CHAPTER TEN

Mission Impossible: II – Menshikov vs the Great Ambassador (April–May 1853)

THE ‘REAL JOCKEY’ TAKES CHARGE

Viscount Stratford (Canning) de Redcliffe arrived in Constantinople on 5 April and was given a regal welcome by the Turks, whose turn it was to act as if a saviour had arrived. More importantly, he came with his own political instructions to engineer a settlement, as well as to save Turkey by reforming her in the interest of the British Empire. In this he appeared to be different from Rose, who had shown a penchant for a French alliance against Russia and for negotiating with a friendly squadron or two only a day away by fast steamer. Stratford took the high moral ground, arguing that France, Austria and Russia should renounce their coercive diplomacy that had caused the crisis in the first place. Geography had allowed him to visit Paris and Vienna en route, where he had seen the two emperors, as well as Drouyn and Buol, and obtained commitments from them to support a peaceful resolution and the integrity of the Ottoman realm. Russia was the big question, since words and actions were not exactly squaring with each other, but Stratford displayed confidence in the Tsar’s promises and Nesselrode’s counsels.¹

The new French ambassador, Edmond de la Cour, arrived the next day armed with instructions of a different nature. His bottom line was the Note of 8 February 1852, which could be reconciled with the ‘February’ firman, if Menshikov so desired. La Cour was to refer to Paris all new Turkish concessions to the Greeks, even if the cupola were involved or the Russians pushed the Turks to break previous engagements. In other words, la Valette had been bluffing, and France would not start a war with Turkey over the sanctuaries.

The meat of la Cour’s instructions, however, concerned the deployment of the fleet after Menshikov’s mission failed and Russia made a military move – which the French had to predict was likely to happen in order to justify their response to Rose’s summons. Political Director Edouard Thouvenel, the author of these instructions, foresaw three possible Russian moves: (1) just the occupation of the Principalities; (2) the occupation plus a fleet against the Turks; (3) the use of that fleet to force the Bosphorus. In the first instance la Cour was to offer the French squadron to the Turks; if the Turks did not want it inside the Dardanelles, it should be close enough to deter an attack on Varna or Burgas. In the second instance, he was to obtain, with or without British help, permission to pass the Dardanelles. In the third instance, he was to pass the Dardanelles, secure the castles or fortresses there, and offer the remainder of his forces to the Turks. If the expected British help materialized, they each could defend a side of the Straits.²

The lack of a squadron actually was an asset for Stratford. La Cour was starting with the Menshikov-Benedetti impasse over the Holy Places, and both sides were armed and within striking distance of the Straits. The key for Stratford was not to associate with the French, as Rose had in March, but to pose as the true conciliator and cooperate with the Austrians and Prussians. La Cour and Menshikov could then fight it out over Bethlehem and Jerusalem, and the Russians and the Turks could battle over the guarantee. Stratford, meanwhile, could advise the Turks behind the scenes, force reform upon their empire and quietly send back military intelligence to boot.

The seasoned Englishman wasted little time. Within three days he had told first Menshikov that the ‘status quo’ included promises made to the French and then la Cour that he should concede as much as possible to Menshikov. Stratford also urged the Turks to give way to the Russians where feasible, while holding firm on matters of sovereignty and proceeding with the reforms. Mehmed Ali then tried the old idea of sending an extraordinary ambassador to St Petersburg, this time with a humble letter, but Menshikov rejected this compromise on the grounds that Russia already had an ambassador in Constantinople. Actually from the start Stratford had Menshikov cornered even more than Rose did, since the Turks now leaked everything to the British mission. Stratford would then level with at least Ozerov, so the Russians had to allow some unofficial mediation. It is no wonder that Clarendon, who complained of Rose’s ‘anti-Russian varnish’, but had a similar inclination, reacted to Stratford’s first dispatches with joy: ‘We have a real jockey on our horse instead of a stable boy, and the odds are highest against the Czar.’³

Menshikov for his part soon wrote home that he envisioned a satisfactory solution to the issues of the Holy Places and the Russian church and hospice in Jerusalem. The Turks would resist the sened or convention, but the guarantee could be obtained by an exchange of notes with assurances. Even so, he would need to invoke Russia’s military preparations and provoke a crisis, if Imperial legation were to regain its former influence. He went so far as to propose precise words to use in his final note in case of a rupture.⁴

All the same, for the next two weeks both Menshikov and la Cour talked with either each other, Rifaat, Mehmed Ali, or Stratford concerning the Holy Places at least every other day, and their subordinates were also busy. La Cour tried to avoid concessions, but the Turks held him off by demanding a firm military commitment. Then on 22 April at a three-power meeting concerning the Greco-Turkish frontier, Stratford took la Cour and Menshikov by the arms and got both to compromise over the cupola.⁵ Thirteen more days were needed for the Porte and the diplomats to settle on a revised draft of the original firman of ‘February’ 1852 and a new one for the hitherto missing Holy Sepulchre.⁶

This near-solution to the Holy Places conflict only now made its entrance through the Great Door. La Cour accepted the posting of an Ottoman Greek porter at the Church of the Nativity who could not impede Latin passage, and there was no talk of ownership. The Greek Patriarch could not regulate Latin use of the Tomb of the Virgin, but the Latins had to accept only a ninety-minute daily service following the Greeks and Armenians and without special compensation. The Turks would reconstruct the cupola, and the Greek Patriarch of Jerusalem could make observations, but the Turks were not mandated to listen and the Latin Patriarch was not silenced. The vague compromise that Stratford had promoted for sixteen months had finally been enacted. Even here, Menshikov accepted only ad referendum, while la Cour made a few verbal observations. The Porte forlornly asked that these arrangements might serve as Russia’s guarantee.⁷

THE ‘PIG’ WITHOUT A ‘STRING’

The entrance to a greater door, however, was barred. Menshikov and Rifaat could not compromise over that guarantee. They toyed with a rupture over the draft sened, which the Turkish Council rejected on the 14 April. Both sides then retreated, but the draft remained formally on the table.⁸ Menshikov’s long-distance communications from St Petersburg turned out to be crucial. Nesselrode’s further instructions and optimistic political commentary reflecting London’s initial sweet talk started to arrive in late March. There were two basic messages: compromise with the French over the Holy Places, but first and foremost push vigorously for the guarantee. A third message came in mid-April and revealed only slightly more sober deliberations over British concerns and the dispatch of the French squadron. Now the Turkish alliance was no longer necessary, but some strengthening of Kuchuk-Kainarji still was. Stratford, in contact with both la Cour and the former Grand Vizier, Reshid, over the question of Ottoman reform, tried to talk Menshikov out of the sened altogether. The latter, however, was planning to make his concessions later. So he went ahead and on the 19th submitted another note verbale, restating the original demands of 16 March with the implicit threat to break relations if the Turks did not agree to the draft sened.⁹

The Turks by now were very fearful of a rupture. Their fleet of nine ships with 648 cannon was at the Golden Horn, and the Chief of the Arsenal, Naimik Pasha, even considered arming the entire Muslim population. They also continued their delaying tactics, while Rifaat tried to work something out with the two most important Greeks on the scene, Argyropoulos representing the Russian legation, and Aristarchi the Patriarchate. Rifaat had also been sounding out Austria’s views of the draft sened and had some luck. By early May Buol too was worried about Russia’s ulterior demands and about the difficulty of reconciling Nesselrode’s assurances with Klezl’s reports.¹⁰ The Porte’s good sense in compromising with Leiningen in February was obvious.

Menshikov, though, had come to the conclusion that Stratford and only Stratford was blocking the sened. However, precisely because the Russian legation did not take into consideration the foundations of British foreign policy, Menshikov believed that Stratford’s animosity toward French and Catholic policies and his polite acceptance of Russia’s assurances were signs that there would be no Anglo-French alliance. Curiously, Stratford did not yet believe that the Russians would be so foolish as to throw away what influence they still had in Constantinople by insisting upon the sened.¹¹

He was mistaken. Back in St Petersburg, the Tsar was shaken but not moved by the sombre news from London about the responses to Rose’s call for the fleet. ‘Everything is uncertain and we must be ready for everything’, Nicholas wrote on 5 April.¹² But his reaction on the 18th to the word of Turkish opposition to the draft sened and the advice about the Asian province was to adhere to his original scheme. He had no operational military plans yet. Still he did not even await the initial reports of Stratford’s attitudes, but ordered Menshikov to commence the three-day ultimatum operation immediately, if the Turks had not yet agreed to the draft. When the plan for engineering the rupture arrived on the 18th by express courier, Nicholas treated it as already approved, and hardly bothered with the fine print. Menshikov asked about substituting a diplomatic note for the convention (sened), and Nicholas jotted: ‘treaty or convention are all the same to me’. The crucial matter was to restore Russian influence at the Porte, by whatever means it took – this, despite a polite word from Berlin indicating that Prussia, as well as Britain, did not want Menshikov to push things too far.¹³

Nesselrode, for his part, agreed with Menshikov on one crucial item and assumed from Ozerov’s initial impressions that Stratford was dictating policy to the Ottoman ministers. If the Turks continued to procrastinate, then Stratford was preventing the Russians from re-establishing their influence via negotiation. Hence, Stratford alone (rather then Menshikov acting on instructions which Nesselrode helped compose) ‘held war and peace in his hands’.¹⁴ This argument could serve to throw the blame for Russian policy failures on the British ambassador, but actually revealed once more the blank cheque given to England to start a coalition war against Russia. Nesselrode’s most bizarre logic was his mystification and cult of the Emperor in a dispatch that the latter approved. If others saw ‘political aims’, a ‘new protectorate’ and a ‘new political transaction’ in Russia’s demands, that was because ‘the true thinking of the Emperor … is of a higher order than one can comprehend in Constantinople and, perhaps, elsewhere … [since] His Majesty … obeys his conscience’.¹⁵ This was the true believer, with his self-imposed mental black-out, heading for a showdown.

When these dispatches arrived in Constantinople toward the beginning of May, the diplomatic community, including the minor legations, were already awaiting Menshikov’s next move and expecting some form of ultimatum. Menshikov by now seems to have lost interest in the course of normal diplomacy and was just awaiting the Porte’s official firmans and notes regarding the Holy Places, before he moved on to the next phase of his mission. His only real hope was that court politics still might work, since now ‘all of Europe’, that is, the other important legations, opposed the sened. He was ready to try the note format next, but he also wrote to Brunnow to prepare Britain for the approaching Russo-Turkish rupture.¹⁶

Stratford himself wished that he could somehow bring Russia to compromise on the basis of the 1841 Treaty, but could not find a handle. On 5 May, the day the Porte issued the awaited firmans and notes, he bared his inner thoughts to Clarendon: ‘The Turk is very much like a pig on a string. You may get him to market at last, but his bolts and zigzags by the way are sadly puzzling. The Russian has also a spit of this pig, but where is the string by which to guide him?’¹⁷

There was none. Nesselrode tried to be optimistic when Menshikov’s reports of the Holy Places deal and his intentions to issue the ultimatum arrived. The Tsar, though, was characteristically fatalistic, as if the course of events were completely out of his control: ‘Let us hope so, but not be too quick to believe in success; with this Redcliffe, there is everything to fear.’¹⁸

THE FIRST ULTIMATUM

On 5 May Menshikov responded to the settlement of the Holy Places dispute by submitting an ultimatum, threatening a rupture on 10 May, if the Turks did not sign a revised sened, prepared by Ozerov, as a guarantee for the future. The new draft contained two concessions, one retraction of them and one new requirement. These were: (1) no mention of Kuchuk-Kainarji; (2) no mention of the patriarchs’ life tenure; but (3) a new Article I affirming the strict status quo of the ‘rights, privileges and immunities, that the churches, pious institutions, and Orthodox clergies possess ad antiquo’; and (4) a new Article II granting automatically to the Ottoman Orthodox ‘cult’ any ‘rights and advantages conceded by the Ottoman government in the past or in the future to other Christian cults by means of treaties, conventions, or particular dispositions’.¹⁹ The legal tricks in Article I were two-fold, as Menshikov explained to Nesselrode but concealed from Klezl. One was to use the language of the Austrian treaties with Turkey concerning the Ottoman Catholics. The other was to introduce the words “status quo of the clergy”, since its practical application “would be extendable to the entire ecclesiastical hierarchy”. Article II, moreover, could be interpreted as giving the Ottoman Orthodox Church under Russian protection the same rights that native and foreign Catholics enjoyed under French and Austrian protection, even if Menshikov’s accompanying note indicated that only other native cults were envisioned. Nobody was fooled, least of all the Turks, but they used the recent death of the Sultana Valide as an excuse to delay the response.²⁰

Stratford obtained a copy of the draft sened the next day and was in a quandary, since he did not trust the French to keep secrets. On the other hand, he was more worried about the alleged ‘30 sail’ at Sevastopol, the Russian legation’s preparations to pack up, and Prussian and Austrian ignorance of Menshikov’s true intentions. So forced by circumstances, Stratford saw to it that Rifaat supplied la Cour with copies of the sened and most of the other Russian notes and projects. On the following day, the two ambassadors finally consulted seriously about urging the Turks to resist, but Stratford also had a plan to promote British interests. Rifaat would refuse Menshikov with a note that could appeal to European public opinion, while the Porte enacted more domestic reforms. La Cour was persuaded, and he followed in Stratford’s wake, which meant that the Turks were not going to get any carte blanche from the Western powers.²¹

Each ambassador saw Menshikov on 7 May and tried to talk him out of the sened, Klezl also weighed in that day and tried on Rifaat’s behalf to work something out with Menshikov that bypassed la Cour and Stratford. But the Austrian charge dared not be blunt about the two new articles. The best he could elicit from Menshikov was a repetition of Russia’s standard line that no serious interference in domestic Ottoman affairs was intended and a vague promise to be generous with the Turks, if they became friendlier to Russia. This was not enough, and by the 9th Klezl was predicting a Russian occupation of the Principalities and war. Blondeel, the Belgian envoy who had contacts and sympathies with the Ottoman traditionalists, thought that the Turks might cede, but he appears to have been an exception. The sharper Stratford saw that the Russians were setting him up as their scapegoat, and so turned to public diplomacy and composed a ‘confidential’ letter to Menshikov, which the latter immediately answered.²² It was also rumoured that Menshikov offered to abandon the sened, in return for an offensive-defensive alliance, though this does not appear in the Russian sources and smells like a new leak of an older story.

The nervous Turks, meanwhile, divided into parties of resistance and capitulation. The resisters themselves split between those who looked for Anglo-French military support and perhaps a war with Russia, and those who favoured four-power mediation. Rifaat, as if forgetting which century it was or who was a great power these days, even revealed the essence of the demands to the Swedish envoy and tried to gain him ‘for the party of resistance’.²³ More to the point, Mehmed Ali and Rifaat put their cards on the table and demanded to know at what point they could count on the Anglo-French squadrons. La Cour, however, found a way to reconcile his instructions with Stratford’s intentions and told Rifaat that to agree to the sened would be a breach of the 1740 Treaty. In other words, the Turks had to resist to prove that they were sovereign and independent, while only if the Russians then attacked could la Cour summon the squadron. Stratford simply hid behind his instructions, but gave some opinions in writing. He did not explicitly say to Rifaat: ‘Do not agree to the draft’, but conveyed that message nonetheless -precisely what the Foreign Office expected.²⁴ Stratford’s bottom line was that a sened concerning only the Holy Places and the Russian church and hospice in Jerusalem was permissible as a last resort. He also saw the Sultan on the 9th, hinted that the Malta squadron was available, and firmed up the latter’s courage. Resistance prevailed. Menshikov soon learned that ‘all the legations’ opposed Russia,²⁵ and Rifaat wrote to the Turkish missions in Paris and London that the Porte would not sign the sened.²⁶

In general, the events of 5–9 May were crucial for breaking the Gordian knot of British and ‘European’ trust of Russia and for making the Anglo-French alliance, which was Napoleon Ill’s dream. By the time the ultimatum played itself out, London and Paris were ready with similar and virtually coordinated responses. The man in the centre of these events in Constantinople articulated the situation perfectly and revealed his inner thoughts again to Clarendon: ‘Either I am dreaming … or Russia has regularly bamboozled us.’²⁷ Both, in fact, were true. Stratford and most of Europe’s upper echelons had been dreaming that Russian disclaimers were accurate, while the Russian leaders and diplomats had been fooling most statesmen with their recent diplomacy and themselves to boot with their political mythology. Now some chickens were coming home to roost. But Stratford had his own special gripe: he thought he had convinced Menshikov to take out the clauses concerning Kuchuk-Kainarji and the Patriarchs from the draft sened, and Menshikov had pulled a double-cross with the new articles. As a result, the imperialism of free trade had to ally with the imperialism of Mediterranean Catholicism against the imperialism of Kuchuk-Kainarji. At least that is, more or less, what Stratford was telling a mistrustful la Cour.²⁸

The British and French attitudes conditioned Rifaat’s amicably worded answer to Menshikov on 10 May, which was approved by the Turkish Council. The Porte would negotiate a written arrangement, but only concerning the Jerusalem hospice and church, since the fundamental rights and privileges of the Ottoman Greek Church emanated from the sovereign will of the Sultans. Such a line had been implicit in almost everything the Turks had been saying from before Menshikov arrived and would continue to be the core of all Ottoman proposals and responses. This note was thus the first version of the many, many drafts, which embassies and foreign ministries would produce over the next six months to try to reconcile the irreconcilable.²⁹

THE RETURN OF RESHID PASHA

The Russian legation did not immediately pack up and go, but rather sought another ministerial change and engaged in court politics and waiting-boat diplomacy, Menshikov abandoning his land quarters on and off for his war steamer, The Thunderer. On this dangerous turf he was dealing with a clever Ottoman Greek and an even cleverer Turk, who understood local politics much better than did Ozerov & Co. Fearful of leaving his Church without any Russian protection, Aristarchi hoped to engineer a Russo–Turkish reconciliation. Reshid sought to return to power, better with than without the reconciliation. Both were playing double games. Aristarchi was working with Reshid and trying as well to broker a workable response from the current Ottoman ministers. Reshid appeared to the Russians as their best hope, and to some extent was, while to others he was a leading member of the resistance party.³⁰

Menshikov’s formal response on 11 May to Rifaat’s ‘Anglofrench’ note, as Aristarchi called it, was to extend the term of the ultimatum to the 14th to obtain the sened with a different type of guarantee. The Turkish Council, now in session daily, had two proposals on the table, representing imperialist alternatives: extend the Tanzimat reforms to satisfy the British or accept the sened or an equivalent to placate the Russians. Both legations were virtually lobbying for votes, as if this were eighteenth-century Poland or Sweden, and a parliament, half for sale, were in session. Mehmed Ali and the Turkish war party, lacking either British or French support, were temporarily marginalized. So the Turks made serious moves to satisfy some of their Orthodox with new, spontaneous grants of immunities, while some pro-Russian Greeks were preparing to skip town, if necessary.³¹

Reshid, meanwhile, furnished Aristarchi with string to lead Menshikov. Accordingly the Turks believed the ultimatum was making Russia appear as aggressive and predatory as under Catherine II, while the removal of Mehmed Ali would clear the way for the sened. Menshikov’s best chance would be the private interview with the Sultan, which Aristarchi arranged for midday on the 13th. The night before, Aristarchi even provided a script prepared by Reshid, whereby Menshikov was to combine his insistence upon ‘a formal act of a splendid guarantee’, with the disclaimer that ‘our propositions are innocent and completely religious’. In other words, Menshikov would demand something akin to the type of flowery and vapid document that the Porte was so brilliant at composing. The Sultan, presumably, would then turn to Reshid to engineer a harmless and ‘completely religious’ guarantee.³² It is important to note that Reshid was not committing himself to the sened, just to negotiations.

Aristarchi almost did a brilliant job of prompting. The day of the interview, he provided Menshikov with some important information: the Turks resolved to resist independently of Stratford, and Musurus reported from London that Clarendon assumed that only the Holy Places were at stake. The Logothete, however, shot himself in the foot, by passing on some enticing news: the lack of a firm Anglo-French military commitment to the Turks was increasing the odds for the sened, and at least one influential minister, Fehti-Ahmad, favoured capitulation. Up to the last minute, moreover, Ozerov was still arguing for the sened, which would surely precipitate the rupture, and this countered Argyropoulos’s arguments for a note, which might not.³³ Ozerov also found some way to implicate Argyropoulos in a ‘mistake’ in his dealings with Reshid, and this weakened the Russian legation moderates.³⁴ Actually a trio of reported conversations at this time showed that the Russian legation’s basic goal was in fact the same as the nationalists’ at home: to restore Russia’s diminished influence at Constantinople.³⁵

At the crucial meeting Menshikov used Reshid’s draft only as a starting point, and then gave the Sultan two hypothetical choices: Turkey could be reduced to a Greece, Switzerland, or Belgium that was legally subject by treaty to the interference of several great powers, or Turkey could have bilateral relations with Russia. Menshikov also insisted on a quick response, which is precisely why the Ottomans preferred a five-power or four-power arrangement to a bilateral one. The Sultan was evasive and mendacious: ‘You would have had it already, had not the retirement of the Grand Vizier at his request deprived me this moment of my principal adviser.’³⁶

The naive Menshikov, trying to act like the power-broker that he certainly was not, cancelled his appointment with Mehmed Ali and sent the news over to Reshid, as if the latter needed to be informed by the Russian legation about what was coming. When the mist of court intrigue was lifted later that day, the Ottoman elite had made room for Reshid to return as Foreign Minister, but otherwise had only played musical chairs, shifting Mehmed Ali to Defence and Rifaat to the Council presidency and making Mustapha, a respected moderate, Grand Vizier.³⁷ What did not change at all was basic opposition towards Russia’s maximum demands, but Reshid was ready to probe for modulations.

THE NEW TEAM IN ACTION

The return of Reshid to power on 13 May brought all of the pressing issues to a head and was decisive for the future. He and Stratford, first separately and then together, easily got the best of Aristarchi and Menshikov. The Russians may have learned from diplomatic scuttlebutt that the dismissal of Mehmed Ali shocked Stratford into ‘fury approaching insanity’,³⁸ but he never acted as if he were demented. He was in communication that night with Reshid, as well as with other Turkish ministers. The next day, the extended expiration date of the ultimatum, Reshid received first Menshikov and then Stratford.³⁹

At the first meeting, Reshid, who had been forewarned by Ozerov and Argyropoulos of what was coming, used the ‘nice cop/mean cop’ routine by pointing out the rejectionist view of his colleagues and quickly disabused Menshikov of the idea of an easy victory. Menshikov in turn used ‘severe language’ and referred to ‘recent’ instructions calling for an immediate rupture in case of Turkish non-compliance. He then demanded a ‘clear and precise response’ with ‘the briefest possible delay’. In other words, the moderate Menshikov of Reshid’s script had disappeared. Soon afterwards Menshikov presented to some Turks Brunnow’s earlier argument to Aberdeen, that ‘a maritime occupation legitimized a territorial occupation’,⁴⁰ a position that implicitly denied both Anglo-French freedom of the seas outside the Straits and Ottoman sovereignty. The battle for the moral and legal high ground in the realm of threat escalation was on again, this time in Constantinople, and Russia was taking on two maritime powers as well as Turkey.

Stratford, meanwhile, was ready for his meeting with a brief memorandum for Reshid, which expanded on Rifaat’s note of 10 May, but reduced the guarantee to a solemn communication of the new firmans to all five Great Powers. This became Reshid’s alternative to the draft sened of 5 May and would serve as his legal guide in dealing with Russia’s demands over the next four months. With Stratford’s coaching and the Council’s approval, Reshid asked Menshikov for an additional five or six days for the new ministry, which was really seeking certain Western military support, were war to break out. The allegedly furious Stratford thus put in a good day’s work on the 14th, regained his trust in Reshid, and had every reason to be hopeful.⁴¹

Menshikov obtained the Porte’s formal request for a postponement right after the Council met on the 15th. He had little faith in the new ministry which he had helped bring to power, but had to grant the delay or he would appear especially unreasonable before he sailed off with nothing. His compromise was to declare relations officially broken, but delay his departure to allow for more negotiations, using now a new legation fiction, namely that Reshid had promised the desired sened.⁴²

The real Reshid was now brokering between the Ottoman elite and the foreign legations. While the French still insisted on equality in the Holy Land, but would give no firm military commitment,⁴³ Reshid gave the Russians another chance for a back-door compromise, sending his son to see Menshikov on the 16th. The junior Reshid floated the old idea of dispatching a special Turkish emissary to St Petersburg, but old Menshikov in turn insisted on the justice of Russia’s demands. Employing his recent legal invention, that Russia was merely asking for the same treaty rights enjoyed by Austria, he retorted: ‘Only after the acceptance of our propositions will the Emperor receive an ambassador.’⁴⁴ Russia would hold to all of these positions until the war began.

Reshid and the Turks did not waste any time. A Turkish Grand Council of ministers, ex-ministers, provincial governors and ulema met for the next two days to consider Menshikov’s demands, the governance of the Christians, and the possibility of war. Aristarchi personally saw most of the members on the 16th and deluded himself that Reshid’s insinuations regarding Stratford meant that the Council would decide for Russian imperialism over British imperialism.⁴⁵ There was next to no support for Russia, only three votes, and a few hawks even entertained the offer of a military alliance from Piedmont-Sardinia. The real debates were between two anti-Russian camps. Mehmed Ali’s group, representing majority Ottoman sentiment, wished to stonewall Stratford on reform and call the Anglo-French bluff by courting war with Russia. Reshid’s minority, which gained the majority of votes, was willing to placate the West with domestic measures, at least on paper, as much out of opportunism as conviction.⁴⁶

The Grand Council’s compromise decision on the 17th was to authorize Reshid to offer Menshikov an official note containing the Sultan’s reaffirmation of the rights of the Ottoman Orthodox, a promise of no future changes in the status of the sanctuaries without prior Russian and French approval, and a sened covering the Russian church and hospice in Jerusalem. Thus la Cour and Stratford, not Menshikov, got what they wanted from the Turks.⁴⁷ Aristarchi now hoped that he and Reshid could work something out and warned Menshikov that Stratford thought that the Russians ‘were kicking up a row’ and would not dare declare war, since all of Europe would favour the Turks.⁴⁸

THE FINAL EXCHANGE: STRATFORD’S REAL VICTORY

Menshikov, however, hardly heeded Aristarchi any more and rejected the Turkish proposals without seeing the actual documents, when he met with Reshid on the 18th. Instead, while the Council was still in session, Menshikov sent over his rejection with an announcement that his government would ‘seek means within its own power’, that he was evacuating the entire embassy except for the commercial section, and that any assault on the status quo of the Orthodox Church would be seen as a hostile act.⁴⁹ The Council then finished its business by authorizing Reshid’s note anyway and ordering a general mobilization over a period of three months, while protecting the Christian populations and Russian commerce. The note was published the following day in the Journal de Constantinople⁵⁰.

Now everybody got into the act simultaneously. Ozerov, fearful of Aristarchi’s private agenda, opposed Reshid’s note outright, while Aristarchi and Klezl suggested further use of one of Reshid’s sons as the intermediary.⁵¹ La Cour, having secured French interests and hoping Menshikov would retreat, was ready to work individually with him or to follow Stratford’s plan for a four-power demarche to the Russian legation. So was Klezl, who now assumed the role of the delegate of the four powers and thereby showed Austria’s dilemma, since the stronger two, Britain and France, saw no reason for Turkey to make further concessions, while Vienna was afraid that this stance would alienate Russia. Stratford met with Wildenbruch, Klezl and la Cour again on the 19 May to authorize Klezl’s appeal, and both Klezl and la Cour saw Menshikov on the 20th.⁵²

Menshikov, meanwhile without any help from the four powers, finally pulled out his draft of a Turkish note to be addressed to himself, and sent it over to the Turks. He later claimed this was a response on the 20th to Reshid’s and Klezl’s calls for more negotiations, but Ozerov had been working on such a piece for a week.⁵³ At any rate, the younger Reshid came once more on the evening of the 20th with a draft from his father, which was no more than a minor variation of the note from the 18th. Menshikov in turn pointed to his draft, said it would suffice, and officially communicated it. This one was also nothing other than the old wine in a new bottle. All the objectionable linkage was alive and well – the bilateral Sultan-Tsar alliance, the ‘sense of the articles of former treaties … touching religious questions’, the ‘forever’ guarantee, and the automatic extension to the entire Orthodox Church, generally in the Empire and specifically in Jerusalem–Bethlehem, of any rights that other Christian cults obtained by treaty.⁵⁴ Reshid and Menshikov were thus talking past each other, not to each other.

Since the Turks had just published Reshid’s note of the 18th, they could not possibly accept Menshikov’s of the 20th. Curiously, early in this century one leading French scholar deemed the Turkish opposition to the note ‘silly’, while in our time an eminent American historian found it ‘difficult’, and another ‘impossible’ to discover in it ‘any threat to the independence and sovereignty of the Sultan’.⁵⁵ However, historical scholarship has not been aware of Menshikov’s private letter to Nesselrode outlining how the revised draft sened would assure Russian influence over the Orthodox Church. This was proof that the Turks knew what they were doing in seeing precisely such a threat in the draft note, whose first article carried over the pertinent, objectionable stipulations from the draft seneds. Besides St Petersburg would consider it to be ‘an obligatory note’.⁵⁶ Stratford was thus correct in viewing it as having, in Russian eyes, ‘the force of a Treaty’, without the specific reservations concerning the ‘spiritual’ rights of the Greek clergy that the Turks desired to insert.⁵⁷

Here is the relevant text of Menshikov’s note:

The Eastern Orthodox cult, its clergy, its churches, and its possessions, as well as its religious establishments, shall enjoy in the future without any harm, under the aegis of His Majesty the Sultan, the privileges and immunities that have been assured to them ah antiquo, and which have been granted to them at different occasions by imperial favour, and by the principle of complete equity, will participate in the advantages accorded to the other Christian rites, as well as to the foreign legations accredited at the Sublime Porte, by convention or by particular disposition [my italics].

None of the Turkish leaders would make such a bilateral and hence dangerous pledge to Russia concerning the future of their Orthodox Church unless compelled by military defeat or combined Great Power pressure.

Reshid now expected the four-power support and got some. When Stratford reconvened the other envoys, they agreed that the Turks were the best judges of their sovereign rights, a position that effectively delivered the Porte from Menshikov, even if it did not go so far as Reshid or Stratford may have wished. Stratford also wanted Reshid to try once more to negotiate on the basis of the latest Turkish note and the four-power statement, but there was no time for this.⁵⁸ All the same, Stratford and Reshid would pick up from this point in the future, and Stratford would follow such a tack until war erupted. Menshikov, for his part, privately considered Reshid’s latest proposals to be ‘unusual (insolites)’, and thereby showed that he had not paid much serious attention to the Turks all along. All he wished to understand was: ‘Lord Redcliffe prevents the Porte from accepting my last demands’. If Menshikov had substituted the words ‘capitulate to’ for ‘accept’, he would not have been completely wrong.⁵⁹

The next day, prompted by Ozerov, Menshikov warned the Porte again about any act that might ‘invalidate the other rights, privileges, and immunities’, of the Orthodox Church, lifted anchor, and steamed away. By then Stratford had checked out the Ottoman defences and made sure that the squadron was ‘in readiness in Malta’.⁶⁰ In Constantinople it would be full steam ahead for the extension of the rights of the various Christian communities under Stratford’s auspices, if not for full Muslim-Christian equality. The imperialism of ‘commerce’ had just won a resounding victory.

NOTES

1.Cln. to Str., 25 Feb. 1853 (CORR 1.146); Str. to Cln., pr., 15 March 1853 (PRO FO 352/36/6); Wal. to Thv., pr., 11 March 1853 (AMAE PA PT 20); Arnim to Mnt., pr., 26 March 1853 (PAP II).

2.Drn. to Lac, 22 March 1853 (AMAE CP Turq. 312).

3.Cln. to Cwl., pr., 15, 29 April 1853 (ClDp. c. 125).

4.DM 25–27 March/6–8 April 1853; Mnsh. to Nes. 29 March/10 April 1853 (ZP 1.120–1).

5.DM 10/22 April 1853.

6.Copies in CORR 1.301; analysis in Lac. to Drn., 19 April, 7 May 1853 (AMAE CP Turq. 312), less so in Mnsh. to Nes., 24 April./6 May 1853 (AVPR K 19).

7.Arg. to Mnsh., 13/25 April 1853 (TsGADA XI/1234).

8.DM2/24 April 1853; Arg. to Mnsh, 3/15 April 1853 (TsGADA XI/1234); cf. Str. to CI., 15 April 1853 (CORR 1.276).

9.Nes. to Mnsh., 3/15, 10/22, 19/31 March 1853 (AVPR K 20); Mensh. to Nes., pr., 4/16 April 1853, with Nich. I gloss, Note verbale, 7/19 Apr. 1853 (TsGADA 111/124, ZP 1.123).

10.Klezl to Buol, 31 March 18, 21 April 1853; Buol to Klezl, Lbz., 2, 6 May 1853 (AGK 1.1 41, 47–50).

11.Arg. to Mnsh., 3/15, 6/18, 10/22 April 1853 (TsGADA XI/1234); Mnsh. to Nes., 14/26 April 1853 (AVPR K 19).

12.Gloss on Nes. memo. (AVPR K 1853 30).

13.Nes. to Mnsh., 31 March/12 April 1853; Mnsh. to Nes., 29 March/ 10 April 1853, with Nich. I gloss (AVPR K 19–20); Mnt. to Henckel, 22 March 1853 (AGK II. 1.9).

14.Nes. to Brw., pr., 9/21 April 1853 (TsGADA 111/115).

15.Nes. to Mnsh., draft, with Nich. I’s ‘so be it’, 11/23 April 1853 (ZP 1.124).

16.Mnsh. to Brw., 20 April/2 May 1853 (TsGADA III/124).

17.ClDp. c. 10.

18.Nes. to Nich. I, with gloss., 26 April/8 May 1853 (AVPR K 30).

19.Mnsh. to Rifaat with draft sened, 23 April/5 May 1853 (ZP 1.126–7); cf. Oz. to Mnsh., 15/27 April 1853 (TsGAVMF 19/3/214).

20.Mnsh. to Nes., pr., 24 April/6 May 1853 (TsGADA III/124); Klezl to Buol, 9 May 1853 (AGKIA).

21.Str. to Cln., one pr., 6 May 1853 (ClDp. c. 10, CORR 1.300); Lac. to Drn., 9 May 1853 (AMAE CP Turq. 312).

22.Str.-Mnsh. exchange, 8–9 May 1853 (CORR 1.305, 338).

23.SRA KUB Konst. Dep. (8 May 1853).

24.Str. to Rifaat, 9 May 1853 (CORR 1.336); Wal. to Thv., pr., 19 May 1853 (AMAE PA PT 20).

25.Arg., Oz. to Mnsh., 26–27 April/8–9 May 1853 (TsGADA XI/1234, TsGAVMF 19/3/214): according to Russian intelligence, Stratford was upset that he could not call up the British squadron.

26.Cwl. to Cln. 23 May 1853 (CORR 1.312); cf. Saab OCA: 38–9.

27.Str. to Cln., pr., 9 May 1853 (CIDp. c. 10).

28.Lac. to Drn., 7 May 1853 (AMAE CP Turq. 312): ‘What you have accomplished with treaties in the interest of the Catholic Church, we have done for commerce.’

29.CORR 1.331, ZP 1.135 (English, French trans.).

30.Cf. B1C to Bkr., 9 May 1853 (AMAE Big. Turq. V); Temperley SROCWl: 617.

31.Here also SRA KUB Konst. Dep. 1853 (12 May 1853).

32.Rsh., draft speech, French trans, by Aristarchi, ‘Wednesday’, i.e., 29 April/11 May 1853 (TsGAVMF 19/3/6).

33.Aristarchi, Oz. to Mnsh., late 30 April/12 May 1853, received early 1/13 May 1853, (TsGAVMF 19/3/16, 214).

34.Oz. to Mnsh. 2/14 May 1853 (TsGAVMF 19/3/214); Mehmed Ali’s later, self-serving, fantastic tale of ‘Levantine intrigue’ surrounding Argyro-poulos’s momentary eclipse made its way into standard historiography via Thouvenel’s memoirs: Thouvenel: 145–54; cf. Emile Bourgeois, Manuel III: 373–7; Temperley SROCW I: 613–17, which is more cautious; also Saab OCA: 40–3, Curtiss RCW: 128–30.

35.B1C. to Bkr., 12 May 1853; BIC-Balabin-Dmitry Nesselrode (AMAE Big. Turq. V); Mollerus to vH., 16 May 1853: Mollerus-Mnsh. (NRA 2.05.01 BZ 2679 Const. Dep.); Str. to Cln., pr., 25 May 1853: Balabin-Oz. (PRO 352/36/6); cf. Temperley ENEC: 320–1.

36.Mnsh. to Nes., 4/16 May 1853 (ZP 1.138); cf. Lac. to Dnr., 15 May 1853 (AMAE CP Turq. 313), with no indication that Menshikov ‘was as violent as ever’, as Temperley abstracted from private British correspondence: ENEC: 323–4, note. 490.

37.Cf. Saab OCA: 43.

38.Oz. to Mnsh., Mnsh. to Nes., pr., 3–4/15–16 May 1853 (TsGAVMF 19/3/214, ZP 1.141).

39.DM 2–3/14–15 May 1853; Str. to Cln. 14 May 1853 (CORR 1.337, orign., PRO FO 78/932); and Lac. to Drn., 15 May 1853 (AMAE CP Turq. 313) correct Mnsh. to Ness., 4/16 May 1853 (ZP 1.139), that moved Reshid’s first communications to the 14th and the meetings to the 15th, as in Temperley (ENEC: 324–5) and Curtiss (RCW: 131).

40.Mnsh. to Nes., pr., 4/16 May 1853 (ZP 1.141).

41.Str. to Rsh., Cln., 14 May 1853; Resh. to Mnsh., 15 May 1853 (CORR 1.321–322, 339); Str. to Cln., pr., 15 May 1853 (CIDp c. 10).

42.Mnsh. to Rsh., 3/15 May to Ness 4/16 May 1853 (ZP I.138–140): the Menshikov files in TsGAVMF or TsGADA give no indication of his source for this most unlikely story.

43.Drn. to Lac, 3 May 1853, rec. by 13 May (AMAE CP Turq. 312).

44.DM 4/16 May 1853.

45.Aristarchi to Mnsh., 5/17 May 1853 (TsGAVMF 19/3/16).

46.Saab OCA: 46–7.

47.Mnsh. to Nes., 9/21 May 1853 (ZP 1.142): Menshikov wrote that an English dragoman observed the Council and that Stratford was waiting in a small boat outside, a statement perhaps based on Ozerov’s similar report from the 14th (TsGAVMF 19/3/214).

48.Aristarchi to Mnsh., 17 May 1853, 4:00pm (TsGAVMF 19/3/16).

49.Mnsh. to Sublime Porte., 6/18 May 1853 (ZP 1.145).

50.Rsh. to Mnsh., dated 18 May 1853, Lac. to Drn., 19 May 1853 (AMAE CP Turq. 313); cf. CORR 1.381, Saab OCA: 47.

51.Oz., Aristarchi to Mnsh., 7–8/19–20 May 1853 (TsGAVMF 19/3/214, 16).

52.Str. to Cln., 20 May 1853 (CORR 1.343); Lac to Drn., 17, 24 May 1853 (AMAE CP Turq. 313); DM 7–8/19–20 May 1853; Saab OCA: 47–8.

53.DM 7/19 May 1853; Oz. to Mnsh. 2–3/14–15 May 1853 (TsGAVMF 19/3/214); Mnsh. to Nes. No. 47, 9/21 May 1853 (AVPR K 19).

54.Rsh., Mnsh., draft notes, dated 8/20 May 1853 (ZP 1.144, 147).

55.Bapst: 377–8; Curtiss RCW: 136–7; Rich: 56.

56.ZP 1.124; Saab OCA: 48.

57.Str. to Cln., 20 May 1853 (CORR 1.343).

58.Str. et al., memo, 20 May 1853; Str. to Cln., 20, 22 May 1853 (CORR 1.343–4).

59.DM 6/18, 9/21 May 1853; cf. Mnsh. to Nes., 9/21 May 1853 (ZP 1.143, 146).

60.Oz. to Mnsh., Mnsh. to Rsh., 7, 9/19, 21 May 1853 (TsGAVMF 19/3/214, ZP 1.148); Str. to Cln., pr., 20 May 1853 (CIDp. c. 10).