CHAPTER TWO:
During the winter of 1355–6, the troops were billeted along the northern march. Warwick remained at La Réole, Salisbury went to Saint-Foy, and Suffolk to Saint-Emilion. The prince, with Chandos and Audley marched to Libourne. Three weeks passed before they undertook any further action.1
From the beginning of the Hundred Years War the need for public and parliamentary support encouraged the development of a sophisticated propaganda campaign in England. This took a wide variety of forms and media from stained glass images, manuscript illuminations, public ceremonies, pageants and proclamations, to meetings of the Order of the Garter. As part of this campaign it became normal practice to send regular communications back from the front to England in order to inform the public of successes and request further resources. In some cases these included personal letters. The 1355–6 expedition was no different and such documents are extremely valuable and provide a great deal of information about the period between the grande chevauchée and the raid that would lead to a battlefield outside Poitiers.2
Two letters were written at Bordeaux on 23 and 25 December 1355 by the prince and John Wingfield (governor of the prince’s business affairs) to William Edington, bishop of Winchester. Edington was the head of the prince’s council in England and communications sent initially to the prince’s officials were then circulated more widely throughout the country. Wingfield also wrote from his base at Libourne on 22 January, probably to Richard Stafford, who had travelled back to England bearing letters and with a commission to return with reinforcements and supplies. This communication related events which followed the first raid.3 Later, other letters were dispatched, three of which remain and recount the events of the second raid and the battle of Poitiers. A communication of 25 June 1356, sent to the bishop of Hereford, was brief and requested prayers and masses. On 20 October, Roger Cotesford, one of the prince’s bachelors, took another letter to the bishop of Worcester. The most important missive, carried by Nigel Loryng to the mayor, aldermen and commonality of London, was probably also intended for subsequent distribution outside the capital.4 Other members of the retinue who wrote home also passed information. Bartholomew Burghersh penned communications to John Beauchamp, and Henry Peverel corresponded with the prior of Winchester. The prince also wrote to the prior naming all those killed or captured at Poitiers. News was also passed by papal envoys, via wine merchants, and by the sub-admirals Deyncourt and Hoggeshawe who returned with some of the ships which had taken the army to Gascony.5 Requests for prayers continued to be made regularly. The Friars Preachers, Friars Minor, Carmelites, Austin friars, and the bishop of London were contacted in this regard.
In its propaganda programme the crown relied heavily on the services of the church and the parochial system became the chief conduit for the distribution of news through sermons and prayers made for the success of English armies in France. Both English and French judged they fought a ‘just war’ according to Augustinian principles. This not only ‘justified’ the shedding of blood but also emphasised triumph in battle as an indication of divine approbation. Prior to his departure in 1355 the prince visited Westminster to pray for success in the forthcoming expedition, and on his return to England after Poitiers, the prince gave thanks at Canterbury for his victory.
During the winter and spring of 1355–6 the prince busied himself with various administrative and governmental matters as well as the forthcoming campaign. In his capacity as the king’s lieutenant he dealt with affairs such as an appeal of the people of Bayonne against the count of Albret, and favourable diplomatic relations had to be maintained with the count of Foix.6
While the prince focused on the affairs of the duchy, Sir Richard Stafford returned to England and Wales with a commission to bring reinforcements and supplies. The exact details of his mission are uncertain, but he brought over 300 Cheshire archers into service. Larger numbers may have been requested but the duke of Lancaster was also recruiting troops at this time which restricted the availability of manpower. Recruitment elsewhere probably brought another 300 archers. Military summons were also sent to the seneschal of north Wales, and in addition to those troops from the prince’s demesne, the expedition attracted men from Westmoreland, Yorkshire and as far afield as Germany.7
In Gascony defence was the first priority – both internal and external. The frontiers of the duchy were extended. Support was secured from a number of Gascon nobles who had not participated in the earlier campaign including Jean de Galard, Bertrand de Durfort, and the lords of Caumont and Chalais. Deployed at key locations along the frontier a number of important figures in the military retinue undertook a series of small-scale raids to keep Armagnac and the French on the defensive. By this means counter-measures were put in place to prevent French attacks, the Anglo-Gascon ‘Pale’ was enlarged, and the soldiery were kept usefully employed. Despite this, however, the French retook over 30 towns and castles.8 Defence of the extended Gascon frontier had been and remained a major problem for English authorities and it grew considerably after 1362 with the creation of the much larger principality of Aquitaine.
This period of relative inactivity also saw a change in the moral dynamic of the expedition. When the army had ridden through Languedoc it had been at liberty to burn and destroy. Now it occupied ‘not only the physical borderland between English and French territory, but also the moral and legal borderland between the warrior and the armed criminal.’ A much more careful distinction now had to be made between non-combatants in English (Gascon) and French territory, those who had the right to protection, and those who might be attacked legitimately.9
Broadly speaking the policy in the winter and spring of 1355–6 was to harass the enemy while waiting for reinforcements, or until a diversionary English invasion was launched elsewhere. The raids began around Christmas. Burghersh was stationed in Saintonge where the frontier probably lay along the River Charente from Rochefort (threatening La Rochelle) to Taillebourg and as far as Cognac. From there he raided northward into Poitou. The captal de Buch was particularly successful in raids on the same area. He recaptured a number of castles in the east of Saintonge, then invaded Poitou in January before turning south toward Périgeux which he captured and handed over to the lord of Mussidan. In the Dordogne, operational headquarters were established at Libourne with reserves at St Emilion. The earls of Oxford, Salisbury, and Suffolk with Elie de Pommiers and the lord of Mussidan, in command of about 1,000 men raided across the river valley towards Rocamadour. They took Souillac and Beaulieu-sur-Dordogne.
The Garonne formed another boundary, although the French maintained some garrisons west of the river. Warwick’s raiding party, including Chandos and Audley, probably crossed somewhere near Port Sainte Marie, which they captured in January 1356. The earl then swung northwards along the right hand bank of the river. He took Clairac and then Tonneins. By the time Wingfield sent his letters Warwick had reached Marmande, and a detachment under Chandos and Audley launched raids into the Agenais, capturing Castelsagrat.
Meanwhile Baldwin Botetourt (master of the prince’s great horses) was based at Brassac. The first six weeks of 1356 proved scarcely less damaging to French royal interests in the south than the grande chevauchée itself. English territorial gains while modest were significant as they were concentrated on the north-west frontier of the duchy and so ensured the support of allies among the Gascon nobility. The role of the Gascon aristocracy should not be underestimated. Durfort, for example, controlled some 30 walled towns, Caumont a further six, and both Galard and Albret were major landholders. ‘They were the weather-vanes of the south-west’,10 their allegiance was vital to the political integrity of the duchy, and their defection in 1368–9 would destroy the principality.