PART II
CHAPTER 6
JOHN W. I. LEE
IN the two decades since Victor Hanson’s The Western Way of War first appeared in 1989, the literature on ancient warfare has multiplied dramatically. This surge of research has greatly enhanced our understanding of classical Greek battle, while well-written surveys have quickly disseminated new interpretations to a wider audience. Still, the flood of publication has continued to follow some well-worn channels. Both popular and scholarly works continue to emphasize a few periods: the Persian invasions of Greece (490–479), the Peloponnesian War (431–404), and to a lesser extent the Theban hegemony (371–362). Despite calls to recognize the diversity of classical military practices, the polis armies of Athens and Sparta still hold the spotlight, and the Greek hoplite, the heavily armored infantryman, stands front and center (Hanson 2000b: 201). Meanwhile, regional developments in the Greek world, as well as the histories of non-Greek military forces, notably those of Achaemenid Persia, remain neglected (Wheeler 2007b: 187–8).
There is still space, then, for a wider view. Classical warfare was in continuous evolution from the sixth through the fourth centuries (noted by Hanson 1988: 206–7). Developments occurred across the Mediterranean basin, not just in mainland Greece. In the Aegean and in western Anatolia, the sustained interaction of Greeks, Persians, and others had important effects on battle practices. Military contacts between the mainland and the western Mediterranean world were less intimate, but Sicily and southern Italy nonetheless deserve attention. Western Greeks raised large armies and fought battles rivaling any in mainland Greece: to name just one, Akragas in 472/1, where a clash between Hieron of Syracuse and Thrasydaios of Akragas allegedly cost six thousand dead (Diod. 11.53). From Sicily too would emerge siege artillery, which would help shape the face of battle in the later classical era (see further Marsden 1969, 1971).
The Peloponnesian War has long been considered a watershed that overturned traditional war making in favor of new tactics, troops, and attitudes. Yet recent attention to the era between the “great wars” of 490–479 and 431–404 has brought a fresh perspective on fifth century changes. The fragmentary or unreliable sources for the period often tempt students and scholars to skip directly from Herodotus’s Persian War narrative to Thucydides’s detailed account of the conflict between Athens and Sparta. A closer look suggests that from 478 to 431 armies all over the Mediterranean were developing techniques such as combined arms warfare, amphibious assaults, and surprise attacks. The military systems that fought the Peloponnesian War were forged in the decades that preceded it, especially in imperial Athens’s campaigns on the periphery of the polis world (Wheeler 2007b: 215, 221–2). Looking beyond the “great wars,” moreover, helps moderate the widespread image of the hoplite as the dominant classical soldier and of phalanx-on-phalanx combat as the quintessential battle experience.
This short chapter offers an introduction to the diverse troops, equipment, formations, and tactics that characterized the period from about 500 to 350. In an effort to expand our vision from Athens and Sparta, the chapter emphasizes regional variation and draws on examples from across the entire classical world. To the extent that the scarce evidence permits, it examines non-Greek as well as Greek military forces. It also investigates battle mechanics and the experience of battle, expanding from the excellent work already done on hoplites to look at a fuller range of classical soldiers. The chapter finishes by suggesting some potentially fruitful directions for future research.
MILITARY FORCES
Classical military forces varied widely in size and complexity. From Sicily to Anatolia, many tribal or non-state societies mustered ad hoc bands under chieftains or nobles rather than formal armies. Neighbors sometimes temporarily joined forces, as the Chalybians, Taochians, and Phasians of Anatolia did against the mercenaries of Cyrus in the winter of 401–400 B.C. (Xen. An. 4.6.5–6). Occasionally a charismatic leader successfully united tribal groups for a longer time, as the Sicel king Ducetius apparently did in Sicily during the 450s and 440s (Diod. 11.88.6; CAH2 V.161–5; Green 2006). Tribal military forces might number a few thousand at most, and were usually much smaller. The absence of logistical support constrained the size of many war bands, for warriors reliant on plunder or individual provisioning could not long sustain themselves in the field.
In the eyes of Greek authors, tribal warriors prized martial display over tactical sense and were prone to swing between extremes of bravery and cowardice. Thucydides, for example, depicts the Chaonians of northwest Greece rushing impetuously forward, then quickly panicking (Thuc. 2.81). Although they might be extremely skilled as individuals, many tribal warriors, such as the Carduchians of Anatolia, had no apparent unit organization or rank structure (Xen. An. 4.1.10). Other groups displayed more order. The Mossynoecians on the Black Sea coast, for instance, prepared for battle by marshaling themselves in rough lines before marching forward in rhythm (Xen. An. 5.4.11–14).
One level up from war bands were the citizen militias of most Greek poleis (city-states). The army of a small polis, comprised of part-timers who provided their own equipment, might number only a few hundred men at full strength. At the start of the classical period, the entire citizenry might fight in a body regardless of armament, but from the early fifth century onward polis armies began to divide their differing troop types into separate units. Until the later fourth century, most polis militias had scant training or organization. They also lacked many of the trappings of an army, such as uniforms, insignia, and standards. Citizen militia did use shield blazons. At first these may have denoted individuals or families, although by the fourth century some standard city markings seem to have entered into use.1
Larger poleis, and federal states like those of the Aetolians, Arcadians, and Boeotians evolved more complex military practices, including troop call-up systems, formal unit organization, and defined command hierarchies. Large polis armies, such as those of Akragas and Syracuse in the west, Ephesus and Miletus in the east, and Argos, Athens, and Sparta, could field many thousands of men. The armies of larger poleis were not always composed purely of citizens. At Athens, metics or resident aliens had to serve in ranks as hoplites. Sparta required its perioikoi, subordinated neighbors, to serve in the Spartan army. The Chians in the late fifth century enrolled slaves in their units (Rubinstein 2004: 1065–6; military roles of slaves generally: Hunt 2007: 138–9, van Wees 2007: 277–9). Large states were also better able to supply armies on campaign. Although “report with three days’ rations” remained a stereotypical instruction for Athenian hoplites, as early as 479 in Plataea, a convoy of pack animals was used to provision an army in the field (Ar. Pax 1138, Hdt. 9.39). Treaties between poleis sometimes specified ration subsidies for allied troops (Thuc. 5.47). The fleets of Athens and Carthage enabled these cities to deploy large forces on distant overseas expeditions.
The unit organizations of many large polis armies mirrored their political structures. Athens, for example, fielded its hoplites in ten regiments (taxeis), corresponding to its ten civic tribes (Xen. Hell. 4.2.19; on the Athenian levy, Christ 2001, van Wees 2004: 99). Each regiment had an elected commander (taxiarchos), and its strength depended on how many men were called up for a campaign. Subdivisions of the taxis called lochoi or “companies” are first attested in the mid-fifth century; the regimental commanders appointed captains (lochagoi) for these. By the end of the fifth century, there is evidence for Athenian lochoi moving independently on the battlefield (Xen. Hell. 1.2.3). The Athenian cavalry was likewise divided into ten tribal units. Other poleis, including Argos, Corinth, and Megara, came to use lochoi in their armies as well. Mercenary hoplites, especially those serving in Asia Minor and the Levant, also commonly used the lochos.2 In addition, some armies further structured their ranks with age-class systems (Singor 1999, 2002; Krentz 2007: 148).
The Spartan army was exceptional in its organization. Spartan soldiers wore uniform red cloaks and all had the letter lambda (for Lacedaemonians) painted on their shields. The army’s tactical makeup changed over time. In the fifth century, according to Thucydides, four platoons (enomotiai) of thirty-two men each formed a company (pentekostys) of 128 men, and four companies a regiment (lochos) of 512; there were apparently five such lochoi, with perioikoi organized in separate units. By the fourth century changes had occurred as Xenophon describes two (or possibly four) forty-man enomotiai constituting a pentekostys, two pentekostyes a lochos, and two lochoi a brigade (mora). The entire army counted six morai, with Spartans and perioikoi now serving together. While scholars continue to wrestle with the details and timing of these changes, Sparta’s unit organization and officer hierarchy—every Spartan knew exactly who was in charge no matter how many casualties were suffered—made its troops tactically superior to those of any other Classical army (Anderson : 225–51; Lazenby 1985: 6–10; Singor 2002; van Wees 2004: 97–9, 243–9).
Much less information exists for the organization and command of light troops. In the fourth century, some mercenary archers and peltasts operating in Asia Minor were formed into lochoi (Xen. Hell. 4.2.5). Other light infantry units during the same period were divided into battalions (taxeis) of uncertain size, led by taxiarchoi (Xen. An. 3.1.37, 4.1.28). Commanders of archers (toxiarchoi) are known from the mid-430s onward at Athens (IG I3 138.5–7; Thuc. 3.98).
Citizens who could afford the expense sometimes hired personal weapons instructors (Pl. Lach. 179e, 181e-182d), but comprehensive training for polis soldiers remained rare. The Spartans were unique in having an entirely professional, tightly disciplined army. Some large poleis and federal states did raise bodies of logades or epilektoi, picked troops maintained at public expense. In mainland Hellas, the Argives, Eleans, Mantineans, and others deployed such units, but the Theban Sacred Band of three hundred men was the most famous of all. The Athenians had a permanent elite force in the fourth century. Picked troops also existed in the west, where Syracuse apparently deployed an elite force of six hundred in the mid-fifth century (Hdt. 9.21; Thuc. 2.25, 5.67, Plut. Pel. 18–19; van Wees 2004: 59–61; Pritchett 2: 221–5).
Achaemenid Persia, the most complex state society of the period, retained many Assyrian military practices, including the use of an imperial army formed from a professional core backed by units of conscripts, and the combination of cavalry with archers and shieldmen (Tallis 2005: 215; Farrokh 2007; Reade 1972; Postgate 2000; Dezsö 2006). From the Greco–Persian Wars onward Iranians constituted the core, while conscripted units came from a variety of tribes, poleis, and small states. The result was a complicated mélange of military forces, perhaps intended as much to display the empire’s power as for use in combat (Briant 1999: 118–120; Cawkwell 2005: 243). The Empire’s satraps, or provincial governors, also mustered troops for garrisons and punitive expeditions. In western Anatolia and along the Levantine coast, satraps relied on mercenaries and local levies, along with smaller numbers of Persian troops. The Persian army’s superb logistical organization enabled it to raise large forces, move them long distances, and maintain them for extended periods in hostile territory.
Achaemenid commanders faced the challenge of coordinating disparate contingents of troops that employed diverse weapons, formations, and languages. Persian infantry and cavalry seem to have organized on a decimal basis: squads of ten, companies of one hundred, regiments of one thousand, and brigades of ten thousand, with officers at each level. Units were not always kept up to strength, except for the elite Immortals, whose losses were immediately replaced (Hdt. 7.81–83; Sekunda 1988: 69–70; 1992: 5–7; Tallis 2005: 215). Mercenaries and local levies recruited as units may have preserved their original structures, though it is also possible that some of them adopted Persian decimal organization (Xen. An. 1.2.16). Persian leaders often employed detachments of picked troops, some of them mercenaries, as bodyguards or escorts (Hdt. 7.41.1, 9.63.1; Xen. An. 1.1.2).
TROOP TYPES AND EQUIPMENT
Classical armies fielded an assortment of troops. Of these, the best-known heavy infantry type was the hoplite. Hoplites take their name from the Greek ta hopla, tools or equipment, but not all hoplites were Greek. In Asia Minor the Carians, Lycians, Lydians, and Pamphylians were using hoplite equipment by the time of the Persian Wars.3 In the fourth century, Carian hoplites were distinguished by their white shields (Xen. Hell. 3.2.15). In northern Greece, the tribal Lyncestians fought as hoplites (Thuc. 4.124). In the west, some Hellenized Sicels adopted hoplite equipment. Assyrian and Egyptian hoplites are attested at the end of the fifth century (Xen. An. 1.8.9, 7.8.15). All hoplites carried the aspis, a large round shield of bronze-faced wood, about a meter in diameter, with a distinctive double grip. The round shield type was already common in Iron Age Near Eastern armies, including that of Assyria, but with only a single grip (Snodgrass 1964: 66–8, 233 n. 19; Postgate 2000: 103). The double grip may have been a Carian innovation; the Carians are also said to have been the first to devise helmet crests (Hdt. 1.171; Polyaenus Strat. 7.2.3).
Hoplite armor varied, especially amongst polis troops who paid for their own equipment (see further Jarva, 395–409). Wealthier men bought bronze breastplates, closed helmets that encased the head, and greaves. Poorer ones used leather or laminated fabric corselets and pilos helmets that covered only the top of the head. While the hoplite shield remained a constant, the trend over time was to shed protection for mobility. By the fourth century, some hoplites wore no armor other than pilos and cloth tunic (figure 6.1).
Figure 6.1 Inscribed stele of Mnason, a Theban soldier killed at Delium, 424 B.C.(?), depicted with helmet and shield. Archaeological Museum of Thebes. Photo Credit: L. Tritle.
There were also regional differences. In the eastern Aegean, the shield apron, a leather or fabric skirt attached to the bottom of the hoplite shield, remained popular as defense against missiles. Some Boeotians perhaps carried a variant version of the hoplite shield, with crescent-shaped cutouts on the upper and lower edges, into the classical period (van Wees 2004: 50–2). Such shields remained familiar enough to appear on coins as emblems of the Boeotian federal league during the fourth century. Some Cretan soldiers may have used light oxhide shields rather than canonical hoplite versions (Jarva 1986: 2).
Hoplite side arms varied too. Greeks carried several types, including straight two-edged swords as well as the curved machete-like machaira or kopis; the Spartans preferred a short stabbing blade. Carians used sickle swords, while Lycians employed tridents or Achaemenid Anatolian daggers (for depictions see Mellink 1972: 268, Mellink 1973: 297–8, Summerer 2007a). All hoplites, though, used the same primary weapon: an eight-foot thrusting spear with a bronze head and a sharpened end spike.
The burden of hoplite gear is often overstated. Figures of up to seventy pounds for full bronze panoply have become commonplace, but close analysis shows that twenty-three kg (fifty lb) may be a better estimate. An unarmored hoplite with shield, open helmet, spear, and sword would have carried only about eleven kg (24 lb), with the shield accounting for some 6.2 kg (13.5 lb) of that burden (Lee 2007: 111–16; cf. Franz 2002: 339–49; weight of the aspis: Blyth 1982: 16–17).
Not all heavy infantry fit the hoplite mold. Some Egyptian infantry carried large wooden shields that almost reached their feet, plus spears and sabers (Xen. An. 1.8.9, 2.1.6; Xen. Cyr. 6.2.10, 6.4.16; cf. Hdt. 7.8.1; Fischer-Bovet 2008). The Chalybians of central Anatolia had helmets, greaves, and linen corselets, and carried lances and knives. They impressed Xenophon with their ability to meet Greek hoplites in close combat (Xen. An. 4.7.15–16). Elsewhere in Anatolia, Chaldaeans equipped with lances and long wicker shields could be found as satrapal mercenaries (Xen. An. 4.3.4–5). In the west, the Carthaginians in Sicily deployed heavy infantry with large elephant-hide-covered shields, iron breastplates and helmets (Plut. Tim. 27–8).
Beyond the polis world, medium infantry prepared for both missile and melee combat were widespread. Persian infantry, for example, carried bows and spears, daggers, or axes (Hdt. 5.49, 6.211, 7.41, 7.61; Xen. An. 4.4.16–17). They wore armor of iron scales, leather, or reinforced fabric. During the Persian Wars, some Persian infantry employed the spara or gerron, a tall rectangular wicker pavise that could be held by a shield-bearer or propped up to form a defensive barrier. These tall shields appear very rarely in Greek and Persian art, and may have been used only for a brief time in the early classical period (Bittner 1985: 158–160; Sekunda 1988, Sekunda 1994: 184). The Persepolis reliefs do show many Persian spearmen carrying smaller round or scalloped shields. By the mid-fifth century, some Greek vase paintings show Persian infantry using round shields with a crescent cut out of the upper edge. A few vases also depict Persian troops wearing Greek-style corselets (Sekunda 2002: 25; Villing 2005: 239).
Peltasts were another type of medium infantry. The original peltasts were Thracians, equipped with a rimless crescent-shaped shield or pelta. Herodotus describes them carrying javelins and short knives, but fifth century vases show them with thrusting spears ready for close combat (Hdt. 7.74). Thracian mercenary peltasts were common in the Aegean world, and many others, Greeks and non-Greeks, eventually adopted peltast equipment. A fragmentary funeral epigram from Athens, dating circa 460, may commemorate an Athenian peltast; by circa 430 Athenian peltasts are securely attested (Thracian peltasts: Best 1969; Athenian peltasts: IG I3 1381, IG I3 60, Bradeen 1974: 33–4; cf. Eur. Rh. 311). These new peltasts sometimes used round rather than crescent-shaped shields, in both double- and single-grip versions. The recently discovered Çan sarcophagus of circa 400 depicts a peltast carrying a machaira and a round single-grip shield with javelins wedged behind the grip. His mixed weaponry indicates that peltasts could fight capably at close quarters, especially against disorganized foes (Çan sarcophagus: Sevinç et al. 2001; peltasts at close quarters, cf. Thuc. 7.29, 8.25). The same was likely true of the Celtic, Iberian, and Libyan infantry that various Sicilian armies deployed (Xen. Hell. 7.1.20, 7.1.31; Caven 1990: 244–5). In the fourth century, the Athenian Iphicrates may have developed hybrid peltasts equipped with long spears, but the details are uncertain (Wheeler 2007b 220–1; Sekunda 2007: 327–9).
Light infantry skirmishers (psiloi) used javelins, darts, and stones to strike from afar while relying on speed to escape attack. Polis armies, federal states, and tribal bands all deployed light infantry (Hdt. 7.64–80; Thuc. 1.60). Despite Thucydides’s statement (Thuc. 4.94) that Athens possessed no psiloi at the time of the battle of Delium in 424, light infantry were already an important component of polis armies at the start of the Peloponnesian War and were used throughout the war (Thuc. 2.23, 2.31, 2.79, 4.67, 6.43). Sailors sometimes deployed as skirmishers on land, as at Sphacteria in 425/4 (Thuc. 4.32–4). During his Ionian campaign of 409 B.C., the Athenian general Thrasyllus armed five thousand sailors as light infantry (Xen. Hell. 1.2.3). By the fourth century light infantry came to be portrayed as ideal for mountain warfare and border defense (Xen. Mem. 3.5.27).
Archers and slingers formed distinct classes of light troops. Cretan archers were known throughout the Mediterranean, while Acarnanian, Balearic, and Rhodian slingers enjoyed high reputations (Thuc. 2.81; Xen. An. 3.3.16; Diod. 5.18). Most ancient bows were relatively weak, with limited arrow range and penetration. Slingers, especially when using lead bullets instead of stones, could outrange archers. They likely practiced a variety of throwing methods besides the stereotypical overhead whirl (Sling range: Hunt 2007: 122–4; methods: Lee 2001: 16). Archers and slingers held extra missiles in bags and quivers, but the need for mobility kept them from carrying large quantities of ammunition. While Cretan bowmen are justly famous, the prominence of archers in the Athenian army is often overlooked. Although apparently absent at the battle of Marathon, they played a key role at Plataea (Hdt. 9.22). An Athenian casualty list of the Erechtheid tribe of 460/59 includes four citizen archers; citizen archers also appear in inscriptions from the mid-430s (IG I2 929.67–70, IG I3 1147, ML 76; cf. Bradeen 1969: 149; IG I3 138). In 431 Athens mustered no less than 1,600 archers, and Athenian archers served throughout the war (Thuc. 2.13, 4.9, 6.43). After the defeat at Sphacteria, the Spartans recruited their own archers (Thuc. 4.55).
The best cavalry of the classical world belonged to the Persian Empire. The Achaemenids fielded a wide range of horsemen, drawn from their far-flung satrapies (Hdt. 7.84–6; Xen. An. 1.8.5–7). Persian cavalry had high-quality, well-trained mounts (Hdt. 5.109, 7.196). Cuneiform documents from Babylonia describe cavalrymen equipped with bows, swords, lances, and iron corselets. Valets wearing cuirasses and helmets may have accompanied them (Tallis 2005: 216; Kuhrt 2007: 715–716,722–3; on Persian horses: see further Hyland, 493–5). Persian horsemen could attack with missiles from a distance or engage in close combat. Xenophon, who had been on the receiving end of Persian mounted attacks, admired their equipment and tactics (Xen. Eq. mag. 12; for Persian cavalry armor see Sevinç et al. 2001, Casabonne and Gabrielli 2007).
Greek cities and federal states also fielded cavalry, of varying quality (see further Bugh 1988; Spence 1993; Gaebel 2002). In mainland Greece, the Chalcidians and Thessalians had the best mounts and riders. The Athenians fielded 1,200 cavalry, including mounted archers, at the start of the Peloponnesian War and continued using them thereafter (Thuc. 2.13, Lys. 15.6). Sparta’s cavalry was notoriously bad, and it mostly relied on allies to provide mounted contingents (Xen. Hell. 6.4.11). The Spartan unit ofhippeis(“horsemen”) was actually an elite infantry guard. Most Greek cavalry was lightly armed and preferred to fight from a distance using javelins or bows. Still, armor for men and horses was not unknown and some troopers, notably the Thessalians, carried lances for shock combat.
In the eastern Aegean, Colophon was known for its cavalry (Polyaenus Strat. 7.2.2). Other Ionian Greek cities also maintained riding traditions, for the Spartan king Agesilaus was able to raise a respectable cavalry during his Asia Minor campaign of 396–5 (Xen.Hell. 3.4.15). In the west, several cities fielded powerful cavalry forces from the beginning of the classical period. Syracusan cavalry played a decisive role in the Greek victory at Himera in 480. By the early fourth century, Taras (Tarentum) fielded a force of several thousand cavalry, including a thousand specially trained men who could dismount to throw javelins and then ride quickly away. Other Greeks eventually adopted this “Tarentine” style (Xen. Hell. 7.1.20–1; Strab. 6.3.4; Sekunda 1994: 178–9; Huffman 2005: 11–12).
War chariots saw continued use during the classical period, notably on Cyprus during the Ionian Revolt of 499–494 B.C. (Hdt. 5.113). Tomb paintings from southwest Asia Minor, dating to about the same time, show Persian chariots engaging in close combat with a nomadic enemy (Summerer 2007a, 2007b). The Carthaginians were still using chariots against the Greeks in Sicily in the late fourth century (Plut. Tim. 27). The Persians occasionally fielded scythed chariots, with blades attached to the axles. These may have been developed in the 460s to disrupt hoplite formations. Though often derided as ineffective, such chariots could be deadly when properly deployed (Nefiodkin 2004: 376–8; Cawkwell 2005: 252). Near Dascylium in 395, the satrap Pharnabazus with just two scythed chariots and four hundred cavalry routed seven hundred Greeks (Xen. Hell. 4.1.17–19). Unsupported chariot attacks, though, were easily countered, as Cyrus’s mercenaries discovered at Cunaxa in 401 B.C. (Xen. An. 1.8.20). As late as the fourth century some armies employed chariots or wagons as troop transports (Aen. Tact. 16.14–15; see also Strab. 10.1.10, Anderson 1975).
FORMATIONS
Much attention has been devoted in recent years to the phalanx. This classical heavy infantry formation appears to have evolved gradually over the course of the seventh and sixth centuries (see further Rawlings 18–21). At the beginning of the fifth century, the phalanx was still evolving.
The polis armies that fought Persia in the Ionian Revolt and defended mainland Greece at Marathon and Plataea did so using phalanxes that remained relatively loose and unstructured, perhaps without defined ranks and files. The late archaic phalanx was of mixed composition, including hoplites and missile infantry, and occasionally even horsemen (Hdt. 9.22, 9.29–30). Although armies formed up in close order for combat, individuals and contingents might still advance or withdraw on their own initiative. Battle lines could sway back and forth, as the opposing sides alternately charged and fell back.
The victories of Greek hoplites in the Persian Wars led to the idealization of massed heavy infantry combat and the exclusion of non-hoplites from the phalanx. Many scholars also argue that the all-hoplite phalanx appealed to the political sensibilities of Greek citizen-farmers, but a unified, homogeneous hoplite middle class is a modern exaggeration (see further Krentz 2002: 35–7, van Wees 2001: 61–2). The rise of Athens’s maritime empire may have influenced the movement of light troops out of the phalanx, as poorer Greeks who previously fought as light infantry now preferred to serve as rowers in the Athenian navy (see further de Souza 381–2). By circa 460, at any rate, the Athenian army seems to have divided into separate bodies of hoplites and light troops (Thuc. 1.106). Direct evidence for conditions at Sparta is lacking, but the all-hoplite phalanx probably appeared there too by the mid-fifth century.
The men of an all-hoplite phalanx stood in regular ranks and files, normally eight shields deep (Pritchett 1: 134–54). Phalanx depth varied depending on tactical circumstances and commanders’ preferences. The Thebans were notable for their massed formations, up to fifty shields deep (Thuc. 4.93; Xen. Hell. 4.2.18, 6.4.12). No classical source specifies the width of a file, but a figure of three feet of lateral space per hoplite is widely accepted. The three-foot interval has been employed to estimate the length of hoplite lines at specific engagements, and to test these estimates against battlefield topography (cf. Pritchett 1969: 32–5, and van Wees 2004: 185–6). Wider spacing was also apparently not used to extend the length of a hoplite line. Instead, commanders preferred to reduce phalanx depth if they needed to stretch their line. Non-Greek heavy infantry such as the Egyptians seem to have employed massed formations akin to the phalanx (Xen. Cyr. 7.1.33; Xen. An. 1.8.9).
Little study has so far been made of other infantry formations. Persian infantry in the early classical period used a mixed arrangement of archers and shield-bearers, based on earlier Assyrian practice but possibly with a greater proportion of bowmen (Sekunda 1988: 69–70; Tallis 2005: 216–17, Farrokh 2007: 76). If equipped with large wicker shields, either propped up on stands or held by shield-bearers, Persian spearmen could form a loose defensive line, from behind which archers could loose their volleys (Hdt. 1.214, 9.62, 9.102). Once archery had demoralized their enemy, the troops followed up with hand weapons. This formation was effective against hoplite forces in Egypt and during the Ionian Revolt (Hdt. 5.102, 5.119), but less successful in the wars of 490–479, when Persian infantry found their short spears wanting in melee (Hdt. 9.63, 9.102). Although evidence is scarce, Persian battle formations seem to have been changing in the mid-fifth century, perhaps around the time the all-hoplite phalanx was coming into being. Smaller round shields may have supplanted large wicker ones, with archers and spearmen eventually splitting into distinct units. By the battle of Cunaxa in 401, Artaxerxes seems to have employed at least some solid infantry formations, with separate units of bowmen (Xen.An. 1.8.9–10). In the fourth century the Persians may have attempted to equip some of their own troops in hoplite fashion (on these see Sekunda 1992: 52–3, Briant 1999: 120–22). They certainly made increasing use of Greek hoplite mercenaries.
Classical cavalry formations depended on armament and mission. Light cavalry discharging missiles in relays or caracoles required a looser arrangement, while deep, tight formations were better for charges. Most Greek cavalry drew up in squares or wedges, though the Thessalians preferred rhombus or diamond arrays (Spence 1993: 109, 178). Some Persian cavalry in Asia Minor used an extremely deep column that easily bested a four-deep Greek mounted line (Xen. Hell. 3.4.13–14). As Xenophon’s manual on cavalry command reveals, riders and mounts required intensive training to maneuver effectively. Persian horses were sometimes specifically trained to fight hoplites (Hdt. 5.111).
Peltasts and other light troops fought in open order, sometimes dispersed enough for charging cavalry to pass harmlessly through (Xen. An. 1.10.6). The absence of regular ranks and files, though, did not leave light infantry free to roam across a battlefield. Officers needed to be able to move their units, direct their fire, and withdraw or rally them when necessary. How officers maintained control goes unrecorded in our sources, but it may be that trumpet calls or other signals were used to control the movements of light troops. Skirmishers may also have practiced prearranged battle drills, lessening their need to receive orders while in combat.
BATTLE
Though most of the evidence for pitched battle between phalanxes comes from the Peloponnesian War, Greek armies were fighting such battles throughout the early and mid-fifth century, in mainland Greece and elsewhere. Some were extremely bloody affairs: perhaps up to four hundred of the one thousand Argive allies of Athens who fought at Tanagra in 458/7 were killed (ML no. 35; Thuc. 1.108). Despite intensive scholarly scrutiny, the mechanics of pitched battle between two phalanxes remain obscure. Some see a hoplite clash as a literal shoving match, while others take the term othismos (“pushing”), used in ancient battle descriptions, more metaphorically (Wheeler 2007b: 205–13). Men may have begun with spear thrusts over the wall of their own shields, aiming for eyes and exposed limbs. As spears shattered and ranks broke down, they could resort to swords and broken spear ends. At some point one side would recoil or break. If troops discarded shields to flee in panic, their victorious opponents could easily cut them down (figure 6.2).
Figure 6.2 Attic grave relief depicting hoplite battle, with detail of the inner construction of the hoplite’s shield, late fifth century B.C.. Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York. Fletcher fund (40.11.23). Photo Credit: L. Tritle.
While phalanx-on-phalanx clashes among Greek poleis did display some ritual elements, including speeches, sacrifices, and post-battle truces, much of what used to be considered archaic and agonistic in Greek battle probably evolved as nostalgia for an imagined past in the fifth century (so Krentz 2002). The search for the “typical” phalanx clash, at any rate, has obscured the diversity of activity that could appear in pitched battle between hoplites. In 425, for example, an Athenian force of hoplites and cavalry made an amphibious landing at Solygeia in Corinthian territory. The Corinthians hurried troops to meet them, resulting in a seesaw battle where hoplites took shelter in a village and behind walls, threw stones, and alternately gave ground without either side fleeing the field (Thuc. 4.42–44).
The mechanics of pitched battle between hoplites and non-hoplite infantry are extremely difficult to elucidate. Herodotus writes of the fighting between Greeks and Persians at Marathon, Plataea, and Mycale as long and drawn out (Hdt. 6.113, 9.62.2, 9.102.2). While such descriptions could be mere rhetorical flourish, they might just have some basis in reality, considering the looser structure of the early classical phalanx, and the nature of the tall Persian shields, which created a barrier between opposing forces. At Plataea and Mycale, only after the Persian shields fell did the two sides come to close quarters. With their inferior armor and shorter hand weapons, the Persians were then at a disadvantage. Persian soldiers may also been less inclined or trained to keep in formation, instead dashing out to attack in small groups, as they did against the Greek line at Plataea. Further pitched battles between Greeks and Persians occurred after Mycale, notably in Egypt in the 460s (Diod. 11.74), but little evidence survives about their conduct. Xenophon’s description of Cunaxa in 401, though, makes no mention of a shield wall or of mixed archer–spearman formations, but focuses on the solid blocks of Persian infantry and on the rapid Persian flight when faced with a hoplite charge.
Greek literary descriptions such as Xenophon’s have led some to conclude that Persians eschewed close-in fighting in favor of missiles, but Achaemenid art shows differently. Grave stelae, tomb paintings, and cylinder seals depict Persians victorious in close combat (Mellink 1972: 267; Bruns-Özgan 1987: 290; Boardman 1988: 66–7; Sevinç et al. 2001; Summerer 2007b). Whether or not they depict specific historical events, the prominence of such scenes reveals that Persians as well as Greeks valorized victory in close combat. Some Persian commanders even became experts at making sudden cavalry attacks on disorganized infantry (Xen. An. 6.4.24–5, Hell. 4.1.17).
The Persians may also have taken the first steps toward combined arms tactics that employed infantry, cavalry, and supporting troops in tandem. At Malene in Asia Minor (494?), the Persians under Harpagos defeated rebel Greeks by using an infantry assault combined with a cavalry flank attack (Hdt. 6.29). The literary record is backed by Achaemenid art from Anatolia, which shows many scenes of combined arms attack. To coordinate their units, the Persians pioneered the use of battlefield standards (Hdt. 9.59.2; Xen.An. 1.10.12–13). They were not always successful: at Plataea, their commanders failed to mesh infantry and cavalry assaults (Hdt. 9.23, 9.59). Persian commanders continued to innovate throughout the period. Cyrus’s tactics at Cunaxa, where he fought his brother Artaxerxes for the Achaemenid throne, provide a good illustration. Cyrus attempted to fix the opposing line with his infantry, then charged straight for the enemy commander at a crucial moment—foreshadowing the tactics that Alexander would use (Xen. An. 1.8.12–26). By the 390s, Persian commanders in Anatolia seem to have become quite familiar with how to deploy combined arms forces for battle (Xen. Hell. 3.2.15).
Other early steps in the development of combined arms warfare occurred on Sicily. In 480 Gelon of Syracuse was the first Greek to field a true combined arms army, with hoplites, cavalry, archers, slingers, and other light troops (Hdt. 7.158; Diod. 11.21.1; Sekunda 1994: 179–80). In mainland Greece, cavalry and infantry were used together early on, at first without much coordination. The Pisistratids, for example, twice used Thessalian cavalry against Spartan invaders, but on both occasions the cavalry seems to have attacked separately (Hdt. 5.63–4). Athenian hoplites and archers fought well together at Plataea, and in 458 an Athenian force of hoplites and light troops maneuvering in concert trapped and annihilated part of a retreating Corinthian army near Megara (Thuc. 1.106). By the outset of the Peloponnesian War, commanders were well aware of the need to coordinate different arms. At Potidaea in 432, for instance, the Corinthian Aristeus planned to trap advancing Athenians between his own infantry and allied cavalry (Thuc. 1.62). At Spartolus in 429, both the Athenians and their Chalcidian opponents deployed mixed forces of hoplites, cavalry, and light infantry; the Athenians lost because their light troops were unable to support their hoplites effectively (Thuc. 2.79). During and after the Peloponnesian War, Greek commanders practiced combined arms battle, and Epaminondas, perhaps the greatest classical polis tactician, might have continued to innovate had he not been killed at Mantinea in 362 (on Epaminondas see further Buckler 657–70).
The Spartan take on combined arms was to develop the tactic of “running out”—sending the youngest, swiftest hoplites out from a phalanx in a countercharge against attacking infantry or cavalry. The Spartans typically dispatched the first ten age classes (ages 20–29), although in desperate situations the first fifteen classes (ages 20–34) might go (Xen. Ages. 1.31, Hell. 3.4.23, 4.5.14–16, 4.6.10, 5.4.40). “Running out” worked so well that the Spartans in the early fourth century became dismissive of the peltast threat (Xen.Hell. 4.4.16–17). Their overconfidence caught up with them at Lechaeum near Corinth in 390, where Athenian peltasts and hoplites working in tandem cut down most of the men of a Spartan mora (brigade) despite its resort to the tactic. Armies without age classes developed their own versions of “running out,” and the Athenians may have adopted an age-class system in the mid-fourth century at least partly in order to emulate the Spartan technique (see Lee 2007: 74–5).
Another style of combined arms fighting entailed the use of cavalry and light infantry together in the same unit. Such a combination seems to have been first used by Gelon of Syracuse in the 480s (Hdt. 7.158.4; Spence 1993: 30). From the middle years of the Peloponnesian War light infantry known as hamippoi ran into battle alongside cavalry; the Boeotians made frequent use of them (Thuc. 5.57). Others, including the Athenians, adopted the fashion during the fourth century.4
Hoplites could also respond to light infantry and cavalry by forming a hollow square (plaision). The tactic is first attested in 423, when the Spartan commander Brasidas formed his troops into a rectangle to ward off attacking Lyncestians (Thuc. 4.125). A decade later the Athenians in Sicily used the plaision (Thuc. 6.67.1, 7.78.2). The Cyrean mercenaries, on their retreat up the Tigris and across Anatolia, perfected the plaision, even using it to protect their baggage and noncombatants on long marches (see further Lee 2007: 155–63). Through the Cyreans the formation reached the Spartan army in Asia Minor, and was used by Agesilaus (Xen. Hell. 4.3.4). Infantry squares worked best when they were not purely passive. Brasidas, for instance, deployed his youngest soldiers to countercharge attacking troops. The Cyreans, and later Agesilaus, used their own cavalry and light troops to bite back (Thuc. 4.125; Xen. An. 4.2.16, 7.3.46).
Cavalry was important but not dominant on the classical battlefield. At Plataea, Theban horsemen covered the Persian retreat, staving off total disaster (Hdt. 9.68). Soon after the Athenian Aristides proposed a joint Hellenic force of infantry and cavalry to fight the Persians (Plut. Arist. 21). Cavalry were difficult to transport by sea, though, and the major Greek operations of the 470s–460s were overseas, limiting its use. The Athenian democracy, moreover, was not interested in supporting an aristocratic cavalry force. The Athenians tried to compensate with allied Thessalian cavalry, but these were sometimes unreliable. At Tanagra in 458/7, the Thessalians went over to the Spartans, perhaps causing the Athenians to lose the battle (Thuc. 1.107; Diod. Sic. 11.80). In the Peloponnesian War, cavalry was employed to harass invaders, screen advances, and conduct reconnaissance (Thuc. 3.1). Horsemen were often relegated to the wings of phalanxes for pitched battle, but cavalry charges were decisive factors in some battles, especially when against surprised or outflanked enemies (Thuc. 2.79.6, 4.44.1, 4.94.5). Agesilaus during his Asia Minor campaign and during the wars against Thebes had some success with cavalry in combined arms battle (Xen. Hell. 5.4.39–40). So too did Epaminondas in the 370s and 360s. Not until the age of Philip II, though, would the mounted arm achieve its fullest use.
OTHER KINDS OF FIGHTING
Pitched battle was not the only sort of combat. Across the classical world, raids, skirmishes, and border spats were common. All types of soldiers, including hoplites, participated in these actions. Hoplites, archers, and javelin men also found increasing use as marines in naval battles. Siege warfare became increasingly common in the Aegean during the mid-fifth century B.C., as the Athenian empire expanded. The Athenians besieging Samos in 440 are said to have been the first Greeks to use rams and covered platforms to attack city walls continuously (Plut. Per. 27.3; Diod. 12.27–28; Green 2006: 219–20; Strauss 2007: 237–8). Sicily, where siege artillery was first developed, also witnessed numerous sieges and assaults on city walls. Perhaps the most famous of these occurred at Motya in 397, where Dionysius I employed catapults, rams, and wheeled towers to force his way into the city (Diod. 14.49–53). Classical soldiers also found themselves building and defending field fortifications, at Pylos, around Sicily, in Asia Minor, and elsewhere.
Surprise attacks were not unknown even at the start of the classical era, and they continued to be used throughout the period. In 546 Pisistratus finally succeeded in gaining control of Athens by attacking the Athenian army just after it had finished its midday meal (Hdt. 1.62). In the 460s, the Athenian Cimon disguised part of his force with captured Persian gear, enabling him to raid a Persian encampment at the Eurymedon after dark (Diod. 111.61; cf. Polyaenus, Strat. 1.34.1). Throughout the period, men who left camp to forage for food or firewood had to face the possibility of surprise attack, especially from enemy cavalry. Surprise attacks on cities continued on into the fourth century, and the military writer Aeneas Tacticus devoted particular attention to defense against such assaults.
Urban combat was another notable aspect of the classical battle experience. From the allied Greek assault on Sardis in 498 (Hdt. 5.99–102), to the battles in Syracuse throughout the 460s (Diod. 11.67–76), to the Athenian civil war of 403 (Xen. Hell. 3.4.11–19, 3.4.30–34), soldiers found themselves fighting in houses and streets, temples and marketplaces. In such situations, formations and command control often broke down, as men slaughtered each other savagely in dark corners of cities. Women played an important role in urban combat, often by throwing tiles and stones from rooftops (urban combat: Lee 2010; women and urban warfare: Hornblower 2007: 43–6).
CONCLUSIONS
The story of classical battle is often told through the famous clashes of Marathon, Thermopylae, Mantinea, and Delium. While these struggles deserve the attention they receive, taking a wider look reveals how much more research remains to be done. In addition to moving beyond mainland Greece to look at regional developments in the eastern and western Mediterranean, there is much room for additional work on the Persian army and on other non-Greek military forces of the period. The study of classical battle might benefit greatly from archaeological reconstruction of arms and armor, and from practical experiments performed under controlled scholarly conditions. These methods have been utilized with great success in Roman army studies, but have so far seen little use in regard to Greek warfare (Griffiths 2000 is good reading for those considering this approach; Aldrete et al. 2013 demonstrate the potential of archaeological reconstruction for classical equipment studies).
Battlefield archaeology also has the potential to yield rich rewards. While archaeological survey of many battle sites may be impractical, analysis of urban battle at excavated sites such as Olynthus or new surveys of isolated battle locales such as Sphacteria may produce new evidence to supplement the existing body of textual and material evidence. Mortuary studies of classical battlefield dead also have great promise. Some of the most famous monuments, that might have yielded material for such studies, were dug up late in the nineteenth century and never properly examined. Recent work on the surviving Theban and Macedonian skeletal remains from the field of Chaeronea casts new light on the gruesome battle injuries that classical soldiers suffered, and on the use of monuments to reshape memories of the battle (Ma 2008). And there is always the possibility of new evidence. In Sicily near the site of ancient Himera, archaeologists have recently uncovered mass graves of soldiers, apparently casualties of several fifth-century clashes involving Greeks and Carthaginians (Vassallo 2009). When fully excavated and studied, this unprecedented collection of remains will undoubtedly further reshape our understanding of battle in the Classical world.
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