- CHAPTER 4 -
The Panther was a direct response to the lurking presence of the Soviet T-34 and KV-1 tanks which were first encountered on 23 June 1941. The T-34 was relatively easy to produce and was soon available in large numbers. The KV-1, although rarer, easily outclassed the existing Panzer III and IV of the Panzertruppen. At the insistence of General Heinz Guderian, a special Panzerkommision was dispatched to the Eastern Front to assess the T-34. Among the features of the Soviet tank which the Panzerkommision considered most significant were the sloping frontal armour, which gave much improved shot deflection and also increased the effective armour thickness against penetration, the wide tracks of the T-34 also provided excellent mobility over soft ground.
This photograph showing shows the production of the wide tracks for the Panther, which as with the T-34, enabled the Panther to have improved mobility over soft ground.
The 76.2 mm main gun of the T-34 in contrast to the short barrelled howitzer type of the Mark IV had a reasonably high muzzle velocity making for good armour penetration, furthermore it also fired an effective high explosive round. This type of main gun was therefore considered by the Panzerkommision to be the new minimum standard for the next generation of German tanks. However, it should be noted that the Germans already boasted a comparable main gun which was fitted to Mark IV F2 tanks from 1942 onwards. Other than the massive frontal armour of the Panther the Mark IV F2, although approaching the limits of the design, actually incorporated many of the features which the Panther was intended to deliver.
In November 1941, the decision to up-gun the Panzer IV to the 50 mm gun had been dropped, and instead Krupp was contracted in a joint development to modify Rheinmetall’s pending 75 mm anti-tank gun design, later known as the PaK 40 L/46. As the recoil length was considered too long for PaK 40 to be mounted in the Mark IV turret, the recoil mechanism and chamber had to be shortened in order that the weapon could serve as an effective Kampfwagenkanone. The conversion work was undertaken with the usual war time speed resulted in the new 75 mm KwK 40 L/43. This new tank gun, when firing an armour-piercing shot, achieved a dramatic rise in muzzle velocity was increased from 430 metres per second to 990 metres per second. Initially, the gun was mounted with a single-chamber, ball-shaped muzzle brake, which provided just under 50% of the recoil system’s breaking ability. Firing the Panzergranate 39, the KwK 40 L/43 could penetrate 77 mm of steel armour at a range of 1,830 m. This new Kampfwagenkanone was first introduced into the 1942 Panzer IV Ausf. F2 which was the equal of the T-34 in combat. A simple process of evolution and more efficient manufacturing programme could therefore have provided the hard pressed Panzerwaffe in 1942 with a large volume of tried and tested machines. In reality much needed resources were diverted to the Panther programme which did not bear fruit until 1944.
Some graphic advice on how essential maintenance could avoid breakdowns from the Pantherfibel.
On 1st March 1943 Guderian, who had spent the previous year in the wilderness, was rehabilitated and appointed Inspector-General of the armoured Troops. His responsibilities were to determine armoured strategy and to oversee tank design and production and the training of Germany’s panzer forces. According to Guderian, Hitler was far too easily persuaded to field a surfeit of new tank and tank destroyer designs, this resulted in unnecessary supply, logistical, and repair problems for the German forces in Russia. Guderian preferred the simple expedient of fielding large numbers of Panzer IIIs and Panzer IVs over smaller numbers of heavier tanks like the Panther which had limited range and required its own logistical channel of Panther spares. Guderian famously summed up these frustrations with the remark that “logistics are the ball and chain of the tank forces”.
The importance of an adequate supply of spare parts is often over looked when armoured affairs are considered, but without replacement parts tank formations soon grind to a halt. As Guderian was all too aware, the decision to deploy the Panther alongside the Mark III, IV and Tiger I added a real logistical headache. The introduction of the Panther meant that a system for the supply of an entire new set of spare parts had to be set up and drawn along a 2000 mile supply line as opposed to simply utilising the existing chain which provided Mark IV spares.
Despite the fact that, in Guderian’s view, by utilising the existing Mark III and IV an acceptable battlefield solution lay within the grasp of the Panzertruppen, it was to prove fortunate that the Panther with the new longer barrelled L/70 was already under development. Had the tank not been a pet project enjoying Hitler’s blessing, Guderian may well have prevailed in his desire to limit the number of German tank models. However, as a result of the inevitable evolution which was taking place on the battlefield, the presence of the Panther with its heavy hitting punch would soon be required and welcomed. The Russian T-34 equipped with an 85mm gun first appeared in late1942. This up-gunned version of the T-34 was known to the Germans as the T-43 and it began to appear in large numbers during 1943.
The race towards producing tanks with a larger main gun was all about achieving increased muzzle velocity; the speed a projectile achieves at the moment it leaves the muzzle of the gun. Longer barrels give the propellant force more time to develop the speed of the shell before it leaves the barrel. For this reason longer barrels generally provided higher velocities and hence more penetrating power. During World War II the constant introduction of faster burning propellant, improved shells and longer barrel length led to constantly enhanced armour piercing capabilities on both sides.
Providing the antidote to the T-43 and T-43 required the introduction of a tank equipped with ideally the 8.8 cm KwK 36 L/56 of the Tiger I or alternatively the long barrelled 7.5 cm L/70. There was no prospect of fitting either Kampfwagenkanone into the turret of the Mark IV. It was fortunate therefore that , driven on by Hitler’s mania for radical new solutions, in late November 1941 Daimler-Benz (DB) and Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nürnberg AG (MAN) were each given the task of designing a completely new 30- to 35-ton tank. This development machine was designated VK30.02 and was required to was to be ready by April 1942 apparently in time to be shown to Hitler for his birthday.
The VK30.02 prototype proposed by MAN (upper) seen alongside the alternative design proposed by Daimler-Benz (lower).
The Daimler Benz design imitated the T-34 almost completely. It closely resembled the T-34 in both hull and turret form and therefore posed obvious problems concerning battlefield recognition. Unusually for a German design it also incorporated a rear sprocket drive. The initial road wheel arrangement was also visually similar to that of the T-34 although Daimler’s design initially used a leaf spring suspension whereas the T-34 incorporated coil springs. The Daimler Benz turret was smaller than that of the MAN design and had a smaller turret ring which was the result of the narrower hull required by the leaf spring suspension which lay outside of hull. The main advantages of the leaf springs over a torsion bar suspension were a lower hull silhouette and a simpler shock damping design. Unlike the T-34, the Daimler Benz design had the advantage of a three-man turret crew comprising commander, gunner, and loader whereas the T-34 turret initially allowed for only the commander and gunner. The planned L/70 75 mm gun was much longer and heavier than the L/43 and mounting it in the Daimler-Benz turret was difficult. Active consideration was given to reducing the turret crew to two men to address this problem but this retrograde step was eventually dropped.
The MAN design for the Panther embodied more conventional German thinking with the transmission and drive sprocket in the front and a turret placed centrally on the hull. One of the main design flaws of the Tiger lay in the low positioning of the front sprocket which made obstacle crossing less efficient. The design for the Panther eliminated this draw back by situating the front drive sprockets much higher than the road wheels making obstacle crossing more efficient and improving cross country performance in muddy conditions.
The MAN design for the Panther incorporated a Maybach petrol engine and eight torsion-bar suspension axles per side. Because of the torsion bar suspension and the drive shaft running under the turret basket, the MAN Panther needed to be higher and had a wider hull than the Daimler Benz design. The MAN Panther incorporated the “slack-track” Christie-style pattern of large road wheels with no return rollers for the upper run of track. Like the Tiger the main road wheels were interleaved but were arranged in just two rows eliminating the worst aspects of the Tiger I design.
The complex drive arrangement of the Panther as shown in the Pantherfibel.
The two designs were reviewed over a period from January through March 1942. Following a significant programme of development in which the running gear of the Daimler Benz design was altered to match that of the MAN design Reichminister Todt, and later, his replacement Albert Speer, both recommended the Daimler Benz design to Hitler because of its several advantages over the initial MAN design.
However, by the final submission, MAN had substantially improved their design, having incorporated the best elements of Daimler Benz proposal. A final review by a special commission appointed by Hitler in May 1942 belatedly settled on the MAN design. Hitler approved this decision after reviewing it overnight. One of the principal reasons given for this decision was that the MAN design used an existing turret designed by Rheinmetall-Borsig, while the Daimler Benz design would have required the tooling a brand new turret to be designed and produced which would have significantly delayed the commencement of production.
Albert Speer recalled the trials and tribulations concerning the development of the Panther in his autobiography Inside the Third Reich. It produces a primary insight into Hitler’s hands on involvement in the Panther design process.
“Since the Tiger had originally been designed to weigh fifty tons but as a result of Hitler`s demands had gone up to seventy five tons, we decided to develop a new thirty ton tank whose very name, Panther, was to signify greater agility. Though light in weight, its motor was to be the same as the Tiger`s, which meant it could develop superior speed. But in the course of a year Hitler once again insisted on clapping so much armour on it, as well as larger guns, that it ultimately reached forty eight tons, the original weight of the Tiger.”