Chapter Eight
During Garibaldi’s southern campaign, which provided the pretext for Piedmontese intervention and absorption of the greater part of the Papal States, Rome was by-passed. Its future depended on the ambitions of the Italians, the attitude of the Powers, the policies of Pio Nono and Cardinal Antonelli, and the ability of Napoleon to juggle his confusing and contradictory commitments. On the one hand the French Emperor promised Antonelli and the Catholics he would preserve the Eternal City for the Pope, while on the other, he resented Papal and Austrian opposition to the completion of Italian unity, pledging to overcome their resistance.1 Mazzini no less than Pius, questioned the motives and ambitions of Napoleon, denouncing his duplicity.
As a united Italy miraculously emerged, the Papal police in Rome preserved order, preventing any demonstration of sympathy and support.2 They suspected that Turin coveted Rome, and their assumption proved correct. Prior to the proclamation of Italy, Cavour determined that it be parliamentary and eventually include both Venice and Rome. The new kingdom, which covered some 248,692 square kilometres and 21,894,925 inhabitants did not incorporate either Lazio, which remained under Papal control, or Venice, still subject to the Habsburgs. The Chamber of Deputies elected in March 1860 no longer represented the extended state, so at the end of January 1861 new elections were called. On 18 February 1861, Deputies throughout the peninsula, save the Veneto and Rome, convened in Turin. Opening as the eighth session of the Sardinian parliament, it closed as the first of the new Italy. Championed by some, the Kingdom of Italy was denounced by others.
While all patriots agreed that unification had to be completed, they differed sharply as to the means to achieve this objective. The Mazzinians, having little faith either in the desire or the ability of the monarchy to fulfil the task, attacked the institutions of the new state and looked to establish a republic. Invoking popular initiative, they sought insurrection to topple the kingdom and acquire Venice and Rome. The Party of Action, which had broader support, under the leadership of Garibaldi, likewise demanded immediate liberation of Rome and Venice, even at the cost of waging war against France and Austria. The moderate party, under Cavour, burdened with the responsibility of power, recognized the need to consolidate the state before attempting to resolve these thorny issues.
Cavour, Bettino Ricasoli, Marco Minghetti, Luigi Carlo Farini and others of the moderate camp, appreciated the importance of extending the geographical boundaries of the kingdom, but understood that considerable political and diplomatic groundwork was necessary to accomplish the goal. Cavour preached caution, lest they endanger everything they had accomplished. Contending that the revolutionary element had already made its contribution, he insisted those who governed be allowed to select the time and means of acquiring Rome and Venice. Above all, Cavour contended that these provinces had to be absorbed with the approval of Napoleonic France and the European powers. The moderate party realized that Italy could not ‘do it alone’. It lacked the wherewithal to wage war against Austria for Venice, and could ill afford to antagonize Napoleon, the ally who had made possible the consolidation achieved to date, over the question of Rome.
Mazzini, from his exile, found both the structure and the boundaries of the unitary state, wanting. He complained to Garibaldi, who had conquered the south, that neither Cavour nor Vittorio Emanuele could be trusted to complete the national edifice. Both, he maintained, were too timid to initiate an assault on the Veneto or publicly call upon Napoleon to withdraw his troops from Rome.3 Mazzini insinuated that once again direct and popular action was needed, and looked to Garibaldi to unsheath his sword to finish the work he had started. The guerrilla chieftain shared many of his ideological mentor’s concerns, like him distrusting the two who had bartered away his birthplace. The actions and statements of both Cavour and Napoleon roused his ire. The French Emperor remained as elusive and enigmatic as ever, asserting that while he could not oppose Italian unification, he predicted it would not succeed.4
On 17 March 1861, the Chamber proclaimed Vittorio Emanuele II, by the Grace of God and the will of the nation, King of Italy. A week later Cavour, selected by his Monarch as the country’s first prime minister, had the Chamber approve the Boncompagni bill, which made Rome, still garrisoned by French forces for the Pope, capital of Italy. This stop provided Pius with additional justification to withhold recognition and preclude any negotiation with the ‘Piedmontese faction.’ The Pope denounced the call for pacification and negotiation as unlikely as a pact between Christ and the devil.5 Pius persevered in his prohibition until his death in 1878, when his successors assumed his intransigent stance.
Rome’s refusal to disavow the temporal power and recognize the Kingdom of Italy created problems for Paris, Turin, Vienna, and the other capitals. Thus Napoleon found himself on the horns of a dilemma concerning the completion of Italian unity, caught as he was between his national aspirations and Catholic supporters. A compromise solution either with Austria for Venice or with the Papacy concerning Rome, appealed to the Emperor, as did the thought of shifting the burden of the solution to the shoulders of a European congress. Neither prospect materialized, so that Napoleon was constrained to await the course of events. At the end of 1860 a brochure by the banker M. Isaac Pereire, but probably inspired by Napoleon, proposed that Austria sell Venetia to Italy, and purchase Bosnia-Herzegovina from Turkey by way of compensation. The suggestion was not well received in Vienna.
The Roman imbroglio and the Italian question, which disrupted the Empire’s internal quiet and weakened its international position, distressed Napoleon, who sought to extricate himself from the labyrinth. His anger was compounded by Rome’s decision to provide a haven for Francis II and his family, disgruntled Legitimists, and French Republicans, who challenged his authority. Early in 1861 he reproached Pius for permitting Rome to become the centre of a conspiracy against his person and government. The Emperor lamented that his efforts, made at great cost and carrying grave consequences, were little appreciated by the Curia. Protesting his fidelity to preserve what remained of the temporal power, he confessed that events in the peninsula had taken a turn he had neither foreseen nor favoured. Pius responded that he did not shelter or encourage the Emperor’s enemies.6
Cavour recognized the need for the support of much of Europe in his quest for Venice, and even more so in that for Rome, relying on diplomatic and moral means to achieve his ends. Soon after his parliamentary declaration, in the autumn of 1860, that Rome must serve as the capital of the kingdom, he sought to open negotiations with the Papacy. His hopes for a peaceful solution were dashed by the expulsion of his agent, Diomede Pantaleoni, from Rome, and then by the Papal Allocution of 18 March 1861, denouncing the notion of a conciliation between the Holy See and the new kingdom. A week later Cavour was questioned in parliament about the means by which he proposed to acquire Rome. In his response of 27 March 1861 Cavour reaffirmed his earlier resolution that Rome serve as capital of Italy. Promising the Papacy broad liberty, he aimed to resolve both the Roman question and Church-state relations by the formula of ‘a free Church in a free state’. Rome rebuffed the offer. The temporal power was not simply a national issue, the Cardinal Secretary of State, countered, but a Catholic and international one whose resolution required the input of the Catholic world.7
Neither Mazzini nor Garibaldi appreciated the difficulties confronted by Cavour. Indeed, in March of 1861 Britain was one of the few nations to recognize the new Italy. However, not one government, Catholic or non-Catholic, deemed it legitimate to deprive the Papacy of its temporal power by taking Rome. Perhaps Protestant England proved the most sympathetic, as Palmerston recognized that so long as Venice and Rome remained outside the Italian union, it would remain beholden to France. The larger and stronger the new state became, he advised Queen Victoria, the more resistant it would be to French coercion. His solution was to have the French Emperor and Italian king accept Pio Nono’s sovereignty during his lifetime, but refuse to recognize the temporal power of subsequent Popes.8
Palmerston’s pragmatic proposal did not satisfy the impatient Garibaldi, who was elected to represent the first district in Naples in the Italian parliament. He ventured to Turin in April 1861 not only to chastise Cavour’s government for its treatment of his volunteers, but to call for the creation of a potent new military force to complete Italian unification. Sporting his symbolic red shirt, Garibaldi denounced Cavour for provoking a civil war, and for his subservience to Napoleon III. Asserting that Italy could only resolve its difficulties by arming, arming and again arming, he proposed the creation of a large force under his supervision, which would be ready to tackle the difficult problems facing the nation. Cavour made it clear that the Ministry deemed it inopportune to provoke a war at the moment, and therefore refused to accept Garibaldi’s modified proposal calling for a force of 25,000–30,000 volunteers. Neither Vienna nor Paris would tolerate such a military build-up without taking countermeasures jeopardizing the kingdom’s position.
Cavour recognized that the acquisition of Venice would have to await the impending question of German unification and the outbreak of an Austro-Prussian War. In January 1861 he sent General La Marmora to Berlin to congratulate William I on his accession to the throne, and this prompted the Prussian king to send a military mission to Turin. Regarding Rome, Napoleon proposed an agreement whereby he would withdraw his garrison from the Eternal City within the next few months, in return for an Italian guarantee of the truncated Papal State. Cavour considered this the best he could expect from Napoleon; since the Italians did not have to defend the Papal regime against any internal opposition, it provided him with the pretext for a revolutionary upheaval, once the French abandoned the city.
Negotiations for a Franco-Italian agreement began, but Cavour’s illness in the summer of 1861 prevented its conclusion. Until the last minute, and indeed on his deathbed, Cavour reflected that though weary, he had two more things to do – acquire Venice and Rome.9 He confessed that he, no less than his critic Garibaldi, wanted to go to Venice and Rome, but insisted that time was needed. Unfortunately his time ran out on 6 June 1861. The disappearance of the chief architect of the Italian state deprived Italy of her greatest statesman, certainly the one best qualified to continue the unification process. Even the writers of the Osservatore Romano wondered what would happen in the peninsula now that Cavour’s sure hand had gone.10
Two figures prominently tipped as successors to Cavour were the Tuscan nobleman, Bettino Ricasoli, and the Piedmontese barrister, Urbano Rattazzi. The king chose the former, who belonged to the Destra (or Party of the Right), rather than the pliant Rattazzi of the centre-left, who had close ties with the Party of Action. In mid-June the French Foreign Minister, Thouvenel, transmitted a dispatch finally recognizing the existence of the Kingdom of Italy, but making it clear that his government neither approved of the means employed in its creation, nor guaranteed its existence. Furthermore, French troops would remain in Rome until Catholic France was certain that the Pope’s position was secure. Ricasoli, like Cavour, was haunted by the question of Rome which occupied his thoughts throughout the remainder of 1861.
Before his death, Cavour had stressed the advisability of acquiring Rome before Venice, a priority his successor Ricasoli preserved. Early in September 1861 the ‘Iron Baron’ sent a long letter to Pius IX and Antonelli, seeking a solution of the Roman Question on the basis of Cavour’s ‘Free Church in a Free state’. The overture was not opposed by Paris, which urged the Cardinal Secretary of State to reach some accommodation with the new state. However, neither the promptings from Turin nor Paris persuaded the Pope, who remained little disposed to reach any sort of agreement which compromised the temporal power. Indeed Father Lavigerie, auditor of the Rota, warned the French Foreign Minister that Pius was not prepared to renounce even an inch of his territory and would not consider negotiations so long as the Italians controlled one village of the former Papal States.
Lavigerie’s assessment was confirmed by the tone of the Gazzetta di Roma which brushed aside Ricasoli’s proposal as ‘ridiculous’ and indicative of ‘the cupidity and greed’ of the Turin government. Neither the Pope nor his chief minister were moved by the petition of the Italian clergy, pressing the Pope to reach an accord with the Kingdom of Italy, and were angered and aroused by the address to Vittorio Emanuele invoking his intervention in Rome. The Italian bishops, almost to a man, supported the Pope’s position.11
Ricasoli understood that France would not tolerate any Italian-inspired insurrection against the Papal Regime, warning the Party of Action to abandon any thought of an armed incursion. The British, while sympathetic to Italian national interests, were determined to preserve the peace and protect Central Europe from revolutionary upheaval. Ricasoli made it clear that he would apply the full force of the law against those who undermined Italy’s diplomatic stance by attempting a popular move against Rome or Venice. His position was publicly supported by Vittorio Emanuele, who assured the British government – one of the few to have immediately granted Italy recognition – that the policy of his Cabinet was temperate, discouraging any violent or venturesome enterprise to complete unification. Like Cavour, he promised recourse to moral and diplomatic means.
The Italians considered the compromise suggested by Lord John Russell to Napoleon. The English Minister proposed that the French occupation be restricted to the Vatican and Civitavecchia, leaving the remaining Roman land to the Italians. The Pope would preserve his temporal power by controlling a truncated territory, but retaining the full exercise of his spiritual authority. While Turin showed interest, Paris did not, as the French Emperor flatly rejected the Italian request to make Rome their capital. Antonelli maintained his intransigent stance, indicating that Pius would reject any proposition until his entire state had been restored. Ricasoli’s failure to resolve the Roman question, the bristling of Vittorio Emanuele at the restrictions and restraints imposed by the haughty Tuscan on the Crown’s activity, and the intrigues of Rattazzi, all contributed to the Iron Baron’s fall in February 1862.
The replacement of the rigid ‘Grand Seigneur’, Ricasoli, by the pliant and intriguing Piedmontese, Rattazzi, which was orchestrated by the king, delighted the Party of Action. Garibaldi, who was allowed to preside over a meeting of the radical left in the City of Genoa, appeared gratified and vindicated. He was further pleased when the new ministry encouraged him to visit the major cities of northern Italy to institute the Tiro Nazionale, or Rifle Association, which would hopefully provide the basis of a permanent volunteer force. Meanwhile rumour was rife about a possible Garibaldi mission to Greece or to the Danubian provinces to strike the Habsburg Empire in the rear, so forcing it to disgorge Venice in the west. There was even talk of a volunteer incursion into the South Tyrol or the Trentino, creating concern in Vienna, Paris and London. As Turin received pointed enquiries about plots hatched in its territory, Rattazzi suddenly awoke to the perils of this policy. Confronted with the possible diplomatic consequences of condoning if not aiding and abetting Garibaldi’s manoeuvres, a number of his volunteers were arrested in Sarnico in Lombardy. The Party of Action felt betrayed, but both the king and Rattazzi secretly met with Garibaldi to explain the apparent volte face. Garibaldi then returned to Caprera for the time being.
Frustrated in his Venetian enterprise in the North, Garibaldi now turned to the South and Rome, denouncing Napoleon for preventing the Italian acquisition of the Eternal City. The French Emperor, for his part, reiterated his support for legitimate Italian national interests, warning the Italians not to make unreasonable demands, and the Papacy to reach some reasonable accommodation with the kingdom. He proposed that Pius should be satisfied with the territory he retained, and that the Italians should renounce their claim to Rome in return for Papal recognition. Since neither Turin nor Rome accepted his premise, Napoleon believed that the European powers would have to intervene to assure the Pope’s possession of Rome and the recognition of Italy.12 In May 1862 Napoleon replaced the pro-Papal General de Goyon as French Commander in Rome with the Count de Montebello, who was less sympathetic to Papal pretensions for a full restoration. The alteration may have influenced Garibaldi, if not Rattazzi, to focus on the Roman Question.
In June Garibaldi sailed for Sicily without hindrance from the Italian naval forces and officials, who remained convinced that the general again moved at the behest of secret royal orders. Arriving in Palermo at the end of June, he announced that Napoleon, the assassin of the Roman Republic and executioner of French liberty, had to be pushed out of Rome, invoking the assistance of the ‘people of the vespers’. In mid-July at Marsala, when someone shouted ‘Either Rome or Death!’ Garibaldi adopted this as his rallying cry and prepared for action. Early in August Garibaldi assumed command of some 3,000 volunteers determined to liberate Rome, while the government in Turin watched and waited. The king, in a proclamation of 3rd August, warned hotheads against attacking Italy’s closest ally, arguing that at an appropriate time he would lead the movement to complete unification. However, many in and out of the peninsula regarded the king’s words as mere rhetoric, convinced that Vittorio Emanuele and Rattazzi secretly supported Garibaldi. The fact that the general and his volunteers were allowed to commandeer two merchant ships and sail to Calabria served to confirm their suspicions.
At first Rattazzi intimated that Garibaldi could only be stopped if the Italian government occupied Rome, but neither France nor Austria accepted his logic, demanding that the Italian government move against the volunteers. Reluctantly the government had to declare martial law, and General La Marmora then Prefect in Naples and Commander-in-Chief of the army in the south, reinforced the troops in Calabria. In turn, General Cialdini ordered Colonel Emilio Pallavicini to ‘crush the movement’ and force Garibaldi to accept ‘unconditional surrender’. On the heights of Aspromonte, on 29 August 1862, the royal army fired on the Garibaldini, wounding Garibaldi in his ankle, and imprisoning him and a number of his followers. Though soon amnestied, Garibaldi was disgusted with the conduct of the Rattazzi government, which resigned in December 1862. In Paris, Napoleon, irritated by Piedmontese schemes and Garibaldi’s aggressive actions, replaced his pro-Italian Foreign Minister, Thouvenel, with Drouyn de Lhuys, who championed the maintenance of the status quo in Italy.13
During the short-lived ministry of Luigi Carlo Farini, followed by that of Marco Minghetti, Vittorio Emanuele continued his conspiracies for Rome and Venice, shifting his priority to the latter. The king, like his former minister and co-conspirator Rattazzi, was convinced that Italian unification would last, and therefore did not shy from expedients that others feared threatened its existence.14 Napoleon did not share his enthusiasm for such adventures, and harped upon the need for a European congress to resolve the thorny issues of Rome and Venice. The treaties of 1815 no longer existed, the Emperor proclaimed in his speech from the throne in November, inviting the powers to participate in a proposed European congress to adjust borders and preserve the peace.
London, Rome and Vienna did not share Napoleon’s optimism. In a courteous but firm response, Lord John Russell made it clear that under the prevailing situation the English government did not believe such a congress would be productive. He observed that in general, congresses such as the French proposed followed long and exhausting wars when the parties were prepared to compromise. At present neither Austria nor Russia, which were called upon to make concessions, were under such constraints. Russell’s analysis proved accurate. Austria opposed the idea of a congress, fearing that the French would attempt to press them to abandon Venice, a step they were not prepared to take. Pius IX, for his part, wrote to Napoleon that his attempt to establish peace in Europe through the mechanism of a congress was admirable, but stressed that he would not compromise on the question of temporal power. The Cardinal Secretary of State likewise did not expect anything positive to come from Napoleon’s suggested European congress.15
When the congress failed to materialize, Vittorio Emanuele resumed his conspiratorial efforts directed mainly for the acquisition of Venice, while his minister Minghetti commenced direct negotiations with Napoleon for the evacuation of Rome. Apparently the two were working independently of each other. While Vittorio Emanuele sought to create internal dissension within the Habsburg Empire, forcing her to concentrate on the planned insurrection in Galicia or Hungary, Venice could be snatched from her grasp. As before, the king looked to the Party of Action for assistance, and counted upon the leadership and charisma of Garibaldi. The latter, however, had left Caprera for a triumphal tour of England, so that Vittorio Emanuele for the moment lacked the charismatic figure who could galvanize the masses. This did not prevent the king from opening talks with the republican Mazzini and sending messengers to Garibaldi in London inviting him back home to lead the proposed expedition. The king’s conspiracy was exposed by an article in one of the radical journals, which momentarily put the Venetian question on ice.16
Minghetti and his Foreign Minister, Visconti Venosta, on the other hand, opened secret talks with Napoleon for a French withdrawal from Rome on the basis of the convention earlier planned with Cavour. However, Napoleon added two elements not present in the earlier proposal. The first provided for a staged withdrawal over a two-year period, and the second called for some indication that the Italians would respect the Pope’s position in Rome. Eventually the parties agreed that the transfer of the Italian capital from Turin to another city, which Minghetti deemed essential in any case, would be sufficient to calm French apprehensions about the future of Papal Rome. The conclusion and subsequent publication of the Convention in mid-September led to riots in Turin and the collapse of the Minghetti government. It encouraged Pio Nono in Rome to publish the encyclical Quanta cura, to which was attached the ‘Syllabus of Errors’, condemning many developments and ideologies of the contemporary age.
The Italian attempt to acquire Venice proved no easier than the drive for Rome, since the reluctance of Austria to cede Venice equalled that of the Pope to abandon Rome. One major difference was that Napoleon, who blocked the Italian acquisition of Rome, favoured their absorption of Venice. Nonetheless, he was not prepared to wage a war against Austria to acquire Venice for Italy. Instead he hoped that Vienna could be persuaded either by diplomacy or by a congress to cede the province, in return for territorial compensation in the Balkans. The Emperor also envisioned some monetary compensation for the Austrians. Finally, Napoleon, like Cavour earlier on, recognized that the Austrian-Prussian rivalry in Germany could work to Italy’s advantage, forcing the Austrian government to mend its fences in Italy as it prepared to confront Prussia in Germany.
The Italians understood that Prussia nourished German ambitions thwarted by Austria, and Bismarck believed that only a military confrontation could resolve the rivalry. The government, which had transferred to Florence in the spring of 1865, was therefore distressed to see the two German powers cooperate in the war with Denmark over Schleswig-Holstein. Napoleon did not share the concern, reassuring the Italians that this cooperation was temporary and would inevitably lead to a later clash of arms, providing them with the opportunity to seize Venice. For the moment this prediction seemed far-fetched. The Italians, who hoped for a Franco-Prussian rapprochement, were disappointed by Bismarck’s visit to Biarritz in the autumn of 1864. Subsequently, the Emperor, diffident towards Bismarck’s overtures, noted sarcastically that the Prussian Minister had offered him all sorts of things that were not his to give. Bismarck, in turn, branded Napoleon, the ‘unknown incompetent’. Indeed, Napoleon now cautioned the Italians to disarm, predicting that would lead to an Austrian recognition of the kingdom – a necessary prerequisite to its cession of Venetia, once offered adequate compensation. General La Marmora, who had succeeded Minghetti, observed that the public would perceive disarmament as a renunciation of Venice, and could not follow the French counsel.17
Meanwhile relations between Vienna and Berlin deteriorated. Bismarck expressed his determination to incorporate the duchies into Prussia’s military, postal and commercial system and in the face of Austrian opposition, settle matters by war. He prepared the groundwork by seeking the neutrality of France and the active assistance of the Italians. In August 1865 Count Usedom travelled to Florence, to enquire of La Marmora whether Italy would join Prussia in a war against Austria. The Italian Minister, pleased by the proposal, responded cautiously, unwilling to make any commitment before knowing the sentiments of Napoleon. The latter responded enigmatically to queries from Florence, making it clear that while Paris would not encourage war, it would not block it, asserting Italy’s liberty to act as it saw fit. La Marmora, suspicious of Bismarck’s intrigues, dispatched Count Malguzzi to Vienna to purchase Venice for 100,000,000 lire, but the offer was flatly rejected. The Italians concluded that Austria would cede Venice only under threat of war; thus they reconsidered the Prussian proposal.
In early October 1865 Bismarck again ventured to Biarritz to confer with Napoleon and his advisers. Debate still exists concerning the exact content of the conversations on the terrace of Eugénie’s villa by the sea, and later in Paris. Apparently the Prussian Minister revealed his intention of incorporating the German areas of Schleswig-Holstein, ceding the Danish territory to Denmark, and creating a North German Confederation under Prussian leadership. Knowing Napoleon’s penchant for the Venetian Question, Bismarck indicated that Austria would be constrained to cede Venice to the Italians in return for compensation in the Balkans. France, in turn, could annex Belgium or Luxemburg, and Bismarck also dangled further prospects before the startled Emperor. Napoleon did not know whether to conclude that the Prussian Minister was crazy or crafty, but was much more impressed by his person and policies than during their earlier encounter. Neither Napoleon nor Bismarck chose to make concrete their agreement in a formal accord, preferring to retain their freedom of action.
The French ruler, who perceived the advantages his Empire might accrue as a result of an Austrian-Prussian War, believed in the military superiority of Austria over Prussia. Consequently, he readily supported the formation of a countervailing Italian-Prussian Alliance, which was the main object of Bismarck’s visit to Biarritz. Bismarck understood that Vittorio Emanuele and the Italians would not join an alliance without Napoleon’s approval, and obtained it at Biarritz. In his talks with Nigra in Paris, on his way back to Berlin, Bismarck confided his conviction that a war against Austria was inevitable, thus revealing his desire to have Italy fight alongside Prussia. He suggested that if Italy had not existed, Prussia would have had to invent her.18
Napoleon sent mixed signals to Florence. On the one hand he offered his approval for the formation of an Italian-Prussian bloc against Austria, while on the other, he proposed that the Italians seek a rapprochement with Vienna. La Marmora was confused, but conscious of the difficulties in improving relations with Austria and the continuing reluctance of Vienna to cede Venice. To further frustrate the Italians, the Austrian Emperor, Franz-Josef, supported the person and policies of Pius IX, championing both the interests of the Church and the preservation of the temporal power of the Papacy.19 Under the circumstances, La Marmora did not foresee the prospect of an accord with Austria.
Relations between Florence and Berlin, on the other hand, became increasingly cordial. Following Biarritz, early in 1866 the Prussians negotiated the formation of a commercial agreement between Italy and the Zollverein, while William I conferred the Order of the Black Eagle on Vittorio Emanuele. The commercial agreement was ratified on 12th March, followed by the recognition of the kingdom of Italy on the part of all the members of the German Tariff League. Meanwhile, Berlin proposed that the Italian government dispatch a general to Prussia, to explore their respective positions, should war erupt. The Italians momentarily hesitated, seeking an alternative to war as a means of acquiring Venice.
In February 1866 Prince Couza of Romania was deposed, the throne fell vacant and the Italians explored the prospect that Vienna would trade Venice for Romania. The Italians, who sought the assistance of Napoleon in effecting the exchange, responded that the Austrians would probably reject the suggestion, but promised to float the proposal in London. However, he was pessimistic concerning its prospect and urged the Italians not to abandon talks with Berlin. Consequently La Marmora sent General Giuseppe Govone to Berlin, and the Italian emissary had his first meeting with Bismarck on 14th March. Since both La Marmora and Govone still hoped for the Romanian-Venetian transfer, they both saw the Italo-Prussian talks as another means of pressuring the Austrians to accept the exchange. The Italians suspected that the Prussians were doing more or less the same, using the talks as a means of frightening the Austrians into forcing Vienna to accept their absorption of the duchies. By 17th March the Italians had learned that Britain, Russia and Austria all opposed the Venetian-Romanian agreement, and so began serious negotiations with the Prussians.
The Italians wished to bind Prussia to a definite time-table for the impending war, while Bismarck, concerned about the attitude of William I and Napoleon III, sought to preserve his freedom of action.20 At the end of March a six-point compromise was ironed out. Among other things Italy was bound to join the war against Austria, once Prussia had opened the conflict. The agreement would only be implemented if Prussia initiated hostilities against Austria within three months following ratification of the treaty. Any armistice or peace concluded with the enemy had to be by mutual consent of the signatories, and would become operative when Austria was prepared to cede Venice to Italy and an equally populated territory to Prussia. La Marmora, whose nightmare was to be left in the lurch by Bismarck, found these terms acceptable, as did Napoleon. While the latter encouraged the Italians to formally sign the accord with Prussia on 8 April 1866, he assumed no responsibility or obligation of any sort. Napoleon, in Nigra’s opinion, expected to exploit the crisis and possibly the war to push the French frontier to the Rhine.
As La Marmora ordered the mobilization of the Italian army on 26th April, and early in May Bismarck placed the Prussian forces in a state of readiness, French public opinion, not privy to the scheming of the Emperor, was alarmed at the prospect of a war which strengthened Prussia and Italy. On 3rd May Adolphe Thiers, rejecting the notion of German unification, called upon Napoleon to take steps to prevent Prussian aggrandizement. The Emperor was already weighing that possibility as Austria, finally awakened to the nightmare of a two-front war, offered to cede Venice to Italy if France and Italy would remain neutral in the coming war, and would allow the Habsburgs to seek compensation at Prussia’s expense.
On 4th May, Napoleon transmitted the Austrian offer to the Italians who pondered the proposal. The obvious advantage was that Italy would gain Venice without cost or bloodshed, if Austria won and received compensation from Prussia. The Florentine government quickly perceived the disadvantages. What if Prussia won? How could the Italians explain their inactivity and failure to take advantage of the opportunity to acquire Venice? It might well lead the radicals to initiate their own campaign to the detriment of the monarchy and public order. Furthermore, a victorious Austria that had scored a major triumph in Germany could not be trusted to cede Venice, and even if she did, the balance of power would remain tilted in Vienna’s favour. Since the transfer of Venice was to be effected via France, this would increase Gallic influence in Italian affairs. Finally, Italy needed a popular war to help cement unity and strengthen the still fragile state. For all these reasons, but specifically citing loyalty and keeping one’s word to Prussia, La Marmora telegraphed to Napoleon that Italy could not accept the Austrian proposal.21
In his speech of 6 May 1866, Napoleon returned to one of his earlier schemes: the calling of a European Congress to settle the affairs of Schleswig-Holstein, Venice, and the organization of the German Confederation. Confronted with the threat of war in Central Europe, Britain and Russia accepted the French offer. Italy and Prussia agreed informally to the Congress, the latter much more reluctantly than the former, and it was believed that Vienna would accept the invitation which was sent out on 24th May. Napoleon and Bismarck were astounded by the Austrian assent which was conditional and tantamount to a rejection. Count Mensdorf insisted on the exclusion from the agenda of any matter leading to the territorial extension or increase in power of any participating state. Furthermore, he insisted that the Pope be invited to take part in the discussion and resolution of the Italian question.22 The Austrian response killed the Congress and, in Bismarck’s words, made war inevitable.
Napoleon was convinced that Austria would emerge victorious from a war with Prussia, and therefore opened negotiations with Vienna to influence the ensuing peace. The Duke de Gramont ventured to Vienna on 4th June, and on 9th June, signed an accord. By its terms the French government promised a strict neutrality in the impending war, while assuming the obligation to persuade the Italian government to do likewise. Austria, in turn, pledged to respect the existing situation in Italy, to cede Venice no matter what the outcome of the conflict, to renounce any attempt to achieve hegemony in Germany, and further promised not to introduce any territorial changes, without French permission, that might undermine the European equilibrium. When Napoleon transferred Venice to Italy, he was to obtain an Italian agreement to respect what remained of the temporal power of the Pope, securing a recognition from the Florentine government of the Austrian-Italian frontier, renouncing all claims to the Italian Tyrol and Trieste.
Napoleon also received verbal assurances from the Prussians that whatever the outcome of the war, matters which concerned France would not be settled without her consent. The Emperor, for his part, pledged that he did not seek Gallic aggrandizement from the civil war in Germany, unless the map of Europe was changed to benefit one great power, or some provinces freely sought union with France. Although he adhered to the letter of his 9th June agreement with Austria, by passing word of the cession of Venice and suggesting that Italy might wish to avoid war with Austria, the prospect of the civil war in Germany pleased him. The transfer of Venice to the Italians, the guarantee of the truncated Papal States, the restriction of Prussia north of the Main border, and the substitution of French for Austrian influence in south Germany were all possible consequences. Finally, there was the lure of territorial revision as the Emperor in turn considered the acquisition of the frontier of 1814 or a buffer state on the Rhine.
On 10 June 1866 the Prussians presented their outline for a reorganization of Germany, which excluded Austria, leading to a suspension of diplomatic relations between Vienna and Berlin and the mobilization of the forces of the German Confederation. On 15th June, the Prussian army went on the offensive, declaring war the following day. Austria, because of her procrastination, proved unable to dislodge Italy from her Prussian alliance; thus she faced the difficult prospect of waging a war on two fronts. Franz-Josef decided to employ the Archduke Albrecht, the best commander in the Habsburg ranks, in the Italian theatre, where he proved his mettle. Field Marshal Ludwig von Benedek, whose military career had been in Italy, was transferred to preside over the northern campaign.
In Italy, the outbreak of the Austrian-Prussian War on 16 June 1866, was followed by General La Marmora’s move to the front, and Bettino Ricasoli’s assumption as head of the government. On 19th June, the Italians declared war on Austria and prepared for the campaign. The Italians enjoyed a number of advantages. Firstly, the Austrian willingness to transfer Venice to France to hand over to the Italians, assured that they would not assume the offensive on the southern front and would limit their action to a defence of their positions. Secondly, the regular Italian forces outnumbered the Austrians by two to one. Garibaldi, as in 1859, led his volunteers, and while only some 15,000 were expected to enrol, more than double that figure rushed to fight under his banner. Finally, since Austrian rule in Venice was deemed unpopular, some expected the Venetians to rise in rebellion as they had in 1848 during the course of the First War of Liberation. The course of events proved otherwise.
The Prussians suggested that the Italians skirt the Quadrilateral and penetrate the Dalmatian coast, possibly using Garibaldi to rouse the population against the Austrians, and then drive on to Vienna. The proposal was seconded by Garibaldi, but rejected by La Marmora, whose strategy was more restricted and less audacious. Indeed, La Marmora decided to implement the plan prepared by the French and Sardinian general staff in 1859, before the war had been closed by Villafranca. The Italian forces were divided, with La Marmora and the main army of some 120,000 men on the Mincio, General Cialdini’s 80,000 troops on the lower Po, which was to act as a diversion, and Garibaldi’s volunteers directed against the Austrian position in the Tridentine mountains assigned the dual task of closing the valley of the Adige and capturing Trento.
La Marmora, assuming that the Austrians would be focused on Cialdini’s manoeuvring on the Po, believed his actions on the Mincio would not be seriously contested. Unfortunately, while the Italian commander had little information on the plans and activities of the Archduke Albrecht, the latter was well informed of the movements and intentions of the three major Italian forces. On 23rd June the bulk of La Marmora’s forces bivouacked on the left, or Venetian side, of the Mincio, advancing on the 24th with the intention of gaining control of the heights between Peschiera and Verona, which unbeknown to the Italians was already garrisoned by the Austrians. When the two armies met, the Austrians had the advantage of surprise and control of the high terrain. Although Italian and Austrian losses during the second battle of Custozza were about equal (the Italians endured some 720 fatalities and 3,112 wounded, while the Austrian casualties were respectively 960 and 3,690), the Italians panicked and withdrew.23
The command of the regular Italian Army left much to be desired. Although La Marmora resigned as Commander-in-Chief, following the second battle of Custozza, confusion still prevailed. It was hoped that the Italian navy would perform better. At sea, as on land, the Italians had the numerical advantage, possessing a fleet of thirty-three vessels, which included twelve ironclads, to Austria’s fleet of twenty-seven, of which only seven were ironclad. However, the commander of the Italian fleet, Count Carlo di Persano, lacked the ability and confidence possessed by the Danish commander of the Austrian fleet, Wilhelm von Tegethoff. The disparity in ability and preparation was manifest during the battle of Lissa, fought on 20th July, during the course of which the Italian fleet lost three vessels, including the flagship, the Re d’ltalia, with the loss of almost a thousand lives, while the Austrians emerged virtually unscathed.
The poor performance of the Italian armed forces was highlighted by the spectacular victory achieved by the Prussians at Sadowa on 3rd July. The progress made by General Cialdini in Venice, once Archduke Albrecht and the bulk of his troops were recalled to the German theatre, and Garibaldi’s tentative advances in the valley of the Trento, proved small compensation. While the Italians were discouraged, the French were alarmed at the prospect of a total Austrian collapse and a Prussian reorganization of Germany. Both Napoleon’s belief in an Austrian victory or in a long war which would permit French intervention were shattered. The only positive developments were Vienna’s decision to immediately transfer Venice to France and its call for French mediation for an armistice. The prospect of a French diplomatic intervention which might turn to a military one prompted Bismarck to come to terms with Austria quickly. On 25th July, Prussia signed the preliminaries of a peace with Vienna without consulting her Italian ally. As in the war of 1859 the Italians had been left in the lurch; once again they realized the impossibility of continuing the conflict without their ally. Prevented by Napoleon from militarily seizing Venice, now under French control, and receiving no support from either Berlin or Paris for their claim to the Italian Tyrol, the Italians reluctantly agreed to an armistice on 12th August.
By the peace of 3 October 1866, the Italians finally acquired formal recognition from Austria as well as Venice, which was transferred to Italy by France. The vote in the plebiscite, overwhelmingly in favour of union, supposedly 642,000 for and only sixty-nine against, did not seem to reflect the sentiment of the population. Not one Venetian city had risen during the course of the war of 1866, and few Venetians had flocked to Garibaldi’s standard. Furthermore, while Venice had finally been attained, Rome still remained outside the kingdom. Thus, when the results of the plebiscite were presented to Vittorio Emanuele, who claimed it was the greatest day of his life, referring to Rome, he noted that while Italy was made, it was as yet incomplete.24
Notes
1. Text of Napoleon’s speech to his troops, 1860, Archivio di Stato di Roma, Miscellanea di Carte Politiche o Riservate, busta 137, fascicolo 4913.
2. Police Report of 1860, ASR, Miscellanea di Carte Politiche o Riservate, busta 134, fascicolo 4815.
3. Giuseppe Leti, Roma e lo Stato Pontificio dal 1849 al 1870. Note di storia politica (2nd edn, Ascoli Piceno, 1911), II, pp. 212–15; Francesco Crispi, The Memoirs of Francesco Crispi, ed. Thomas Palamenghi-Crispi (New York: Hodder and Stoughton, 1912), I, pp. 271–2.
4. William E. Echard, Napoleon III and the Concert of Europe (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1983), p. 142.
5. ‘La Confederazione Italiana e l’Unità piemontese’, Civiltà Cattolica, Series IV, x, 529–55.
6. Pius IX to Napoleon III, 14 February 1861. Archivio Segreto del Vaticano, Archivio Particolare Pio IX, Sovrani, Francia, no. 56.
7. I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, I, 79.
8. The Letters of Queen Victoria, first series, ed. Arthur C. Benson and Viscount Esher (London: John Murray, 1907), III, pp. 428, 441.
9. Count Cavour and Madame de Circourt: some Unpublished Correspondence, ed. Costantino Nigra, trans. Arthur John Butler (London: Cassell and Co., Ltd., 1894), p. 15.
10. L’Osservatore Romano, 4 July 1861.
11. The Roman Journals of Ferdinand Gregorovius, 1852–1874, ed. Friedrich Althaus, trans. Mrs Gustavus Hamilton (London: George Bell and Sons, 1907), p. 152.
12. L. Thouvenel (ed.), Le Secret de L’Empereur. Correspondance confidentielle et inédite échangée entre M. Thouvenel, Le Duke de Gramont et Le Général Comte de Flahaut 1860–1863 (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1889), I, pp. 8–10.
13. De Corcelles to Pius IX, 1 November 1862, ASV, Archivio Particolare Pio IX, Francia, Particolari, no. 155.
14. Emile Ollivier, Journal, ed. Theodore Zeldin and Anne Troisier de Diaz (Paris: Julliard, 1961), II, p. 71.
15. Pius IX to Napoleon III, 4 November 1863, ASV, Archivio Particolare Pio IX, Sovrani, Francia, no. 65.
16. Il Diritto, 10 July 1864.
17. Costantino Bulle, Storia del Secondo Impero e del Regno d’ltalia (Milan: Società Editrice Libraria, 1909), II, pp. 375–8.
18. Alfonso La Marmora, Unpo di luce (Mangonza, 1873), p. 57.
19. Franz-Josef to Pius IX, 22 October 1865, ASV, Archivio Particolare Pio IX, Sovrani, Austria, no. 52.
20. Otto Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of the German Empire: The Period of Unification, 1815–1871, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 287.
21. Bulle, pp. 383–90.
22. Echard, p. 234.
23. Countess Evelyn Martinengo Cesaresco, The Liberation of Italy, 1815–1870 (Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1972), pp. 365–9.
24. Ibid., p. 380.