CHAPTER ONE
I think you may be King of Summer;
King of Winter you will not be.
Medieval monarchy craved prestige, and prestige was bestowed above all by military adventurism. The situation of ‘two kings on one poor island’ therefore was not conducive to lasting harmony.1 Wars between England and Scotland were then perhaps inevitable; yet the Edwardian imperialism experienced by Wales and Ireland did not necessarily presage any English attack on Scotland. Prior to 1296 the thirteenth century had been a period of unparalleled felicity in Anglo-Scottish relations. Peaceful co-existence was greatly assisted by the significant number of landholders who held territories in both kingdoms. At one stage in the thirteenth century nine out of 13 Scottish earldoms had property in England, and seven out of 22 English earldoms had Scottish landed interests.2 War between the kingdoms, whatever the outcome, would cost these landowners dear. Co-existence was broken not by geo-political necessity but the rivalry between Bruce and Balliol for the kingship of Scotland and by the overweening ambition of Edward I. Before examining the chain of events that led to Robert Bruce’s coup d’état in 1306, it is necessary to say something of how English involvement in Scotland began, and also something of the nature of warfare in the early fourteenth century.
THE ORIGINS OF THE SCOTTISH WAR OF INDEPENDENCE
The story of the rift between the kingdoms is too well known to bear repetition in any detail. Alexander III of Scotland died in 1286, leaving as his only heir a granddaughter, Margaret, the three-year-old ‘Maid of Norway’. In accordance with the customs of the realm, aristocratic Guardians took temporary control of the Kingdom of Scotland during the interregnum, sent to Norway for the child and in 1290 arranged for her to marry Edward of Caernarfon, Prince of Wales, infant heir to Edward I and later to succeed as Edward II. But first they took steps to protect the liberties of the kingdom in the event of a union of the crowns. On 18th July the Treaty of Birgham-Northampton was agreed between the English and the Scots. Scotland was to continue ‘separate, free in itself, without any subjection to the King of England’.3
In the autumn of 1290, before the marriage could take place, the Maid died. There now arose a danger of civil war in Scotland between two leading Scottish aristocratic factions, the Bruces and the Comyns. Violence threatened to erupt; but Edward I may have played up the danger of conflict in Scotland in order to intervene. He had an obvious interest in the stability of Scotland, all the more pressing because of the enmity of Philip the Fair, the powerful and hostile King of France. He may also have wished to exploit the situation by extracting recognition of the overlordship of Scotland, which he had claimed in 1278 and his father in 1251. Yet his intervention was invited, and at first it was not unwelcome. As a friendly neighbouring monarch he was to some extent a natural choice as arbiter in the issue of the Scottish succession.4 He arrived at Norham on the River Tweed to preside as judge in the ‘Great Cause’ and set about claiming rights of jurisdiction. In a move calculated to extract that overlordship which he believed to be his right, Edward made it clear to the claimants or competitors that there would be no award unless acceptance of his overlordship was universally accepted. Then he demanded possession of the royal castles of Scotland, which put him in a position to enforce his decision. Although the Scottish parliament conceded nothing as regards Edward’s claim to be overlord of Scotland, the competitors had no choice but to acknowledge it, since Edward would in any case be the adjudicator. Fourteen claimants appeared to protest titles to the throne; but the two leading contenders were Robert Bruce, grandfather of the future king and known to history as ‘The Competitor’; and John Balliol, an ally of the powerful Comyn family. They were both descendants of David Earl of Huntingdon, grandson of David I of Scotland (1124–53). Balliol was the grandson of the eldest daughter of Earl David; whereas Bruce was son of his second daughter. After protracted deliberation Edward in 1292 awarded the kingdom to Balliol, and then received as overlord the homage and fealty of the new King of Scots.
The succession had been settled, but Edward continued to intervene in Scottish affairs, claiming an appellate jurisdiction in lawsuits on which King John had given judgement.5 A man of his time, Edward I undoubtedly conceived it his duty to enforce his rights; but his insistence on them from 1292 created a wholly new situation. Scottish nobles despaired for the freedom of action of Scottish kings. In 1294 however the King of France, Philip the Fair, challenged Edward’s control of Gascony by declaring it forfeit. This at once threatened the Scottish aristocracy with having to perform military service overseas for Edward, and the prospect of Edward’s involvement in a continental war encouraged them to resist. In a palace revolution they forced the reluctant John to concede power to a council, which then made alliance with France. On 16th December 1295 Edward summoned the host of England to assemble at Newcastle on 1st March for war on the ‘rebellious’ Scottish king, and so he embarked upon the subjugation of Scotland by force. A brutal war of atrocity and reprisal followed. Scots who mistrusted the Balliol king and the Comyns who controlled him sided with the King of England. The chief of these was Robert Bruce of Annandale, father of the future king, who defended Carlisle against John Comyn, Earl of Buchan. All resistance was swept aside when the English army entered Scotland. Berwick was captured and the Scottish royal army routed in battle at Dunbar. King John resigned; and spinelessly Robert Bruce of Annandale asked Edward that he now be awarded the throne which Balliol had forfeited. Edward’s scorn was withering: ‘Have I nothing better to do than win kingdoms for you?’ The English king was done with puppets, and was no longer prepared to settle for anything less than outright domination. The castles of Scotland were taken into his hands; and every substantial freeholder in Scotland was required to swear fealty to the king of England. A government was set up at Berwick through which Edward administered the country; and he removed the royal archive and sacred regalia of Scotland (including the Stone of Destiny) to Westminster. ‘The conqueror was appropriating the past of the conquered people in order to replace it by his own emblems.’6
Resistance however grew in the north of Scotland and among the lower ranks of the Scottish gentry. The standard of rebellion was raised by Andrew Moray and William Wallace; and in 1297 while Edward I was in Flanders, they inflicted at Stirling Bridge a serious defeat upon an English army led by the Earl of Warenne. Moray was mortally wounded in the battle; but led by ‘William the Conqueror’ rebellion (in the name of King John) spread throughout Scotland. Wallace captured Berwick, driving the English out of Scotland altogether, and even led an invasion of Northumberland and Cumberland during which he tried to intimidate into surrender Carlisle and Newcastle.7 On his return, however, Edward I defeated Wallace in battle at Falkirk in 1298. He reimposed his rule over most of southern Scotland; but Wallace, Sir John Soules and other ‘Guardians of the Realm’ established a rival authority to the north, and while Edward held the population centres and most of Scotland south of the Forth, these Scottish ‘patriots’ resisted from the forests and the north. In 1299 they succeeded in capturing the key fortress of Stirling Castle; but Edward responded by launching a series of en masse invasions, in 1300, 1301 and 1303–4. It is worth pausing to consider the nature of these armies and those of Edward II, which were awe-inspiring demonstrations of the power of the Edwardian state.
WARFARE IN THE AGE OF EDWARD I AND PHILIP THE FAIR
Details of royal expenditure on the invasions of Scotland are preserved in the Wardrobe Books, the royal wardrobe being a department of the household which was used by English kings in preference to the exchequer to fund their wars. These books contain a vast amount of information about the workings of the royal household, including details of payments to cavalry, infantry, craftsmen, labourers and others employed in each regnal year. The household however supplied only a part – albeit the largest part – of the fighting force; contingents brought and paid for by earls do not generally appear in the Wardrobe Accounts, because the earls considered it below their dignity to accept wages directly from the king.8
Warriors of knightly rank and above always fought as heavy cavalry, displaying banners and shields with splendidly colourful armorial devices and riding great destriers specially bred to take the weight of heavy armour. The standard heavy cavalry tactic had not changed for almost two hundred years.9 Anchored firmly in the saddle by stirrups, the knights would charge at the enemy, lowering their lances while they gathered speed. Such was the momentum of armoured rider and armoured horse at the gallop, such the intimidating height of the ensemble that the opposing infantry rarely stayed to experience the impact, and so the cavalry charge could only be countered by a counter-charge. The armour worn by knights in the early fourteenth century was at this time the heaviest it would ever be during the middle ages, and could weigh in excess of 60 lbs (27 kg). The knight’s head was protected by a bascinet, a helmet usually open at the face; the body by a coat of mail known as a hauberk and, increasingly, by the addition of strips of plate armour along the arms and legs. The portrayal of Andrew Harclay on the Carlisle charter of 1315 shows that by that time knights were already wearing plumes, and that a visor could be attached to the bascinet.10 The horses, hugely expensive and well worth protecting, also bore some armour. One of the great logistical difficulties for the English in Scotland was how to keep their great horses in fodder. Oats and hay, peas and beans had to shipped north at great expense for the purpose. The Lanercost Chronicle remarks that ‘the English do not willingly enter Scotland to wage war before summer, chiefly because earlier in the year they find no food for their horses’.11 The Scots, who had fewer heavy cavalry, did not have such a problem.
Other cavalry – esquires, soldarii or men-at-arms – were mounted on unarmoured horses. The rider’s body armour was often made of boiled leather, a cheaper and lighter alternative to metal armour. A particular type of mounted warrior came briefly into vogue during this period, known as the hobelar. They were introduced to the Scottish Wars from the marches of Ireland, and typically they wore leather armour and rode light horses or hobins rather than powerful destriers. As mounted raiders their mobility over rough terrain gave them a decided advantage over men-at-arms, and they were ideally suited to hit-and-run warfare. The tactics of these turbulent mercenaries were later adopted by the Scots in their raids on the north of England. While the Scottish raiders do not seem to have been referred to as ‘hobelars’ in the sources, it is certain that they operated in precisely this manner. The Scottish practice of fighting pitched battles on foot and with thrusting spear gave rise to the view that hobelars dismounted to confront an enemy, that they were in effect ‘mounted infantry’. Certainly the Scottish raiders seem to have dismounted on the rare occasions when they took on an opposing army. But it was the devastating raid on rural communities of the countryside, the chevauchée, that was the essence of ‘hobelar warfare’. Edward I employed Irish hobelars in significant numbers: almost 400 for the 1301 campaign and 500 for that of 1303.12 They ceased to be employed on this scale for a time, but were reintroduced in 1315. Through bitter experience Edward II came to realise that the Scots could only be brought to battle by light cavalry.
Archers did not yet play a pivotal role on the battlefield. The term was often applied to general infantry; but specialised bowmen were only just beginning to be employed in large numbers, and keeping archers in arrows was already a major problem. London, Lincolnshire and Yorkshire sent bows and quivers of arrows to the siege of Stirling in 1304. Barbour seems to have been impressed by the density of volleys at Bannockburn.13 Nevertheless, this was before the heyday of the longbow; and there is no evidence for the popular belief that Welsh contingents were mainly archers, or that effective use of the ‘longbow’ was introduced into England by Edward I from Wales. The crossbow was still the weapon of preference, and crossbowmen received a daily wage of 3d or 4d as opposed to the 2d paid to archers. Crossbowmen were often employed in castle garrisons, and Edward II employed Gascon crossbowmen as part of his bodyguard during the invasion of Scotland in 1310 and in large numbers in that of 1322.14
The military history of the period is commonly written in terms of common infantry overcoming the dominance of aristocratic heavy cavalry. At the battle of Courtrai in 1302 the weavers of the Flemish towns, fighting on foot, had defeated the flower of French chivalry; at Bannockburn the Scottish infantry were to inflict a similar discomfiture on the English heavy cavalry. In fact heavy cavalry continued to be the most highly valued form of military service throughout the middle ages; but there was at this time considerable experimentation with specialised varieties of infantry. At the battle of Falkirk William Wallace had resisted a heavy cavalry charge by deploying infantry spearmen in dense formations known as schiltroms. So far as we can tell, these were hollow squares or circles bristling with pikes, likened by Barbour to the spines of a hedgehog.15 The English, for their part, experimented with heavily armoured infantry. In 1306 the aketon, a quilted surcoat padded with wool, was the commonest form of armour among infantrymen.16 Throughout his reign, however, Edward II extracted from rural communities both an increasing period of military service and additional and more expensive armour. This emphasis on heavy armoured infantry was clearly a response to encounters with the Scottish schiltrom Edward II’s efforts in this regard were given additional impetus by the experience of defeat by infantry spearmen at Bannockburn in 1314. In November 1314 London was requested to supply 300 crossbowmen with aketon, bascinet andcolerettos (a broad collar of mail), besides crossbows and quarrels, to serve at the king’s expense in the defence of Berwick. Thereafter successive levies of infantry were required to possess additional armour: in 1316 infantry were to have aketon, bascinet and lance, or at least aketon; in 1318 a levy on towns required aketon, hauberk, bascinet and iron gauntlets.17 In 1319 Edward ordered that infantrymen possessing goods to the value of between 100s. and 10 marks should have aketon, hauberk, bascinet and iron gauntlets and a horse, ‘fit for a hobelar’.18 By these measures Edward might have wished to ensure that English levies had the equipment needed for garrison duty, sieges and other relatively static situations that might be encountered during invasions of Scotland. Countering the Scottish hobelars in their capacity as highly mobile raiders was much more difficult; and neglect of this aspect left the whole of northern England unprotected from their ravages.19
Hobelars and heavy infantry then passed in and out of fashion; but the common footmen, known as pitaille or rebaldaill, though despised and very poorly equipped, were a perennial feature of medieval hosts. Infantry contingents in Edward I’s armies rarely exceeded 10,000 troops, and numbers always fell away rapidly after the start of the campaign both as a result of desertion and as contingents completed their periods of service. On the occasion of the Falkirk campaign Edward did however manage to raise 25,700 troops, the largest army of the period. In addition to the troops, the armies of the period were followed by a rabble of footmen, servants, carters and keepers of baggage. These were the poveraill, described by Barbour as ‘worth nothing in battle’, but who intervened with striking effect at Bannockburn.20
The present work confines its survey of the economic effects of war to the areas directly affected. However, it is important to recognise that the capacity to field even such small armies required a mobilisation of resources far beyond the war zone.21 Wales, Ireland and Gascony all contributed foodstuffs and manpower towards Edward I’s invasions of Scotland; but England herself bore the brunt of royal demand. Military service, though not perhaps the heaviest burden which war imposed on the peasantry, provoked vigorous and widespread resistance from 1315 to 1317. Commissariat arrangements placed an enormous strain on the resources of English counties far to the south of the war zone. Foodstuffs of every kind were requisitioned by purveyance, an arbitrary system of purchase on credit that was open to abuse by royal officials and always deeply resented by local and religious communities. Purveyances in England fell heaviest on the counties which produced most grain – Lincolnshire, Yorkshire, Norfolk and Suffolk, and also on Essex. From these counties grain could be easily shipped up the east coast to Scotland. An entirely arbitrary exaction that needed no consent, purveyance raised food prices, and violently disrupted both local economies and long-distance trade. Furthermore the frequency and rate of royal financial demands also increased to meet the colossal cost of the wars, and in 1315 and 1316 Edward II collected lay subsidies in two successive years. Dr. Maddicott points out that whereas the lord’s exactions were mainly recurrent and predictable, royal demands in respect of purveyance, taxation and military service were arbitrary and irregular, and all the more damaging as a result. No corner of England, no segment of the population remained unaffected by the royal demands for victual and money.
THE ‘KING OF SUMMER’
Like many other Scots, the Bruces adhered to Edward I on the outbreak of war in 1296. Their stance was determined largely by two facts: their bitter rivals, the Comyns, were leading the patriotic resistance to Edward; but first and foremost, the Bruces passionately believed in their own claim to the kingship and clung to Edward as the only hope of realising it. It is therefore surprising to encounter, during the rebellion of Wallace and Moray, Robert Bruce, Earl of Carrick and the future king, as one of the leaders of patriotic resistance. He is unlikely however to have been fighting purely for patriotic motives and against all self-interest. Rather, he may have given up hopes of receiving the kingship from Edward I, and concluded that, since a Balliol revival seemed unlikely, the patriots would be forced to recognise his own title to the throne.22 By 1301, however, the tide had turned. Anglo-French détente, negotiated at Asníres, had profound consequences for Scotland. The cause of King John revived with diplomatic intervention by Philip the Fair and the Papacy. Edward I was prevailed upon to transfer John himself to papal custody in July 1299. From the Pope Balliol came into the custody of Philip the Fair, who was anxious to keep Edward occupied in Scotland. It was now even possible that Philip would intervene in Scotland with troops on John’s behalf. Bruce’s hopes of acquiring recognition from the patriots were dashed; and he returned ‘to the peace of’ Edward I in the winter of 1301 to 1302. The terms of his surrender have been preserved: his freedom, titles and claims were all guaranteed by the English king.23 But it is not clear whether this guarantee extended to the Bruce’s claim to the Scottish throne; the terms are tantalisingly vague. To encourage Bruce’s defection, it is possible that Edward I dangled before him the prospect of a limited restoration of the Scottish kingship, in the person of Bruce himself. But there seem to have been other more immediate inducements. Bruce’s second marriage, to Elizabeth de Burgh daughter of the Earl of Ulster, follows directly upon his change of sides, and the prospect of this too may have tempted him to abandon the patriotic cause. The de Burgh marriage promised a revival of the long-standing alliance between the Bruce, de Burgh and Stewart families.
Bruce’s surrender to Edward I in 1301 or 1302 was part of a gradual but general collapse of patriotic resistance. To crush the remaining resistance Edward mobilised men and resources on a scale unparalleled in medieval history. Successive invasions en massewere launched: already in 1300 an army of 9,000 English and Welsh infantry had occupied southern Scotland; in 1301 and 1303 armies of similar size were deployed. All the resources of the Edwardian state were mustered against the Scots; all the technology of the age harnessed. Great siege engines, the Warwolf and the Parson, were applied to demolish the walls of Stirling Castle (the focus of remaining resistance); primitive explosives were also used in the work; and ingenious prefabricated bridges were floated up the North Sea to assist in projecting an army north of the Forth. In 1304 the Scots asked for terms and a general surrender ensued. Resistance at Stirling duly collapsed in 1304; in 1305 Wallace was captured, taken to London and tortured, humiliated and executed for the gratification of the mob.
In the service of Edward I Robert Bruce played ‘an active though never a brilliant or conspicuous part’.24 He served as Sheriff of Lanark and Ayr; Edward Bruce, Robert’s younger brother, served in the entourage of Edward of Caernarfon Prince of Wales. What was it, then, that drove Robert Bruce into rebellion in 1306? And given the abject state of the country, what made him think he had the slightest chance of reviving and retaining the kingship of Scotland? Professor Barrow argues that as head of his family (since his father’s death in 1304), Earl of Carrick, possessor of estates in England as well as in Scotland, he had never been more powerful than at this stage; and that he may have been biding his time until this point. Coupled with this, Professor Prestwich points out that a number of petty discontents (difficulty in reclaiming expenses, arguments over rights claimed in Annandale) may have rankled; and that he may have felt himself entitled to richer rewards than those Edward had bestowed.25 As the fateful year 1306 opened, one fact must have been weighing heavily with all the magnates of Britain: that Edward I, now 67, could not be expected to last much longer.26 Perhaps in preparation for the king’s demise, and in an effort to guarantee some security in an uncertain future, Bruce began to exchange promises of solidarity with other magnates. In 1304 or 1305 he had made a pact with Bishop Lamberton of St. Andrews, promising mutual assistance in the event of future perils.27 At about the same time he is said to have made a similar agreement with John Comyn who was effectively the head of the great Comyn connection, long the Bruces’ main rivals for power in Scotland.28 It seems that among the Scottish aristocracy a debate on the status of the realm was already taking place. Passions were stirred by an assembly in May 1305 at Scone (the place where Scottish kings were inaugurated in an age-old ritual, and a location with powerful associations). The formal purpose of this assembly was to select representatives for the next parliament in England, but it broke up without agreeing anything.29 Then at Edward I’s parliament at Westminster in September 1305, twenty of the king’s councillors met with nine Scots as representatives of community to draw up an Ordinance for the governance of Scotland. This document made provision for formal offices of government, and for a revision of Scottish law; but it carefully avoided describing Scotland as a realm, and the implication was that Scotland had been relegated to the status of a kingless ‘land’, like Ireland, without a king and directly subservient to the English crown.
It is impossible to discern whether the Ordinance provoked any reaction – hostile or otherwise – among the Scottish aristocracy; all one can say is that, together with the advanced age of the English king, it may have fomented political speculation. Early in 1306 Bruce and John Comyn agreed to meet on 10th February in Greyfriars church at Dumfries. Both the principals brought along followers; on Comyn’s side was his uncle, Sir Robert Comyn. The agenda is unknown, but the arguments reached sudden and violent climax when a fight broke out and Bruce struck Comyn with his sword. Bruce’s followers later finished him off. Chroniclers colour the story according to their various prejudices; Scottish narratives allege that Comyn had betrayed to Edward I Bruce’s plans to seize the throne, English writers invariably accuse Bruce of murder.30 On the face of it, it seems unlikely that Bruce had arranged the meeting in order to assassinate a rival for the throne. Murder and sacrilege are not normally to be expected of any man set upon winning hearts and minds. A power-struggle between these leaders of aristocratic factions may have lain at the heart of the quarrel; but the earliest account relates only that Bruce accused Comyn of blackening his reputation with the English king. On balance it seems that the brawl had less to do with revival of the Scottish kingship than with Robert’s standing at the English court. ‘Bruce had blundered into being an accessory to a murder which had nothing to do with reviving the patriotic cause.’31 To his family and followers, however, it may have seemed that Robert had brought ruin on them all. Retaliation by the Comyns and their allies would be swift and bloody.
Edward I had news of the murder by 23rd February.32 According to one source, Bruce made an appeal of some sort to Edward, threatening to defend himself ‘with the longest stick that he had’ if this appeal were unsuccessful. Professor Duncan thinks it likely that Bruce demanded a comprehensive pardon to shield him from the fury of the Comyns.33 There was no reply from court; and as a last resort Bruce was forced to assert in arms his claim to kingship. It was the only way he could raise an army. This rather desperate decision seems to have been taken during a fleeting visit to Robert Wishart, Bishop of Glasgow and veteran of patriotic resistance. Before rushing off to Scone, Bruce took care to secure a series of castles in the southwest: Dumfries, Dalswinton, Tibbers (held by John Seton), Ayr, Loch Doon (a Bruce castle, held by Christopher Seton), Caerlaverock, Dunaverty (held by Malcolm fitz Lengleys or MacCulian) and a half-finished castle at ‘Tolibothvill’.34 Probably they were taken with a view to keeping open the way for reinforcements from Ireland or the Western Isles, and they were provisioned by a nocturnal raid on the English stores. In April Robert was also believed to be in control of Ayr, Galloway and Dumbarton; but it seems that he had more castles than he could garrison, for his men later abandoned some of these strongholds after demolishing fortifications and ruining stores.35
Unable to await the end of the Lent, the enkinging ritual was planned for the first available feast day, and at a dignified but hasty ceremony at Scone on the feast of the Annunciation, 25th March 1306, Robert I was enthroned. Two days later, on Palm Sunday, high mass was celebrated.36 The traditions of Scottish monarchy were honoured as far as circumstances would allow. The heir to the earldom of Fife was not present to lead the king to the throne as tradition demanded, but his aunt, Isabel Countess of Buchan, supplied his place. The Stone of Destiny had been removed to adorn the shrine of St. Edward at Westminster Abbey by Edward I; but Scone was itself powerful evocation of royal tradition. Robes and regalian insignia, mothballed since the monarchy had been in abeyance, were produced. Absolution for the slaying of Comyn had already been granted by the Bishop of Glasgow, and solemn oaths were now sworn. Even so the makeshift nature of the ceremonials may have been difficult to disguise; Robert’s wife is said to have reproved her husband, mockingly addressing him as the ‘king of Summer’.37 This anecdote may be an accurate reflection of de Burgh scorn for Bruce pretensions. The turnout of aristocracy at his enthronement was nevertheless greater than might have been expected. However, three bishops were present, and so too were the abbots of Scone and Inchaffray. The earls of Athol, Menteith and Lennox, and the bishops of Glasgow and Moray were his foremost allies. Robert may have had the support of James, the hereditary Stewart of Scotland, if tenants and family adhered to the traditional alliance with the Bruces; but James himself was infirm and in no position to offer open allegiance.38 Many lesser nobles supported Robert, among them James Douglas, Thomas Randolph, Reginald Crawford, Robert Boyd, Neil Campbell and Gilbert Hay who were to become his close companions. Simon Fraser, one of the most steadfast in resistance to Edward I, raised the men of Selkirk Forest independently of Bruce. Most others seem to have joined him out of fear or intimidation. Vital segments of the Scottish aristocracy would have nothing to do with the Bruce monarchy. The Comyns and their allies the MacDougalls of Argyll bayed for revenge against the murderer of John Comyn; other lords such as Patrick Earl of Dunbar and Malise Earl of Strathearn recognised Edward I as the only legally constituted king. Whatever sympathy Robert might have stirred, most Scots must have considered resistance to Edward I futile.
In the face of such divided loyalties the ignominious collapse of the Bruce coup was only a matter of time. Robert travelled to the northeast of the kingdom, to Aberdeen and possibly further north, demanding military service and money, promising favours in return for support and threatening dire vengeance on any who failed him. His allies secured the towns of Brechin, Cupar and Dundee.39 East coast ports were bullied into providing cash; merchants of Dundee and Aberdeen were seized as hostages for payment. Bailiffs at Perth were thrown in prison and threatened with death until they paid up £54 which Robert claimed as rents due to him as king.40 Homage and military service were exacted from often reluctant lairds; in the case of the earl of Strathearn, by threat of hanging. But now the English magnates Henry Percy and Robert Clifford were closing in on the southwest with over a hundred cavalry.41 As early as 22nd February they had recovered Tibbers castle; on 3rd March they had possession of Dumfries, where Robert’s garrisons had deliberately spoiled the provisions; Ayr too had been slighted and relinquished, probably for want of military service.42 In June Aymer de Valence (later Earl of Pembroke) advanced from Berwick, with 300 cavalry and over 2,000 infantry. Valence recaptured Cupar and Perth, and Robert moved to confront him. In the twilight of 19th June, Valence caught Bruce’s force by surprise at Methven. Hastily the knights accompanying Robert covered their heraldic devices with white cloth to preserve their anonymity, for Edward I had promised a terrible vengeance.43 The Scottish infantry bore the brunt of the fighting, but were eventually forced to flee. Guerilla resistance continued for a short time, led by Simon Fraser, until he too was rounded up and executed.44Robert was lucky to escape with his cavalry; but they too were defeated a few days later at Loch Tay.45
By the end of July most of Robert’s supporters in the east had been captured; by August Valence was able to report that he had the situation ‘well settled’ north of the Mounth.46 The Bishops of Glasgow and St. Andrews were arrested. Menteith was imprisoned and stripped of his lands; Strathearn was captured, and, to prove his willingness to cooperate with the English, sent his son to assist in the pursuit of Robert and his family. Badly mauled, the Bruces’ army fled to the west, but at Dail Righ they ran into the men of Lorn, followers of MacDougall. Another defeat scattered what had remained of the army. Robert’s sisters may have been captured after Methven; his queen and daughter Marjory had been taken to safety in Kildrummy Castle by the earl of Atholl. The keeper of Kildrummy was Neil Bruce, the new king’s brother, and as the English approached, queen and daughter were taken from the castle to a place of sanctuary at Tain, from where they may have hoped to reach Norway. But there they were captured by the earl of Ross and delivered into the hands of Edward I. Kildrummy fell to Edward of Caernarfon in September.47 Magnanimity could not be expected and it was not forthcoming. Neil Bruce was drawn, hanged and beheaded at Berwick, the first of four Bruce brothers to die in the war. Fraser, Atholl and others were taken to London to be executed. In a punishment grotesque in its cruelty, Robert’s sister Mary and Isabel Countess of Buchan were imprisoned in cages on the battlements of Roxburgh and Berwick castles.48Unusually lenient, on the other hand, was the treatment of Elizabeth, Robert’s queen. It seems she was distancing herself from her husband’s pretensions and her stance was in keeping with that of her father, the earl of Ulster.
Two of the Bruce brothers, Thomas and Alexander, may already have been mustering allies in Ireland since February. Robert and Edward now fled to the southwest, seeking refuge in the lands of Lennox, Campbell and MacDonald. Here too the Bruce position was collapsing. James the Stewart had bowed to the prevailing wind and entered Edward I’s service on 1st July; and the ancestral Bruce castle of Lochmaben had surrendered to Edward of Caernarfon on 11th July.49 By the end of June the hunt was on for the ‘King of Summer’, or ‘King Hobbe’ as the English satirists called him:
Now King Hobbe to the moors has gone,
To come to town he has no desire.50
Throughout the summer the ailing Edward I travelled painfully northwards to take charge.51 Taking up residence at Lanercost Priory, he took to his sickbed, but showed keen interest in the pursuit. Resistance was now confined to a few castles on the west coast; Loch Doon castle was under siege in August.52 By the end of July the pursuit may have moved to the coast, since boats for men-at-arms were ordered to be provided from the waters around Carlisle and sent to Carrick.53 Barbour relates that unseasonal weather obliged Robert to make for shelter in Kintyre. On the way, he was joined by his follower Malcolm Earl of Lennox. Crossing Loch Lomond, they are said to have been pursued by hostile galleys, but, rowing by way of Bute they made it safely to Kintyre, where, Barbour says, they were received by Angus Óg MacDonald of Islay. Robert chose to continue his flight because he feared treason.54 The vigour with which Percy and Clifford applied themselves to the siege of Dunaverty in September suggests that they thought Bruce was within. This siege was carried on in tandem with the siege of Robert’s relatives at Kildrummy.
Taking to the sea, Robert was not short of options. He could travel to Orkney, where he would be sure of refuge, for his sister Isabel was dowager queen of Norway; he could sail for the Western Isles, where he could be sure of support from Christina MacRuairidh, who had married into the family of Mar, the family of Robert’s first wife. Probably he intended to return on or in time for the death of Edward I. It is unlikely that as yet he despaired of regaining the throne; but then, darker days lay ahead.
NOTES
1 The phrase comes from Sir Walter Scott, The Talisman (Centenary Edition, Edinburgh, 1887), p. 30.
2 Frame, Political Development, pp. 59–60.
3 Prestwich, Edward I, p. 361; Stevenson, Documents i, 162–73.
4 Prestwich, Edward I, Chapter 14; Barrow, Robert Bruce, pp. 28–30. Documents relating to the Great Cause are printed in Edward I and the Throne of Scotland, 1290–1296, ed. E.L.G. Stones and G.G. Simpson (2 vols.) (Oxford, 1978).
5 Prestwich, Edward I, pp. 371–73; Barrow, Robert Bruce, pp. 51–53, 57–62.
6 Davies, Domination and Conquest, p. 125. A similar fate had befallen the coronet of the Prince of Wales and the jewel or crown of King Arthur, and the fragment of the true cross which was the most potent relic of the Welsh, Y Groes Naid.
7 For the Wallace rebellion, see H. Gough, Scotland in 1298 (Paisley, 1888) and C. McNamee, ‘William Wallace’s Invasion of Northern England, 1297’, NH xxvi (1990), 40–58.
8 M. Prestwich, ‘Cavalry Service in Early Fourteenth Century England’, in War and Government in the Middle Ages, ed. J.B. Gillingham and J.C. Holt (Woodbridge, 1984), pp. 147–48.
9 R.H.C. Davis, The Medieval Warhorse: Origin, Development and Redevelopment (London, 1989), pp. 11–29; and, most recently, M.Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: the English Experience (Newhaven and London, 1996), pp. 18–30.
10 Plate 3.
11 Lanercost, p. 190. In the spring of 1311, the English were inactive and ‘waiting for the grass’, CDS iii no. 202, pp. 40–41.
12 J.F. Lydon, ‘The Hobelar: An Irish Contribution to Mediaeval Warfare’, The Irish Sword ii (1954–56), 12–16; ‘Irish Levies in the Scottish Wars, 1296–1302’, Ibid. v (1963), 214; and ‘Edward I, Ireland and the War in Scotland, 1303–1304’, England and Ireland in the Later Middle Ages: Essays to Jocelyn Otway-Ruthven, ed. J. Lydon (Dublin, 1981), p. 57.
13 J. Bradbury, The Medieval Archer (London, 1985), pp. 71–90; Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, p. 135.
14 Bodleian Library MS Tanner 197, ff. 46, 46d; BL MS Stowe 553, f. 83.
15 Barbour, The Bruce XII, 352–56.
16 The aketon is clearly depicted on the effigy of Bricius McKinnon, plate 1. Late Medieval Monumental Sculpture in the West Highlands, K.A. Steer and J.M.W. Bannerman (Royal Commission on the Ancient and Historical Monuments of Scotland, 1977), pp. 23–27 and plate 8.
17 Powicke, Military Obligation, pp. 141–60.
18 Powicke, Military Obligation, p. 148; Rot. Scot. i, 159–60, 163, 204.
19 J.O. Morris long ago highlighted the inconsistency in Edward’s strategy, ‘Mounted Infantry in Medieval Warfare’, TRHS 3rd series viii (1914), 80–91.
20 Barbour, The Bruce VIII, 275–76, 368; XI, 242–46, 426–32.
21 J.R. Maddicott, The English Peasantry and the Demands of the Crown, 1294–1341 (P&P Supplement 1, 1975).
22 Barrow, Robert Bruce, pp. 121–22.
23 Prestwich, Edward I, p. 496; the terms of surrender are printed in Barrow, Robert Bruce, pp. 122–23.
24 Barrow, Robert Bruce, pp. 141–43.
25 Prestwich, Edward I, pp. 505–6.
26 In September 1306 Edward at 67 years of age was reported to be convalescing from illness, ‘hearty and strong enough, considering his age’, CDS ii, no.1832, p. 491.
27 Barrow, Robert Bruce, p. 131; CDS ii no. 1818, pp. 487–88.
28 Fordun ii, 330–33 ; Barrow, Robert Bruce, pp. 139–40.
29 Prestwich, Edward I, pp. 503–4.
30 T.M. Smallwood, ‘An unpublished early account of Bruce’s murder of Comyn’ SHR liv (1975), 1–10 examines a version of Peter Langtoft’s chronicle. Guisborough, pp. 366–67 is the earliest source. Compare Bower vi, 309–13.
31 Guisborough, pp. 366–67; Duncan, ‘War of the Scots’, p. 135.
32 CDS v no. 472(r), p. 203.
33 Duncan, ‘War of the Scots’, p. 136.
34 CDS ii, no. 1811, pp. 485–86; CDS v, no. 472(d), p. 199; CDS v, no. 492(xii), pp. 211–13.
35 E101/369/11, f. 83d. On 5th April Edward I ordered that ships bearing provisions from Ireland were not to land at these destinations, CDS ii nos. 1753, 1763; Duncan, ‘War of the Scots’, pp. 136–37.
36 Barrow, Robert Bruce, pp. 148–53.
37 Flores Hist., 130.
38 G.W.S.Barrow and A. Royan, ’James Fifth Stewart of Scotland’, in Essays on the Nobility of Medieval Scotland, ed. K.J. Stringer (Edinburgh 1985), p. 180.
39 Duncan, ‘War of the Scots’, p. 137; CDS iii, no. 68, p. 13.
40 Duncan, ‘War of the Scots’, p. 137.
41 CDS v no. 420, p. 191.
42 CDS iv, Appendix no. 11, pp. 389, 390–91, 396–97; Duncan, ‘War of the Scots’, p. 137.
43 Prestwich, Edward I, pp. 506–7.
44 CDS ii no. 1811, pp. 485–86.
45 Duncan, ‘War of the Scots’, p. 138.
46 CDS ii no. 1820, p. 488.
47 CDS v nos. 444, 471.
48 This outrageous punishment is discussed in Prestwich Edward I, pp. 508–9 and references given in note 164 there. Similar treatment was meted out to the Welsh rebel, Owain son of Dafydd ap Gruffydd CDS, iii no. 16, p. 4.
49 CDS v no. 471, p. 197; CDS ii no. 1803, p. 485.
50 CDS ii Addenda no. 1979, p. 526; The Political Songs of England, ed. T. Wright (Camden 1st series vi, 1839), p. 216.
51 Itinerary of Edward I Part II 1291–1307 (List and Index Society 132, 1976), pp. 273–80.
52 CDS ii no. 1819, p. 488.
53 CDS ii no. 1821, pp. 488–89.
54 Barbour, The Bruce III, 367–674.