There was, of course, much more to the Korean War than the big picture represented by lines on the map and debate in Washington and Beijing. It was a multi-faceted conflict which blighted the lives of millions and brought with it developments in all aspects of warfare.
The Air War
The air war over Korea was to witness the first jet versus jet combat and the extensive use of helicopters. Having swept aside the North Korean Air Force during the early days of the war, the US Air Force and her allies had unchallenged command of the air until the appearance of the Chinese MiGs at the end of 1950. In the dogfights that ensued, it was only the F-86 Sabre which was able to match the MiG15. The Americans never had more than 200 Sabres in theatre at any given time, while Communist strength climbed to 800 MiGs. Despite this, the Americans maintained an impressive kill ratio and never lost overall superiority. It did mean that the bombers required escorts and there were casualties. But pilot training and quality gave the Americans the edge. Fortunately for the United Nations – and in another example of the use of restraint in this limited war – the Communists based their MiGs in China. Their use was, therefore, confined to North Korea and the Chinese border.
Other aspects of air support – notably helicopter-based medevac and air-sea rescue – reached levels of efficiency undreamt of in the Second World War. On the downside, the claims of the air force generals that they could win the war proved as hollow as they had during the 1940s, or would in Vietnam. Especially in a rural Asian setting, there were clear limits as to what air power could achieve.
The Naval War
At sea, the United Nations did not have to worry about Chinese or North Korean naval units. There was a brief one-sided engagement between the Royal Navy and some small North Korean gunboats in July 1950, but that put paid to such threat as there was. An important learning point from the war was the threat posed by Soviet mine technology: the Americans lost several ships in attempting to clear Wonsan harbour in October 1950. The navies routinely provided gunfire support to ground forces and shuttled them from port to port or beach as required. The most innovative use of naval power was in the deployment of aircraft carriers. Much was learnt about the difficulties of maintaining high-tempo air operations at sea, as Britain and the USA kept carriers on station throughout the conflict. In the case of the USA’s naval jets, the huge fuel requirements caused a rethink concerning ranges and aircraft types. The Americans also adopted the British angled flight deck as a result of experience in Korea.
Irregular Warfare
Perhaps the one aspect of the war in Korea which did not become as prominent as it might was irregular, or guerilla, warfare. There had been a problem with Communist guerrillas in the South before June 1950, but this had largely been brought under control. After the South had tasted Communist rule in 1950, little sympathy remained for the North once the United Nations had regained the country at the end of that year. Rhee’s regime was not pleasant, but the people in the South were not minded to give succour to a Vietcong equivalent. As for the North, the regime was so totalitarian and oppressive that any kind of domestic opposition was suicidal. Unlike the Vietnam War ten years later, the Korean War would be fought mostly as a conventional, large unit conflict – and in this, the USA may have been fortunate.
Propaganda and Intelligence
The use of propaganda reached new levels in Korea, though to doubtful effect. Both sides dropped leaflets and used radio broadcasts routinely. Much of the material was patently implausible and, therefore, ineffective. China claimed that the USA had been using biological weapons – and does so to this day. A team of left-leaning British academics travelled to China to endorse these claims. It later transpired that they had not undertaken any independent research of their own. The Russians, who had been party to the accusations at the time, later conceded that they were a fiction, but the use of the Western scientists had been shrewd. Notoriously, some allied prisoners were subjected to ‘brainwashing’ techniques while in Chinese hands. This practice was not as widespread as first reported and, like the propaganda, largely ineffectual.
The intelligence efforts of both sides did not produce the important results that they had in the Second World War. There was no ‘Enigma’ equivalent, whereby code-breakers would produce strategically important information. The North Koreans managed to miss the impending invasion at Inchon. Until quite late in the war, the Chinese were able to move large formations of troops over great distances, without their opponents becoming aware. Hundreds of brave souls served for the allies behind Communist lines, but few survived or provided useful information. These were boon years for the newly established CIA, however, which made the case for significant investment and has remained influential ever since. Overall, it may be that the cultural and political divide during the Korean War was such that reading the enemy was simply too difficult.
Changing Attitudes
Social attitudes to the Korean War varied by country and through time. In Korea itself, the people on both sides had little opportunity for democratic reflection on the conflict. Although the North was a ruthless totalitarian regime with full military conscription, such evidence as there is suggests popular support for the war throughout the period. Most were persuaded by the Communist doctrine and Nationalist sentiment fuelled the ambition to reunite the country. In China too there was little opportunity for dissent but equally little evidence of anti-war sentiment.
South Korea was a more pluralist society but not a thoroughly democratic one. Those opposed to Rhee’s conduct of the war were mostly Communist sympathizers – and if not, were treated as such. These were dangerous views to express. Besides, this was a national emergency. As such, within the South as the North, the ordinary people struggled to survive as best they could. Hostility towards North Korea and communism in general remained widespread, encouraged by Rhee’s regime but also the experience of Communist occupation during 1950–1. Looking back, modern South Koreans overwhelmingly regard the war as a sacrifice which was worth making.
It was only in the Western democracies that popular opinion in any way questioned the continued prosecution of the war and began to influence policy makers. Even here, compared to the mass protests of the Vietnam era, anti-war sentiment was muted. In the USA, Truman’s presidency was badly damaged by perceived failures in Korea. But much of the criticism reflected MacArthur’s view – that the USA should stop fighting with one arm tied behind its back. Outright opposition was limited to the far left, such as the American Communist Party, and a few isolationist politicians. Notwithstanding this, Eisenhower recognized that the issue was potentially problematic during the 1952 election and chose to neutralize it with his ‘I shall go to Korea’ speech. Of course, his real intention turned out to be an early American exit.
There was more widespread public concern in some of the other countries contributing to the UN war effort. At its outset, popular support was almost universal. But after the trials of 1950–1 and the seemingly intractable stalemate which followed, criticism became more commonplace. There was division within Britain’s Labour Party, for example, even though a Labour government had first agreed to intervene. Left-wing journalists reported on the war in hostile terms. Much of the concern about continued involvement stemmed less from pacifism than it did from the austerity of the times in Europe. Australia too had a lively public debate about continued support for the war. For most people in the West however, the war was an irrelevance, a long way from home. Apathy and disinterest were far more pronounced than outright opposition. When the soldiers came home, many were saddened and surprised by this.
Public attitudes to the Korean War at the time serve to hint at the future. The low-level dissent which began to influence political leaders back then would become decisive during the Vietnam War and central to foreign policy making ever since. In the 1950s, however, the habit of supporting the national effort in time of war was still fairly deeply ingrained.