CHAPTER THREE

The Approach of Confrontation in Korea

The UN deals with Korea

The UN became heavily involved in Korean affairs from the beginning of 1948 as a consequence of the acceptance by the UN General Assembly of the American proposal that elections should be held in both parts of Korea to achieve a national assembly and then a unified government for Korea. The United States had taken the initiative in this development, since it appeared the only means by which the Americans could disengage gradually from Korea with some hope that the UN could produce a solution that would sustain south Korea for at least a limited period. The Soviet Union made clear its firm opposition, maintaining that UN intervention was unnecessary and that Korea could advance to independence through the withdrawal of foreign forces and agreement reached among the Koreans themselves. There was no prospect of the UN securing consensus, since the terms of reference for UN involvement represented the position of the United States. It is possible but unlikely that progress might have been made had the UN adopted an investigative role instead of a course of action proposed by the United States. In the practical working out of UN policy the UN has to be regarded as a vehicle of American foreign policy. This was not always the case, and the Americans criticised aspects of the functioning of the UN in commissions; nevertheless, in the main the UN fulfilled American desires and was condemned by the Soviet Union. There is strong continuity in the position of the UN over Korea from the end of 1947 to the termination of the Korean War in 1953.¹

1. For a clear account of the early years of the UN, including discussion of general aspects of UN activities and of the UN in Korea, see Evan Luard, A History of the United Nations, vol. 1, The Tears of Western Domination 1945—1955 (London, 1982). See also Leon Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peacejul Unification of Korea: The Politics of Field Operations, 1947-1950 (The Hague, 1959).

Direct UN activity in Korea began with the establishment of UNTCOK under the terms of the resolution proposed by the United States in October 1947: UNTCOK was to observe the holding and conduct of elections throughout Korea and to advise in the establishment of a unified, independent Korea. Elections were to take place no later than 31 March 1948 and UNTCOK would have the right to verify any aspects it wished. American and Russian armed forces would have to be withdrawn from Korea as soon as possible and within three months of a Korean government being formed.² The members of the commission met in Seoul on 12 January 1948. The challenges facing it were daunting: a considerable proportion of the UN was opposed to its existence; the predominant political forces in south Korea regarded it simply as providing a veneer of international respectability for the creation of a south Korean state; north Korea had no intention of helping it in any way and the United States believed the commission should complete its task swiftly and without asking awkward questions. It is hardly surprising that the members of UNTCOK felt exasperated and frustrated or that acrimony occurred between certain members and the American military government.

2. Luard, History of the UN, vol. 1, p. 232.

When UNTCOK began to assess the situation in January 1948 it was clear that it was impossible to fulfil the conditions of the UN resolution. The members of the commission could not gain entry to north Korea and could not observe the nature of elections there. In south Korea it could not determine the registration of voters, political parties or other electoral arrangements. There was division in UNTCOK whether it could accomplish anything in the circumstances; but others believed that it could make limited progress. A majority believed that UNTCOK should supervise elections in the south but Australia, Canada and India were against doing so on the grounds that it would perpetuate and not eliminate the division in Korea. A report was made to the Interim Committee of the UN General Assembly, which operated when the General Assembly was not sitting. The Interim Committee reached the decision on 26 February 1948 that UNTCOK should adhere to the original intention in so far as this could be accomplished; elections would be supervised in the south but nothing could be done about the north.³ Canada, Australia and eleven other members of the Interim Committee opposed the decision and a number of countries abstained. American pressure ensured it was carried, however. On 28 February UNTCOK stated that elections would proceed no later than 10 May 1948. The American military government promptly announced that elections would be held on 9 May 1948, and UNTCOK undertook to observe the elections provided they were held 'in a free atmosphere, wherein the democratic rights of freedom of speech, press, and assembly would be recognised and accepted'.⁴ Canada and Australia maintained it was unwise to observe elections only in south Korea; France and Syria abstained.

3. Ibid., p. 234.

4. Cited ibid., p. 235.

The American military government resented the presence of UNTCOK since it was bound to inquire into many features of the political scene, some of which were better not pursued from the American viewpoint. Jacobs, the political adviser to General Hodge, castigated members of UNTCOK for interfering in local politics. The Chinese delegation had endeavoured to promote the ambition of Kim Ku, long a favourite of the Kuomintang; the Syrian was hostile to the military government. The French, Filipino and Salvadorean delegates were sympathetic to the United States. Jacobs placed the three remaining delegates, from Canada, Australia and India, in the category of being obstructive. The delegates concerned, Jackson (Australia), Patterson (Canada), and Menon (India), comprised a 'British bloc' or 'anti-American bloc'.⁵ It would no doubt have upset Kumara Menon to be described as a member of the 'British bloc'; Jacobs could not decide whether Menon was a visionary or was persuaded by the arguments of Patterson, Jackson and Djabi (Syria). The principal obstacle was Jackson; as in Tokyo, Americans believed that Australian representatives were too radical in their political sympathies and that they worked against American policies. Jacobs described Jackson as clearly anti-American and anxious to find 'dirt' on the military government. Jackson had previously been in Japan and appeared to harbour ill will because Australia had not played a more prominent part in the allied occupation of Japan. He was well disposed towards journalists of left-wing sympathies. Jacobs quoted the British consul-general as describing Jackson as a 'man of very strange and wild ideas, in many cases very radical'.⁶ General Hodge met Jackson and deduced that he and some other members of UNTCOK would do all they could to sabotage American aims in south Korea. Jackson conveyed the impression of wishing to establish a permanent UN presence in Korea on the basis of always seeking to convince the Russians of the value of cooperation. Hodge believed that Jackson wanted American troops to remain in order to protect a long-term UN presence and this could frustrate the American wish to withdraw troops from Korea. Hodge contended that it would be preferable to terminate UNTCOK, withdraw American troops (even though the Soviet Union was demanding this), and press ahead with the establishment of a government in south Korea.⁷

5. FRUS 1948(6), p. 1107, Jacobs to Marshall, 12 Feb. 1948.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., pp. 1110—13, Hodge to Marshall, 14 Feb. 1948.

The British consul-general in Seoul, D. W. Kermode, reported a view of Jackson different from that ascribed to him by Jacobs. When Kermode met Jackson in January 1948 he commented that he was able, responsible and steady. Jackson told him that General MacArthur had spoken to Jackson before he left Tokyo and had urged him to do all he could to assist Hodge and to prevent any dangerous developments.⁸ The British Foreign Office held that the prestige of the UN must be preserved and that it would be foolish for the United States to treat the UN as a rubber stamp for decisions already taken in Washington. The British delegation to the UN informed London on 11 February that when UNTCOK reported to the Interim Committee the United States would advocate observing elections in the south despite the refusal of north Korea to cooperate. Seats in the new national assembly could be left vacant for north Korean representatives, should the latter subsequently be elected on an acceptable basis; the United States held that it was vitally important that the Soviet Union should not exercise a veto on the role of the UN in Korea.⁹ D. F. MacDermot of the Foreign Office minuted that the report from UNTCOK must be considered before determining a course of action: to stipulate a detailed plan in advance would play into the hands of the Russians and of dissident political groups in Korea.¹⁰ This view was communicated to the United States embassy in London.¹¹ In the middle of February press reports indicated that the Soviet Union was advancing with the formation of a government in north Korea to be supported by a north Korean army. This pointed to the likelihood of the withdrawal of Soviet troops soon. The British assessment was that the United States had no long-term interest in Korea and had no scheme to extend sufficient economic or military aid to render a south Korean administration viable: 'It is probably therefore the American intention to pull out herself, as soon as she has found face-saving formula for doing so.'¹²

8. Seoul to FO, 13 Jan. 1948, F682/511/81/G, FO 371/69937.

9. New York (UK delegation) to FO, 11 Feb. 1948, F2280/511/81, ibid.

10. Minute by MacDermot, F2631/511/81, FO 371/69938.

11. FO to New York, 13 Feb. 1948, ibid.

12. Minute by MacDermot, F2631/511/81, FO 371/69938.

The decision of the Interim Committee that supervision of elections should proceed left UNTCOK with the task of indicating basic guidelines to the military government. The members of UNTCOK met American and Korean officials and travelled throughout south Korea. However, the supervision was of an extremely cursory nature: there were only thirty non-Koreans involved in observation over an area of approximately 40,000 square miles (100,000 sq. km) with a population of twenty million.¹³ As Evan Luard has remarked, this was in stark contrast to the thorough supervision provided by the League of Nations for the Saar plebiscite in 1935 when 1,000 neutral observers operated.¹⁴ Meanwhile in the United States important decisions were taken, which established the essentials of American policy in south Korea to the outbreak of the Korean War. The National Security Council (NSC) submitted a report to President Truman on 2 April 1948 reviewing the situation in Korea and recommending the principles that should govern future policy. The choices facing the administration were to acquiesce in Soviet domination of Korea, to provide aid for south Korea without assuming excessive commitments, or to provide a full guarantee of defence and support for south Korea. The first possibility was discounted:

13. Luard, History of the UN, vol. 1, p. 235.

14. Ibid.

The extension of Soviet control over all of Korea would enhance the political and strategic position of the Soviet Union with respect to both China and Japan, and adversely affect the position of the US in those areas and throughout the Far East. Unless the US, upon withdrawal, left sufficient indigenous military strength to enable south Korea to defend itself against any but an overt act of aggression, US withdrawal could be interpreted as a betrayal by the US of its friends and allies in the Far East and might well lead to a fundamental realignment of the forces in favour of the Soviet Union throughout that part of the world.¹⁵

15. FRUS 1948 (6), p. 1167, Souers to Truman, 2 Apr. 1948.

Furthermore the authority of the UN was involved and this would be undermined by a Soviet-inspired invasion of south Korea. At the same time American global responsibilities were such that it was not feasible to give an unlimited guarantee to south Korea. The best policy would be a middle approach whereby economic and military aid was provided for south Korea in the hope that this could give sufficient strength for the regime to survive.¹⁶ This demonstrated the uneasy nature of American policy from 1948 to 1950 - clear that south Korea was not essential to American strategy against the Soviet Union but equally unable to accept that south Korea might go communist. Most observers believed that south Korea would eventually be unified by north Korea with die support or at the instigation of the Soviet Union. While this deduction was logical, it ignored the repercussions for American prestige and for the authority of the UN for the unification of Korea on a communist basis. This dilemma was starkly perceived in June 1950 and answered in a way directly contrary to that anticipated so widely in the spring of 1948. Truman accepted the report's recommendations and instructed that withdrawal of American forces should commence.

16. Ibid., p. 1169.

In south Korea the preparations for the elections took place in a tempestuous, acrimonious atmosphere. Tension along the 38th parallel had been serious for some months: General Hodge informed the joint chiefs of staff in January 1948 that both the south Korean police and north Korean border guards were engaged in sporadic attacks on one another. Some of the Korean rightists provoked incidents and Hodge intended watching matters carefully:

In view of the Korean love for fighting, although we have no proof it is safe to assume that some of the North Korean attacks are in retaliation of South Korean attacks. I am renewing my efforts to be sure that these incidents are not instigated by South Koreans.¹⁷

17. Hodge to JCS, 15 Jan. 1948, RG 9, box 89, Formosa File, MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, Va.

Political rivalry was intense in the south with Syngman Rhee making the running in censuring his rivals and in attacking the military government. Rhee condemned Hodge for not understanding the strength of the Korean wish for independence and for unity. Hodge recognised that his position had become untenable and wrote to Mac Arthur proposing that he be replaced within six to eight weeks. He explained that he was definitely persona non grata with Rhee and that the latter would bring in his 'carpetbaggers' if he won the election, meaning Rhee's supporters in the United States, Hawaii and China. Given Rhee's vindictiveness, it would be counter-productive for Hodge to remain.¹⁸ Hodge was replaced by General John B. Coulter, the next most senior officer in Korea. W. Walton Butterworth had already written that 'acute personal animosity between General Hodge and Dr. Rhee, considered in conjunction with the fact that the latter is expected to emerge as the dominant figure, if not the titular head of the new government in south Korea', rendered Hodge's departure inevitable.¹⁹

18. Personal letter from Hodge to MacArthur, 17 May 1948, RG 9, box 148, ibid.

19. FRUS 1948 (6), p. 1193, memorandum by Butterworth for Marshall and Lovett, 11 May 1948.

Creation of the ROK

The hostility of the military government to some members of UNTCOK was unchanged. Jacobs alleged that the Canadian and Australian delegates were trying to sabotage the election because they were interested in a north Korean decision to convene a conference in Pyongyang for all Korean politicians concerned with unification.²⁰ Jacobs and Hodge believed there was a communist group in UNTCOK, encouraged by Jackson and Patterson, working to promote the failure of the UN efforts and to ensure that south Korea fell into the Soviet sphere.²¹ The elections in south Korea were held amid charges of corruption, intimidation, impersonation and the familiar concomitants of the supposedly democratic processes. The outcome was a victory for the rightists, notably Rhee's NSRRKI and the KDP. A qualified judgement was submitted by UNTCOK: the results were accepted as valid in those areas visited by members of the commission but UNTCOK did not recognise the assembly as a national assembly, which could lead to the formation of a national government.²² Rhee was elected as chairman of the assembly and formed a government claiming to represent the whole of Korea. A constitution for the Republic of Korea (ROK) was approved on 12 July;, this stated that the ROK represented all of Korea. On 15 July Rhee was elected President of the new state. Withdrawal of American troops was prepared by 19 May in fulfilment of Truman's decision that 'Every effort should be made to Create conditions for the withdrawal of occupation forces by 31 December 1948'.²³ Most members of the UN willing to contemplate recognition of South Korea (ROK) felt that UNTCOK's report must be considered by the General Assembly before a decision was reached on recognition. In Washington the preliminaries for recognition were being compleied. Walton Butterworth noted that a constitution had been adopted, a president and a vice-president elected, and the formal launching of the state would occur shortly. The thinking in the State Department was that a statement should be issued shortly, confirming that the ROK was regarded as the government of Korea in accordance with past resolutions of the UN General Assembly. A special representative would be sent to Seoul to negotiate the transfer of functions from the military government to the ROK.²⁴ It was decided that an able career diplomat of wide experience, John J. Muccio, should be the representative and subsequently ambassador.²⁵ President Truman approved the extension of uninterrupted economic assistance to the ROK: this would continue under the aegis of the Department of the Army until the Administrator of Economic Cooperation was ready to assume responsibility.²⁶ Rhee wanted economic and military assistance and did not wish American troops to be withdrawn, given internal instability and the threat of a North Korean invasion.²⁷

20. Ibid., p. 1180, Jacobs to Marshall, 22 Apr. 1948.

21. Ibid., p. 1198, Jacobs to Marshall, 13 May 1948.

22. Luard, History of the UN, vol. 1, pp. 235—6.

23. FRUS 1948 (6), p. 1225, Royall to Marshall, 23 June 1948.

24. Ibid., p. 1248, memorandum by Butterworth to Lovett, 20 July 1948.

25. Ibid., pp. 1264—5, memorandum from Lovett to Truman, 28 July 1948.

26. Ibid., pp. 1288-9, memorandum from Truman to Marshall, 25 Aug. 1948.

27. Ibid., pp. 1308-10, memorandum from Lovett on conversation with Rhee's special representative, Chough Pyon Ok, 23 Sept. 1948.

The UN General Assembly resumed its consideration of Korea in October 1948. The report of UNTCOK was submitted and decisions taken thereon. In a position paper for the American delegation it was stated that the United States should support early withdrawal of occupying forces; that steps should be urged to remove barriers between the two parts of Korea and that Korean unification be advanced through North Korean participation in the ROK; and that UNTCOK should be reconstructed as a permanent body.²⁸ Developments in recent months were reported to the General Assembly by UNTCOK. The government of the ROK was considered capable of performing the customary functions of a government and to offer the prospect of eventual unification, particularly through fostering economic links. Negotiations between the ROK and North Korea prior to withdrawal of American and Soviet forces were firmly advocated by UNTCOK. The Soviet Union had announced on 19 September that the evacuation of Russian forces would be completed by the end of December 194-8. The General Assembly ignored the points of qualification in UNTCOK's report and passed a resolution recognising the ROK and accepting the outcome of the elections held in May. The departure of occupying forces was recommended and a new commission, the UN Commission on Korea (UNCOK), was set up as a permanent body charged with helping to attain unification. The resolution was ambiguous in not making it clear whether the ROK was being recognised as 'South Korea' or as the government of the whole of Korea. Members of the UN were invited in the resolution to recognise the ROK. Predictably the Soviet Union vetoed the South Korean application to join the UN but the ROK joined other significant organisations in 1949, including the World Health Organisation and the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.²⁹ A North Korean application to join the UN was rejected; UNCOK was in just as invidious a position as UNTCOK except that South Korea had now been given a degree of recognition denied to North Korea. The efforts of UNCOK to intervene in internal matters were rejected by Rhee. The deterioration of relations between the two Korean states diminished any faint hopes of securing a compromise and Rhee ruled out using trade to improve contacts, UNCOK being left to reflect on the unstable internal situation and the combustible nature of the border along the 38th parallel. The danger of serious conflict occurring on the border was anticipated in a motion proposed by the United States and carried in the General Assembly in 1949 authorising UNCOK to observe developments on the border and to report back on clashes that could give rise to war.³⁰ Observation posts were established by UNCOK and important reports were to be forwarded in June 1950, as will be seen in Chapter 7.

28. Ibid., pp. 1315-17, United States delegation position paper, 22 Oct. 1948.

29. Luard, History of the UN, vol. 1, p. 237.

30. Ibid., p. 238.

Establishment of the DPRK

Now to consider the establishment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the character of the state as it developed between 1948 and 1950. Communism was solidly established in north Korea by the beginning of 1948, although there was considerable rivalry between different factions. The Soviet Union saw no need to remain in military terms and appears to have thought it was merely a matter of time before communism was extended to the southern half of the peninsula. Preparations were advanced for the establishment of a government claiming, as did the regime in the south, to represent all of Korea. A conference of the North Korean People's Council met in July 1948 and approved the proposed constitution. Kang Yang Wook, chief secretary of the council, spoke to the assembled delegates and according to the intercept of a broadcast on Radio Pyongyang said:

This is one of the most historical events to the Korean people, who have been fighting against the American imperialists and their reactionary and treacherous collaborators who plot to colonize Korea. It has brought the Korean people to a new hope. The Constitution is put into enforcement, and then the supreme People's Council shall be established with the representatives who will be elected by general election which shall be carried out by the provisions of the Constitution. As you all know, the American imperialists carried out the ruinous separate election and organised the so-called National Assembly with the support of the traitor minority and with savage oppression upon the majority of the South Korean people. However, all Korean people never recognised the so-called National Assembly and will never recognise it. So at this grave moment we have come to establish a supreme people's council which can represent all the Korean People and include representatives from all the classes of the Korean people.³¹

31. Radio intercept, Radio Pyongyang, 1900 (I), 10 July 1948, Headquarters XXIV Corps, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, enclosed in letter from Holt to MacDermot, 15 July 1948, F10201/29/81, FO 371/69936.

Kim Il Sung presented a report in which he deplored the division of Korea, which was itself attributable to the machinations of the Americans. North Korea had made immense progress with the assistance of the Soviet Union. Stalin had observed, when the treaty between the Soviet Union and Finland was signed, that Russia believed in true equality between states regardless of respective might. This had been proved in the relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang since 1945. By contrast, the United States had assisted traitors and reactionaries and had violated the Moscow agreement of December 1945. The people of North Korea were happy and contented; the people of South Korea in reality supported the north but were prevented by the Americans and Rhee's cronies from expressing their real opinions. The workers and peasants of South Korea were not represented in the governing structure. The constitution connoted the just aspirations of the Korean people and the yearning for the unification of the nation.³²

32. Ibid.

The British Foreign Office analysed the constitution of North Korea and compared it with the constitutions of other communist states. The constitution contained a great deal that was familiar but also differences. There were indications that some articles had been taken from the Soviet Union's constitution but there was little evidence of other constitutions having been consulted except, curiously, for the Meiji constitution in Japan. However, the latter's impact was extremely superficial and could be explained on the grounds of the familiarity of Koreans 'with the laws of their quondam masters'.³³ The essence of the Soviet constitution was incorporated, some features having been compressed and others expanded. The constitution was intended to fulfil a propaganda role in attracting support in the south in the sense of emphasising the dedication of North Korea to radical reform and nationalism.

33. Memorandum by R. S. Milward, FO Research Department, 'The constitution of North Korea', 10 Oct. 1948, F15019/29/81, FO 371/699936.

Kim Il Sung visits Moscow

The leading members of the government of the DPRK were Kim II Sung and Pak Hon-yong; Pak was'simultaneously Foreign Minister and leader of the South Korean Workers Party (SKWP). Pak's presence strengthened the argument for regarding the government as representing the whole of Korea and underlined the hopes that Korean unification could be achieved through a major rebellion in the south. The turbulent history of much of South Korea since 1945 suggested the likelihood of this eventuality and was further strengthed by the bloody fighting in Cheju island in October 1948, which will be discussed below. Much obscurity surrounds the views within the North Korean leadership and what exactly were the perceptions of the probable evolution of politics in the south. Pak Hon-yong needed to bolster his own role in the North Korean government and the maintenance of a revolutionary spirit in the south would assist that objective.³⁴ The revolutionary impetus was declining, however, in 1949-50 amid the harsh repression by the South Korean government. North Korea was forced more upon itself as a result of American success in manipulating UN recognition of the ROK. The Soviet Union endorsed the leadership of Kim Il Sung and, to some extent, Stalin encouraged Kim's ambition to unify Korea: a Soviet Foreign Ministry assessment, written in 1966, stated that Kim desired to achieve a unified Korean state as early as 1948.³⁵ Kim visited Moscow in March 1949, accompanied by five colleagues, including Pak Hon-yong. Kim met Molotov and then Stalin in the course of his visit, which lasted for two weeks. An economic and cultural agreement was signed. Bruce Cumings has commented that 'the agreement was neither generous nor equal'.³⁶ The DPRK had to pay interest on a loan of 220 million rubles (loans concluded between the Soviet Union and Poland and between the Soviet Union and China in 1950 were on more advantageous terms). No mutual defence pact was signed. It would appear that Kim did not visit the Soviet Union again during 1949.³⁷ There are indications from Soviet sources that Stalin may have been apprehensive that the DPRK might prove vulnerable to military action started by the ROK but he was not prepared to promise support for Kim's ambition to unify Korea in March 1949.³⁸ The intepretation advanced by Goncharov, Lewis and Xue confirms the view put forward by Bruce Cumings that Kim Il Sung was an able leader who revealed considerable skill in exploiting the complex relationship between Stalin and Mao Tse-tung, as the CCP swept to victory in China in 1949.³⁹

34. See John Merrill, 'Internal warfare in Korea, 1948-1950: the local setting of the Korean War', in Bruce Cumings (ed.), Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1953 (London, 1983), pp. 158-61.

35. S. N. Goncharov, J. W. Lewis and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War (Stanford, Calif., 1994), pp. 136-7.

36. Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 2, The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 (Princeton, NJ, 1990), p. 345.

37. The nature of the evidence surrounding Kim's actual and alleged visits to Moscow has been reviewed by Goncharov, Lewis and Xue: see Uncertain Partners, pp. 137-8. See also Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York, 1994), pp. 86-7 and N. S. Khruschev, Khruschev Remembers (London, 1971), pp. 367-9.

38. Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Uncertain Partners, p. 140.

39. Ibid., p. 146.

Between 1948 and 1950 the Soviet Union helped in building the armed strength of North Korea to a powerful level. Regular intelligence assessments of North Korean strength were prepared by different American agencies: with varying results. John J. Muccio informed Washington in November 1948 that military intelligence pointed to North Korea defeating South Korea in the event of war occurring.⁴⁰ There were frequent rumours of North Korean invasion plans down to June 1950. A British estimate a year later, based largely on intelligence from American sources, concluded that North Korea would triumph in an encounter from which other countries were excluded. The Foreign Office requested an assessment from the War Office in December 1949 to clarify or confirm the analysis the Foreign Office had made of the respective strength of the two sides. The War Office wrote:

40. FRUS 1948 (6), pp. 1325-7, Muccio to Marshall, 12 Nov. 1948.

In the past it had always been our view that irrespective of strengths the North Korean forces would have little difficulty in dealing effectively with the forces of South Korea should full scale hostilities break out. This somewhat naturally (since they raised, equipped and trained South Korean forces) was not the American view. Recently, however, they have been coming round to our way of thinking regarding the capabilities of the respective forces.

... On the question of aggression by the North, there can be no doubt whatever that their ultimate object is to overrun the South; and I think in the long term there is little doubt that they will do so, in which case, as you so aptly remark, the Americans will have made a rather handsome contribution of equipment to the military strength of Asiatic Communism, As to their method of achieving their object, short of World War III beginning, I think they will adopt the well tried tactics of preparing the country from within rather than resort to open aggression, although 'frontier incidents' will doubtless continue.⁴¹

41. Letter from Major J. R. Ferguson Innes, War Office, to E. J. F. Scott, 30 Dec. 1949, FK1016/2, FO 371/84076.

It seemed to be the case that three divisions and one tank regiment had returned to Korea from Manchuria but this could not be verified. Approximately 80,000 to 100,000 Korean troops (the Korean Volunteer Army) had from time to time been reported as serving in Manchuria with the communist armies but it was difficult to ascertain actual strengths. It was believed that Russia maintained a 'military mission' numbering around 3,000 in North Korea. American policy was described in terms very similar to those applied by the Foreign Office to American policy in China in 1947-49:

Regarding American policy, if in fact one exists, towards South Korea, I can only say we know little, and of their future intentions even less. Their military advisors' group consists, we believe, of 300 and the emphasis is on 'advisory'.

Whilst being in no doubt about future North Korean (or Soviet plans) [sic] regarding South Korea we think an invasion is unlikely in the immediate view; however, if it did take place, I think it improbable that the Americans would become involved. The possession of South Korea is not essential for Allied strategic plans, and though it would obviously be desirable to deny it to the enemy, it would not be of sufficient importance to make it the cause of World War III. Meanwhile, we must accept an uneasy status quo and hope for the best.⁴²

42. Ibid.

The most threatening feature of the development of the North Korean armed forces lay in air power. The Soviet Union gave appreciable assistance in cultivating a significant air strength, in contrast to the United States, which concentrated solely on the army in the south, ruling out aid in the air and naval spheres. An American air intelligence report in February 1950 summarised the trend in so far as this could be ascertained. The report stated that early in 1949 information indicated that an air regiment had been created in North Korea. It was believed to be based at Pyongyang and to comprise approximately 800 personnel and 36 Soviet trainers plus obsolete Japanese planes. Koreans were being sent to the Soviet Union for air crew training and were sent back to North Korea when their efficiency had reached a satisfactory level. Intelligence suggested that personnel had recently returned and there had been a significant increase in the number of aircraft seen and in the locations at which they had been sighted. The original thirty-six aircraft had been increased or replaced by about thirty-six Soviet fighter aircraft. The latter were thought to be Yak-9s, considered 'one of the USSR's better conventional fighters, which compares well with USAF's F-51'.⁴³ The precise number of personnel was not known but was estimated as high as 1,500. The air unit was commanded by Senior Colonel Wang Yon, who had served in Manchuria and graduated from a Soviet military academy as an air force lieutenant in the Soviet army; he had been in North Korea since 1945. The chief of staff was believed to be Colonel Lee Hwal, who had been educated in Japan; he was thought to be responsible for the organisation of the North Korean air force. Evidence pointing to the expansion of the North Korean air force included construction of airfields in five different locations. North Korea thus possessed a line of airfields from coast to coast with four close to the 38th parallel. The location of the airfields was not logical if they were intended for defensive purposes. 'They are, however, so located as to place North Korean aircraft in decidedly advantageous positions for offensive air action against South Korea.'⁴⁴ The morale of the air force was at first excellent, this being achieved through provision of better rations and other privileges. It was believed that morale had recently declined and that only firm Soviet and North Korean police rule was preventing defections. The report summarised the position thus:

43. Air Intelligence Information Report, 'Review of North Korean air power and its potentialities', 28 Feb. 1950 (based on information received by 11 Feb. 1950), Headquarters, Far East Air Forces, APO 925, State Department records, 795.00/1-750, RG59, box 4682, National Archives, Washington.

44. Ibid.

The North Korean Air Force is daily becoming more potent. Both psychologically and as an actual threat it weighs heavily on the minds of the South Koreans. If not now, it will soon be capable of achieving complete air superiority over south of the 38th Parallel, and of materially assisting the North Korean ground forces should they attempt to move into South Korea.⁴⁵

45. Ibid.

While too much emphasis should not be placed upon it, intelligence pointed to the offensive capacity of North Korea being strengthened.

The American embassy in Seoul analysed current trends within the North Korea Workers Party (NKWP) at the beginning of 1950; it was based on various embassy records and on interrogations of refugees from North Korea. The NKWP was the heart of the complex of 'political parties' and 'social organizations' in North Korea, all of which were communist-controlled; the same applied to the 'facades' of the DNF and the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification of the Fatherland (DFUF). Membership of the NKWP was estimated at nearly 700,000 in a pyramidal structure at the base of which 'is an enormous mass of virtually illiterate farmers, numbering perhaps half a million, as well as about 180,000 uneducated factory workers'.⁴⁶ The party was controlled by a small group of Soviet-trained communists; a few leading figures had been in Yenan. Near the summit of the pyramid was a category of semi-educated members numbering a few thousand occupying subordinate positions: most of these were previously non-political residents or nationals of the Soviet Union or had links with the Chinese communists. The dominant elements were certainly the Soviet ones with the Yenan communists second and the 'native communists' having little influence. The NKWP exhibited the familiar signs of 'inflexible bureaucracy', which inhibited advancement. No evidence could be detected of significant schisms or 'nationalistic tendencies'. This observation was misleading on both counts. A continuous purge was pursued in order to rid the NKWP of those lacking genuine commitment. The NKWP had been formed in August 1946 with the unification of the Korean Communist Party and the Yenan Independence Alliance; numerous small left-wing parties were absorbed at that time or subsequently. The NKWP's sister party in the south, the SKWP, had suffered serious reverses in 1949 at the hands of the Rhee government and was no longer the force it had once been. Rumours proliferated of disagreements between the leaders of the NKWP and SKWP and these were justified. The NKWP controlled the Democratic People's Front, which existed to present a 'democratic' facade for communist dictation and to ensure that North Koreans felt part of the political life of the state. In addition, there was the DFUF. This had been established in August 1949 in part to promote the arguments for unification under the direction of Pyongyang. The DFUF also fulfilled a strategic function in organising military training for Koreans of both sexes between the ages of sixteen and thirty. The report concluded that the Soviet Union and not the NKWP connoted the reality of power - 'The NKWP is merely an instrument of Soviet control over the northern half of the peninsula.'⁴⁷ The vigour and enthusiasm of the CCP were conspicuously absent in the NKWP. This report is interesting for the stress placed on the subservience of the NKWP to the Kremlin:

46. Drumright to Acheson, 'Current conditions and trends within the North Korea Labour Party', 7 Jan. 1950, ibid.

47. Ibid.

The power delegated by the USSR to the NKWP resides in a small elite leadership of Soviet-sponsored professional revolutionaries who rule the party's relatively enormous, illiterate, mass membership with customary Communist discipline. That the party has little popular support, even within its own ranks, is shown by the fact that it is purging its own educated 'native' members who might voice discontent over the party's subservience to Soviet Russia .. .⁴⁸

48. Ibid.

The belief that the NKWP possessed little if any independence and was a vehicle for the implementation of Soviet foreign policy was held by most American officials, including George Kennan, and was illustrated in the reactions to the events of 25 June 1950.

The Soviet press celebrated the first anniversary (March 1950) of the signing of the agreement for economic and cultural cooperation between the Soviet Union and North Korea with much emphasis. Maslonikov wrote in Pravda that the DPRK had made huge strides with the aid of the USSR. Economic progress was particularly noteworthy:

Thanks to the enthusiasm of the workers and the widespread emulation movement in the sphere of production, the two year plan for the development of national economy is being successfully fulfilled ...

The 1949 plan, that of the first year of the two year plan, was fulfilled by industry as a whole by 103 per cent. Old engineering plants have been repaired and new ones built. In the two years from 1946 to 1948 industrial output as a whole increased 2.6 times, but the output from engineering works increased 6.6 times. In 1949 engineering took a big step forward.⁴⁹

49. Soviet Monitor, 17 Mar. 1950.

The agrarian reform had done much to improve the efficiency of agriculture and to ameliorate living standards among the peasantry. Unemployment, 'the terrible curse of capitalism', had been eliminated and the wages of workers were rising.

In Izvestia Tavrov wrote in similar vein that the agreements of March 1949 had strengthened the cause of peace in the Far East and throughout the world. The DPRK had won international recognition through the diplomatic relations established with the Soviet Union, the Chinese People's Republic and other countries representing 'people's democracy' in Europe and Asia, including the German Democratic Republic. Tavrov compared the achievements of North Korea with the failures in South Korea, remarking that the American imperialists had made strenuous efforts to handicap the independent, democratic spirit of the Korean people:

Their policy is aimed at making the Southern part of the country a colony without rights and a military strategic springboard for the United States. It was precisely for this purpose that the United States Government obstructed the carrying out of the Moscow Agreement on Korea, which envisaged the speediest creation of an independent Korean democratic State;

Under cover of the so-called United Nations Commission for Korea, American ruling circles set up a puppet 'Government' under the traitor Syngman Rhee, who traded away the independence and national wealth. The collapse of national industry, increased unemployment, a continuous worsening of the economic position of the working people and bloodthirsty terror - these are the results of American rule in Southern Korea.⁵⁰

50. Ibid.

Rhee and his followers had tried to liquidate the guerrilla movement in the south but had failed. The democratic approach inherent in the guerrilla movement would triumph ultimately. The principles of Stalinist foreign policy would ensure continued support for the just aspirations of the Korean people:

The Korean people have a loyal, disinterested and great friend in the Soviet Union. Soviet-Korean friendship and economic cooperation is developing and growing stronger for the good of the peoples of Korea and the Soviet Union, thus promoting the strengthening of universal peace and international cooperation.⁵¹

51. Ibid.

Kim Il Sung reciprocated in an article warmly praising Soviet help before and after the agreement of 17 March 1949. Soviet aid had put North Korea on a vigorous and successful course for the future:

Thanks to the constant assistance of the Soviet Union and the selfless labour of the Korean people in the restoration of their country on a democratic basis, the Northern Part of our Republic has developed into a powerful military, political, economic and cultural base for the democratic development of the whole country, and has considerably raised the level of material and cultural life of the people of our young Republic.⁵²

52. Soviet Monitor, 22 Mar. 1950.

The Soviet Union had furnished machines, materials and raw materials essential for the growth of industry and had sent specialists to advise on economic developments. The economic attainments of North Korea were compared favourably with the poor results in the south; the latter had been adversely affected by the 'barbarous and plundering policy of the Americans'.⁵³ The political realities of the division of Korea made the Korean people appreciate all the more the value of the assistance provided by the Soviet Union:

53. Ibid.

The consolidation of the eternal and unshakeable friendship formed between the Soviet and Korean peoples, thanks to the liberation and assistance by the Soviet Union will further strengthen the international democratic camp and will make a valuable contribution to the struggle against the aggressive imperialists, the instigators of a new war.⁵⁴

54. Ibid.

Instability in the ROK

Finally we turn to South Korea, to examine the political, economic and strategic situation between 1948 and 1950. Syngman Rhee had established a strong but not invincible position in 1948. He was the most tenacious politician in South Korea and an adroit manipulator but lacking in popularity. John J. Muccio, the first ambassador to the ROK, knew Rhee well and appreciated the President's strengths and weaknesses. In retirement, Muccio recalled that Rhee was very intelligent, determined and assertive; he had reached the top at a late age and was too set in his ways, his attitude having been determined by his lengthy period in exile, amid the seemingly forlorn struggle to save Korea from Japanese colonialism. When Rhee was in a logical frame of mind, he showed an excellent historical perspective, but when he became emotional he became particularly awkward to deal with. Rhee was highly autocratic yet claimed to represent the desire for genuine democracy in Korea.⁵⁵ He was concerned with consolidating his own power base, building up the strength of his regime, securing American economic and military assistance, and with achieving the unification of Korea under his leadership: this would be the crowning attainment of his long struggle. The omens for the new state were not encouraging in the first months of its existence. Muccio reported in November 1948 that economic developments were disturbing, with inflation reaching worrying proportions. Politically the situation was contentious and Rhee had not shown the correct touch in tackling domestic problems. It was possible that this ineptitude revealed incipient senility. Corruption was a serious problem and the success of the Chinese communists had made people feel jittery.

55. Muccio Oral History, interview between John J. Muccio and Jerry N. Hess, recorded 18 Feb. 1971, copy in Truman Library, Independence, Missouri. Through the generous assistance of Mr Richard Finn, I met Ambassador Muccio in Washington on 15 March 1982 when he kindly expanded on various aspects of his service in Seoul. This was most helpful for clarifying my understanding of American perspectives and of Rhee as a personality.

There was much anxiety as to how South Korea would cope when American troops were withdrawn. Internal disaffection was significant in certain areas, accentuated by communist infiltration. Fear of a North Korean invasion was real and military intelligence indicated the probability of North Korean success if they attacked.⁵⁶ During 1948 unrest in South Korea reached its most serious level since the autumn harvest uprisings of 1946. A major rebellion started on Cheju island on 3 April 1948 with guerrillas advancing into coastal towns from their bases on the higher volcanic summit of the island.⁵⁷ The timing was explicable because of the vigorous SKWP campaign against separate elections. The conflict was peculiarly bloody with both sides responsible for committing atrocities. Extra police and groups of rightists went to Cheju-do to assist in restoring order. American naval and air units acted to deter the rebels. The fighting diminished after the elections but developed again in October 1948 and January 1949. It has been estimated that the Cheju rebellion involved 30,000 deaths, approximately 10 per cent of the population.⁵⁸ The guerrillas fought fiercely and effectively. The nature of the rebellion is explained by the social character of the island with a cohesive clan structure and social solidarity; the leaders included radicals who had returned from Japan and schoolteachers. The SKWP had a number of loyal supporters including some among the local police. John Merrill has concluded that the rebellion was probably not the result of conspiracy but rather of the geographical remoteness of the island, the tenuous nature of government authority, and ancient grievances against Seoul.⁵⁹ On 19 October 1948 the Yosu rebellion occurred when police about to be sent to Cheju-do rebelled. Communist infiltration of the police was clearly shown in the mutiny.⁶⁰ It is likely that about 3,000 people, divided roughly equally between supporters and opponents of the rebellion, perished.⁶¹

56. Muccio to Marshall, 13 Nov. 1948, forwarded by Coulter, RG9, box 175, MacArthur Memorial.

57. See Merrill, 'Internal warfare', in Cumings (ed.), Child of Conflict, p. 141.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid., p. 142.

60. Ibid., pp. 143-4.

61. Ibid., p. 144.

Thereafter guerrilla activity gradually subsided and the most dangerous period faced by South Korea from the viewpoint of internal unrest had been surmounted. Rhee combated dissension with a mixture of harsh suppression, new security provisions and drastic purges of dubious elements in the police force. The American embassy in Seoul reviewed the history of guerrilla activity over the past few years in April 1950. The embassy used intelligence provided by the Korean police, army and the American military mission (KMAG G-2]; Korean assessments had been analysed by American military advisers. Guerrilla forces were considered to have reached their highest point numerically in September 1949 when approximately 3,000 to 3,200 were operating. Korean police and army operations had succeeded in reducing guerrilla strength by March 1950 to approximately 400. However, more guerrillas had been sent from North Korea in March 1950 and the number had tripled. The ROK army had proved effective in assailing the infiltrators and guerrilla strength on 12 April 1950 was put at about 577. The worst-affected province was Kangwon. The South Korean army anticipated that an attack might be launched by North Korea to support guerrilla units in the Taebaek-san area. The vital section for the south to defend was the left flank, which protected the routes to Seoul and Inchon. The right flank was less well defended and the nature of the terrain complicated defences. At present guerrilla activity was reported in Kyongji province, north and south Chung-chong provinces and on the island of Cheju. Russian advisers had been involved in border incidents but there was no evidence that they had advanced south of the 38th parallel. Russian weapons were rarely found south of the border and the guerrillas used mainly Japanese and American weapons. The Japanese weapons were derived from old stocks and the American weapons had originally been supplied to the Kuomintang forces in China, had been captured by the Chinese communists, and then passed to North Korea.

Guerrilla activity was supposedly concentrated, according to Pyongyang radio, on 'vicious landlords', 'puppet Rhee's country-ruining gang', the 'puppet army' and the 'puppet Police'.⁶² In reality guerrilla action was largely indiscriminate with sporadic attacks on the occasional landlord, local official, or police post. Ordinary farmers bore the brunt of guerrilla actions. Guerrilla strength was restricted to certain mountainous regions and they had proved singularly incapable of retaining control of'liberated areas'. Guerrillas from North Korea possessed excellent morale and were thoroughly indoctrinated in communist aims; there were few desertions and a strong bond of loyalty existed among guerrillas. They were young, usually between seventeen and twenty-five years of age. In the opinion of qualified American observers the South Korean assessment of guerrilla strength was convincing. The evidence pointed to a sharp decline in guerrilla prowess. Police and army behaviour and tactics had been improved to some extent, especially in appreciating the need for reform policies rather than simple oppression. Police and army now worked more closely together without the quarrels which had hindered operations in the past. A guerrilla reserve of approximately 3,000 was deemed to exist in North Korea. Vigilance on the border had been stepped up and large-scale infiltration should be extremely difficult. At the same time limited guerrilla activity would continue indefinitely. It was concluded that North Korean strategy was 'synonymous with Soviet strategy' and that if North Korea did not push a guerrilla campaign further, it was because this did not assist the Soviet Union.⁶³ While exaggerating some of the successes of the South Korean forces, the report was correct in bringing out the decline of guerrilla activity and the difficulties of transforming guerrilla operations into a major threat to the existence of the government in Seoul.

62. Drumright to Acheson, 15 Apr. 1950, 'Guerrilla strength and activity', State Department records, 795.00/4—1550, RG59, box 4682, National Archives, Washington.

63. Ibid.

The policy of the United States regarding the defence of South Korea was to continue in 1949 with the withdrawal of American troops so that the process was completed by 30 June 1949. Economic and military aid would be furnished to render the ROK government capable of defending itself but without being very explicit as to what this meant. The NSC reviewed Korean policy in March 1949 in very similar terms to NSC 8, approved in April 1948. Once again the dilemma of maintaining the independence of South Korea without involving the United States in an open-ended commitment was examined. Once more the conclusion was that a middle policy was appropriate. All American forces would be withdrawn by 30 June 1949. An American military advisory group should be established formally, taking over from the provisional group already in existence. Congress should be asked to continue economic and military aid with the objective of achieving a well-trained, efficient army of 65,000 men, including air detachments adequate for maintaining political order inside South Korea, a coastguard of 4,000 men, and a police force of 35,000 possessing small arms and ammunition. 'In publicly announcing the withdrawal of its remaining occupation forces from Korea, the US should make it unmistakably clear that this step in no way constitutes a lessening of US support of the Government of the Republic of Korea, but constitutes rather another step towards the regularisation by the US of its relations with that Government and a fulfilment on the part of the US of the relevant provision of the UN GA Resolution [UN General Assembly] of December 12, 1948.'⁶⁴ This sentence admirably encapsulates the ambiguities in American policy. The ROK armed forces were to be developed so as to be capable of handling internal dissent but the issue as to its capacity for reacting effectively to North Korea was side-stepped. The ambiguity was the product of two factors: unwillingness to pay for larger armed forces and doubts as to the policy of South Korea itself. With reference to the former, Congress was unlikely to pour out vast sums of money for Korea. As regards the latter, Rhee had stated on many occasions that Korea must be reunited; given his advanced age, the President might well be tempted to accomplish this sooner rather than later. It would be dangerous to supply too much to South Korea since Rhee could not be trusted to behave responsibly if he possessed powerful forces.

64. FRUS 1949 (7, part 2), p. 978, NSC report, NSC 8/2, 22 Mar. 1949.

The Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, warned the American mission in Seoul on 13 April 1949 that information had been received from a source believed to be reliable to the effect that serious trouble might arise in Korea within two months and that the initiative in these developments would be taken by South Korea.⁶⁵ It was necessary to exercise a restraining hand in Seoul while proceeding with the programme recommended by the NSC and accepted by President Truman. In late April 1949 the decision was taken to establish an augmented Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) to function as part of the American mission in Korea with responsibility for the training mission so far undertaken by the provisional military advisory group. It would be headed by Brigadier-General W. L. Roberts, currently commanding general of United States army forces in Korea.⁶⁶ Syngman Rhee was dissatisfied with American policy, which was insufficiently supportive, and he told Muccio that South Korea should be included within an essential American defence line.⁶⁷ Rhee issued a press statement raising publicly whether South Korea could rely on American assistance in the event of North Korean aggression.⁶⁸ This touched a raw nerve and Muccio was instructed immediately to see Rhee and protest at this 'grave breach [of] ordinary diplomatic courtesy'.⁶⁹ Such criticism of American policy would be counterproductive; the claims on the United States for economic and military assistance were so great that only a limited amount could be given to Korea. Under pressure from Muccio, Rhee qualified his previous remarks in a further public statement. He stressed that South Korea desired the formation of a Pacific pact analogous to the Atlantic pact; agreement between the United States and the ROK alone, or with some other nations, for mutual defence against aggressor nations; and a public declaration by the United States of a pledge to defend a reunited, democratic, independent Korea, in accordance with the policy enunciated in the Truman Doctrine. South Korea was prepared to fight alone if necessary.⁷⁰ The reference to a Pacific pact was to developing contacts between Rhee, Chiang Kai-shek and President Quirino of the Philippines to encourage the formation of an anticommunist front to be guaranteed by the United States. Chiang wished to bolster his tottering regime in Taiwan and hoped to secure bases in South Korea from which his forces could launch sporadic attacks on Communist China. Chiang also sounded out Rhee on the possibility of basing his regime in South Korea in the event of Taiwan falling. Chiang visited Seoul and was to be followed by other Kuomintang emissaries until June 1950. This is an interesting if murky subject, which will be examined further in Chapters 5 and 7.

65. Ibid., pp. 987-8, Acheson to American Mission, 13 Apr. 1949.

66. Ibid., p. 997, Acheson to Muccio, 28 Apr. 1949.

67. Ibid., p. 1005, memorandum by Muccio, 2 May 1949.

68. Ibid, pp. 1011-12, Muccio to Acheson, 7 May 1949.

69. Ibid., p. 1014, Acheson to Muccio, 9 May 1949.

70. Ibid., pp. 1023-4, Muccio to Acheson, 16 May 1949.

Tension along the 38th parallel

American apprehension at the danger of the ROK provoking North Korea from across the 38th parallel was reinforced by serious incidents in early May 1949. General Roberts stated that on 6 May a unit of the ROK army had advanced north of the 38th parallel to a depth of 2.5 miles (4 km) and had attacked several settlements. Muccio discussed the incidents at Kaesong and Chunchon with Rhee on 10 May: he reminded the President that UNCOK was observing developments and it would hardly benefit the cause of South Korea if the impression was conveyed to the UN that South Korea was indulging in aggression. Rhee reiterated the strategic importance of Kaesong and the necessity of standing firm against communist aggression. He gave an undertaking that his government would not adopt aggressive measures in future.⁷¹ Muccio's considered opinion in June 1949 was that the departure of Russian and American troops left the two sides in Korea evenly balanced and that neither side was likely to risk 'an all-out invasion' in the foreseeable future.⁷² The 38th parallel offered frequent opportunities for incidents, and reports indicated strengthening of the North Korean forces. The morale of the South Korean army had improved recently. Muccio blamed North Korea for provoking two serious incidents at Kaesong and Ongjin within the past six weeks. Minor incidents would doubtless continue to arise in future.⁷³ The Army Department reviewed commitments in Korea and wrote to the State Department that Korea possessed 'little strategic value' in the view of the joint chiefs of staff- 'To apply the Truman Doctrine to Korea would require prodigious effort and vast expenditure far out of proportion to the benefits to be expected.'⁷⁴

71. Ibid., pp. 1016-18, memorandum by Muccio, 10 May 1949.

72. Ibid., p. 1042, Muccio to Acheson, 11 June 1949.

73. Ibid., p. 1043.

74. Ibid., pp. 1046-57, memorandum from Department of the Army to Department of State, 27 June 1949.

Rhee therefore failed to secure the definite promises of American support that he deemed to be essential. Indeed the tone of reports emanating from Washington between August 1949 and May 1950 gave cause for increasing alarm in Seoul over ultimate American intentions. The publication of the China White Paper in August 1949 worried Rhee, since it connoted a virtual collapse of American support for Chiang Kai-shek and the possibility of the United States preparing to recognise Communist China. The statement by President Truman on 5 January 1950, to be followed a week later by Dean Acheson's address to the National Press Club, deeply concerned Rhee, for they seemed to show that South Korea was expendable or, at any rate, that American intentions towards South Korea were ambiguous. Equally disturbing was the fact that the House of Representatives voted narrowly on 19 January 1950, by 193 votes to 191, to reject the administration's Korean Aid Bill. The defeat was attributable to resentment at the Truman administration's bankrupt policy in China, to complacency regarding the Korean bill, and to the grave ill health of Senator Vandenberg. Vandenberg was a prominent moderate Republican who had worked closely with the Truman administration to promote a bi-partisan policy for Europe. It did not reflect particular animus over Korea but more a feeling of frustration at the setbacks encountered by American policy in the Far East in the previous two years. There was, however, growing concern over the effects of inflation in the ROK. Acheson visited Vandenberg in hospital on 21 January and the senator emphasised his support for Acheson's policy. Vandenberg was shocked at the House vote and the stupidity of many of his fellow Republicans. 'He thought that as good a case could be made for our efforts in Korea - and probably a better one - as almost anything we had done in the foreign field'.⁷⁵ In his memoirs Acheson lays much stress on the impact of the House vote and sought to play down criticism of his own speech of 12 January; the latter criticisms had focused on Acheson having given encouragement to a North Korean attack by not making clear what the American reaction would be in these circumstances.⁷⁶ The criticisms were to be renewed after 25 June 1950. The House vote was soon reversed and Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) aid for Korea approved. The House carried a bill on 9 February authorising 60 million US dollars for the second part of the fiscal year 1950.

75. Memorandum by Acheson on conversation with Vandenberg, 21 Jan. 1950, folder of conversations, Jan. 1950, Acheson Papers, box 65, Truman Library.

76. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Tears in the State Department (London, 1970), pp. 354—8.

The South Korean ambassador in Washington, John M. Chang, visited the State Department on 20 January and conveyed anxiety at Acheson's speech and at the House vote:

He [Chang] said that the fact Korea found itself on the other side of that line as defined in Acheson's address, combined with the House action yesterday, appeared to raise the serious question as to whether the United States might now be considered as having abandoned Korea. Mr. Butterworth said he could not share this view. He pointed to the fact that with respect to Korea the United States had associated itself with others of the United Nations in support of Korea's cause and, in that sense, therefore, Korea's position transcended a definition of interest by a line drawn in any direction.⁷⁷

77. FRUS 1950 (7)_} p. 12, memorandum by John Z. Williams, 20 Jan. 1950.

The ambassador returned to the charge at the beginning of April 1950, just before he departed for visits to Australia and New Zealand before returning to Seoul. Chang expressed the hope that the American defence line in the Far East could be extended to include South Korea. Dean Rusk declined to discuss it other than to make the observation that

the so-called 'defense line' to which the Ambassador had referred was in actuality merely an enumeration of those sectors in the western Pacific in which the United States held firm military commitments: i.e. our responsibilities as an occupying Power in Japan, our special interest in the Philippines as a former part of United States territory etc. The Ambassador replied that he realized that no statement could be made on this subject and he himself had avoided making any such statement which he felt might prove embarrassing. He added that he did wish, however, to impress upon the Department the importance which the Korean Government and people attached to their apparent exclusion from the defense plans of the United States in the Far East. Mr. Rusk replied that the inference that the United States had decided to abandon the Republic of Korea to its enemies was scarcely warranted in the light of the substantial material aid and political support which we had furnished and were furnishing to that Republic.⁷⁸

78. Ibid., p. 42, memorandum by Bond, 3 Apr. 1950.

Soon afterwards an unfortunate press interview was given by Senator Tom Connally (Democrat, Texas), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which appeared in the 5 May issue of US News and World Report. Connally conveyed a defeatist air, commenting that he feared that the communists would overrun Korea and the same was probably true of Taiwan. Connally did not regard Korea as vitally important to American strategy.⁷⁹ Syngman Rhee's reaction was vitriolic when he met the American charge d'affaires in Seoul on 9 May:

79. Ibid., pp. 64—6, memorandum from Rusk to Webb, 2 May 1950, discussing Connally's interview and the ramifications thereof.

Speaking in a deeply bitter and sarcastic manner, President Rhee said it was very easy for a man several thousand miles away from Korea airily to dismiss Korea and its 30 million people as of no strategic or other importance to the United States. The President went on to say he regarded Senator Connally's remarks as an open invitation to the Communists to come down and take over South Korea. He wondered how any man in his right senses, not to mention Senator Connally ... could make such an irrational statement.⁸⁰

80. Ibid., memorandum by Drumright, pp. 77-8, May 1950.

The charge, Everett Drumright, countered by reminding Rhee that the ECA was spending more than 100 million dollars in Korea at present and had perhaps its largest staff in Korea. In addition, the United States had its largest military mission in Korea except for Turkey. Rhee complained bitterly at American failure to provide an adequate level of air support.⁸¹ In a message to the State Department on 25 May John J. Muccio rightly drew attention to the unwise nature of various statements relevant to Korea made in the previous five months:

81. Ibid.

I refer to public statements attributed to the President, the Secretary or other high Government officials in which various countries are named as especial objects of United States interest and concern, but from which the name of Korea very frequently is omitted.

The omissions are always noted here in Korea and they add to the sensitivity and fear of the Korean Government and Korean citizens that the United States Government is not fixed in its determination to assist Korea and will abandon Korea at the earliest opportunity ...

I should like to urge that those persons particularly charged with drafting speeches and statements on United States policy have this problem brought to their attention, so that in any listing of Asiatic countries in whose freedom the United States maintains a continuing interest, Korea may always be included.⁸²

82. Ibid., pp. 88-9, Muccio to Rusk, 25 May 1950.

It was unquestionably foolish to convey the impression that Korea was expendable. North Korea and the Soviet Union could only have drawn encouragement in the belief that America would most likely not act with vigour if North Korea moved against the south to reunify the peninsula.

Apart from perturbation in Washington concerning the uncertain consequences of border clashes, the political and economic situation in South Korea gave rise to additional anxiety. The South Korean economy was heavily dependent on American support, and inflation, developing since 1945, reached grave proportions. In January 1949 Walton Butterworth warned the South Korean minister that the ROK must not repeat the mistakes of the Kuomintang in China.⁸³ Philip C. Jessup, Truman's ambassador at large, visited Seoul in January 1950 and held wide-ranging discussions covering political, financial and strategic matters. Jessup felt the ROK government realised the necessity of solving pressing economic problems. The difficulty lay not in identifying the issues but in tackling them resolutely. The adoption of land reform had been held up by the opposition of recalcitrant landlords. In other spheres attempts to increase productivity had been blocked.⁸⁴ Jessup considered the morale of South Korean troops to be good but he was struck by the appreciation of the strength of the North Korean forces: the resources of the North Koreans were not underestimated by South Korean officers. Muccio spoke trenchandy to Rhee on 18 January 1950 and warned of the perils of inflation. Rhee explained the failures to control inflation as the fault of his incompetent ministers but Muccio maintained that Rhee himself was to blame. Muccio handed Rhee an American note containing advice on handling inflation and referred to the unhappy precedent of China:

83. FRUS 1949 (7, part 2), pp. 940—1, memorandum by Butterworth, 5 Jan. 1949.

84. FRUS 1950 (7), p. 6, memorandum by Jessup, 14 Jan. 1950.

I cited that Korea seemed to be in the same position as China in 1947-1948; that the Chinese officials also continuously stated that they could put a stop to inflation at any time. They never faced the situation realistically; inflation got out of hand and contributed even more than the military inertia to bringing about the Nationalist downfall.⁸⁵

85. Ibid., pp. 8-9, Muccio to Acheson, 18 Jan. 1950.

Muccio added that Rhee's tendency to be surrounded by 'yes men' compounded the problem. On 15 March a joint meeting of representatives of the ECA and State Department was held in Washington to discuss the Korean economy. Dr Bunce, the senior ECA adviser, said that the essence of the difficulty involved personalities, particularly Rhee, Madame Rhee (who was an Austrian) and Harold Lady, Rhee's 'economic adviser'. Rhee had totally failed to understand the inflationary threat and, encouraged by Lady, had bypassed the constitutional arrangements with respect to the financing of the government. Rhee's autocratic tendencies and the growth of the police state accentuated the ECA's wish to see inflation dealt with realistically. Most branches of the ROK government were not cooperating with ECA; the exceptions were the defence and police authorities, which spent on an extravagant scale. It was agreed that more vigorous representations would have to be made.⁸⁶

86. Ibid., pp. 30-3, memorandum by Bond, 15 Mar. 1950.

In domestic politics in South Korea Rhee's growing authoritarianism and the accelerating acrimony between Rhee and his political opponents did not augur well for stability. Rhee had long displayed intolerance of dissent and his obsession with his mission to unite Korea under his leadership led him to equate criticism with treachery. Jessup reported in January 1950 that the dominance of Rhee was unquestioned and few people stood up to him. The national security law was responsible for the fears of a police state. Anyone could be arrested and accused of communist sympathies; such a person would be tried by a special court consisting of four judges from which no appeal was allowed. The South Korean justification to Jessup was that no one would be convicted, unless he or she was taking orders from a foreign power. Supposedly no danger existed of an individual being prosecuted for happening to disagree with the government, but Jessup was understandably sceptical. It was obvious that Rhee had intimidated the national assembly with threats of arrest.⁸⁷ The growth of criticism of Rhee led to speculation that he might seek to postpone the elections scheduled for May 1950. Muccio recommended on 1 April 1950 that Rhee be warned that autocratic actions could adversely affect relations with Washington.⁸⁸ Dean Acheson sent an aide-memoire to the ROK ambassador on 3 April protesting at the state of the economy and firmly warning against any idea of postponing the general election. Despite the American criticism of Rhee, the British ambassador in Washington, Sir Oliver Franks, believed that the Truman administration was identifying itself more closely with South Korea.⁸⁹ Feeling in Congress was less critical than it had been and Senator William F. Knowland (Republican, California), a lively critic of the administration, supported it over Korean aid while castigating the administration for the serious economic plight in which the Koreans found themselves.⁹⁰ The elections were duly held in May 1950 with more than 2,000 candidates standing for 200 positions. Numerous independents stood and did well in the elections. The outcome was widely regarded as a considerable rebuff for Rhee and a weakening of his position, underlined by the number of successful independents. However, John Merrill has qualified this assessment by pointing out that Rhee himself encouraged many independents to stand because of the weakness of his own political organisation; while a reverse for Rhee, his position after the election was rather stronger than it appeared to be.⁹¹

87. Ibid., pp. 6-7, memorandum by Jessup, 14 Jan. 1950.

88. Ibid., pp. 39-40, Muccio to Acheson, 1 Apr. 1950.

89. Franks to Bevin, 14 Apr. 1950, FK11345/5, FO 371/84147.

90. Ibid.

91. Merrill, 'Internal warfare', in Cumings (ed.), Child of Conflict, p. 156.

Let us conclude with a brief consideration of the state of the South Korean armed forces in 1950. Under the command of General Roberts, KMAG worked enthusiastically to improve the calibre of the ROK army. The ROK army had been ocupied throughout the winter in containing guerrillas; they were under the direction of North Korea and occasionally obtained arms supplies from the north as with a recent arms shipment landed on the east coast, the bulk of which was confiscated before it could be used inland. The anti-guerrilla activities occupied five regiments. The invasion threats, which had seemed so immediate in 1948-49, had subsided and there had been fewer incidents on the parallel. The guerrillas no longer represented a significant threat. One-fifth of the national police force (10,000 out of 50,000) had been deployed as combat police engaged in hunting guerrillas. Roberts thought the national police strength of 50,000 was perhaps too large by between 15,000 and 20,000. The police being used in fighting guerrillas in effect increased the strength of the army by 10,000; 240 of their officers were currently undergoing training at the Infantry School. Roberts commented that all the top officers of KMAG were due to depart for other posts within the next six months, which was disturbing. He recommended that his successor should be a major-general with fighting experience and not a diplomat. Roberts then reviewed the functioning of KMAG. It had not reached full strength until approximately 15 December 1949; the school system (subdivision into Infantry Staff School, Korean Military Academy, Artillery, Ordnance, Engineer, Quartermaster, Finance, Medical Schools) comprised a solid foundation for the army and must be continued. Full advisers had exerted a valuable effect. A few of the divisions were in the battalion phase of training and marksmanship had shown a level of attainment second only to the United States. It was inevitable that Washington should be considering future reductions in the KMAG and Roberts commented on this. The first cut should occur with the removal of advisers from battalions and a general cut in advisers to headquarters and service troops: Roberts recommended that no cuts be implemented before January 1951, as the intervening period was crucial for training purposes. He summarised the capabilities and limitations of the South Korean army as follows:

... If South Korea is called upon to defend itself against aggression from the North its ground army is capable of doing an excellent job. If American advisers are present (even on Regimental and Divisional level) it will do an even better job, for we have found Americans are leaned on heavily the rougher it gets. In other words, the advisers will almost command except in name.

However, all G-2 sources tell that the North Koreans have up to 100 Russian planes and a training programme for pilots. You know and I know what 100 planes can do to troops, to towns and to transport on road.

So, if South Korea were attacked today by the inferior ground forces of North Korea plus their Air Corps, I feel that South Korea would take a bloody nose. Again then, knowing these people somewhat, I feel they would follow the apparent winner and South Korea would be gobbled up to be added to the rest of Red Asia.

This is a fat nation now with all its ECA goods, with warehouses bulging with plenty of rice from a good crop even if their finances are shakey [sic] with great inflationary tendencies. It is getting into the position of an excellent prize of war; strategically it points right into the heart of Japan and in the hands of an enemy it weakens the Japanese bastion of Western defence.⁹²

92. Letter from Roberts to Bolté, 8 Mar. 1950, OPS 091, Defense records, RG319 (Army Staff), G-3, box 121, National Archives, Washington. Roberts had asked to be transferred, prior to retirement, because of his wife's ill health.

Roberts added that what this really pointed to was the importance of having some aircraft in South Korea; at present only twelve or fourteen planes were there. The P-51s and P-47s in Japan were being replaced by jets; these might be obsolescent viewed from the highest standards but they were acceptable enough in Korea. It would be sensible if about fifty of these planes could be sent to Korea and the pilots could be found in Korea. It should be feasible to find advisers from the air force without exceeding the total of 500, allocated to KMAG. Roberts maintained that the negative attitude taken towards air power in NSC 8/2 would have rendered positive through its 'air detachments' being 'stretched a little'.⁹³ Roberts concluded that KMAG itself had operated successfully without internal disputes and that morale was good.

93. Ibid.

General Bolte replied that Roberts's successor would be Major-General Frank A. Keating, who would probably not arrive until July. He described Roberts's observations on a reduction in KMAG as timely:

Currently the JCS are studying on a global basis, the possibility of reducing missions, advisory groups and other special duty assignments. I strongly recommend that you prepare a phased plan to reduce KMAG activities effective 1 January 1951 and after approval by Ambassador Muccio, submit it to the Department of Army.⁹⁴

94. Letter from Bolté to Roberts, 23 Mar. 1950, ibid.

Bolté asked for Roberts's advice on cutting administrative costs in Korea. Aspects of the military aid programme were under discussion in the State Department:

Most of us realize that there may be valid reasons behind such requests but the expansion of Korea's armed forces, though born of necessity, does not fall within current policy decision of the NSC. I refer, of course, to NSC 8/2 which precludes US support of a Korean Navy, and omits mention of an Air Force. You are also familiar with the strength limitations imposed by this document in a Korean Army, Coast Guard, and Police Force supported by the US. Therefore, it is my opinion that nothing can be done to engender additional assistance of the type requested unless the State Department secures authority therefore ...⁹⁵

95. Ibid.

Roberts usually spoke favourably of the development of the army, while recognising its deficiencies in equipment. He circulated a report on KMAG advisers on 5 May 1950. He recalled that the original American commitment was to supply the ROK army with an initial issue of equipment and six months' supply of spare parts for a total strength of 50,000. Since then the personnel of the army had been increased to 100,000 and there was a marked deficiency in major items of equipment. The six months' stock of parts was exhausted and it was believed that 10 to 15 per cent of the weapons and between 30 and 35 per cent of vehicles were unserviceable. According to the Department of the Army in Washington, spare parts would not arrive until some time in 1952. South Korea was incapable of providing parts from its own production or from foreign exchange. The inflationary spiral constituted a grave threat which, if not halted, could jeopardise the entire economy. Counter-inflationary measures were compelling restrictions in the military budget. Roberts ended by once more conjuring the spectre of Kuomintang China:

The significance of this situation is that unless prompt effective and vigorous measures are taken to conserve available resources the Army will be dangerously reduced in fire power, mobility and logistical support. The economy will deteriorate further and be unable to support either the military establishment or the civil and political movement toward a free and democratic country. In short, Korea is threatened with the same disaster that befell China.⁹⁶

96. FRUS 1950 (7), p. 93, Muccio to Acheson, 29 May 1950, enclosing memorandum by Roberts, 5 May 1950.

The crucial weaknesses of the South Korean army on the eve of the Korean War were that it lacked the range and quality of the equipment possessed by the North Korean forces and that the leadership of the North Korean army was inspired by a fanaticism unequalled by those fighting for Syngman Rhee. In addition, South Korea had no air force or navy; air power was one of the key ingredients in North Korean prowess in the first phase of the Korean conflict.

Therefore in May 1950 the balance sheet of strengths and weaknesses between the two Korean states could be summarised as follows. North Korea was tightly organised and directed by a tough, ruthless elite. The armed forces were efficient with good equipment. There, were significant factional divisions, particularly between the followers of Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-yong. There was probably a tendency in the north to exaggerate the potential for a guerrilla-led insurrection in South Korea. As for the RGK, it was divided politically but dominated by the intransigent Syngman Rhee. Grave economic and political problems existed and the army was clearly inferior to its opponents. However, South Korea had overcome the armed challenge from within. Tension along the 38th parallel had been serious since 1947 but was worse on some occasions than on others. There was always the possibility of an obscure clash escalating into full-scale conflict. The situation in the Korean peninsula was in essence one of civil war. As in other civil wars the big question mark was the approaches to be adopted by the great powers. The responses of the United States, the Soviet Union and China would soon become clear.