NOTES

PROLOGUE

1. As Max Weber observed, the “medieval knights made feudal social organization inevitable; then its displacement by mercenary armies and later (beginning with Maurice of Orange) by disciplined troops led to the establishment of the modern State.” Max Weber, Economy and Society(University of California Press, 1978), 904 – 908. It is also to Weber that we owe the idea that the State seeks a monopoly on legitimate violence. Max Weber, “Politics as Vocation,” in Essays in Sociology, ed. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Routledge, 1970), 77 – 78.

2. Frederick Turner, Natural Classicism: Essays on Literature and Science (Paragon House, 1985) and The Culture of Hope: A New Birth of the Classical Spirit (New York: Free Press, 1995).

INTRODUCTION: LAW, STRATEGY, AND HISTORY

1. Cf. La Pietra Report (2000), which affirms national histories, but of a very different kind. “Instead of assuming the nation to be the “natural” unit of historical analysis, it acknowledges a variety of relevant and interrelated geographical units of history. It urges not only the exploration of the different historical forces, including transnational ones, that made and sustained the nation and national identities but also the importance, always changing, of the nation in relation to other social units, from the town, to the transnational region, to solidarity with all peoples of color, to international corporations.” Thomas Bender, “Writing National History in a Global Age,” Correspondence: An International Review of Culture and Society, no. 7 (Winter 2000/2001): 14.

2. Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1945).

3. John Austin, Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1995 [1832]).

4. Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. (University of Chicago Press, 1985).

5. Jean Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth (B. Blackwell, 1955 [1606]).

6. Georg Wilhelm Hegel, The Phenomenology of the Spirit (1807), trans. A. V. Miller and J. N. Findlay (Oxford, 1979). Also see Roger Kimball, “The Difficulty with Hegel,” New Criterion 19 (September 2000): 4.

7. William A. Owens, “The Wrong Argument about Readiness,” New York Times (September 1, 2000): A27.

8. See, e.g., Thomas Friedman, “It's Harder Now to Figure Out Compelling National Interests” New York Times (May 31, 1992): E5.

9. See A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (Penguin, 1961) for a related argument.

10. U.S. Department of the Army, Decisive Victory: America's Power Projection Army (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1994). See also the Quadrennial Defense Review (May 1997, http://www.defenselink.mil.pubs/qdr/) and the Bottom-Up Review(October 1993, http://www.fas.org/man/docs/bur/).

11. Bernard Brodie, “Implications for Military Policy,” in The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, ed. Bernard Brodie (Harcourt, Brace, 1946), 76.

12. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

13. Michael Howard, “Lessons of the Cold War,” Survival 36 (1994 – 1995): 165.

14. Philip Bobbitt, Democracy and Deterrence (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), 286.

15. Fred Ikle, “The Next Lenin: On the Cusp of Truly Revolutionary Warfare.” The National Interest 47 (1997): 9.

16. Bobbitt, Democracy and Deterrence, 19 – 96.

17. But see Ashton Carter and William Perry, Preventive Defense (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999).

18. Paul Bracken, “The Military after Next,” The Washington Quarterly 16 (1993): 157.

19. Fred Iklé, “The Next Lenin.”

20. See also Robert D. Kaplan, “Fort Leavenworth and the Eclipse of Nationhood,” Atlantic Monthly (September 1996), and Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (Free Press, 1991); see also van Creveld's The Rise and Decline of the State(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

21. Jean-Marie Guehenno, The End of the Nation-State (University of Minnesota Press, 1995).

22. Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation-State: The Rise of Regional Economies (New York: Free Press, 1995).

23. Martin van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State (Cambridge, U.K., 1999). See also Empire.

CHAPTER ONE: THUCYDIDES AND THE EPOCHAL WAR

1. On Justice, Power, and Human Nature: The Essence of Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War, ed. and trans. Paul Woodruff (Hackett, 1993).

2. The term Hundred Years' War appears first to have been used in 1821 by Charles Desmichels. During this period of Anglo-French détente, Desmichels labeled the hundred years of animosity—often punctuated by long periods in which there was no actual fighting—as the Hundred Years' War. The term was picked up in Germany in 1829, and by English historians in 1870. P. J. Winter, “Sur l' origine de l' appellation de la guerre de cent ans,” Information History 37 (1975): 20 – 24.

3. In contrast to the Hundred Years' War, the Thirty Years' War was named almost instantly, once the Westphalian Peace actually seemed to deliver a general settlement. The term Thirty Years' War was used as early as 1648 in an anonymous outline of the main events of the war, and in three other works about the war printed in 1649, 1650, and 1657. See Guenther H. S. Mueller, Journal of Modern History 50 (1978): iii.

4. The Punic Wars, for example, fit this pattern: although the participants thought, more than once, that hostilities had ended, and significant periods without fighting did occur, historians came to view the various Carthaginian wars as engagements in a single war because the peace settlements failed to resolve the conflicts over which the wars were fought.

5. Geoffrey Parker, The Thirty Years' War (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984); see also C. V. Wedgwood, The Thirty Years' War (J. Cape, 1938); P. Limm, The Thirty Years' War (1984); and J. H. Elliott, Richelieu and Olivares (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

6. P. Brightwell, “Spanish Origins of the Thirty Years' War,” European Studies Review (1979).

7. Parker, The Thirty Years' War, xiv.

8. Supra, n. 2.

9. Egon Friedell, A Cultural History of the Modern Age, trans. Charles Francis Atkinson (Knopf, 1930 – 1932), 15.

10. Kenneth Fowler, The Age of Plantagenet and Valois (Putnam, 1967), 13.

11. Anne Curry, The Hundred Years War (London: Macmillan, 1983).

12. Hunter R. Rawlings III, The Structure of Thucydides' History (Princeton University Press, 1981); Simon Hornblower, Thucydides (Duckworth, 1987).

CHAPTER TWO: THE STRUGGLE BEGUN: FASCISM, COMMUNISM, PARLIAMENTARIANISM, 1914 – 1919

1. Kurt F. Reinhardt, Germany 2000 Years, rev. ed., Vol. I, The Rise and Fall of the “Holy Empire” (Frederick Ungar, 1961).

2. “It is usual, in analysing the constitution of 1871, to emphasize its federal character, pointing out that it betrays in every paragraph the conflicts of a thousand years of German history. But the reality is otherwise. The federal rights… were illusory….Prussia had sufficient votes to veto constitutional changes, but more important was the fact that the Chancellor was under no necessity of consulting the council on any question of major political importance….The system contrived in 1871 included a Reichstag elected by universal and equal franchise; but its powers were nugatory…. [I]t had no power of voting or refusing to vote taxes… since imperial revenue was provided partly from permanent fixed duties, partly by pro rata contributions from the individual federal states….Finally, the Reichstag had no control over executive ministers, who were responsible only to the Prussian king who was also German emperor…. The German labour leader, Wilhelm Liebknecht, was therefore not wide of the mark in dubbing the Reichstag ‘the fig-leaf of absolutism‘; the system of government established in 1871 was, in fact, a veiled form of the monarchical absolutism vested in the king of Prussia.” Geoffrey Barraclough, Factors in German History (B. Blackwell, 1946). It is important to note, in the debate as to whether Wilhelmine Germany was a proto-fascist state, that while many parliamentary nation-states allowed for the suspension of constitutional provisions in an emergency, the Kaiserrech and Nazi Germany permitted the chancellor to remain in office and to rule by decree even when he had lost his parliamentary majority.

3. Barraclough, Factors in German History, 116.

4. Fritz Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War (Norton, 1967). This is the English translation of his Griff nach der Weltmacht (Droste, 1961); Fritz Fischer, World Power or Decline: The Controversy over Germany's Aims in the First World War, trans. Lancelot Farrar, Robert Kimber, and Rita Kimber (Norton, 1974); Fritz Fischer, War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914, trans. Marian Jackson (Norton, 1975); see Krieg der Illusionem (1969).

5. “Analysis of the origins of the First World War has therefore been profoundly influenced by the ‘Fischer revolution.’” Norman Stowe, Europe Transformed, 1878 – 1919 (Harvard University Press, 1984), 196, comments that “Not many historians nowadays dissent from the proposition that the German government, egged on by its generals, deliberately provoked the war of 1914.” John Moses, The Politics of Illusion (George Prior, 1975), 48, says that “Even Fischer's most persistent opponents such as Gerhard Ritter (1888 – 1967) and Golo Mann, for example, were forced to agree with him that Imperial Germany's policies unleashed the war; however, they imputed to Germany's leaders defensive rather than offensive motives.” “As Fischer has forcefully stated, ‘there is not a single document in the world which could weaken the central truth that in July 1914 a will to war existed solely and alone on the German side and that all arrangements on the side of the Entente served the defensive security of their alliance. And that will to war had been crystallising for many years previously.’” Some historians, while not disputing this, emphasize the opportunistic nature of German policy. “James Joll, The Origins of the First World War (Longman, 1984), 235, feels that by December 1912 German rulers had ‘accepted war as inevitable' but were concerned to wage it at the most opportune time.” Ruth Henig, The Origins of the First World War (Routledge, 1989; reprinted 1991), 43.

6. For the current status of the Fischer controversy, compare Bernd-Jurgen Wendt, “Zum Stand der ‘Fischer-Kontroverse' um den Ausbruch des ersten Weltkrieges,” Annales Universitatis Scientarium Budapestinensis de Rolando Eotvos Nominatae: Section Historica 24 (1985): 92 – 132 (concluding that Fischer's theses regarding the Riezler papers, the role of Bethmann Hollweg, and the continuity of German policies leading to both world wars remain unrefuted) with Wayne C. Thompson, “The September Program: Reflections on the Evidence,” Central European History 11 (1978): 348 – 354 (arguing that the Riezler paper was only “a provisional catalog of possible war aims drawn up for negotiating purposes”).

7. See Roger Fletcher, introduction to Fischer, Kaiserreich to Third Reich: Elements of Continuity in German History, 1871 – 1945 (Allen & Unwin, 1986; reprinted Routledge, 1991).

8. Ian Kershaw, “1933: Continuity or Break in German History?” History Today 33 (1983): 13 – 18.

9. Fletcher, Introduction to Fischer, 10.

10. Edward Acton, State and Society under Lenin and Stalin, in Themes in Modern European History, 1890 – 1945, ed. Paul Hayes (London: Routledge, 1992).

11. Ibid., 156 – 157.

12. William G. Rosenberg, “Russian Labor and Bolshevik Power after October,” Slavic Review (1985): 222 – 223.

13. Condoleezza Rice, “The Making of Soviet Strategy,” Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, 1986), 648.

14. “A variety of motives lay behind this support: ideological commitment, patriotism… The rhetoric of class warfare in terms of which the [Five-Year] Plan was implemented struck a responsive chord. It promised a return to the heroic tradition of October and the Civil War, an attack on Bourgeois deformities, on NEP-men, kulaks and privileged members of the intelligentsia.” Edward Acton, “State and Society under Lenin and Stalin,” in Themes of Modern European History, 1890 – 1945 (Routledge, 1992), 162-163. Note the similarity between this rhetoric and the Nazi attacks on Weimar society.

15. Rosenberg, 164 – 165.

16. Eugene Genovese, “The Squandered Century,” Current (July – August 1995): 36.

17. Henig, The Origins of the First World War, 14.

18. Vladimir I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (International, 1988 [1916]).

CHAPTER THREE: THE STRUGGLE CONTINUED: 1919 – 1945

1. In Mein Kampf Hitler gave such an account. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (F. Eher Nachf 1941).

2. Paul Hayes, “The Triumph of Caesarism: Fascism and Nazism,” in Themes in Modern European History 1890 – 1945, ed. Paul Hayes (Routledge, 1992), 176.

3. Fritz Fischer, From Kaiserreich to Third Reich (Allen & Unwin, 1986), 97; the interior quotes are from his work cited as n. 122 in that book.

4. Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (Bantam Books, 1958).

5. David E. Kaiser, Economic Diplomacy and the Origins of the Second World War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).

6. A.J.P. Taylor, Origins of the Second World War (Hamilton, 1961).

7. William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1960).

8. See, for example, The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered: The A.J.P. Taylor Debate after Twenty-five Years, ed. Gordon Martel (Allen & Unwin: 1986); and Paths to War: New Essays on the Origins of the Second World War, ed. Robert Boyce and Esmonde M. Robertson (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989).

9. “The march on Rome [was in fact] a mere symbol of a triumph of political intrigue, though in order to satisfy both the squadristi and the need for a myth, it was depicted as a real and important event involving the violent seizure of power.” Hayes, 177 – 178.

10. May 1924 (6.5%); December 1924 (3%); May 1928 (2.6%); September 1930 (18.3%); July 1932 (37.3%); November 1932 (33.1%). Richard F. Hamilton, Who Voted for Hitler? (Princeton University Press, 1982), 476.

11. Jacek Jedruch, Constitutions, Elections, and Legislatures of Poland, 1493 – 1977: A Guide to Their History (University Press of America, 1982); Rett R. Ludwikowski and William F. Fox, Jr., The Beginning of the Constitutional Era (Catholic University of America Press, 1993); Timothy Wiles, ed., Poland between the Wars, 1918 – 1939 (Indiana University Polish Studies Center, 1989); Jan Karski, The Great Powers & Poland, 1919 – 1945: From Versailles to Yalta (University Press of America, 1985).

12. Kenneth B. Pyle, The Making of Modern Japan, 2nd ed. (D. C. Heath, 1996), 78, 87, 122 – 124.

13. Ibid., 116 – 117.

14. Ibid., 125 – 138.

15. Bernard Eccleston, “The State and Modernization in Japan,” in The Rise of the Modern State, ed. James Anderson (Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1986), 204.

16. For example, with the Peace Preservation Law of 1925.

17. James B. Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy (Princeton University Press, 1966), 116 – 121. For an opposing view, see Richard Storry, A History of Modern Japan (Pen-uin Books, 1960), 186 – 187.

18. “Teikoku Zaigo Gunjinkai Sanjunenshi,” in Richard J. Smethurst, The Social Basis for Japanese Militarism (dissertation, University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, 1968), 22.

19. Diane Shaver Clements, Yalta (Oxford University Press, 1970); Richard F. Fenno, The Yalta Conference (Heath, 1955); Edward R. Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference (New York: Doubleday, 1949).

CHAPTER FOUR: THE STRUGGLE ENDED: 1945 – 1990

1. W.S. Churchill, Speech at Fulton, Missouri, March 5, 1946.

2. H. S. Truman, Address to the U.S. Congress, March 12, 1947.

3. G. M. Malenkov, September 22, 1947, quoted in Edgar Geoffrey Rayner, The Cold War (Hodder & Stoughton, 1992), 17.

4. NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, April 14, 1950, reprinted in American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68, ed. Ernest May (Bedford Books, 1993), 32; see also Philip Bobbitt, Lawrence Freedman, and Gregory F. Treverton, eds. U.S. Nuclear Strategy: A Reader (New York University Press, 1989).

5. David N. Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas (Brookings Institution, 1983), chapters 1 and 2; Jane E. Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible Response: NATO's Debate over Strategy in the 1960s (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988).

6. See statement by Arthur Henderson, British Secretary for Air, May 11, 1949.

7. Known as Jiang Jieshi in later transliterations of Chinese nomenclature.

8. N. S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, ed. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

9. This assessment was first broached by a senior Chinese diplomat in conversations with the author.

10. Although the circumstance of Nagy's judicial murder remain uncertain, the best recent scholarship can be found in György Litván, “A Nagy Imre per politikai háttere,” Vilá-gosság, vol. 10, 1992, 743 – 57; and János M. Rainer, “Nagy Imre életútia,” Multunk, vol. 4, 1992, 3 – 14.

11. Letter of President Eisenhower to Marshal Bulganin, November 5, 1956.

12. Kai Bird, The Color of Truth (Simon & Schuster, 1998), 203 – 206.

13. This doubled U.S. forces in Germany. In the 1950s allied forces levels in Germany were between 240,000 and 250,000. During the “flexible response” period of the mid to late sixties, force levels were just over 200,000. See Horst Menderhausen, “Troop Stationing in Germany: Value and Cost, Memorandum 588 – 1 PR” (Santa Monica: RAND, 1968), 8; and James D. Hessman, “U.S. Forces in Europe,” Armed Forces Journal (July 11, 1970): 20.

14. See the Soviet Reply to Western Notes on Berlin, August 3, 1961.

15. N. S. Khrushchev, television broadcast, August 7, 1961. See also Lawrence Freedman, Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam (Oxford, 2000), 45 – 111.

16. Khrushchev Remembers, 460. This report invites skepticism in light of Khrushchev's antipathy toward Mao. See, e.g., pp. 461– 479, discussing Mao Zedong and the schism.

17. Bobbitt, Democracy and Deterrence, 201 – 202.

18. In English as “… without firing a single shot” and “… without having to fire a single shot” in Khrushchev Remembers, 460 and 504, respectively.

19. Frederick the Great wrote in his 1747 Instructions for His Generals: “The greatest secret of war and the masterpiece of a skillful general is to starve his enemy. Hunger exhausts men more surely than courage, and you will succeed with less risk than by fighting. But since it is very rare that a war is ended by the capture of a depot and matters are only decided by great battles, it is necessary to use all these means to attain this object… War is decided only by battles and is not finished except by them. Thus they have to be fought, but it should be opportunely and with all the advantages on your side… The occasions that can be procured are when you cut the enemy off from his supplies and when you use favourable terrain.” Reproduced in The Roots of Strategy: A Collection of Military Classics, ed. T. R. Phillips (Military Service, 1955), 173, 213.

20. Donald Kagan, On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace (New York: Doubleday, 1995).

21. “Son of Late Soviet Premier to Become U.S. Citizen,” Agence France-Presse, July 11, 1999.

22. Charles Bohlen, memo to Secretary of State, April 5, 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States 1(1950), 222.

23. See the views of McGeorge Bundy in this regard, as reported (with some skepticism) in Kai Bird, The Color of Truth: McGeorge Bundy and William Bundy, Brothers in Arms (Simon & Schuster, 1998), 354, citing Department of State Bulletin, February 5, 1968 (speech by Bundy).

24. Speaking at the Ninth Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in Beijing, April 1, 1965. Quoted in E. G. Rayner, The Cold War (1992), 63 – 64.

25. Compare Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War,” International Organization 48 (Spring 1994): 185.

26. Vladimir Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel (New York: Free Press, 1992).

27. Michael Howard, “Hardship, Famine, and Fear,” The Financial Times, May 6/7, 1995.

28. Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914 – 1991 (Pantheon Books, 1991), 12.

29. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992).

30. Richard Kugler, Commitment to Purpose: How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War (Santa Monica: RAND, 1993).

31. G. Craig and F. Gilbert, “Strategy in the Present and Future,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, 1986), 870 – 871. This might also be applied with justice to the “limitations determined by political considerations”—though much criticized—applied by the U.S. in the Viet Nam War.

32. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, 1976 [1832]), 87.

CHAPTER FIVE: STRATEGY AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

1. Michael Roberts, The Military Revolution 1556 – 1660 (1956), reprinted with slight changes in Michael Roberts, Essays in Swedish History (University of Minnesota Press, 1967), 195 – 225.

2. Sir George Clark, War and Society in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1958).

3. See, for example, Karen Rasler and William Thomson, “War Making and State Making and Governmental Expenditures, Tax Reviews and Global War,” American Political Science Review 49 (1985): 491 – 507; Michael Mann, States, War, and Capitalism(Basil Blackwell, 1988); John Brewer, The Sinews of Power (Unwin Hyman, 1989); Niall Ferguson, The Cash Nexus: Money and Power in the Modern World, 1700 – 2000 (Basic Books, 2001).

4. Parker, The Military Revolution, 2–3.

5. See also William McNeill, The Pursuit of Power (University of Chicago Press, 1982).

6. Geoffrey Parker, “The ‘Military Revolution,’ 1560 – 1660—A Myth?,” Journal of Modern History 46 (1976).

7. Jeremy Black, European Warfare, 1660 – 1815 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).

CHAPTER SIX: FROM PRINCES TO PRINCELY STATES: 1494–1648

1. Compare Dante, The Inferno, trans. Robert Pinsky (Noonday Press, 1996), Canto III, 11.5–6, 24 – 25. (“No things before me not eternal.”)

2. Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society (Routledge, 1992), 143.

3. Eric Christiansen, The Northern Crusades: The Baltic and the Catholic Frontier, 1100 – 1525 (Macmillan, 1980), 250 – 251.

4. See Watson, n. 106, chapters 13 and 14 generally.

5. John Keegan, A History of Warfare (Hutchison, 1993). His predecessor, Charles VII, had used bombards to great effect earlier in the century. Harfleur, which had successfully resisted long sieges in 1415 and 1440, fell to Charles in only seventeen days after an attack by sixteen bombards. See Christopher Allmand in The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare, ed. Geoffrey Parker (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

6. Quoted in M. E. Mallet, “Diplomacy and War in Later Fifteenth Century Italy,” Proceedings of the British Academy, 67 (1981): 267 – 288.

7. Keegan, A History of Warfare, 320 – 322.

8. Michael T. Clark, “Realism: Ancient and Modern,” Political Science and Politics 26, no. 3 (September 1993): 491.

9. Samuel E. Finer, “State and Nation-Building in Europe,” in The Formation of Nation States in Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton University Press, 1975), 74.

10. Wallace K. Ferguson, Europe in Transition (Houghton Mifflin, 1962), 153 – 155.

11. Such was the rise of Francesco Sforza, a condottiere who became Duke of Milan by ex-ploiting the state apparatus that the Visconti had developed. Franco Catalano, Francesco Sforza (Dall' Oglio, 1983); Cecilia Ady, “The Invasions of Italy,” New Cambridge Modern History, ed. G. R. Potter (Cambridge, U.K., 1960), 1, 344; Jacob Burckhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, vol. 1 (Harper & Row, 1958), 34 – 44.

12. See Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, Fifteenth – Eighteenth Century, vol. 3, The Perspective of the World, trans. Sian Reynolds (Harper & Row, 1984), 120; see also Michael Knapton, “City Wealth and State Wealth in Northeast Italy, Fourteenth – Seventeenth Centuries,” in La ville, la bourgeoisie, et la genèse de l'état moderne, XIIe – XVIIIe siècles: Actes du colloque de Bielefeld, 29 novembre – I décembre 1985, ed. Neithard Bulst and Jean-Philippe Genet (Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique: Diffusion, Presses du CNRS, 1988).

13. Niccolò Machiavelli, last chapter in The Prince.

14. Michael Howard, War in European History (Oxford, 1976), 5.

15. Felix Gilbert, “Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, 1986), 12 – 13.

16. Machiavelli, The Prince, chapter 12.

17. Machiavelli, The Discourses, III, 31.

18. Machiavelli, The Prince (trans. L. Ricci, 1903: rev., 1935), 43 – 44.

19. John Addington Symonds, A Short History of the Renaissance in Italy (Scribner, 1893), 4.

20. Of which scutage, which dates from the high Middle Ages, was a harbinger.

21. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (Random House, 1987), 23; see also John Ulric Nef, War and Human Progress: An Essày on the Rise of Industrial Civilization (Russell & Russell, 1950), 46.

22. Lynn, citing recent scholarship on state formation in early modern Europe, recognizes this link between war and emerging absolutism. See also Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 900 – 1990 (B. Blackwell, 1990); Brian Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change (Princeton University Press, 1992); and David Kaiser, Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990).

23. Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society (Routledge, 1992), 164.

24. Ibid., 146.

25. Ibid., 161.

26. Clifford Rogers, “Military Evolution,” in The Reader's Companion to Military History, ed. Robert Cowley and Geoffrey Parker (Houghton Mifflin, 1996), 396.

27. Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution, 12.

28. Bert S. Hall and Kelly R. DeVries, “The Military Revolution Revisited,” Technology and Culture (July 1990): 500 – 507, take issue with Parker but on different grounds, i.e., they assume the premise that such fortresses would affect the state's political order but deny that the effects were as large, or as attributable to fortress design, as Parker maintains; and see Simon Adams, “Tactics or Politics? The Military Revolution and Hapsburg Hegemony, 1525 – 1649,” in Tools of War, ed. John A. Lynn (University of Illinois Press, 1990), 28 – 52, and John Lynn, “The Trace Italienne and the Growth of Armies: The French Case,” Journal of Military History 55 (July 1991): 297 – 330.

29. Watson, 164.

30. Lynn, “Trace Italienne,” 322, speaking of the French experience.

31. Kennedy, 70.

32. Christopher Marlowe, The Famous Tragedy of the Rich Jew of Malta (Da Capo Press, 1971), 7.

CHAPTER SEVEN: FROM KINGLY STATES TO TERRITORIAL STATES: 1648 – 1776

1. William Shakespeare, The Tempest, Act I, Scene 2, lines 94 – 100. The Yale Shakespeare, ed. W. L. Cross and Tucker Brooke (Barnes & Noble, 1993), p. 1408.

2. Peter Mancias, “The Legitimation of the Modern State: A Historical and Structural Account,” in State Formation and Political Legitimacy, ed. R. Cohen and J. D. Toland (Transaction Books, 1988), 173 – 176.

3. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, 14.

4.Michael Howard, War in European History, 20; “Historians indeed normally date the beginnings of ‘Modern European History' from the Italian Wars which opened with the French invasion of 1494.”

5. Jeremy Black, who is in a position to know, makes this claim. Jeremy Black, European Warfare, 1660 – 1815 (Yale University Press, 1994), 3.

6. Parker, The Military Revolution, 19. In this wonderfully written and illustrated book, Parker actually provides a plate reproducing William Louis's original letter, with a diagram in the count's hand showing how the countermarch would work.

7. Richard Bonney, The European Dynastic States, 1494 – 1660 (Oxford University Press, 1991), 524 – 525.

8. Max Weber, from Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. and ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Oxford University Press, 1946), 256 – 257.

9. Gunther E. Rothenberg, “Maurice of Nassau, Gustavus Adolphus, Raimondo Monte-cucolli, and the ‘Military Revolution' of the Seventeenth Century,” in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, 1986), 33.

10. Roberts, Essays in Swedish History, 204 –205, 210; see also Paul Kennedy's observation that “each belligerent had to learn how to create a satisfactory administrative structure to meet the ‘military revolution’; and of equal importance, it also had to devise new means of paying for the spiraling costs of war.” Kennedy, 56.

11. McNeill, Pursuit of Power, 80, 95.

12. Black, European Warfare, 1660 – 1815, 4.

13. Jean Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth, ed. K. D. McRae (Harvard University Press, 1962), 200.

14. Nicholas Henshell, The Myth of Absolutism: Change and Continuity in Early Modern European Monarchy (Longman, 1992), 3–4.

15. Thomas Hobbes, Behemoth, William Olesworth, ed. (B. Franklin, 1963).

16. Konrad Repgen, “What Is a ‘Religious War‘?” in Politics and Society in Reformation Europe, ed. E. I. Kouri and Tom Scott (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 319; quoted in Bonney, 550.

17. Kennedy, 52.

18. Ibid., 25.

19. A Habsburg prince was emperor from 1273 to 1291, 1298 to 1308, 1438 to 1740, and 1745 to 1806.

20. Roberts, 202.

21.Geoffrey Symcox, War, Diplomacy, and Imperialism, 1618 – 1763 (Walker, 1974), 103 – 105.

22. Roberts, 24.

23. Quoted in Michael Roberts, Gustavus Adolphus (Longman, 1992), 29 – 30.

24. Roberts, 31.

25. Kennedy, 64 – 65, citing several works by Roberts (“What follows relies heavily upon the writings of Michael Roberts,…”), see vol 1.

26. Howard, War in European History, 59.

27. This account is taken from Roberts's superb Gustavus Adolphus.

28. E. A. Beller, “The Thirty Years War,” New Cambridge Modern History, vol. 4 (ed. J. P. Cooper) (Cambridge, 1970), 354. Note that this is to be distinguished from “sovereignty.”

29. Barbara Riebling, “Milton on Machiavelli: Representations of the State in ‘Paradise Lost,’” Renaissance Quarterly 49 (1996): 573.

30. Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and the International Order, 1648 – 1989 (Cambridge University Press, 1991), 25.

31. Ibid., 39.

32. Bonney, 525.

33. Quoted by Bonney, 531; see also Jacques B. Bossuet, Politique tiréde des propres paroles de l'Ecriture sainte, ed. LeBrun (Droz, 1967), 114.

34. Supra, Chapter 5, n. 3.

35. See James Anderson and Stuart Hall, “Absolutism and other Ancestors,” in The Rise of the Modern State, ed. James Anderson (Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1986).

36. Ibid.

37. Howard, War in European History, 37.

38. See John Theibault, “The Rhetoric of Death and Destruction in the Thirty Years' War,” Journal of Social History 27 (Winter 1993): 272; Henry Kamen, “The Economic and Social Consequences of the Thirty Years' War,” Past and Present 39 (1968): 44 – 61. Christopher Friedrichs, The Thirty Years' War, ed. Geoffrey Parker (Routledge, 1984), 208 – 215, compromises by estimating the percentage of population loss during the war at about midway between the horrific figures of Gunther Franz, Der Dreissigjahrige Krieg und das Deutsche Volk, 4th ed. (Fischer, 1979) and the skeptical conclusions of S. H. Steinberg, The ‘Thirty Years War' and the Conflict for European Hegemony, 1600 – 1660 (Norton, 1967).

39. Gordon A. Craig and Aleksander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, 1990), 6.

40. Watson, 195.

41. Wedgwood, 526.

42. See John Locke, First Treatise on Civil Government, undertaken to refute Filmer's Patriarcha.

43. Kennedy, 75.

44. Oeuvres de Louis XIV (1806 ed.) i, 14 – 18.

45. Howard, War in European History, 63 – 64.

46. William Doyle, The Old European Order, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, 1992), 265.

47. Ibid., 164.

48. Sir George Clark, “From the Nine Years War to the War of Spanish Succession,” New Cambridge Modern History, v. VI (ed. J. S. Bromley) (Cambridge, 1971), 384.

49. Losskey, New Cambridge Modern History, v. VI, 191 – 192.

50. Quoted in Andreas Osiander, The State System of Europe, 1640 – 1990 (Oxford University Press, 1994), 93 – 94.

51. Ibid., 94 – 95.

52. Watson, 193, 204.

53. Ibid., 198,211.

54. Howard, War in European History, 56.

55. Voltaire, L'Histoire du regne de Louis XIV Chapter 2.

56. Emmerich Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, Book III, Chapter 3, Sections 47 – 48.

57. Quoted in Geoffrey Holmes and William A. Speck, The Divided Society: Parties and Politics in England, 1694 – 1716 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), 96.

58. Quoted in Bernard Fay, Louis XVI ou la fin d‘un monde (Perrin, 1955), 148.

59. New Cambridge Modern History, v. V, 544.

60. Ibid., 546.

61. Ibid., 552.

62. Ibid.

63. Quoted in Craig and George, 20.

64. R. R. Palmer, “Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic to National War,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Paret, 99.

65. See Hubert C. Johnson, Frederick the Great and His Officials (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975).

66. Keegan, History of Warfare.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid., 99.

69. Quoted in Palmer, 105.

70. Indeed his tactical innovations prompted innovative responses to such an extent that even the Prussian oblique order, in Jeremy Black's words, “lost its novelty.” Jeremy Black, “The Seven Years' War,” in The Reader's Companion to Military History, ed. Robert Cowley and Geoffrey Parker (Houghton Mifflin, 1996), 423.

71. By the eve of the French Revolution, Prussia included half a dozen small territories in western Germany that did not border Prussia herself.

72. Frederick II, “Military Testament of 1768,” in Die Werke Friedrichs des Grossen, v. 6 (R. Hobbing, 1912 – 1914, 248; Montesquieu, Oeuvres Complètes, vol. 29 (Gallimard, 1951), 3; and Montesquieu, “Histoire de mon temps, preface of 1775,” in Oeuvres Complètes, v. 2 (Gallimard, 1951), xxxviii.

73. Frederick II, “Politisches Testament von 1752,” in Die Werke Friedrichs des Grossen, v.7 (R. Hobbing, 1912 – 1914), 158. Quoted by Palmer, 105.

74. Consider Palmer, 92 – 93, and Craig and George, 22 – 23.

75. As Palmer has concluded, “The period from 1740 to 1815, opening with the accession of Frederick the Great as king of Prussia and closing with the dethronement of Napoleon as emperor of the French, saw both the perfection of the older style of warfare and the launching of a newer style which in many ways we still follow…. The seventeenth century, while enlarging armies beyond precedent, had advanced the principles of orderly administration and control. It had put a new emphasis on discipline… turned army leaders into public officials, and made armed force into the servant of government.” Palmer, 91.

76. George, 22.

77. Holsti, 90.

78. Evan Luard, War in International Society (Tauris, 1986), 110. See also Evan Luard, Conflict and Peace in the Modern International System: A Study of the Principles of International Order (SUNY Press, 1988).

79. Holsti, 92.

80. Black, European Warfare, 85.

81. Ibid., 94.

CHAPTER EIGHT: FROM STATE-NATIONS TO NATION-STATES: 1776 – 1914

1. Goethe, Faust, The Second Part of the Tragedy, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Doubleday, 1961).

2. William Doyle, The Old European Order, 295 – 296.

3. Ibid.

4. Kennedy, 143. Just as in the first part of the twentieth century, the First World War was known as “the Great War.”

5. Quoted in New Cambridge Modern History, vol. 9, 253.

6. Ibid., 311.

7. Ibid.

8. Osiander, 196 – 197.

9. New Cambridge Modern History, vol. 9, 299.

10. Ibid., 269.

11. Philip Henry, Fifth Earl Stanhope, Notes of Conversations with the Duke of Wellington 1831 – 1851 (J. Murray, 1888), 81.

12. New Cambridge Modern History, vol. 9, 273.

13. See Peter Paret, Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform, 1807 – 1815 (Princeton University Press, 1960), 208; and Peter Paret, Understanding War (Princeton University Press, 1992), 16 – 17.

14. Peter Paret, “Napoleon,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Paret, 126.

15. Howard, War in European History, 83 – 84.

16. Paraphrasing ibid.

17. Charles Tristan de Montholon, Recits de la captivité de l'empereur Napoleon [Paris, 1847], 2:432 – 433; quoted by Paret, “Napoleon,” 127.

18. Paret, “Napoleon,” 129.

19. Ibid., 129 – 130.

20. Cf. David Chandler, “The Right Man in the Right Place: Napoleon Bonaparte and the Battle for Toulon, France,” History Today 49 (June 1999): 35.

21. Black, European Warfare, 187.

22. James H. Billington, Fire in the Minds of Men: Origins of Revolutionary Faith (Transaction, 1999), 160.

23. Consider the following from Act II of Puccini's Tosca.

Sciarrone: Oh such fearful news, your lordship?

Scarpia: Why this air of anxious hurry?

Sciarrone: All our armies are defeated….

Scarpia: All our troops are defeated? Where?

Sciarrone: At Marengo…

Scarpia (impatiently): Yes, go on, man!

Sciarrone: No! Melas was beaten!

(Cavaradossi, who has been listening to Sciarrone with mounting agitation, now in his excitement finds the strength to stand up and confront Scarpia menacingly.)

Cavaradossi: Victorious! Victorious!

God of vengeance appear,

Fill the wicked with fear!

Surge up Liberty,

Crushing all tyranny!

Giacomo Puccini, Tosca, libretto by Giuseppe Giacosa and Luigi Illica after the play by Victorien Sardou, trans. Edmund Tracey (Riverman Press, 1982), 63 – 64.

24. Quoted by André Fugier, La Revolution francaise et l'Empire Napoleonien (Hachette, 1954), 265; quoted in Robert Gildea, Barricades and Borders, Europe 1800 – 1914 (Oxford University Press, 1987), 49.

25. Michael Howard, The Causes of War and Other Essays (Temple Smith, 1983), 27.

26. With the exception of the Russian and Habsburg armies, which were drawn from multinational states. Geoffrey Best, War and Society in Revolutionary Europe, 1770 – 1870 (Leicester University Press, 1982), 255.

27. “A wretch, never named but with curses and jeers!” Lord Byron, The Poetical Works of Lord Byron, “The Irish Avatar” (1910), 107 – 109.

28. See e.g., Sir Charles Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh (Bell, 1950).

29. See e.g., Henry Kissinger, A World Restored (Grosset & Dunlap, 1964).

30. New Treaty of the Allied Powers, April 3,1815 (Vienna) (from the German Papers).

31. Craig and George, 27.

32. On September 21, 1809, Castlereagh fought a duel with Canning to defend his “honor and reputation” after he discovered that the intention to remove him from the cabinet had been long concealed. Canning, who was hit in the leg in the second round of the duel, had managed the concealment, and then denied doing so. Wendy Hinde, Castlereagh (Collins, 1981), 166.

33. Ibid., 99.

34. See Franklin Ford, Europe 1780 – 1830, 2nd ed. (Longman, 1989), 234.

35. Ibid., 276.

36. Quoted by Craig and George, 29.

37. Quoted by Craig and George, 31.

38. Craig and George, 31.

39. Jacques Droz, Europe between the Revolutions, 1815 – 1848 (New York: Harper & Row, 1967).

40. Quoted in Droz, 217.

41. Quoted in Craig and George, 32.

42. Quoted in F. B. Artz, Reaction and Revolution, 1814 – 1832 (Harper & Brothers, 1934), 161.

43. Lieven to Nesselrode, December 4, 1820: St. Petersburg Archive.

44. Quoted in Robert W. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789 – 1914 (Macmillan, 1937), 74.

45. Harold Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna (Constable, 1946), 268.

46. Chateaubriand to Montmorenci, August 13, 1822; see d‘Antioche, Chateaubriand, 342,348.

47. Ford, 288.

48. Paul Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763 – 1848 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).

49. Brendan Simms, “The Transformation of European Politics,” Historical Journal 37 (December 1995): 999 – 1000.

50. Kissinger, A World Restored, 170 – 174.

51. John Lynn, “The Great Question Concerning the Congress of Vienna Is This: Why Was It So Successful?” Reader's Companion to Military History, ed. Robert Cowley and Geoffrey Parker (Houghton Mifflin, 1996), 105.

52. Lord Castlereagh, Second Marquis Londonderry, “Letter to Lord Camden,” September 25, 1793; see Sir Archibald Alsion, Lives of Lord Castlereagh and Sir C. Stewart (Blackwood, 1861), 23.

53. Neumann to Esterhazy, September 21,1822: Vienna State Archives Berichte, 216, ix.

54. Black, European Warfare, 234.

55. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, A.D. 900 – 1990 (Blackwell, 1990), 14; see also Harold Dorn, “The Military Revolution: Military History or History of Europe?” Technology and Culture 32 (1991): 656, “The concept of the military revolution is primarily an attempt to account for the formation of the centralized nation-states of Europe by directing attention to the enormous costs and financial burdens associated with gunpowder weapons and the defensive systems they entailed, costs and burdens that only a politically centralized state could shoulder.”

56. Brian Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change (Princeton University Press, 1991), 14; see also David Kaiser, Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990).

57. Christopher Davdeker, Surveillance, Power, and Modernity (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).

58. The French royal army in 1788 – 1789, on the eve of the revolution, had about 150,000 men; by August 1793 it had reached 645,000 and the leveé en masse then doubled this number.

59. Schroeder, 391.

60. Black, European Warfare, 237.

61. “The advanced technology of steam engines and machine made tools gave Europe decisive economic and military advantages. The improvements to the muzzle loading gun (percussion caps, rifling, etc.) were ominous enough; the coming of the breech loader vastly increasing the rate of fire was an even greater advance; and the Gatling guns, Maxims and light field artillery put the final touches to a new firepower revolu-tion which quite eradicated the chances of successful resistance by indigenous peoples reliant upon older weapons. Furthermore, the steam driven gunboat meant that European power, already supreme in open waters, could be extended inland via major waterways like the Niger, the Indus and the Yangtze.” Kennedy, 150.

62. Black, European Warfare, 15 – 16, 201, n. 62. A recent study has concluded that the Maratha artillery was more advanced than the British on several counts but that their command structure was a shambles, with fatal consequences. At Assaye, Wellington's success owed much to a bayonet charge, scarcely confirming the standard image of Western armies gunning down masses of non-European troops relying on cold steel.

63. Quoted in Michael Glover, Napoleonic Wars (Hippocrene Books, 1979), 129; Kennedy, 133.

64. Mira Kamdar, “Rangoon: A Remembrance of Things Past,” World Policy Journal 16 (Fall 1999): 89.

65. Quoted by Jack R. Pole, Political Representation in England and the Origins of the American Republic (University of California Press, 1966), 441.

66. Black, European Warfare, 195.

67. Michael W. Doyle, Empires (Cornell University Press, 1986), 232.

68. H. G. Wells, The Outline of History (Newnes, 1920), 618.

69. Gildea, 178.

70. Gildea, 179.

71. Gildea, 181.

72. Michael Doyle, Empires (Cornell University Press, 1986), 239.

73. Kissinger, A World Restored, 6.

74. Quoted by Helmut Bohme, The Foundations of the German Empire (Oxford University Press), 113 – 14.

75. Hajo Holborn, “The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Paret, 286.

76. Howard, War in European History, 102.

77. Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War (Allen & Unwin, 1983), 114.

78. Quoted by Holborn, 288.

79. Gunther Rothenberg, “Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment, in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Paret, 296.

80. Howard, War in European History, 111.

81. Quoted by Helmut Bohme, Deutschlands Weg zur Grossmacht (Cologne/Berlin, 1966), 84; in Gildea, 197.

82. Lothar Gall, Bismarck: The White Revolutionary, vol. 1 (trans. J. A. Underwood) (Unwin Hyman 1986) 240

83. Ibid., 239.

84. “Flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movebo!” Die politischen Recen des Fursten Bismarck: Historischkritische Gesammtausg, vol. 2, ed. Horst Kohl (Cotta, 1892 – 1905), 278.

85. Gall, 300.

86. See Georges Bonnin, Bismarck and the Hohenzollern Candidature for the Spanish Throne (Chatto & Windus, 1957), 70 – 71.

87. Gall, 355.

88. Quoted in Gall, 356, and cited there.

89. Winston Churchill, A History of the English-Speaking Peoples: The Great Democracies, vol. 4, (Cassell, 1956 – 1958), 276.

90. Quoted in Gall, 359.

91. Quoted in John A. S. Grenville, Europe Reshaped, 1848 – 1878 (Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1976), 358.

92. Quoted in Henry Kissinger, “Reflections of Bismarck,” in Philosophers and Kings, ed. Dankwart A. Rustow (Braziller, 1970), 918.

93. Kessel, Moltke, 747 – 748; quoted by Rothenberg, 310.

94. James McPherson, Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution (Oxford University Press, 1990), viii; see also Harold Hyman, A More Perfect Union: The Impact of the Civil War and Reconstruction on the Constitution (Knopf, 1973).

95. Bevin Alexander, Robert E. Lee's Civil War (Adams Media Corp., 1998).

96. Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative History (Random House, 1986).

97. New Cambridge Modern History, vol. 11, 273, 284 – 294.

98. See Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, which documents the repeated bankruptcies of kingly and territorial states.

99. Osiander, 312, n. 165, speech by Wilhelm before the Brandenburg regional parliament, February 24, 1892, quoted in Christian Graf von Krockow, Die Deutschen in ihren Jahrhundert, 1890 – 1990 (Rowohlt, 1990), 17.

CHAPTER NINE: THE STUDY OF THE MODERN STATE

1. Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt, Tragic Choices (New York: Norton, 1978).

2. See also Hendrick Spruyt, “Institutional Selection in International Relations: State Anarchy as Order,” International Organization 48(1994): 527.

3. Jeremy Black, War and the World: Military Power and the Fate of Continents, 1450 – 2000 (Yale University Press, 1998), 133. “War is not always won by the big battalions and the determinist economic account that would explain success in international relations in terms of the economic strength of particular states… is open to question.” See also Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War (New York: Basic Books, 1999).

CHAPTER TEN: THE MARKET-STATE

1. In his essay “The Future of the Nation-State,” David Beetham makes a similar assertion: “If we consider European history, then it is only the period from the fifteenth to the nineteenth century that saw the definitive emergence of the centralized state, successfully claiming a monopoly of lawmaking and enforcement power over unified geographical territory and independence from any external authority…. If that process of state formation is comparatively recent in historical terms… it was only as late as the nineteenth century that the idea became widely accepted that the proper boundaries of the state should coincide, not with the particular territory that had been historically acquired by dynastic alliance or conquest, but with a given people, who constituted a nation.” David Beetham, “The Future of the Nation-State,” in The Idea of the Modern State, ed. Gregor McLennan, David Held, and Stuart Hall (Open University Press, 1984), 209.

2. Michael Howard, War and the Nation-State (Clarendon Press, 1978), 103.

3. Gregor Dallas, At the Heart of a Tiger: Clemenceau and His World, 1841 – 1929 (Macmillan, 1993), 501.

4. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Doubleday, 1948), 259.

5. Stalin issued orders to proceed with the development of a Soviet atomic bomb in June 1942, possibly because of information relayed by Klaus Fuchs concerning the Manhattan Project, on which he was working at Los Alamos. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist(December 15, 1967); Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change (New American Library, 1963), 82, n. 5; and David Holloway, “Research Note: Soviet Thermonuclear Development,” International Security 4 (1979 – 1980): 192 – 197.

6. “Tojo Ordered Japan's Own Atomic-Bomb Project: Report,” Agence France-Presse, July 20,1995.

7. Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future of American Power,” Political Science Quarterly 7 (1994).

8. Martin van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 399 – 401.

9. As exemplified by Timothy McVeigh's bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995. See Tom Kenworth and Lois Romano, “Nichols Prosecutor Cites ‘Avalanche of Evidence‘; Closing Arguments Underway in Bombing Trial; Defense Paints Star U.S. Witness as Drug User,” Washington Post, December 16, 1997, A8.

10. Daniel R. Headrick, The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics, 1851 – 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

11. See e.g., Keegan, A History of Warfare, 305 – 306; and Harvey A. DeWeerd, “Churchill, Lloyd George, Clemenceau: The Emergence of the Civilian,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton University Press, 1944), 289.

12. Mary Fulbrook, The Divided Nation: A History of Germany, 1918 – 1990 (Oxford University Press, 1991), 296.

13. Eric Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994).

14. Ralph Bryant, “Global Change: Increasing Economic Integration and Eroding Political Sovereignty,” Brookings Review 12 (1994): 42.

15. Quoted in Jeffrey A. Friden, Banking on the World: The Politics of International Finance (Harper & Row, 1987), 114 – 115; see also Walter Wriston, “Technology and Sovereignty,” Foreign Affairs 67 (1988): 63.

16. The Bush administration that took office in 2001 was, in this respect, a continuation of its predecessor, the Clinton administration. Clinton and Blair were joined in the pursuit of this new order by the Schroeder government in Germany as well. William Boston, “The Battle for Berlin: Does Gerhard Schroeder Have What It Takes to Modernize Europe's Largest Economy?” Wall Street Journal, September 29, 1999, R12; and William Drozdiak, “U.S. Urges ‘Third Way' between European Left and Right,” Washington Post, August 20,1998, A23.

17. Mancias, 192: “The ideology of democracy, freedom and equality provided much of the conceptual material for the legitimation of the state. But it may be that… these ideas now persuade too much.”

18. See, e.g., “State of the First Amendment Survey” conducted by the Center for Survey Research and Analysis, University of Connecticut, Feb. 26 – Mar. 24, 1999; see also Institute for Research in Social Science, University of North Carolina, July 19, 1991, Virginia Commonwealth Poll, match #4.

19. In Poland, the media “raised expectations, then fueled frustration. It spread official propaganda; it also provided alternative information.” Tomasz Goban-Klas, The Orchestration of the Media: The Politics of Mass Communications in Communist Poland and the Aftermath (Westview Press, 1994), 4.

20. Or in unusual cases like the BBC, partly independent, partly government controlled, the media organization is driven to seek audiences of the size of those captured by those networks that are seeking consumers.

21. Michael Howard, “Reflections on Strategic Deception,” Faculty Seminar on British Studies, University of Texas at Austin, 1994.

22. See the excellent essay by A. Michael Froomkin, “The Internet as a Source of Regulatory Arbitrage,” Borders in Cyberspace: Information Policy and the Global Information Infrastructure, ed. Brian Kahin and Charles Nesson (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997).

23. Robert Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes: A Biography (London: Macmillan, 1983).

24. Mark V. Tushnet, “The Supreme Court 1998 Term, Foreword,” 113 Harvard Law Review (1999), 26; see also Betty Sue Flowers, “The Economic Myth” (Center for International Business Education and Research, Graduate School Business, University of Texas at Austin, December 1995).

25. Hopwood v. State of Texas, 999 F. Supp. 872 (1998).

26. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973); and Griswold v. Connecticut, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965).

27. Michael Walzer, “The Concept of Civil Society,” in Toward a Global Civil Society, ed. M. Walzer (Berghahn Books, 1995), 13,17 (emphasis supplied).

28. Ibid., 13.

29. See Peter Drucker, The Post-Capitalist Society (Harper Business, 1993) and Peter Drucker, “The Post-Capitalist World,” Public Interest 109 (1992): 89; Peter Drucker, “The Age of Social Transformation,” Atlantic Monthly, November 1994, 53.

30. It is often said that we owe to Einstein and the theory of relativity the new and characteristic point of view of this century, perhaps, it is said, even something of our “relativism” in ethics. Like the Copernican revolution that reoriented man in the solar system, this intellectual breakthrough is thought to have reoriented contemporary man. I doubt this. In the first place (unlike the ideas of Copernicus and Kepler), there is nothing in the general or special theories of relativity that has much to do with the ordinary perceptions of everyday life. Second, there is nothing in Einstein's theories—except possibly the names of the theories themselves—that bears on relativism. Einstein's point, in fact, seems if anything rather the opposite: energy and mass can be related by virtue of their common relation to a constant, the speed of light. Third, there is another candidate that is more appropriate to this role. Einstein believed, when he presented the special theory of relativity, that the universe was composed of a single galaxy. Hubble has shown us that this is not the case, indeed that it is so far from being the case that our peripheral position in a peripheral galaxy appears to reduce us to cosmic insignificance. It is Hubble's observations that have, and will have, a profound effect on the attitude of every person to his or her life. How each person reacts to this repositioning is partly a matter of temperament, I suppose, but everyone will feel something, perhaps something like nothingness.

31. Michael Howard, War and the Nation-State (Clarendon Press, 1978), 14.

32. “Government Cleared in 1993 Branch Davidian Deaths,” Houston Chronicle, September 21, 2000, A17.

33. Sanford Levinson, “The Embarrassing Second Amendment,” Yale Law Journal 99 (1989): 637.

34. Here again, the fundamental difference between the American idea of popular sovereignty and the European idea surfaces. Whereas Europeans and Americans can agree that “a legitimate monopoly on the use of violence lies with the state, whose forces can only use violence on the authorization of responsible political leaders,” the American view holds that the right to delegate this monopoly to the State lies with the people, who, as they have done in the Second Amendment, may take a residual interest, as it were, in the monopoly. The European view assumes that the State, being sovereign, has been fully delegated the sovereignty of the people and thus has the monopoly so long as it can keep it. These fundamental differences are discussed in Philip Bobbitt, Three Dogmas of Sovereignty (unpublished manuscript).

35. William R. Hawkins, “The Transformation of War,” National Review, April 1991, 50.

36. And though voting mechanisms will persist, even flourish in the private sector—you will vote for the chairman of the condo association, for the trustees of the charter school, and the like—these mechanisms may be weighted just as shareholder voting is “weighted” in those institutions that reflect, rather than serve as counterweights (churches, synagogues) to, the market-state.

37. David Butler and Austin Ranney, Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978), 34.

38. Also consider James S. Fishkin's Center for Deliberative Polling, which attempts to determine how the public would vote if it were properly educated about the issues (http://www.la.utexas.edu/research/delpol/bluebook/summary.html).

39. Baker v. Carr, 82 S. Ct. 691 (1962); and Reynolds v. Sims, 84 S. Ct. 1362 (1964).

40. Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future of American Power,” Political Science Quarterly 109 (Spring 1994): 5.

41. Robert E. Litan and William D. Nordhaus, Reforming Federal Regulation (Yale University Press, 1983), 157.

CHAPTER ELEVEN: STRATEGIC CHOICES

1. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

2. Alan Tonelson, “Superpower without a Sword,” Foreign Affairs 72 (Summer 1993): 166 – 182.

3. It is noteworthy that during the Gulf War, not one son or daughter of a member of Congress went off to war. Patrick J. Buchanan, “America's new nationalism: The new political fault line is emerging, and it will be drawn over prosperity at home vs. aid abroad,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, January 3, 1994, D3

4. Alan Tonelson, “Tremors across the America First fault line: Fearful opposition,” Washington Times, February 18, 1992, E1.

5. U.S. Congressional Research Service.

6. Alexander Haig, interview with Fox News, January 14, 2001.

7. Alan Tonelson, “Beyond Left and Right: New Thinking in Foreign Policy,” Current, May 1994, 39.

8. Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwarz, “No New World Order: America after the Cold War,” Current, December 1993, 26, 27.

9. “Lord Salisbury, the British prime minister at the beginning of this century, once said in exasperation about his military advisers that if they had their way they would garrison the moon to protect us from an attack from Mars.” Michael Howard, The Lessons of History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991).

10.As quoted in Benjamin Schwarz and Christopher Layne, “The Case against Intervention in Kosovo,” The Nation, April 19,1999,11.

11. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press, 1970); Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend, For and Against Method: Including Lakatos's Lectures on Scientific Method and the Lakatos-Feyerabend Correspondence, ed. Matteo Motterlini (University of Chicago Press, 1999).

12. James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

13. James Chace, The Consequences of the Peace: The New Internationalism and American Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

14. Though that day of parity may still be a ways off.

15. Richard N. Rosecrance, The Rise of the Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the Coming Century (New York: Basic Books, 1999).

16. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997).

17. The Western European Union is a body established in 1955 to facilitate coordination of European security and defense matters. It may soon be supplanted by the European Union's new Rapid-Reaction Force.

18. John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983).

19. Kenneth Neal Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981).

20. A free rider is an agent who exploits a service provided by another without paying for it. New Zealand, for example, benefits from the United States's nuclear deterrent without paying for it, by, for example, allowing U.S. nuclear submarines to use New Zealand harbors.

21. James B. Steinberg, “Sources of Conflict and Tools for Stability: Planning for the Twenty-first Century” (Address at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, June 14, 1994), Department of State Dispatch, vol. 5, July 11, 1994,464.

22. George Kennan, The Cloud of Danger: Current Realities of American Foreign Policy (Little, Brown, 1977), 41 – 42.

23. Tony Smith, “Making the World Safe for Democracy,” Washington Quarterly 16 (1993): 207.

24. Alexander Hamilton, Federalist Paper #6. Hamilton wrote “Republics” where I have substituted “Democracies.” Hamilton clearly did not mean the latter as he understood the distinction, but contemporary readers today will better grasp this point, I think, if this substitution is made.

25. Graham E. Fuller, The Democracy Trap: The Perils of the Post–Cold War World (Dutton, 1991).

26. Charley Reese, “Clinton Continues U.S. Tradition of Hypocritical Meddling Abroad,” Orlando Sentinel, May 11, 1993, A8.

27. Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs 70 (1991): 23, 24, 27.

28. William E. Odom, “NATO's Expansion: Why the Critics Are Wrong,” National Interest, Spring 1995, 38.

29. Krauthammer, 25.

30. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, “A Normal Country in a Normal Time,” National Interest, Fall 1990,40 – 44.

31. Krauthammer, 27.

32. Richard N. Haass, “Paradigm Lost,” Foreign Affairs 74 (1995): 43,44.

33. Available at www.rice.edu/projects/baker/pubs/workingpapers/efac/jan21.html.

34. Bobbitt, Democracy and Deterrence, 283.

35. For an elaboration of the argument for this conclusion, I refer the reader to Calabresi and Bobbitt, Tragic Choices.

36. “Instrucción que dio el Conde Duque a Felipe I,” British Museum, Egerton MS 347, fos. 249 – 290.

37. It is not only intellectuals who make this error. Insofar as the movement toward a European Defense Initiative is, for many, merely a political station on the way to an integrated European defense system, coordinated by the European Union, it reflects a similar disposition, because such a defense arrangement requires a fundamental constitutional modification of the nation-states of Europe in the direction of a superstate.

CHAPTER TWELVE: STRATEGY AND THE MARKET-STATE

1. William Poundstone, Prisoner's Dilemma: John von Neumann, Game Theory, and the Puzzle of the Bomb (New York: Doubleday, 1992).

2. Lamar Smith, “Immigration and Welfare Reform: Finally, Taxpayers Are Being Considered,” USA Today, March 1, 1997, 30. See also George Borjas, “Immigration and Welfare Benefits,” Congressional Testimony, March 12, 1996. For a contrasting view, see James Bornemeier, “Study Says Newcomers Give More Than They Take,” Portland Oregonian, December 1, 1995, A1.

3. On February 23, 1996, the Outstanding Public Debt was $5,017,056,630,040.53. This was the first time in history the U.S. national debt surpassed the $5 trillion mark.

4. R. W. Apple, Jr., “Poll Shows Disenchantment with Politicians and Politics,” International Herald Tribune, August 14, 1995, 3, reporting on New York Times/CBS Poll; ironically this was reported a few pages away from a rather snide New York Times attack on the Clintons for refusing to reveal their private tax returns from the mid-1980s, suggesting that “the Clintons owe it to the public to… waive their privacy rights at the IRS” and concluding that until the Whitewater independent counsel publishes his report one cannot know whether the President and the First Lady “were truthful,” “The Whitewater Tax Questions,” 6.

5. Robert M. Dunn, Jr., “Has the U.S. Economy Really Been Globalized?” Washington Quarterly, Winter 2001, 54.

6. See the proposal by Ronald Asmus, Robert Blackwill, and F. Stephen Larrabee, “Can NATO Survive?” Washington Quarterly, Spring 1996, 79, for an expansion of a NATO agenda.

7. See the excellent recent books on this subject by Richard Haass, Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post –War World (Brookings Institution, 1994); and The Reluctant Sheriff (Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1997).

8. James Kurth, “The Decline and Fall of Almost Everything: Paul Kennedy Peers into the Future (‘Preparing for the 21st Century’),” Foreign Affairs 72 (Spring 1993): 162. “The best way—for a nation and a person—to prepare for the 21st century will be what has always been the best way to prepare for uncertainty. That is to rely not so much upon the outer supports of plans, programs and policies but upon the inner strengths of character—resiliency and resourcefulness, discipline and cooperation, endurance and courage, and, perhaps above all, faith and hope.” See also James Fallows, More like Us: Making America Great Again (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989).

9. For an excellent analysis, see Richard O. Hundley, Past Revolutions, Future Transformations: What Can the History of Revolutions in Military Affairs Tell Us about Transforming the U.S. Military? (Rand, 1999).

10. “One set of possibilities relates to future advances in sensor technology; these are opening up unused portions of the electromagnetic spectrum that, when matched with improved computational capabilities and deployment in space, offer the prospect for a truly transparent battlefield…. [E]lectronic systems may be redesigned so that they will be virtually undetectable.” Dan Goure, “Is There a Military-Technical Revolution in America's Future?” Washington Quarterly 16 (1993): 179.

11. Ibid., 175.

12. Carter and Perry, 135. This change “began in the 1970's with the development of satellite reconnaissance, smart weapons, cruise missiles, stealth aircraft, and other breakthroughs that would not have been possible without the microchip…”

13. Eliot Cohen, “A Revolution in Warfare,” Foreign Affairs 75 (1996): 37. “Admiral William Owens, former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has written of a ‘system of systems’: through an integrated network of powerful computers and high-speed communications. This will transform the way commanders and troops see and communicate on the battlefield. In the past, information was passed around the battlefield via radio conversations or typewritten messages. Commanders got only a fraction of the information they could really use in combat. With the system of systems envisioned in Force 21, commanders will have the ability to send and receive, in digital bursts, critical information about the location of enemy and friendly forces: the rate of use of food, fuel, and ammunition; the progress of current operations; and plans for future operations.“The effect on combat operations will be revolutionary. Every commander will have ‘battlefield awareness’: a constant, complete, three-dimensional picture of the battlefield. Every field unit will be better able to carry out its commander's orders because it will be able to see more clearly through the ‘fog of battle.’ An entire division will be able to fight as a single integrated combat system.“In battle, when a tank commander spots enemy forces, he will have a choice. He could engage the enemy with the weapons on his tanks, or he could call in attack helicopters, artillery, strike aircraft, or naval gunfire. Because of digital technology… these other units will see exactly what the tank commander sees…. As combat is underway, the supporting logistics unit will monitor the ammunition usage, so it will be able to resupply at the time and amount needed, thereby reducing the huge logistics tail otherwise needed to support combat operations.” Carter and Perry, 199.

14. Cohen, 38.

15. It had caused a complete reworking of American nuclear strategy and prompted the introduction into Europe of fast-reacting Pershing II missiles and survivable ground-launched cruise missiles.

16. Jeffrey R. Cooper, “Another View of the Revolution in Military Affairs,” in In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age, ed. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997), 114.

17. Future Visions for U.S. Defense Policy, the Council on Foreign Relations Defense Policy Review, ed. John Hillen (Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), 5 – 6.

18. Les Aspin, address to Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, Washington, D.C., September 21, 1992, reprinted in Richard Haass, Intervention, 183 – 190.

19. See e.g., “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement,” The White House, February 1995; and see also “Annual Report to the President and the Congress,” William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense (1999), 3 – 4.

20. General Colin S. Powell, remarks to defense writers' group, September 23 1993, quoted in Harry G. Summers, The New World Strategy: A Military Policy for America's Future (Simon & Schuster, 1995), 139.

21. Paul Bracken defines this list a little differently, treating the “C” class candidates as states that, though they suffer problems rather than pose threats—for example, problems such as ethnic civil war (Yugoslavia), insurgency (Peru), terrorism (Egypt), civil disorder (Somalia), or infiltration such as by narcotics flows—these states nevertheless can impose demands on the U.S. military. Paul Bracken, “The Military After Next,” The Washington Quarterly 16 (Autumn 1993): 157.

22. T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness (Pocket Books, 1963).

23. This study was highly controversial insofar as it seemed to imply that current allies might become future competitors. See Patrick Taylor, “Pentagon Drops Goal of Blocking New Superpowers,” The New York Times, May 24, 1992, Ai; Barton Gellman, “Keeping the U.S. First; Pentagon Would Preclude a Rival Superpower,” Washington Post, March 11, 1992, A1. See also Francis Fukuyama, “The Beginning of Foreign Policy,” The New Republic, August 17, 1992, 24.

24. Bracken, 157.

25. Goure, 31.

26. Jeffrey Cooper, “Another View of the Revolution in Military Affairs,” in In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age, ed. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997), 114.

27. This figure comes from Dr. Hans Mark, former director for defense research and engineering at the United States Department of Defense.

28. Cohen, 50.

29. “An analogy might be Germany's acquisition of a modern air force in the space of less than a decade in the 1930s. At a time when civilian and military aviation technologies did not diverge too greatly, Germany could take the strongest civilian aviation industry in Europe and within a few years convert it into enormous military power, much as the United States would do a few years later with its automobile industry.” Cohen, 51.

30. Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler, “A Report Card on the Department of Energy's Nonproliferation Programs with Russia,” The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, United States Department of Energy, January 10, 2001.

31. Carter and Perry, 76 – 77.

32. Cohen, 51.

33. See Paul Bracken, “The Military after Next,” 161. Clifford Rogers notes that although the technology has been perfected, when military organizations failed either to restructure effectively, whether through lack of funds or organizational insight, they failed to achieve the benefits of revolutionary increase in military effectiveness. Clifford J. Rogers, “The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years War,” The Journal of Military History (April 1993): 241– 278.

34. Cohen, 53.

35. Goure, 180.

36. “To the extent that the defense sector increases its dependence on the commercial sector for the ability to support and reconstitute its forces, it will be further pushed in the direction of a revolution by necessity.” Ibid.

37. “Virtually no one is considering [conflicts] where the next military will face competition from its peers or from major regional competitors that can adversely affect U.S. interests in key regions. This is terra incognita,” Bracken, 166.

38. Josef Joffe, “Bismarck or Britain?: Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity,” International Security 19 (Spring 1995): 31 – 32.

39. Joffe describes this as “a demand for [American] services, and that translates into political profits,” and he suggests that “[t]hese revenues can be nicely invested elsewhere, e.g., [in gaining] America's access to the [European] Single Market. To be in a position where all the powers need us… would clearly help the United States to improve the political terms of trade vis-à-is the E.U. and to contain neo-mercantilism in general.” Joffe, 113.

40. Carter and Perry, 56 – 57.

41. Ibid., 27.

42. Ibid., 42.

43. Ibid., 47.

44. Ibid., 120 – 121.

45. Martin C. Libicki, “Informational War and Peace,” Journal of International Affairs 51 (1998): 420 – 421.

46. Joseph Nye and William Owens, “America's Information Edge,” Foreign Affairs 75 (1996): 21, 28.

47. Kees van der Heijden, Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation (Wiley, 1997), 2.

48. Ibid., 8, 7.

49. Bracken, 162.

50. See Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War (Public Affairs, 2001).

51. Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,” International Security 21 (1997): 50 – 51. The Clinton administration, in its second term, plainly took these lessons of the first term to heart when it determined to prosecute a humanitarian intervention in Kosovo through the use of precision air strikes.

52. Joffe, 2.

53. Edward Luttwak, “Toward Post-Heroic Warfare,” Foreign Affairs 74 (1995): 115.

54. See Colin L. Powell, “U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead,” Foreign Affairs 72 (1993): 32; and Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (Warner Books, 1990).

55.Luttwak, 109, 112.

56. Bobbitt, Democracy and Deterrence, 101 – 102.

57. Ibid., 102.

58. Roger Hilsman, “Does the CIA Still Have a Role?” Foreign Affairs 74 (1995): 104

59. “The key professional argument advanced by the most senior U.S. military chiefs to reject all proposals to employ U.S. offensive air power in Bosnia rested on the implicit assumption… that only decisive results are worth having…” Luttwak, 120 – 121.

60. Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (Random House, 1998), 142 – 158.

61. Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo (Brookings Institution, 2000), 231.

62. Ibid., 4.

63. Ibid., 233.

64. “The rise of information technologies [has led to] the development of intelligent weapons that can guide themselves to their targets [but this] is only one and not necessarily the most important. The variety and ever-expanding capabilities of intelligence-gathering machines and the ability of computers to bring together and distribute to users the masses of information from these sources stem [also] from the information revolution.” Eliot Cohen, “A Revolution in Warfare,” Foreign Affairs 75 (1996): 37.

65. “Spacecast 2020” (Air University, June 1994).

66. Andrew F. Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolution,” National Interest (Fall 1994): 30 – 41.

67. Raffi Gregorian, “Global Positioning Systems: A Military Revolution for the Third World?” SAIS Review 13 (1993): 133.

68. For a more skeptical view of missile defense, see Joseph Cirincione and Frank von Hippel, The Last Fifteen Minutes: Ballistic Missile Defense in Perspective (Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, 1996).

69. Keith Payne, “Post-Cold War Deterrence and Missile Defense,” Orbis 39 (1995): 203.

70. Hans Mark, “Pentagon Official Touts Sea-Based Missile Defense,” Aerospace Daily, September 1, 1999, 344.

71. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 260.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN: THE WARS OF THE MARKET-STATE

1. Machiavelli, Discoursi (Modern Library, 1950), 104.

2. Bodin, 200.

3. See Hume's remark that the “greatness of the state” and “the happiness of its subjects” had become interdependent. David Hume, “Of Commerce,” in Essays, Morals, Political and Literary (Oxford University Press, 1963), 1753.

4. Pole, Political Representation in England, 441.

5. Burke and Napoleon, Lenin and Wilson: how surprised they might be that, in retrospect, they were struggling to give pre-eminence to the same constitutional order.

6. See Charles Tilly, European Revolutions, 1492 – 1992 (Blackwell, 1993), which focuses on the role of revolution in state formation. See also Michael Richards, “How to Succeed in Revolution without Really Trying,” Journal of Social History 28 (1995): 883.

7. Howard, “War and the Nation State,” in The State, ed. Stephen Graubard (Norton, 1979), 101 – 110.

8. Geoffrey Parker, “Continuity and Change in Western Geopolitical Thought during the Twentieth Century,” International Social Science Journal 43 (1991): 21.

9. Friedberg, “The Future of American Power,” 1.

10. Anthony Giddens, The Nation State and Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

11. Peter Mancias, The Death of the State (New York: Putnam, 1974).

12. D. Beetham, “The Future of the Nation-State,” in The Idea of the Modern State, ed. Gregor McLennan, David Held, and Stuart Hall (Open University Press, 1984), 208 – 222.

13. Hans Mark in his commencement address at St. Edwards University, Austin, Texas, Saturday, May 8, 1993.

14. See John Lynn, “Clio in Arms: The Role of the Military Variable in Shaping History,” Journal of Military History 55 (1991): 83 – 95. See also Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and the European States, A.D. 90 – 1990 (Blackwell, 1990); David Kaiser, Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler (Harvard University Press, 1990); Brian M. Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change in Early Modern Europe (Princeton University Press, 1991); Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500 – 1800 (Cambridge University Press, 1988); and David Ralston, Importing the European Army: The Introduction of European Military Techniques and Institutions into the Extra-European World, 1600 – 1914 (University of Chicago Press, 1990); Jeremy Black, War and the World: Military Power and the Fate of Continents, 1450 – 2000 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

15. See e.g. Norman Angell, The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage (Heinemann, 1910); Arthur Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations (Macmillan, 1947), 238 – 247.

16. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72 (1993): 22.

17. “Insights and Action Items for U.S. Global Relations in the 21st Century,” Report of the Project on the Future of Global Relations, 1997.

18. Bill Clinton, “Remarks on the Reinventing Government Initiative,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 30, 1994, 1763.

19. Bill Clinton, “Remarks to the Joint Session of the Louisiana State Legislature in Baton Rouge, Louisiana,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 32, 1996, 969.

20. Ibid.

21. Bill Clinton, “Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 33, 1997, 136.

22. Bill Clinton, “Inaugural Address,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 33, 1997, 60. Nor is the executive the only branch of government leading the movement toward the market-state in the United States. As Mark Tushnet has observed, the U.S. Supreme Court's “federalism decisions are the most obvious examples…. United States v. Lopez, which struck down the Gun-Free Zones Act as beyond the power given Congress in the Commerce Clause; Printz v. United States, which invalidated the Brady Handgun Control Act because it forced state executive officials to implement a national program; City of Boerne v. Flores, which invalidated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act for exceeding the scope of Congress's power to remedy court-identified violations of the Free Exercise Clause; and a series of deci-sions restricting Congress's ability to impose retroactive monetary liability on states because such remedies violated the Eleventh Amendment.” Mark V. Tushnet, “The Supreme Court 1998 Term, Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration,” 113 Harvard Law Review 26 (1999).

INTRODUCTION: THE ORIGIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

1. See Machiavelli's chapters in The Prince on “dangling the carrot” and “brandishing the stick” for a view of the state in strategic terms, i.e., those that aim for collective aggrandizement with, in principle, no limits. See Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, Chapters XV and XVII. Clifford Orwin, “Machiavelli's Unchristian Charity,” American Political Science Review 72 (1978): 1217 – 1228.

2. Stanley Hoffmann, “Politics among the Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,” The Atlantic, November 1985, 134.

3. Michael Howard, The Causes of War and Other Essays, 27.

4. Philip Bobbitt, Three Dogmas of Sovereignty.

5. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 75.

6. Hedley Bull, “The Emergence of a Universal International Society,” in The Expansion of International Society, ed. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Oxford University Press, 1984), 117.

7. Montesquieu, Oeuvres Complétes, vol. 2 (Gallimard, 1951), 237.

8. “Barbarus” is the Latin word for foreigner.

9. Murray Forsyth, “The Tradition of International Law,” in Traditions of International Ethics, ed. Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 24.

10. Ibid.

11. Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society, 8. The most important of these limitations arises from the constitutional order of the State because this governs strategy, which is the exercise of the state's power abroad.

12. Anne-Marie Slaughter, “The Real New World Order,” Foreign Affairs 76 (1997): 183, 195.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN: COLONEL HOUSE AND A WORLD MADE OF LAW

1. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. 1, 16.

2. Ibid., 45.

3. Ibid., 46.

4. Ibid., 62.

5. Ibid., 126.

6. Profiles in Power: Twentieth Century Texans in Washington, ed. Kenneth E. Hendrickson, Jr., and Michael L. Collins (Harlan Davidson, 1993), 5.

7. Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. 1,114.

8. B. W. Huebsch letter, House Files, Yale University.

9. Ibid.

10. Portland (Maine) Evening Telegram, November 30, 1912.

11. Dallas Morning News, December 30, 1912.

12. Hartford Courant, December 13, 1912.

13. Trenton Advertiser, January 5, 1913.

14. Philadelphia Public Ledger, January 12, 1913.

15. “Literary Gossip,” Los Angeles Times, February 2, 1913.

16. Cincinnati Enquirer, December 12, 1912.

17. The New York Times, January 26, 1913.

18. Los Angeles Times, February 2, 1913.

19. Philadelphia Public Ledger, January 27, 1913; see also LaFollette's, Madison, Wisconsin, March 29, 1913.

20. Chicago Record Herald, November 28, 1912.

21. Zion's Herald, February 19, 1913, Boston: “It would be much more interesting to know. For after all, it makes a difference who says a thing.”

22. Los Angeles Times, March 30, 1913.

23. Milwaukee, Wisconsin, January 18, 1913: the “story is rather amateurish in places,” Chicago News, January 18, 1913.

24. Walter Lippmann, “America's Future Pictured in a Decidedly Quaint Novel,” New York Times Book Review, December 8, 1912, 4.

25. Franklin K. Lane, The Letters of Franklin K. Lane, ed. Anne Wintermute Lane and Louise Herrick Wall (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1922).

26. Daniel P. Moynihan, On the Law of Nations (Harvard University Press, 1990), 1.

27. “Why We Went to War: President Wilson's Famous Address at the Opening of the War Congress, April 2, 1917,” in President Wilson's Great Speeches and Other History Making Documents (Stanton and Van Vliet, 1919), 17.

28. See Joyce Williams, Colonel House and Sir Edward Grey: A Study in Anglo-American Diplomacy (University Press of America, 1984), 22 – 29.

29. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. 1, 240 (diary date 5/9/13).

30. Almost identical to a plan set out in Philip Dru.

31. G. M. Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon (Longmans, Green, 1946), 271.

32. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. 1, 262.

33. Ibid., 274 – 275.

34. Indeed, Spring-Rice, the British ambassador to the United States, thought that House's mission had precipitated the German action toward Austria because it signaled to the war party in Berlin that U.S. mediation might weaken their hand with the kaiser. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. I, 286 – 287.

35. Ibid.

36. George W. Egerton, Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations: Strategy, Politics and International Organization, 1914 – 1919 (University of North Carolina Press, 1978), citing Grey to Spring-Rice, December 22, 1914, F.O. 800/84. See also Trevelyan, 314 – 315. House's initial reply—that the United States could not become a party to any agreement binding members to enforce the observance of treaties, see Egerton, 25—seems to have been based on constitutional grounds having to do with the war powers of the executive. See Philip Bobbitt, “War Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely's War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath,” Michigan Law Review 92 (1994): 1364; (arguing that the United States can go to war on the basis of a ratified treaty without further congressional action); see also Philip Bobbitt, Three Dogmas of Sovereignty (noting that Congress can also supersede a treaty by statute and thus that the U.S. treaty commitment is only conditional, posing the possibility that U.S. constitutional law—the basis of congressional supersession—might come into conflict with doctrines of international law, e.g., pacta sunt servanda).

37. The Nation, March 14, 1914, quoted in A.J.P. Taylor, The Trouble Makers: Dissent over Foreign Policy, 1792 – 1939 (Indiana University Press, 1958), 115.

38. Egerton, 25.

39. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. I, 364.

40. Zimmerman to House, March 21, 1915.

41. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. 1, 433 – 434.

42. House Files, Yale University.

43. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. 2, 89.

44. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. 2, 90 – 91.

45. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. 2, 98.

46. Hildebrand in Profiles in Power, 17.

47. Patrick Devlin, Too Proud to Fight: Woodrow Wilson's Neutrality (Oxford University Press, 1974), 473.

48. Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., “A Soldier's Faith: An address delivered on Memorial Day, May 30, 1895, at a meeting called by the graduating class of Harvard University” (Research Publications, 1984). On this change, as on so many other subjects, Michael Howard has written with insight. See Michael Howard, The Causes of War and Other Essays, 27.

49. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. 2, 359.

50. “The Making of a President,” in Philip Dru, 89 – 90.

51. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. 2, 359 (just as, in 1996, President Clinton ran for governor, as it were, on issues of crime, welfare reform, and the domestic economy).

52. No Democratic candidate save Madison and Buchanan had won the presidency without New York.

53. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. 2, 361.

54. Devlin, 686.

55. Woodrow Wilson, “An Address to a Joint Session of Congress,” April 2, 1917, in Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 41, ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton University Press, 1966 – 1992), 526 – 527.

56. Devlin, 679.

57. New York Times, September 4, 1918; see also U.S. Cong. Rec., 2d sess., vol. LVI, part 10, p. 9875 (Sept. 3, 1918).

58. The quoted passage above, see TAN 559, describing the organization of the campaign is taken from Selwyn and almost perfectly tracks House's memo to Wilson. Compare the following extracts, the first from Philip Dru, the second a campaign memo by House from June 1916.

“He began by eliminating all the states he knew the opposition party would certainly carry, but he told the party leaders there to claim that a revolution was brewing, and that a landslide would follow at the election. This would keep his antagonists busy and make them less effective elsewhere.

“He also ignored the states where his side was sure to win. In this way he was free to give his entire thoughts to the twelve states that were debatable, and upon whose votes the election would turn. He divided each of these states into units containing five thousand voters, and, at the national headquarters, he placed one man in charge of each unit. Of the five thousand, he roughly calculated there would be two thousand voters that no kind of persuasion could turn from his party and two thousand that could not be changed from the opposition. This would leave one thousand doubtful ones to win over. So he had a careful poll made in each unit, and eliminated the strictly unpersuadable partymen, and got down to a complete analysis of the debatable one thousand. Information was obtained as to their race, religion, occupation and former political predilection. It was easy then to know how to reach each individual by literature, by persuasion or perhaps by some more subtle argument. No mistake was made by sending the wrong letter or the wrong man to any of the desired one thousand.

“In the states so divided, there was, at the local headquarters, one man for each unit just as at the national headquarters. So these two had only each other to consider, and their duty was to bring to Rockland a majority of the one thousand votes within their charge. The local men gave the conditions, the national men gave the proper literature and advice, and the local men then applied it. The money that it cost to maintain such an organization was more than saved from the waste that would have occurred under the old method.” E. M. House, Philip Dru: Administra-tor (Huebsch, 1912), 89–90.

“House's Plan of Campaign, June 20, 1916. In preparing the organization I would suggest that the following States be classified in this way:

“Class 1. Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Maryland, West Virginia, Indiana, Missouri, Wyoming, Arizona, and New Mexico.

“Class 2. Maine, Massachusetts, Ohio, Illinois, Colorado, California, Oregon, and Washington.

“Class 3. Rhode Island, Wisconsin, Michigan, Minnesota, Iowa.

“We should put forth our maximum effort in the States of Class 1, a strong effort in those of Class 2, and a lesser effort in those of Class 3.

“There are seven states in Class 1 of prime importance, which we should and must carry. These States should be divided into units of not larger than 100,000 voters.

“By having the State organizations cooperate closely with the national organization, it will not be over-difficult to have the certain Republican and certain Democratic voters of these units segregated. This can be done by writing to the precinct chairmen in those units and obtaining from them lists of the entire electorate, putting the absolutely certain Republicans and absolutely certain Democrats in one class and the fluctuating voters in another.

“This independent vote should be classified as to race, religion, and former affiliations. Roughly speaking, we must assume that in a unit of 100,000 voters, eighty per cent of them will be unchangeable voters, which would leave twenty per cent that can be influenced by argument.

“The size of these units must necessarily depend upon the size of our campaign fund. If it is small, a larger unit will have to be considered; if sufficient money is raised, a smaller unit can be made. The smaller the unit the more successful, of course, will be the result.

“Literature, letters in sealed envelopes, and personal appeals should be made to each of these doubtful voters.

“One member of the Campaign Committee should be placed in charge of the organization of these units, with nothing else to do. He, in turn, should place one man in charge of each unit. The duty of this man should be to keep in touch not only with the State Executive Committee of his particular unit, but also with each one of the doubtful voters in that unit.” The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. 2, 361 – 362.

59. Philip Dru, 44 – 45

60. Ronald Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century (Little, Brown, 1980), 127, n. 18

61. Steel, 166.

62. Steel, 130.

63. Steel, 125.

64. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. 3, 316, et seq.

65. Eugene V. Rostow, Toward Managed Peace: The National Security Interests of the United States, 1759 to the Present (Yale University Press, 1993), 218.

66. W. M. Knight Patterson, Germany from Defeat to Conquest (Allen & Unwin, 1945), 137.

67. Woodrow Wilson, “President Wilson's Address to Congress Analyzing German and Austrian Peace Utterances,” Joint Session, February 11, 1918,” in The Messages and Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 1 (Review of Reviews Corporation, 1924), 475.

68. Paul M. Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 272.

69. Arthur Bryant, Unfinished Victory, 32, noted in Roy Denman, Missed Chances (Cassell, 1993), Chapter 2, note 3.

70. Roy Denman, Missed Chances, 31.

71. Denman, 32.

72. House Files, Yale University.

73. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. 4, 361.

74. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. 4, 362.

75. Edith B. Wilson, My Memoir (Bobbs-Merrill, 1939), 245 – 246.

76. See A. H. Robertson, Human Rights in the World: An Introduction to the Study of the International Protection of Human Rights (New York: St. Martin's, 1982), 118 – 125.

77. H. Kissinger, “The New Face of Diplomacy: Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles, Diplomacy (Simon & Schuster, 1994), 218 – 245. My treatment is completely at odds with the charge of Colonel House's alleged agreement to sidetrack the league into a separate “annex” in order to conclude the conference, a charge that appeared conspicuously in Mrs. Wilson's Memoirs and in an article by her confidant, Wilson's physician, and that has now regrettably become an accepted part of the received history of this period. Not only does Mrs. Wilson's view lead to many historiographical anomalies, it wholly misreads House's tactics, which endeavored to save the Wilsonian program.

78. “Seton-Watson,… an eloquent advocate of the Slav claims… [had] helped me draw up a boundary line between the two nationalities which was much nearer the truth… In this way [House and I] tossed about free cities and played ducks and drakes with not a few islands, and we certainly whittled down the territory which both countries claimed… I made a ‘graph' and a map showing what we had accomplished. There was the city of Fiume and the port of Susak and a little of the adjacent territory. All the rest was assigned. ‘But this area, Colonel,’ I explained, ‘we shall call Disputanta, and we shall place it under the administration of the League of Nations for the period of fifteen years. Then we shall end up with a free and fair election, a plebiscite…’ The Colonel was enchanted with what he called a magical solution of all our troubles.’” Stephen Bonsai, Suitors and Suppliants: The Little Nations at Versailles (Prentice-Hall, 1946).

79. Quoted in Kissinger, Diplomacy, 235.

80. Which we know was dictated each day and was not subsequently “corrected”; see Yale Papers memorandum.

81. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. 4, 390.

82. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. 4, 488 – 489.

83. David H. Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, vol. 1 (Putnam, 1928), 49.

84. Philip Bobbitt, “War Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely's War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath,” Michigan Law Review 92 (May 1994): 1364.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN: THE KITTY GENOVESE INCIDENT AND THE WAR IN BOSNIA

1. This account is largely taken from A. M. Rosenthal's excellent study of the Kitty Genovese murder, Thirty-Eight Witnesses (McGraw-Hill, 1964). Rosenthal's account draws upon contemporaneous interviews made in the aftermath of the murder.

2. “Calling for Help on the T,” Boston Globe, February 3, 2000, A20.

3. Dave Lieber, “Biggest Mystery Is Why No One Called the Police,” Fort Worth Star Telegram, October 13, 2001, 1.

4. International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights Annual Report 1996; see also U.S. Department of State, Bosnia & Herzegovina Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996, January 30, 1997; also Dan Smith, et al., The State of War and Peace Atlas (Penguin, 1997).

5. Janusz Bugajski, “Balkan Tragedy,” Orbis 40 (1996): 638; see also Laura Silber and Alan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (TV Books: Distributed by Penguin USA, 1996).

6. Ibid.

7. Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers—America's Last Ambassador Tells What Happened and Why (Times Books, 1996), 157.

8. Brigitte Hipfl, Klaus Hipfl, and Jan Jagodzinski, “Documentary Films and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Conflict: From Production to Reception,” Bosnia by Television, ed. James Gow, Richard Paterson, and Alison Preston (British Films Institute, 1996), 34, 35, 45.

9. James Gow, Triumph of Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War (Hurst, 1997), 304.

10. The Bosnian minister to the U.N. later stated that members of the incoming Clinton administration had suggested that it would be more helpful to Bosnia once in office than had been the Bush administration.

11. Cf. Tyler Marshall, “Nato Issues Ultimatum to Serbs Ringing Enclave: Bosnia; Alliance Threatens Air Strikes Unless Rebels Withdraw 2 Miles from Gorazde's Center by 3 P.M. Today,” Los Angeles Times, April 23, 1994, A1.

12. Gwen Ifill, “Clinton Defends Foreign Policy Record,” New York Times, May 4, 1994, A12.

13. Patrick Glynn, “See No Evil: Clinton-Bush and the Truth about Bosnia,” The New Republic, October 25, 1993, 23.

14. Ibid.

15. There was preparation on the Western side for a response to such eventualities, so especially the 2/94–9/95 ones were played up.

16. “The Sacking of Croatia,” New York Times, September 22, 1991, E16.

17. “Erasing Bosnia's Memory,” Washington Post, October 16, 1992, A24.

18. But see the Final Report of the Commission of Experts, published in May 1994.

19. “Crisis in Yugoslavia” (House of Representatives, June 25, 1991), Congressional Record, 1991, H5043.

20. “Spare Bosnia the Postmortems,” Washington Post, October 13, 1993, C6.

21. Henry Kissinger, “Bosnia Has Never Been a Nation and Has No Specific Cultural Identity. Why Are We Intent on Preserving This Balkan No-Man's Land?” Los Angeles Times, May 16, 1993, M2.

22. Noel Malcolm argues that the U.S./E.C. position emboldened Milosevic to attempt to crush the Slovenia and Croatian secession movements with military force. Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (New York University Press, 1994).

23. European expectations seem to have been significantly different from American ones—much more pessimistic and more willing to assume that violence is the natural state of the Balkans.

24. One report described the tarmac lot at Omarska as “a killing yard, the bodies loaded onto trucks by bulldozers. Omarska was a place where cruelty and mass murder had become a form of recreation. The guards were often drunk and singing while they tortured. A prisoner named Fikret Harambasic was castrated by one of his fellow inmates before being beaten to death. One inmate was made to bark like a dog and lap at a puddle of motor oil while a guard… jumped up and down on his back until he was dead. The guards would make, videos of this butchery for their home entertainment.” Dusan Tadic, the Bosnian Serb primarily responsible for this, was convicted of crimes against humanity by the war crimes tribunal in The Hague and sentenced to twenty years in concurrent sentences for the killing and torture of Muslim prisoners. Gillian Sharpe and Bob Edwards, “Bosnian Serb Sentenced. Gillian Sharpe reports from The Hague on the International War Crimes Tribunal's first sentencing of a Bosnian Serb war criminal. Dusan Tadic was sentenced to twenty years in concurrent sentences for the killing and torture of Muslims in prison camps,” NPR Morning Edition, July 14, 1997.

25. Members of the American Jewish community repeatedly spoke out to call attention to the systematic violence against the Muslims in Bosnia. Notable among them for his tenacity and eloquence was Elie Wiesel.

26. Ed Vulliamy, “Middle Managers of Genocide,” The Nation, June 10, 1996, 11.

27. See Final Report of the Commission of Experts.

28. “A Mission of Mercy for Tavnik,” New York Times, December 6, 1992, E18.

29. Final periodic report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, special rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to paragraph 42 of the Commission Resolution 1995/89.

30. “A Defeat for Civilization,” Wall Street Journal, July 17, 1995, A10.

31. Dimitri Simes, “There's No Oil in Bosnia,” New York Times, March 10, 1993, A1.

32. See U.N. Report S/26765.

33. Tigalrth-Pileser III (745 B.C.-727 B.C.) was the first Assyrian ruler to make forced resettlement a policy; under his reign half the population of a conquered land would be carried off, to be replaced by settlers from other areas.

34. Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, “A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing,” Foreign Affairs 72 (1993): 110.

35. Cf. William Safire, “On Language,” Houston Chronicle, March 14, 1993 (syndicated column).

36. Christopher Hitchens reports that Jose-Maria Mendiluce, the UNHCR envoy, believes he first coined the term. Christopher Hitchens, “Appointment in Sarajevo,” The Nation, 1992, 236.

37. Norman Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of Ethnic Cleansing (Texas A&M University Press, 1995), 18 – 19.

38. Cited in Rabia Ali and Lawrence Lifschultz, “Why Bosnia?,” Monthly Review 45 (March 1994): 1; also in V. P. Gagnon, “Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia,” International Security 19 (1994): 130; and in Wohlstetter, see n. 41 below.

39. See Ali and Lifschultz.

40. Classified State Department report, cited in Ali and Lifschultz; “A Last Chance,” New Yorker, July 27, 1993, 4 (saying U.S. had one “last chance” not to become implicated in an E.C.-U.N. scheme of apartheid).

41. Albert Wohlstetter, “Creating a Greater Serbia,” The New Republic, August 1, 1994, 22.

42. A similar account describes the first stage of operations, before systematic shelling:

A 62-year-old Bosnian Muslim witnessed the willful killing by ethnic Serb paramilitary forces of at least 53 men, women, and children in the village of Prhovo, Bosnia. At about 3 pm on May 30, 1992, a large force of ethnic Serb paramilitary soldiers and three armored personnel carriers entered Prhovo, a village located about 7 kilometers northeast of Kjuc. The village, which contained 45 houses grouped along a main road and several small streets, had more than 150 inhabitants. The soldiers, who wore stocking masks over their faces, went from house to house searching for weapons. After finding some weapons, the soldiers proceeded to ransack the homes, break windows and doors, and pull the residents out into the streets. These men, women, and children were ofdered to fold their hands behind their heads and were herded through the village to a point on the road where they were stopped and lined up. Meanwhile, the soldiers attempted to coax back into the village those residents who had run into the woods when the soldiers arrived. The soldiers announced through megaphones that the residents would not be harmed if they returned. When these people returned, the soldiers beat them severely; about 10 were beaten into unconsciousness. The assembled villagers were then told that they were free, that they need not worry anymore, and that they must place white flags on their homes to indicate the village had surrendered. During the nights of May 30 – 31, some people fled to the woods, while others slept in their cellars. At about 6 pm on June 1, the soldiers returned and again used megaphones to call people in from the forest. They also went from house to house, pulling people out into the streets. The male residents were beaten severely. At about 7 pm, the soldiers began murdering the residents with automatic weapons. They fired single shots, then long bursts of automatic gunfire. After the shooting stopped and the soldiers had departed, the witness, who had fled to the woods when the shooting started, returned to the village. The murdered men, women, and children lay in the streets. Houses were burning, and their roofs were collapsing. Some women and children who had hidden in basements began coming into the street crying and looking for their loved ones.

43. David Owen, Balkan Odyssey (Harcourt, Brace, 1995), 355. Roger Cohen savagely commented on this passage: “In other words: to deny a people the right to defend themselves is morally defensible if it enables you to have the satisfaction of feeding them free macaroni.” Roger Cohen, “Balkan Odyssey (Book Reviews),” The New Republic, March 11, 1996, 37.

44. Ali and Lifschultz, 28.

45. “Perisic Calls Journalist's War Crimes Questions ‘Illogical,’” World News Connection, May 9, 2000. But see also the case of Cedomir Mihailovic, a relatively high-ranking intelligence officer, who defected to the Netherlands and presented documents and evidence to the War Crimes Tribunal that he claimed would show that the original orders for ethnic cleansing and the setting up of the camps came directly from the Milosevic regime in Belgrade. They were purported to have been written over a number of months in a variety of different offices, but forensic analysis showed that they were all produced on a single typewriter in a much shorter period of time. Mihailovic was merely trying to ingratiate himself with Western governments. Christopher Hitchens, “Minority Report,” The Nation, June 19, 1995, 875. Dan Fesperman, “Genocide Evidence Proves Elusive: Atrocities: UN Investigators Have Failed So Far to Build a Case against Slobodan Milosevic for War Crimes in Bosnia,” Baltimore Sun, June 10, 1999, A2.

46. “Hearing of the House National Security Committee Regarding the Proposal to Send U.S. Ground Troops to Bosnia,” Federal News Service, November 2, 1995; see also Charles Boyd, “Making Peace with the Guilty: The Truth about Bosnia,” Foreign Affairs 74 (September 1995): 22

47. Gow, 301.

48. Cf. Marlise Simons, “3 Serbs Convicted in Wartime Rapes,” New York Times, February 23, 2001, A1.

49. “I think the world should recognize that the Serbian people do have legitimate interests, especially the right to self-determination for the three million Serbs living outside the borders of Serbia and Montenegro.” Heather Green, “Q&A: Diplomacy and Force in Facing the Balkan Conflict,” International Herald Tribune, March 22, 1993, 2.

50. Owen, 342 – 343.

51. “Declaration on the ‘Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union,’” December 16, 1991, reprinted in International Legal Materials 31 (1992): 1487.

52. Gow, 8.

53. Stephen Hedges, Peter Cary, Bruce Auster, and Tim Zimmerman, “The Road to Ruin: Bosnia Policy and the Many Causes of Failure,” U.S. News and World Report, December 12, 1994, 59.

54. Ibid.

55. Quoted in Leslie H. Gelb, “Euro-Bosnian Games,” New York Times, January 31, 1993, E7.

56. See also Secretary Christopher's frequent statements that “these people have hated each other for hundreds of years.” Also see General Charles Boyd's testimony, cited at n. 45, that the Serbs may at present appear more culpable than Muslims or Croats, but this is only because we are witnessing a small slice of the bigger picture involving a “centuries old conflict.” Hearing of the House National Security Committee Regarding the Proposal to Send U.S. Ground Troops to Bosnia, November 2, 1995.

57. Charles Lane, “The Death of Yugoslavia,” Washington Monthly, April 1996, 48.

58. “Reader Feedback, What Do You Think about U.S. Intervention in Bosnia?” Boston Globe, May 7, 1993, 10.

59. Ibid.

60. Jeff Jacoby, “A Recipe for a Debacle,” Boston Globe, November 30, 1995, 23.

61. Transcript, report by Tom Gjelten, “Morning Edition,” National Public Radio, July 17, 1995. In this the president was only following his predecessor President Bush who said, on August 10, 1992, “Now the war in Bosnia… is a complex, convoluted conflict that grows out [of] age-old animosities…. Those who understand the nature of this conflict understand that an enduring solution cannot be imposed by force from outside on unwilling participants.”

62. “US efforts to promote a peaceful settlement in Yugoslavia. (Statement by Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Ralph Johnson) (Transcript).” U.S. Department of State Dispatch, vol. 2, October 21, 1991, 782.

63. Quoted by Saul Friedman, “U.S. Joins Aid Effort,” Newsday, July 2, 1992.

64. “Clinton Mulls New Bosnia Steps,” USA Today, May 13, 1993, A1 (“calling the crisis a ‘European issue'…”)

65. This eventually became the demand that the Vance-Owen Plan be accepted.

66. Heinz A. J. Kern, “The Clinton Doctrine: A New Foreign Policy: The White House Bosnia Retreat Shows a New Approach to the U.S. World Role—Balancing U.S. Power and Commitment. The New Doctrine Is a Mixed Blessing,” Christian Science Monitor, June 18, 1993.

67. This remark made on CNN, Larry King Live, July 31, 1993.

68. At Srebrenica one desperate request by the local U.N. commander for air strikes was rebuffed on the grounds that the wrong form had been submitted.

69. Any possible air strikes may do nothing to deter Serbian aggression. ‘Will it be enough to… stop the shelling of Sarajevo, to bring parties to the peace table?’” Boutros-Ghali said. Johanna Neuman, “Cautious Clinton Tiptoes Nearer to Bosnia Commitment,” USA Today, July 29, 1993, A7.

70. “A ‘Terrible War' Rages On” U.N. Chronicle 31 (March 1994): 62.

71. Frank Murray, “Clinton Turned Down U.S. Plan for Air Strikes,” Times of London, June 14, 1993, Overseas News.

72. Craig Whitney, “Conflict in the Balkans; the Strategy; NATO Diplomats Question Details of Plan for Air Raids,” New York Times, July 23, 1995, A1.

73. “NATO military officers pointed out that Britain had often agreed to threaten NATO air strikes against the Serbs in principle but had balked at launching them for fear of provoking retaliation against British soldiers in the United Nations peacekeeping force in Bosnia.” Ibid. See also, “The Crossing of the Mogadishu Line,” Economist, January 13, 1996, 51.

74. Owen, 355.

75. James B. Steinberg, “International Involvement in the Yugoslavia Conflict,” in Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts, ed. Lori Fisler Damrosch (Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), 64.

76. Steinberg, 44; Leslie H. Gelb, “False Humanitarianism,” New York Times, August 6, 1992, A23.

77. John F. Burns, “Serbs Hedging on Vows to Ease Siege in Bosnia,” New York Times, August 7, 1993, A1.

78. “Kozyrev, U.N. Chief Oppose Armed Intervention in Ex-Yugoslavia,” Agence France-Presse, December 26, 1992.

79. The Dayton Agreement also gives rights to Bosnian Croats and Serbs for political affiliation with Croatia and Serbia respectively.

80. “To understand the failure of international efforts and the conditions for success, it is necessary to analyse in detail what the initiatives taken actually were.” (Gow, 6.)

CHAPTER SIXTEEN: THE DEATH OF THE SOCIETY OF NATION-STATES

1. Charles Tilly, “Futures of European States,” Social Research 59 (1992): 715.

2. G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).

3. As one U.N. official put it, “The lesson of all this is that the U.N. does not learn lessons.”

4. And also the Chinese suppression of Tibet.

5. Nevertheless, the need to keep allies on board restrained the United States at a number of points in the conflict. William Stueck, The Korean War: An International History (Princeton University Press, 1995), 130 – 142.

6. See also W. Michael Reisman, “Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4),” American Journal of International Law 78 (July 1984): 642.

7. An alternative proposal was put forward by Brian Urquhart, “For a UN Volunteer Military Force,” New York Review of Books, June 10, 1993, 3.

8. NATO having successfully made the transition from nation-state to market-state instrument.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN: PEACE AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER

1. Guicciardini wrote in his Ricordi, “Before the year 1494, wars were protracted, battles bloodless, the methods followed in besieging towns slow and uncertain; and although artillery was already in use, it was managed with such want of skill that it caused little hurt. Hence it came about that the ruler of a state could hardly be dispossessed. But the French, on their invasion of Italy, infused so much liveliness into our wars, that [until compensating fortifications could be introduced] whenever open country was lost, the state was lost with it.” Cf. Francesco Guicciardini, Ricordi (Mursia, 1994).

2. A sympathetic thesis was propounded by Robert Randle in 1987 that I gratefully stumbled upon only as this book was going to press. Randle writes that “major peace settlements, such as Westphalia and Vienna, have the characteristics of constitutions; the same can be said of many lesser settlements, even those ending bi-lateral wars. Peace settlements not only bring wars to an end; they can also revise the constitution of the state system.” Robert Randle, Issues in the History of International Relations: The Role of Issues in the Evolution of the State System(Praeger, 1987), 34. See also Christian Reus-Smit, “The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions,” International Organization 51 (Autumn 1997): 555. In this chapter, I shall argue that the peace settlements that conclude epochal wars are the constitutions of the society of states.

3. Randle, Issues in the History of International Relations, 183.

4. Randle believes that the “key patterning of interstate relations results from states' interests in issues,” whereas I argue that the key pattern results from states' security needs in interaction with their domestic constitutional development—which may or may not be coextensive with the issues of the day. And Randle argues that the peace agreements are revisions of the constitutions of state systems, whereas I suggest that it is the society of states (by no means limited to its formal, juridical components) that is being reformed.

5. Cf. the opening paragraph of Hedley Bull, “The Emergence of a Universal International Society” in The Expansion of International Society, 117.

6. Cf. Paul Rice Doolin, The Fronde (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1935).

7. Randle, The Origins of Peace (New York: Free Press, 1973) 46 – 47; A transformation occurs when one ordering principle replaces another. A constitution embodies ordering principles so a transformation of the society of states occurs when a new constitution of that society replaces the old.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN: THE TREATY OF AUGSBURG

1. New Cambridge Modern History, vol. 1, 5.

2. Richard. Bonney, The European Dynastic States, 1494 – 1660 (Oxford University Press, 1991), 81.

3. Ibid.

4. New Cambridge Modern History, vol. 2, 7.

5. Wilbur K. Jordan, The Development of Religious Toleration in England, vol. 1 (P. Smith, 1965), 37.

6. See Ben S. Trotter, “War and Government in the French Provinces: Picardy, 1470 – 1560,” a review of David Potter's book of this title in The Historian 57 (Autumn 1994): 183. Potter “contends that the Hundred Years War and the Wars of Religion, seemingly motivated by issues more lofty than dynastic concerns, have eclipsed the role which the Habsburg-Valois Wars played in the development of absolute monarchy, particularly its military, administrative, and financial institutions.”

7. Ronald A. Brand, “External Sovereignty and International Law,” Fordham International Law Journal 18 (May 1995): 1688.

8. Bull and Watson, 15.

9. See Part II of Book I of the present work.

10. The Sea of Faith / Was once, too, at the full, and round earth's shore / Lay like the folds of a bright girdle furl'd.” Matthew Arnold, “Dover Beach,” in The Norton Anthology of English Literature (Norton, 1974), 1355.

11. Adam Watson, “European International Society and Its Expansion,” in The Expansion of International Society (ed. H. Bull and A. Watson) (Oxford, 1984), 15.

12. See S. Schumann, “Joachim Mynsinger von Frundeck: Humanist-Rechtgelehrter-Politiker (1514 – 1588),” Archiv fur Kulturgeschichte 1980 – 1981, 62 – 63, 159 – 193, arguing that “the stable period between the Peace of Augsburg and the outbreak of the Thirty Years War allowed the development of consolidated territorial states run for princes by bureaucrats drawn largely from a mostly bourgeois educated elite.”

13. Judith Brown, “Courtiers and Christians: the First Japanese Emissaries to Europe,” Renaissance Quarterly 47 (Winter 1994): 872.

14. Ibid.

15. Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts, “Introduction to Hugo Grotius and International Relations,” Hugo Grotius and International Relations, ed. Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts (Oxford University Press, 1992), 8.

16. Political Writings, Francisco de Vitoria, ed. Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrence (Cambridge University Press, 1991): “The origin of public international law dates to Father Francisco de Vitoria and his studies of sovereign rights to claim and colonize the New World.” See also “The International Community According to Francisco de Vitoria,” The Thomist 10 (January 1947): 1 – 55.

17. See J. Verhoeven's essay in Actualité de la Pensée Juridique de Francisco de Vitoria, ed. A. Truyol y Serra, H. Mechoulan, P. Haggenmacher. A. Ortiz-Arce, P. M. Marine, and J. Verhoeven (Bruylant, 1988), reviewed by R. Beenstra, American Journal of International Law 86 (1992): 181.

18. Alice J. Knight, Las Casas: “The Apostle of the Indies” (Neale, 1917); Francis A. McNutt, Bartholomew de las Casas: His Life, His Apostolate, and His Writings (Putnam, 1909); both cited by Nussbaum, n. 12, 310.

19. Vitoria, De Indis Recenter Inventis, II, i – vii.

20. In the heresy proceeding against Erasmus, Vitoria, as the representative of the Inquisition, judged the great humanist guilty though many of Vitoria's colleagues attempted to dissuade him. Nussbaum, 63.

21. Vitoria, Relectio de Jure Belli, XIII. “Having suffered a wrong is the one and only just basis for war.”

22. Compare James L. Brierly, “Suarez's Vision of a World Community” and “The Realization Today of Suarez's World Community,” in The Basis of Obligation in International Law and Other Papers, ed. Hersch Lauterpacht and C.H.M. Waldock (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958).

23. Francisco Suarez, De Legibus ac Deo Legislatore, II.xix.9.

24. See e.g., Cornelius F. Murphy, Jr., “The Grotian Vision of World Order,” American Journal of International Law 76 (July 1982): 496 – 497.

25. Francisco Suarez, Selections from Three Works, vol. 2, ed. Carnegie, trans. Gwladys Williams, Ammi Brown, and John Waldron (Clarendon Press, 1944), 817.

26. See plates on p. 346.

27. P. Haggenmacher, “Grotius and Gentili,” in Kingsbury and Roberts, 140. This is Haggenmacher's translation of a letter from Gentili to his friend John Bennett; see Holland, “Alberico Gentili,” appendix no. 4, 29–30; see also Gesina H. J. van der Molen, Alberico Gentili (A. W. Sijthoff, 1968), 53.

28. “[A]nd thus paradoxically the Protestant refugee had come to side with the main Catholic power against the country which was steadily becoming a bastion of Calvinism.” Haggenmacher, 141; see also Nussbaum, saying that Gentili's acceptance of this role was “a somewhat puzzling step for a Protestant refugee to take.” Nussbaum, 76.

29. Alberico Gentili, De Jure Belli Libri Tres, vol. 2, ed. Carnegie, trans. John C. Rolfe (Clarendon Press, 1933), 1612, paragraph 609.

30. Compare TAN 141. This conclusion is at variance with that drawn by Francis I also on the juridical basis that the State is distinguishable from the prince. Either conclusion is reasonable; what is interesting is the shared premise.

31. See Theodor Meron, “The Authority to Make Treaties in the Late Middle Ages,” American Journal of International Law 89 (January 1995): 14.

32. “There remains now the one question concerning an honorable cause for waging war… which is undertaken for no private reason of our own, but for the common interest and in behalf of others. Look you, if men clearly sin against the laws of nature and mankind, I believe that any one whatsoever may check such men by force of arms.” Quoted by Meron, 114.

33. Nussbaum 84.

34. Nussbaum, 79.

CHAPTER NINETEEN: THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA

1. See memorandum to Louis XIII of January 1629, quoted in New Cambridge Modern History, vol. 4, 328.

2. Henry J. Chaytor, European History: Great Leaders and Landmarks from Early to Modern Times, vol. 3 (Gresham Publishing, 1915), 113.

3. As Randle observed in his monumental study of European wars and peace agreements, “The European order collapsed in the Franco-Dutch war in 1678. It did so again in 1683 with a general European war that lasted 17 years, in 1701 in the War of Spanish Succession, in 1740 in the War of Austrian Succession, and again in the Seven Years War (1756 – 1763)… In the settlements that ended all these major wars, Westphalia was approved and incorporated by reference.” Randle, 70.

4. New Cambridge Modern History, vol. 4, 352.

5. Which was reflected in the name chosen in Philadelphia for the new American consti-tutional entity, the “United States,” just as the new name that emerged from the Bolshevik Revolution—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—reflected a new constitutional order.

6. Sweden had refused a Danish offer to mediate. Swedish suspicion was not without foundation: see the instructions of the Danish government to its delegates in Andreas Osiander, The States System of Europe 1640 – 1990: Peacemaking and the Conditions of International Stability(Oxford University Press, 1994), 18.

7. Ibid., 21.

8. Ibid., 19. In 1649 Christina commissioned a dramatic play entitled La naissance de la paix, with a book by Descartes, who had come to Stockholm and wished to honor his patroness.

9. Ibid., 26.

10. Report to Oxenstierna, quoted by Osiander, 29.

11. The French delegates reported to Mazarin that the “disposition of the princes of Germany… is very different from that of the princes of Italy, the latter, being very intelligent and well-advised, approving of, and wishing for, everything that may contribute to make them independent while [the German princes] are much more affected by the love of their fatherland [beaucoup plus touchés de l' amour de leur patrie] and cannot approve of foreigners dismembering the Empire, no matter what hope of a gain we hold out to them.” D’Avaux and Servien to Mazarin, January 14, 1645, quoted by Osiander, 38.

12. Bearing in mind, as the reader must, that the emperor wore two constitutional hats, as it were: his kingship, which was derived by heredity over certain Habsburg lands, and his emperorship, which was his by the vote of the Imperial electors.

13. Randle, The Origins of Peace, 332.

14. Ibid., 54.

15. Osiander uncharacteristically overstates this revision, however, by saying that “the six-teenth century maxim of cuius regio, eius religio… was abandoned” and sharply reproves Holsti, McKay, and others for “serious factual errors” in maintaining otherwise. It is true that it is a common error to treat Westphalia as the agreement that introduced the “cuius” provision, but this principle was embraced, not abandoned, in the Westphalian settlement.

16. Karsten Ruppert, Die Kaiserliche Politik auf dem Westflischen Friedenskongreβ (1643 – 1648)(Aschendorff: 1979), 229, cited by Osiander, 48.

17. As Leo Gross wrote in the most authoritative legal commentary on the treaty, West-phalia was “a public act of disregard for… the papacy” that “liquidat[ed], with a degree of apparent finality the idea of the Middle Ages as an objective order of things personified by the Emperor in the Secular realm.” Gross, 37.

18. Osiander, 51.

19. Ibid., 68.

20. Randle, Issues in the History of International Relations, 53.

21. Cicely V. Wedgwood, The Thirty Years War (Cape, 1938), 526.

22. Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 87 (March/April 1993): 325 and citations, n. 10.

23. C. G. Roelofsen, “17th Century International Politics,” in Bull, Kingsbury, and Roberts, 124.

24. Ibid.

25. Quoting John Morley, who ranked it with Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations, Bull, 71.

26. R. A. Falk, “On the Recent Further Decline of International Law,” in Legal Change: Essays in Honor of Julius Stone, ed. A. R. Blackshield (Butterworths, 1983), 272; compare Bruce Ackerman's “Constitutional Moment,” in Bruce A. Ackerman, We the People: Foundations, vol. 1, and Transformations, vol. 2 (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991, 1998).

27. The Latinized version of the Dutch name de Groot.

28. A notable figure described in Book I.

29. Georg Schwarzenberger, “The Grotius Factor in International Law and Relations: A Functional Approach,” in Bull, Kingsbury, and Roberts.

30. Martin Wight, Systems of States, ed. Hedley Bull (Leicester University Press for the London School of Economics and Political Science, 1977), 127.

31. Bull, 70.

32. Bull, 75, 77.

33. William Stanley Macbean Knight, The Life and Works of Hugo Grotius (Oceana, 1962), 289.

34. See Bull, 79 – 91.

35. Cf. Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought: The Age of Reformation, vol. 2 (Cambridge University Press, 1978), 152 – 154; and see Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development (Cambridge University Press, 1969), 67.

36. G. Mattingly, “International Diplomacy and International Law,” in New Cambridge Modern History, vol. 3, ed. R. B. Wernham, 169 – 170.

37. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book I, trans. Maurice Cranston (Penguin, 1968), 51.

38. Mattingly, 169.

39. Schwarzenberger, “The Grotius Factor,” 306.

40. Bull, “The Importance of Grotius,” 74.

41. Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (apud Ioannem Blaev, 1667), II.xx.40.

42. Osiander, 41.

43. Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, ed. and trans. W. Whewell (J. W. Parker, 1853), I.ix.

44. All of these arguments—the one at the footnote call is nowadays termed “rule utilitarian”—will be found in contemporary debates in political philosophy.

45. Murphy, 15.

46. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, “Opinion on the Principles of Pufendorf,” The Political Writings of Leibniz, ed. and trans. Patrick Riley (Cambridge University Press, 1972), 64.

CHAPTER TWENTY: THE TREATY OF UTRECHT

1. On April 11, 1713, treaties were signed between France and Britain, Portugal, Prussia, and Savoy; on November 4, between France and the United Provinces; on July 13, between Spain and Britain and Savoy and with the Dutch on June 26. The emperor Charles concluded terms on March 6, 1714, at Rastatt, which was confirmed in a separate treaty at Baden on Nov 7, 1714; Portugal finally agreed to peace with Spain at Utrecht on February 6, 1715.

2. Bolingbroke, Henry St. John Viscount, and Gilbert Parke, Letters and Correspondence, Public and Private, of Viscount Bolingbroke (G.G. & J. Robinson, 1798), ii, 443, 614.

3. Bolingbroke, Henry St. John Viscount, The Works of Lord Bolingbroke (Frank Cass, 1967) (reprint of the 1844 edition), ii, 276 ff., 313, 302.

4. See Osiander, 111 – 113.

5. Bolingbroke, Henry St. John Viscount, and Gilbert Parke, Letters and Correspondence, Public and Private, of Viscount Bolingbroke (G.G. & J Robinson, 1798), i, 595, letter dated July 21, 1712.

6. Osiander, 119.

7. Bolingbroke, Henry St. John Viscount, The Works of Lord Bolingbroke (Frank Cass, 1967) (reprint of the 1844 edition), ii, 287.

8. At Utrecht, Osiander perceptively writes that “the word ‘state' was used ordinarily to designate an administrative unit with the potential to be an autonomous international actor, even though it might not, and in fact often did not, possess that quality at the moment. For instance, the French instruction for the congress refers to the Spanish dominion as ‘a monarchy so vast and consisting of so many states’” (Osiander, 103).

9. Bolingbroke, Henry St. John Viscount, The Works of Lord Bolingbroke (Frank Cass, 1967) (reprint of the 1844 edition), ii, 288.

10. Osiander, 123.

11. Quoted in Osiander, 132; see also the renunciations of the Duke of Orleans, and that of Philip V.

12. Quoted in Osiander, 127.

13. Quoted in Osiander, 128.

14. Quoted in Osiander, 131.

15. In the Austrian Netherlands, the Dutch acquired the right to garrison Namur, Tournai, Menin, Ypres, and other places. In Italy, the duke of Savoy gained Exilles, Fenestrelle, and other forts; Allesadrai, part of Montferrat, Valenza, Vigevano, and other critical places that would bar a French invasion of Italy. Various districts on the Rhine were obtained by German states, and France removed to the west bank. Brandenburg got part of Gelders, Bavaria recovered the Palatinate, and the elector at Cologne was restored: all these arrangements were thought to deter any renewed French aggression, yet not to provide a base for independent forays.

16. Randle, 261.

17. F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius (Clarendon Press) (vol. I, 1957) (vol. II, 1967) (vol. III, 1974).

18. Murphy, 34.

19. Nussbaum, 156.

20. Robert von Mohl referred to it as “a kind of oracle with diplomats and especially with consuls,” see Nussbaum, ibid.

21. Ibid., 161.

22. See e.g., Armitz Brown v. United States, 8 Cranch (12 U.S.), 110.

23. Vattel, Le droit des gens (Editions A. Pedone, 1998), II.i. 16.

24. Reminiscent in our day of George Gilder and his descriptions of a market-state backlit by universal prosperity.

25. “Now although nature has so constituted men that they absolutely require the assistance of their fellow men if they are to live as it befits men to live, and has thus established a general society among them, yet nature cannot be said to have imposed upon men the precise obligation of uniting together in civil society; and if all men followed [the laws of nature] subjection to civil society would be needless.” Vattel, Le droit des gens, preface.

26. Murphy, 51; see Vattel, II.i. 16.

27. Osiander, 48.

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE: THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA

1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Howard and Paret.

2. Gneisenau observed: “The Revolution has set in motion the national energy of the entire French people…. If the other states wish to restore the balance of power they must open and use the same resources.” Also, consider the Prussian constitutional reform of 1807, discussed in New Cambridge Modern History, vol. 9, 367 – 394.

3. Thomas B. Macaulay, Napoleon and the Restoration of the Bourbons, ed. Joseph Hamburger (Columbia University Press, 1977), 98.

4. Kissinger, Diplomacy, 84.

5. Nussbaum, 178.

6. New Cambridge Modern History, vol. 9, 646 – 647: “To Vienna as guests of Francis I of Austria came King Frederick I of Württemberg, Elector William of Hesse, the Hereditary Grand Duke George of Hesse-Darmstadt, King Maximilian I, Joseph of Bavaria, King Frederick VI of Denmark and Karl August, Duke of Weimar and friend of Goethe. The King of Prussia, present himself, was accompanied by his white-haired chancellor, Prince Hardenberg, assisted by the scholarly Humboldt, and a group of experts, among them the prominent statistician, Hoffmann. Alexander I of Russia… was supported by the most international group of advisers at the Congress—the Russian Razumovski; Nesselrode, his foreign minister of German extraction; Stein, distinguished reformer and exile of the Prussian service; Tsartoryski of Poland; and Pozzo di Borgo, Corsican enemy of Bonaparte…. Talleyrand headed the French delegation…. Castlereagh took with him his three principal European ambassadors… [and] hired his own embassy staff as insurance against the Austrian spy system, at that time the most efficient in Europe. Metternich… was assisted by… a regular group of assistants and specialists, and particularly by Friedrich von Gentz, a most interesting intellectual and publicist…. Prominent among the lesser statesmen were Wrede, chief diplomatist for Bavaria; Cardinal Consalvi, secretary of state for the Pope; and Münster, able and experienced representative of Hanover…. The Congress… attracted to Vienna a medley of princes, aristocrats, tourists, beggars, spies and pickpockets.”

7. This is discussed in Chaters 7 and 8.

8. New Cambridge Modern History, vol. 9, 22, citing K. Waliszewski, Le regne d‘Alexandre I, vol. 2 (1924), 378.

9. It is interesting that Britain only signed a peace with Napoleon when the British state took a retrogressive constitutional move away from state-nationhood. It was the resignation of the Pitt cabinet over the king's refusal to assent to a law removing the disabilities of Catholics that cleared the way for a treaty with the French.

10. Treaty of Union, Concert and Subsidy between Austria, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia, March 1, 1814, art. XVI, 673 Consol. T.S. 84,91; W. Alison Phillips, The Confederation of Europe: A Study of the European Alliance, 1813 – 1823 (H. Fertig, 1966), 74 – 75 (discussing the importance of article XVI for Europe and also noting that the treaty was actually signed on March 10 but antedated).

11. Quoted in Osiander, 243.

12. Kissinger, Diplomacy, 82.

13. Quoted in Osiander, 243.

14. Quoted in Osiander, 194.

15. Osiander, 190.

16. Quoted in Osiander, 191.

17. Ibid.

18. Osiander thinks Webster owes his view to an anachronism also, but not the same one I have in mind. For Osiander, Webster is confounding twentieth century nationalism with early nineteenth century national ideas; this may be true, but it does not go to the public opinion/expediency point; whatever sort of state nationalists wanted, Webster's point is that their feelings were simply ignored rather than that they were not accommodated.

19. In contrast, for example, to the territorial state, for which such allocations were everything.

20. Osiander, 196 – 197.

21. Calabresi and Bobbitt, Tragic Choices.

22. Ibid., 41 – 42.

23. Talleyrand, Memoirs, vol. 2 (Putnam, 1891), 120.

24. Talleyrand thus spoke to the tsar: “Neither you, sire, nor the allied powers, nor I, whom you believe to possess some influence, not one of us, could give a king to France. France is conquered—and by your arms, and yet even today, you have not that power… In order to establish a durable state of things, and one which could be accepted without protest, one must act upon a principle. With a principle we are strong. We shall experience no resistance; opposition will, at any rate, vanish soon, and there is only one principle. Louis XVIII is a principle; he is the legitimate king of France.” Talleyrand, vol. 2, 124, quoted in Osiander, 214; see also the discussion of legitimacy by Macaulay, 70 – 72.

25. For example, the Habsburg realms, though vast, were materially augmented by the addition of the Spanish Netherlands as compensation for the loss of the Spanish throne.

26. This was the Russian delegation; see Osiander, 229.

27. Osiander, 226.

28. Osiander, 227.

29. Osiander, 224.

30. Quoted in Osiander, 226.

31. November 4, 1814; Wellesley ix, 415.

32. October 12, 1814; Wellesley ix, 329, 331.

33. Quoted in Osiander, 187.

34. Final Report to Louis XVIII, Talleyrand, ii, 238, 244f. As Osiander concludes, “[I]t was the turn of the republicanism to return through the back door. Mandated parliamentary assemblies sprang up everywhere, more ambitious and more effective than their precursors in pre-revolutionary Europe,” 220.

35. See Osiander, 220, n. 134.

36. Quoted in Osiander, 202.

37. Ibid.

38. Alan Palmer, Metternich (Harper & Row, 1972), 113.

39. Harold Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna: A Study in Allied Unity: 1812 – 1822 (Viking Press, 1946), 143.

40. Palmer, 139.

41. Quoted in Osiander, 205.

42. Quoted in Osiander, 206.

43. J. G. Lockhart, The Peacemakers 1814 – 1815 (Duckworth, 1932), 46.

44. This account was given by the Prussian diplomat Stein.

45. Lockhart, 49.

46. Article XIII of the Federal Act provided: “In alien deutschen Staaten wird eine land-standische Verfassung stattfinden.” The term “Verfassung” was variously interpreted as either requiring a “parliamentary constitution” (by liberals) or a system of Estates (by conservatives).

47. Talleyrand, quoted in Holsti, 114.

48. It was largely taken from the code prepared by Francis Lieber for the Union Army in 1863 during the American Civil War.

49. Quoted in Nussbaum, 233.

50. Ibid.

51. Murphy, 117.

52. Quoted in Francis H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States (Cambridge University Press, 1963), 224 – 225.

53. Robert B. Mowat, The Concert of Europe (Macmillan, 1930), vi-vii.

54. Murphy, 89.

55. Ibid.

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO: THE VERSAILLES TREATY

1. Friedrich Nietzsche, “Thus Spake Zarathustra,” in The Portable Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (Viking Press, 1954), 160 – 161. Charles de Gaulle also spoke of states as “monstres froids.”

2. William Langer, “A Critique of Imperialism,” in The New Imperialism: Analysis of Late Nineteenth Century Expansion, ed. Harrison M. Wright (Heath, 1961), 98.

3. Osiander, 251.

4. For I dipt into the future; far as human eye could see. Saw the Vision of the world, and all the wonder that would be… Heard the heavens fill with shouting, and there rain'd a ghastly dew From the nations' airy navies grappling in central blue… Till the war-drum throbb'd no longer and the battle flags were furl'd In the Parliament of Man, the Federation of the World. Alfred Lord Tennyson, “Locksey Hall,” in Poems Published in 1842 (Clarendon Press, 1914), 207 – 220. According to his biographer, President Truman copied this stanza in his own hand and carried it with him for the next fifty years. Alonzo L. Hamby, Man of the People: A Life of Harry S Truman (Oxford, 1995), 13.

5. The Messages and Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 1, 378 – 379.

6. Arthur Walworth, America's Moment, 1918: American Diplomacy and the End of World War I (Norton, 1977), 95.

7. See discussion in Chapter 14, “Colonel House and a World Made of Law.”

8.

1.     An open peace conference.

2.     Freedom of navigation of the seas.

3.     Reduction of trade barriers.

4.     Reduction of armament levels to “the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.”

5.     “A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims.”

6.     Withdrawal from Russian territory and respect for Russian political self-determi-nation.

7.     “Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored.”

8.     “All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored.”

9.     “A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.”

10. “The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development.”

11. Balkan states evacuated and restored.

12. Ottoman Empire removed from Europe to allow for free passage in the Dardanelles and self-determination.

13. “An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations.”

14. Establishment of the League of Nations.

9. A role played by the first Treaty of Paris with respect to the Vienna congress.

10. See Osiander, 299.

11. The Messages and Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 1, 352.

12. Robert F. Randle, The Origins of Peace: A Study of Peacemaking and the Structure of Peace Settlements (Free Press, 1963), 429: “They… fix the structure of the then-current system in terms of the territory and resources of the belligerents….” See also Osiander, 313.

13. U.S. State Department, 1942 – 1947, vi, 882.

14. I have consolidated several remarks of Clemenceau, including some made the next day. Quoted in Osiander, 283 – 284.

15. France on the northern coast of the Black Sea; Britain in Central Asia in the Trans-caucasus; Japan, the United States, and Britain in Siberia; and Britain, the United States, and France in the Murmansk-Archangel region.

16. Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative (Houghton Mifflin, 1921), 244.

17. Harold George Nicolson, Diaries and Letters (Atheneum, 1966 – 1968).

18. Larry E. Jones, German Liberalism and the Dissolution of the Weimar Party System, 1918 – 1933 (University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 3.

19. Charles L. Mee, Jr., The End of Order, Versailles, 1919 (Dutton, 1980), 267 (emphasis supplied).

20. See Herbert Spiro, The Dialectic of Representation, 1619 – 1969 (University Press of Virginia, 1969).

21. Eberhard Kolb, The Weimar Republic, trans. P. S. Falla (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988).

22. This was characteristic of the German advances in historiography during this period; see for example, Schliemann.

23. Hegel makes this argument in the introduction to The Philosophy of History: Georg W.F. Hegel, Introduction to the Philosophy of History (Hackett, 1998), 40 – 56.

24. Hans Linde, “State, Sovereignty, and International Law: A Study of Three German Legal Theories,” unpublished thesis (1947), 32. I would prefer to say “a misunderstanding derived from the days of feudal monarchy.”

25. Ibid., 28.

26. J. J. Lador-Lederer, “Jews in Austrian Law,” East European Quarterly 12 (1978): 129 – 142.

27. Leaders from Canute to Stalin have disputed this.

28. Linde, 50.

29. If Mé + E (or Mê + E), then Z → M (where M is a human act, the performance of which is Mé—or its avoidance Mê; E signifies an event, usually produced by behavior M; Z is the enforcing behavior of the official, and the arrow directed against M indicates that generally the behavior of the official is directed against the actor that is responsible for the behavior). Erich Voegelin, “Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law,” Political Science Quarterly 42 (1927): 270.

30. “Without your calling it, the tide comes in / Without your hurling it, the earth can spin / Without your pushing them, the clouds roll by / If they can do without you duckie, so can I.” “Without You,” from the musical My Fair Lady, written by Alan Jay Lerner and Frederick Loewe.

31. Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, trans. Anders Wedberg (Russell & Russell, 1945), 115.

32. Cf. M. A. Bedau, “Weak Emergence,” in Philosophical Perspectives: Mind, Causation, and World, vol. 11, ed. James Tomberlin (Blackwell, 1997), 375.

33. Compare: “the world is everything that is the case.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, I.

34. Hans Kelsen, “Centralization and Decentralization,” in Authority and the Individual (Harvard University Press, 1937), 239.

35. Stephen Holmes, The Anatomy of Illiberalism (Harvard University Press, 1993), 37. Interestingly, the left quarterly Telos devoted its entire Summer 1987 issue to Schmitt, introducing its subject by saying “in the present situation of political stalemate, the left can only benefit by learning from Carl Schmitt.” P. Piccone and G. L. Ulmen, “Introduction to Carl Schmitt,” in “Special Issue on Carl Schmitt,” Telos: A Quarterly of Critical Thought 72 (1987).

36. M. Wiegandt, “The Alleged Unaccountability of the Academic: A Biographical Sketch of Carl Schmitt,” Cardozo Law Review 16 (March 1995).

37. In Political Romanticism, he attacked the Romantics whose attitudes “preclude[d] any firm position or commitment” and for whom God as a point of reference was replaced by “the genial ‘I.’” His next book, Die Diktatur, was also a product of the Munich period of Schmitt's life. This work included an interpretation of that provision of the Weimar Constitution—which permitted the president to assume dictatorial powers—that attracted attention owing to Schmitt's novel reading of Article 48 as both expansive in its allocation of power to suspend basic rights, but restricted in that the ultimate form of the State—the constitutional order referred to in Book I—could not be changed.

38. Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George Schwab (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985).

39. Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, trans. Ellen Kennedy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985).

40. Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab (Rutgers University Press, 1976).

41. A fifth idea is derived from this distinction: Schmitt's theory of Grossraum—a geographical region dominated by the general application of a particular friend/enemy distinction, affording rights to resist intervention in the area by other powers.

42. Quoted in David Dysenhaus, “Hermann Heller and the Legitimacy of Legality,” 17, later published in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies vol. 16, 641 (1996), 22, n. 41.

43. Dysenhaus, 2.

44. As for modern-day critical legal theorists and for the Frankfurt School that was their progenitor and Schmitt's contemporary.

45. Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).

46. Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation (B. Blackwell, 1991).

47. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 26.

48. Ibid., 27.

49. Stephen Holmes, The Anatomy of Illiberalism, 40.

50. Quoted in Dysenhaus, 13.

51. Dysenhaus, 14.

52. In Political Theology, Schmitt had characterized the views of de Maistre and other counterrevolutionary philosophers as “decisionism” (decisionem).

53. Schmitt, Political Theology, 30.

54. This identification apparently ran in one direction only. Count Ciano reported that in early 1943 Mussolini said that that year would determine whether the Italians were a great people or a nation of waiters.

55. See Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories, and Political Significance, trans. Michael Robertson (Polity Press, 1994); Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923 – 1950 (Little, Brown, 1973); George Friedman, The Political Philosophy of the Frankfurt School (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1981). See also Laurent Stern, “On the Frankfurt School,” History of European Ideas 4 (1983): 83

56. György Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, trans. Rodney Livingstone (MIT Press, 1971), 1.

57. Ibid., 85.

58. Judith Marcus, “The Judaic Element in the Teachings of the Frankfurt School,” 1986 Yearbook of the Leo Baeck Institute (Leo Baeck Institute, 1986), 339 – 353.

59. Social Democracy and the Rule of Law: Otto Kirchheimer and Franz Neumann, ed. Keith Tribe, trans. Leena Tanner and Keith Tribe (Allen & Unwin, 1987).

60. See lecture, University of Kansas Law Review 42, Summer 1994, 770.

61. Cardozo Law Review 17, March 1996, 826.

62. Neumann's arguments—that legal formalism can be used to combat oppression and to protect minorities—were very much an exception in the school.

63. Kirchheimer was greatly influenced by Carl Schmitt. He adopted wholesale the latter's views on direct democracy and social homogeneity, as well as Schmitt's emphasis on the “emergency exception” and the crucial role of the definitive decision, of which, both Schmitt and Kirchheimer argued, a liberal democracy was incapable.

64. Otto Kirchheimer, “The Socialist and Bolshevik Theory of the State,” in Social Democracy and the Rule of Law (Allen & Unwin, 1987), 14.

65. William Scheuerman, Between the Norm and the Exception (MIT Press, 1994), 25.

66. Kirchheimer, “The Socialist and Bolshevik Theory of the State,” 12 – 14.

67. Ibid., 10 – 14.

68. Otto Kirchheimer, “Weimar—And What Then?” in Social Democracy and the Rule of Law (Allen & Unwin, 1987), 44.

69. Scheuerman, 31 – 32.

70. Ibid., 26.

71. Quoted in Otto Kirchheimer, Political Justice: The Use of Legal Procedures for Political Ends (Princeton University Press, 1961), 287, as part of a critique of state socialist law.

72. Scheuerman, 36.

73. Kirchheimer, “The Socialist and Bolshevik Theory of the State,” 18.

74. Otto Kirchheimer, “Criminal Law in National Socialist Germany,” in Studies in Philosophy and Social Science 8 (1939): 463.

75. Otto Kirchheimer, “The Legal Order of National Socialism,” in Studies in Philosophy and Social Science 9 (1941): 456 – 478.

76. Ehrhard Bahr, “The Anti-Semitism Studies of the Frankfurt School: The Failure of Critical Theory,” German Studies Review 1 (1978): 125.

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE: THE PEACE OF PARIS

1. Kenneth A. Oye, “Explaining the End of the Cold War: Morphological Behavioral Adaptations to the Nuclear Peace?” in International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War, ed. Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). Kenneth A. Oye has concluded that the bipolar strategic world required such enormous infusions of resources that the Soviet economy was undermined. The burdens thus imposed by the international competition structured Gorbachev's reform agenda. See also Robert Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insiders Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

2. Michael Doyle has argued that the domestic pressures for political reform persuaded the Soviet leadership to enter the international political economy in order to gain the fruits of the international market. See the final chapter, “The Future,” in Michael Doyle, Ways of War and Peace(New York: Norton, 1997). See also Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Did ‘Peace through Strength' End the Cold War? Lessons from INF,” International Security 16 (1991): 162; and on a related note, Mancur Olson, Power and Prosperity (Basic Books, 2000), in which it is argued that democracy performs better economically than either communist or capitalist tyranny.

3. Compare Paulette Kurzer, “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,” Political Science Quarterly 8 (1996): 166; and Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War,” International Organizations 48 (1994): 185.

4. See Part II, Book I.

5. Gorbachev deployed glasnost and perestroika as a response to the delegitimization of Soviet communism and as an attempt to retain control through reform: “[Counter-reformation] is a self-critical show of strength with the aim of incorporating those values created against the will of [the established orthodoxy], and outside the social institutions in order to stop them [from] becoming antagonistic and subversive.” Adam Michnik, “The Great Counter-Reformer,” Labor Focus and Eastern Europe 9 (July – October 1987): 23.

6. Michnik.

7. Coit Blaker, Hostage to Revolution: Gorbachev and Soviet Security Policy, 1985 – 1991 (Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), 188.

8. See Adam Michnik, “On Resistance,” in Adam Michnik, Letters from Prison and Other Essays, trans. Maya Liatynski (University of California Press, 1985), 41,43.

9. In this regard it is quite interesting to recall the following statements by Gorbachev at a press conference held with Mrs. Thatcher: “… I will tell you about an interesting conversation which I had at Stanford when I met a group of professors… Professor Friedman, the economist… had a very interesting observation to make. He recalled that, after World War II, when the U.S. set out to help the Japanese… to master the forms of a market economy, a group of them, specialists, arrived in Japan. His first impression… was that the people were wholly unprepared for working in the conditions which they wanted to propose. They were all very unhurried people. They lacked energy and initiative. They were absolutely not the right kind of human material…. Subsequently he quickly changed his mind. You know how the Japanese work now, he said. I met leaseholders in the Kremlin recently and they are the very people who are working under conditions which are necessary for a market economy. I was struck by their openness, judgment, experience, and initiative. They had so many proposals. That discussion ended with them sitting around preparing a proposal for the president…. These are already different people.” Joint Press Conference, June 8, 1990, Moscow Television in FBIS-SOV, June 11, 1990. Gorbachev believed that he could make the Russian people into a disciplined and yet innovative workforce—as he thought the Americans had done with the Japanese—not, however, in order to support a parliamentary system but to advance socialism.

10. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Russian state-nation employed about 160 full-time personnel in its secret police, and a police force of about 10,000. Its successor, the Soviet nation-state's secret police, amounted to 262,400 in 1921, excluding the NKVD. John Gray, “The Politics of Cultural Diversity,” in Postliberal-ism (Routledge, 1993), 257.

11. These can be compared to Mao's Great Leap Forward, and the “Cultural Revolution.”

12. Fairbanks attributes the first noticing in the West of this recurrence to Walter Laqueur. See Charles Fairbanks, “The Nature of the Beast,” The National Interest 31 (Spring 1993): 46.

13. Vladimir Kontorovich, “The Economic Fallacy: Economic Problems and the Collapse of Communism in the Former USSR,” The National Interest 31 (Spring 1993): 35.

14. Ibid.

15. This theory holds, roughly, that economies are so rife with distortions and compensations for them, that interventions will inevitably have unintended, indeed unpredictable consequences.

16. Kontorovich, 35.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Walter C. Uhler, “The Gorbachev Factor,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 53 (1997): 65.

20. Soviet forces crushed popular uprisings in East Germany (1953), Hungary (1956), Poland (1956), and Czechoslovakia (1968). There was a popular joke in Communist Hungary that while Hungarians could get a passport to travel abroad every three years, Russians were only given one every twelve years: 1944, 1956, 1968, and 1980 (Afghanistan).

21. See Zbigniew Herbert, Barbarzynca w ogrodzie (Barbarian in the Garden), trans. Michael March and Jaros Law Anders (Carcanet, 1985); Václav Havel, “The Memorandum,” trans. Vera Blackwell, in Selected Plays, 1963 – 83 (Faber and Faber, 1992); Milan Kundera, Nesnesitelna lehkost byti (The Unbearable Lightness of Being), trans. Michael Henry Heim (Harper & Row, 1984); and the Russian glasnost literary journal, Glas: New Russian Writing, available both in Russian and in English translation.

22. See Jacek Kuron's conception of “social self-organization” in Polityka i odpowiedzialnosc (“Aneks,” 1984); György Konrád, Antipolitics: An Essay, trans. Richard E. Allen (Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1984); and Václav Havel, “Power of the Powerless,” in Open Letters: Selected Writings, 1965 – 1990, ed. Paul Wilson (Knopf, 1991).

23. Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993).

24. Rey Koslowski and Friedrich Kratochwil, “Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System,” International Organization 48 (Spring 1994): 215.

25. Ibid. Compare Raymond Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Brookings Institution, 1994), for a contrary view.

26. Kontorovich, 43.

27. Pierre Lelloche, “Kohls Apart: Schemes of Reunification,” The New Republic, March 19, 1990, 12.

28. Brian Beedham, “Baker and the Old One-Three-Two,” The Economist 316 (September 1, 1990): S10.

29. Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).

30. Ibid.

31. James A. Baker, “The Common European Interest: America and the New Politics Among Nations,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch, vol. 1, September 3, 1990, 36.

32. Michael F. Miley, “The CSCE Process and The Question of Sovereignty,” Southern University Law Review 19 (1992): 123.

33. S. Roth, “The CSCE ‘Charter of Paris for a New Europe,’” Human Rights Law Journal 11, no. 3 – 4 (1990): 374.

34. Note Miley, 116.

35. “Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Charter of Paris for a New Europe and Supplementary Document to Give Effect to Certain Provisions of the Charter,” International Legal Materials 30 (January 1991): 1993.

36. R. W. Apple, Jr., “Summit in Europe: 34 Leaders Adopt Pact Proclaiming a United Europe,” New York Times, November 22, 1990, A1.

37. Roth, 374. In a later article R. W. Apple observed that when “wars turn things upside down, the politicians, craving stability, always start trying to institutionalize the new world order. After Napoleon came the Holy Alliance, after World War I, the League of Nations, after World War II the United Nations. So last week [a congress of states] had a go, around a hexagonal table in Paris, at inventing something to replace the cold war.”

38. At Paris, President Bush proclaimed that the “Cold War is over. In signing the Charter of Paris we have closed a chapter of history.” The New York Times commented that the Charter of Paris marked “the final denouement of the global conflict that began a half century ago.” See Apple, “Summit in Europe.”

39. Le Monde, November 21, 1990. The summit at Paris spoke on behalf of the society of nation-states, it should be noted, in contrast to the Congress of Vienna, which spoke for the society of state-nations.

40. Roth, 375.

41. Thomas Buergenthal, “CSCE Rights,” George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics 25, no. 2 (1991): 361.

42. “Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Document of the Moscow Meeting on the Human Dimension, Emphasizing Respect for Human Rights, Pluralistic Democracy, the Rule of Law and Procedures for Fact Finding,” International Legal Materials, 30 (October 3, 1991): 1672.

43. Buergenthal, 380 – 381 (emphasis supplied).

44. Quoted in Daniel Patrick Moynihan, “The Time and Place for International Law,” Washington Post, April 1, 1990, C7.

45. Harold Hongju Koh, “A World Transformed,” Yale Journal of International Law 20 (Summer 1995): ix.

46. See David Kennedy, “The Move to Institutions,” Cardozo Law Review 8 (1987): 844; and Nathaniel Berman, “But the Alternative Is Despair: European Nationalism and the Modernist Renewal of International Law,” Harvard Law Review 106 (1993): 1792.

47. Koh, 1045.

48. Daniel Westberg, “The Relations between Positive and Natural Law in Aquinas,” Journal of Law & Religion 11 (1994 – 95): 1.

49. Martin van Gelderen, “The Challenge of Colonialism: Grotius and Vitoria on Natural Law and International Relations,” Grotiana 14/5 (1993 – 94): 3 – 37.

50. See Dennis Patterson, Law and Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

51. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: On Our Law and Its Study (Oceana Publica-tions, 1951; first published 1930). This shocking remark was an extension of Holmes's celebrated observation that “Law is nothing more pretentious than the prediction of what courts will in fact do,” perhaps via Cook, who had suggested, regarding this passage, that “[t]he word ‘courts' should include some other more or less similar officials.” W. W. Cook, “The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,” Yale Law Journal33 (1924): 457.

52. Abram Chayes, et al., International Legal Process 1 (1968): xi (emphasis supplied); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., and Philip P. Frickey, “An Historical and Critical Introduction to Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process,” The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law (Foundation Press, 1994); ciii, note 232, dxiv, note 286, cxxxii, note 346, describing the origin of Chayes and Ehrlich's work in the legal process materials, cited in Koh, n. 94.

53. See Roger Fisher, “Bringing Law to Bear on National Governments,” Harvard Law Review 74(1961): 1130.

54. Akehurst, Michael, A Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th ed. (rev. ed., Peter Malanczuk) (Routledge, 1997), 6.

55. Ibid.

56. Akehurst, 2; see also Akehurst, “Custom as a Source of International Law,” British Year Book of International Law 47 (1974 – 75): 1.

57. Tom J. Farer, “Human Rights in Law's Empire: The Jurisprudence War,” American Journal of International Law 85 (1991): 117.

58. Ibid., 118.

59. François, Duc de La Rochefoucauld, Maxims, trans. Leonard Tancock (Penguin Books, 1959), 65.

60. Despite the fact that Europe, and especially Germany, were early contributors to legal realism, note the German Interessenjurisprudenz and Freie Rechtslehre, acknowledged by Llewellyn, as well as Geny's Libre recherche scientifique.

61. “An examination of the Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law… reveals that European scholarship in international law… [has] continued largely in the traditional, non-theoretical, doctrinal vein. International legal scholarship in other countries followed this doctrinal, Eurocentric pattern.” Cf. Yasuaki Onuma, “Japanese International Law in the Postwar Period—Perspectives on the Teaching and Research of International Law in Postwar Japan,” Japanese Annual of International Law 33 (1990): 25, 44.

62. Farer, 117.

63. Some say the earliest known writing is a treaty.

64. Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice: General Course in Public International Law (Academic Publishers, 1982), 24.

65. Ibid., 25.

66. Cf. Thomas Franck, “The Case of the Vanishing Treaties,” American Journal of International Law 81 (1987): 763.

67. Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, 44.

68. Oscar Schachter, “The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion,” American Journal of International Law 78 (1984): 645, 649.

69. See Leland M. Goodrich, Edvard Hambro, and Anne P. Simons, Charter of the United Nations (Columbia University Press, 1969), 629 – 632.

70. Oscar Schachter, “United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict,” American Journal of International Law 85 (July 1991): 464.

71. Compare the strikingly similar hypothetical exercise used by Justice Hugo Black in his Charpentier Lectures to ridicule the position of Justice Frankfurter; see Hugo L. Black, “The Bill of Rights,” New York University Law Review 35 (1960): 877 – 878. It suggests that even the plainest of the textual provisions of the Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution could be overridden by an appeal to extratextual values, like necessity.

72. Most of McDougal's most important early work is collected in Myres S. McDougal and Associates, Studies in World Public Order (Yale University Press, 1960), although in many ways McDougal's Hague lectures provide more insight into the development of his unique framework. Other important articles, although only a limited selection from a vast corpus, include: Myres S. McDougal, “Law as a Process of Decision: A Policy-Oriented Approach to Legal Study,” Natural Law Forum 1 (1956): 53; Myres S. McDougal, “Some Basic Theoretical Concepts about International Law: A Policy-Oriented Framework of Inquiry,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 4 (1960): 337; Myres S. McDougal and W. Michael Reisman, “The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision,” Journal of Legal Education 19 (1967): 253; Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, and W. Michael Reisman, “Theories about International Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence,” Virginia Journal of International Law 8 (1968): 188; Myres S. McDougal, “International Law and Social Science: A Mild Plea in Avoidance,” American Journal of International Law 66 (1972): 77; Myres S. McDougal and W. Michael Reisman, “International Law in Policy-Oriented Perspective,” in The Structure and Process of International Law, ed. Ronald St. J. Macdonald and Douglas M. Johnston (Martinus Nijhoff, 1983), 103 [hereinafter Policy-Oriented Perspective]. On the contributions of his many students, see the Festschrift published on the occasion of his retirement: Toward World Order and Human Dignity, ed. W. Michael Reisman and Burns H. Weston (Free Press, 1976) [hereinafter Toward World Order], also containing a complete bibliography of works by and relating to McDougal; see also “International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda,” American Journal of International Law 87 (1993): 205.

73. Anthony Kronman, “Jurisprudential Responses to Legal Realism,” Cornell Law Review 73 (1988): 335; Jan Vetter, “Postwar Legal Scholarship on Judicial Decision-making,” Journal of Legal Education 33 (1983): 412.

74. As Anne-Marie Burley (herself one of the most insightful and distinguished of McDougal's heirs) concluded, “Although many of his students profited from his insights when turned to their own purposes, McDougal's most prominent disciple and heir to his jurisprudential approach is W. Michael Reisman.” See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, “A Theory about Law from the Policy Perspective,” in Law and Policy, ed. D. N. Weisstub (Osgoode Hall Law School, 1976), reprinted as abridged in Myres S. McDougal and W. Michael Reisman, International Law Essays: A Supplement to International Law in Contemporary Perspective (Foundation Press, 1981), 1; and [other] co-authored works also written with McDougal.

75. Reisman, 273.

76. Richard Falk, “Casting the Spell: The New Haven School of International Law,” Yale Law Journal 104 (1995): 1991 – 92.

77. Reisman, 277.

78. See generally Myres S. McDougal, “Legal Bases for Securing the Integrity of the Earth-Space Environment,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 184 (1971): 380; Myres S. McDougal and Harold D. Lasswell, “The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order,” American Journal of International Law 53 (1959): 1; Winston Nagan, “Civil Process and Power: Thoughts from a Policy-Oriented Perspective,” University of Florida Law Review 39 (1987): 453; W. Michael Reisman, “A Theory about Law from the Policy Perspective,” in Law and Policy, ed. Weisstub, 75.

79. See for example, Samuel P. Huntington's well-known argument in The Clash of Civilizations.

80. Emphasis supplied. Paula Wolff, “McDougal's Jurisprudence: Utility, Influence, Controversy,” Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 79 (April 25 – 27, 1985): 270 – 271. One might add that even if there is a universal consensus on what people want for themselves, it does not follow, alas, that there is an identical consensus on what we are prepared to accord to others.

81. Ibid., 284.

82. Franck, 765.

83. Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave (Columbia University Press, 1979), 40; see also Louis Henkin, “Force, Intervention and Neutrality in Contemporary International Law,” Proceedings of the American Society on International Law 57 (1963): 168.

84. Ervin H. Pollack, Jurisprudence, Principles and Applications (Ohio State University Press, 1979), 788.

85. Dean Acheson, “The Arrogance of International Lawyers,” International Law 2 (1968): 592; and also Dean Acheson, Fragments of My Fleece (Norton, 1971), 156.

86. “The law is what the judges say it is,” Charles E. Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States (Columbia University Press, 1928), 120; “the Constitution is what the Supreme Court says it is,” Charles E. Hughes, Addresses and Papers of Charles Evans Hughes (Putnam, 1908), 139 – 141.

87. Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 13 (1963): 14.

88. See John Lewis Gaddis, “The Tragedy of Cold War History,” Diplomatic History 17 (1993): 1.

89. Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, “Great Britain,” in The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives, ed. David Reynolds (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).

90. “The Soviet occupation of the Western Ukraine and Byelorussia from 1939 – 41 provide an example of how the Soviet system foreshadowed the policies Stalin would pursue after World War II. The entire program of phony elections, purges and mass shootings was carried out during the invasion of Poland in 1939.” The security police murdered 400,000 persons and expelled another 1.5 million to the interior. Jacob Heilbrun, “Who Writes the History: Neo-Revisionism and the Cold War,” Current, December 1994, 12.

91. Quoted by Heilbrun, ibid.

92. Douglas Brinkley, Dean Acheson: The Cold War Years 1953 – 71 (Yale University Press, 1992); see also Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department (Norton, 1969); and Gaddis Smith, Dean Acheson (Cooper Square Publishers, 1972).

93. Brinkley, p. 66.

94. Perhaps women will not fall prey to this conceit; in Acheson's day there were virtually no females at the Harvard Law School.

95. See David McCullough, Truman (Simon & Schuster, 1992), 760 – 761.

96. Acheson, “The Arrogance of International Lawyers,” 592.

97. Brinkley, Dean Acheson; also quoted in Hodgson.

98. Acheson, “The Arrogance of International Lawyers,” 598.

99. Bobbitt, Tragic Choices, 18.

100. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush; this is also a popular assertion in critical legal studies.

101. Wolff, “McDougal's Jurisprudence,” 272.

102. Judith Gail Gardam, “Gender and Non-Combatant Immunity” (Symposium: Feminist Inquiries into International Law), Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 3 (1993): 345.

103. Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, and Shelly Wright, “Feminist Approaches to International Law,” American Journal of International Law 85 (1991).

104. The constitution of the society of state-nations was very different: the Ottoman Empire was not admitted to this society until 1856.

105. David A. Westbrook, “Islamic International Law and Public International Law: Separate Expressions of World Order,” Virginia Journal of International Law 33 (Summer 1993): 829.

106. See also David N. Kennedy, “A New Stream of International Law Scholarship,” Wisconsin International Law Journal 7 (1998): 1, and his book International Legal Structures (Nomos, 1987); James Boyle, “Ideas and Things: International Legal Scholarship and the Prison-House of Language,” Harvard International Law Journal 26 (1985): 327; and Phillip Trimble, “International Law, World Order and Critical Legal Studies,” Stanford Law Review 42 (1990): 811; and Nigel Purvis, “Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law,” Harvard Journal of International Law 32 (1991): 81.

107. Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation.

108. “Law is something we do, not something we have as a consequence of something we do. Sometimes our activities in law—deciding, proposing, persuading—may link up with specific ideas we have at those moments; but often they do not, and it is never the case that this link must be made for the activities that are law to be law. Therefore the causal accounts of how those inner states come into being, accounts that often lose their persuasiveness in contact with the abundance of the world, are really beside the point. If we want to understand the ideological and political commitments in law, we have to study the grammar of the law, that system of logical constraints that the practices of legal activities have developed in our particular culture.” Ibid., 24.

109. See for example, Gunnar Schuster, “Extraterritoriality of Securities Laws: An Economic Analysis of Jurisdictional Conflicts,” Law and Policy in International Business 26 (1994): 165; Joel Trachtman, “The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of International Economic Organization: Toward Comparative Institutional Analysis,” in Symposium: Institutions for International Economic Integration, Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 17 (Winter-Spring 1996 – 97): 470.

110. Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

111. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986).

112. See Thomas Franck's Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford University Press, 1995) for a sophisticated and even charming exposition of how Rawls's work might be applied to the issue of legitimacy in international law.

113. Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought), trans. William Rehg (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996).

114. James Brierly, The Law of Nations, 6th ed. (Oxford University Press, 1963), 51.

115. Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, vol. 86, 120.

116. See Jack Balkin for argument that deconstruction can be put to conservative uses; and Bruce Ackerman, in We the People: Foundations (Belknap Press, Harvard, 1991), 320 – 322, and Frederick Schauer in “Constitutional Positivism,” Connecticut Law Review 29 (Spring 1993), for arguments that formalism can be put in service of liberal ideals.

117. These are discussed in some detail in Constitutional Fate (1982) and Constitutional Interpretation (1991).

118. James A. Baker III, with Thomas DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace (New York: Putnam, 1995).

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR: CHALLENGES TO THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER

1. Having looked at this question when I was writing Democracy and Deterrence, I have less sympathy with those scholars who argue that the United States need not have dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki because the Japanese were obviously losing the war and thus could have been induced to surrender without an American invasion.

2. For an excellent discussion, see “Japanese Nuclear Weapons,” in Asia-Pacific: Issues and Developments (National Security Planning Associates, 1997), 23.

3. Lawrence Freedman, “The ‘Proliferation Problem' and the New World Order,” 2 (man-script in possession of the author); see also Lawrence Freedman, “Great Powers, Vital Interests and Nuclear Weapons,” Survival 4 (Winter 1994/95).

4. Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better (1981).

5. See Lawrence Freedman, “Great Powers, Vital Interests and Nuclear Weapons, supra n. 3, 36.

6. This speech is reproduced in Churchill's “Iron Curtain” Speech Fifty Years Later, ed. James W. Muller (with assistance from the Churchill Center) (University of Missouri Press, 1999).

7. Martin Van Creveld, Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict (Macmillan, 1993), 122.

8. Supplying other states with ballistic missile defense can strengthen the credibility of American commitment. This is because it avoids the theorem described in Democracy and Deterrence, which holds that any American effort to cure “decoupling”—the abandonment of the European or any extended theatre—risks “uncoupling”—the confinement of nuclear war to an extended theatre while the U.S. remains a sanctuary. See Bobbitt, Democracy and Deterrence, 99 – 109.

9. See Richard Betts, “The New Threat of Mass Destruction,” Foreign Affairs 77 (1998): 31.

10. Cf. Colin G. Calloway, New Worlds for All: Indians, Europeans, and the Remaking of Early America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 33 – 338.

11. George W. Christopher and Julie Pavlin, “Biological Warfare: A Historical Perspective,” Journal of the American Medical Association 278 (1997): 412.

12. Robert Koch (1843 – 1910) discovered mycobacterium tuberculosis as the agent of human tuberculosis in 1871. His postulates are these: an infectious disease is caused by a pathogen organism; that organism must be obtained in pure culture; the organism obtained in culture must reproduce in experimental animals; the pathogen organism must be recovered from the animals used for the experiment so vaccines can be produced.

13. This was Ken Alibek, the former deputy director of Biopreparat, a network of institutes responsible for weapons research and the production of pathogen agents.

14. See Ronald Atlas, “Combating the Threat of Biowarfare and Bioterrorism: Defending against Biological Weapons Is Critical to Global Security,” BioScience 9 (1999): 465, from which much of the background provided in this account is taken. The CIA reported in 1995 that seventeen countries—Bulgaria, China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Laos, Libya, North Korea, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Syria, Taiwan, and Viet Nam—were researching or stockpiling weapons for germ warfare.

15. Ibid. See M. Leitenberg, “The Conversion of Biological Warfare Research and Development Facilities to Peaceful Uses,” in Control of Dual Threat Agents: The Vaccines for Peace Program, ed. Erhard Geissler and John P. Woodall (Oxford University Press, 1994), 77.

16. Brad Roberts, in Washington Quarterly, Winter 1995, 5; see also Biological Weapons: Weapons of the Future?, vol. 15, ed. Brad Roberts (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993).

17. A United States Office of Technology Assessment Report concluded that a small private plane with 220 pounds of anthrax spores flying over Washington, D.C., on a north to south route trailing an invisible mist would kill a million people on a day with moderate wind. Even a single warhead of anthrax spores, OTA estimates, would kill 30,000 to 40,000 persons, more in fact than an Hiroshima-size nuclear weapon.

18. A Japanese attack using cholera agents on Changteh in 1941 led to an estimated 10,000 casualties and 1,700 deaths among Japanese troops.

19. The anthrax released from the Soviet lab near Sverdlovsk in 1979 may have been specially bred to be resistant to antibiotics and specifically engineered to attack adult males. Antibiotics failed to prevent the deaths of over 1,000 civilians, but three times as many men as women died and not a single child.

20. Though it was ultimately unable to seal its borders against communication. Arthur C. Clarke, who early on speculated about the geosynchronous satellite, observed that “[r]adio waves have never respected frontiers, and from an altitude of 36,000 kilometers, national boundaries are singularly inconspicuous.” Satellites enable persons with such decentralized devices as a simple transistor radio or television to receive information beyond the control of national authorities.

21. It is worth noting that a team of researchers at Malvern, Worcestershire, given a task of improving the reliability of RAF radar equipment, hit upon the idea of putting an entire circuit on a block of silicon a half-inch square. This concept was not operationalized until 1958 by Roger Kilby at Texas Instruments.

22. Quoted in Walter B. Wriston, “Clintonomics,” Vital Speeches, vol. 59, April 1, 1993, 376.

23. Peter Drucker, “The Changed World Economy,” Foreign Affairs 64 (1986): 777 – 778.

24. Wriston, 379.

25. Ibid., 380.

26. Ibid.

27. Ask not what your country can do for you (nation-state) or what you can do for your country (state-nation), but what, with your country's help, you can do for yourself (market-state).

28. C. Fred Bergsten, “The World Economy after the Cold War,” Foreign Affairs 69 (1990): 98.

29. Ibid.

30. According to the CIA World Factbook 2000, current U.S. external debt stands at $862 billion. The Bureau of the Public Debt does not provide percentage breakdowns by nation. According to Peter Hadfield, “Japan holds a large chunk of U.S. national debt—$500 billion worth, according to some estimates,” “Japan backs away from bond threat,” USA Today, June 25, 1997, 10B. But see Claire Mencke, “Prices Flat Despite Bullish Data: Japan Rumors, Iraq Events Cited,” Investor's Business Daily, November 17, 1997, B14. “‘There's no real evidence of this yet, but people in the market are very fearful of it because of Japan's super-large Treasury holdings,’ MCM Money Watch economist Astrid Adolfson said, ‘noting that Japan holds about $321 billion of the $1.3 trillion of Treasury debt outstanding.’”

31. Drucker, 786.

32. See Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1981), 235.

33. Robert P. Kadlec, “Biological Weapons for Waging Economic Warfare,” in Battlefield of the Future, ed. Barry R. Schneider and Lawrence E. Grinter (Air University Press, 1995), 251.

34. Drucker, 771.

35. David Sapsford, Real Primary Commodity Prices: An Analysis of Long-Run Movements, International Monetary Fund Internal Memorandum, May 17, 1985 (unpublished).

36. Drucker, 773.

37. Ibid., 781; see also Walt Rostow, “The Terms of Trade in Theory” and “The Terms of Trade in Practice,” in The Process of Economic Growth (Norton, 1953), 168.

38. Robert W. Kates, “Expecting the Unexpected?” Environment 38 (1996): 6.

39. William McNeill, Plagues and Peoples (Anchor Press, 1976), 254.

40. Some knowledgeable commentators expect that advances in biotechnology will obviate this problem by allowing us to grow organs cheaply.

41. Methyl chloride, for example, killed more than a hundred people in a Cleveland hospital in 1929 when it leaked into a ventilation system following an explosion in an X-ray lab.

42. Kates, n. 38.

43. SALADIN: And I a Mussulman. Between us is the Christian. Now, but one of all these three religions can be true. A man like you stands not where accident of birth has cast him. If he so remain, it is from judgment, reason, choice of best. Impart to me your judgment; let me hear the reasons I've no time to seek myself.

Saladin then gives Nathan a few hurried moments to contemplate on this question alone. After a soliloquy by Nathan, Saladin returns to be told this story.

NATHAN: In gray antiquity there lived a man in Eastern lands who had received a ring of priceless worth from a beloved hand. Its stone, an opal, flashed a hundred colors, and had the secret power of giving favor, in sight of God and man, to him who wore it with a believing heart. What wonder then this Eastern man would never put the ring from off his finger, and should so provide that to his house it be preserved forever? Such was the case. Unto the best beloved among his sons he left the ring, enjoining that he in turn bequeath it to the son who should be dearest; and the dearest ever, in virtue of the ring, without regard to birth, be of the house the prince and head. You understand me, Sultan?

SALADIN: Yes; go on!

NATHAN: From son to son the ring descending, came to one, the sire of three; of whom all three were equally obedient; whom all three he therefore must with equal love regard. And yet from time to time now this, now that, and now the third,—as each alone was by, the others not dividing his fond heart, appeared to him the worthiest of the ring; which then, with loving weakness, he would promise to each in turn. Thus it continued long. Be he must die; and then the loving father was sore perplexed. It grieved him thus to wound two faithful sons who trusted in his word; but what to do? In secrecy he calls an artist to him, and commands of him two other rings, the pattern of his own; and bids him neither cost nor pains to spare to make them like, precisely like to that. The artist's skill succeeds. He brings the ring, and e'en the father cannot tell his own. Relieved and joyful, summons he his sons, each by himself; to each one by himself he gives his blessing, and his ring—and dies. You listen, Sultan?

SALADIN: (who, somewhat perplexed, has turned away)—Yes; I hear, I hear. But bring your story to an end…

NATHAN: Return we to our rings. As I have said, the sons appealed to law, and each took oath before the judge that from his father's hand he had the ring, —as was indeed the truth; and had received his promise long before, one day the ring, with all its privileges, should be his own, —as was not less the truth. The father could not have been false to him each one maintained; and rather than allow upon the memory of so dear a father such stain to rest, he must against his brothers, though gladly he would nothing but the best believe of them, bring charge of treachery; means would he find the traitors to expose, and be revenged on them.

SALADIN: And now the judge? I long to hear what words you give the judge. Go on!

NATHAN: Thus spoke the judge: Produce your father at once before me, else from my tribunal do I dismiss you. Think you I am here to guess your riddles? Either would you wait until the genuine ring shall speak?—But hold! A magic power in the true ring resides, as I am told, to make its wearer loved—pleasing to God and man. Let that decide. For in the false can no such virtue lie. Which one among you, then, do two love best? Speak! Are you silent? Work the rings but backward, not outward? Loves each one himself the best? Then cheated cheats are all of you! The rings all three are false. The genuine ring was lost; and to conceal, supply the lost, the father made three in place of one.

SALADIN: Oh, excellent!

NATHAN: Go, therefore, said the judge, unless my counsel you'd have in place of sentence. It were this: accept the case exactly as it stands. Had each his ring directly from his father, let each believe his own genuine. ‘Tis possible your father would no longer his house to one ring's tyranny subject; and certain that all three of you he loved, loved equally, since two he would not humble, that one might be exalted. Let each one to his unbought, impartial love aspire; each with the others vie to bring to light the virtue of the stone within his ring; Let gentleness, a hearty love of peace, benefiance, and perfect trust in God, come to its help. Then if the jewel's power among your children's children be revealed, I bid you in a thousand, thousand years again before this bar. A wiser man than I shall occupy this seat, and speak. Go!—Thus the modest judge dismissed them.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE: POSSIBLE WORLDS

1. Joseph Nye, Jr., “Peering into the Future,” Foreign Affairs 73 (1994): 82.

2. Ibid.

3. See Scenario Planning: Forging a Link with Strategic Decision Making (Corporate Executive Board, 1999), 51; and Arie de Geus, The Living Company (Harvard Business School Press, 1997); David Mason, “Scenario-Based Planning Decision Model for the Learning Organization,” in Planning Review, vol. 22, March/April 1994; Ian Wilson, “The Effective Implementation of Scenario Planning: Changing the Corporate Culture,” in Learning from the Future: Competitive Foresight Scenarios, ed. Liam Fahey (Wiley, 1998).

4. Scenario Planning, supra n. 3.

5. Ibid., 19 – 21.

6. For an excellent treatment of the scenario process see Peter Schwartz, The Art of the Long View (New York: Doubleday, 1991).

7. Public Global Scenarios 1992 – 2020, 2 (Shell International Petroleum Company, 1992). “[T]he purpose of scenario planning is not to pinpoint future events but to highlight large-scale forces that push the future in different directions. It's about making these forces visible, so that if they do happen, the planner will at least recognize them. It's about helping make better decisions today. Scenario planning begins by identifying the focal issue or decision. There are an infinite number of stories that we could tell about the future; our purpose is to tell those that matter, that lead to better decisions.”

8. Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the Future with Nongovernment Experts (National Intelligence Council 2000 – 02, Dec. 2000), 12. The following “assumed facts” for the scenario period are taken from this document.

9. See National Intelligence Estimate on Ballistic Missile Threat, declassified (U.S. GPO, 1999).

10. Walt W. Rostow, “2050: An Essay on the 21st Century,” 29 (ms.).

11. Ibid.

12. Paul Domjan, “Future Scenarios” (2001) (unpublished manuscript).

13. Ibid., 9.

14. William Greider, One World, Ready or Not: The Manic Logic of Global Capitalism (Simon & Schuster, 1997), 167 – 168; this is basically a description of Germany's policy in the late 1990s.

15. Roger Rainbow, in Scenarios for the Future.

16. Fukuyama, xiv.

17. Ibid., 77.

18. Ibid., 48.

19. This is a paraphrase of Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage: Why So Many Muslims Deeply Resent the West, and Why Their Bitterness Will Not Be Easily Mollified,” The Atlantic Monthly, September 1990, 48.

20. See Benjamin Barber, Jihad v. McWorld (Ballantine Books, 1995); and Patrick Glynn, “The Age of Balkanization,” Commentary 96 (July 1993): 21 – 24.

21. Seven Tomorrows: Seven Scenarios for the Eighties and Nineties (MCB University Press, 1982), 150 et seq.

22. Joseph Jaworski, Synchronicity (Berrett-Koehler, 1996): 164; see also Tragic Choices.

23. Quoting a speech by R. Kako, who was chairman of Canon, Inc., at the time.

CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX: THE COMING AGE OF WAR AND PEACE

1. Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the Future with Nongovernment Experts, 12.

2. President Clinton's January 18, 1998, State of the Union Address.

3. E.g. Don DeLillo, Underworld (Scribner, 1997), 76. “Now that power is in shatters or tatters and now that those Soviet borders don't even exist in the same way, I think we understand, we look back, we see ourselves clearly, and them as well. Power meant something thirty, forty years ago. It was stable, it was focused, it was a tangible thing. It was greatness, danger, terror, all those things. And it held us together, the Soviets and us. Maybe it held the world together. You could measure things. You could measure hope and you could measure destruction. Not that I want to bring it back. It's gone, good riddance. But the fact is… Many things that were anchored to the balance of power and the balance of terror seem to be undone, unstuck. Things have no limits now. Money has no limits. I don't understand money anymore. Money is undone. Violence is undone, violence is easier now, it's uprooted, out of control, it has no measure anymore, it has no level of values…”

4. Richard Danzig, The Big Three: Our Greatest Security Risks and How to Address Them (Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1999).

5. Michael Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (1983): 205, 323.

6. Thomas Schwartz and Kiron Skinner, “The Myth of Democratic Pacifism,” Wall Street Journal, January 7, 1999, A10.

7. At the same time that the pope was condemning war among Christians the Church was murdering Cathars, Albigensians, Waldensians, and others. See Wolfgang Wacker-nagel, “Two Thousand Years of Heresy: An Essay,” Diogenes 47 (Fall 1999): 134; or, for a more entertaining account, see David Roberts, “In France, an Ordeal by Fire and a Monster Weapon Called ‘Bad Neighbor’: Cathars, Nonviolent Christian Heretics, Victims of the Inquisition in the Thirteenth Century,” Smithsonian 22 (May 1991): 40.

8. R. James Woolsey, “On National Security Challenges in the 21st Century,” National Security Law Report 23 (January/February 2001): 5.

9. Rules, and also techniques.

10. See testimony of Michael Beschloss, Ed Turner, and Ted Koppel before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in Impact of Television on U.S. Foreign Policy (U.S. GPO, 1994).

11. “The defining moment was when Walter Cronkite announced on nationwide television after the Tet Offensive that he didn't believe we had any further reason to be in Vietnam.” Interview with Senator John McCain, March/April 2000, Association of Graduates, West Point.

12. David Anderson, “Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 140, no. 2 (December 1991): 487.

13. In the twelve months prior to July 1994, the Defense Department detected 3,600 computer intrusions on military networks. Admiral McConnell, former head of the National Security Agency (NSA), has stated that computer intruders, in his view, have already included foreign intelligence agencies, criminals, terrorists, and members of the computer underground. A 1996 GAO report estimates, on rather slender evidence it must be said, that as many as 250,000 attempts to penetrate Defense Department computer systems occurred in 1995, and that twice that many would occur in 1997. When the Defense Department has attempted to penetrate its own systems, it succeeded in over 7,800 attempts—an 87 percent success rate, fewer than 5 percent of which attempts were even detected and fewer than 1 percent of which were reported up the chain of command.

14. An October 1996 Ernst & Young survey of corporate executives disclosed that 78 percent of respondents reported financial losses from the preceding two years that were attributable to information security problems and computer viruses. And there are escalating grounds for concern. In 1998 identified computer viruses increased from 8,000 to 12,000 within the past year, and they continued to grow at an estimated 300 per month. Intruders have compromised nearly all elements of the PSN: switching systems, operations, administration, maintenance and provisioning systems, and packet data networks. They have regularly attacked the networks linked to the PSN. And they have demonstrated great skill at manipulating data networks including the ATM (asynchronous transfer mode) networks and the synchronous optical networks (SONET).

CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN: PEACE IN THE SOCIETY OF MARKET-STATES

1. For an excellent discussion of the debate surrounding this doctrine, see Richard Haass, Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post – Cold War World (Brookings Institution, 1994).

2. For a different proposal, see Richard Haass, The Reluctant Sheriff (Council on Foreign Relations).

3. Joseph Nye, “Redefining the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs 78 (July/August 1999): 28.

EPILOGUE

1. Fred Ikle, The National Interest, March 1, 1997.

2. Michael Walzer, “The Concept of Civil Society,” in Toward a Global Civil Society, ed. Michael Walzer (Berghahn Books, 1995), n. 342.

3. John Keegan, History of Warfare: see Chapter 6, n. 5.

4. Martin van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

APPENDIX

1. Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, “Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System” (Symposium: The End of the Cold War and Theories of International Relations), International Organization 48 (Spring 1994): 15.