work.
5 These standards have been raised considerably for new ships in SOLAS 90. Cargo ships must float with one compartment flooded and both they and liners are to have greater reserve after flooding.
6 As a student in the 1940s I was taught that this concession was exceptional and liners should be two-compartment standard. I was horrified to discover how conditions had deteriorated.
7 The constructor in charge of this one rang me over Sunday lunch to say she was not safe to leave the estuary.
8 As a result of these studies I was asked to join the Department of Transport committee drawing lessons from the Herald of Free Enterprise tragedy. This eventually led to some retrospective improvements in ro-ro ships, particularly after the Scandinavian Star and Estonia tragedies.
9 They were known as the ‘Ellas’, as four had names ending in -ella (like Northella).