CHAPTER 8
JOHN SERRATI
THE Hellenistic world was born out of warfare and its history was largely forged by military developments. The period itself is bracketed by Alexander’s conquest of the East and the Roman defeat of Ptolemaic Egypt. In the intervening three centuries, Macedonian kings fought each other frequently, marshaling vast resources to field armies of unprecedented size. Warfare in the Hellenistic world affected nearly every aspect of life for people living in the Greek East at the time. So much so that it is amazing our sources even bother to write about its specifics at all, so familiar must every person have been with the composition of armies, arms, armor, soldiers and soldiering, and the impact of conflict on the civilian landscape. Mercenaries—the bulk of Hellenistic armies—came from all walks of life and from all over the Mediterranean and Near East. They were also often used as garrison forces and quartered upon the civilian population. Moreover, representations of warfare appeared in art, pottery, on inscriptions and coinage. War was the principal subject of both histories and technical manuals from the period, and was, either in the form of negotiations, treaties, or combat, the main form of contact between governments (see Chaniotis 2005: 2–3, 243, 247; on warfare in art cf. Rice 1993: 225–7).
While conflict may have been as ubiquitous among the Greeks of the first half of the fourth century, warfare—except for Sparta—never played such a defining role in the culture of the classical world as it did for the Hellenistic Macedonians, who have been accurately described as hyper-imperialist (Eckstein 2006: 101–13). As in the time before Philip II, Macedonian society in the fourth and third centuries was still one of tribal warrior elites. Macedonian generals of the Hellenistic world still had to prove their worth by fighting from the front as their predecessors had, and traditionally kings were merely seen as the chieftains commanding fellow warriors in battle, the first among equals (see Beston 2000; Walbank 1984: 81–4). As such, although some accounts, both ancient and modern, often highlight the role of the commander in a given campaign, most primary sources would lead us to believe that victory in battle was more of a collective achievement (e.g., Diod. 18.50.2, 5, 54.4; Plut. Demetr. 15.3, Eum. 12.1; cf. Austin: 455; Errington 1976: 158–9). The Macedonian warrior ethos speaks a great deal about why conflict was ever present in the Hellenistic period. Warfare was what the Diadochi, the Successors of Alexander, did. They were both generals and fighters; in theory, like all Macedonian kings, they should have possessed the ability to plan and undertake a massive campaign, outmaneuver an opposing army, outline a solid battlefield strategy, and then personally lead men into the thick of combat. Not only did this attitude diminish a general’s efficiency on the battlefield—commanding thousands of men with no reliable system of communication must have been difficult enough without having to fight as well—but it moreover exposed a commander to far greater risk, and Hellenistic monarchs suffered accordingly; death in battle was common (cf. Sabin and de Souza 2007: 406–9; Wheeler 1991: 121–3).
The history of the Hellenistic world is a reflection of this warrior ethos among the Diadochi; the empire of Alexander was in fact a Macedonian one, as it had been won by both commander and subordinate. And because no obvious successor to Alexander had emerged, why should the Diadochi not fight each other for the spoils for which they had spent over a decade campaigning? Why should the empire not go to the one who proved himself strongest? This was what would have happened in the age before Philip II, and therefore it should come as no surprise that this happened after the death of Alexander, only the scale of the warfare had changed.
The basic unit of the Hellenistic army remained the phalanx as used by Philip II and Alexander. Once the elite Macedonian cavalry that conquered Persia retired or died, the phalanx returned to the place that it had occupied in the classical world as the main arm of Greek military forces. Other aspects of classical warfare persisted long after the age of the polis had waned. War and government finances continued to be closely linked and the profits of campaigns were still expected to enable further military and political advances for one’s state. Good agricultural lands remained prime targets for conquest, and places with abundant forests were still prized as wood was necessary for shipbuilding. Navies retained their importance among the Greek states, and in this realm tactics, mostly ramming, boarding, and breaking the enemy’s oars, were largely unaltered. As much as there was continuity, however, there was even greater change. Primarily, armies were now massive in comparison to their classical predecessors. In 317 at Paraetacene, Antigonus and Eumenes fielded armies with a combined total of nearly 80,000 troops, while by the time of Raphia exactly a century later, the forces of Antiochus III and Ptolemy IV Philopater totaled nearly 140,000 (Diod. 19.27–8; Polyb. 5.79). Battles became geographically colossal affairs in the Hellenistic world, covering entire plains or valleys. Wars themselves were no longer confined to local conflicts and border disputes where phalanxes would simply meet on a field and decide the issue in a relatively short time span. Conflicts now involved fully fledged campaigns where generals might maneuver over vast expanses for months at a time before coming to battle. As a result, commanders themselves were forced to become more professional, scrupulously planning and preparing campaigns as well as studying both their opponents as well as warfare in general. To further this cause, the Hellenistic world witnessed a proliferation of technical manuals concerning the art of war (see further Chaniotis, 445–8).
Not only were generals more accomplished, but the enormous armies they commanded were now composed largely of mercenaries, professionals whose only job was fighting. Unlike the citizen soldiers of classical Greece, mercenaries had to be paid and could even command significant sums as well as benefits and bonuses. This combination of lengthy campaigns with sizable and expensive armies meant that Hellenistic states had to command substantial resources for both pay and supply. This was by far the greatest change experienced within Hellenistic warfare; although, as previously stated, the link between warfare and finances was not new, Hellenistic states required new sources of revenue in order to raise the capital necessary to equip and feed an army and to execute a campaign. For the first time in the Greek world states emerge whose economies are completely geared toward furthering their military aims. In fact, it would be no exaggeration to state that Hellenistic economies largely existed to enable their monarchs to make war.
In respect of Hellenistic armies, numerous themes such as strategy and tactics, recruitment and composition of armies and navies, siege warfare, arms and armor, and individual campaigns, wars, and rulers have all received extensive treatment in recent decades.1More recent contributions have shone light on heretofore neglected areas such as imperialism, finance, and the social and cultural impact of warfare (e.g., Austin 1986, Archibald 2001; Billows 1995; Lévêque 1968; Serrati 2007). Scholarly attention is also shifting away from the great Successor states and their armies so as to examine forces and conflicts on the level of the polis, illustrating continuities with the classical world and how these minor players dealt with the changes in the political and military landscape that were forced upon them by the large-scale warfare of the age (Baker 2003; Bernand 1999; Chaniotis 2005; Ma 2000).
THE COMPOSITION OF ARMIES
Infantry
The use of infantry can be divided into two phases. In the decades following the death of Alexander, tactics, the composition of armies, and orders of battle remained much as before: the phalanx, supported by a host of specialized units, was used to either keep an enemy in place or, through its size, to force an opponent onto specific ground. Meanwhile, elite cavalry and infantry would act as the main offensive arm, outflanking the enemy, often by defeating its cavalry, or exploiting gaps in its formations, thus, in theory, bringing about victory. As under Alexander and Philip, the success of the late fourth and third century phalanx was due in no small part to the rigorous training and drill that each soldier received (on this see Arr. Anab. 7.23.1–4; Curt. 8.5.1; Diod. 17.108.1–3). Indeed, the maneuvers executed by the Macedonian phalanx in the fourth and early third centuries, in particular the use of feigned retreats, no easy feat for soldiers carrying six-and-a-half-m pikes, could not have been undertaken without intense practice and preparation (Diod. 16.86; Polyaenus, Strat. 4.2.2). The Macedonian infantryman was also a tough soldier (e.g., Diod. 18.7.2, 9.3, 29.5; Just. 11.6.4; Plut. Eum. 16.4). But once the generations that had fought with Philip, Alexander, and their Successors died off, we notice a marked shift in tactics: the phalanx reverted to its archaic and classical roots and became the centerpiece of the Hellenistic army (so Hammond 1984: 51–4). The heavy reliance of Hellenistic forces upon mercenaries as well as the establishment of epilektoi—picked, or elite, troops—by some Greek states ensured that armies remained professional, but these did not compare with the drill and precision of the forces commanded by Philip and Alexander. The lack of elite cavalry and the decline of well-trained Macedonian infantry meant that from the mid to late third century onward the phalanx no longer had its earlier maneuverability, thus battles became slogging matches between opposing phalanxes, which had ballooned in size in an attempt to compensate for the lack of quality soldiers. This swollen phalanx became rigid and increasingly immobile. Since Hellenistic generals seldom attempted to address this shortcoming, mostly because they found themselves fighting armies similar to their own, they had no answer when later forced to fight opponents employing more adaptable forces, most notably Parthia and Rome.
Another factor limiting the mobility of the Hellenistic phalanx was the famous sarissa, a pike made from cornel cherry wood that varied in length from six-and-a-half to seven-and-a-half m (Polyb. 18.29.1; Arr. Anab. 1.15.5, on cornel cherry wood). This was a phalangite’s principal weapon and originated with the military reforms of Philip II. The sarissa featured a large iron point at the top of the heavy wooden pole. A heavy spear butt acted as a counterbalance; this could also be dug into the ground in order to provide extra defensive power, as an ad hoc spear should the blade break, and to spike the weapon when not in use. It provided the phalanx with tremendous power in attack and made it virtually impenetrable to frontal assaults, particularly by cavalry. Nonetheless, thesarissa was cumbersome and could prove unwieldy; at the same time it severely limited the phalanx’s ability to turn or maneuver once engaged, and left the formation vulnerable to flank and rear assaults.
The length of the weapon meant that only the soldiers of the first five ranks of the phalanx could level their pikes, the remainder held their sarissai pointed upward, acting as a screen against missiles. As a result, while all soldiers wore helmets, only the first five ranks had any type of body armor, usually a metal or leather cuirass and greaves. As two hands were required for the sarissa, the shield, or aspis, which was significantly smaller than the classical hoplon, was held by a strap around the neck. The phalangite’s armament was rounded out by a short sword for use in close combat should the phalanx be broken. All of this equipment was unlikely to have been provided by the state and was probably owned and maintained by each individual soldier, as in classical times. In the Hellenistic world this would have been doubly true as so many military personnel were now mercenaries. Thus, other than with individual mercenary battalions, and possibly not even here, there would have been little in the way of uniformity between soldiers beyond the aspis and the sarissa.
The first-century military theoretician Asclepiodotus provides us with a schema of the subdivisions of the Macedonian phalanx (Ascl. 2.1, 8–10). Modern authors have long dismissed his work, along with that of Aelianus, as pure theory, an account of how a Hellenistic army appeared on paper only. As such these works present the phalanx in such a highly formulaic and schematized fashion that they are of little practical use to the modern scholar. While there is no doubt that both Asclepiodotus and Aelianus present the phalanx as it would appear at full paper strength and with little attention to the differences that may have developed between armies of the Successor states, an examination of the evidence argues that nearly all of their terminology for the subdivisions of the phalanx appears not only in mainstream ancient authors, including Arrian and Polybius, but also in contemporary papyrological and epigraphic sources. In fact Asclepiodotus never claims to be writing from the perspective of an actual campaign. All organized military forces exist, even if only in theory, at full strength and with the utilization of every unit. Therefore, used with caution and with the knowledge that practical considerations, chronological evolution, and geographic differences would have altered each army’s phalanx, there remains no a priori reason to dismiss these tactical manuals; indeed contemporary Hellenistic evidence often bears out their veracity.
The Hellenistic phalanx then largely followed the model of Philip and Alexander. The main subdivision of the phalanx was the syntagma of 256 soldiers. While the term is largely unknown outside of Asclepiodotus (2.8), it would make practical sense as it provided a commander with a perfect sixteen-by-sixteen square. This would also agree with Polybius who notes that the Hellenistic phalanx was typically sixteen ranks deep; this is also the smallest formation to feature commanders who operated outside of its ranks (Ascl. 2.9; Polyb. 18.30.1). Thus it would follow that all higher and lower divisions emanated from this unit itself. The first such section was the taxis, which we are told consisted of 128 men. The use of the taxis is well known in the armies of Alexander and the Successors, and in fact the term itself is very old. Unfortunately, the sources sometimes use it in a vague context: sometimes it means no more than “formation,” a group of soldiers of unspecified size operating outside of the larger phalanx.
The phalanx was then furthermore broken down into the tetrarchia and the dilochia of sixty-four and thirty-two men respectively. Both terms are found in source material beyond the tactical writers, and there is no reason to doubt that Hellenistic infantry operated in such subdivisions. The same cannot be said, however, for the lochos of sixteen men, supposedly the smallest component of the Macedonian phalanx. The existence of such a unit would be logical given Polybius’s statement that Hellenistic phalanxes tended to be sixteen ranks deep; nonetheless, like taxis, lochos is also an old military term. It is also not found in contemporary Hellenistic sources. Thus, while the sixteen-by-sixteen square makes such a subdivision theoretically possible, there is no evidence for the term’s authenticity.
We are on firmer ground when it comes to the larger sections of the phalanx which, like its subdivisions, appear to have been based on the 256-man syntagma. Papyrological evidence attests to the existence of the pentakosiarchia of 512 soldiers, while thechiliarchia of 1,024 was a unit used frequently by Alexander. Polybius, along with other sources, confirms the use of a telos, also called a merarches, of 2,048, as well as the phalangarchia of 4,096 and the diphalangia, 8,192. Thus Asclepiodotus’s phalanx, on paper, would have had a full strength of 16,384 soldiers divided into 1,024 columns, each sixteen ranks deep. Such a number, of course, must remain theoretical and cannot represent an ideal sought by Alexander or the Successors. All that we can truly say is that the Hellenistic phalanx, regardless of its size, and there must have been tremendous variations here, was a highly organized component of the Macedonian-style army; its basis appears to have been the syntagma square with multiples of this unit existing at larger and smaller levels. These, furthermore, appear to have been more or less universal in a Macedonian Hellenistic context. Considering the sizes of the armies fielded by the great powers of the third and second centuries, the utilization of such divisions and subdivisions for the phalanx only stands to reason as a testament to the high degree of organization and the professionalism which characterized the forces of the time. Evidence attests to the phalanx’s great level of efficiency on the battlefield and the existence of a multi-tiered command-and-control structure should be seen as a major contributing factor toward its success.
After the mid-third century the phalanx had become the main arm of Macedonian military formations and developed into an offensive shock weapon. Battlefield tactics were designed around its movements and its purpose was now to overwhelm the enemy with its initial charge. When this did not happen, as was frequent, battles were decided on lengthy close-quarter combats pitting phalanx against phalanx. This was inevitable given the very limited mobility of the Hellenistic phalanx, something its architect Philip had never intended. As individual soldiers became less adept in the use of the sarissa, fears increased that gaps would appear in the formation and break its cohesion; the phalanx then could do little save charge forward, and once engaged it was next to impossible to extricate itself from combat without creating chaos. Moreover, even if it could maneuver, its scope was limited to level ground, and plains that could accommodate upward of one hundred thousand infantrymen were often scarce. Simply put, there is no doubt that the charge of such a phalanx could be devastating and that the formation was still impregnable to frontal assault by cavalry. But its limitations greatly outweighed its strengths, particularly when its flanks were not protected, and it would prove no match for generals who understood its weaknesses. Thus by the second century, when Macedonian-style forces came into contact with armies that did not use the phalanx, we see a number of tactics used against it.
The most effective way to counter the power of the Hellenistic phalanx was to attack its vulnerable flanks and rear. Soldiers using the sarissa found it difficult to turn in order to meet an enemy not advancing toward its front, and this combined with the rear eleven ranks being unarmored meant that such attacks were usually devastating and very often decisive. Occasionally this involved sending a force around the battle line and surprising the enemy from behind. Such a tactic, according to Polybius (18.26), was used by the Romans against the phalanx of Philip V at Cynoscephalae in 197 when one of Flamininus’s tribunes seized an opportunity and marched his troops around the Macedonians after emerging victorious on their right wing.
Such opportunities were rare, and the preferred tactic of opponents was the flank attack. This could be achieved through stripping away the phalanx’s protective cavalry by either drawing it away from the phalanx, as was done to Demetrius’s horse at Ipsus in 301, or by defeating them outright as the Romans and their allies did at Magnesia against Antiochus III. This stratagem was widely known, even among the Macedonians, who often used it against one another. However, its chances of success improved remarkably with the decline in quality of Hellenistic cavalry in the third century. The phalanx was also vulnerable when on broken ground as this caused gaps to appear within its formation. Enemy soldiers could exploit these openings where they usually found the phalangites, encumbered as they were by the sarissa and otherwise lightly armed and often poorly trained, to be easy targets. This tactic was frequently used, the most famous example being Aemilius Paullus’s crushing defeat over the Macedonian Perseus at Pydna in 168 (Frontin. Str. 2.3.20; Livy 41.6–8; Plut. Aem. 20.4).
A more straightforward yet less effective maneuver against the phalanx was to use lighter-armed troops to hack into its frontal wall of spear-points. We have only one reference to this tactic being undertaken with any success: Polyaenus (Strat. 2.29.2) relates its use by the Spartan Cleonymus against a Macedonian phalanx at Edessa in the early 270s. If a flanking maneuver proved impossible or broken ground not available, then this was perhaps the only option for cutting open a Hellenistic phalanx. By slicing off their spear-points the sarissai were rendered useless, so permitting a frontal charge where the phalangites would be forced to fight individually. The tactic involved considerable danger: we are told that a sarissa had to be physically grabbed and held fast with one hand while the soldier sliced into its shaft with his sword. In doing so he exposed himself to vicious counterattack. Such was the action at Pydna, where the Romans inflicted great losses upon the Macedonians, but themselves suffered terribly. Nonetheless the Romans persevered, eventually drawing the Macedonians onto broken ground and so destroying the Macedonian phalanx (Livy 44.41–42).
Once the phalanx went from an integral piece in a combined and balanced force to an army’s main weapon, it had exceeded its abilities. Without accompanying units of sufficient number and training, the phalanx’s weaknesses were too many and were too easily exploited once the Hellenistic states moved from fighting each other to facing foreign, well-trained, and experienced armies from abroad.
There were, however, exceptions to the static tactics of the late third and second centuries. Some generals did comprehend the weaknesses of the phalanx and indeed attempted reform. In fact, this process began with Alexander. At Gaugamela in 331, a Macedonian army employed a reserve force for the first time. This innovation immediately paid dividends as Alexander won the battle by throwing this reserve force at the Persians, thus saving the phalanx, then suffering from the fierce attacks of Persian cavalry (Arr. Anab. 3.12–14.6; Curt. 4.13.30–2). But perhaps the only true exception to the static nature of tactics in the Hellenistic world was Pyrrhus of Epirus. More than anyone else who followed the age of Alexander and his immediate Successors, Pyrrhus evidently comprehended the decline in the quality of cavalry and use of combined forces and attempted to address these problems as well as the failings of the phalanx. Against the Romans at Ausculum (279) he deployed local levies of Italians at intervals alongside his own phalanx, not only guarding against flanking maneuvers, but also lessening the damage that a gap in the phalanx would cause (Polyb. 18.28.10). Upon returning to Greece he introduced this light-armed soldier, the thureophoros, into Hellenistic armies. Thethureophoros fought principally with javelin and sword while protecting himself with the thureos, a large oval shield used in Italy by Pyrrhus’s allies as well as his Roman opponents.2 The mobile thureophoroi were much better suited to rough terrain than phalangites. They could be deployed ahead of the phalanx as skirmishers or along its flanks for protection. As at Ausculum, they could be interspersed among the phalangites in order to fill any gaps that might develop. From Tarentum, Pyrrhus also brought back mounted javelin men for use as mobile missile cavalry, perhaps also to compensate for the lack of well-trained heavy Macedonian horsemen no longer available. These swift riders could be used as skirmishers and as a supplement to cavalry who protected the flanks of the phalanx. They could also be employed as an attacking force to strike at the flanks or rear of an enemy phalanx. Adopted by many Hellenistic armies after Pyrrhus, they became known universally as “Tarentines” regardless of their origin (see e.g., IG 2.2.2975; Arr. Tact. 4.5–6; Diod. 19.29.2, 5, 39.2–6; Livy 37.40.13; Polyb. 16.18.7; also Bugh 2006: 273–5). After Pyrrhus, we find little in the way of innovation in infantry tactics until the mid-second century when military forces began abandoning the phalanx altogether.
Nevertheless, while thureophoroi and Tarentines were first seen in Hellenistic times, Greek and Macedonian armies had earlier developed other types of specialized units. These include the hypaspists and argyraspides of Alexander’s day (see further Heckel 162–78). While generally considered to be one and the same, Diodorus (19.28.1) clearly distinguishes between them in his description of Eumenes’s army at Paraetacene. Both appear to have been elite units trained to fight with multiple weapons and were thus able to undertake highly specialized missions. We find them fighting with sarissai in phalanx formation in pitched battles, usually in a central role and often proving the difference between victory and defeat. At Paraetacene they were the deciding factor in the rout of Antigonus’s phalanx, and of them Diodorus (19.30.5–6) says,
Eumenes’s men were victorious because of the Macedonian argyraspides. These soldiers were already advanced in years, but because of their superior skill and bravery, no one confronting them was able to withstand their strength. Therefore, although there were only three thousand of them, they were the spearhead of the entire army.
We are later (19.41.2) told that “all of them are irresistible in battle due to their experience and strength, these skills and their bravery being acquired through great exposure to combat.” Such skills extended beyond the phalanx, and we also find them undertaking specialized missions where swift movements over rough terrain were required. Such types of troops were courted by many of the Successors who sought their services for their own armies.
The hypaspists and the Silver Shields, regardless of whether they were one and the same, were regiments that fought primarily under Alexander and were then utilized by his successors until they retired or died in battle. Afterward, Hellenistic leaders continued the tradition of having specialized infantry units that were distinguished by the color of their shields.
Many Greek states never thought beyond the phalanx and were thus absorbed in quick succession by Rome. However, those that avoided or escaped being conquered rapidly began to abandon the formation in favor of using armies entirely made up of troops likethureophoroi and the argyraspides as well as soldiers that were armed as Roman legionaries, who by now had emerged as the most effective and deadly fighters in the Mediterranean world. The Seleucids and the Ptolemies began moving toward the Roman system as early as the mid-second century and gradually others followed suit (Sekunda and de Souza 2007: 354–6). The process peaked with Mithridates VI of Pontus, who by the 70s at the latest had an army that featured Roman-style infantry at its core supported by specialized units of thureophoroi and chalcaspides (Caes. Alex. 39–40; Frontin. Str. 2.3.17; Plut. Luc. 7.4, Sull. 16.7). Thus by the first century the Macedonian phalanx was no more; the formation, bristling with sarissai and nearly impregnable to frontal assault, had done excellent service within the armies of Philip and Alexander, but here it was just one weapon in the highly trained Macedonian army. After the third century the phalanx became the primary offensive arm of Hellenistic armies, a role for which it was never intended. Combined with a decline in the quality of the phalangite and his commander, the phalanx was hopelessly outmatched when dealing with more mobile and better-trained forces.
Cavalry
In the army that conquered Asia, the Macedonian cavalry was the main striking arm of the combined force. Horsemen were highly trained, often from birth, and as a result their movements were swift, exact, and often decisive. Not only did they protect the wings of the infantry phalanx, they also created and exploited gaps in the enemy’s formation, executing complicated flanking maneuvers, as at Gaugamela. This cavalry took its final bow at Ipsus in 301, by which time most of Alexander’s veterans were either dead or had retired. After Ipsus the purpose of heavy cavalry in the Greek armies of the Hellenistic world was primarily to protect the wings of the phalanx. Defeating opposite numbers of cavalry was a bonus, as this might expose the enemy infantry to a flank attack. But the priority was always defensive in making sure that the phalanx could advance without hindrance. And therefore rarely was their role any longer decisive.
What brought about the demise in the use of cavalry and a rise in the importance of the phalanx in Hellenistic armies was not a priori a decline in the number of horsemen employed and deployed by commanders, as sometimes argued, but a decline first and foremost in quality (cf. Spence 1993: 157, n.145, 177; Sage 1996: 206; Sekunda and de Souza 2007: 345). Simply put, Hellenistic monarchs were unwilling to make an investment in elite cavalry. Horsemen who possessed the skill common among the Companion cavalry of Philip and Alexander took generations to produce. If military horsemanship is not culturally ingrained within an aristocracy, as in fourth-century Macedonia and medieval Western Europe, then tremendous resources must be marshalled toward the procurement, training, and provisioning of capable men and, perhaps more importantly, horses. As the Successors decided that such commitments were not attainable, then a decline in the quality of cavalry was inevitable. Once this occurred, infantry naturally regained its primacy on the battlefield, and, with that, the need for cavalry diminished and ipso facto smaller and smaller numbers were recruited. The successful use of cavalry by Philip and Alexander should not be seen as the ushering in of a new era, but as a blip, a brief period where horses decided the outcome of battles; afterward, though numbers were still larger than what had been witnessed in the classical world, the role of cavalry in combat was decidedly secondary (see Gaebel 2002: 261–2).
In other areas, however, Hellenistic heavy cavalry, often called “Macedonian” regardless of origin, remained much as it had been in the time of Philip and Alexander. Riders wore large and colorful cloaks as had the Companions, and they continued to be protected by helmets and breastplates. Boots were also worn as the rider’s legs were utilized both for gripping the horse as well as controlling it in conjunction with the reins (cf. Kähler 1965: Plates 16–19 for depictions of Hellenistic Macedonian horsemen). Sometimes called sarissophoroi in Alexander’s era (Arr. Anab. 1.14.1, 6, 4.4.6), some scholars believe they fought with the infantry sarissa as their principal weapon (cf. Bugh 2006: 272 and Markle 1977: 333–8). Yet most sources tend to refer to Macedonian heavy cavalry under both Alexander as well as the Successors as xystophoroi, indicating that their principal weapon was the xyston or lance, which is more likely given their swiftness (Arr. Anab. 1.15.5–8, 16.1; Ascl. 1.3; Diod. 19.27.2, 29.2; Plut. Alex. 16.11).
Rounding out the panoply, Macedonian cavalry adopted the shield by the mid-third century (Kähler 1965: Plates 16–9). This innovation may again originate with Pyrrhus as he observed horsemen with shields in Italy. It may be that this represented a trend toward greater protection for horse and rider, as it develops only shortly before kataphraktoi (literally “fully armored”) were introduced onto Hellenistic battlefields by Antiochus III (Polyb. 16.18.6–8; cf. Diod. 13.109.2, 22.8.5, but his usage seems anachronistic). Presaging the medieval knight by more than a millennium, these were cavalrymen who were covered head to toe in armor of mail or a combination of mail and plate. Horses were often equally well protected. This type of cavalry originated with the eastern nomadic peoples of Alexander’s empire and formed part of the Parthian army that rebelled against the Seleucids. Antiochus most likely first encountered kataphraktoi during his eastern campaigns (209–204) and soon adopted them. As with Macedonian heavy cavalry,kataphraktoi required specialized training; also required, and at an appreciable cost, was the breeding of larger warhorses in order to support the extra weight of the armor. Hence, as with the regular Macedonian heavy cavalry, Hellenistic rulers were seemingly little interested in employing such cavalry as they were reluctant to commit the resources and time necessary for the production of quality horsemen. Kataphraktoi then did not spread much beyond the Seleucid army, and even within this force their numbers remained small. Nevertheless they were obviously effective as they were regularly used by Antiochus against the Romans (Livy 35.48.3, 37.40.5, 11). Eventually adopted by Mithridates VI and subsequently by the Romans themselves, kataphraktoi are one of the few battlefield advancements from the Hellenistic world that survived the period.
Cavalry in the Hellenistic world were organized largely as in Alexander’s day. Cavalry divisions appear to have been organized based on the eight-by-eight ile of sixty-four riders. The ile was then divided into two lochoi, which in turn may have been further subdivided into four units of eight each. Eight ilai came together to form a hipparchia of 512 men (cf. Sage 1996: 206, arguing for an ile of 128 riders, and Sekunda and de Souza 2007: 331, suggesting two hundred). These higher and lower divisions, however, appear to have been mainly for command purposes, as in battle the main unit was almost certainly the ile. These utilized squares, rhomboids, or wedges for attacking as these formations, first adopted by Philip II, more easily cut their way into enemy forces. Our tactical manuals suggest that the wedge and the rhombus continued to be used despite the new role of Hellenistic cavalry, increasingly employed for defensive purposes only (Ael. Tact. 18–20; Ascl. 7.2–10). This last point illustrates the lack of progressive thinking employed by contemporary commanders who relied increasingly on the phalanx to settle engagements and relegated heavy cavalry wielded so efficiently by Philip and Alexander to a secondary role on the battlefield. Pyrrhus aside, most Hellenistic commanders lacked the organizational talents to train, raise, and equip good attacking cavalry, and consequently effective use of them in battle gradually disappeared. Polybius’s famous dictum (3.117.2) that “it is better to give battle with half as many infantry as the enemy and an overwhelming force of cavalry than to be in all respects equal,” cannot hold true. Experience shows that in the Hellenistic world it was not the quantity of one’s cavalry that counted, but its quality.
Auxiliary Forces
The strength of the armies of Philip and Alexander lay in their use of combined forces to assist the phalanx and heavy cavalry. Hellenistic armies continued to utilize such diverse units. Polybius’s descriptions of the opposing Ptolemaic and Seleucid forces at Raphia in 217 (5.79) and the military parade at Daphne for Antiochus IV in 166 (30.25.2–11) offer perhaps the best record of the composition of a Hellenistic army beyond its phalanx and heavy cavalry. In the realm of infantry, we find archers, slingers, peltasts, javelin men, and swordsmen. These soldiers were employed, as in classical times, in skirmishing, ambuscades, reconnaissance, patrol, and as guards for camps and baggage trains. Arms and armor were light and usually comprised linen cuirass, helmet, and small shield, though some might wear no body armor at all. Skirmishers were generally equipped with spears or javelins, although several forces employed Gauls who fought with their traditional long, heavy swords and oval shields. Their use is illustrative of the changing ethnic composition of auxiliary forces in the Hellenistic world from the early third century onward. Though many of these soldiers continued to come from Greece—Cretan archers remained highly valued throughout the period and beyond—increasingly they were recruited from natives within one’s own empire and as mercenaries from the Mediterranean region. Peltasts were no longer simply javelin men from Thrace but now came from various places in the eastern Mediterranean and often employed short spears rather than missiles. As the trend in the Hellenistic world was toward lighter-armed, swifter, and more maneuverable soldiers, the use of this type of peltast, in particular by the Seleucids, only increased and by the second century forces were rarely without several thousand of them (App. Syr. 32; Livy 37.40.13–14).
Hellenistic armies also employed numerous forms of auxiliary horsemen who, like their infantry counterparts, became more diverse over time. Light cavalry, regardless of origin, were known as Tarentines, if they fought with javelins, or as prodromoi (“those in advance”) if they employed short lances or spears. Although prodromoi appeared in fourth-century Greece and formed an organized component of the Macedonian army that conquered Asia, we have just one later reference to them, that in Jewish Antiquities of Josephus (12.372). Yet it is difficult to believe that light, non-javelin-throwing cavalry ceased to exist in the Hellenistic world. Asclepiodotus (1.3) distinguishes them from the Tarentines and calls them simply light cavalry (elaphroi). From the mid-third century onward, save for skirmishing, heavy and light lance-wielding cavalry played much the same role on the battlefield as both were charged with the task of guarding the wings of the phalanx. Moreover, “Macedonian” heavy cavalry came now, like their light counterparts, increasingly from places outside Macedonia. For these reasons, the distinctions between these two branches of horse may well have gradually disappeared. Thus, while it is likely that light, spear-wielding horsemen who engaged with the enemy continued to be utilized in the Hellenistic period, the shift in the lexicon is perhaps more representative of the diminished role of the traditional Macedonian heavy cavalryman. The appearance of kataphraktoi as true heavy cavalry on Hellenistic battlefields supports this conclusion. With the addition of these heavily armored riders, and the trend toward lighter, more maneuverable soldiers, it is possible that Macedonian heavy cavalry shed some of its armor as time went on, and so even in appearance resembled theprodromoi, who often fought with only a helmet, or at most a leather cuirass, for protection. The latter, however, continued to play distinct cavalry roles: reconnaissance, scouting, and guard duty, while also fighting as skirmishers and main battle forces.
As much as the kataphraktos might symbolize the diminished role of Macedonian heavy cavalry, nothing speaks more about the decline in quality of this force than the respective introduction and reintroduction of the elephant and the chariot into Hellenistic warfare. In these two weapons we see a desperate bid by Hellenistic monarchs to fill the void of decisive battlefield action played by the likes of Alexander’s Companions. Elephants, it was hoped, would smash into an opposing phalanx or clear the field of the cavalry who were protecting the infantry’s flanks. Yet from the beginning elephants were impractical and played decisive roles in only three battles. At Ipsus in 301, Seleucus used them to defeat the cavalry of Demetrius, while at Heraclea in 280 they were employed by Pyrrhus to rout Roman cavalry. Finally, in the famous “Elephant Victory” of 275, sixteen elephants belonging to Antigonus Gonatas frightened a much larger force of Gauls into retreat (Ipsus: Plut. Demetr. 29.4–5; Heraclea: Dion.Hal. Ant. Rom. 19.9–12; Plut. Pyrrh. 16–18; Elephant Victory: Lucian Zeux. 8–11). The volatility of elephants, however, was well known, and there are several examples of them turning on a general’s own troops and creating mass chaos (App. Syr. 35; Livy 37.43.9; Plut.Pyrrh. 25.2–5; Polyb. 5.84.6–7). As the Romans demonstrated at Zama (202), men and horses could be trained to deal with them effectively (Livy 30.33.14–16; Polyb. 15.12.3–7). One must also presume that capturing, training, and maintaining elephants was no easy or inexpensive task. As a result their use was largely confined to the Seleucids, who monopolized the Indian elephant market, the Ptolemies, and the Carthaginians, who took theirs from Africa.
In combat, elephants were outfitted with armor and featured towers on their backs that housed the mahout and four soldiers with various missiles. The mahout also carried a spike which he would hammer into the elephant’s skull should it turn and stampede friendly forces. Its use as a mounted missile platform as well as for crashing headlong into the enemy to create or exploit weak areas was secondary, however, to its role as a psychological weapon, a way of terrifying men and horses. Nonetheless, in all of these tasks the elephant was almost consistently unsuccessful, and it has recently been argued that even the few cases where elephants did play a pivotal role are themselves exaggerated (Sabin and de Souza 2007: 421; see Scullard 1974, the only detailed study). Battlefield use of the elephant then declines with the early second century, as the now-advancing Romans had perfected the means necessary to defeat them on the battlefield (Livy 37.42.5 gives a short description of Roman tactics against elephants).
Another attempt to offset the decline in cavalry and find a new way of breaking open the phalanx was the war chariot, often with scythed wheels, which reappeared on Greek battlefields in the late fourth century. To judge by Herodotus (7.40.4) and Xenophon (Cyr. 8.3.15–18), scythed chariots never fell out of use among the Persians. After Alexander they were mostly found in the Seleucid army. Like elephants, they carried a driver and a missile trooper and were employed in order to smash into the enemy line, creating gaps in the formation and causing casualties with the scythes. And like elephants they were similarly unsuccessful at these tasks, and suffered from many of the same deficiencies, being large, unwieldy, and exposed. As a result, each could fall victim to missile fire and chariots in particular were no match for Tarentine cavalry or horse archers. Even if a chariot did succeed in creating the desired gap, the vehicle needed such a running start that it often found itself far ahead of friendly infantry, and thus any advantage gained might prove unsustainable. Defensive tactics were also similar to those used with elephants, as infantry could be trained to open gaps in their formation to allow the chariots to pass through harmlessly. The gaps would then be closed and the infantry would take advantage of the vehicle’s wide turning circle to shower the horses and charioteers with missiles. Chariots proved utterly disastrous at Magnesia in 190, as Eumenes forced them back into their own lines, where they destroyed Antiochus’s left wing. After this their use in warfare was rare, and by the first century they were seen as something of a joke: their revival in 86 by Mithridates VI at Chaeronea was greeted with laughter from Sulla’s legionaries, who easily dispatched them (Magnesia: Livy 37.41.6–42.4, including the best description of a Hellenistic war-chariot; Chaeronea: Plut. Sull. 18.1–3).
Rounding out our list of exotic mounted weapons are horse archers and camel cavalry. Like kataphraktoi, elephants, and war chariots, horse archers and camel cavalry had their origins in the Near East and thus in the Hellenistic world were most often employed by the Seleucids. Although used extensively for logistical purposes, camels in combat were a rare sight and appear only at Magnesia. They are not mentioned by our tactical writers and Vegetius (Mil. 3.23) comments that they were ill-suited to battle. They are likely to have been from Arabia and represent simply another native contingent within the Seleucid army. Such was also the case with horse archers, who mostly hail from in and around Parthia. These soldiers, although they could prove an effective and deadly weapon, are in fact rarely mentioned in the sources and so are unlikely to have played much of a role in Hellenistic warfare (Bar-Kochva 1976: 108–9, 248 n.15, argues for a greater presence in Seleucid forces). The training required of a horse archer was extensive, and as few Near Eastern peoples practiced the art they were not readily available on the mercenary market. The rise of the Parthian kingdom (after 247) monopolized their services, making mercenary employment unlikely. Finally, horse archers could be neutralized on the battlefield by light cavalry, Tarentines, or even very skilled heavy cavalry, anything that would force them into direct combat.
As the Hellenistic world was so characterized by warfare on a grand scale, the ever-increasing use of foreign and exotic weapons is not surprising. Philip and Alexander had instilled the use of combined arms upon the Successors, who themselves were constantly seeking ways of militarily surpassing one another. Some of these—elephants and chariots—had relatively short life spans, while others, like kataphraktoi and the increased use of light-armed soldiers, would see service well beyond the Hellenistic world. More than anything else, these auxiliary troops were now seen as full and integral parts of any force, and afterward no major ancient general would be without them. This diversification, specialization, and accumulation of forces was not merely a phenomenon that related to an army’s ability to fight pitched battles, however, as a similar process occurred in another, arguably more important, sphere of military activity—the siege.
Siege Warfare
Without question one of the greatest secrets of success for Philip and Alexander was their ability to break into fortified places. Until the invention of siege artillery and the adoption of engines from the Near East in Syracuse under Dionysius in 399, the inability to get at a foe when he was behind the walls of his urban center was perhaps the defining feature of Greek warfare. It was one of the main factors that prolonged the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404) and consistently prevented armies from dealing death blows to their enemies (see further Seaman, 642–56). While Dionysius provided the means, all of this truly changed with Philip, who not only attracted engineers to his court to build new and more impressive machines, but built an army that was large enough to undertake lengthy sieges (Sabin and de Souza 2007: 451–3; Serrati 2007: 462–3).
The Roman engineer Vitruvius (10.13.3) tells us that Philip’s new machines used torsion technology, employing tightly twisted ropes for power. This was a vast improvement upon earlier tension-driven machines. In the Hellenistic era, these machines would grow in size, power, and accuracy, coming to range from the deadly accurate small bolt shooter known as the Scorpion to massive lithoboloi (“stone-throwers”) that could hurl projectiles weighing nearly eighty kilograms in excess of three hundred meters (see especially Marsden 1969–71: 1.86–98, still the standard work on Hellenistic artillery). The success Philip and Alexander enjoyed with these machines and with sieges in general set the pace for the Hellenistic world, as from this point onward science played a major role in all military campaigns. This would culminate in the siege train of Demetrius Poliorcetes (“the besieger of cities”) that featured numerous double-armed torsion stone- and bolt-shooting catapults, various sheds and screens, battering rams, and thehelepolis(“city-taker”), an armor-plated tower over forty meters high bristling with artillery. The mere sight of all this supposedly caused the defenders of Sicyon to surrender to Demetrius without a fight in 303.
As on the battlefield, the era is famous for exotic siege weapons. Beyond Hannibal’s snake projectiles in a naval battle in 184 (Frontin. Str. 4.7.10–1), the most famous of these belonged to the great Syracusan scientist and military engineer, Archimedes. During the Roman siege of his native city (213–211), Polybius (8.6.1–4, 7.1–4) describes his “iron hand” deployed against the Romans: the device would swing forth from the walls of city, grab hold of individual men, sheds, or entire ships at sea, lift them up, in the process shaking loose the soldiers or sailors, only to release the contents of the hand to send the person or object crashing down. Another device, related by Diodorus (26.18) and Zonaras (9.4), used mirrors to channel the rays of the sun in order to set enemy ships afire. Yet none of our authors actually witnessed any of this. While these tales must be questioned, they probably arose because Archimedes’s more conventional machines did indeed foil the early Roman attempts to assault the city. His reputation as a quirky yet brilliant scientist who designed strange, wondrous, and colossal machines emerges only two generations after his death. The same cannot be said of Dionysius of Alexandria’s repeating catapult (third century), which did exist as the engineer Philon saw it in action himself. He commented, however, that while it could fire several stones in rapid succession, the device was inefficient and had poor range (Ph. Bel. 76; Marsden 1969–71: 2.6–9). Hellenistic siege warfare featured its share of exotic weapons: at best these machines were impractical and too complex to use; at worst they may have been purely mythical (for further treatment of siege warfare see Chaniotis, 438–56).
Navies
Hellenistic powers continued to prioritize land forces, but the sea also became a venue for battle. As naval warfare became more common it required not only the employment of engineers to design, build, and equip new ships, but provided opportunities for a number of battle experts across the Mediterranean. These would advise inexperienced kings and admirals with tactics at sea. They were mostly Rhodian, as Rhodes was the only state of the time, other than Carthage in the west, that privileged its navy over land forces. Such experts were a necessity because, as with land forces, navies now increased in size and individual ships became more complex and carried more men and weaponry. Tactics, as a result, adapted to this new environment.
Invented by Dionysius I in the early fourth century and featuring banks of oars manned by four and five men respectively, quadriremes and quinqueremes were the most common warships in the Hellenistic era. Their increased deck size and greater height and steadiness were necessary since artillery was now introduced as a naval weapon. Vessels not only featured bolt- and stone-throwers, which were used to clear enemy decks, not to sink ships, but also large screens to cover crews from enemy fire and an increased number of marines. Triremes were still utilized, and navies could be successful with light, swift vessels, as is clear from Polybius’s (16.2.5–7.5) description of the battle of Chios in 201 between Philip V and a combined Greek fleet. Generally, speed and maneuverability were now considered of lesser importance in comparison to bulk, firepower, and the ability to undertake ship-to-ship combat. Ramming, while still practiced, declined in favor of grappling and boarding (cf. Morrison and Coates 1996: 263–5, 316–7; see further de Souza, 369–94).
The fifth century Athenian fleet relied upon rowers and sailors recruited both locally and abroad, and so did the navies of the Hellenistic era. All of the major kingdoms recruited in Asia Minor and the Aegean islands where there was a plentiful supply of skilled seamen. Coele-Syria was also particularly rich in such men, and gaining unfettered access to them was one of the reasons the Ptolemies and Seleucids battled for control of this region so often. In a break from the classical past, however, nearly all crews were now composed of mercenaries, men who served the highest bidder. While in truth this would have been the only possible way to man such huge fleets, this nevertheless represents a marked shift in the composition of both navies and armies during the Hellenistic period.
Without question mercenaries had been around for centuries in Greece, but it was only in the Hellenistic world that they began to make up such a large percentage, at times even a majority, of a state’s forces. Citizen soldiers and local levies continued to make-up the bulk of forces in the period immediately following the death of Alexander, but toward the end of the third century, more and more units came to be composed of mercenaries (Chaniotis 2005: 82; Serrati 2007: 474–6). The xenologos, or mercenary recruiter, became a highly important post on a king’s general staff. These men were certainly busy, as the increasing size of forces in the third century meant greater competition to secure the services of professional soldiers, sailors, and engineers. A survey of mercenaries in Ptolemaic service illustrates clearly that early in the Hellenistic world, local recruiting ceased to supply the quantity of soldiers and the degrees of specialization demanded by the royal army. Although the largest number of mercenaries continued to come from Greece, especially Crete and Taenarum in the southern Peloponnese (Taenarum: Diod. 18.9.1–3, 19.60.1; Isoc. 8.44; see Chaniotis 2005: 81–2; Bugh 2006: 276), nevertheless non-Greeks were also heavily represented in Hellenistic armies, and many soldiers for hire were also supplied by Judaea, Caria, Palestine, Syria, and Thrace (see further Trundle, 336–40).
As with any era, the late fourth to first centuries represented continuity as much as it did change. Philip and Alexander were in many ways products of what came before, though no one brought together the innovations of their times in quite the same way. Still, the highly efficient military machine that they created was somewhat of an anomaly, as later monarchs either could not or would not make the investments in training to replicate it. Although certain things, like the primacy of the phalanx, returned to earlier forms, even more things were altered. War was now the business of the professional, and as such troops gradually became more specialized and military science was thrust into the foreground. The concentration of power in the hands of a few states meant that the wealth each commanded was unimaginable to classical Greeks outside of Athens and Persia. Thus, in an effort to make up for quality with quantity, each could now afford to field massive forces. In the end the era produced too few men of the caliber of Alexander or Pyrrhus, men able to unite the numbers, specializations, and technologies to create truly formidable forces. This should not detract from the fact that much was new and innovative on the battlefields of the time, and that the epoch of the local hoplite militia was gone forever from the Greek East. This last point makes it perhaps ironic that, in this age of individually acquired skill, where professional fighting men formed the core of massive armies, accompanied by specialists and serving under kings who had textbooks on warfare available to them, the Hellenistic world would be brought down by a state made up of citizen-soldiers—Rome.
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