CHAPTER 15
STEFAN G. CHRISSANTHOS
A fragment (10 Edmonds) of the Spartan poet Tyrtaeus makes clear the brutal nature of infantry battle in the Greek and Roman world. “Let each man hold, standing firm,” he says, “setting foot against foot, and resting shield against shield, … [and] let him fight his man breast to breast, grasping the hilt of his sword or of his long spear.” This bloody work, Tyrtaeus concludes, identifies the agathos man, the man able to endure bloody slaughter.
With all the horrors of the battlefield, several dimensions of what is generally defined as discipline helps us comprehend how soldiers were willing, or made willing, to fight and to ignore (at least enough so that they could function) the real threat of injury or death, possibly a lingering and painful death, to themselves and their comrades. Specifically, discipline goes a long way toward helping soldiers stand together on the battlefield. Sometimes it enables them to execute certain tactics in the face of the enemy, inflict casualties, and create sufficient panic in the opposing force to cause its disintegration and defeat. While weapons and tactics have evolved over time, the importance of discipline has remained unchanged, often deciding battles, wars, and the course of history. The process, however, by which citizens or subjects of various states, kingdoms, and empires were transformed into disciplined soldiers willing to stand united and face the horrors of the battlefield has changed over time. Unsurprisingly perhaps, what constitutes discipline both reflects a society’s values and ideals as well as its response to those within who fail to meet the standard of behavior.
Discipline has usually been equated with harsh punishment and the punitive measures of a government or general to keep soldiers under control while on campaign and, more importantly, to instill in them the fear necessary to force them to fight. But discipline also encompasses a wide range of meanings and involves such factors as training, the nature of leadership practiced by a general, rewards bestowed by officers and communities for proper military behavior, and the social and martial values of the soldiers themselves which inspired bravery in battle. Both the positive and the negative, the proverbial carrot and stick, played roles in military discipline. This discussion aims to provide a brief history of military discipline in ancient armies, to explain how and to what degree societies imposed discipline on their soldiers or how, in various ways, soldiers imposed discipline on themselves. It will also follow the evolution of military discipline from Greece until eventually something similar to a modern system developed in the early Roman Empire.1
HOMERIC GREECE
The earliest insight into military discipline comes from Homer. The Iliad and Odyssey provide fascinating glimpses of a society emerging into a more settled form of social-political organization. This transition had a large impact on military organization. In the epics the great heroes are termed basileis—“kings,” but in reality “big men” or “chiefs.” At Troy basileis commanded their own contingents of soldiers, such as Odysseus and his Ithacans. Though called kings, they were not absolute monarchs like Egyptian pharaohs, and did not administer complex political and economic machinery like the Mycenaean kings. There were no military codes or laws, no official chain of command. Instead a basileus attained his position through inheritance and the sanction of both the gods and to some extent the people. To maintain his position he relied on his abilities to control dependents and followers by inspiring loyalty, specifically through military and oratorical skills. Above all, he was expected to be the bravest in battle by leading from the front. This conferred the legitimacy he needed to demand submission to his authority. As the Lycian hero Sarpedon said, “Why in Lycia, Glaucus, do we receive special honor?…it is because we take our stand at the head of all the Lycians and bear the brunt of the fighting, so that our people say to each other ‘Our princes are fine fellows, they fight well and are ever at the front of battle’” (Hom. Il. 12.290–328).
A king was also expected to be wise in council and be able to persuade his men to follow him. His position did not allow him to simply command his men to move, nor could he threaten them with punishment; instead he often had to convince them that his strategies were sound. For example, it is evident that Odysseus does not have the power to order his men about. In some cases he is able to persuade them to follow his lead; in others his men refuse to obey his orders. On one occasion, after sacking the town of the Cicones, Odysseus, sensing danger, tries to tell his men that “we should be off, but my foolish men refused; there was plenty of wine so they kept drinking and eating by the shore” (Hom. Od. 9.50–53). Soldiers in the epics enjoyed the freedom to speak out against and argue with their leaders. For example, Odysseus’s companion Eurylochus protested in open assembly against Odysseus’s plan to avoid the Island of the Sun. When Eurylochus finished speaking he was greeted with applause. Odysseus was forced to give in because, as he put it, “I was one against many” (Hom. Od. 12.322). Subordinate officers and even the average soldier enjoyed and demanded certain freedoms and rights and a certain independence from their leaders. There was in fact a “constant tension” between leaders and followers as the soldiers jealously guarded their prerogatives against the encroachment of royal authority (Donlan 1999: 350). Even Agamemnon, the overall commander of the Greek forces at Troy, was unable to lead autocratically. He cannot force Achilles or anyone else to fight. He is rebuked on numerous occasions by his fellow kings, such as Odysseus, and on one famous occasion by Thersites, a common soldier. Diomedes clearly articulated a vital privilege he and others possessed and frequently exercised: “We are privileged in open debate, and you Agamemnon cannot get upset” (Hom. Il. 9.36–37).
Despite the lack of a command structure or military code, discipline was not unknown. In Greek armies much of the discipline came “from within the soldiers themselves” (Phillips 2001: 326). Character traits such as bravery and excellence, and their opposite numbers, shame and cowardice, played a huge role for Homeric soldiers. They wanted above all else to distinguish themselves in battle, to achieve deeds that would enhance the honor of their family and their name, while avoiding doing anything that would bring dishonor. These values helped deter them from abandoning their comrades. Desire for glory and fear of dishonor, rather than fear of some form of disciplinary punishment, was their main motivation. These values would outlive Odysseus and the other Homeric heroes and continue to play a role in war in the classical and Hellenistic periods. Alexander was only the most famous Greek soldier driven by these values.
POLIS ARMIES
The hoplite armies that emerged along with the polis during the archaic age changed the nature of Greek warfare. The scale of battle increased along with the size of armies; no longer did forces consist of wealthy men, their dependents, and companions. Yet important elements of the Greek battle experience remained the same. Specifically, there were no military codes or laws by which commanders or individual city-states could impose discipline through the exemplary punishment of recalcitrant soldiers. Instead, the heroic values of the Homeric era filtered down and were in some ways transformed to fit the new phalanx warfare. Soldiers no longer fought in small groups of noble warriors, with an Achilles or Diomedes in front demonstrating their bravery. Instead hundreds, sometimes thousands, of hoplites fought shoulder to shoulder in the phalanx. The cardinal rule of war still applied: they must at all costs hold their phalanx together while forcing the disintegration of the enemy’s.
Though there was little or no formal training or disciplinary system in the archaic or early classical periods (outside of Sparta), men were still inspired to hold their position by the same values as the Homeric heroes. Bravery in battle was still prized, but it was bravery of a different sort. From within a soldier came the same urge to fight well, to win honor for himself, and to uphold his family name. There was now, however, a more patriotic motivation to fight well: to defend the polis and the people. Therefore glory was not to be won on an individual basis, out in front of the ranks against opposing aristocratic heroes; instead glory was to be won in the service of the state. The soldier fought to secure a good reputation among his comrades with whom he fought; cowardice in battle was not only shameful in itself, but flight could cause panic and bring about defeat for an entire army. As Tyrtaeus wrote, “a man is not agathos in war unless he endure seeing the bloody slaughter, and standing close reach out for the enemy … this is a common good for the whole polis and the people when a man holds, firm among the fighters…never will his fame die, nor his name…since he acted bravely and was fighting for his land and children” (Tyrtaeus fr.10 Edmonds). Though performance did not always match expectations, this was the ideal to which hoplites aspired.
The dread of the shame which would be incurred if he did not fight well, the contempt of his fellow citizens and soldiers, was a powerful force to maintain discipline despite the horrors of hoplite warfare. The fate of Aristodemus and Pantites, the two Spartan survivors of Thermopylae, seems to indicate that even in early fifth-century Sparta there were still no laws governing military behavior nor specific tribunals organized to hear cases for breaches of military discipline such as cowardice (Hdt. 7.231–232, 9.70–73). Shame, however, remained a powerful coercive force: none of Aristodemus’s fellow citizens would speak to him, and he was derisively referred to as “Aristodemus the Coward.” This provided the motivation necessary for him to perform more bravely at Plataea than any other Spartan, though his fellow Spartans refused to bestow any award for bravery on him, arguing that his exploits merely balanced the scales. Unlike Aristodemus, Pantites could not endure the harsh treatment he faced upon returning home, which prompted his suicide. Certainly the fate of both men would make a great impression on other Spartan soldiers and help them overcome their fears and stiffen their resolve in combat.
It should be noted that outside factors sometimes dictated military punishment. For example, demographic pressures in the late fifth and early fourth centuries would force the Spartans to deal more leniently with cowardice in battle. The survivors of Sphacteria in 425, at first shunned, were eventually restored to full citizenship. For similar reasons, the survivors of Leuctra fifty years later would be spared when the harsh laws for cowardice in battle were allowed to “sleep” for a day (Plut. Ages. 30.6).
As phalanx warfare continued into the classical period campaigns became more frequent and battles were fought on an even greater scale. Armies were far larger, with thousands of soldiers serving under commanders they could not know well. Conflicts, especially the great Peloponnesian War, were no longer relatively short and fought against a neighboring state. Greater discipline seemingly would be needed, and apparently disciplinary systems did develop in some cities, possibly due to the pressures of ongoing war, by which certain military offenses were punished. In many ways these laws standardized what had before been custom. By the end of the fifth century, at Athens, for example, penalties had been established for refusing service and desertion. Citizens could be punished for four acts relating to military service: 1) treason; 2) refusing to join the army when called; 3) abandoning a place in the phalanx line; and 4) throwing away a shield in battle to flee more quickly (Lys. 14.6). Treason was a crime whether a citizen was in the army or not. The last three were all variations of an action that predated polis armies: cowardice. The difference now was that this was apparently written into law in some cities and could lead to legal consequences rather than public disgrace alone. Such penalties represent a change since the time of Aristodemus and Pantites: not only shame but specific punishments apparently prescribed by some sort of court could be imposed.
Examples survive from the Peloponnesian War. The polemarchs Hipponoidas and Aristocles were officially tried and banished for cowardice after the battle of Mantinea (418 B.C.), and Thucydides implies that there was some sort of formal procedure involved (Thuc. 5.71, with Hornblower 3: 189). On the eve of the second fight off Naupactus (429 B.C.), one of the Peloponnesian commanders warned his men that cowardice would be punished “as it ought to be” (Thuc. 2.87.9). Political-military turmoil in Argos also in 418 B.C. suggests that a military court had been established which, at the conclusion of a campaign, tried military offenses. Apparently this was not something done on an informal basis: there was a specific procedure for organizing a court, arguing strongly that there were specific laws for such crimes (Thuc. 5.60.6, with Hornblower 3: 158).
After the great Peloponnesian War of the fifth century, the fourth century witnessed further developments. Xenophon’s works, especially the Anabasis, seem to indicate an increasing concern with discipline and good order. The Spartan commander Clearchus demanded discipline from his men and sometimes used physical force to get it (Xen. An. 2.6.9–10). In Sparta, by the time of Leuctra, specific penalties were imposed on tresantes (“runaways,” “cowards”), such as disqualification from office and random beatings from fellow citizens. There were personal humiliations as well: they were forbidden to bathe, were forced to wear ragged clothes, and were obliged to shave off half their beard and leave the other half uncut (Plut. Ages. 30; Xen. Lac. 9.4–5).
Even though there was a general trend toward greater training and discipline in Greek armies during the fifth and fourth centuries, examples of the actual imposition of specific punishments are still rare, and those punishments were usually inflicted only in cases of some form of cowardice. Exemplary punishments to enforce orders and obedience were rarely imposed, except perhaps in the case of mercenaries. The Athenian general Iphicrates once found a sleeping sentry and killed him, later remarking, “I left him as I found him.” Such savage discipline was perhaps unusual among the Greeks, though Epaminondas was said to have acted similarly (Frontin. Str. 3.12.2–3).
The freedoms enjoyed by Homeric soldiers had in many ways been retained through the centuries. Freedom of speech and the freedom to disagree or even to disobey a commander were in many ways still a part of the Greek military experience. There was little to differentiate a citizen from a soldier so most of the rights enjoyed by a citizen were maintained when that citizen became a soldier. Generals in any Greek city were citizens, not professionals, elected by their fellows to command. Once their service was over, they went back to civilian life along with their men. More importantly their conduct could be reviewed and charges could be brought against them in the assembly or in a court before a jury, as often happened in Athens. Sitting in the assemblies and juries could be the very soldiers the generals had recently commanded. This was the great deterrent to any commander who may have wished to impose harsh discipline or maintain order through various punishments. Xenophon’s speech to the army after Cunaxa is highly illustrative (Xen. An. 3.2.30–31). Like Odysseus before him, he is forced to try to persuade the men to follow orders and maintain discipline. By highlighting the gravity of the situation he was in some ways attempting to scare them into being more obedient than was usual. Xenophon even asks for the men’s help to uncover and report acts of disobedience. Even in what was essentially a professional army, and despite the efforts of Xenophon and other officers, the march up-country provided many examples of the freedom of the independent soldiers. They often refused orders, they spoke out against their officers during councils and sometimes rejected their advice (that they were being advised rather than ordered was of course significant), they were insolent, they sometimes even physically attacked their superiors, and they often deserted from one Greek officer to another. Officers, like Xenophon, could even be brought before a tribunal if their men had complaints (Xen. An. 5.8). This was indeed a mobile polis, with the soldiers continuing to exercise many of the same rights they enjoyed as citizens.
MACEDONIA
In archaic and classical Greek armies training and discipline (again outside of Sparta) were almost nonexistent. In most cities citizens were usually expected to train on their own, and any formal, public training was of the most “elementary” kind (Pritchett 2: 238). Philip II created a new type of army in which new weapons, frequent exercises including long marches, specific training designed to pull off complicated maneuvers on the battlefield, and obedience to orders were more important. In addition the Macedonian chain of command was far more complex than those in the poleis. A chain of command, especially with junior officers in close proximity to the men, enabled Philip to control his units. Also, the very nature of monarchy gave Philip (and his successors) advantages Greek generals did not enjoy. Though his powers were limited by custom and by the Macedonia nobility, the king held office for life. He was not in command for only one year or one campaign, nor was he subject to any type of review or trial after a battle was concluded. He would continue to be the commander far into the future, as long as he won battles and avoided assassination. Soldiers could not be consistently disobedient to a commander whose term would not soon end. This permanence allowed Philip and his successors, especially those who wielded greater powers in the later Seleucid and Ptolemaic states, an increased ability to demand a higher standard of obedience than other, earlier Greek generals.
All this would suggest that a disciplinary system was emerging, one in which obeying orders, especially during complicated battle maneuvers, was of greater importance. Yet much of the success of Philip and Alexander was of a personal nature. Their Homeric-style leadership, their willingness to lead from the front, and their obvious military talents and charisma, in large measure created the discipline in the Macedonian army and legitimated their rule. Their achievements were further rooted in a deft touch that balanced possible rewards (promotion, greater percentage of plunder, cash or land bonuses, and other honors) with the possibility of royal displeasure. They were able to convince their men to obey them and to follow them continuously; in the case of Alexander, all the way to India.
Though training was increased, and the greater duration of the campaigns essentially made these soldiers into professionals, evidence of specific punishments for the breaking of orders is rare. Macedonian soldiers still inherited certain rights from the past. Like Homeric warriors they did have the freedom to speak out to the king, though sometimes their freedom of speech could have tragic results, as in the cases of Philotas and Cleitus. The challenge to Alexander’s leadership raised by the rank and file of his army at the Hyphasis, and seconded by some of the elites, demonstrates again the tentative nature of leadership and discipline in Macedonian armies. Though aspects of this episode have been questioned (see Heckel 2003), for the story to work it must have been believable that Macedonian soldiers could make demands of this type on their commander. And, though the army was more sophisticated in terms of training, the motivation for discipline still largely rested on internal inspiration, as it had for centuries. Soldiers overcame the terrors of the battlefield to try to win or maintain a reputation for bravery among their comrades and countrymen for themselves and for their families, and to win honor in sight of the king, along with possible rewards his appreciation might bring.
HELLENISTIC ARMIES
The death of Alexander in 323 precipitated almost fifty years of continuous warfare that ultimately led to the creation of the Hellenistic monarchies. This contributed to increased professionalism in Macedonian and Greek armies, whether at home or abroad, and therefore had a direct effect on discipline. It is in this period that the first military law codes develop. The surviving examples date to the reign of Philip V (r. 221–179) but may have been part of Hellenistic armies before this; it may be possible too that contact with well-disciplined Roman armies hastened reforms. An inscription discovered at Amphipolis, though fragmentary, provides some insight into efforts to improve on discipline in the Macedonian kingdom, suggesting a new way of military thinking (see Austin 136–8 for texts).
For the first time we see a Greek military code with specific rules and regulations that govern a far greater spectrum of behavior than just cowardice. No longer is this an informal system, governed by custom. Now discipline was to be maintained by a strict obedience to orders, enforced by specific punishments. As the Amphipolis code clearly states, soldiers guilty of even minor military crimes will be “punished according to the written rules.” Specific offenses are spelled out. Soldiers are not to sit or sleep while on guard duty, they must be in possession of the proper armor, weapons, and other equipment at all times, they cannot plunder or destroy property without orders, and they are required to report any transgression of the code by their fellow soldiers.
Generally, monetary fines were imposed as punishment. Those asleep on guard duty paid one drachma, someone guilty of witnessing a crime and not notifying their superiors was penalized a quarter of a drachma, and the penalty for not having the proper equipment varied from two obols to one drachma. Informants who reported these and other breaches received monetary rewards, which would probably make them more diligent in uncovering offenses. An elaborate chain of command had evolved from older Macedonian models allowing greater control of individual soldiers through the enforcement of the code.
Various officers were given specific duties related to the discovery, reporting and punishment of indiscipline. Tetrarchs were responsible for making the rounds to check on those on guard duty. The hypaspists, who had traditionally been an elite battlefield unit and royal bodyguard, now seem to take on the job of military policemen. They were to discover when offenses went unreported and punish those responsible both for the crime and those who failed to report the crime; they were to collect fines which they were allowed to keep as a reward; and they were to compose “written denunciations” of specific offenders which were to be sent up through channels to the general. All officers were to punish unauthorized plundering and destruction by individual soldiers. Beyond that, provisions were made for military courts to hear cases, and for an officer (exactly who is not clear) to act as a judge.
The Amphipolis code represents a fairly substantial evolution from earlier Greek armies in regard to discipline. To some extent this process had been slowly building from the Homeric period through the Persian and especially Peloponnesian Wars, to the Persian expedition of Xenophon and his Ten Thousand, and the increased emphasis on discipline and training in the fourth century at Thebes and elsewhere. Only in Macedonia, however, has an actual military code emphasizing strict adherence to specific orders and regulations been discovered. Yet even Macedonian discipline paled in comparison to that of Rome. One example will suffice. A Macedonian soldier guilty of either sitting or sleeping on guard duty was fined one drachma; a Roman soldier guilty of the same offense was beaten to death with clubs (fustuarium). An awed Polybius (6.37) explains that this was why the Romans kept night watches better than anyone.
ROMAN REPUBLIC
The Roman army represents something completely new in ancient Mediterranean warfare. Certainly Homeric-like desires would be present here to inspire men from the inside to fight well for themselves, their comrades, and their country. Discipline, however, now takes on a whole new meaning since in addition to internal motivation, Roman military custom provided plenty of external incentives to compel, if necessary, Roman soldiers to obey orders and fight well. Numerous military infractions would be systematically punished, sometimes with brutal effectiveness. No longer would shame alone keep men in line. Fear of punishment by their own officers or the state would help keep the men in place and deter them from flight.
As in Macedonian armies, the Romans employed a system consisting of both rewards and punishments. First was positive reinforcement. There were the financial rewards of loyal service, including plunder, specific monetary rewards for bravery in battle, and monetary bonuses at discharge. There were promotions that could be won, soldiers could work their way up to the centurionate with increased authority and higher pay and plunder, and later, with the founding of the Empire, there would be the opportunity to move into elite units such as the Praetorian Guard or evocati, which meant higher pay and exemption from fatigue duties. There were other intangibles which played a role: various honors and symbols for bravery in battle could be bestowed, often in ceremonies at which the whole army might be assembled. Honors included various crowns, such as the corona civica. There were other motivating factors involved as well, such as pride in one’s century, cohort, or legion.
Often the discipline of the men depended on leadership. A number of Roman authors had specific ideas on what constituted a good leader. Cicero said a general must possess military ability and proven success, prestige—by which he meant a noble family background—previous military success, and good luck (Cic. Leg. Man. 27). Caesar too believed that luck played a large role in keeping the soldiers loyal, as did a general’s willingness to share the wealth with his men (Caes. B Gall. 1.40). A general also was expected to share the same hardships and face some of the dangers his men did, which meant eating, marching, and living with them.
If these positive methods were not successful there was always the harsh discipline for which the Romans were famous. Roman legend was full of relevant examples, such as Manlius’s execution of his own son for disobedience. In book four of his Stratagems, Frontinus provides forty-six examples of discipline in ancient armies; thirty-eight come from the Roman Republic (Frontin. Str. 4.1). As Carney and others have noted, the Roman disciplinary system generally bore a “much greater resemblance to modern armies” than did Greek armies (Carney 1996: 20). Pritchett concurs: “disciplina militaris” was a Roman not a Greek virtue (Pritchett 2: 244–5). The military oaths, sacramentum and the ius-iurandum, sworn by Roman soldiers had a direct bearing on this discipline. By the first century B.C., the importance of the sacramentum to military service, religiously, historically, and legally, had long been established. Sacramentum, with all its important ramifications, was employed only for the swearing in of soldiers either when they first began service or when they received a new general. Caesar, who should have known, used it only in this context (Caes. B Gall. 6.1, B.C. 1.23, 1.86, 2.28, 2.32). No man could serve without taking this oath; he had to be “sworn into service with thesacramentum” or “he could not legally fight the foe” (Cic. De Off. 1.36–37; Livy 3.53). Once a citizen had sworn the oath he was transformed into a soldier, subject to military law, without many of his civilian rights. His service had officially begun. The distinction between citizen and soldier was illustrated by Caesar’s speech before his mutinous soldiers in 47. According to legend he was able to regain their loyalty simply by addressing them as Quirites—“civilians”—rather than miles, implying that they were no longer in his service (Suet.Iul. 70).
Though the exact formula is unknown, the sacramentum required the men to swear by the gods to assemble when called by their commander, to obey their commander, to do nothing contrary to military law, neither to desert nor disband until discharged, never to flee the battlefield and never to abandon the battle line except to retrieve a weapon, strike an enemy, or save a friend (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 10.18, 11.43; Polyb. 6.21; Livy 22.38; Frontin. Str. 4.1.4; Serv. ad Aen. 8.614; Veg. Mil. 2.5). Though it was essentially a very brief formula, it covered all aspects of military behavior. The Romans had a very definite chain of command and very definite ideas on what constituted proper military discipline. Almost any act contrary to military discipline was a breach of the oath. If soldiers violated the oath they could be punished because they had committed sacrilege by breaking the religious sanctity of the oath and were now considered nefas.
The sacramentum is not to be confused with the second oath sworn by Roman soldiers, the ius-iurandum. A mandatory ius-iurandum was sworn in camp when the military tribunes paraded the men and compelled them to vow they would not steal from the camp and would return anything they might find (Polyb. 6.33). A voluntary ius-iurandum was sometimes sworn as a means of extending and enhancing the original sacramentum by boosting morale among the men and increasing their cohesiveness, especially during times of crisis (Caes. B Civ. 1.76, 3.12–13, 3.86–87).
The presence of these oaths distinguished Roman armies from earlier Greek and Macedonian forces. Comparisons with early modern armies can provide illumination. During the sixteenth century Tudor armies became modern in the sense that feudal and personal aspects of the military service were replaced with impersonal military codes and punishments. Most important was the introduction of the military oath, the breaking of which made the soldiers liable to well-defined punishments. As Phillips notes, “the swearing of the oath” was “the basis for the military disciplinary system” (Phillips 2001: 327).
In Rome the mandatory oaths sworn by the men to their commander forbade certain types of behavior. Offenses included mutiny, disobeying the orders of the commander, cowardice in battle, desertion, loss of a weapon in combat, lying to superiors, homosexuality, sleeping on guard duty, and camp theft. Breaking the oaths meant a guilty miles or centurion was no longer protected by Roman law, and punishments, sometimes brutal, could be imposed. Pay could be withheld or reduced, or fines could be imposed. Soldiers could be reduced in rank. They could be dishonorably discharged or even exiled. They could be sold into slavery. Various humiliations could be imposed. Scourging and flogging were common. A soldier’s hand could be chopped off. Individual executions were often carried out, in some cases by the particularly horrible method of the fustuarium (cudgeling to death). Decimation was also employed throughout the Republic. Usually discipline was inflicted in public at a camp contio, not only to punish the guilty party or parties but also as a warning to the others.
The elaborate, formal chain of command in the Roman army played a large role in the discovery and punishment of these offenses. First, the small number of men in each century would sometimes make it difficult for soldiers to hide transgressions from the nearby centurion. Also, military tribunes were designated to hear cases in the principia and had the power to impose fines, restrict pay or supplies, or order corporal punishment. It was the military tribunes who tried soldiers accused of major crimes in a court martial.
While discipline played a large role in Roman army life and in Roman military success, a certain balance does need to be maintained. Contrary to the picture painted by Polybius and many modern historians, the Roman republican soldier was not always a robot unquestioningly obedient to his commander (Ziolkowski 1993: 86–9). He did not demonstrate “absolute, mindless obedience” at all times (Goldsworthy 1996: 281). As Messer long ago noted, the Roman soldier “arrogated to himself an amount of independent thought and action which was quite on par with that claimed by the Greek soldier and far beyond that with which the Roman soldier is credited” (Messer 1920: 174).
As both catalyst and product of such events as the Struggle of the Orders, the secessions of the plebes, and the political victories of the plebeian order through the intervention of the army, the Roman soldier was first and foremost a citizen vested with certain important rights. He inherited too a long tradition of independent thought and action. As such, despite the oaths and various military regulations, soldiers expected to be able to express their opinions freely on literally any matter about which they were concerned, especially, obviously, matters pertaining to their military situation and their conditions of service (for the scores of examples of soldiers speaking freely in camp, and the ramifications of this speech, see Chrissanthos 2004: 341–67).
Though it has been argued that “neither the questioning of orders nor the attempts to negotiate the course of a campaign was generally tolerated,” this traditional view is simply not supported by the evidence (Brice 2003: 64). There were apparently no restrictions, legal or otherwise, that might prevent the average Roman soldier from exercising freedom of speech in camp. All Roman soldiers swore the sacramentum when they were inducted into the army. The soldiers, however, swore no oath that deprived them of their freedom of speech. Also, there was no known military law during the Republic that restricted freedom of speech in camp or mandated any punishment of “guilty” soldiers. Much later writers do speak of specific military laws to restrict freedom of speech in camp during the Empire. Those guilty of participating in loud, disorderly meetings would be beaten and discharged. Those guilty of clamoring and complaining would be reduced in rank (Rufus, Military Laws 17; Corpus Juris Civilis 20).
Yet nothing is found in Polybius or Caesar or even Livy that indicates there was ever any formal or informal discipline imposed by a commander, lower-ranking officers, or centurions on soldiers who were guilty merely of speaking their minds during the Republic. The famous example of L. Aemilius Paullus before Pydna is the exception (Livy 44.34). Even later authors such as Frontinus and Valerius Maximus preserve no anecdotes of such a military law being invoked. Roman political and military history dating back to the first secession provides many examples of this freedom in action. Though these may or may not be true, they represent what the Romans believed to be true. Therefore this encouraged the exercise of free speech in camp, not just for the officers but also for the common soldier.
Therefore, Roman citizen-soldiers (and not the socii or foreign auxiliaries) could and did express opinions on any matter pertaining to military service and army life. They expressed their views on the course of a campaign and debated, praised, or criticized the military strategies and tactics of their superiors (Caes. B Gall. 5.31, B Civ. 1.47). Sometimes, they did not agree with a commander’s strategy (Livy 27.26, 44.3–8; Polyb. 3.89). Soldiers often expressed rage and indignation among themselves at the unwillingness of their commanders to lead them into battle (Caes. B Gall. 3.24, 6.36, B Civ. 1.7, 1.64, 1.71, 1.72, 2.33, 3.6, B Af. 82; Livy 7.12). There are examples of soldiers being afraid of impending conflict (Caes. B Gall. 1.39–1.41, B.Civ. 1.20, 2.29, 2.43–44). Sometimes rumors flew freely through the camp, exaggerating an already bad military situation (Caes. B Civ. 2.27–2.43, B Af. 10). Soldiers often complained among themselves about the conditions of service regarding pay, plunder, length of service, and harsh discipline (Cass. Dio 36.6; Plut. Luc. 32–34, Caes. 37; Livy 28.24). Soldiers were sometimes concerned with dire religious omens (Plut. Crass. 19, 23). Sometimes soldiers even discussed the mood of their commander (Sal. Iug. 82). In every Roman army, on an almost continuous basis, these concerns and issues were discussed.
The setting of the camp facilitated the exercise of libertas and with it free expression by citizen-soldiers. Camp geography highlighted a link between a Roman citizen and a Roman soldier. Political assemblies in Rome and military assemblies in camp were both labeled contiones. They were both held in a forum, either the Forum Romanum or the camp forum. The platform from which politicians spoke in Rome and the platform from which generals spoke in camp was usually referred to as the rostra. The purpose of the camp contio was often the same as the contio in Rome: information was to be relayed, decisions to be explained, and Roman citizens to be convinced of something.
The way in which a general presented himself in camp rostra was hardly different from a politician speaking in Rome, and the behavior of the soldiers in the camp forum was little different from the behavior of the people in the Roman Forum. There was an obvious “political meaning to the assemblies” in camp (Polo 1995: 215). Discussions among the soldiers would sometimes lead to free expression at these meetings as soldiers could make their opinions known at official camp contiones. They could cheer or voice their approval. They could remain silent as a sign of respect. They could speak directly to their commander on the tribunal. They could jeer the speaker, and even drown him out by shouting their disapproval. They could remain silent or wander away from the meeting to show their displeasure. The soldiers could even resort to violence at contiones, attacking or even killing their commander.
In short, the camp contio could represent an important expression of libertas by providing the men with a forum in which to express their grievances (see further Chrissanthos 2004: 341–67). In addition, the soldiers’ tents were usually some distance from the tents of the commander and the officers in the principia, encouraging freedom of expression. There were open spaces next to the soldiers’ tents, in which many routine duties were carried out. Since their tents were small, the soldiers spent much of their time in those open spaces. It was here that the soldiers talked, commiserating, complaining, and speaking out. The camp chain of command also provided an avenue of expression. Often soldiers used their centurions or even their military tribunes to relay requests, concerns, or demands up through the ranks to their commander.
On many occasions the soldiers were able to convince their commander to redress certain grievances or even to change his military strategies. Roman soldiers unable to change the minds of their officers often resorted to more forceful methods. Mutiny, the ultimate breakdown of discipline, occurred sixty times in the Roman Republican army. Forty-five of these mutinies happened between the Social War and Actium, meaning 16 percent of all Roman armies during this period experienced a mutiny. Not only did these incidents occur quite often, they usually achieved their goals: 72 percent of all mutinies (43/60) ended in success for the mutineers and, maybe more tellingly, despite widespread belief in Rome’s harsh system of military discipline, mutineers were actually punished on only ten occasions (17 percent). Of these ten cases, we know of nine specific acts of punishment, including: trials in Rome to punish officers, decimation of the army or decimation of the ringleaders alone, execution of all ringleaders, and the execution of all the mutineers. In these instances the famed Roman discipline was employed successfully. Yet, despite the Roman system of discipline and reputation for harshness, when the numbers are analyzed it becomes clear that the actual punishment of mutineers was rare.
ROMAN EMPIRE
Once in power Augustus implemented wide-ranging reforms and by 13 B.C. he had created Rome’s first professional army. No longer would temporary armies be created to deal with temporary threats. Now there would be twenty-eight legions of 5,500 men plus cavalry reinforced by a similar number of auxiliary units. Altogether, there would be a permanent standing force of about 300,000 men. These men would serve for defined periods of time. Originally the term called for sixteen years of active service followed by four years in reserve. Those periods were extended in 6 B.C. to twenty and five years (Cass. Dio 55.23).
The key to this system, in enticing volunteers and in keeping soldiers happy while performing a difficult job, was, of course, money. One of the most frequent causes of trouble during the Republic had been money. Problems included irregular pay, unfair or infrequent distribution of plunder, and dissatisfaction with discharge bonuses of cash and land or the lack thereof. Augustus was able to make significant economic improvements to military service. He provided pay of 225 denarii, the same amount distributed by Caesar, which was itself a doubling of the previous stipend provided by the state. This pay would be distributed regularly, and would not be subject to the whim of a general or the senatorial government.
This was important because Republican soldiers often did not receive pay in a timely fashion. Donatives were granted by Augustus, but were usually not large or frequent. Though the pay was not extravagant, the key to the system was the retirement benefits. Augustus provided either a cash bonus or land or both to men who had served their time. It seems that after 13 B.C. men often received money instead of land: 12,000 sesterces or about twelve years’ pay (Cass. Dio. 54.25). Estimates vary, but possibly as many as 200,000 men received benefits during the first three decades of Augustus’s reign. These included mass discharges in 30 to 28 and 14 B.C. To cover all these expenditures, Augustus established the aerarium militare in A.D. 6. To help fund this military treasury, Augustus donated his own money, and later supplemented that with sales and inheritance taxes (Mon. Anc. 17). These steps were fundamental to the creation of a permanent, professional army. The soldiers would now receive these economic benefits “as a right and no longer as a privilege” (Watson 1969: 147). These economic reforms, at least for much of the Principate, helped keep the soldiers happy, or at least happy enough that one important cause of indiscipline was removed.
Money aside, a soldier’s willingness to overcome the fears of battle was still at least partially based on his desire to fight courageously in front of his comrades and earn a reputation for bravery, as it seems to have been since Homeric times. But other positive incentives that rewarded disciplined conduct included a large number of decorations such as the various coronae (aurea, vallaris, muralis), torques, armillae, and phalerae (for an exhaustive list of decorations, for both men and units, see Maxwell 1981). Whole units or even whole legions could receive rewards for bravery, an honor known too in modern armies. Soldiers also now attached even greater loyalty to the legion itself as each unit now had a specific number and name, and often nicknames as well, to denote special honors or achievements or the favor of a particular emperor. Further positive incentives included hopes for promotion, especially to the centurionate. A promotion not only recognized a soldier’s valor and the respect of his comrades and superiors, it also represented an opportunity for an increased salary and percentage of the plunder. Lastly, an honorable discharge was extremely important because only then could a soldier collect his rewards of land and money, and if he were in the centurionate or above, he could step into an elevated social position in civil society. All of these potential rewards would not only entice volunteers to enlist but generally would also help keep them obedient to orders.
If these positive incentives were insufficient, Roman military discipline could still be used to coerce proper behavior. Josephus, like Polybius before him, recognized that fear played a large role in the discipline, and the effectiveness, of the Roman soldier. The range of possible punishments actually remained very similar to the Republican period. Decimation could still be enforced. Execution of individual soldiers for the crimes of mutiny, desertion, or insubordination still took place. Lesser punishments were inflicted for lesser infractions, including corporal punishment, monetary fines, increased fatigue duties, demotion, reduction of pay or plunder, dishonorable discharge, and other punishments designed to publicly humiliate the soldier. Tacitus’s account of the mutinies ofA.D. 14 demonstrates that harsh discipline was still imposed which, not surprisingly, often led to bitterness among the men. Centurions were “the customary targets of the army’s ill-will” since they carried out the various punishments (figure 15.1). One famous example was the centurion Lucilius who was nicknamed “cedo alteram” or “Give me another” by his men because whenever he broke a rod over a soldier’s back he would call again for another and then another (Tac. An. 1.23).
Though many harsh punishments were within the legal purview of the commander, it is unknown how often extreme measures were actually inflicted. Of the forty-six episodes in Frontinus’s discussion of discipline (4.1), only two date to the Empire compared with thirty-eight from the Republic. The two imperial examples both occurred in armies of Corbulo, who was renowned for his “old-fashioned” discipline. In A.D. 14, Aufidienus Rufus, one of the camp prefects who was attacked by the mutinous men, was hated, Tacitus tells us, because he favored “strict old-fashioned service conditions.” Because of the major revolts in Illyria and Pannonia in A.D. 6, it had been necessary to conscript unwilling citizens, some off the streets of Rome, into the army. These unwilling soldiers may not have been nearly as obedient as willing volunteers necessitating harsher discipline than was the norm. Yet it is possible that Corbulo and Rufus were exceptions and that commanders generally did not always adhere to the strict letter of the law and that mitigating factors were sometimes considered. In an army requiring large numbers of volunteers, a slight relaxation of discipline may have been necessary to entice recruits.
Figure 15.1 A Roman centurion with cudgel in hand. A modern reconstruction from Römerwelt, Rheinbrohl/Bad Honnigen, Germany. Photo Credit: L. Tritle.
Though no written military codes from the early Empire have survived they must have developed at some point. Military law would later become a branch of the general study of law. P. Taruttienus Paternus, a Praetorian Prefect during the reign of M. Aurelius, was the first known jurist to write on military law (see Watson 1969: 71, 76, 182, n.179). By his time, formal military laws were in place, and most likely were far older. The professional and permanent nature of Roman military service from the time of Augustus necessitated a new and comprehensive set of rules and regulations to govern life in the camp and on campaign. Due to the revolutionary nature of this new Imperial army as the first and certainly the largest permanent and professional force in Greek and Roman history, the Principate represented a major step in the evolution of ancient military discipline.
CONCLUSION
This discussion has outlined the evolution of discipline from its humble beginnings in Homeric Greece through its refinement and codification in the Hellenistic period to the creation of a more modern system in Republican and especially Imperial Rome. Rome’s fall would bring this type of military disciplinary system to an end in the West as things came full circle. Medieval Europe was characterized by armies more similar to Homer than to Rome. Not until the sixteenth century would modern systems comparable to Rome’s again develop (see Phillips 2001). Paralleling ancient times, this process was caused in part by the breakdown in feudalism and the decline of feudal military arrangements and the concomitant rise of more sophisticated governments. It may also have been inspired by the rediscovery of the classics which chronicled in great detail the success of the Roman army and the legendary discipline upon which that success was built, or on the acquisition of Byzantine texts which included numerous military codes. Machiavelli argued from ancient historical precedent that a state could only survive if it possessed good laws and a good army, and that there “can be no good laws where there are no good armies” (Prince 12). Undisciplined mercenary armies were ineffective and dangerous, and states which employed them were doomed to destruction. In contrast, armies filled with patriotic citizen-soldiers were disciplined and provided reliable defense and preserved freedom. Rome was his ideal.
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