SCOTT MCDONOUGH
Along the main access road northwest of the Sasanian royal city of Firuzabad (Ardashir-Kurra/Gor), below the early Sasanian palace of Qal’a-ye Dokhtar, are two carved rock reliefs, one depicting Ardashir I’s overthrow of the Arsacid king Artabanus/Ardavan V and the other his investiture as Ardashir, “King of Kings of Eran [Aryans]” (Huff 2008). The first relief depicts three scenes of single combats: to the left, a Persian noble clutching a Parthian warrior, in the center, the royal Prince Shapur impaling the Parthian minister Dadhbundadh on his lance, and at the far right, Ardashir personally unhorsing the king Artabanus. This scene briefly illustrates the official Sasanian account of the battle of the plain of Hormizdagan (28 April 224 [all dates are A.D. unless indicated otherwise]), a tradition also echoed in al-Tabari and numerous other post-Sasanian sources in Arabic and New Persian (al-Tabari, Ta’rikh: 1.818–19; Shahbazi 2004; Bosworth 1999: 13–14). The second relief, perhaps meant to illustrate the aftermath of the battle, shows the victorious Ardashir, backed by Shapur and two other princes, receiving a ribboned ring representing sovereignty over a fire altar from the god Ohrmazd.1
These two scenes provide significant insight into the military ideology of the Sasanians, the Persian dynasty that would contest with Rome for dominion over West Asia for the next four centuries. The reliefs allude to peculiar circumstances of Ardashir’s rise to power, as a Persian rebel against his Parthian king, one who claimed divine sanction for his rebellion (Ardashir’s rebellion: Huff 2008; Frye 1984a: 116–24; Frye 1984b: 291–5, Widengren 1971). Above all these reliefs point out how the Sasanians linked military acumen with religious piety and social order. Central to Sasanian royal ideology was the idea of the king as a warrior, given victory and kingship by the gods. The Sasanian polity, despite significant changes over its four-hundred-year existence, remained wedded to the formula of the king as the bringer of justice, order, and peace through military victory (cf. Widengren 1959; Frye 1964; Choksy 1988; Daryaee 2008).
A. D. Lee’s chapter in this volume has effectively sketched the capabilities of the Sasanian military in its confrontation with the Roman Empire over the period 220–628. This chapter will look specifically at the military as an institution in Iranian politics and society, beginning in the Parthian era and focusing on Sasanian developments. Although the sources will exhibit a significant overlap with those featured in Lee’s chapter, whenever possible reference will be made to material produced within the Sasanian world, whether primary evidence, such as epigraphy, architecture, sculpture, coins, seals and bullae, or epistles and literature composed in Middle Iranian, Aramaic, and Armenian. Post-Sasanian writings in these languages, and in Arabic and New Persian, will also be consulted, although their use presents significant historiographical challenges (on the difficulties inherent in the study of pre-Islamic Iran see Wiesehöfer 1996: 153–64; Morony 1997).
THE ROOTS OF SASANIAN MILITARY IDEOLOGY
The cavalry-centric armies that faced each other on the plain of Hormizdagan were the culmination of four centuries of Parthian tactical innovation (Shahbazi 1987). Parthian armies under the Arsacid dynasty had evolved to confront the Macedonian-style phalanges of the Seleucids in the long campaign that established Parthian hegemony over the Iranian plateau and in Babylonia. To avoid meeting the superior Macedonian (and, later, Roman) infantry on their own terms, Parthian armies emphasized mobility through superior horsemanship, in both rapid cavalry charges and feigned retreats. The bulk of the Parthian cavalry consisted of lightly armored horse archers who could strike infantry from long range or lure enemies from tight formations to their doom through feigned retreat and the use of the “Parthian shot” (Rostovtzeff 1943: 174ff). The additional Central Asian innovation of the kataphraktoi, horsemen (and horses) massively armored in iron scale and armed with lance and compound bow, was adopted wholeheartedly by the Parthians, with devastating effect on the battlefield (Bivar 1972: 273f.). Indeed, at Carrhae (53 B.C.) Crassus and his legions found that Parthian arrows could punch through legionary armor at a distance, while charging lancers might even skewer two Roman soldiers at once (Plut. Crass. 24.4–6, 27.1–2).
However tactically innovative the Parthians were in their use of cavalry, this rarely translated into lasting territorial gains following their expulsion of the Seleucids from Babylonia (129 B.C.). Mobility came with a cost of slighting the development of nonaristocratic infantry (Plut. Crass. 19; App. B Civ. 2.18), and the Parthians seem to have lacked the capability to engage in the siege warfare necessary to capture frontier cities and fortresses, such as those established by the Romans in Syria, Mesopotamia, and Armenia (Plut. Ant. 38).
Further, Arsacid ambitions were highly circumscribed by the decentralized character of their regime. The Arsacid Great King was essentially primus inter pares among the Parthian noble families, and, according to Pliny, ruled over some eighteen subordinate monarchs outside of the Parthian heartlands (Plin. HN 6.29; Wolski 1981, 1988). As such, the Arsacids could seldom count on the ready availability of all the potential military power of their empire, or the undivided loyalty of their soldiers. Moreover, the Arsacid dynasty was prone to schism, which often divided its Parthian aristocrats and client kingdoms in civil war. Indeed, Roman generals and emperors proved especially skilled in exploiting these divides both diplomatically and militarily, encouraging civil war and ravaging the fertile lands of Babylonia on a generational basis (Isaac 1992: 28–33).
The Sasanian revolution of the 220s arose from this background of Arsacid civil war and Roman invasion. The Sasanians, guardians of the temple of Anahita at Estakhr, had over a decade consolidated a power base in Persis (al-Tabari, Ta’rikh: 1.814; Azarnoush 1987; Boyce 1985; Chaumont 1958; Nöldeke 1879: 17). With the support of several of the great Parthian aristocratic families, the Sasanians toppled the Arsacids through military force and propaganda that portrayed their opponents as militarily and morally weak rulers, deserted by the gods, who were unable to defend the “land of the Aryans” (Eranshahr). After his victory, the Sasanian king, Ardashir I, emphasized his right to the monarchy though his consolidation of the client kingdoms that formerly lent their allegiance to the Arsacids (Chaumont 1975). Ardashir also initiated an aggressive campaign of raids and attacks on the Roman East, culminating under his successor, Shapur I, in the sack of Roman Antioch (260). These activities are described in detail on the inscription of Shapur at the Ka’ba-i Zardoshht (Huyse 1999).
The early Sasanian military (spah) was essentially Parthian in character. Indeed, the bulk of “Sasanian” cavalrymen were those same Parthian aristocrats who had fought under their Arsacid predecessors (Shahbazi 1987). Nevertheless, the Sasanians appear to have employed greater numbers of kataphraktoi wearing lighter, Roman-style chain-mail armor (Bivar 1972: 275). Indeed, by the fourth century it appears that the Parthian and Persian nobility were entirely outfitted as kataphraktoi (or, clibanarii: Amm. Marc. 25.1.12–13; Heliod. Aeth. 9.15), with allied federate troops (see below) providing more lightly armed cavalry. The Sasanians also quickly adopted siege technologies, apparently in imitation of Roman models (see further A.D. Lee, 721–3).
However, notwithstanding the Sasanian adoption of Roman techniques (and vice versa) structurally, the Sasanian military remained unlike that of their Roman foes. While Iranian society was highly militarized and its elites defined themselves as a “warrior aristocracy” (arteshtaran, arteshtarih), Sasanian Iran was still a considerably less populous, poorer, and far more decentralized polity than Rome (Rubin 1995; Howard-Johnston 1995a, 2008). Consequently, the Sasanian kings had few full-time soldiers at their disposal, relying instead on aristocratic levies. The few exceptions to this were the royal cavalry bodyguard (apparently called “immortals” in imitation of Achaemenid practice), small garrison forces, and some foreign contingents. However, the numbers of soldiers in full-time service to the dynasty may have increased in the sixth and seventh centuries, through military restructuring and the press of more frequent conflicts with the Roman state (see below).
The backbone of Sasanian military power, the Iranian (“Aryan”) cavalry, was, for lack of a more accurate term, a “feudal” army organized around the banners of the aristocratic azadan (“the free”), most prominently the vuzurgan (“great families”) of Parthian descent (on the difficulties of using the term “feudal,” see Wiesehöfer 2007; Frye 1987; Widengren 1976; Altheim and Stiehl 1954). These aristocrats fought as heavy cavalry, conscripting infantry from among their own peasantry (Amm. Marc. 23.6.83). This organization reflected the essential nature of the Sasanian polity, which was from its inception defined by cooperation and tension between the Persian Sasanian monarchy and large, essentially autonomous Parthian aristocratic families based on the Iranian plateau.2
Indeed the Sasanian kings had notably little direct influence over the vuzurgan who dominated the Iranian plateau and provided the bulk of their offensive forces. Despite legendary embellishments, the initial development of Sasanian military power, and their overthrow of the Parthian Arsacids, was more a product of Ardashir I’s successful exploitation of resentments and tensions between the great families than the creation of a truly new military order. Indeed, an alternate narrative of Sasanian origins might argue that factions among the great families took advantage of Sasanian ambitions to topple the Arsacids and realign power in the Iranian plateau to their own advantage. Thus, kings who demonstrated the sanction of the gods through victory and distribution of the consequent spoils, generally gained aristocratic support, while those Sasanian kings who attempted to curb the traditional “freedoms” of the Parthian nobility tended to meet gruesome ends.3 In the end, the Parthian aristocracy served the Sasanian monarchy out of self-interest, personal oath, and, perhaps, a shared sense of “Aryan” (Eran) identity with their Persian kings.
Indeed, from an ideological perspective the primary raison d’être of the Sasanian king was the protection and unification of Eranshahr, the “land of the Aryans” (Gnoli 1987, 1989) The early Sasanian conception of Eran (“Aryan”) is difficult to characterize, as it interwove notions of cultural, ethno-linguistic, religious, and territorial identity that were probably kept deliberately vague. Yet, the notion of the Sasanians as the blessed champions of a unified “Aryan” people, a people sharing common language, culture, and religion, was a rallying cry in their struggle against the divided and militarily ineffectual regime of the Arsacids. On the throne, the crucial juxtaposition of civilized Eranshahr surrounded and menaced by the apocalyptic forces of the Aneran (“non-Aryans”) was a standard trope of Sasanian-era Middle Iranian literature, persisting into the Islamic period in Zoroastrian texts and Persian epic (Gignoux 1987). Setting out into the lands of the Aneran, the Sasanian kings assembled their armies at the great fire temples (like Adur Gushnasp, modern Takht-i Suleiman). On their return, they offered sacrifices of foreign booty and the heads of their enemies to the gods (al-Tabari, Ta’rikh: 1.819; Labourt 1904: 71 n. 2; Nöldeke 1879: 4 n. 2, 17). For as long as they protected Eranshahr from its foes, Sasanian kings could depend on the sanction of the gods.
ERAN UD ANERAN: RECRUITMENT, ETHNICITY, AND ORDER IN THE SASANIAN MILITARY
The protection of Eranshahr provided justification for both the Sasanian subjugation of the Aneran and for the raiding and conquest of regions outside of Sasanian control. Within the first century of their regime, the Sasanians established suzerainty over all subordinate kingdoms of the Parthian Empire and aggressively pursued expansion in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and on their eastern frontier (for a narrative of this expansion: Kettenhöfen 1982; Frye 1984a: 124–40; Frye 1984b: 296–312; Dodgeon and Lieu 1994). The Sasanians maintained a network of client kingdoms and the basic forms of Parthian administration, including the title “King of Kings.” However, they aggressively consolidated power over these client kingdoms through warfare, assassination, and diplomacy. By the fourth-century reign of Shapur II (309–379), many of the original Parthian client kingdoms were directly under the administration of Sasanian princes. Perhaps as a consequence of dynastic struggles between “client kings” of the Sasanian family, these kingdoms were further reduced to the status of provinces beginning in the late fourth and fifth centuries, to be governed by shahraban (“satraps”) or royal military appointees, the marzpanan (“border lords”).4 By the end of the Sasanian period, Sasanian kings appear to have envisioned all the provinces of their empire as effectively part of “Eranshahr,” whatever the cultural, ethnic, or linguistic character of their inhabitants.
The military roles of the peoples of conquered territories varied considerably. Few, if any, soldiers were recruited from the Aramaic-speaking (Aramaean) populations of Adiabene, Garmakan, Asorestan, and Mayshan, although small garrisons and ad hoc militias helped defend the cities of these regions (Amm. Marc. 24.2.9–22, 24.3.10–11). The vast agricultural and commercial wealth of these lowlands, the economic core of both the Arsacid and Sasanian polities, coupled with the presence of distinct non-Iranian local populations, and the preponderance of politically suspect Jews and Christians among these populations may perhaps explain the Sasanian reluctance to conscript forces there.5
By contrast, regions on the “bleeding edge” of Sasanian expansion came to contribute significant portions of Sasanian military strength. These were often groups who had recently been conquered or had submitted by treaty to Sasanian rule. Thus Ammianus describes large groups of Chionites (Huns) at the siege of Amida in 359, some of whom had recently been conquered in Shapur II’s eastern campaigns (Amm. Marc. 19.1). Similarly, pseudo-Joshua the Stylite and Procopius note the presence of large numbers of Hephthalite warriors in the armies of Kavad (488–496, 498–531), probably a consequence of Kavad’s marital alliance with the Hephthalite king (ps.-Josh. Styl. 1.277; Procop. Pers. 1.7.5–11). These patterns of recruitment removed armed men from circulation in their homelands and gave them a chance to demonstrate their new loyalties to the Sasanian state and family. Indeed, accounts of Sasanian armies suggest a general tendency to draw forces from the east to fight on the Roman frontier, and from the Transcaucasian regions to fight in Central Asia. The loyalties of soldiers recruited from these groups, when not secured by abstract notions of honor, were guaranteed by the granting of privileges and royal stipends and by invitations to the Sasanian court, a thinly veiled form of hostage taking (Łazar P’arpec’i, Patmut’iwn hayots’ 47–55).
Armenia and other regions of the Transcaucasus also supplied aristocratic heavy cavalry for Sasanian campaigns, although the question of “identity” among the Caucasian cavalry would prove highly problematic in the Sasanian military system (McDonough 2006). The question of whether the frontier peoples of the south Caucasus, particularly Armenians, were “Aryan” was a problematic one for Iranians and Parthians alike. Armenia was at least nominally ruled by a branch of the Parthian Arsacids (from 64 to 428); its language was Indo-European with a massive contribution of Iranian loan words; its culture was, essentially, Iranian, and Armenian aristocrats contributed significantly to Sasanian military efforts (on Armenian links with “Eran” see Garsoïan 1996, 1982, 1976; Russell 1987; Schmitt et al. 1987). Yet Armenia was divided between Roman and Persian spheres of influence, and was, from the fourth century, increasingly Christianized. The Armenian revolts against Sasanian rule of 450/451 and 572 reflect one response to the competing pulls of Iran and Rome (Adontz 1970).
After the Sasanian polity’s initial wave of expansion its military (spah) was comprised of four categories of troops, organized by regiment (gund).6 First were conscripted infantry, regarded with distain by a late observer as “a multitude of miserable peasants, who follow the army only for demolishing walls, pillaging corpses and serving the soldiers” (Procop. Pers. 1.18.31–34). Second were more skilled and specialized infantry units, especially archers, who are, unfortunately, little attested in the sources. Third were “foreign” units of infantry and cavalry, recruited from among recently conquered peoples or from the “allied” forces of tributary client kings. In the fourth century account of warfare on the Roman eastern frontier given by Ammianus Marcellinus, these were Chionites (Huns) and Sakas, while later authors mention Lakhmid and other allied Arabs, Hephthalite Huns, and Daylamites in fifth- and sixth-century Sasanian armies (Greatrex 1998: 55–6). Finally, the core of the Sasanid spah was the heavy cavalry drawn from the “Aryan” aristocracies of Eranshahr discussed above (figure 26.4). These were also organized along ethnic lines, as attested in inscriptions, such as that of Narseh at Paikuli and on late Sasanian sealings, such as those inscribed with the titles “aspbedanof the Persians” and “aspbedan of the Parthians” (Gyselen 2007: 57–8, 284–7).
Figure 26.4 Sasanian cavalryman in battle. A bas-relief near Naqsh-e Rustam, Iran. Photo Credit: Gianna Dagli Orti/Art Resource, NY.
Judging from military titles (e.g., hazarbed: “commander of one thousand”), the early Sasanian spah was at least theoretically organized along decimal lines, although it would be naïve to assume that the Sasanians consistently maintained such an organized military “system.” Aristocratic generals (spahbedan) led the Sasanian spah, perhaps serving under a single “Iran-General” (Eran-spahbed) drawn from the ranks of the Parthian “Great Families.” However, regional subject-kings, members of the Sasanian family, and the kings themselves also played vital roles on campaign.7 Judging from the letters of the fifth-century bishop of Nisibis, Barsauma, the marzpanan gradually introduced as military governors of frontier provinces from the fifth century commanded local garrison troops (where available) and played roles mustering and commanding soldiers in larger campaigns (Barsauma ep. 2–4).
A variety of other Sasanian military officials are attested from seals, bullae, and literary evidence with responsibilities over royal granaries and other military provisions.8 Yet while generals were clearly able to requisition food for their armies, Sasanian kings took pride in their armies’ ability to live lightly off their subjects’ land, a fact admired by some Roman observers (Mazzucchi 2002: 14 [= f. 298r]). Early Sasanian soldiers were largely self-sufficient, serving for their oaths and personal loyalty, as well as the expectation of battlefield remuneration in the form of booty. Regular military pay, along with military land grants, were more an aspect of administrative reforms instituted by the kings Kavad and Kusro I (531–579), and expanded by Kusro II (590, 591–628), which significantly transformed the character of the Sasanian spah.
A SASANIAN “GRAND STRATEGY”?
As A. D. Lee’s contribution in this volume demonstrates, the fully assembled Sasanian military was a highly effective offensive force, devastating against disorganized enemies and certainly the match of Roman armies of smaller or equal size. Yet, while the early Sasanian kings theoretically commanded impressive, even overwhelming armies, as a strategic consequence of their political and social systems, Sasanian forces were slow to assemble, difficult to weld into a coherent fighting force, and sustained largely by the personal charisma of their king or commander.
What were the goals of Sasanian offensive efforts? The Sasanians used their offensive forces to raid Roman territories, and, less frequently, in larger attempts to occupy and hold territories through the besieging of cities and set-piece battles with Roman forces. On the northeastern frontier, Sasanian armies raided deep into the Central Asian steppe to challenge confederations of nomads and seminomads and assert their authority over kingdoms and city-states of the silk routes.
As noted above, Sasanians framed this offensive warfare as “defending” Eran. Conflict with the Aneran was a pious act that expanded the abode of the gods and demonstrated divine favor for the Sasanian monarchy. Moreover, successful offensive warfare provided the Sasanians with a deeper base of military manpower from new “allies.”
Economic predation also shaped Sasanian military activities. Successful campaigns could result in the negotiation of financial subsidies, the taking of loot from raids and campaigns against neighbors, and, significantly, the taking of captives. Roman prisoners were deported in large numbers in Sasanian Khuzestan and Asorestan, with those taken from the two Sasanian sacks of Antioch (260 and 540) resettled in the immodestly named royal foundations Veh-andiyok-i Shapur (“the better Antioch of Shapur”) and Veh-andiyok-i Kusro (“the better Antioch of Kusro”). Captives played significant roles in the economic development of the Sasanian royal domain (ostan), providing skilled artisans and (evidently) mass labor for the construction of infrastructure (Lieu 1986; Kettenhofen 1996b; Morony 2004). While the economic benefits of warfare were widely disseminated, they served particularly to enhance the economic base of the Sasanian kings, gradually shifting the balance of power in the “Parthian-Sasanian Confederation” toward the monarchy.
However, while the Sasanian offense was fearsome, its range was also rather limited, at least until the sixth and seventh centuries. The parochial interests of the Iranian aristocratic cavalry made short-term raiding more feasible than sustained fighting on the frontiers. Although far better organized than their Arsacid predecessors and more effective in mimicking Roman tactics, the Sasanians lacked Rome’s deep logistical and financial resources, its efficiencies realized through Mediterranean transport and the cohesion of Roman armies. On its steppe frontiers, Sasanian cavalry were known for their use of nomadic tactics like the so-called “Parthian shot” and tactical retreats, but royal forces were ultimately dependent on the resources of cities and vulnerable agricultural regions for material support. As a consequence of these limitations, small bands of determined invaders were able to push quite quickly into the economic heartlands of the Sasanian Empire, as in the 395 Hunnic raid that penetrated into Sasanian Mesopotamia and Asorestan (Greatrex and Greatrex 1999). Larger armies, such as those of the Roman emperors Galerius, Julian, and Maurice ravaged the rich agricultural lands of the Tigris-Euphrates floodplain without significant opposition for considerable periods of time.
Sasanian efforts to retain offensive initiative, the tactical skill of individual commanders, and the general over-commitment of their primary foes in the Roman Empire partially mitigated these inherent defensive weaknesses. Further, the archaeological record presents considerable, but uneven, evidence of Sasanian fortifications, constructed to compensate for the offensive orientation of Iranian military power. Thus, while invaders ravaged the Sasanian countryside without immediate fear of confrontation, they faced a variety of walled cities, fortresses, and linear defenses constructed by local, aristocratic, and royal initiative that hindered their freedom of movement (Kleiss 2001).
Most Sasanian cities were walled, typically in mud brick, with stone-rubble or cut-stone walls reserved for exceptional fortifications (Negroponzi and Cavallero 1967 discuss Sasanian mud-brick fortifications at Kokhe [Veh-Ardashir]). In the lowlands of the Tigris-Euphrates valley, urban sites also incorporated rivers and canals into the defensive systems, as seen by the armies of the Roman emperors Julian, Maurice, and Heraclius in their campaigns into Sasanian Babylonia. In this, the Sasanians continued the architectural traditions of their Mesopotamian and Iranian predecessors. Indeed, in Mesopotamia, Babylonia, and Khuzestan, millennia of construction, fortification, accretion, and abandonment at urban sites further enhanced sites’ defensibility by raising tells above the flat floodplain landscape.
Probably only a few Sasanian frontier cities, such as Nisibis, Dvin, Darband, and Merv, and unique sites like Takht-i Suleiman, were sufficiently well-fortified and garrisoned to withstand a long siege, especially one (in the west) led by Roman military engineers.9 Instead, the fortification of cities, coupled with the establishment of castles and fortified way stations, provided basic protection from banditry and raiding, particularly on the Arabian, Caucasian, and Central Asian limes, and served as a statement of Sasanian rulers’ power and commitment to defend their lands.10 Despite this, fortifications, backed by local militias, were sufficient to significantly delay any invader, who had to laboriously besiege each city and fortress, or face harassment from these strong-points to his rear. For ideological and fiscal reasons, the Sasanian kings could not allow such incursions to continue long term, but the establishment of fortifications served to delay invaders long enough for the Sasanian kings to assemble field armies to confront their enemies on equal terms.
Yet fortifications also proved something of a mixed blessing to the Sasanian kings in times of civil conflict or revolt. At several moments, cities served as focal points of insurrection, as in such cases as the revolt of Susa under Shapur II or Bet Lafat under Kusro I. Indeed, after his defeat of the rebels in Susa, Shapur II had the city’s walls and buildings pulled down by massed elephants and trampled into dust (Potts 1999: 426). Nevertheless these urban rebellions seldom spread widely. By contrast, fortifications used by the rural aristocracy of the Iranian plateau and south Caucasus were considerably more troubling foci of rebellion, particularly the revolts of Bahram Chobin and Bistam in the late sixth century.
The military functions of the “long walls” constructed by the Sasanians are rather more mysterious (on which see Frye 1977; Kettenhofen 1996a; Kiani 1982; Nokandeh et al. 2006; Hoffmann 2007). The most notable of these are found at (and extending considerably south of) the narrow pass between the Greater Caucasus Mountains and the Caspian Sea at Darband (Persian: “Barred Gate”); north of the Gorgan plain between the Elburz Mountains and the Caspian Sea (the so-called “Alexander Wall”); and at the interface between the lands watered by the Euphrates and the Arabian steppe. The massive fortress at Darband, thought by medieval authors to be Alexander the Great’s defenses against the tribes of Gog and Magog (van Bladel 2008), was evidently an effective impediment to the incursions from the Eurasian steppe and a center of long-distance trade, as well as a powerful bargaining chip in negotiations with the Romans, whose territories it also protected. However, it is unlikely that more extensive linear fortifications, such as the 135-km “Alexander Wall” in Gurgan, the Arabian limes, or fortifications in Sistan were (or could be) permanently garrisoned. That leaves the question of what function these fortifications served. Presumably, these fortifications could be rapidly refurbished and occupied in times of conflict, while serving as convenient lookout points at most times. Arabic futuh literature also suggests a program of settling lesser nobles (the dihqanan) near these frontiers. Ultimately though the symbolic value of walls as markers of the boundaries between “civilization” and “barbarity” should not be discounted.
The disposition of Sasanian fortifications and walled cities indicates a Sasanian strategic interest in defending, controlling, exploiting, and developing royal properties (ostan) and the lands of subject populations in fertile lowland regions beyond the traditional range of “Eran.” The construction of linear fortifications on the Arabian, Caucasian, and Gurgan frontiers all aimed to shelter revenue-generating agricultural lands from threatening migrants traversing these frontiers. The foundation of royal cities in these regions further strengthened local defenses, while serving in the development of markets for local and long-distance trade (Pigulevskaja 1963; Wenke 1975–1976; Christensen 1993: 67–116; Alizadeh and Ur 2007). Many of the core agricultural regions of the empire were further developed through the settlement of captives taken in raids and military campaigns, notably the inhabitants of Antioch deported to Khuzestan by Shapur I in 260, and from the same city to Asorestan by Kusro I in 540. In this sense, the Sasanians exerted significant military power in the defense and development of agricultural and urban resources exploitable by the Sasanian family. Sasanian efforts in this respect appear to have contributed significantly to the urban and agrarian development of the economic core of the empire: Khuzestan, Maishan, and Asorestan, as well as more remote regions, such as Azerbaijan, Gurgan, and Tabaristan. The roads, bridges and fortifications constructed along routes of travel, trade, and communication in the Sasanian era may provide further insight into the “development agenda” of the Sasanian kings (or local kings and aristocrats).
What becomes clear from examining the offensive and defensive measures of the era is a slight disjunction between the goals of the Parthian aristocratic families and the Sasanian dynasty. The Parthian aristocracy viewed warfare as a means to protect their Iranian estates, gain income from warfare, and influence (or intimidate) the Sasanian King of Kings. By contrast, the successive Sasanian monarchs evidently viewed warfare and its rewards as a means to enhance their weak position vis-à-vis the traditional aristocracies of Eran. For the king, war provided the opportunity to demonstrate decisive, charismatic leadership, to expand networks of patronage and personal loyalty, to recruit military forces independent of the traditional aristocracies, and to build economic and social networks that might act as a counterweight to the military power of the traditional aristocracy.
THE FINAL CENTURIES OF SASANIAN MILITARY POWER
The final two centuries of the Sasanian era saw first a military crisis and the restructuring of the Sasanian military and society. At its roots, this era saw the Sasanian monarchy attempt to renegotiate the terms of the aristocratic alliance between Persian and Parthian great families to the advantage of the Sasanians. While this renegotiation saw only limited success from the perspective of the Sasanian kings, the related transformation of the military in the sixth century dramatically reshaped the ambitions of the Sasanian polity in its final years.
In the fifth century, the Sasanian regime was threatened with three major challenges. The first of these was the development of large, politically suspect Christian populations, especially on the western frontiers of the empire (Brock 1982). Second was the increasing resistance, particularly among the aristocracies, to royal attempts to centralize power in the monarchy and Sasanian family. Finally, the establishment of aggressive Hunnic confederations, such as the Hephthalites, on the empire’s northeastern frontiers placed enormous stress on Sasanian armies.
Although each of these issues would trouble the Sasanian kings into the sixth century, they would all, in combination, contribute to the Armenian (or Caucasian) revolt of 450/451. In that year, Yazdgard II demanded the conversion (or reconversion) of the Armenian military aristocracy to Magianism/Zoroastrianism. Although these events are largely narrated by Armenian sources inveterately hostile to Yazdgard II, the king’s edicts were clearly rooted in a series of anxieties based on the nature of Sasanian recruitment and Sasanian military ideology (McDonough 2006). The aristocracy of Armenia had, over the previous century, substantially Christianized, despite their deep cultural affinities with the peoples of the Iranian plateau. Christian conversion undermined the complex and informal web of relations that traditionally bound the military strength of the empire to the king’s authority. Without a common culture, shared belief in the gods and the oaths they guaranteed, and respect for tradition, how could Christians be trusted to fight for Iran?
Doubts about Christian loyalties and the failures of the Sasanian army in the latter days of the fifth century critically shaped the internal and external policies of the kings in the late Sasanian era. The revolt of Armenia and the loss of its cavalry likely undermined Sasanian efforts to maintain military pressure on the Hephthalites of the northeastern frontier. Indeed, the years after 451 saw a progressive deterioration of the Sasanian position in Central Asia, culminating in the decimation of their army and the death of King Peroz in 484. Certainly a lack of soldiers forced the Sasanian kings Peroz, Balash, Jamasp, and Kavad to negotiate with the Hephthalites and ultimately to employ abnormally large numbers of federate troops (Arabs and Hephthalites, especially) to fill out their armies (Greatrex 1998: 55, 57–8). Kavad’s stint as his father’s hostage to the Hephthalites, and his return to the throne with Hephthalite backing further emphasizes the depth of the military crisis at the turn of the sixth century. Contemporary with, and probably related to, these stresses were a series of social disturbances among the Iranian aristocracy arising out the Magian communal religious movements of the Zaradushtakan and the Mazdakan, which had the consequence of upsetting (temporarily) the military, economic, and political power of the aristocracy and “Great Families” of Eranshahr (on which see Crone 1991, 1994; Gaube 1982; Tafazzoli 1984; Klima 1977, 1957; Christensen 1925).
The consequences of these crises may perhaps also be seen in the social and administrative reorganizations of the Sasanian polity under Kavad and Kusro. In the wake of their forcible repression of the Zaradushti and Mazdaki movements, Kavad and his son Kusro I Anoshirvan (“Of the immortal soul”) undertook a general survey of the empire’s economic resources and revised taxation systems to strengthen the empire’s fiscal position (Rubin 1995). In a related reform, Kusro enrolled a new lesser military aristocracy (the diqhanan), whose service was compensated through royal land grants. Recruiting the diqhanan, Kusro and his successors appear to have expanded the size of the Sasanian armies significantly, and may have aimed (with limited success) to reduce the monarchy’s dependence on the military resources of the vuzurgan (Tafazzoli 1996). The elaboration of a Sasanian version of “chivalry,” codified in this period (and recently discussed by Mohsen Zakeri), may also be related to development of the diqhanclass.11 In a further development, the centralizing kings of the sixth century reorganized the empire into four regional military commands, each under an Eran-spahbed who reported directly to the monarch (Gyselen 2000). Other contemporary administrative changes were directed specifically at Christians, to ensure that even if they did not practice the “Good Religion” of Magianism, they might at least obey their king. The Sasanian monarchs officially encouraged Christian heterodoxy to sever Christian churches under Sasanian political control (e.g., the Church of the East, Miaphysite Armenia) from the Roman Church. Late Sasanian kings, particularly Kusro II, invested considerable patronage in Christian shrines and institutions. Further, Sasanian kings appear to have generally accepted that Christians might play significant roles in administration or that the king might interfere in the administration of “his” Christian churches (Morony 1984: 332–83; McDonough 2008). Finally, and most significant from a military perspective, Sasanian kings made a tentative peace with their Armenian Christian subjects, accepting that culturally “Aryan” military aristocrats could loyally serve the Sasanian monarchy, even as Christians. The extensive Sasanian use of Armenian cavalry in Central Asia during the late sixth and early seventh centuries, especially under the Armenian general Smbat Bagratuni, illustrated this new modus vivendi.12
These military reforms were at least superficially successful. Beginning in 540, Kusro I initiated a new era of conflict against the Roman Empire and its allies, fought from the South Caucasus to the Yemen. Further, Kusro’s armies effectively eliminated the kingdoms of the Hephthalites that had threatened the Sasanian northeast for a century. These campaigns, wars against the newly established Göktürk Khaganate in the later sixth century, and, finally, the massive invasion of the Roman Empire by Kusro II (602–628) characterized an era of aggressive military activity unseen since the first century of Sasanian rule (see Whittow 1996: 15–68 for a useful survey of the geopolitical situation of the sixth and early seventh century).
However, the revitalization of the Sasanian army in the sixth and seventh century had a variety of deleterious consequences. Sasanian campaigns against the Hephthalites and Arabs, while successful, created a power vacuum on both frontiers, filled by Turks and other Arab tribes. Incessant warfare placed great strain on the resources of the empire, even following the reforms and development activities of the late Sasanian kings. While these stresses were partially mitigated by wealth extracted from new conquests, they had the effect of “hollowing out” the inherently weak defenses of the Sasanian polity. Finally, the wars of the later Sasanian kings empowered a number of aristocratic warlords given extraordinary military commands in the Sasanian northeast and west.
Perhaps the most successful of these warlords was the Parthian general Bahram Chobin, whose career neatly illustrates the triumph and troubles of the late Sasanian military system. Given command of the Sasanian east by King Hormizd IV, Bahram lead Sasanian armies to victory over the Turks, killing the Great Khagan in single combat. Yet Bahram’s successes cast doubt on the martial valor of the king himself, leading to the general’s recall and his revolt against the Hormizd. In the subsequent revolt, Bahram declared himself King of Kings, explicitly claiming for himself the mantle of the defender of Eranshahr, and marking the first time in almost four centuries that anyone had mounted a serious challenge to Sasanian claims to kingship.13
While Bahram’s rebellion was defeated by Kusro II (albeit only with Roman assistance) and Kusro’s armies achieved incredible successes in the east (under the Armenian Smbat Bagratuni) and against the Roman Empire in the west (sacking Jerusalem in 614 and besieging Constantinople in 626), these victories were ephemeral. The overstretched Sasanian armies proved incapable of capturing Constantinople (Howard-Johnston 1995b). Simultaneously, the Roman emperor Heraclius, allied with Turkish khans, exploited Sasanian weaknesses, smashing the irrigation works laboriously constructed by kings and nobles over centuries, and destroying the great fire temple at Adur Gushnasp, the point of origin for so many campaigns against the Roman Empire (on Heraclius’s campaigns see Kaegi 2003: 100–91; Howard-Johnston 1994, 1999, 2004; Whittow 1996: 69–82). At Nineveh (627), Heraclius and his allies defeated the Sasanian field army, leaving King Kusro with no support. His previously loyal subjects and commanders in the field turned on their king, executing Kusro, and perhaps the Sasanian Empire with him.
THE END OF THE SASANIAN ARMY
In the style of his ancestors, Kusro II had planned a great rock relief sculpture to commemorate his unprecedented victories. This monument to Kusro’s personal glory, and to the power of the Sasanian dynasty, was never to be completed, with only its platform and cleared canvas left at Taq-i Bustan to attest to Kusro’s ambitions. The more lasting legacy of Kusro’s wars was the physical and financial ruination of the Sasanian economic heartland and a half-decade of civil conflict (Howard-Johnston 2004).
In the years to come, the Sasanian polity would face the new challenge of Arab invaders, energized by the unification of the Arabian peninsula and the promise of Islam (see further, e.g., Hoyland 1998; Kaegi 1995; Crone 1987; Morony 1984; Donner 1981). In a series of battles, Arab Muslim armies repeatedly humbled the previously formidable Sasanian military. In the face of Arab Muslim successes, the aristocrats and warlords who had risen during the era of Sasanian success died on the battlefield, carved out their own fiefdoms in the Caucasus, the Iranian plateau and beyond, or, as they had at the dawn of the Sasanian period, allied themselves with the new, rising power.
Facing the ruin of his empire, the last Sasanian king, Yazdgard III, died, murdered in Merv, the most remote Central Asian outpost of the once-powerful Sasanian polity. His surviving son, last loyal generals and soldiers would reappear in service to Tang China, hoping for the eventual restoration of a Sasanian King of Kings of Eranshahr. While these hopes were stillborn, the soldiers and principles of the Sasanian military would live on in Iran and beyond through the Middle Ages.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei. 1970. Atti del Convegno sul tema: La Persia nel Medioevo. Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei. Problemi attuali di scienza e di cultura. Cuaderno; n. 160. Rome.
Adhami, S. (ed.). 2003. Patimana: Essays in Iranian, Indo-European, and Indian studies in honor of Hans-Peter Schmidt. Costa Mesa.
Adontz, N. 1970. Armenia in the period of Justinian: The political conditions based on the Naxarar system. Trans. N. G. Garsoïan. Leuven.
Alizadeh, K., and J. A. Ur. 2007. “Formation and destruction of pastoral and irrigation landscapes on the Mughan Steppe, north-western Iran.” Antiquity 81: 148–60.
Altheim, F., and R. Stiehl. 1954. Ein asiatischer Staat. Feudalismus unter den Sasaniden und ihre Nachbarn. Wiesbaden.
Azarnoush, M. 1987. “Fire temple and Anahita temple: A discussion of some Iranian places of worship.” Mesopotamia 22: 391–401.
Bivar, A. D. H. 1972. “Cavalry equipment and tactics on the Euphrates frontier.” DOP 26: 271–91.
Bosworth, C. E. 1999. The Sasanids, the Byzantines, the Lakhmids and Yemen: The history of al-Ṭabari. Ta’rikh al-rusul wa’l-muluk. Albany.
Boucharlat, R. 1977. “La forteresse sassanide de Tureng-Tepe.” Collogues internationaux du C. N. R. S., No. 567: Le plateau iranien et l’Asie Centrale des origines a la conquête islamique. Paris, 329–42.
Boyce, M. 1985. “Anahid. i. Ardwisur Anahid.” Encyclopaedia Iranica Online (www.iranica.com).
Brock, S. P. 1982. “Christians in the Sasanian empire: A case of divided loyalties,” in S. Mews (ed.), Religion and national identity. Studies in church history, 18. Oxford, 1–19.
Cameron, A. (ed.). 1995. The Byzantine and early Islamic near east. Vol. 3. States, resources and armies. Princeton.
Chaumont, M.-L. 1958. “Le Culte d’Anahita à Staxr et les premiers Sassanides.” RHR 153: 154–75.
———. 1975. “États vassaux dans l’empire des premiers Sassanides.” Acta Iranica 4: 89–156 (= Monumentum H. S. Nyberg 1). Leiden.
Choksy, J. K. 1988. “Sacral kingship in Sasanian Iran.” Bulletin of the Asia Institute, ns 2: 35–52.
Christensen, A. 1925. Le règne du roi Kawadh I et le communisme mazdakite. Copenhagen.
———. 1944. L’Iran sous les sassanides. 2nd ed. Copenhagen.
Christensen, P. 1993. The decline of Iranshahr. Irrigation and environments in the history of the middle east, 500B.C. toA.D. 1500. Copenhagen.
Crone, P. 1987. Meccan trade and the rise of Islam. Princeton.
———. 1991. “Kavad’s heresy and Mazdak’s revolt.” Iran 29: 21–42.
———. 1994. “Zoroastrian communism.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 36: 447–62.
Curtis, V. S., and S. Stewart (eds.). 2008. The Sasanian Era. The Idea of Iran. Vol. 3. London.
Daryaee, T. 2008. “Kingship in early Sasanian Iran,” in Curtis and Stewart 2008: 60–70.
Dignas, B., and E. Winter. 2007. Rome and Persia in late antiquity. Cambridge.
Dodgeon, M. H., and S. N. C. Lieu. 1994. The Roman eastern frontier and the Persian wars (A.D. 226–363): A documentary history. London.
Donner, F. M. 1981. The early Islamic conquests. Princeton.
Finster, B., and J. Schmidt. 1976. “Sasanidische and frühislamische Ruinen im Iraq.” Baghdader Mitteilungen 8: 26–43.
——— and ———. 2005. “The origin of ‘desert castles’: Qasr Bani Muqatil, near Karbala, Iraq.” Antiquity 79: 339–49.
Frendo, D. 1989. “Theophylact Simocatta on the revolt of Bahram Chobin and the early career of Khusraw II.” Bulletin of the Asia Institute 3: 77–88.
———. 1995. “The early exploits and final overthrow of Khusrau II (591–628): Panegyric and vilification in the last Byzantine-Iranian conflict.” Bulletin of the Asia Institute 9: 209–14.
Frye, R. N. 1964. “The charisma of kingship in ancient Iran.” Iranica Antiqua 6: 36–54.
———. 1977. “The Sasanian system of walls for defence,” in M. Rosen-Ayalon (ed.), Studies in memory of Gaston Wiet. Jerusalem, 7–15.
———. 1984a. “The political history of Iran under the Sasanians,” in E. Yarshater (ed.), The Cambridge History of Iran. Vol. 3: The Seleucid, Parthian and Sasanid Periods. Cambridge, 116–80.
———. 1984b. The history of ancient Iran. Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft; 3. Abt., 7. T. Munich.
———. 1987. “Feudalism in Sasanian and early Islamic Iran.” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 9: 13–18.
Garsoïan, N. G. 1976. “Prolegomena to a study of the Iranian elements in Arsacid Armenia.” Handes Amsorea 90: 177–234.
———. 1982. “The Iranian substratum of the ‘Agat’angelos cycle,” in N. G. Garsoïan, T. F. Mathews, and R. W. Thomson (eds.), East of Byzantium. Washington, DC, 151–89.
———. 1996. “The two voices of Armenian mediaeval historiography: The Iranian index.” Studia Iranica 25: 7–43.
———. 1999. L’Église arménienne et le grand schisme d’orient. Corpus scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium 574. Leuven.
———. 2005. “Smbat Bagratuni.” Encyclopaedia Iranica Online (www.iranica.com).
Gaube, H. 1982. “Mazdak: Historical reality or invention?” Studia Iranica 11: 111–22.
Gibb, H. A. R. (ed.). 1960–2009. Encyclopedia of Islam. New ed. 13 vols. Leiden [cited as Encyclopedia of Islam2].
Gignoux, P. 1987. “Aneran.” Encyclopaedia Iranica Online (www.iranica.com).
Gnoli, G. 1987. “Er mazdesn: Zum Begriff Iran und seiner Entstehung im 3. Jahrhundert.” Studia Iranica 5: 83–100.
———. 1989. The idea of Iran: An essay on its origin. Rome.
———, and A. Panaino (eds.). 2004. La Persia e Bisanzio. Atti del Convegno internazionale. Rome
Greatrex, G. 1998. Rome and Persia at war, 502–532. Leeds.
——— and M. Greatrex. 1999. “The Hunnic invasion of the east of 395 and the fortress of Ziatha.” Byzantion 69: 65–75.
——— and S. N. C. Lieu. 2002. The Roman eastern frontier and the Persian wars. Part II. A.D. 363–630. A narrative sourcebook. London.
Gyselen, R. 1989. La géographie administrative de l’Empire sassanide. Les témoignages sigillographiques. Res Orientales 1. Paris.
———. 2000. The four generals of the Sasanian empire: Some sigillographic evidence. Rome.
———. 2002. Nouveaux matériaux pour la géographie historique de l’empire sassanide: sceaux administratifs de la collection Ahmad Saeedi. Studia Iranica 24. Paris.
———. 2007. Sasanian seals and sealings in the A. Saeedi collection. Acta Iranica 44. Leuven.
Herrmann, G. 1999. Monuments of Merv: Traditional buildings of the Karakum. London.
———. 2000. “The rock reliefs of Sasanian Iran,” in J. Curtis (ed.), Mesopotamia and Iran in the Parthian and Sasanian periods. London, 35–45.
Hoffmann, B. 2007. “An imperial frontier of the Sasanian empire: Further fieldwork at the great wall of Gorgan.” Iran 45: 95–136.
Howard-Johnston, J. 1994. “The official history of Heraclius’ Persian campaigns,” in E. Dąbrowa (ed.), The Roman and Byzantine army in the east. Cracow, 57–87.
———. 1995a. “The two great powers in late antiquity: A comparison,” in Cameron 1995: 157–226.
———. 1995b. “The siege of Constantinople in 626,” in C. Mango and G. Dagron (eds.), Constantinople and its hinterland. Aldershot, 131–42.
———. 1999. “Heraclius’ Persian campaigns and the revival of the eastern Roman Empire, 622–630.” War in History 6: 1–44.
———. 2004. “Pride and fall: Khusro II and his regime, 626–628,” in Gnoli and Panaino 2004: 95–113.
———. 2008. “State and society in late antique Iran,” in Curtis and Stewart 2008: 118–31.
Hoyland, R. G. 1998. Seeing Islam as others saw it: A survey and evaluation of Christian, Jewish and Zoroastrian writings on early Islam. Princeton.
Huff, D. 1977. “Takht-i Suleiman.” Archaologische Mitteilungen aus Iran, 10: 211–30.
———. 2008. “Formation and ideology of the Sasanian state in the context of the archaeological evidence,” in Curtis and Stewart 2008: 31–59.
Huyse, P. 1999. Die dreisprachige Inschrift Shabuhrs I. an der Ka’ba-i Zardusht. London.
Inostrantsev, C. A. 1926. “Sasanian military theory.” Journal of the Cama Oriental Institute 7: 7–53.
Isaac, B. 1992. The limits of empire: The Roman army in the east. Rev. ed. Oxford.
Kaegi, W. E. 1995. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. Cambridge.
———. 2003. Heraclius: Emperor of Byzantium. Cambridge.
Kalantarian, A. A. 1996. Dvin. Histoire et archeologie de la ville medievale. Neuchâtel.
Kettenhofen, E. 1982. Die römisch-persischen Kriege des 3. Jahrhunderts n. Chr. Nach der Inscrift Šāpuhrs I. Wiesbaden.
———. 1996a. “Darband.” Encyclopaedia Iranica Online (www.iranica.com).
———. “Deportations.” ii. Encyclopaedia Iranica Online (www.iranica.com).
Khurshudian, E. 1998. Die Parthischen und Sasanidischen Verwaltungsinstitutionen. Nach den Literarischen und Epigraphischen Quellen. 3. Jh. v Chr.–7. Jh. n. Chr. Yerevan.
Kiani, M. Y. 1982. “Excavations on the defensive wall of the Gorgan plain: A preliminary report.” Iran 20: 73–7.
Kleiss, W. 2001. “Fortifications.” Encyclopaedia Iranica Online (www.iranica.com).
Klima, O. 1957. Mazdak. Geschichte einr sozialen Bewegung im sassanidischen Persien. Prague.
———. 1977. Beiträge zur Geschichte des Mazdakismus. Prague.
Labourt, J. 1904. Le christianisme de l’empire Perse sous la dynastie sassanide. Paris.
Lieu, S. N. C. 1986. “Captives, refugees and exiles: A study of the cross-frontier civilian movements and contacts between Rome and Persia from Valerian to Jovian,” in P. Freeman and D. Kennedy (eds.), The defence of the Roman and Byzantine east. Oxford, 475–505.
Mazzucchi, C. M. (ed.). 2002. Menae patricii cum Thoma referendario de scientia politica dialogus. Milan.
McDonough, S. J. 2006. “A question of faith? Persecution and political centralization in the Sasanian empire of Yazdgard II (438–457 c.e.),” in H. A. Drake (ed.), Violence in late antiquity: Perceptions and practices. Aldershot, 69–81.
———. 2008. “Bishops or bureaucrats? Christian clergy and the state in the middle Sasanian period,” in D. Kennet and P. Luft (eds.), Current research in Sasanian archaeology, art and history. Oxford, 87–92.
Morony, M. G. 1984. Iraq after the Muslim conquest. Princeton.
———. 1991. “Marzpan,” in Encyclopedia of Islam2 7: 633–4.
———. 1997. “Sasanids,” in Encyclopedia of Islam2 9: 70–83.
———. 2004. “Population transfers between Sasanian Iran and the Byzantine Empire,” in Gnoli and Panaino 2004: 161–79.
Negro Ponzi, M. M., and M. C. Cavallero. 1967. “The excavations at Choche.” Mesopotamia 2: 41–56.
Nokandeh, J., et al. 2006. “Linear barriers of northern Iran: The great wall of Gorgan and the wall of Tammishe.” Iran 44: 121–73.
Nöldeke, T. 1879. Geschichte der Perser und Araber zur Zeit der Sasaniden. Leiden.
Pigulevskaja, N. V. 1963. Les villes de l’état Iranien aux époques parthe et sassanide. Paris.
Potts, D. T. 1999. The archaeology of Elam: Formation and transformation of an ancient Iranian state. Cambridge.
Pourshariati, P. 2008. Decline and fall of the Sasanian empire: The Sasanian-Parthian confederacy and the Arab conquest of Iran. London.
Rostovtzeff, M. L. 1943. “The Parthian Shot.” AJA 47: 174–84.
Rubin, Z. 1995. “The reforms of Khusro Anurshiwan,” in Cameron, 1995: 227–98.
———. 2000. “The Sasanid monarchy.” CAH2 14: 638–61.
Russell, J. R. 1987. Zoroastrianism in Armenia. Cambridge.
Schmitt, R., et al. 1987. “Armenia and Iran.” Encyclopaedia Iranica Online (www.iranica.com).
Shahbazi, A. S. 1987. “Army. 5. The Sasanian period.” Encyclopaedia Iranica Online (www.iranica.com).
———. 1989. “Bahram. 6. Bahram VI Chobin.” Encyclopaedia Iranica Online (www.iranica.com).
———. 2003. “The horse that killed Yazdagerd ‘The Sinner’,” in Adhami 2, 355–62.
———. 2004. “Hormozdagan.” Encyclopaedia Iranica Online (www.iranica.com).
Siroux, M. 1965. “`Atesh-gah pres d’ Ispahan.” Iranica Antiqua 5: 39–82.
Tafazzoli, A. 1984. “Observations sur le soi-disant Mazdak-Namag.” Acta Iranica 23: 507–10.
———. 1996. “Dehqan.” Encyclopaedia Iranica Online (www.iranica.com).
van Bladel, K. 2008. “The Alexander legend in the Qur’an 18:83–102,” in G. S. Reynolds (ed.), The Qur’an in its historical context. London, 175–203.
Vanden Berghe, L., and E. Smekens. 1983. Reliefs rupestres de l’Iran ancien. Brussels.
Walker, J. T. 2006. The legend of Mar Qardagh: Narrative and Christian heroism in late antique Iraq. Berkeley.
Wenke, R. J. 1975–1976. “Imperial investments and agricultural developments in Parthian and Sasanian Khuzestan 150 B.C. to A.D. 640.” Mesopotamia 10–11: 31–331.
Whitehouse, D. 1972. “Excavations at Siraf.” Iran 10: 63–87.
Whittow, M. 1996. The making of Byzantium, 600–1025. Berkeley.
Widengren, G. 1959. “The sacral kingship of Iran,” in R. Pettazzoni (ed.), The Sacral Kingship. Contributions to the Central Theme of the VIIIth International Congress for the History of Religions (Rome, April 1955). Leiden, 242–57.
———. 1971. “The establishment of the Sasanian dynasty in the light of new evidence,” in Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 711–82.
———. 1976. “Iran, der große Gegner Roms. Königsgewalt, Feudalismus, Militärwesen.” ANRW II 9.1: 219–306.
Wiesehöfer, J. 1996. Ancient Persia: from 550B.C. to 650A.D. Trans. A. Azodi. London.
———. 2007. “King, court and royal representation in the Sasanian empire,” in A. J. S. Spawforth (ed.), The court and court society in ancient monarchies. Cambridge, 58–81.
Wolski, J. 1981. “L’aristocratie foncière et l’organisation de l’armée parthe.” Klio 63: 105–12.
———. 1988. “Le titre de ‘roi des rois’ dans l’idéologie monarchique des Arsacides.” Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 1.4: 159–66.
Zakeri, M. 1995. Sasanid soldiers in early Muslim society: The origins of ‘Ayyran and Futuwwa. Wiesbaden.