CHAPTER SIX
The Anglo-American commission met against a background of Arab agitation over Haganah’s policy of promoting illegal Jewish immigration into Palestine, Zionist protests over Britain’s establishing Transjordan as an independent state with Abdullah as King,1 and fears that there could be war with Russia over Iran. Indeed, in March 1946, Attlee urged the Defence Committee to consider abandoning the Mediterranean route, withdrawing from the Middle East, and concentrating instead on a line of defence across Africa from Lagos to Kenya. This was supported by Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, who preferred Africa to the Middle East.2 But these ideas were not pursued as the United States finally decided to stand against Russian expansion, starting in Iran in March 1946.3
Of the six American members of the commission, two, James G. McDonald and Bartley Crum, were known to be Zionists. The State Department felt unable to give Crum security clearance, but Truman was persuaded by David Niles to allow Crum to serve.4 The Zionists, however, saw the co-chairman, Judge Joseph C. Hutcheson, as unsympathetic to their aspirations,5 and another, William Phillips, soon found Zionism intransigent.6 The British delegation was led by Sir John Singleton, who had a horror of terrorism after experiences in Ireland, and was also conscious of the need for Anglo-American co-operation in the face of the Russian threat. The only member with overriding Zionist sympathies was Richard Crossman, who had been married to a Jewess, and later admitted that his loyalty to Zionism was greater than that to his king.7 The commission first sat in Washington, and there Crossman established a rapport with the Zionist, David Horowitz. The Arabs argued their case in London: they did not object to a Jewish national home, but a Jewish state would bring Jewish political domination. Bevin implied to the commission that he would try to follow its advice provided the report were unanimous. The Foreign Secretary apparently thought he had Crossman’s assurance that this would not happen unless British interests were taken into account. Zionist propaganda in the refugee camps in Europe meant that the commission was told that refugees were not prepared to settle anywhere other than Palestine. Against this, in the Middle East, the Arabs protested that there was no reason why they, the one race with no anti-Semitic tradition, should have to bear the sins of Christian Europe. The commission held its final deliberations at Lausanne in Switzerland. Anglo-American unity had to be sustained in the face of the perceived Russian menace, and it was thought that a unanimous report was essential. Crossman and Crum argued for partition, but were persuaded to subscribe to a unanimous document recommending a binational state and the immediate admission of 100,000 Jewish refugees.8
The American members of the commission were apprised of the report by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research that Palestine was on the imperial lifeline and could become the headquarters of the British armed forces in the Near East, and also by that of the joint chiefs of staff that the importance for Britain of the Middle East was comparable to the significance for the United States of the Caribbean and the Panama Canal zone.9 Truman also knew through conversations between Crum and Niles of the direction in which the commission was moving.10 At a time of attempts to renegotiate the Anglo-Egyptian treaty Britain wanted a few days to consider the commission’s report and it was agreed that it would be released simultaneously in Washington and London.11
A special committee, chaired by Sir Norman Brook, considered the commission’s report in London. It concluded that adoption of the report would have ‘disastrous effects’ on Britain’s position in the Middle East and unfortunate repercussions in India. Furthermore, it would not silence Zionist clamour in the United States. The financial burden would be enormous, and it was intolerable that the British taxpayer should have to pay. On 29 April the Cabinet, against the background of the murder of six British soldiers by Zionist terrorists in Palestine, agreed that Bevin should ask the Americans how far they were prepared to help with money and troops.12 The Zionist lobby, however, once again exerted decisive influence on Truman. Crum suggested to the Zionist Emergency Council that Truman merely endorse the recommendations acceptable to the Zionists. Crum took a possible presidential statement to the White House. Wagner released a press statement that the long-range recommendations were at variance with the overwhelming sentiment in the United States for a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine.13
On 30 April, without consulting London, Truman endorsed the recommendation that 100,000 certificates be issued and two other aspects favourable to Zionism. The clauses conciliatory to the Arabs were dismissed as long-range considerations. The British public was outraged: British soldiers had just been murdered by Zionist terrorists. Attlee himself drafted the key section of his speech to the House of Commons on 1 May. The Prime Minister said that a large number of Jewish immigrants could not be absorbed into Palestine in a short time unless the illegal organizations were disbanded and disarmed. It raised the question of active American participation.14 On 24 May the chiefs of staff insisted that Britain had to be able to place in Palestine any forces it considered necessary. The Viceroy warned of the intensity of Indian feeling.15 Bevin, at the Labour Party conference at Bournemouth, made a speech in which, following Foreign Office policy, he drew a distinction between ‘Jew’ and ‘Zionist’.16 The Foreign Secretary then referred – according to the information he had, quite accurately – to the Jews in the United States wanting the refugees to go to Palestine as they did not want them in New York. The Zionist organizations considered trying to defeat, or at least delay, the American loan to Britain. But Niles stopped this, and the loan was passed by Congress.17 Niles, however, advanced a pro-Zionist policy to Truman. The President should not be deterred by worries about Ibn Saud and Arab threats of violence.18 At this time the Zionist position was strengthened by the arrival of the new British ambassador, Lord Inverchapel (Sir Archibald Clark Kerr), who had strong Zionist sympathies, and the merging of the American Palestine Committee and the Christian Council on Palestine to form the American Christian Palestine Committee under Wagner.19 Wagner and Taft claimed that Bevin’s distinction between Jews and Zionists was without foundation: 98.95 per cent of United States Jews who had an opinion were united behind the Zionist programme.20
The State Department, however, agreed with Bevin: the United States and other countries should take more Jewish refugees. J. C. Satterthwaite suggested 200,000 be admitted to the United States. Even Eleanor Roosevelt, a self-confessed Zionist, suggested in her syndicated column that the United States should relax its immigration laws: Bevin’s speech ‘had point’.21 The chiefs of staff, pointing to Britain’s role in the Middle East in the defence of the West, and the importance of oil, warned that Russia could replace British and American influence throughout the area.22 Indeed, conversations between British and American officials at the end of June led to the War Department agreeing to provide the necessary transportation to move 100,000 Jews from Europe to Palestine.23
The Morrison-Grady plan
The British position hardened, however, at the end of June: Zionist terrorists kidnapped five British officers in a series of attacks. The probability of Arab violence forced the Cabinet to take a strong stand. It decided to suppress the illegal organizations: this necessitated raiding the offices of the Jewish Agency as there was evidence of its connections with Haganah. Washington was informed just before the raids.24 The Cabinet considered the worsening situation on 11 July. The Colonial Secretary, George Glenville Hall, advocated a new long-term policy with provincial autonomy as a convenient stepping-stone to either federation or partition. From Paris, Bevin objected: the Foreign Secretary suggested that the major part of the Arab province should be assimilated into Transjordan and the Lebanon, and the Jewish province, possibly enlarged, should form an independent Jewish state. Largely on strategic grounds the Cabinet favoured Hall’s scheme.25
Hall’s plan was the brainchild of Sir Douglas Harris in the Colonial Office. It was similar to one William Yale had drawn up in the State Department for a trusteeship of Palestine.26 The Anglo-American Cabinet Committee that met in London in July 1946 concentrated on these schemes of provincial autonomy. Before the American delegates left, Truman indicated that he would support the idea that Palestine should be neither a Jewish nor an Arab state, that future announcements would emphasize the larger interests of the United States in the Middle East and would ask Congress to admit 50,000 non-quota Jewish refugees. As a result of Nazism in Europe the United States had admitted 275,000 refugees, including 180,000 Jews. Between May 1945 and September 1946, however, only 5,718 Jewish refugees were allowed entry. Britain had received over 300,000 refugees, including 70,000 Jews.27 The British chiefs of staff preferred provincial autonomy to the binational scheme, but insisted that Britain should be able to control Palestine.28 This proviso influenced the British delegates. The British position was also made more resolute by the blowing up of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, a wing of which was used as British army headquarters: ninety-one were killed. This was perpetrated by Begin’s Irgun working in alliance with Haganah. Begin has claimed that the British were warned, but no satisfactory evidence has been produced.29 Truman initially endorsed three recommendations of what came to be known as the Morrison–Grady plan: it should definitely be settled that Palestine should be neither an Arab nor a Jewish state; the immigration of the 100,000 and thereafter an opportunity for future immigration; that other measures should be introduced to deal with the problem of displaced Jews.30
On 26 July, however, the American press published an account of the Morrison–Grady plan based on leaks, probably from Crum, and the Zionist lobby went to work. McDonald and leaders of the American Christian Palestine Committee, including Wagner, saw Truman and insisted on the need for a Jewish state.31 Celler and eight other New York members of the House of Representatives saw Truman on 30 July. Over the next few days the Zionists warned explicitly that 90 per cent of the 4 million American Jews were pro-Zionist and were influential in elections in large urban centres including Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, Cincinatti, Cleveland, Los Angeles, Hartford, New Haven and elsewhere.32 Truman informed Attlee on 31 July that he could no longer agree that the Morrison–Grady plan should be thought a joint Anglo-American venture. Loy W. Henderson of the State Department admitted to Inverchapel that this ‘deplorable display of weakness was solely attributable to domestic politics: the executive could not afford the risk of antagonizing the powerful Zionist lobby in an election year’.33
Britain was faced with a rapidly deteriorating situation in Palestine, and fading morale. After the King David Hotel explosion the British army commander, Lieutenant-General Sir Evelyn Barker, had spoken of ‘punishing the Jews in a way the race dislikes – by striking at their pockets’. Zionist propaganda took over. Herbert Morrison’s disavowal in Parliament of Barker’s subsequent non-fraternization order, according to the Washington Post, would not repair the damage done to the British administration: this colonial-militarist policy smacked of a Goering model.34 From the floor of the House Churchill suggested that Britain abandon the mandate: the Zionists’ claims went beyond anything agreed upon by Britain.35 But, towards the end of August, the military had the situation in Palestine under control, and the Arab states accepted an invitation to consultations in London. Weizmann and other Zionist delegates went as well.
The Arabs showed inflexible opposition to the establishment of a Jewish national state in Palestine: that would be a bridgehead for Jewish economic and political penetration into the whole Arab world. The Arabs feared that the Zionists would fill their state with immigrants from Europe, creating conditions which would warrant a demand for more lebensraum. The Arabs wanted a unitary state in Palestine with a permanent Arab majority. The conference was adjourned on 2 October for several months to give Britain time to study the Arab proposals.36 On 1 October Bevin and Hall saw Weizmann and other Zionist delegates. Weizmann was prepared for a transitional period of several years before partition. Bevin was blunt: the British government had not ‘taken the initiative in blowing people up’. He had never known such strong latent anti-Semitism in Britain. Relatives of British soldiers in Palestine felt that they had been badly treated by the Jews. Britain could not allow its young soldiers in Palestine to be slaughtered. It also had to ensure that the rights and position of other inhabitants of Palestine were not prejudiced: ‘If a person’s land and livelihood had to go in order to make room for another, his rights and position were certainly prejudiced.’ Rather than force partition on the Arabs at the point of British bayonets he would hand the problem to the United Nations. Bevin could not accept that Palestine was the only home for the Jewish people: he hoped the Jews would be a great force in the reconstruction of Europe. There were hopes that agreement could be reached about the release of detainees in Palestine, and that the Jewish delegates could be brought into conference even before the return of the Arabs.37
Truman’s Day of Atonement speech
This prospect was destroyed by Zionist agitation in the United States. Wise and others urged Truman to make an immediate statement in favour of partition. The State Department advised against this, as did the joint chiefs of staff: partition might alienate the Arabs from the West.38 But Niles working with Eliahu Epstein, the official for the Jewish Agency for Palestine, urged Crum to send a letter to Robert E. Hannegan, the chairman of the Democratic National Committee, emphasizing the positive political implications of a presidential statement favourable to the Jews.39 Attlee asked Truman to delay making his statement. Bevin pointed out that Truman’s claim that the work had come to an end was incorrect: the Zionists had agreed to discuss joining the conference on Palestine.40
On 4 October Truman said that he believed a solution along the lines of partition originally proposed by the Jewish Agency on 5 August would ‘command the support of public opinion in the United States’. There should be immediate and substantial immigration to Palestine in which the United States would assist.41 Truman refused Attlee time for consultation. Acheson explained to Inverchapel that the President felt threatened by immediate dangers such as the Jewish Day of Atonement on 5 October, and a speech by his likely opponent in the presidential election, Thomas E. Dewey, envisaged for 6 October, and designed to catch the Jewish vote in five major eastern states that tended to dominate the presidential elections: ‘For this reason Mr Truman dare not keep quiet.’42
Faced with the situation where the security interests of the West could be sacrificed on the altar of American domestic politics, the British government started investigating seriously the possibility of taking the Palestine question to the United Nations. Both the Colonial and the Foreign Offices considered this option. Inverchapel argued it from Washington. On 5 October Arthur Creech Jones, a known Zionist sympathizer, became Colonial Secretary, and his office took the initiative in advancing schemes of partition, but this was resisted by the Foreign Office and some of his own officials including Sir Douglas Harris and Sir George Gater.43
Truman faced the anger of Ibn Saud: the President would surely agree that ‘no people on earth would willingly admit into their country a foreign group desiring to become a majority and to establish its rule over that country’. The United States would not admit 100,000 Jewish refugees as it was contrary to its laws ‘established for its protection and the safeguarding of its interests’.44 Truman’s Day of Atonement speech did not win the Democrats the November congressional elections: for the first time since 1928 the Republicans secured a majority in both Houses.45 Privately Truman wrote: ‘the Jews themselves are making it almost impossible to do anything for them. They seem to have the same attitude towards the “under dog” when they are on top as they have been treated as “under dogs” themselves. I suppose that is human frailty.’46 At this time the embassy in Washington reported to London that although Zionist pressure would continue, with no elections for two years in the United States, it was doubtful whether it would be effective.47
British strategic interests and ‘trusteeship’
As attempts to renegotiate the Anglo-Egyptian treaty reached impasse, in December 1946 the Cabinet decided to move a further division from Egypt to Palestine. The importance of Palestine as a British military base in the Middle East increased.48 Against this background Bevin visited the United States at the end of the year. He was met by Zionist demonstrators and compared to Hitler. On the Palestine issue Bevin did not receive much encouragement from Byrnes or Truman, though the President did agree that the United States would have to take more Jewish refugees. There were hints, however, that the United States was prepared to take over Britain’s responsibilities in Greece and Turkey, and to commit itself to Europe. Hostile domestic reaction in the United States to a continuing British presence in Palestine could jeopardize that great advance. Bevin became convinced that Britain should consider abandoning the mandate.49 Towards the end of December Bevin was against any continuing British military commitment in Palestine, and felt that before surrendering the mandate to the United Nations it should be offered to the United States.50 At this time opinion in Britain was antagonized by unusual terrorist activities in the mandate. A sixteen-year-old convicted Zionist terrorist, too young to hang, was sentenced to eighteen years imprisonment and given eighteen cuts with a cane. This sudden indulgence in ‘the English vice’ by public school men51 outraged Begin. His Irgun kidnapped and flogged four British officers, giving them eighteen strokes each with rawhide whips or a rope’s end.52 The Palestine administration stopped using judicial corporal punishment. British morale was further eroded at a time when withdrawal from Palestine was being considered. From the floor of the House, Churchill deplored this giving way to terrorism.
At the beginning of January 1947 the Cabinet was advised of the vital importance for Britain and the Empire of the oil resources of the Middle East. The chiefs of staff also continued to insist that Palestine was the only area able to accommodate Britain’s Middle East reserve. Imperial communications also necessitated air bases there.53 The Foreign Office emphasized the danger of the Russian threat.54 Influenced by the military arguments that the retention of Britain’s position in the Middle East was cardinal for the future defence of the Commonwealth, Bevin suggested to the Cabinet on 15 January that the Morrison–Grady proposals could be amended to point towards a unitary state. The Foreign Secretary did not examine the alternative, withdrawal, because of the insistence of the chiefs of staff that Britain’s strategic interests necessitated the stationing of troops in Palestine. Creech Jones argued the Zionist case, and was supported by Dalton and Aneurin Bevan. Creech Jones then drew up a memorandum suggesting that Britain recommend a plan of partition to the United Nations, and indicate the difficulties inherent in alternative schemes. The Cabinet discussed this on 22 January, and seemed convinced that if there were no agreed settlement the matter would have to go to the United Nations.55
Washington indicated to London that, because of domestic considerations, partition would be the easiest solution for the United States to back. But the State Department advised that the United States could not advocate partition: that would place it in the position of favouring the creation of a state against the wishes of the indigenous inhabitants.56 London took the unusual step of keeping Washington fully informed of its discussions with the Arabs and the Zionists. Creech Jones arranged with Ben-Gurion that responsible members of the Jewish Agency would be in London for informal discussions. British officials spoke to the Arab delegates at the reconvened Palestine conference. The protagonists were intransigent. The Palestinian Arabs, led by Jamal Husseini, spoke of inflexible opposition to partition: the Arabs wanted self-determination. It was pointed out by an Iraqi delegate that the Arab peoples were the only ones who seemed to be called upon to pay for what Hitler had done to the Jews. Faris Bey Khouri of Syria argued that the real obstacle lay in the Jews looking upon non-Jews as subordinates ‘whom they would use for their own ends and for this they considered they had biblical warrant’; the Jews had to be persuaded to abandon the idea of a state based on religious and racial principles. The British delegates were asked by C. Bey Chamoun of the Lebanon to substitute the words ‘Great Britain’ for Palestine and to say what the reaction would be in Britain ‘if a third Power were to impose upon her an alien element whose presence was of a nature to disrupt her national life and her political and territorial unity’.57 Ben-Gurion conceded that the Arabs had a right to stay in Palestine, but insisted that the future of the Arab peoples and culture did not depend on that country: ‘For the Jews that little country was the only one in which they could ensure the continuance of their race.’ Palestine was needed for the unborn generations of the Jewish people: the Zionists wanted to create there ‘something worthy of the generations of Jewish martyrs’. Ben-Gurion conceded that ‘state’ had not been used in the mandate, but argued that ‘national home’ meant more than that a number of Jews would be allowed to live in Palestine. Bevin replied that it was a ‘dreadful thing that Jews should be killing the British soldiers who had fought their battles for them against Germany’.58
These meetings weaned Creech Jones away from his Zionist sympathies. Ben-Gurion had spoken of 1,200,000 Jewish immigrants. For Britain that was unacceptable. The Colonial and Foreign Secretaries submitted a joint solution to the chiefs of staff and the Cabinet. It envisaged self-government in Palestine leading to independence after a transitional period of five years under trusteeship. The plan provided for 100,000 Jewish immigrants over the following two years: immigration after that would be by the agreement of the two communities, and failing that through United Nations arbitration. The chiefs of staff were worried about the loss of British military rights in Palestine. Bevin warned the Cabinet on 7 February that, if the parties would not acquiesce to this plan, Britain would have to submit the Palestine problem to the United Nations without making any recommendations.59
In the United States, Henderson commented that the ‘plan should not be so objectionable to the Arabs as to the American Jews’. Ben-Gurion argued that Britain envisaged a state composed of Palestinian nationals of Arab and Jewish race. That was unacceptable: ‘They were first and foremost Jews and they wanted a Jewish state in Palestine in which the Jews would be a majority.’ Bevin responded: ‘under the Jews the Arabs would have no rights but would remain in a permanent minority in a land they had held for 2,000 years’. The Arab delegates also rejected the new proposals: they could lead to partition and provided for further Jewish immigration.60
On 14 February the Cabinet decided to submit the problem to the United Nations without any recommendation for a solution. Attlee insisted that during the interim period there should be no concessions on Jewish immigration. The United States under its new Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, assisted by Robert A. Lovett, remained without a definite policy for Palestine. Bevin announced that the Palestine issue would be referred to the United Nations. He told the House of Commons on 25 February: ‘In international affairs I cannot settle things if my problem is made the subject of local elections.’ This attack on Truman was cheered in the House only a few days after the United States had decided to take over Britain’s responsibilities in Greece.61 With the emergence of the Cold War Britain had succeeded in isolating the Palestine question from the overall development of the Anglo-American special relationship. The Zionists realized this, and tried, unsuccessfully, to force Washington to link the Palestine question with negotiations over Greece and Turkey. Wagner suggested to Senator Arthur Vandenberg, a fellow member of the American Christian Palestine Committee, that as the United States was relieving Britain of a financial burden in Greece, Britain should relieve the United States of the burden of supporting 250,000 displaced Jews in Germany, and admit them to Palestine. Wagner hinted that British military personnel employed in Palestine could be used in Greece.62
At a time when opinion was roused in Britain over sensational kidnappings in Palestine in retaliation for death sentences passed on Zionists, and the deaths of twenty British soldiers in an attack on the Jerusalem officers’ club,63 the British government became increasingly concerned about the Haganah’s policy of bringing pressure to bear through the traffic in illegal immigrants, and raised the issue with Washington, as most of the ships concerned originated in the United States and were crewed by American citizens. This operation was financed largely by tax-free contributions from American sympathizers. Attlee complained directly about a report that the Mayor of New York had initiated a Zionist drive to raise nearly £2m for the purchase of ‘men, guns and money’. The Prime Minister protested: ‘the guns which are being subscribed for in America can only be required to shoot at British soldiers in Palestine, and it is a matter for the greatest regret that they should be supplied from the United States’. Washington, however, felt that it could not stop the publication of advertisements, and that the tax-exemption issue raised complicated legal issues. No legal authority could be found to stop the sale of ships for illegal immigration, or to prevent their departure. Every possibility was being investigated to halt the purchase of surplus American army material by the Zionist terrorists.64
United Nations Special Committee on Palestine
The United States blocked the formation of an ad hoc United Nations committee of inquiry on Palestine. A special session, however, on 15 May established a fact-finding committee. Russia insisted that the committee’s membership be increased by seven to eleven, and that the solution of partition be considered. Beeley consequently thought that Russia hoped to be associated with a joint trusteeship over Palestine. The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) consisted of eleven neutral states and had broad powers of investigation.65 Throughout this period the State Department and the White House were subjected to a barrage from the Zionists. Truman wrote to Niles on 13 May that the Palestine problem could have been settled but for American politics: ‘terror and Silver are the contributing cause of some, if not all of our troubles’.66
UNSCOP went to Geneva to deliberate in August. The partition bloc crumbled, and it appeared that the majority favoured a ten-year period of probably British trusteeship. Crossman rushed to Geneva, and seemingly managed to change this. UNSCOP’s report was finally signed on 31 August. The majority plan suggested partition into an Arab state, a Jewish state and the city of Jerusalem under international trusteeship. Britain would administer the mandate during the interim period and admit 150,000 refugees into the Jewish state. The minority plan proposed an independent federal state.67
The period of the UNSCOP inquiry saw the final wearing down of British morale in Palestine. Even Creech Jones was conscious that there were limits to the forbearance of the troops and the civilian administration. It was also expensive: the estimated military expenditure for the army and air force alone was £23.5m.68 Zionist activities in the United States did not help. The Foreign Office protested to Lewis Douglas, the American ambassador in London, about the probability of funds openly collected in the United States being passed on to the Irgun. In particular it objected to Ben Hecht’s encouragement of the terrorists by advertisements. The profits from Hecht’s Zionist musical, A Flag is Born, went to the Irgun, tax free, as contributions to charity.69 Eleanor Roosevelt, perhaps conscious of her latent anti-Jewish prejudice, was active in the fund-raising campaign.70 Britain repeatedly asked the United States to deny illegal immigrant ships bunkering facilities, but a decision at ‘a high level’ ruled that this could not be done. But Washington did take action over the issuing of improper identification documents for illegal immigrants by officials of the International Red Cross.71 Bevin protested directly to Marshall, who took limited action to stem the flood of illegal immigrants.72
Two incidents convinced Britain that it had to withdraw from Palestine. The one was the arrival in Palestine of the President Warfield, renamed Exodus, with 4,493 illegal immigrants. These were returned to their French port of embarkation. But the French declined to force the refugees to land. The fate of these immigrants was determined by Begin’s Irgun: in retaliation for the execution of Zionist terrorists the Irgun hanged two British sergeants and booby-trapped their bodies. These were found on 31 July. From Jerusalem the American consul reported on the ‘utter horror’ at this act of the Irgun. The cold-blooded letter from the terrorist organization explaining that this was an act of war, the innocence of the victims, the atrocious nature of the murder and the bloody booby-trapping of the bodies led the consul to dilate on the ‘mentality lurking behind outrages of this type’. He argued that the terrorist thinking was based on the premise, proclaimed by both the Irgun and the Stern gang, that all of Palestine and Transjordan belonged to the Jewish people: the British were merely there to bring about the unchallenged Jewish occupation and government of those two states. The consul concluded: ‘During the time of the Nazis it was a commonplace to hear the opinion that Hitler and his followers were deluded to the point where their sanity was questionable. If such generalizations are permissible, it may be well to question whether the Zionists, in their present emotional state, can be dealt with as rational human beings.’73 There were widespread outbreaks of anti-Semitism in Britain, and synagogues were daubed with swastikas. The British public blamed the Americans for giving the terrorists money; the Daily Mail, on 1 August, appealed to the feelings of ‘American women whose dollars helped to buy the rope’. The press and some Members of Parliament demanded an early evacuation of British troops from Palestine: Britain could no longer support the moral and financial drain. An American official warned that British patience had been exhausted by the ‘deliberate murder of two innocent men’. With opinion like this in Britain, any landing of refugees from the President Warfield was out of the question. Bevin explained to Inverchapel that Britain had no alternative other than to send them back to Germany. They were shipped back to Hamburg, giving the Zionists their most notable propaganda success of the time.74
On 20 September Bevin told the Cabinet that, failing a satisfactory settlement, Britain should announce its intention to surrender the mandate of Palestine, and plan for an early withdrawal of British forces and administration. Attlee saw a parallel between the situation in Palestine and the British withdrawal from India. He did not think it reasonable to ask the British administration to continue. The Cabinet accepted this policy of withdrawal.75 The military, though it did not like withdrawal, had to accept it as well. The service directors of intelligence had estimated that the abandonment of the Palestine mandate would lead to the total collapse of Britain’s position in the Middle East. The joint planning staff was worried that the Arabs, unless they were convinced that British withdrawal was dictated by a refusal to implement a solution unjust to them, would be alienated. This could leave Britain with no footing in the Middle East, apart from Cyprus, and Britain could lose the oilfields. Russia would be able to infiltrate and eventually dominate the area.76 Informal political and strategic talks on the Middle East with American officials between 16 October and 7 November, however, reassured Britain to a limited extent. Bevin opposed any combined Anglo-American policy for the Middle East, as the area was primarily of strategic and economic interest to Britain. Both Truman and the British Cabinet endorsed the recommendations of the officials, though there was no formal agreement. The American participants recommended that their government strengthen the British strategic, political and economic position throughout the Middle East. This would include American diplomatic support for Britain, and also at the United Nations, over the retention of facilities in Egypt, Cyrenaica and Iraq. The United States also favoured the retention of Britain’s strategic position in the Sudan, Gibraltar, Aden and Cyprus.77
It was at this time that the United States was forced into enunciating a specific policy on Palestine. The research and intelligence organization of the State Department regarded the UNSCOP majority plan as objectionable: it established two theocratic states in which majorities would apparently have special privileges. A single secular state was more in accord with American thinking. William A. Eddy, the special assistant to the Secretary of State, bluntly said that what was important was whether there should be ‘a theocratic racial Zionist state’ and secondly, whether there should be ‘area self-determination, and an end to outside pressure and artificial economy’. He warned that acceptance of the majority report would damage American interests and leadership: it was contrary to America’s ‘example of non-clerical political democracy, without prejudice to race or creed’. It was ‘an endorsement of a theocratic sovereign state characteristic of the Dark Ages’. The Arab League would immediately align itself with Russia for survival.78 Niles, however, secured the appointment of John Hilldring to the American delegation to the UN, and he sustained the Zionist viewpoint.79 Marshall warned that delegation on 15 September that if the majority report were adopted there would be a rapprochement between the Arabs and Russia. But the American decision to support partition was taken in New York, without reference to the State Department and indeed to the consternation of its officials, who feared Russian participation. Marshall went along with this.80 On their own initiative the military opposed the move. The joint chiefs of staff warned on 6 October of the strategic consequences of partition: it would curtail American influence in the Middle East to that which could be maintained by military force. If the people of that area turned to Russia this would have an impact on American strategic and security interests similar to military conquest of the area by Russia. Partition would gravely prejudice American access to the oil of Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. If it lost these resources America might have to fight an oil-starved war. Russia would be in a better position to fight such a war. There was a danger of Russian participation in any United Nations agreement which could establish for Russia a strategic interest in the Middle East incompatible with that of the United States.81
United Nations vote for partition
On 26 September Creech Jones told the ad hoc Palestine Committee of the United Nations that if the General Assembly recommended a policy not acceptable to the Arabs and Jews, Britain would not be able to implement it.82 Russia, on 13 October, ‘mystified’ Britain and the United States by announcing its support for the partition of Palestine. Russian delegates to the United Nations hinted privately that Moscow wanted to create chaos in the Middle East, destroy American influence there, hasten the withdrawal of British troops and establish a Russian bridgehead instead, and, finally, to set a precedent for similar action in Kurdistan, Azerbaijan and even Macedonia.83 Bevin drew up a timetable for Britain’s withdrawal. The Foreign Secretary insisted that, in line with its treaty obligations, Britain was obliged to supply military equipment to various Arab armies. Britain would also continue to finance and loan British officers to the Arab legion in Transjordan, and the British military missions which were a vital link with the armies of Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia would continue. The position would have to be reviewed if the Arab armies became involved in the fighting in Palestine.84
Washington realized that it would be impossible to persuade Britain to stay in Palestine, and so the State Department considered the likelihood of having to use American forces there. However, it remained determined not to yield to demands of the Jewish Agency and the American Zionist Emergency Council for the inclusion of the Negev in the Zionist section.85 then Weizmann saw Truman on 19 November about this. Hilldring supported Weizmann. Under White House instructions Hilldring was given a free hand: Truman and Weizmann had their way on the question of the Negev.86 The British chiefs of staff became worried that a communist regime could be set up in Palestine after the British withdrawal on 15 May 1948,87 but Bevin insisted on a British attitude of neutrality in the United Nations. On 24 November Bevin dined with Marshall and told him that Britain would abstain in the United Nations vote. It was deplorable that Britain was once again being held up to ‘ignominious abuse’. Bevin had thorough legal advice that the Balfour Declaration did not commit the British government to developing a Jewish state. ‘This great issue’ had been handled by the United States more with ‘the electoral situation in New York City in mind than the large issues of foreign policy which were involved’. Anti-Semitism was growing in Britain and feelings were running high in the House of Commons. The callous murder of the two British sergeants was responsible. Before that, Bevin had felt that the situation in Palestine could be held. Britain could not be committed to a position which might involve military action against the Arabs.88
On 29 November the General Assembly voted for partition. Prior to the vote, and particularly during the immediately preceding three days, the American Zionists exerted unprecedented pressure on the administration, and both delegations to the United Nations and their governments, to secure the necessary majority. Some correspondence suggests that Truman himself might have intervened at the last minute to ensure success for partition.89 The State Department acknowledged that the votes of Haiti and the Philippines, at least, had been secured by the unauthorized intervention of American citizens.90
While the situation in Palestine deteriorated and, as Bevin told Marshall on 17 December, the Arab reaction was worse than expected, the Zionists in the United States celebrated. The Roman Catholic, Wagner, was singled out for particular praise. Silver acknowledged how magnificently he had championed the Zionist cause throughout the years and at this hour ‘of joyous consummation’ offered his people’s gratitude.91 The American Zionists had successfully sidestepped attempts to secure the entry of Jewish refugees into the United States by the bill introduced into the House of Representatives in the middle of 1947. This would have allowed 400,000 displaced persons into the United States and coped with the whole Jewish refugee problem in Europe. The Zionists contributed only eleven of the 693 pages of testimony.92
As the Cold War was joined in Europe, the Zionists and Arabs argued the relative merits of their claims on Palestine. In the end what they said counted for little. The Arabs were, perhaps, unfortunate in that they did not have an effective propaganda machine, or even easy access to the mass media of the West. The Zionists, however, were able to mount a campaign based on sympathy for the victims of the Holocaust. Zionist propaganda was able to turn the King David Hotel incident from a terrorist atrocity into an instance of British anti-Semitism. Most successful of all was the publicity surrounding the Exodus. This, combined with terrorist activities in the mandate, especially the hanging of the two sergeants, eroded British morale. Britain, conscious of the dangers of Russian penetration in the Middle East, the vital strategic importance of the area and the significance of oil, was faced with a public opinion that would not tolerate a continued British presence in Palestine. To safeguard its interests the British government tried to leave in a way least likely to offend the Arabs. British policy was governed by a determination to maintain British paramountcy in the Middle East, and to prevent an increase of American influence in an area of traditional British concern. By the end of 1947 Russia hoped to establish a bridgehead in the area either through the United Nations or in the chaos following the end of the Palestine mandate. There was no one American view. The State Department and the military offered a diagnosis identical to that of Britain. The State Department was particularly conscious that support for partition would place the United States in the position of favouring the creation of a state against the wishes of its indigenous inhabitants. That would be un-American. But it was Truman who controlled policy. His private correspondence suggests that the President had no particular sympathy for the Jews. But he wanted to be re-elected. In his diagnosis the Jews in the United States could do that. After the First World War the Middle East was divided by the Great Powers in their own imperial interests. In the years immediately following the conclusion of the Second World War the politics of the powers with their concern for prestige, oil, strategic interests and communications to a large extent controlled developments in the area. But, in the end, the crucial factor was the United States, and its domestic politics determined the fate of the Middle East.
References
1Robert F. Wagner Papers, Palestine Files, Box 3, File 41, Memorandum by Handler, 27 March 1946.
2Dalton Diaries, 34, f. 12, 22 March 1946. Attlee Papers (Bodleian, Oxford), 5, Liddell Hart to Attlee, 10 May 1946; Memorandum on Africa or the Middle East by Liddell Hart, 20 March 1946.
3Ritchie Ovendale, ‘Britain, the U.S.A. and the European Cold War, 1945–48’, History,67 (1982), pp. 217–236 at pp. 229–231; The English-Speaking Alliance. Britain, the United States, the Dominions and the Cold War 1945–1951 (London 1985), pp. 29–87.
4Truman Library,Oral History Interview with Loy W. Henderson, ff. 108–110.
5Robert F. Wagner Papers, Palestine Files, Box 3, File 14, Memorandum by Milton Handler, 27 March 1946.
6William Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy (Boston 1952), pp. 343–396.
7Richard Crossman, Palestine Mission (New York 1947), pp. 15–17.
8Bartley C. Crum, Behind the Silken Curtain (New York 1947), pp. 12–30, 85–86, 147–148, 195, 262–283; Crossman, op. cit., pp. 40–41, 165–187; David Horowitz, State in the Making (New York 1953), pp. 35–50, 91–92; Phillips, op. cit., pp. 425–426; James G. McDonald, My Mission in Israel 1948–1951 (New York 1951), p. 24; for the minutes of the public hearings before the Anglo-American commission see PRO 30 (Public Record Office, London), 78.
9RG 59, OSS Bureau of Intelligence and Research, R + A 3652 D Intelligence, Current United States Policy towards Palestine, Feb. 1946; Joint Chiefs of Staff Leahy Records (National Archives, Washington), Folder 110, State Department Files Leahy to Barnes, Top Secret, 13 March 1946; RG 59, Decimal Files 1945–49, Box 6754, 867N.01/3-746, William F. Finan to Leslie Rood, 7 March 1946.
10Truman Papers, Box 771, OF204, Truman to Niles, 18 April 1946; Niles to Connelly, April 1946.
11RG 84, Entry 59A 543 part 5, Box 1057, 800 Palestine 4/25, Department of State to London Embassy, 25 April 1946.
12Cab 129, 9, ff. 127–129, CP (46) 173, Report of Committee of Officials on Palestine, 27 April 1946; Cab 128, 5, f. 174, Cab 38 (46) 1, Secret, 29 April 1946; see Ritchie Ovendale, ‘The Palestine policy of the British Labour Government, 1945–1946’, International Affairs55 (1979), pp. 409–431 at pp. 416–420.
13Joseph B. Schechtmann, The United States and the Jewish State Movement (New York 1966), p. 156; Robert F. Wagner Papers, Palestine Files, Box 3, File 42, Press Statement for Release after 30 April 1946.
14Prem 8, 627 Part 2, House of Commons, 1 May 1946 (drafted in Attlee’s hand).
15FO 371, 52527, E506A/4/31G, Chiefs of Staff Conclusions, 24 May 1946; 52531, E5816/3/31, Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 11June 1946.
16FO 371 52503, E 178/4/31, Minute by Beeley, 14 Dec. 1945.
17John Snetsinger, Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel (Stanford 1974), pp. 38, 155.
18Truman Papers, Box 184, PSF, Truman to Niles, 7 May 1946; Box 771, OF 204-Misc, Niles to Truman, 27 May 1946.
19Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York 1969), p. 178; Robert F. Wagner Papers, Palestine Files, Box 3, File 41, Howard M. Le Sourd to Wagner, 16 March 1946; File 42, Press Announcement, 23 May 1946.
20Robert F. Wagner Papers, File 30, Joint Statement by Wagner and Taft on Roper Survey.
21RG 59, Decimal Files 1945–49, Box 6755, 867N.01/6–1146, Howard to Merriam and Jones, 11 June 1946; undated Minutes by Officials; Joseph P. Lash, Eleanor: The Years Alone (New York 1972), p. 117.
22Truman Papers, Box 184, PSF, McFarland to State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, 21 June 1946.
23RG 59, Decimal Files 1945–49, Box 6756, 867N.01/7-846, J. H. Hilldring to Robert P. Paterson, 8 July 1946.
24Cab 128, 5, f. 25, Cab 60 (46) 3, 20 June 1946; Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter cited as FRUS), 1946 (7), 867N.01/6-2946; Telegram, Attlee to Truman, undated.
25Cab 129, 11, f. 27, CP (46) 258, 8 July 1946; ff. 38–50, CP (46) 259, 8 July 1946; Cab 128, 6, ff. 19–21, Cab 4 (46) 4, 11 July 1946.
26FO 371, 52551, E7713/4/31, Minute by Beeley, 9 Aug. 1946; RG 59, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Box 1, Merriam to Henderson, undated, DA 65, Draft Terms of Trusteeship for Palestine.
27FRUS1946 (7), pp. 644–645, Memorandum to be considered by London Conference; RG 59, Office of Near Eastern Affairs Palestine, Box 1, Summary of Cabinet Committee Plan for Palestine, July 1946; Zorach Warhaftig, Uprooted Jewish Refugees and Displaced Persons after Liberation (New York 1946), p. 72.
28Prem 8, 627, Pt. 3, Ismay to Attlee, 15 July 1946.
29The Observer,13 Nov. 1977; Saul Zadka, Blood in Zion: How the Jewish Guerrillas drove the British out of Palestine (London 1995), pp. 86–99.
30RG 59, Office of Near Eastern Affairs Palestine, Box 1, Proposed Policy for Palestine, undated.
31Robert F. Wagner Papers, Palestine Files, Box 3, File 43, McDonald to Wagner, 29 July 1946; McDonald to Truman, 29 July 1946; Truman Papers, Box 775, OF 204 C, Memorandum by Connelly, 30 July 1946.
32Robert F. Wagner Papers, Palestine Files, Box 3, File 1, Memorandum No. 2, The Palestine Question Zionism, 7 Aug. 1946.
33Prem 8, 627 Pt. 3, British Delegation Paris to Attlee, 31 July 1946.
34Christopher Sykes, Crossroads to Israel (London 1965), pp. 358–359; FO 371, 52548, E7474/4/31, Inverchapel to Bevin, 3 Aug. 1946.
35United Kingdom Parliamentary Debates House of Commons, 426, col. 1257, 1 Aug. 1946.
36Cab 129, 13, ff. 26–7, CP (46) 358, 5 Oct. 1946.
37FRUS1946 (7), pp. 700–701, Attlee to British Embassy Washington, 2 Oct. 1946; FO 371, 52560, E10030/4/31, Minutes of Meeting at Foreign Office, 1 Oct. 1946; Prem 8, 627, Part 5, Note by G. H. Gater of Interview between Bevin and Weizmann on 29 Sept. 1946; Cab 129, 13, ff. 26–7, CP (46) 358, 5 Oct. 1946.
38FRUS1946 (7), pp. 693–5, Clayton to Truman, 12 Sept. 1946; Annex, Draft Statement by President.
39Truman Papers, Box 184, PSF, Hannegan to Truman, 1 Oct. 1946; Crum to Hannegan, 10 Oct. 1946; Weizmann Archives (Truman Library, Independence), Box 1, Epstein to Nahum Goldmann, 9 Oct. 1946.
40FO 371, 52560, E9966/4/31, Bevin to Attlee, 4 Oct. 1946.
41FRUS 1946 (7), pp. 701–703, Truman to Attlee, 3 Oct. 1946.
42FO 371, 52560, E9987/4/31, Inverchapel to Attlee, 4 Oct. 1946.
43CO 537 (Public Record Office, London), 1783, Palestine Conference 1946, 28 Oct. 1946; 19 Nov. 1946; Meeting between Colonial Office and Creech Jones, 27 Nov. 1946.
44FRUS1946 (7), pp. 717–720, Ibn Saud to Truman, transmitted 2 Nov. 1946.
45Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade and After: America 1945–1960 (New York 1972), pp. 17–90.
46Truman Papers, PSF, Palestine-Jewish Immigration Files, Truman to Pauley, 22 Oct. 1946.
47CO 537,1737, Balfour to Creech Jones, 22 Nov. 1946; Enclosing Memorandum by Branley over State of Jewish Affairs.
48Cab 128, 6, f. 157, Cab 96 (46) 3, 14 Nov. 1946; f. 193, Cab 105 (46) 4, 12 Dec. 1946.
49FO 371, 61762, E 221/46/9, Conversation between Truman and Bevin (extract), 8 Dec. 1946.
50Ibid., 61761, E 74/1/46, Minute by Beeley to read as Bevin to Attlee, undated.
51See Ian Gibson, The English Vice (London 1978) for an account of the role of corporal punishment in the administration of the Empire.
52FO 371, 61761, E 53/46/31, Cunningham to Creech Jones, 30 Dec. 1946.
53Cab 129, 16, f. 49, CP (47) 11, Memorandum on Middle East Oil, 3 Jan. 1947; FO 371, 61763, E 463/46/G, COS (47) 4, JP (47) 1, 6 Jan. 1947; Prem 8, 627 Part 6, COS 161/7, Top Secret, 6 Feb. 1947.
54FO 371, 61874, E 2932/951/31, Minute by McGarran, 6 Jan. 1947.
55Cab 128, 11, ff. 7–9, Cab 6 (47) 3, Confidential Annex, 15 Jan. 1947; ff. 20–2, Cab 11 (47) 2, Confidential Annex, 22 Jan. 1947; Ritchie Ovendale, ‘The Palestine policy of the British Labour Government 1947: the decision to withdraw’, International Affairs56 (1980), pp. 73–93 at pp. 76–86.
56FO 371, 61764, E 743/46/G, Inverchapel to Bevin, 21 Jan. 1947; RG 59, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Palestine, Box 1, Merriam to G. Lewis Jones, 10 Jan. 1947.
57Cab 133, 85, f. 3, Meeting 8, 27 Jan. 1947; f. 17, Meeting 9, 30 Jan. 1947; f. 10, Meeting 10, 4 Feb. 1947.
58Ibid., f. 5, Jewish Delegation Meeting, 29 Jan. 1947; f. 16, Jewish Delegation Meeting 2, 3 Feb. 1947; ff. 12–13, Jewish Delegation Meeting 3, 6 Feb. 1947.
59Cab 129, 16, ff. 322–6, Joint memorandum by Bevin and Creech Jones on Palestine, 6 Feb. 1947; Prem 8, 627 pt. 6, CO 161/7, 6 Feb. 1947; Cab 128, 9, ff. 76–7, Cab 18 (47) 2, 7 Feb. 1947.
60FRUS1947 (5), pp. 1038–1039, Henderson to Acheson, 10 Feb. 1947; Cab 133, 85, ff. 1–14, Jewish Delegation Meeting 4, 10 Feb. 1947; f. 8, Jewish Delegation Meeting 5, 13 Feb. 1947.
61Cab 128, 9, ff. 92–4, Cab 22 (47) 2, 14 Feb. 1947; FRUS 1947 (5), pp. 1054–5, Marshall to Bevin, 21 Feb. 1947; United Kingdom Parliamentary Debates House of Commons, 433, col. 985, 18 Feb. 1947; col. 1901, 25 Feb. 1947.
62Robert F. Wagner Papers, Box 3, File 47, Confidential memorandum, 13 March 1947; Wagner to Vandenberg, 19 March 1947.
63Nicholas Bethell, The Palestine Triangle. The Struggle between the British, the Jews and the Arabs 1935–1948 (London 1979), pp. 297–304.
64RG 84, Entry 59A543 Part 5, Box 1076, 800 Palestine 3/20, Memorandum of Conversation between Inverchapel, Acheson and Henderson, 20 March 1947; 800 Palestine 4/16, G. Lewis Jones to Marshall, No. 527, 16 April 1947; 800 Palestine 4/26, Sargent to Douglas, Enclosing Attlee to Stassen (draft), 26 April 1947; RG 59, Office of Near Eastern Affairs Palestine, Box 1, Acheson to Douglas, 1 May 1947 (draft).
65FO 371, 61777, P. Garran to Sargent, 23 May 1947; for an analysis of the UNSCOP hearings see Jacob Robinson, Palestine and the United Nations (Washington 1947), pp. 140–251.
66Truman Papers, Box 184, PSF, Truman to Niles, 13 May 1947.
67FO 371, 61784, E 7453/46/G, Minute by Beeley, 15 Aug. 1947; 61785, E 7568/46/G, Beeley to MacGillivray, 13 Aug. 1947; Horowitz, op. cit., pp. 202–9; FO 371, 61786, E 7855/46/31, Minute by Beeley, 29 Aug. 1947.
68FO 371, 61931, W. A. C. Mathieson to C. W. Baxter, 19 June 1947; 61941, British Middle East Office to Foreign Office, 7 July 1947.
69RG 84, Entry 59A543 part 5, Box 1076, 800 Palestine 5/29, Sargent to Douglas, 29 May 1947; David Hirst, The Gun and the Olive Branch (London 1977), p. 119.
70Joseph P. Lash, Eleanor and Franklin (New York 1971), p. 214; Hirst, op. cit., p. 119.
71RG 59, Office of Near Eastern Affairs Palestine, Box 1, Memorandum of Meeting of British and American Officials, 27 June 1947; Satterthwaite to Henderson, 2 July 1947.
72S. Villard to Douglas, 11 Aug. 1947, Enclosing E 50001/48/G, Bevin to Marshall, 27 June 1947.
73RG 59, Decimal Files 1945–49, Box 6760, Robert B. Macatee to Merriam, 4 Aug. 1947; Enclosing Memorandum, 3 Aug. 1947.
74RG 84, Entry 59A543 part 5, Box 1076, 800 Palestine 8/14, Jones to Marshall, 14 Aug. 1947; 800 Palestine 8/15, Jones to Marshall, 15 Aug. 1947; RG 59, Decimal Files 1945–9, Box 6760, Clark to Marshall, 6 Aug. 1947; CO 537, 2313, Bevin to Inverchapel, 16 Aug. 1947; RG 59, Decimal Files 1945–9, Box 6760, R. S. Huestis to Marshall, 13 Sept. 1947; David Leitch, ‘Explosion at the King David Hotel’, in Michael Sissons and Philip French (Eds), Age of Austerity 1945–1951 (London 1964), pp. 58–85 at pp. 73–79; Tom Segev, The Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust (New York 1993), pp. 129–132.
75Cab 128, 10, ff. 148–50, Cab 76 (47) 6, 20 Sept. 1947.
76FO 371, 61789, E 8913/46/G, Hayter to Warner, 20 Sept. 1947; E 8913/46/G, JP (47) 131 (Final), Report by the Joint Planning Staff, 19 Sept. 1947.
77FO 371, 61114, AN 3997/45/C, Record of Informal Political and Strategic Talks in Washington on the Middle East held from 16 Oct. to 7 Nov. 1947; AN 4080/3997/45/G, Bevin to Inverchapel, 13 Dec. 1947.
78RG 59, Decimal Files 1945–49, Box 2182, 501.BB Palestine/9–1447, Appendix Cleland to Eddy, 12 Sept. 1947; 501.BB Palestine/9–1347, Comment by Eddy on the UNSCOP Report.
79Truman Papers, Box 184, PSF, Niles to Truman, 29 July 1947; Truman to Under-Secretary, 6 Aug. 1947.
80FRUS1947 (5), pp. 1147–1151, Meeting of United States Delegation to United Nations, 15 Sept. 1947; p. 1151, Statement by Marshall, 17 Sept. 1947; pp. 1152–3, Henderson to Lovett, 18 Sept. 1947; Marshall Library, Xerox, Hamilton to Forrestal, 20 Sept. 1947; RG 59, Decimal Files 1945–49, Box 2182, 501.BB Palestine/10-2847, Merriam to Henderson, 28 Oct. 1947; 501.BB Palestine/10–347, Henderson to Lovett, 6 Oct. 1947.
81Joint Chiefs of Staff Leahy Records (National Archives, Washington), Folder 56, JCS 1684/5, Strategic and Military Implications of Partition, Approved 10 Oct. 1947.
82FRUS1947 (5), p. 164, note 2.
83Joint Chiefs of Staff Leahy Records, Folder 118, US/A/AC 14/113, Wadsworth to Johnson, 22 Oct. 1947.
84FO 371, 61793, E 10281/46/G, Memorandum by Bevin, undated, 22 Oct. 1947.
85FRUS1947 (5), pp. 1269–1270, Lovett to Austin, 19 Nov. 1947.
86Truman Papers, Box 773, OF 204-Misc, Memorandum for Truman, 22 Nov. 1947; Connelly to Truman, 22 Nov. 1947.
87FO 371, 61794, E 10832/46/G, COS (47) 141, 14 Nov. 1947.
88Ibid., 61796, E 11310/46/G, Note of Discussion between Bevin and Marshall, 25 Nov. 1947; see 61783, E 6586/43/31 for legal arguments.
89Truman Papers, Box 773, OF 204-Misc, Celler to Truman, 26 Nov. 1947; Celler to Truman, 3 Dec. 1947; Celler to Matthew Connelly, 3 Dec. 1947.
90RG 59, Office of Near Eastern Affairs Palestine, Box 1, Merriam to Henderson, 11 Dec. 1947. For assessments of the significance of great power interests see: Ritchie Ovendale, Britain, the United States, and the End of the Palestine Mandate 1942–1948 (Woodbridge, Suffolk 1989); Martin Jones, Failure in Palestine. British and United States Policy after the Second World War (London 1986); Michael J. Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers 1945–1948 (Princeton, NJ 1982); Wm. Roger Louis, The British Empirein the Middle East 1945–1951: Arab Nationalism, the US, and Postwar Imperialism (Oxford 1984).
91Robert F. Wagner Papers, Palestine Files, Box 3, File 47, Silver to Wagner, 1 Dec. 1947.
92Senate Library, Vol. 1174 (4), 80th Congress, HR 2910, 4–27 June 1947; 2–18 July 1947.