Prime Minister’s Personal Minutes and Telegrams, May—December 1940

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for those concerned.

18.V.40.

The proximity fuze and the necessary rocket projectors have hitherto been treated as important protection for ships, but even larger numbers will be needed, even some perhaps more urgently, for the protection of aircraft factories and other exceptionally important points. What is being done about this? Let proposals be made tomorrow for setting up the necessary manufacture. Are any modifications in the design of the projectors necessary? The Director of Naval Ordnance (D.N.O.) can go on with the ship side of the business, but be careful no hold-up takes place in the supply for the vulnerable points ashore. Report tomorrow night what organisation or measures are required to procure this production.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for the Colonies.

23.V.40

I am in full agreement with the answer you propose to Wedgwood’s ^lQuestions, and 1 do not want Jewish forces raised to serve outside Palestine. The main and almost the sole aim in Palestine at the present time is to liberate the eleven battalions of excellent Regular troops who are now tethered there. For this purpose the Jews should be armed in their own defence, and properly organised as speedily as possible. We can always prevent them from attacking the Arabs by our sea-power, which thus them off from the outer world, and by other friendly influences. On the other hand, we cannot leave them unarmed when our troops leave, as leave they must at a very early date.

Prime Minister to Minister of Aircraft Production.

24.V.40.

I should be much obliged if you would have a talk with Lindemann, so as to get at some agreed figures upon aircraft outputs, both recent and prospective. I have for a long time been convinced that the Air Ministry do not make enough of the deliveries with which they are supplied, and Lindemann is obtaining for me returns of all aircraft in their hands, so that one can see what use is made of them.

It is of the highest importance that all aircraft in storage and reserve should not only be made available for service, but that these should be organised in squadrons with their pilots. Now that the war is coming so close, the object must be to prepare the largest number of aircraft, even, as you said, training and civil aircraft, to carry bombs to enemy aerodromes on the Dutch, Belgian, and French coasts. I must get a full view of the figures, both of delivery and employment, and this can be kept up to date weekly.

Prime Minister to Professor Lindemann.

24.V.40.

Let me have on one sheet of paper a statement about the tanks. How many have we got with the Army? How many of each kind are being made each month? How many are there with the manufacturers? What are the forecasts? What are the plans for heavier tanks?

NOTE. – The present form of warfare, and the proof that tanks can overrun fortifications, will affect the plans for the “Cultivator,” and it seems very likely that only a reduced number will be required.

Prime Minister to Sir Edward Bridges.

24.V.40.

I am sure there are far too many committees of one kind and another which Ministers have to attend, and which do not yield a sufficient result. These should be reduced by suppression or amalgamation. Secondly, an effort should be made to reduce the returns with which the Cabinet is oppressed to a smaller compass and smaller number. Pray let proposals be made by the Cabinet Office Staff for effecting these simplifications.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air.

27.V.40.

In your communiqué today you distinguish in several cases between enemy aircraft “put out of action” or “destroyed.” Is there any real difference between the two, or is it simply to avoid tautology? If so, this is not in accordance with the best authorities on English. Sense should not be sacrificed to sound.

2. Will you also report today whether you would like the weather to be clear or cloudy for the operations on the Belgian coast.

Prime Minister to General Ismay and C.I.G.S.

29.V.40.

The change which has come over the war affects decisively the usefulness of “Cultivator Number 6.” It may play its part in various operations, defensive and offensive, but it can no longer be considered the only method of breaking a fortified line. I suggest that the Minister of Supply should today be instructed to reduce the scheme by one-half. Probably in a few days it will be to one-quarter. The spare available capacity could be turned over to tanks. If the Germans can make tanks in nine months, surely we can do so. Let me have your general proposals for the priority construction of an additional thousand tanks capable of engaging the improved enemy pattern likely to be working in 1941.

There should also be formed, if it does not already exist, an anti-tank committee to study and devise all methods of attacking the latest German tanks. Pray let me have suggested list of names.

JUNE

Prime Minister to Sir Edward Bridges.

3.VI.40.

Has anything been done about shipping twenty thousand internees to Newfoundland or St. Helena? Is this one of the matters that the Lord President has in hand? If so would you please ask him about it. I should like to get them on the high seas as soon as possible, but I suppose considerable arrangements have to be made at the other end. Is it all going forward?

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air.

3.VI.40.

The Cabinet were distressed to hear from you that you were now running short of pilots for fighters, and that they had now become the limiting factor.

This is the first time that this particular admission of failure has been made by the Air Ministry. We know that immense masses of aircraft are devoted to the making of pilots, far beyond the proportion adopted by the Germans. We heard some months ago of many thousands of pilots for whom the Air Ministry declared they had no machines, and who consequently had to be “re-mustered”: as many as seven thousand were mentioned, all of whom had done many more hours of flying than those done by German pilots now frequently captured. How then, therefore, is this new shortage to be explained?

Lord Beaverbrook has made a surprising improvement in the supply and repair of airplanes, and in clearing up the muddle and scandal of the aircraft production branch, I greatly hope that you will be able to do as much on the personnel side, for it will indeed be lamentable if we have machines standing idle for want of pilots to fly them.

Prime Minister to Professor Lindemann.

3.VI.40.

You are not presenting me as I should like every few days, or every week, with a short, clear statement of the falling-of or improvement in munitions production. I am not able to form a clear view unless you do this.

Prime Minister to Professor Lindemann.

3.VI.40.

See attached paper [Production Programmes: Memorandum by Chiefs of Staff], which seems to contain a lot of loose thinking. Evidently we must “pull forward” everything that can be made effective in the next five months, and accept the consequent retardation of later production, but there is no reason whatever to alter, so far as I can see, the existing approved schemes for a three years’ war. Indeed, they will be more necessary than ever if France drops out.

Pray let me have your views.

Prime Minister to Professor Lindemann. (Secret.)

7.VI.40.

I am much grieved to hear of the further delay in the proximity fuze (P.F.).

Considering the enormous importance of this, and the directions I have given that all possible pressure should be put behind it, it would surely have been right to have two or three firms simultaneously making the experimental pattern, so that if one failed the other could go on.

Please report to me what has been done.

You have not given me yet either a full statement of the production which is already ordered in rockets for the proximity fuze and in rockets for the ordinary fuze before we get the P.F.

It is of the utmost importance that you should go forward with the stabilising bomb-sight, as we must knock out their aircraft factories at the same rate that they affect ours. If you will gather together (a) all the people interested in the P.F. and (b) all those interested in the stabilised bomb-sight, I will next week receive their reports and urge them on.

Prime Minister to Minister of Aircraft Production.

11.VI.40.

It was decided on December 22 at a conference on bomb-sight design that urgent action should be taken to convert two thousand six hundred A.B.s, Mark II, into stabilised high altitude bomb-sights, over ninety percent of the drawings then being completed. Please let me know exactly what followed. How is it that only one bomb-sight was converted? I should be very glad if you would look at the files and ascertain who was responsible for stifling action.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air and C.A.S.

11.VI.40.

This report ² is most interesting, and I shall be glad if you will arrange to use the squadron you mentioned yesterday for the purpose of infecting the reaches mentioned, where the traffic is reported to be so heavy. We do not need to ask the French permission for this, but only for the continuous streaming of the naval fluvials. This I am doing. Meanwhile you should act as soon as you can on the lower reaches. Kindly report what you will do.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for the Colonies.

16.VI.40.

Have you considered the advisability of raising a West Indies Regiment? It might have three battalions strongly officered by British officers, and be representative of most of the islands; to be available for Imperial Service; to give an outlet for the loyalty of the natives, and bring money into these poor islands.

At present we are short of weapons, but these will come along.

Prime Minister to First Lord of the Admiralty.

17.VI.40.

I am content with your proposed disposition of the heavy ships in the West, namely, Repulse and Renown to maintain the blockade at Scapa; Rodney, Nelson, and Valiant at Rosyth to cover the island; Hood and Ark Royal to join Resolution at Gibraltar, to watch over the fate of the French Fleet.

It is of the utmost importance that the fleet at Alexandria should remain to cover Egypt from an Italian invasion which would otherwise destroy prematurely all our position in the East. This fleet is well placed to sustain our interests in Turkey, to guard Egypt and the Canal, and can if the situation changes either fight its way westward or go through the Canal to guard the Empire or come round the Cape onto our trade routes.

The position of the Eastern fleet must be constantly watched, and can be reviewed when we know what happens to the French Fleet and whether Spain declares war or not.

Even if Spain declares war it does not follow that we should quit the Eastern Mediterranean. If we have to quit Gibraltar, we must immediately take the Canaries, which will serve as a very good base to control the western entrance to the Mediterranean.

Prime Minister to Minister of Home Security.

20.VI.40.

I understand that it was settled last Saturday that your department was to take on the executive control of smoke as a means of hiding factories and similar industrial targets. I should be glad to know whom you have put in charge of this work, which I regard as of the highest importance, and what progress he has made.

Prime Minister to Admiralty..

23.VI.40.

I do not think it would be a good thing to keep Hood and Ark Royal lolling about in Gibraltar Harbour, where they might be bombed at any time from the shore.

Surely when they have fuelled they should go to sea, and come back only unexpectedly and for short visits.

What is being done?

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

24.VI.40.

Has any news been received of the German prisoner pilots in France, whose return to this country was solemnly promised by M. Reynaud?

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

24.VI.40.

It does not seem to be necessary to address the President again upon the subject of destroyers today or tomorrow. Evidently he will be influenced by what happens to the French Fleet, about which I am hopeful. I am doubtful about opening Staff talks at the present time. I think they would turn almost entirely from the American side upon the transfer of the British Fleet to transatlantic bases. Any discussion of this is bound to weaken confidence here at the moment when all must brace themselves for the supreme struggle. I will send the President another personal telegram about the destroyers and flying-boats a little later on.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for the Colonies.

25.VI.40.

The cruel penalties imposed by your predecessor upon the Jews in Palestine for arming have made it necessary to tie up needless forces for their protection. Pray let me know exactly what weapons and organisation the Jews have for self-defence.

Prime Minister to Minister of Supply.

25.VI.40.

Thank you for your letter of June 22 about increasing the import of steel from the United States. I understand that owing to the transfer of the French contracts to us our volume of purchases for the coming month has more than doubled and that we are now buying at the rate of about 600,000 tons a month. This is satisfactory, and we should certainly get as much from the United States as we can while we can.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

26.VI.40.

I am sure we shall gain nothing by offering to “discuss” Gibraltar at the end of the war. Spaniards will know that, if we win, discussions would not be fruitful; and if we lose, they would not be necessary. I do not believe mere verbiage of this kind will affect the Spanish decision.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

28.VI.40.

Although our policy about the French Navy is clear, I should like to have an appreciation by the Admiralty of the consequences which are likely to follow, namely, a hostile attitude by France, and the seizure by Germany and Italy of any part of the French Navy which we cannot secure. I should like to have this on Sunday next.

Prime Minister to General Ismay. (Secret.)

28.VI.40.

This is a very unsatisfactory figure [of civilian labour].³ When I mentioned fifty-seven thousand the other day in the Cabinet, I was assured that they represented a very small part of what were actually employed, and that one hundred thousand was nearer the mark, and that many more were coming in before the end of the week. Now, instead, we have a figure of only forty thousand. Pray let me have a full explanation of this.

It is very wrong that fighting troops should be kept from their training because of the neglect to employ civilian labour.

The question must be brought up at the Cabinet on Monday.

Prime Minister to Home Secretary.

28.VI.40.

Let me see a list of prominent persons you have arrested.

Prime Minister to Professor Lindemann.

29.VI.40.

If we could have large supplies of multiple projectors and rockets directed by Radar irrespective of cloud or darkness, and also could have the proximity fuze working effectively by day and to a lesser extent in moonlight or starlight, the defence against air attack would become decisive. This combination is therefore the supreme immediate aim. We are not far from it in every respect, yet it seems to baffle us. Assemble your ideas and facts so that I may give extreme priority and impulse to this business.

Prime Minister to Professor Lindemann.

29.VI.40.

It seems to me that the blockade is largely ruined, in which case the sole decisive weapon in our hands would be overwhelming air attack upon Germany.

We should gain great relief in the immediate future from not having to maintain an army in France or sending supplies of beef, coal, etc., to France. Let me know about this.

How has the question of beef supplies been affected? We are freed from the obligation to supply the French Army with beef. There is really no reason why our Army at home should have rations far exceeding the heavy munitions workers’. The complications about frozen meat and fresh meat ought also to be affected by what has happened, although I am not sure which way.

JULY

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

2.VII.40.

If it be true that a few hundred German troops have been landed on Jersey or Guernsey by troop-carriers, plans should be studied to land secretly by night on the islands and kill or capture the invaders. This is exactly one of the exploits for which the Commandos would be suited. There ought to be no difficulty in getting all the necessary information from the inhabitants and from those evacuated. The only possible rein forcements which could reach the enemy during the fighting would be by aircraft-carriers, and here would be a good opportunity for the Air Force fighting machines. Pray let me have a plan.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

3.VII.40.

I could not reconcile myself to leaving a large number of influential Frenchmen who are the adherents of the Pétain Government free to run an active and effective propaganda in our Service circles and in French circles in this country, against the whole policy of aiding General de Gaulle, to which we are publicly and earnestly committed. The attempt to set up a French Government in Morocco and to obtain control of the Jean Bart and other vessels, and to open up a campaign in Morocco, with a base on the Atlantic, is, in my opinion, vital. It was most cordially adopted by the Cabinet in principle, and, apart from technical details, I should find very great difficulty in becoming a party to its abandonment, and to our consequent relegation to the negative defensive which has so long proved ruinous to our interests.

(Action this day.) Prime Minister to V.C.N.S. and A.C.N.S

5.VII.40.

Could you let me know on one sheet of paper what arrangements you are making about the Channel convoys now that the Germans are all along the French coast? The attacks on the convoy yesterday, both from the air and by E-boats, were very serious, and I should like to be assured this morning that the situation is in hand and that the Air is contributing effectively.

Prime Minister to First Lord of the Admiralty, Secretary of State for War, and Secretary of State for Air.

5.VII.40.

(Sir E. Bridges to implement.)

It has been represented to me that our colleagues not in the War Cabinet but above the “line” are depressed at not knowing more of what is going forward in the military sphere. It would be advantageous if each of the Service Ministers could in rotation have a talk with them, answer questions, and explain the general position. If a weekly meeting were instituted, this would mean that each Service Minister would meet them every three weeks. I trust this would not be too heavy a burden upon you. Nothing must ever be said to anybody about future operations; these must always be kept in the most narrow circles; but explanations of the past and expositions of the present offer a wide field. On the assumption that the above is agreeable to you, I am giving directions through Sir Edward Bridges.

Prime Minister to Colonel Jacobs.

6.VJI.40.

Obtain a most careful report today from the Joint Intelligence Staff of any further indication of enemy preparations for raid or invasion. Let me have this tonight.

Prime Minister to Minister of Aircraft Production.

8.VII.40.

In the fierce light of the present emergency the fighter is the need, and the output of fighters must be the prime consideration till we have broken the enemy’s attack. But when I look round to see how we can win the war, I see that there is only one sure path. We have no Continental army which can defeat the German military power. The blockade is broken and Hitler has Asia and probably Africa to draw from. Should he be repulsed here or not try invasion, he will recoil eastward, and we have nothing to stop him. But there is one thing that will bring him back and bring him down, and that is an absolutely devastating, exterminating attack by very heavy bombers from this country upon the Nazi homeland. We must be able to overwhelm them by this means, without which I do not see a way through. We cannot accept any lower aim than air mastery. When can it be obtained?

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air.

11.VII.40.

Generally speaking, the losses in the Bomber force seem unduly heavy, and the Bremen raid, from which only one out of six returned, is most grievous. At the present time a very heavy price may be paid (a) for in formation by reconnaissance of the conditions in the German ports and German-controlled ports and river mouths, (b) for the bombing of barges or assemblies of ships thus detected. Apart from this, the long-range bombing of Germany should be conducted with a desire to save the machines and personnel as much as possible while keeping up a steady attack. It is most important to build up the numbers of the Bomber force, which are very low at the present time.

Prime Minister to Home Secretary.

11.VII.40.

You should, I think, prepare a Bill vacating the seat of any Member of Parliament who continues during the present war outside the jurisdiction for more than six months without the leave of the Secretary of State.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

12.VII.40.

What is being done to reproduce and install the small circular pillboxes which can be sunk in the centre of aerodromes, and rise by means, of a compressed-air bottle to two or three feet elevation, like a small turret commanding the aerodrome? I saw these for the first time when I visited Langley Aerodrome last week. This appears to afford an admirable means of anti-parachute defence, and it should surely be widely adopted. Let me have a plan.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War.

12.VII.40.

Now is the time to popularise your administration with the troops by giving to all regiments and units the little badges and distinctions they like so much. I saw the London Irish with their green and peacock-blue hackles. We can easily afford the expense of bronze badges, the weight of which is insignificant in metal. All regimental distinctions should be encouraged. The French Army made a great specialty of additional un official regimental badges, which they presented to people. I liked this-idea, and I am sure it would amuse the troops, who will have to face a long vigil. I am delighted at the action you have taken about bands, but when are we going to hear them playing about the streets? Even quite small parade marches are highly beneficial, especially in towns like Liver pool and Glasgow; in fact, wherever there are troops and leisure for it there should be an attempt at military display.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee.

12.VII.40.

1. The contacts we have had with the Italians encourage the development of a more aggressive campaign against the Italian homeland by bombardment both from air and sea. It also seems most desirable that the Fleet should be able to use Malta more freely. A plan should be prepared to reinforce the air defences of Malta in the strongest manner with A.A. guns of various types, and with airplanes. Malta was also the place where it was thought the aerial mine barrage from the “Egglayer” would be useful. Finally, there are the P.E. fuzes,⁴ which will be coming along at the end of August, which should give very good daylight results. If we could get a stronger Air Force there we might obtain considerable immunity from annoyance by retaliation.

2. Let a plan for the speediest anti-aircraft reinforcement of Malta be prepared forthwith, and let me have it in three days, with estimates in time. It should be possible to inform Malta to prepare emplacements for the guns before they are sent out.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

12.VII.40.

Will you bring the following to the notice of the Chiefs of Staff:

It is the settled policy of His Majesty’s Government to make good strong French contingents for land, sea, and air service, to encourage these men to volunteer to fight on with us, to look after them well, to indulge their sentiments about the French flag, etc., and to have them as representatives of a France which is continuing the war. It is the duty of the Chiefs of Staff to carry this policy out effectively.

The same principle also applies to Poles, Dutch, Czech, and Belgian contingents in this country, as well as to the Foreign Legion of anti-Nazi Germany. Mere questions of administrative inconvenience must not be allowed to stand in the way of this policy of the State. It is most necessary to give to the war which Great Britain is waging single-handed the broad, international character which will add greatly to our strength and prestige.

I hope I may receive assurances that this policy is being whole-heartedly pursued. I found the conditions at Olympia very bad, and there is no doubt that the French soldiers were discouraged by some officers from volunteering. An opportunity of assisting the French would be to make a great success of their function of July 14, when they are going to lay a wreath on the Foch statue.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

13.VII.40.

Draw Admiralty attention to the importance of all these ships, especially Western Prince. What is her speed? It would be a disaster if we lost these fifty thousand rifles. Draw attention also to the immense consequence of the convoy which is leaving New York between July 8 and 12. When will these various convoys be in the danger zone? When will they arrive? Let me have a report on the measures to be taken.

Prime Minister to Sir Edward Bridges.

13.VII.40.

I am receiving from various sources suggestions that there should be another day of prayer and humiliation.

Will you find out privately what is thought about this by the Archbishop?

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

14.VII.40.

It seems to me very important that everybody should be made to look to their gas-masks now. I expect a great many of them require overhauling, and it may well be Hitler has some gas designs upon us. Will you consider how the necessary overhauls can be set on foot? Action should be taken at once.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for V.C.A.S.

15.VII.40.

I am in full agreement with your proposal for bombing during the present moon-phase. I do not understand, however, why we have not been able to obtain results in the Kiel Canal. Nothing could be more important than this, as it prevents any movement of prepared shipping and barges from the Baltic for invasion purposes. I heard that you had dropped a number of bombs into this area, but that they did no good. Let me know what you have done about it in the past. How many raids, how many bombs, what kind of bombs, and what is the explanation that the canal still works? Can you make any plans for bettering results in the 1 inure? This is surely a matter of the very highest importance, and now is the time when it counts most.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

15.VII.40.

Make sure that overhead cover against bombing attack is provided for the fourteen-inch gun. A structure of steel girders should be put up to carry sandbag cover similar to that over the six-inch guns which are mounted along the coast. All should be camouflaged. You will be told that it will be necessary to change the guns after one hundred and twenty rounds. In that case the structure will have to be taken to pieces and put up again after the gun is changed. There should be no difficulty in this.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

17.VI1.40.

Press the War Office continually to develop the Foreign Legion, either by pioneer battalions or otherwise. Let me have weekly reports.

Prime Minister to Home Secretary.

18.VII.40.

I certainly do not propose to send a message by the senior child to Mr. Mackenzie King, or by the junior child either. If I sent any message by anyone, it would be that I entirely deprecate any stampede from this country at the present time.⁵

(Action this day.) Prime Minister to Home Secretary.

19.VII.40.

I have noticed lately very many sentences imposed for indiscretion by magistrates’ and other courts throughout the country in their execution of recent legislation and regulation. All these cases should be reviewed by the Home Office, and His Majesty moved to remit the sentence where there was no malice or serious injury to the State. By selecting some of those cases which have recently figured in the public eye, and announcing remission publicly, you would give the necessary guidance without which it is difficult for local courts to assess the lead and purpose of Parliament.

Prime Minister to First Lord and First Sea Lord.

20.VII.40.

I have drawn attention to this danger before. I do not think Hood should be left lying in Gibraltar Harbour at the mercy of a surprise bombardment by heavy howitzers. Both she and Ark Royal should go to sea for a cruise, with or without Valiant and Resolution, as may be thought fit. They could return to fuel or to carry out any operations, provided the Spanish situation has not further deteriorated. Pray let me have your proposals.

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary.

20.VII.40.

Don’t you think we might go very slow on all this general and equitable, fair and honourable peace business between China and Japan? Chiang does not want it; none of the pro-Chinese want it; and so far from helping us round the Burma Road difficulty, it will only make it worse. I am sure that it is not in our interest that the Japanese should be relieved of their preoccupation. Would it not be a good thing to give it a miss for a month or so, and see what happens?

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War.

20.VII.40.

You may care to see this [letter from Colonel Wedgwood on “London Defence”]. The only scale of attack which it seems to me need be contemplated for the centre of Government is, say, five hundred parachutists or Fifth Columnists. What is the present plan, and what is the scale against which it is being provided?

You might do something for Jos. He is a grand-hearted man.

Prime Minister to Minister without Portfolio.

20.VII.40.

I am rather doubtful, from information which has reached me, whether our home timber resources are being adequately developed.

This, of course, is primarily a matter for the Minister of Supply, who I know has made certain departmental adjustments recently with this particular end in view.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

21.VII.40.

Let me have a statement showing the scheme of defence for the Central Government, Whitehall, etc. What was the scale of attack prescribed, and who was responsible for taking the measures? What was the reason for attempting to put an anti-tank obstacle across St. James’s Park? Who-ordered this? When was it counter-ordered?

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

23.VII.40.

I am told that the refuelling of fighter aeroplanes could be much more rapidly achieved if there were more tankers on the aerodromes, and considering that an attack by air would make every minute gained in returning the fighters to the air most precious, I should be glad if measures were taken at once to double it or greatly increase the fuelling facilities.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War.

23.VII.40.

I do not seem to have had any answer from you to my query about whether the 2d Canadian Division and all it stands for is being frittered away in Iceland.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War.

23.VII.40.

1. It is, of course, urgent and indispensable that every effort should be made to obtain secretly the best possible information about the German forces in the various countries overrun, and to establish intimate contacts with local people, and to plant agents. This, I hope, is being done on the largest scale, as opportunity serves, by the new organisation under M.E.W. None of this partakes of the nature of military operations.

2. It would be most unwise to disturb the coasts of any of these countries by the kind of silly fiascos which were perpetrated at Boulogne and Guernsey. The idea of working all these coasts up against us by pin-prick raids and fulsome communiques is one to be strictly avoided.

3. Sir Roger Keyes is now studying the whole subject of medium raids – i.e., not less than five nor more than ten thousand men. Two or three of these might be brought off on the French coast during the winter. As soon as the invasion danger recedes or is resolved, and Sir R. K.’s paper-work is done, we will consult together and set the Staffs to work upon detailed preparations. After these medium raids have had their chance, there will be no objection to stirring up the French coast by minor forays.

4. During the spring and summer of 1941 large armoured irruptions must be contemplated. The material for these is, however, so far ahead of us that only very general study of their possibilities is now necessary, and no directions need be given to the Staff upon them until the end of August.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for Chiefs of Staff.

24.VII.40.

Apart from the anti-Nazi Germans, who can begin by being pioneers, rifles and ammunition should be issued to all foreign corps. Whether this should be from British Service rifles now in the possession of the Home Guard, but in process of being replaced by American rifles, or whether the foreign corps ⁶ should be armed with American rifles direct, has no doubt been considered. On the whole, I am inclined to the former solution. It is most urgent to rearm the Poles and the French, as we may need them for foreign service in the near future. The armament of these foreign corps ranks after the armament of British troops so far as rifles are concerned, but they have priority over the Home Guard. They ought to have a small proportion of Bren guns, etc., even at the expense of our own men. What is being done to furnish them with artillery? Surely some of the 75’s can be made to serve the purpose. The Polish unit should be ripened as much as possible. Pray let me have a weekly report of numbers and weapons.

(Action this day.) Prime Minister to First Lord, First Sea Lord and V.C.N.S.

25.VII.40.

I cannot help feeling that there is more in the plan of laying mines behind an invader’s landing than the Naval Staff felt when I mentioned the matter three weeks ago. In the interval I sent a reminder asking that it should be further considered.

If an invader lands during the night or morning, the flotillas will attack him in rear during the day, and these flotillas will be heavily bombarded from the air, as part of the air battles which will be going on. If, however, when night falls a curtain or fender of mines can be laid close inshore, so as to cut off the landing-place from reinforcements of any kind, these mines, once laid, will not have to be guarded from air attack, and consequently will relieve the flotilla from the need of coming back on the second day, thus avoiding losses from the air and air protection. At any rate, I think it improvident not to provide for the option whether to seal off the hostile landing by attack of flotillas or mines. There may be several landings, and you may want to leave one sealed off with mines in order to attack another. Of course, all the above would apply still more if the landing had got hold of a port instead of merely a beach.

Pray let this matter have further attention, and also say what craft are available for the purpose, or how soon they can be provided or adapted.

Prime Minister to V.C.N.S.

25.VII.40.

Let me have a report of how far the German, Dutch, and Belgian harbours have been sealed up by mines or obstructions.

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary.

26.VII.40.

I saw Mr. Quo yesterday at his request, and explained to him frankly the position about the Burma Road. I told him verbally of the message I sent through the Foreign Office to Chiang Kai-shek. He was naturally anxious to extort some promise from me about what would happen when the three months had expired. I said it all depended upon what the situation was then, and that I could make no forecast. I assured him we should put no pressure on General Chiang to consent to terms or negotiations against his will and policy. Mr. Quo seemed fairly satisfied, though rueful.

Prime Minister to Chancellor of the Exchequer.

28.VII.40.

Now that the Rumanian Government are helping themselves to the property of British subjects, ought we not to show the Rumanians that we shall use their frozen fund to compensate our people? I understand that about six weeks ago you blocked Rumanian assets in London. We have been treated odiously by these people.

AUGUST

(Action this day.) Prime Minister to First Lord and First Sea Lord.

1.VIII.40.

In view of the threatening attitude of Japan, it is vitally important to know about Bismarck and Tirpitz. Pray let me have your latest information. It seems to me that a great effort will have to be made by the Air Force to disable these ships, as their apparition in the next few months would be most dangerous.

2. Assuming Japan goes to war with us, or forces us into war, I suppose you would send Hood, three eight-inch-gun cruisers, two Ramillies, and twelve long-radius destroyers to Singapore.

Let me have the legends [i.e., construction details] of the completed Japanese battle-cruisers.

(Action this day.) Prime Minister to First Lord and First Sea Lord.

2.VIII.40.

I pray that we may never have to make this widespread distribution, but I am in full accord with the principles on which the Admiralty would propose to meet the strain. I should have thought that Hood would be a greater deterrent than Renown. Please let me have a report of the possibility of air attack on Bismarck and Tirpitz. This seems to me to be one of the most vital steps to take. Apart from this, there is no need to make any new dispositions at the present time on account of Japanese war-risk.

I was much concerned to hear of the sinking of the three tankers off Tory Island. I should like to see you move some destroyers from the East Coast thither. We had better wait, however, until the August moon-phase is over. During this time also the American guns and rifles will be distributed to the troops.

(Action this day.) Prime Minister to General Ismay.

2.VIII.40.

Next week one of my principal tasks must be going through this scheme of the Air Ministry for increasing the pilots and for the training of pilots. Lord Beaverbrook should be asked for his views beforehand.

2. Let me have a report on the plans for lectures on tactical subjects for the troops in the autumn.

3. What has been done about the collection of scrap of all kinds? Let me’have a short report on one page covering the progress made this year.

4. When at the Admiralty f took a special interest in the work of the Salvage Department, and held a meeting there four months ago. A naval officer, Captain Dewar, was then in charge. Let me have a report on what has happened to salvage since that day.

5. I am also expecting this week to reach a settlement about the functions of the A.R.P. and police in the case of invasion. The Lord Privy Seal was dealing with this in the first instance. At the same time we must consider allowing transfers from A.R.P. to the Home Guard, and their being made available for fighting purposes. To what extent has the payment of the A.R.P. personnel been discontinued or restricted? It ought to be continually restricted.

6. Let me have a report on the progress and future construction of the tank divisions. There should be five armoured divisions by March 31 [1941], and two more by the end of May. Let me know how far the present prospects of men and material allow of this. Let me know also what are the latest ideas for the structure and organisation of an armoured division. This should be prepared on one sheet of paper, showing all the principal elements and accessories.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

2.VIII.40.

It is very important to get on with the uniforms for the Home Guard. Let me have a forecast of deliveries.

(Action this day.) Prime Minister to First Lord.

2.VIII.40.

My objection was to anything in the nature of sinking at sight or sinking without due provision for the safety of the crews. Provided this is excluded, there can be no reason against sinking a captured ship if, owing to air attack or other military reasons, it is impossible to bring her into port as a prize. The disadvantages of sinking a ship and losing valuable tonnage are obvious, and I do not see why in nineteen cases out of twenty the Admiralty cannot put a prize crew on board and send the ship in, in the ordinary way. I see no objection to the action taken in the Hermione case,⁷ which falls entirely within the general principles set forth above.

Prime Minister to Sir Edward Bridges.

2.VIII.40.

The whole question of holidays and reduced hours should be considered by the Cabinet at an early date. It is far too soon to assume that the danger has passed. It is a great mistake to tell the workpeople that they are tired. On the other hand, certain easements are indispensable. Please communicate with Mr. Bevin, Lord Beaverbrook, and the Minister of Supply so that their views may be in readiness for Cabinet conversation. I should also like to know what is being done about holidays for the Civil Service and for Ministers, and persons in high Service positions. Something will have to be done about this, but we must be very careful not to be caught while in an August mood.

Prime Minister to Lord Privy Seal and Home Secretary.

3.VIII.40.

The attached memorandum by Lord Mottistone on duties of police in the event of invasion raises a very difficult question, and one that must be speedily settled. We cannot surely make ourselves responsible for a system where the police will prevent the people from resisting the enemy, and will lay down their arms and become the enemy’s servant in any invaded area. I confess I do not see my way quite clearly to the amendments required in the regulations. In principle, however, it would seem that the police should withdraw from any invaded area with the last of His Majesty’s troops. This would also apply to the A.R.P. and the fire brigades, etc. Their services will be used in other districts. Perhaps on invasion being declared, the police, A.R.P., fire brigades, etc., should automatically become a part of the military forces.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

3.VIII.40.

All secret service reports about affairs in France or other captive countries are to be shown to Major Morton, who is responsible for keeping me informed. Make sure this instruction is obeyed.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War.

3.VIII.40.

It seems quite possible that a portion of General de Gaulle’s forces will be used in the near future. It therefore becomes of the utmost consequence and urgency to complete the equipment of his three battalions, company of tanks, headquarters, etc. Evidently action is being taken already, but I shall be much obliged if you will accelerate this action by every means in your power, and also if you will let me know in what way the situation has improved since Major Morion’s Minute of yesterday.

Prime Minister to Sir Edward Bridges and others concerned.

3.VIII.40.

I think the circular about work in the factories and holidays for whole establishments should, whatever the agreement of the Production Council, be brought before the Cabinet on Tuesday by the Minister of Labour. We must give holidays without creating a holiday atmosphere. It would therefore seem desirable to announce only that “such local arrangements as are possible are being made for staggered holidays,” or something like that.

2. I approve Sir Horace Wilson’s letter to Departments. It arose out of my instructions to him.

3. I shall be very glad if you will adjust the holidays of Ministers, and make sure that the Services arrange for similar relief in case of high military officers at the centre of Government.

Prime Minister to Sir E. Bridges

4.VIII.40.

I circulate to my colleagues the enclosed report on the first use of the U.P. weapon with the wire curtain at Dover. This appears to be of high importance, and may well inaugurate a decisive change in the relations of ground and air, particularly in respect of ships and ports exposed to dive-bombing attack.

Prime Minister to Professor Lindemann.

4.VIII.40.

What are you doing to focus the discussions on food, shipping and agricultural policy for the second twelve months of the war? I thought it looked like 18,000,000 tons of shipping [for food], plough up 1,500,000 more acres, and instruct the Food Department to submit a plan both for increasing rations and building up further food reserves. This should be possible on the above basis.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air and C.A.S.

4.VIII.40.

The danger of Japanese hostility makes it all the more important that the German capital ships should be put out of action. I understand that the Air Force intend to make heavy attacks on these ships as soon as there is sufficient moon. Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau, both in floating docks at Kiel, the Bismarck at Hamburg, and the Tirpitz at Wilhelm-shaven, are all targets of supreme consequence. Even a few months’ delay in Bismarck will affect the whole balance of sea-power to a serious degree. 1 shall be glad to hear from you.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

5.VIII.40.

I am not satisfied with the volume or quality of information received from the unoccupied area of France. We seem to be as much cut off from these territories as from Germany. I do not wish such reports as are received to be sifted and digested by the various Intelligence authorities. For the present Major Morton will inspect them for me and submit what he considers of major interest. He is to see everything and submit authentic documents for me in their original form.

Further, I await proposals for improving and extending our information about France and for keeping a continued flow of agents moving to and fro. For this purpose naval facilities can, if necessary, be invoked. So far as the Vichy Government is concerned, it is not creditable that we have so little information. To what extent are Americans, Swiss, and Spanish agents being used?

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

5.VIII.40.

What orders are extant for the future production of U.P. multiple projectors in groups of twenties, tens, fives, and also single projectors?

What amount of ammunition (a) of the ordinary rocket, (b) of the aerial mine, (c) of the P.E. fuze, (d) of the radio fuze, is on order? What are the forecasts of deliveries in the next six months in all cases?

Presently the P.E. fuze will probably supersede the aerial mine for use in multiple projectors mounted on H.M. ships. This will entail an alteration of the projector tubes. The Admiralty should be asked to study this betimes so that the new tubes can be fitted on the existing mountings of H.M. ships with the least possible delay from the moment that this change appears desirable.

The Admiralty should also be asked to report whether any progress has been made on firing short aerial mines from ships’ guns.

I wish to refresh my memory with what happened about this before 1 left the Admiralty.

Prime Minister to Minister of Mines.

6.VIII.40.

I saw it stated that you were piling up large reserves of coal during the summer for use during the winter. I should be glad to know how far this very wise precaution has advanced. We were very short and anxious in January last, and I hope you are taking precautions.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War.

7.VIII.40.

Please let me know what is being done to train men in the use of the sticky bomb, which is now beginning to come through in quantity.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

9.VIII.40.

Ask for a statement of the Ministry of Supply importation programme under various heads. Professor Lindemann should be consulted about these heads. Let me see them.

The programme for the second year of the war has not yet been presented to me in a coherent form.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War and C.I.G.S.

9.VIII.40.

I was much concerned to find that the 1st Division, which has an exceptionally high proportion of equipment, and includes a Brigade of Guards, should be dispersed along the beaches, instead of being held in reserve for counter-attack. What is the number of divisions which are now free and out of the line, and what is the argument for keeping divisions with a high equipment of guns, etc., on the beaches?

Prime Minister to Lord Beaverbrook.

9.VIII.40.

If it came to a choice between hampering air production or tank production, I would sacrifice the tank, but 1 do not think this is the case, as the points of overlap are not numerous and ought to be adjustable. I gathered from you that you thought you could arrange with the Minister of Supply.

Prime Minister to Minister of Information.

9.VIII.40.

It is important to keep General de Gaulle active in French on the broadcast, and to relay by every possible means our French propaganda to Africa. I am told the Belgians will help from the Congo.

Have we any means of repeating to the West African stations the agreement made between us and de Gaulle?

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

10.VIII.40.

Let me have a weekly return of the deliveries to troops of the American 75’s and the .300 rifles to Home Guard, with consequent liberation by them of Lee-Metfords. Begin at once.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee.

10.VIII.40.

The Prime Minister would be glad to have a report from the C.O.S. Committee, after conference with the C.-in-C. Home Forces, upon the small-arms ammunition position on the beaches and with the reserves.

Prime Minister to Minister of Mines.

11.VIII.40.

I felt sure you would take advantage of the breakdown of the export market to increase our stocks all over the country. I hope you will press on with this, especially as regards our essential gas, water, and electricity works. I note that the gas and electricity supplies are about twenty per cent up; we cannot go wrong in piling up such well-distributed stocks, which are sure to be used sooner or later.

I am sending a note to the Minister of Transport to call his attention to the position of the railways.

The tremendous upset in your plans due to the collapse of France and the loss of three-quarters of our export markets must have put a great strain on your Department. It must be very difficult after all your efforts to increase production to explain the sudden slump, but I have no doubt the men will understand. Indeed, what you tell me about the fortitude of the Kent miners is an encouraging sign of the spirit which I believe informs all the workingmen in the country.

Prime Minister to Minister of Information.

11.VIII.40.

In view of certain activities we are planning for General de Gaulle, it is of the highest importance that the broadcasting of French news in North and West Africa should be carried to the highest point. Please make sure that the B.B.C. conform to this requirement, and let me have a report on Monday to the effect that all is satisfactorily arranged.

I cannot emphasise too strongly that you have full authority to make the B.B.C. obey.

(Action this day.) Prime Minister to Minister of Transport.

11.VIII.40.

I should be grateful for a full report on the steps taken by your Department to deal with the difficulties which may arise from the bombing and closing of ports.

One-quarter of our imports, it seems, normally comes in through the port of London, and one-fifth through the Mersey, with a tenth each through Southampton, the Bristol Channel, and the Humber. We must envisage these entrances being wholly or partially closed, either one at a time or even several at a time, but I have no doubt you have worked out plans to take account of the various contingencies.

In view of our large accretions of shipping, it may well be that port facilities and roadway facilities may be a more stringent bottleneck than shortage of tonnage, so that the preparations you make to meet the various possible eventualities may well be of the greatest importance.

Prime Minister to Sir Edward Bridges.

12.VIII.40.

How does the position now stand about a Timber Controller under the Ministry of Supply?

Ask for a short summary from the Ministry of Supply of the present timber position and policy.

Prime Minister to Lord Privy Seal and Captain Margesson.

12.VIII.40.

It would probably be convenient for me to make a general statement on the war, covering the first year and also the first quarter of the new Government, before the House rises. This would be expected, and I suppose Tuesday, the 20th, would be the best day. This should, of course, be in public session. Perhaps you will let me know what you wish. An announcement could be made in good time this week.

It would save me a lot of trouble if a record could be taken at the time, so that the speech could be repeated over the wireless in the evening, or such parts of it as arc of general interest. Can this be arranged without a resolution? If not, could a resolution be passed this week? I do not think the House would object.

Prime Minister to Home Secretary.

12.VIII.40.

The drafts [about instructions to police in case of invasion] submitted do not correspond with my view of the recent Cabinet decision. We do not contemplate or encourage fighting by persons not in the armed forces, but we do not forbid it. The police, and as soon as possible the A.R.P. Services, are to be divided into combatant and non-combatant, armed and unarmed. The armed will co-operate actively in fighting with the Home Guard and Regulars in their neighbourhood, and will withdraw with them if necessary; the unarmed will actively assist in the “stay put” policy for civilians. Should they fall into an area effectively occupied by the enemy, they may surrender and submit with the rest of the inhabitants, but must not in those circumstances give any aid to the enemy in maintaining order, or in any other way. They may assist the civil population as far as possible.

Prime Minister to Minister of Transport.

13.VIII.40.

I should be glad to know what stocks of coal are now held by the railways, and how they compare with those normally held. With the stoppage of our export trade to Europe there should be a great surplus just now, and no doubt you are taking advantage of this to fill up every available dump so that we shall have a well-distributed stock for the railways in case of any interruptions, or even in case of another very hard winter. Negotiations about price should not be allowed to hold up the process of restocking. If necessary, some form of arbitration will have to be employed to make sure that the prices paid are fair.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War.

13.VIII.40.

If, owing to lack of equipment and other facilities, it is necessary to limit the numbers of the active Home Guard, would it not be possible to recruit a Home Guard Reserve, members of which would, for the time being, be provided with no weapons and no uniform other than arm bands? Their only duties would be to attend such courses of instruction as could be organised locally in the use of simple weapons like the “Molotov cocktail,” and to report for orders in the event of invasion.

Unless some such step is taken, those who are refused enlistment will be bewildered and disappointed, and one of the primary objects of the Home Guard, which was to provide for the people as a whole an opportunity of helping to defend their homes, will be lost. I am anxious to avoid the disappointment and frustration which the stoppage of recruiting for the Home Guard is likely to cause to many people.

Please let me know what you think of this proposal.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

19.VIII.40.

Is it true that Admiral [John] Cunningham says that the only suitable day for “Menace” [Dakar] is September 12, and that if this day is missed owing to storm, no other days will be open till the 27th or 28th, when tide and moon will again be satisfactory? All this raises most grave questions. The Admiral cannot take up a position that only in ideal conditions of tide and moon can the operation be begun. It has got to be begun as soon as possible, as long as conditions are practicable, even though they be not the best. People have to fight in war on all sorts of days, and under all sorts of conditions. It will be a great misfortune if there is any delay beyond the 8th. Pray report to me on this today.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

21.VIII.40.

I am not convinced by these arguments about flame-throwers. The question is one to be settled relatively to other forms of war effort. The prospects of invasion are rapidly receding. The likelihood in an invasion of a column of troops marching up the very defile in which these installations have been laid on appears remote. The idea of setting up a Petroleum Warfare Executive is a needless multiplication of our apparatus. I have no doubt whatever that the method would be very effective it ever the occasion arose, but will it arise, and in this case would it be at the point expected? Troops do not march along roads without having first cleared their way by small parties and guarded their flanks on each side of defiles.

Prime Minister to First Lord.

22.VIII.40.

I await your proposals about the resumption of the capital ship programme, which was approved by the late Cabinet on my initiative. This cannot be settled apart from the general demand upon steel and labour, but in principle I favour its resumption.

I hope opportunity will now be taken to repair the disastrous neglect to convert the Royal Sovereign class into properly armoured and bulged bombarding vessels with heavy deck armour. These will be needed next year for the attack on Italy. It is lamentable that we have not got them now. They should certainly take precedence over the resumption of battleship construction.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

24.VIII.40.

Report to me on the position of Major Jefferis. By whom is he employed? Who is he under? I regard this officer as a singularly capable and forceful man, who should be brought forward to a higher position. He-ought certainly to be promoted Lieutenant-Colonel, as it will give him more authority.

Prime Minister to C.A.S. and V.C.A.S.

24.VIII.40.

It is of high importance to increase both the number of squadrons and the number of aircraft and crews immediately available. After a year of war we have only operationally fit about 1750, of which again only three-quarters are immediately available. You cannot rest satisfied with this, which is less than the number we were supposed to have available before the war.

Prime Minister to Minister of Transport.

25.VIII.40.

I have read with interest your memorandum on port clearance.

I note that the Minister of Shipping doubts whether the country could be supplied through the west coast ports on the scale you envisage. I should be glad to have your views on this.

Does not the widespread dislocation caused by the cold spell last winter raise some doubts as to the ready adaptability of the railway system in case of sudden emergency?

No doubt arrangements have been made for the importation of oil, which is not included in the food or supply programme. It appears that over two-fifths of our oil imports come through London and Southampton in peace-time. Our stocks are high, but if road transport had to be used more fully to relieve the railways, our consumption would, of course, increase.

I presume that you have discussed their import programmes with the Ministers of Food and of Supply, so that alternative schemes will be ready in case of great diversions.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War.

25.VIII.40.

I have been following with much interest the growth and development of the new guerrilla formations of the Home Guard known as “Auxiliary Units.”

From what I hear these units are being organised with thoroughness and imagination, and should, in the event of invasion, prove a useful addition to the Regular forces.

Perhaps you will keep me informed of progress.

Prime Minister to First Lord and First Sea Lord.

25.VIII.40.

The enclosed returns show losses of over forty thousand tons reported in a single day. I regard this matter as so serious as to require special consideration by the War Cabinet. Will you, therefore, have prepared a statement showing the recent losses, their cause, the measures which have been taken by the Admiralty to cope with the danger, any further measures which you feel it necessary to propose, and whether there is any way in which the War Cabinet can assist the Admiralty.

I should be glad if you would make this report to the War Cabinet on Thursday next.

(Action this day.) Prime Minister to General Ismay.

25.VIII.40.

Address the War Office forthwith upon the situation disclosed at Slough. Point out the danger of this large concentration of vehicles; the desirability of dispersing and concealing the vehicles. Ask that a plan should be examined for decentralising this depot as far as possible. We should also make sure that no sediment or surplus accumulates in the depot. It would be a great pity if a thousand valuable vehicles were ruined by an air attack.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air.

25.VIII.40.

I visted Kenley [Air Station] on Thursday, saw the gunner in question and had a rocket fired off. Moreover, it was the Admiralty Committee over which I presided early in the year which produced the idea of using these distress rockets. I am, therefore, well acquainted with the subject. The Air Ministry, not for the first time, spread itself into very large demands, and, using its priority, barged in heavily into other forms of not less important production. I agree that P.A.C.⁸rockets may be a good interim defence against low-flying attack, but they have to take their place in the general scheme. I thought myself about five thousand a month would be sufficient, but I am willing to agree to fifteen hundred a week, or six thousand a month. This figure could be somewhat extended if the wire-recovery projects you mention were further developed and proved an effective economy.

(Action this day.) Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War.

25.VIII.40.

War Office have accepted from the War Cabinet the responsibility of dealing with delayed-action bombs. This may become a feature of the enemy attack. A number were thrown last night into the City, causing obstruction. They may even try them on Whitehall! It seems to me that energetic effort should be made to provide sufficient squads to deal with this form of attack in the large centres. The squads must be highly mobile, so as not to waste men and material. They must move in motor lorries quickly from one point to another. I presume a careful system of reporting all unexploded bombs and the time at which they fell is in operation, and that this information will be sent immediately to the delayed-action section of Home Defence, which has no doubt already been established, and also the various local branches. The service, which is highly dangerous, must be considered particularly honourable, and rewards should follow its successful discharge.

I should be very glad to see your plans for the new section, together with numbers, and it will also be interesting to have a short account of the work done up to date and the methods employed. I presume you are in touch with all the scientific authorities you need.

On the other hand, I am asking the Air Ministry for information as to their reciprocating this process on the enemy.

(General Ismay to see.)

(Action this day.) Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War.

25.VIII.40.

I cannot feel you are justified in maintaining the present scale of communication squadrons when we are fighting so heavily. The sole end should surely be to increase the reserve and operational strength of our fighting squadrons and to meet the problem of trainer aircraft. Surely your dominant idea should be “Strength for battle.” Everything should be keyed onto this, and administrative convenience or local vested interests must be made to give way. In your place I should comb and recomb. I have been shocked to see the enormous numbers at Mention, and I would far rather give up flying on inspections altogether for members of the Government than that this should be made a reason for keeping these forces out of the fight.

I should have thought that Hendon could provide at least two good squadrons of fighter or bomber aircraft of the reserve category, and that they should have the machines issued to them and practise on them as occasion serves. Then they could be thrown in when an emergency came.

Ought you not every day to call in question in your own mind every non-military aspect of the Air Force? The tendency of every Station Commander is naturally to keep as much in his hands as possible. The Admirals do exactly the same. Even when you have had a thorough search, if you look around a few weeks later you will see more fat lias been gathered.

I hope you will feel able to give some consideration to these views of your old friend.

Prime Minister to First Lord and First Sea Lord.

27.V1II.40.

Will you kindly send the following to Admiral Cunningham, Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean:

Following from Prime Minister, Minister of Defence:’

Main object of directive was to safeguard Alexandria. Only a limited number of troops can be maintained Mersa Matruh, as G.O.C. Middle East will inform you. Every effort is to be made to defend this position. If, however, it and intermediate positions are forced or turned, it will be necessary to hold the line from Alexandria southward along the cultivated area [of the Delta]. Air attack on the Fleet at Alexandria is not necessarily less effective from one hundred and twenty miles distance than from twenty miles, since aeroplanes often fly at three hundred miles per hour and have ample endurance. In practice it is usually thought better to hold aerodromes a little back of the actual fighting line. They do not move forward concurrently with the fronts of armies. Everyone here understands the grievous consequence of the fall of Alexandria, and that it would probably entail the Fleet leaving the Mediterranean. If, however, you have any helpful suggestion to make for the more effective defence of Mersa Matruh or of any positions in advance of it, I should be obliged if you would tell me.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for Joint Planning Staff.

28.VIII.40.

Now that the long nights are approaching, the question of the blackout must be reviewed. I am in favour of a policy, not of black-out but of blnckable-out. For this purpose a considerable system of auxiliary electric street-lighting must be worked out. The whole of the centre of London, now lighted by incandescent gas, must be given priority. The best methods in the centres of other great cities must also be studied and local schemes must be examined. Thus the lights can be switched down and up and finally out on an air-raid warning being given. The lights themselves should not be of a too brilliant character. The subdued lighting of shop windows must also be studied with a view to extending the facilities given last Christmas on a permanent basis. Where factories are allowed to continue working at night in spite of the black-out, there can be no objection to extending blackable-out lighting to the surrounding districts, thus tending to make the target less defined. Consideration should also be given to decoy lighting and battle lighting in open spaces at suitable distances from vulnerable points.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air, C.A.S., and General Ismay.

29.VIII.40.

I was much concerned on visiting Mansion Aerodrome yesterday to find that, although more than four clear days have passed since it was last raided, the greater part of the craters on the landing ground remained unfilled, and the aerodrome was barely serviceable. When you remember what the Germans did at the Stavanger aerodrome and the enormous rapidity with which craters were filled, I must protest emphatically against this feeble method of repairing damage. Altogether there were a hundred and fifty people available to work, including those that could be provided from the Air Force personnel. These were doing their best. No effective appliances were available, and the whole process appeared disproportionate to the value of maintaining this fighting vantage-ground.

All craters should be filled in within twenty-four hours at most, and every case where a crater is unfilled for a longer period should be reported to higher authorities. In order to secure this better service, it will be necessary to form some crater-filling companies. You might begin with, say, two of two hundred and fifty each for the South of England, which is under this intensive attack. These companies should be equipped with all helpful appliances and be highly mobile, so that in a few hours they can be at work on any site which has been cratered. Meanwhile, at every aerodrome in the attack area, and later elsewhere, there must be accumulated by local contractors stocks of gravel, rubble, and other appropriate materials sufficient to fill without replenishment at least a hundred craters. Thus the mobile air-field repair companies would arrive to find all the material all ready on the spot.

I saw some time ago that the Germans filled in the shell holes by some process of having the gravel in wooden frameworks. The V.C.N.S. drew my attention to it during the Norwegian operation, and he could perhaps put you on to the telegram referred to.

In what Department of the Air Ministry does this process now fall?

After the craters had been refilled, camouflage effort might be made to pretend they had not been, but this is a refinement.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

30.VIII.40.

{For all Departments concerned, including Service Department, Home Security, M.A.P., and Supply.)

We must expect that many windows will be broken in the bombing raids, and during the winter glass may become scarce, with serious resultant damage to buildings if not replaced.

The utmost economy is to be practised in the use of glass. Where windows are broken, they should, if possible, be boarded up, except for one or two panes. We cannot afford the full-sized windows in glass. All glass not needed for hothouses should be stored if the hothouses are empty. I saw at Mansion a large hothouse with a great quantity of glass; enough was broken to make it useless, and I directed that the rest should be carefully stored.

What is the condition of glass supply? It would seem necessary to press the manufacturers.

Government buildings should all be fitted with emergency windows, containing only one or two glass panes, which, when the existing framework is blown in, can be substituted. Let me have a full report on the position.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

30.VIII.40.

If French India wish for trade they should be made to signify association with General de Gaulle. Otherwise no trade! This is not a matter upon which to be easy-going. Secretary of State for India to be informed.

The accession of any French possessions now is of importance.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

31.VIII.40.

I have not approved of any further cruiser tanks being despatched to the Middle East beyond those which have already gone. Although in principle it is desirable to complete the despatch of a full armoured division, further movements from this country can only be decided in relation to situation of home forces. No decision of this importance must be taken without reference to me, and in this case I should have to consult the Cabinet.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

31.VIII.40.

I am very glad to know that the [chemical warfare] stocks are piling up in this country. Let me know what the total now amounts to. The necessary containers should be brought level with supply. Do these stocks keep? Press on.

SEPTEMBER

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee.

1.IX.40.

Of course if the glider scheme is better than --parachutes, we should pursue it, but is it being seriously taken up? Are we not in danger of being fobbed off with one doubtful and experimental policy and losing the other which has already been proved? Let me have a full report of what has been done about the gliders.

Prime Minister to First Lord and First Sea Lord.

1.IX.40.

I am deeply concerned at your news that you cannot attack these batteries of German long-range guns until the 16th. You are allowing an artillery concentration to be developed day after day, which presently will forbid the entry of all British ships into the Straits of Dover, and will prepare the way for an attack on Dover itself. Pray let me know what you propose to do about this.

Surely while the big guns are actually being hoisted into position and cannot fire back is the time for action. The general weakness of the defences of Dover itself in heavy guns is also a matter of great seriousness. We must not simply look at dangers piling up without any attempt to forestall them. Erebus will have to face double the fire on the 16th that she or any other ship would have to face in the next week.

I remember well that it was customary to bombard the Knocke and other German batteries on the Belgian coast very frequently during the late war. It was possible to fire most accurately by night after a buoy had been fixed and sound-ranging used. I ask for proposals for action this week. Look at the photographs attached.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee.

1.IX.40.

I presume you will be thinking about what is to happen should “Menace” succeed, with little or no bloodshed. It would seem that as soon as de Gaulle has established himself there and in the place a little to the north, he should try to get a footing in Morocco, and our ships and troops could be used to repeat the process of “Menace,” if it has been found to work, immediately and in a more important theatre. This operation may be called “Threat.”

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War.

1.IX.40.

I should be glad to have a full report of the arrangements being made to provide educational and recreational facilities for the troops during the coming winter. Who will be responsible for this important branch of work?

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for India.

1.IX.40.

1. I am sorry to say that I cannot see my way to diverting aeroplanes or A.A. guns from the battle now raging here for the defence of India, which is in no way pressing; neither is it possible to divert American supplies for the building of an aircraft industry in India. We are already running risks which many might question in the reinforcement and re-equipment of the Middle East, and when the battle at home dies down, this theatre will absorb all our surplus for a long time to come.

2. It is very important that India should be a help and not on the balance a burden at the present time. The debit balance is heavy when you consider the number of British troops and batteries locked up there, and the very exiguous Indian forces which, after a year of war, have reached the field. I am glad you are making increased efforts to form Indian divisions for the very large important operations which seem likely to develop in the Middle East in 1941.

Prime Minister to First Lord, First Sea Lord, and Controller.

5.IX.40.

I continue to be extremely anxious for King George V to get away to the north. It would be disastrous if Bismarck were finished and something happened to King George V. Surely the electricians, etc., can go north in her and finish up at Scapa. It would be most painful if you lost this ship now, after all these long, vexatious delays, just at the moment when she is finished and most needed. The Tyne is very ill-defended compared to Scapa.

(Action this day.) Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary.

5.IX.40.

Would it not be well to send a telegram to Lord Lothian expressing War Cabinet approval of the manner in which he handled the whole destroyer question, and paying him a compliment?

At the same time, what is being done about getting our twenty motor torpedo-boats, the five P.B.Y. [Flying-boats], the hundred and fifty to two hundred aircraft, and the two hundred and fifty thousand rifles, also anything else that is going? I consider we were promised all the above, and more too. Not an hour should be lost in raising these questions. “Beg while the iron is hot.”

(Action this day.) Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War and C.I.G.S.

8.IX.40.

I am very pleased with this telegram [about the Cavalry Division in Palestine], It has been heartbreaking to me to watch these splendid units fooled away for a whole year. The sooner they form machine-gun battalions, which can subsequently be converted into motor battalions, and finally into armoured units, the better. Please let nothing stand in the way. It is an insult to the Scots Greys and Household Cavalry to tether them to horses at the present time. There might be something to be said for a few battalions of infantry or cavalrymen mounted on ponies for the rocky hills of Palestine, but these historic Regular regiments have a right to play a man’s part in the war. I hope I may see your telegram approving this course before it goes.

Prime Minister to First Lord.

9.IX.40.

I have read your papers on the new programme. I understand you are going to redraft your Memorandum after reading the one 1 presented to the Cabinet in March. I am not content at all with the refusal to reconstruct the Royal Sovereign class.⁹ I think these should have precedence over all battleships, except those which can finish by the end of 1942. This would mean that you could get on with the Howe, the position of the other five capital ships being considered next year when the time for presenting the navy estimates comes. I see no reason why work should not proceed on the aircraft-carrier Indefatigable, and on the eight suspended cruisers. I am quite ready to approve the refilling of all slips vacated by anti-submarine craft, provided that a maximum limit of fifteen months is assigned to the completion of all new craft. All very large-size destroyers taking over this period to build must be excluded from the emergency wartime programme.

After your final proposals are ready we can have a conference.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

9.IX.40.

1. The prime defence of Singapore is the Fleet. The protective effect of the Fleet is exercised to a large extent whether it is on the spot or not. For instance, the present Middle Eastern Fleet, which we have just power fully reinforced, could in a very short time, if ordered, reach Singapore. It could, if necessary, fight an action before reaching Singapore, because it would find in that fortress fuel, ammunition, and repair facilities. The fact that the Japanese had made landings in Malaya and had even begun the siege of the fortress would not deprive a superior relieving fleet of its power. On the contrary, the plight of the besiegers, cut off from home while installing themselves in the swamps and jungle, would be all the more forlorn.

2. The defence of Singapore must, therefore, be based upon a strong local garrison and the general potentialities of sea-power. The idea of trying to defend the Malay peninsula and of holding the whole of Malaya, a large country four hundred by two hundred miles at its widest part, cannot be entertained. A single division, however well supplied with signals, etc., could make no impression upon such a task. What could a single division do for the defence of a country nearly as large as England?

3. The danger of a rupture with Japan is no worse than it was. The probabilities of the Japanese undertaking an attack upon Singapore, which would involve so large a proportion of their Fleet far outside the Yellow Sea, are remote; in fact, nothing could be more foolish from their point of view. Far more attractive to them are the Dutch East Indies. The presence of the United States Fleet in the Pacific must always be a main preoccupation to Japan. They are not at all likely to gamble. They are usually most cautious, and now have real need to be, since they are involved in China so deeply.

4. I should have preferred the Australian Brigade to go to India rather than Malaya, but only because their training in India will fit them more readily for the Middle East. I am delighted to know they can be trained in the Middle East.

5. I do not, therefore, consider that the political situation is such as to require the withholding of the 7th Australian Division from its best station strategically and administratively. A telegram should be drafted to the Commonwealth Government in this sense.

Prime Minister to the Mayor of Tel Aviv, Palestine.

15.IX.40.

Please accept my deep sympathy in losses sustained by Tel Aviv in recent air attack. This act of senseless brutality will only strengthen our united resolve.

Prime Minister to First Lord.

15.IX.40.

l Your new programme. I am very doubtful whether the Japanese figures are correct. The Naval Intelligence Branch are very much inclined to exaggerate Japanese strength and efficiency. I am not, however, opposed to the resumption of the battleship programme, provided it can be fitted in with more immediate wartime needs. Much of the battleship plant and labour would not be useful for other purposes. Pray let me have a paper showing the demands these ships would make in each year they are under construction, in money, steel, and labour. Every effort must be concentrated upon Howe.

2. I should be content if two R. [Royal Sovereign] class vessels were taken in hand as soon as the invasion situation has cleared and we get King George V in commission. Meanwhile, material can be collected and preparations made. This should enable them to be ready in eighteen months from now – i.e., the summer of 1942.

3. You should press on with Indefatigable, but we need not consider an additional aircraft-carrier until early next year. The drawings can, however, be completed.

4. I suppose you realise that the Belfast type take over three years to build. Considering a large programme of cruisers is already under construction, I hope you will not press for these four to be added to the programme of this year.

5. I am all for building destroyers, and I do not mind how large they are, or how great their endurance, provided that they can be constructed in fifteen months. This should be taken as the absolute limit, to which everything else must be made to conform. We were making destroyers which took three years to build, everyone thinking himself very clever in adding one improvement after another. I should like to discuss the destroyer designs with the Controller and the Director of Naval Construction. They must be built only for this war, and have good protection from aircraft. Extreme speed is not so important. What you say about the U-boats working continually farther west is no doubt true, but the corvettes, formerly called whalers, have very fine endurance and range.

6. The submarine programme is already very large, and makes inroads on other forms of war requirements. I think you would be wise to re-examine the demand for the fourteen additional to the twenty-four to which the Treasury have agreed.

7. Great efforts should be made to produce the landing-craft as soon as possible. Are the Joint Planning Committee satisfied that these numbers are sufficient?

8. I am surprised you ask for only fifty anti-E-boats. Unless this is the utmost limit of your capacity, one hundred would be more appropriate.

9. Speaking generally, the speed of construction and early dates of completion must at this time be considered the greatest virtues in new building. It is no use crowding up the order books of firms and filling the yards with shipping orders which everyone knows cannot be completed. You have, I presume, consulted Sir James Lithgow about this programme, and have heard his views upon the consequences it will have upon merchant-shipping building and our already reduced steel output. It is very wrong to trench too deeply upon the needs of other services in time of war.

10. What has happened to the armoured torpedo ram which I asked the D.N.C. to design?

Prime Minister to Colonel Jacob.

15.IX.40.

More than a year ago it was considered possible that we should soon be able to develop Radar inland. Since then, however, we have relied entirely on the Observer Corps. These have done splendid work; but in cloudy weather like yesterday and today they have the greatest difficulty in functioning accurately. If we could have even half a dozen stations which could work inland, I am assured that very great advantages would be reaped in interception. This is especially important over the Sheerness-Isle of Wight promontory, which is likely to be the main line of air attack on London. I am told that there are duplicate installations already at some of the stations on this sector of the coast as an insurance against bombing. These might be turned round and put in action. In other cases new stations could be made. I regard this matter as of the highest urgency.

2. Tomorrow, Monday, Air Marshal Joubert de la Ferté will assemble all necessary scientific authorities and make a report that day to me on (a) the desirability of the above, (b) its practicability and the time it will lake to get even a few stations into action. He should make proposals for putting into service at the earliest moment six or twelve stations, and for rebuilding their reserves.

3. Should a feasible scheme emerge, I will myself bring it before the Minister of Aircraft Production.

Prime Minister to General Sikorski.

17.IX.40.

I deeply appreciated your telegram of September 14 conveying the relief felt by the Polish Government, the Polish armed forces, and the Polish people at the fortunate escape of the King and Queen from the recent German bombing of Buckingham Palace. As Their Majesties stated, these dastardly attacks have only strengthened the resolution of all of us to fight through to final victory.

Prime Minister to Home Secretary.

18.IX.40.

The enemy will try by magnetic mines and other devices to smash as much glass as possible, and the winter is coining on. We must immediately revert to more primitive conditions in regard to daylight in dwellings. All glass in the country should be held, and every effort made to increase the supply. Everyone should be encouraged or pressed to reduce window-glass to at least one-quarter of its present compass, keeping the rest as spare. Windows should be filled as may be most convenient with plywood or other fabric, and the spare panes kept to replace breakages to be preserved. The quicker this can be done in the target centres the better. Will you convene a meeting of the departments concerned and reach decisions for action of a violent character and on the broadest lines, inviting me to assist you in suppressing obstruction?

Prime Minister to Home Secretary.

19.IX.40.

I sent you a Minute on this subject last night, and you were going to look into it for me.

How many square feet of glass have been destroyed up to date? Can any estimate be formed? It, of course, our monthly production is ahead of the damage there is no need to worry.

Let me have the best estimate possible.

Prime Minister to Postmaster-General.

19.IX.40.

There are considerable complaints about the Post Office service during air raids. Perhaps you will give me a report on what you are doing.

Prime Minister to C.I.G.S.

21.IX.40.

I understood that all brigades from India consisted of one British and three Indian battalions, which would be the normal and desirable formation. But this telegram seems to suggest that Indian brigades have only Indian troops. H so the change made by C.-in-C. Middle East is most desirable.

Prime Minister to First Sea Lord and Controller.

21.IX.40.

How is the expenditure of naval ammunition proceeding in the Middle East, as well as in the North Sea and Channel? Let me know of any weak points in the supplies which are emerging. Have you got over the difficulty of the 4.7 ammunition? Let me have a short note.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air.

21.IX.40.

Pray have a look at the Air Ministry communique issued in this morning’s papers. It includes the following: “The enemy formations were engaged by our fighters, but cloud conditions made interception difficult. Reports so far received show that four enemy aircraft were shot down. Seven of. our fighters have been lost, the pilots of three being safe.” It is very unwise to let the Germans know that their new tactics have been successful and that they resulted in our losing seven fighters as against tour.

We do not, of course, want to conceal our losses, at the present time when we are prospering, but surely there is no need to relate them to any particular action.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

22.IX.40.

Make sure through every channel that all arrangements are made to bring these rifles [from U.S.A.] over at full speed. They must be distributed in at least four fast ships. Could not some of them come by passenger liner? Let me know what Admiralty can do. Make sure there is no delay at Purco’s [Purchasing Commission] end through repacking as described by General Strong, U.S.A.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.

22.IX.40.

I asked Lord Lothian to speak to you about our remaining desiderata. The 250,000 rifles are most urgently needed, as I have 250,000 trained and uniformed men into whose hands they can be put. I should be most grateful if you could arrange the necessary release. Every arrangement will be made to transport them with the utmost speed. They will enable us to take 250,000 .303 rifles from the Home Guard and transfer them to the Regular Army, leaving the Home Guard armed with about 800,000 American rifles. Even if no ammunition is available, these rifles will be none the less useful, as they can draw upon the stock which has already reached us.

Prime Minister to General de Gaulle.

22.IX.40.

From every quarter the presence of General Catroux was demanded in Syria. I therefore took the responsibility in your name of inviting the General to go there. It is, of course, perfectly understood that he holds his position only from you, and I shall make this clear to him again. Sometimes one has to take decisions on the spot because of their urgency and difficulty of explaining to others at a distance. There is time to stop him still if you desire it, but I should consider this was a very unreasonable act.

All good fortune in your enterprise tomorrow morning.

Prime Minister to Minister of Supply.

23.IX.40.

I regard the production of G.L. sets ¹⁰ as of prime importance, and every step should be taken to accelerate output. I understand that the chief difficulty at the moment is that of obtaining the skilled labour required, and I wish everything possible to be done to meet this requirement. Speed is vital.

{Action this day.) Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War and C.I.G.S.

23.IX.40.

There is not much in the report referred to, and what there is applies equally to the Soudan. We are piling up troops and artillery in Kenya which are urgently needed in the Soudan.

With regard to what you say about the vast strategical front of the Kenya operation: if we lie back on the broad-gauge railway from Mombasa to the lake, we have a lateral line of communication incomparably superior to any line by which we can be approached, and it should be possible to move our forces so as to have sudden superior strength at the point where the enemy advance develops. Although no one can say for certain where the enemy’s blow will fall, I am convinced that the true disposition would economise [troops] to the utmost in Kenya in order to reinforce the Soudan. The one concession which is needed for Kenya is about ten cruiser tanks. If these were put on suitable vehicles on the railway, they could strike with deadly effect, and with surprise, at any Italian movement. But the mere piling-up of guns and brigades is a most painful process to watch.

In order to raise these points, I must ask that the move of the mountain battery from Aden to Kenya shall be held up, and that instead the question of moving it or another battery to the Soudan shall be considered. Please let me have a statement showing ration, rifle, machine-gun, and artillery strength of all troops in Kenya.

Prime Minister to Captain, H.M. Destroyer “Churchill.”

25.IX.40.

Am delighted that your ship should be named after the great Duke of Marlborough, and I am sending you one of his handwritten letters for your Ward Room for luck. Thank you so much for your kind message.

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary.

25.IX.40.

Lord Lothian’s proposal to return for a flying visit appeals to me. Pray authorise it, and arrange it as you think most serviceable and convenient.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee.

26.IX.40.

If these facts [about the use of the blind beam for bombing] are accurate they constitute a deadly danger, and one of the first magnitude. I expect the Chiefs of the Staff to use all the resources at their disposal and to give me a report by tomorrow night (a) upon the reality of the danger, (b) upon the measures to counter it. In making any recommendation for action the Chiefs of the Staff may be sure that the highest priorities and all other resources will be at their disposal.

Prime Minister to Home Secretary.

26.IX.40.

The composition hat for air raids which Mr. Bevin is promoting seems to me of the utmost importance, and if it gives a measure of protection against falling splinters, etc., it should certainly be mass-produced on a great scale, and eventually made a full issue.

Pray let me have a report today on the experimental aspect, and in conjunction with the Minister of Supply let me have estimates for production.

Prime Minister to Minister of Labour.

26.IX.40.

I was delighted with your hat, and something on these lines should certainly be mass-produced as soon as possible for issue pending steel hats. I think it is a mistake to call it a “rag hat,” as I see is done in some of the papers today. I hope you will think of some better name.

I am calling for a full report today from the Home Secretary.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air and C.A.S.

26.IX.40.

Considering that everything depends upon Lord Beaverbrook’s success in obtaining the supply of aircraft, and the heavy blows he is receiving at Bristol, Southampton, and elsewhere, I earnestly trust you will see that his wishes are met fully and immediately in the matter of these spares.

Prime Minister to Minister of Agriculture.

26.IX.40.

I am far from satisfied at the proposal to reduce pigs to one-third of their present number by the middle of the autumn. This is certainly not what was understood by the Cabinet. Why do you not ask for a greater proportion of feeding-stuffs in the imports? We could then see what, if anything, had to give way to it. Meanwhile, what arrangements are you making for curing the surplus bacon that will come upon the market through the massacre of pigs? What increases have you been able to establish in the pig population by encouraging people to feed individual pigs from household refuse?

Prime Minister to Minister of Supply.

28.IX.40.

Recent air raids have shown that the production of certain vital munitions, and particularly De Wilde ammunition, has been concentrated in one factory, with the result that output has been seriously curtailed by one successful raid. Pray let me have a report on the distribution of the production of every important key munition. It will then be possible to assess the danger of serious reductions in output and to consider what can be done to distribute the risk more widely.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee.

28.IX.40.

1. These two papers [about the supply of material for chemical warfare] cause me great anxiety. I had understood that Randle [factory] had been working at full capacity as a result of the orders given by the War Cabinet on October 13, 1939 – i.e., almost exactly a year -ago. What is the explanation of the neglect to fulfil these orders, and who is responsible for it?

2. Secondly, it appears that practically no steps have been taken to make projectiles or containers, either for air or artillery to discharge these various forms of gas. The programme now set out would clearly take many months before any results are realised. Let me have an immediate report on this. The highest priority must be given. I regard the danger as very great.

3. Thirdly, the possibility of our having to retaliate on the German civil population must be studied, and on the largest scale possible. We should never begin, but we must be able to reply. Speed is vital here.

4. Fourthly, instant measures should be taken to raise Randle to full production, and above all to disperse the existing stock.

5. What are the actual amounts in stock?

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

29.IX.40.

These figures [about A.A. fire, first year of war] are encouraging. You should ask General Pile, however, to send in the account for September.

I should like to see a return of the ammunition fired every twenty-four hours during September as soon as possible.

(Action this day.) Prime Minister to Minister of Supply and President of the Board of Trade.

30.IX.40.

I am sure we ought to increase our steel purchases from the United States so as to save tonnage on ore. 1 should like to buy another couple of million tons, in various stages of manufacture. Then we should be able to resume the plan of the Anderson shelters, and various other steel requirements which press upon us. 1 would if necessary telegraph to the President.

OCTOBER

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary.

4.X.40.

This shows the very serious misconception which has grown up in this Ambassador’s mind about the consequences of the United States entering the war. He should surely be told forthwith that the entry of the United States into war, either with Germany and Italy or with Japan, is fully conformable with British interests.

2. That nothing in the munitions sphere can compare with the importance of the British Empire and the United States being co-belligerents. That if Japan attacked the United States without declaring war on us, we should at once range ourselves at the side of the United States and declare war upon Japan.

It is astonishing how this misleading Kennedy ¹¹ stud, that we should do better with a neutral United States than with her warring at our side, should have travelled so far. A clear directive is required to all our Ambassadors in countries concerned.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War.

9.X.40.

… Anyone can see that aircraft are needed in the Middle East. What is not so easy is whether they can be spared here. Remember that we are still vastly inferior in numbers, both of fighters and bombers, to the German air forces, and that heavy losses have been sustained by our air production. The Chief of the Air Staff and Secretary of State must be asked for a precise recommendation.

Prime Minister to General de Gaulle.

10.X.40.

I have received your telegram with great pleasure, and I send my best wishes to you and to all other Frenchmen who are resolved to fight on with us. We shall stand resolutely together until all obstacles have been overcome and we share in the triumph of our cause.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee.

12.X.40.

This development of Radar with German long-range coastal batteries is serious. We have for a long time been on the track of this device, and I drew attention to it some weeks ago. I was then told that it had to have a low priority because of other even more urgent needs. Perhaps it may now be possible to bring it forward. Evidently it will turn night into day so far as defence against sea bombardment is concerned.

Pray see if some proposals can be made without injury to other radio projects.

Prime Minister to C.I.G.S.

13.X.40.

There are great disadvantages in stationing many British troops on the West African coast. In view of the altered situation, pray consider bringing one of the West African brigades back from Kenya by one of the convoys returning empty. This should not add in any way to shipping burdens.

Prime Minister to Sir James Grigg.

13.X.40.

A hot discussion is raging in the A.T.S. about whether members who marry should, if they wish, be allowed to quit. Nearly everyone is in favour of this. It seems futile to forbid them, and if they desert there is no means of punishing them. Only the most honourable are therefore impeded. Pray let me have, on one sheet of paper, a note on this showing the pros and cons.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

14.X.40.

Let a report be prepared on two sheets only showing what are the possibilities of Germany developing the munitions industries, especially aircraft, of the countries she has overrun, and when these evil effects are likely to become manifest.

Prime Minister to First Lord.

15.X.40.

If you wish to circulate the Naval Staff paper ¹² of October 13, which I have now read, I do not demur. It is, of course, a most pessimistic and nervous paper which it is very depressing to receive from the Admiralty. Instances of the overdrawn character of the paper are found in paragraph 3, which claims that we must maintain “general control in every sea,” whereas effective power of passage is all we require in many cases. And in paragraph 5, “German strength, in which from now onward [October 15] must be counted the Tirpitz and the Bismarck.” This is not true, as even the Bismarck has, I suppose, to work up, like the King George V, which should be ready as soon, or earlier. The Tirpitz is three months behind the Bismarck, according to every statement I have received, and it is hoped by that time we shall have the Prince of Wales and Queen Elizabeth. If such statements are made to the Cabinet, I should be forced to challenge them.

2. The whole argument is meant to lead up to the idea that we must submit to the wishes of Vichy because they have the power to drive us out of Gibraltar by bombing. I fully share the desire of the Naval Staff not to be molested in Gibraltar, but I do not think that the enforcement of the blockade will lead the French to do this, still less to declare war upon us. I do not believe the Vichy Government has the power to wage war against us, as the whole French nation is coming more and more onto our side. I have dealt with this in a Minute on general policy which is being circulated, and of which I enclose you the relevant extract.

3. The redeeming point in this paper is the suggestion that we should tell the Vichy Government that if they bomb Gibraltar we shall retaliate not against, say, Casablanca, but Vichy, to which I would add, or any other place occupied by the Vichy Government. This is the proper note to strike, and it is also important to bear in mind that while humbleness to Vichy will not necessarily prevent them being ordered to make war upon us by their German masters, a firm attitude will not necessarily deter them from coming over to our side.

These questions are not urgent because of the failure to intercept Primaguet.¹³

Prime Minister to C.A.S.

18.X.40.

What arrangements have we got for blind landings for aircraft? How many aircraft are so fitted? It ought to be possible to guide them down quite safely, as commercial craft were done before the war in spite of fog. Let me have full particulars. The accidents last night are very serious.

Prime Minister to C.I.G.S.

19.X.40.

I was very much pleased last week when you told me you proposed to give an armoured division to Major-General Hobart.¹⁴ I think very highly of this officer, and I am not at all impressed by the prejudices against him in certain quarters. Such prejudices attach frequently to persons of strong personality and original view. In this case General Hobart’s original views have been only too tragically borne out. The neglect by the General Staff even to devise proper patterns of tanks before the war has robbed us of all the fruits of this invention. These fruits have been reaped by the enemy, with terrible consequences. We should, therefore, remember that this was an officer who had the root of the matter in him and also vision.

In my Minute last week to you I said I hoped you would propose to me the appointment that day, i.e., Tuesday, but at the latest this week. Will you very kindly make sure that the appointment is made at the earliest moment.

Since making this Minute I have carefully read your note to me and the summary of the case for and against General Hobart. We are now at war, fighting for our lives, and we cannot afford to confine Army appointments to persons who have excited no hostile comment in their career. The catalogue of General Hobart’s qualities and defects might almost exactly have been attributed to most of the great commanders of British history. Marlborough was very much the conventional soldier, carrying with him the good will of the Service. Cromwell, Wolfe, Clive, Gordon, and, in a different sphere, Lawrence, all had very close resemblance to the characteristics set down as defects. They had other qualities as well, and so I am led to believe has General Hobart. This is a time to try men of force and vision and not to be exclusively confined to those who are judged thoroughly safe by conventional standards.

I hope, therefore, you will not recoil from your proposal to me of a week ago, for I think your instinct in this matter was sound and true.

Prime Minister to C.I.G.S.

19.X.40.

Are there no younger men available for this strenuous administrative appointment? [Director-General Home Guard.] The bringing back of retired officers for posts like these causes much criticism, both in and out of Service circles. Why not try to find a man still in the forties, and give him temporary rank?

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee.

19.X.40.

In view of the forecasts of small-arms ammunition, and the very great improvement in our position which will be effected from the factories coming into bearing in October, and the expanding output expected before March 31, 1941, and having regard to the fact that unless there is an invasion no operations are possible except in the Middle East, and then only on a comparatively moderate scale, I am of opinion that a very much larger issue may be made now to the Commander-in-Chief Home Forces for practice. I understand he has only two million rounds a week for this purpose, and that training is grievously hampered in consequence. Although it seems a risk to deplete our small War Office reserve, I think it should be considered whether, from November 1 onward, the amount issued for practice should not be doubled – i.e., four million a week. I shall be glad if you will consult the Chiefs of Staff immediately.¹⁵

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

20.X.40.

1. When was the last meeting of the Commanders-in-Chief, Naval, Air. and Military? Was it not found very useful? Who attended it?

I should be willing to preside over such a meeting in the course of the next week or so.

2. Let me have a plan for the imparting of more information about our war policy to these very high officers.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air and C.A.S.

20.X.40.

I am deeply concerned with the non-expansion, and indeed contraction, of our bomber force which must be expected between now and April or May next, according to present policy. Surely an effort should be made to increase our bomb-dropping capacity during this period. In moon light periods the present arrangements for bombing are the best possible, and the only difficulty is our small numbers compared to the many attractive military targets. On no account should the limited bomber force be diverted from accurate bombing of military objectives reaching far into Germany. But is it not possible to organise a second line bomber force, which, especially in the dark of the moon, would discharge bombs from a considerable and safe height upon the nearest large built-up areas of Germany, which contain military targets in abundance. The Ruhr, of course, is obviously indicated. The object would be to find easy targets, short runs, and safe conditions.

How is such a second line or auxiliary bomber force to be improvised during the winter months? Could not crews from the training schools do occasional runs? Are none of the Lysander and reconnaissance pilots capable of doing some of this simpler bombing, observing that the Army is not likely to be in action unless invasion occurs? I ask that a whole-hearted effort shall be made to cart a large number of bombs into Germany by a second line organisation such as I have suggested, and under conditions in which admittedly no special accuracy would be obtained. Pray let me have the best suggestions possible, and we can then see whether they are practical or not.

How is it that so few of our bombers are fitted with blind landing appliances? M.A.P. tells me that a number of Lorenz equipments are available. The grievous losses which occurred one day last week ought not to be repeated. Not only do the bombers need the blind landing facilities (which have been used in commercial aviation for years), but also if fighter aircraft are to operate by night, as they must increasingly, such aircraft must also be furnished with the means of making safe landings. Pray let me have your observations.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air and C.A.S.

20.X.40.

In connection with the plans now being developed for night fighting, not only by individual Aircraft Interception fitted machines, but by eight-inch fighter squadrons, it is worth considering whether in any area where our fighters are operating and the guns have to remain out of action, these guns should not fire blank charges. This would (a) confuse the enemy by the flashing on the ground, and tend to make him less aware of the impending fighter attacks – it would thus have a strictly military reason; (b) it would make a noise to drown the approach of our attacking fighters, and also to avoid discouraging silence for the population. It would not be legitimate to fire blank merely for the second purpose, but if there is a military reason the objection disappears.

Prime Minister to C.I.G.S.

20.X.40.

I am concerned by the very low state of equipment of the Polish troops, whose military qualities have been proved so high. I hope to inspect them on Wednesday this week.

Pray let me have during Monday the best proposals possible for equipping them. I am most anxious they should not become disheartened.

(Action this day.) Prime Minister to Secretary, War Office.

20.X.40.

It is impossible to take away steel helmets from “the Home Guard in Government offices.” Four were killed outside Downing Street on Thursday night. Whitehall is as heavily bombed as any part of the country. It will be difficult to take helmets away from anyone to whom they have been issued. I am astonished to see that the Army is aiming at three million helmets. I was not aware that we had three million men. Let me have a full return of all steel helmets in possession of the Regular Army, showing the different branches, i.e., whether field army or training or holding battalions, etc., or in store….

Prime Minister to C.I.G.S., Sir James Grigg.

21.X.40.

This very lengthy report by General Irwin ¹⁶ on how he was carried out to Freetown and back emphasises all the difficulties of the operation in which he was concerned. He foresaw all the difficulties beforehand, and the many shortcomings in the preparations. He certainly felt throughout that he was plunged into the midst of a grave and hazardous undertaking on political rather than military grounds. All this makes it the more surprising that he should have wished to persist in this operation, with all its defects and dangers, of which he was so acutely conscious, after these had been so formidably aggravated by the arrival through a naval failure of the French cruisers and reinforcements in Dakar, and in the teeth of the considered opinion of the War Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff that conditions had now so changed as to make the original plan impossible. However, any error towards the enemy and any evidence of a sincere desire to engage must always be generously judged. This officer was commanding a division very ably before he was selected for the expedition, and I see no reason why he should not resume these duties now that he has returned. He would make a mistake, however, if he assumed either (a) that no enterprise should be launched in war for which lengthy preparation had not been made, observing that even in this connection twenty-five Frenchmen took Duala, and with it the Cameroons, or (b) that ships can in no circumstance engage forts with success. This might well be true in the fog conditions which so unexpectedly and unnaturally descended upon Dakar; but it would not necessarily be true of the case where the ships’ guns could engage the forts at ranges to which the forts could not reply, or where the gunners in the forts were frightened, inefficient, or friendly to the attacking force.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for the Colonies. [Lord Lloyd].

21.X.40.

I am afraid I have been some time in studying your notes on the African continent, and its strategic and political dangers in the present war. I should deprecate setting up a special committee. We are overrun by them, like the Australians were by the rabbits. I see no reason to assume that we shall be at war with Vichy France or Spain, or that the South African position will develop dangerously. I should have thought that you would be able, with your own military experience and political knowledge, to gather such officials of the Colonial Office as you may need around you, and prepare yourself any reports you may think it right to present to the Defence Committee or the War Cabinet. If, however, you feel the need of being associated with a committee, I suggest that the Middle East Ministerial Committee take on the agenda you have outlined as an addition to their present sphere.

P.S. – I am trying to move one of the West African brigades back from Kenya to the West Coast.

(Action this day.) Prime Minister to Minister of Information and Sir Alexander Cadogan.

24.X.40.

Sir Walter Citrine leaves this country shortly for the United States on a mission from the Trade Union Congress to American labour. He is a man of exceptional qualities and consequence, and is a Privy Councillor. He should certainly have a diplomatic status conferred upon him which will facilitate his movements. The T.U.C. are paying all his expenses in connection with the purely Labour side of the business, but I think that any expenses he may incur in work useful in the national interest should be defrayed by the Ministry of Information. Perhaps the Minister would look into this and see what can be done. In any case, Sir Walter should be treated with the greatest consideration, as I am sure we can count on his entire loyalty and discretion.

NOVEMBER

Prime Minister to C.A.S.

1.XI.40.

How is it that when we have five hundred and twenty crews available for bombing operations, and only five hundred and seven aircraft similarly available, we do not draw on the aircraft storage units, where a large number are awaiting use?

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air.

1.XI.40.

Let me have, on not more than two sheets of paper, an analysis of the German aviators taken prisoner of war since July 1, showing numbers, ages, amount of training, etc., distinguishing between bomber and fighter prisoners. Any other information about them would be welcome.

Prime Minister to First Sea Lord.

6.XI.40.

Although 1 feel sceptical about the pocket battleship going to Lorient, the Air Force should be thinking of attacking him there at the earliest moment and should be warned now. If he goes to Lorient, he runs a chance of being caught by you on the way in, bombed while he is there, and caught again on the way out. There is only one way in and out of Lorient. Very different is his position at Kiel, where he can come out via the Heligoland Bight or through the Skagerrak or sneak up the Norwegian Corridor to Trondhjem. f would much rather see him go to Lorient than break south or stay out on the Atlantic route or go back one side or the other of Iceland.

If he continues preying on the trade, you ought to be able to bring him to action.

On further reflection I agree it is better our two heavy ships should stay in the north.

These notes are only for your consideration.

Prime Minister to C.I.G.S.

6.XI.40.

You impressed upon me how important it was to have a first-rate man in charge of the Home Guard, and what a compliment to them it would be if the former Chief of the Staff in France was chosen; so General Pownall was appointed. But a few weeks later I was astonished to learn he was to go to America on the mission now discharged by General Pakenham-Walsh. With some difficulty I stopped this change. However, a little later Pownall was sent to Ireland. Whereas I suppose he would have done very well for the Home Guard, just as he got to know his job and men were beginning to look to him, he was whisked off to something else, and General Eastwood took his place. This is, I think, only a month ago. However, I dutifully set myself to work to make General Eastwood’s acquaintance, and I suppose so did the principal officers of the Home Guard, f formed a favourable opinion of him, particularly on account of his age, which is under fifty. I suppose he has been working very hard for the month, trying to learn his immense new task, and he certainly had begun to speak about it with knowledge. Now you propose to me to send him away, and to appoint a third new figure, all in four months.

All these rapid changes are contrary to the interests of the Service, and open to the most severe criticism. I am not prepared to agree to dismiss General Eastwood from the Home Guard command. If you wish to set up this Directorate-General, he must have it, so far as I am concerned. However, the Secretary of State will be back in two days, if all goes well, and I am sending a copy of this Minute to him. I shall still expect to be consulted.

Prime Minister to C.A.S.

6.XI.40.

Last night at least seven of our planes crashed on landing or were lost. The slow expansion of the bomber force is, as you know, a great anxiety to me. If bombing in this bad weather is imposing altogether undue risks and losses on the pilots, the numbers might be slacked down in order to accumulate our strength while at the same time keeping various objectives alive.

Prime Minister to Sir Edward Bridges.

8.XI.40.

Many of the executive departments naturally have set up and developed their own statistical branches, but there appears to be a separate statistical branch attached to the Ministerial Committee on Production, and naturally the Ministry of Supply’s statistical branch covers a very wide field. I have my own statistical branch under Professor Lindemann.

It is essential to consolidate and make sure that agreed figures only are used. The utmost confusion is caused when people argue on different statistical data. I wish all statistics to be concentrated in my own branch as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, from which alone the final authoritative working statistics will issue. The various departmental statistical branches will, of course, continue as at present, but agreement must be reached between them and the Central Statistical Office.

Pray look into this, and advise me how my wish can be most speedily and effectively achieved.

Prime Minister to Minister of Transport.

8.XI.40.

Let me know what progress has been made in breaking up the queues, and in bringing vehicles into service. With the earlier black-out it must be very hard on many.

Prime Minister to First Sea Lord.

9.XI.40.

Please let me have a report on the improvements of the Asdic and hydrophone technique which have been made in the last year.

Prime Minister to Minister of Transport.

9.XI.40.

Preliminary inspection seems to indicate that the time of turn round in ports has increased in recent months rather than the reverse. This is probably due to the concentration of traffic on a few west coast ports. Are the delays caused by inadequate port facilities or by difficulties in clearing the goods from the docks? Have you a scheme to exploit to the full our large resources of road transport if the railways prove inadequate to deal with these special problems?

Prime Minister to C.A.S.

10.XI.40.

Altogether, broadly speaking, one thousand aircraft and seventeen thousand air personnel in the Middle East provide thirty and one-half squadrons, with a total initial equipment of three hundred and ninety-five operational types, of which it is presumed three hundred are ready for action on any date. Unhappily, out of sixty-five Hurricanes, only two squadrons (apart from Malta) are available. These are the only modern aircraft, unless you count the Blenheim IV’s. All the rest of this enormous force is armed with obsolete or feeble machines. The process of replacement should, therefore, be pressed to the utmost, and surely it should be possible to utilise all this skilled personnel of pilots and ground staff to handle the new machines. Therefore “remounting” the Eastern Air Force ought not in principle to require more personnel, except where new types are more complicated. However, as part of the reinforcements now being sent – i.e., four Wellington and four Hurricane squadrons – we are sending over three thousand additional personnel.

In the disparity between the great mass of men and numbers of aircraft on charge, and the fighting product constantly available, which is painfully marked both here and at home, lies the waste of R.A.F. resources. What is the use of the six hundred machines which are not even included in the initial equipment of the thirty squadrons? No doubt some can be explained as training, communication, and transport. But how is it that out of seven hundred and thirty-two operational types only three hundred and ninety-five play any part in the fighting?

I hope that a most earnest effort will be made to get full value for men, material, and money out of this very large force, first, by remounting, second, by making more squadrons out of the large surplus of machines not formed in squadrons, third, by developing local O.T.U.’s or other training establishments.

Prime Minister to Minister of Health.

10.XI.40.

I see your total of homeless is down by one thousand five hundred this week to about ten thousand. Please let me know how many new you had in, and how many former went out. With such a small number as ten thousand, you ought to be able to clean this up if you have another light week.

What is the average time that a homeless person remains at a rest centre?

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air.17

10.XI.40.

There is a shelter at Chequers which gives good protection from lateral damage. There is the household to consider. Perhaps you will have the accommodation inspected.

The carriage drive is being turfed.

I cannot bear to divert Bofors from the fighting positions. What about trying a few rockets, which are at present only in an experimental stage?

I am trying to vary my movements a little during the moonlight intervals. It is very good of you and your Ministry to concern yourselves with my safety.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War.

10.XI.40.

I hope you will look into this yourself. We had the greatest difficulty in carrying these sticky bombs through, and there was every evidence they would not have received fair play had I not gone down myself to see the experiment. Now is the chance to let the Greeks try this method out, and it would seem that it might be very helpful to them.

What is this tale that they are dangerous to pack and handle? They are, of course, despatched without their detonators, and therefore cannot explode.

Prime Minister to Air C.-in-C., Middle East.

12.XI.40.

I am trying every day to speed up the arrivals in your command of Hurricanes, etc. This is especially important in the next three weeks, Pray report daily what you actually receive, and how many you are able to put into action.

I was astonished to find that you have nearly one thousand aircraft and one thousand pilots and sixteen thousand air personnel in the Middle East, excluding Kenya. I am most anxious to re-equip you with modern machines at the earliest moment; but surely out of all this establishment you ought to be able, if the machines are forthcoming, to produce a substantially larger number of modern aircraft operationally fit? Pray report through the Air Ministry any steps you may be able to take to obtain more fighting value from the immense mass of material and men under your command.

I am grieved that the imperative demands of the Greek situation and its vital importance to the Middle East should have disturbed your arrangements at this exceptionally critical time. All good wishes.

Prime Minister to Sir Edward Bridges and General Ismay.

12.XI.40.

The Prime Minister has noticed that the habit of private secretaries and others addressing each other by their Christian names about matters of an official character is increasing, and ought to be stopped. The use of Christian names in inter-departmental correspondence should be confined only to brief explanatory covering notes or to purely personal and private explanations.

It is hard enough to follow people by their surnames.

Prime Minister to Home Secretary.

12.XI.40.

How are you getting on with the comfort of the shelters in the winter – flooring, drainage, and the like? What is being done to bring them inside the houses? I attach the greatest importance to gramophones and wireless in the shelters. How is that going forward? Would not this per haps be a very good subject for the Lord Mayor’s Fund? I should not be surprised if the improved lighting comes up again before many weeks are out, and I hope that the preparations for it will go forward.

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary.

12.XI.40.

We shall certainly have to obtain control of Syria by one means or another in the next few months. The best way would be by a Weygand or a de Gaullist movement, but this cannot be counted on, and until we have dealt with the Italians in Libya we have no troops to spare for a northern venture. On no acount must Italian or Caitiff-Vichy influences become or remain paramount in Syria.

Prime Minister to Lord Beaverbrook.

12.XI.40.

I do not think this could be said without the approval of the Air Ministry, and indeed of the C.O.S. Committee. My own feeling would be against giving these actual figures.¹⁸ They tell the enemy too much. It is like getting one of the tail bones of the ichthyosaurus from which a naturalist can reconstruct the entire animal. The more I think about it, the more I am against it.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air and C.A.S.

15.XI.40.

This amounts to a loss of eleven of our bombers in one night. I said the other day by Minute that the operations were not to be pressed unduly during these very adverse weather conditions. We cannot afford to have losses of this kind in view of your very slow replacements. If you go on like this, you will break the bomber force down to below a minimum for grave emergencies. No results have been achieved which would in any way justify or compensate for these losses. I consider the loss of eleven aircraft out of one hundred and thirty-nine – i.e., about eight per cent – a very grievous disaster at this stage of our bomber development.

Let me have the losses during the first half of November.

Prime Minister to C.A.S.

17.XI.40.

I watch these figures every day with much concern. My diagrams show that we are now not even keeping level, and there is a marked downward turn this week, especially in the Bomber Command. Painful as it is not to be able to strike heavy blows after an event like Coventry, yet I feel we should for the present nurse the Bomber Command a little more. This can be done (1) by not sending so many to each of the necessary objectives, (2) by not coming down too low in the face of heavy prepared batteries and being content with somewhat less accuracy, and (3) by picking out soft spots where there is not too much organised protection, so as to keep up our deliveries of bomb content. There must be unexpecting towns in Germany where very little has been done in air raid precautions and yet where there are military objectives of a minor order. Some of these could be struck at in the meanwhile.

2. I should feel differently about this if our bomber force were above five hundred, and if it were expanding. But, having regard to the uncertainties of war, we must be very careful not to let routine bombing and our own high standards proceed without constant attention to our resources. These remarks do not apply, of course, to Italy, against which the full-scale risk should be run. The wounded Littorio is a fine target.

(Action this day.) Prime Minister to First Lord and First Sea Lord.

18.XI.40.

I was assured that sixty-four destroyers would be available for the northwestern approaches by November 15. This return of Asdic-fitted ships, which goes to November 16, shows sixty. But what is disconcerting is that out of one hundred and fifty-one destroyers only eighty-four are available for service, and out of sixty for the northwestern approaches only thirty-three are available for service. When we held our conference more than a month ago, the Admiral was found with only twenty-four destroyers available, and all that has happened in the month that has passed is that another nine have been added to his available strength. But meanwhile you have had the American destroyers streaming into service, and I was assured that there was a steady output from our own yards. I cannot understand why there has been this serious frustration of decisions so unitedly arrived at, nor why such an immense proportion of destroyers are laid up for one cause or another. Are the repairs falling behind? What has happened to the American destroyers? Are we failing in repairs and new construction?

I should be glad to have a special conference at 10 A.M. on Tuesday at the Admiralty War Room.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for Chiefs of Staff.

18.XI.40.

I am informed that on the night of November 6/7 one of the German K.G. 100 Squadron ¹⁹ came down in the sea near Bridport. This squadron is the one known to be fitted with the special apparatus with which the Germans hope to do accurate night-bombing, using their very fine beams. Vital time was lost during which this aircraft or its equipment might have been salvaged because the Army claimed that it came under their jurisdiction, made no attempt to secure it, and refused to permit the naval authorities to do so.

Pray make proposals to ensure that in future immediate steps are taken to secure all possible information and equipment from German aircraft which come down in this country or near our coasts, and that these rare opportunities are not squandered through departmental differences.

Prime Minister to Prime Minister of New Zealand.

18.XI.40.

Your telegram is being dealt with departmentally. We dwell under a drizzle of carping criticism from a few Members and from writers in certain organs of the press. This has an irritating effect, and would not be tolerated in any other country exposed to our present stresses. On the other hand, it is a good thing that any Government should be kept keen and made aware of any shortcomings in time to remedy them. You must not suppose everything is perfect, but we are all trying our best, and the war effort is enormous and morale admirable. All good wishes.

Prime Minister to Prime Minister of Canada.

20.XI.40.

1. I am most grateful to you for your message and for your very generous offer to afford facilities for a further expansion of the Joint Air Training Plan. 1 am confident that we shall be able to make excellent use of it.

2. A review of the air training requirements in the light of the latest developments is at present in progress, and it is of the utmost value to the War Cabinet in this connection to know that in such further measures as prove to be necessary they can rely on the continuance of the whole-hearted assistance of the Canadian Government, which has already made such a notable contribution to our common effort.

3. As soon as our review is completed, I will let you know, for your consideration, what we think would be the best direction for our further joint efforts.

4. As you mention in your message, any measures for the extension of the Joint Training Plan must form the subject of discussion and agreement between all the Governments concerned. Would you agree to my repeating to the Prime Ministers of the Governments of Australia and New Zealand the text of your message and of this reply, or would you prefer to take this action yourself?

5. Subject to your agreement, we should like to offer a cordial invitation to Air Vice-Marshal Breadner to pay a short visit to this country. Such a visit would be most valuable for the purpose of consultation on many training questions, and would give Air Vice-Marshal Breadner the fullest and most up-to-date information on our plans for the future development of the Air Force.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for the Dominions.

22.XI.40.

I think it would be better to let de Valera stew in his own juice for a while. Nothing could be more harmless or more just than the remarks in the Economist. The claim now put forward on behalf of de Valera is that we are not only to be strangled by them, but to suffer our fate without making any complaint.

Sir John Maffey should be made aware of the rising anger in England and Scotland, and especially among the merchant seamen, and he should not be encouraged to think that his only task is to mollify de Valera and make everything, including our ruin, pass off pleasantly. Apart from this, the less we say to de Valera at this juncture the better, and certainly nothing must be said to reassure him.

Let me see the Parliamentary Questions as they come in.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for the Colonies.

22.XI.40.

As the action has been announced, it must proceed, but the conditions in Mauritius must not involve these people being caged up for the duration of the war. The Cabinet will require to be satisfied about this. Pray make me your proposals.

[Reference: Proposal to ship to Mauritius Jewish refugees who had illegally emigrated to Palestine.]

Prime Minister to First Lord and First Sea Lord. (General Ismay to see.)

22.XI.40.

In my view Admiral Stark is right, and Plan D ²⁰ is strategically sound, and also most highly adapted to our interests. We should, therefore, so far as opportunity serves, in every way contribute to strengthen the policy of Admiral Stark, and should not use arguments inconsistent with it.

2. Should Japan enter the war on one side and the United States on ours, ample naval forces will be available to contain Japan by long-range controls in the Pacific. The Japanese Navy is not likely to venture far from its home bases so long as a superior battle-fleet is maintained at Singapore or at Honolulu. The Japanese would never attempt a siege of Singapore with a hostile, superior American Fleet in the Pacific. The balance of the American Fleet, after providing the necessary force for the Pacific, would be sufficient, with our Navy, to exercise in a very high degree the command of all the seas and oceans except those within the immediate Japanese regions. A strict defensive in the Far East and the acceptance of its consequences is also our policy. Once the Germans are beaten the Japanese would be at the mercy of the combined fleets.

3. I am much encouraged by the American naval view.

Prime Minister to Home Secretary.

23.XI.40.

There seems to be great disparity in these sentences [on A.F.S. men for looting], and I wonder whether any attempt is being made to standardise the punishments inflicted for this very odious crime. Five years’ penal servitude for stealing whisky for immediate consumption seems out of proportion when compared with sentences of three or six months for stealing valuables. Exemplary discipline is no doubt necessary, as people must be made to feel that looting is stealing. Still, I should be glad to know that such cases are being reviewed and levelled out.

Prime Minister to C.I.G.S.

24.XI.40

I sent you today two Foreign Office telegrams from Bucharest and Sofia respectively, which concur in an estimate of thirty thousand Germans, or one full division, as the maximum in Rumania at the present time. In view of this your Intelligence Branch should carefully, review the advice they gave to the effect that there were five divisions in Rumania and that these could be assembled on the Bulgarian-Greek frontier in three or four days. I thought myself that this estimate was altogether too pessimistic, and credited the enemy with a rapidity of movement and a degree of preparedness which were perhaps more serious than the facts. Will you have the whole problem examined most carefully again? I had thought myself that it would be a fortnight before anything serious could happen on the Greek frontier, and that perhaps it might be a month. The great thing is to get the true picture, whatever it is.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, and others concerned.

24.XI.40

This paper shows that we have completely tailed to make cruiser tanks, and that there is no prospect of the present deficiency being made up in the next year. We must therefore equip our armoured divisions in the best possible way open to us in these melancholy circumstances. At this stage in tank production, numbers count above everything else. It is better to have any serviceable tank than none at all. The formation and training of the divisions can proceed, and the quality and character of the vehicles be improved later on. The “I” tank should not be disdained because of its slow speed, and in default of cruisers must be looked upon as our staple for fighting. We must adapt our tactics for the time being to this weapon as we have no other. Meanwhile the production of cruiser tanks and of A. 22 [a new model] must be driven forward to the utmost limit.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

24.XI.40

The full order for the thirty-five thousand vehicles should be placed in the United States without further delay. Meanwhile the inquiry into the scale required by the War Office is to proceed.

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary.

27.XI.40.

I was the author of this plan of pow-wow, but the Greek complication seems to be serious. It will be of enormous advantage to us if Germany delays or shrinks from an attack on Bulgaria through Greece. I should not like those people in Greece to feel that, for the sake of what is after all only a parade, we had pressed them into action which could be cited by Germany as a justification for marching. The only thing to do is to put the meeting off until we can see a little more clearly on this very confused chessboard of Eastern Europe.

I think the Dominions should be told that we are waiting for the Greek situation to define itself more clearly, and that this ought not to take more than a fortnight. I do not think it is necessary to give any reasons to the Allied Governments, except to assure them that the delay will be short.

[Reference: Draft telegram to General Metaxas.]

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

28.XI.40.

It is of no use giving me these reports five days late. The Admiralty know every day exactly the state of the flotillas. I do not know why this matter should go through the War Cabinet or Defence Ministry. Pray tell the Admiralty to send direct to me, every week, the state o£ their flotillas.

I am much concerned that the patrols on the western approaches should only have gone up to thirty effective. Let me see the chart showing previous weeks tomorrow.

Prime Minister to Minister of Labour.

28.XI.40.

I shall be obliged if you will let me know the present unemployment figures, divided into as many categories as is convenient, and compared with (a) how they stood at the outbreak of war, and (b) when the new Government was formed.

Prime Minister to First Sea Lord.

30.XI.40.

It is to me incomprehensible that with the 50 American destroyers coming into service we should not have been able to raise the total serviceable to above 77 by November 23, when they stood at 106 on October 16. What happened between October 16 and October 26 to beat down serviceable destroyers by 28 vessels, and why did they go down from 84 to 77 between November 16 and November 23? – just at the very time when another dozen Americans were coming into service.

Prime Minister to C.-in-C. Home Forces.

30.XI.40.

I have authorised the ringing of church bells on Christmas Day, as the imminence of invasion has greatly receded. Perhaps, however, you will let me know what alternative methods of giving the alarm you would propose to use on that day, and, secondly, what steps would be taken to ensure that the ringing of the bells for church services and without any invasion does not in fact lead to an alarm. There must certainly be no relaxation of vigilance.

DECEMBER

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Dominions. (General Ismay to see for C.O.S. Committee.)

1.XII.40.

All this talk about Atlantic operations and Atlantic islands is most dangerous, and is contrary to the decision to describe such operations as “Shrapnel.” I see no need for these long and pointless telegrams, and it is becoming quite impossible to conduct military operations when everything has to be spread about the Departments and around the world like this.

Kindly give me the assurance that there will be no further discussion of these matters by telegram without my seeing the messages before they are multiplied.

Let me also know exactly the lists of officials and departments to whom these telegrams have been distributed.

(Action this day.) Prime Minister to C-in-C. Mediterranean (Personal and most secret.)

3.XII.40.

Your 270. We considered whole matter this morning with the Director of Combined Operations, Sir Roger Keyes, who will execute it with full control of all forces employed, and final plans are now being prepared by him. His appointment will not be naval, but limited to these combined operations. If necessary he will waive his naval rank. Cannot feel that air counter-attack will be serious having regard to size island, broken character, many houses and detached forts, in which comparatively small attacking force will be inter-mingled with defenders. Enemy aircraft will not know who holds what till all is over, and even then Italian flags may be displayed on soft spots.

2. Capture of “Workshop” ²¹ no doubt a hazard, but Zeebrugge would never have got past scrutiny bestowed on this. Commandos very highly trained, carefully picked volunteers for this kind of work. Weather and fixed date of convoy may of course prevent attempt, in which case whole outfit will go to Malta or Suda for other enterprises. If conditions favorable, nothing will be stinted.

3. Apprehensions you have that A.A. guns, etc., will be diverted from Eastern Mediterranean and new commitment created may be mitigated by capture of enemy A.A., which are numerous. Enemy unlikely attempt recapture, even though garrison left will be small. Commandos will come away after handing over to Regular troops, and be available for further operations.

4. Comparing “Workshop” with other operation you mention, in future called “Mandibles” ²² (repeat “Mandibles”), kindly weigh following considerations.

“Mandibles” requires ten or twelve thousand men and is far larger affair if the two big ones are to be taken. Little ones you mention would stir up all this area without any important reward unless process continued. Secondly, captures in “Mandibles” area would excite keen rivalry of Greeks and Turks, which above all we don’t want now. Thirdly, our reports show “Mandibles” slowly starving, and perhaps we shall get them cheaper later. Apart from the above, trying “Workshop” does not rule out “Mandibles” afterwards, unless ships and landing-craft are lost, which they may be. Also perhaps operations on enemy’s land communications along North African shore may present opportunities.

5. On strategic grounds “Workshop” gives good air command of most used line of enemy communications with Libyan army, and also increased measure air protection for our convoys and transports passing so-called Narrows. Joint Staffs here consider very high value attaches to removal of this obstruction to our East and West communications. Besides all this, we need to show ourselves capable of vehement offensive amphibious action. I call upon you, therefore, to use your utmost endeavours to procure success should conditions be favourable at zero hour.

Prime Minister to Minister of Aircraft Production.

3.XII.40.

The King asked me today whether there was any shortage of instruments for aircraft.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

4.XII.40.

Two searchlights [at Suda Bay] seem very insufficient. What is going to be done to increase them?

2. In view of the torpedoing of the Glasgow by a seaplane while at anchor, ought not ships at anchor to be protected by nets at short range? I gather this was the Italian method at Taranto, but at the moment of the attack they had taken them off. Pray let me have a note on this.

ARMY ORGANISATION

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War.

9.XII.40.

I understand that you are asking for another big call-up shortly. The papers talk about a million men. This forces me to examine the distribution of the men you have. According to your paper, twenty-seven British divisions are credited to Expeditionary Force and Middle East. These divisions are accounted for at 35,000 men each, to cover corps, army and line of communication troops, etc., plus 70,000 security troops in M.E.

2. The approved establishment of a British division at the present time is 15,500 men. It comprises only nine battalions with an establishment of 850, i.e., about 7500. The establishment of all battalions comprises a considerable proportion of servicing elements, and I doubt whether the rifle and machine-gun strength – i.e., fighting strength – amounts to more than 750. Thus the total number of men who actually fight in the infantry of a British division is 6750. This makes the fighting infantry of twenty-seven divisions, in what used to be called bayonet or rifle strength, 182,250. It used to be said that the infantry was “the staple of the Army,” to which all other branches were ancillary. This has certainly undergone some modification under new conditions, but none the less it remains broadly true. The structure of a division is built round its infantry of nine battalions, with a battery to each battalion, the necessary proportion of signallers and sappers, the battalion, brigade, and divisional transport, and some additional elements, the whole being constituted as an integral and self-contained unit of 15,500 men.

3. When we look at the division as a unit, we find that twenty-seven divisions at 15,500 official establishment require no less than 1,015,000 men. This gives an actual burden of 35,000 men for every divisional unit of 15,500 men, the units themselves being already fully self-contained. Nearly 20,000 men have therefore to be accounted for for each division of the E.F. or M.E. over and above the full approved establishment of 15,500.

This great mass, amounting to 540,000, has now to be explained. We are assured that the corps, army, L. of C. troops, etc., plus the 70,000 security troops in the M.E., justify this enormous demand upon the manhood of the nation.

4. One would have thought, if this were conceded, that the process was at an end. On the contrary, it is only just beginning. There still remain nearly two million men to be accounted for, as are set out on the attached table and graph. No one can complain of seven divisions for the Home Field Force, though it is surprising that they should require 24,000 men for divisional establishments of 15,500. This accounts for 170,000 men.

5. A.D.G.B. 500,000 must be submitted to for the present, pending improved methods of dealing with the night-bomber and increased British ascendancy in the air.

6. Two hundred thousand men for the permanent staffs and “unavailable” at training and holding units is a distressing figure, having regard to the great margins already provided. Staffs, static and miscellaneous units, “Y” list, etc., require 150,000 after all the twenty-seven divisions and the seven home divisions have been fully supplied with corps and army troops. Apart from everything necessary to handle an army of twenty-seven divisions and seven home divisions, there is this mass of 350,000 staffs and statics, living well of the nation as heroes in khaki.

7. Compared with the above, overseas garrisons, other than M.E., of 75,000 seems moderate. India and Burma at 35,000 is slender.

8. One hundred and fifty thousand men for the corps, army, and L. of C. troops for divisions other than British requires to be explained in detail. I understand the Australian and New Zealand fortes had supplied a great many of their rearward services. At any rate, I should like to see the exact distribution of this 150,000 in every category behind the divisions which they are expected to serve.

9. The net wastage – 330,000 – is of course a purely speculative figure. But it might well be supplied from the 350,000 permanent staffs, static and other non-availables already referred to.

10. Deducting for the moment the 330,000 men for wastage, which deals with the future up till March, 1942, and 110,000 required for overseas garrisons other than M.E., India, and Burma, we face a total of 2,505,000 required for the aforesaid twenty-seven divisions plus seven home divisions, equal to about 74,000 per division. If the 500,000 for A.D.G.B. is omitted we still have over 2,000,000 men, i.e., nearly 60,000 men mobilised for each of thirty-four divisions.

Before I can ask the Cabinet to assent to any further call-up from the public, it is necessary that this whole subject shall be thrashed out, and that at least a million are combed out of the fluff and flummery behind the fighting troops, and made to serve effective military purposes. We are not doing our duty in letting these great numbers be taken from our civil life and kept at the public expense to make such inconceivably small results in the fighting line.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

9.XII.40.

Let me have a report on the development of the Salvage Section of the Admiralty, showing the work that has been done and what expansions, if any, are contemplated to meet the evergrowing need of repairs rapidly.

(Action this day. Prime Minister to Minister of Works and Buildings (Lord Reith).

9.XII.40.

I am in general agreement with your proposals to set up machinery for the large-scale rebuilding which will be necessary after the war. Perhaps you will discuss with Sir Edward Bridges the best methods of obtaining a decision upon this, i.e., whether by the Home Policy Committee or by the Cabinet.

2. Your most urgent task, however, is to repair existing buildings which are not seriously but only slightly damaged. Sometimes I see a whole row of houses whose windows are blown out, but which are not otherwise damaged, standing for weeks deserted and neglected. Active measures should be taken to replace the tiles and to close up the windows with fabric, with one small pane for light, and to make such repairs as render the houses fit for habitation. In dealing with house casualties the least serious should claim priority. You ought to have a regular corps of workmen who would get this job done so that the people may get back into their homes, which are unlikely to be hit a second time. Branches of this corps should exist in all the great cities. Not a day should be lost. How the expense is met or divided can be settled with the Treasury. But this question must be no impediment on action.,

Pray let me have your plans for dealing with this forthwith.

(Action this day.) Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air.

14.XII.40.

There is one thing about the warfare between the Air Ministry and M.A.P. which is helpful to the public interest, namely, that I get a fine view of what is going on and hear both sides of the case argued with spirit. Will you very kindly address yourself to the various statements made in this letter attached [from Lord Beaverbrook], and especially to the one that on September 1 you had over a thousand unserviceable trainer aircraft? I have long suspected that the inefficiency which formerly ruled in the A.S.U.s and left us with only forty-five airplanes when the new Government was formed, as against about one thousand two hundred now, was reproduced in all the trainer establishments and communication flights and that a great mass of airplanes were kept in an unserviceable state, and I remember particularly the statement of one of your high officers that the Training Command worked on a basis of fifty per cent unserviceable. Who is responsible for repair and training establishments? If I were you, I should throw the whole business of repair on to M.A.P., and then you would be able to criticise them for any shortcomings.

See also the figures of how repaired aircraft and engines have increased since the change was made.

I recur to the point I made to you yesterday when you sent me your letter to M.A.P. The Air Ministry’s view is that the Germans have nearly 6000 airplanes in front-line action, and we have about 2000. Air Ministry also believe that the German output is 1800 a month, out of which they provide only 400 for training establishments, while we, out of 1400 output, provide also 400. How do you, then, explain that the Germans are able to keep three times our establishment in front-line action with only an equal monthly subscription of trainer aircraft? Apparently, on your figures, which I may say I do not accept (except for controversial purposes), the Germans can keep three times as large a force in action as you can for the same number of trainer planes. I know that you will rightly say you are preparing for the expansion of the future, but they have to keep going on a threefold scale, and expand as well.

I await with keen interest further developments of your controversy.

Prime Minister to Lord Beaverbrook. (Private.)

15.XII.40.

It is a magnificent achievement ²³ in the teeth of the bombing. Quite apart from new production, the repaired aircraft has been your own creation. We now have 1200 in the A.S.U.’s, which is a great comfort. Dispersion has greatly hampered you, but was absolutely necessary as an insurance to spread the risk.

In addition, you have not confined yourself to mere numbers, but, on the contrary, have pushed hard into quality.

The reason why there is this crabbing, as at A,²⁴ is of course the warfare which proceeds between A.M. and M.A.P. They regard you as a merciless critic, and even enemy. They resent having had the M.A.P. functions carved out of their show, and I have no doubt they pour out their detraction by every channel open. I am definitely of opinion that it is more in the public interest that there should be sharp criticism and counter-criticism between the two departments than that they should be handing each other out ceremonious bouquets. One must therefore accept the stimulating but disagreeable conditions of war.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for the Dominions.

15.XII.40.

You will see from my telegram to Mr. Menzies that I do not view the situation in the Far East as immediately dangerous. The victory in Libya has reinforced, nay redoubled, the argument there set forth. I do not wish to commit myself to any serious dispersion of our forces in the Malay peninsula and at Singapore. On the contrary, I wish to build up as large as possible Fleet, Army and Air Force in the Middle East, and keep this in a fluid condition either to prosecute war in Greece and presently in Thrace, or reinforce Singapore should the Japanese attitude change. I could not commit myself to the dispatch of many of the air craft mentioned, certainly not the P.B.Y.s [Flying-boats] at this juncture, when we have a major peril to face on the northwestern approaches. I could not therefore agree to your telegram, and I should have thought my own (as amended in red) was quite sufficient at the present time.

Prime Minister to C.A.S.

15.XII.40.

How are you getting on with the development on a large scale of aerodromes in Greece to take modern bombers and fighters, and with the movement of skeleton personnel, spare parts, etc., there?

It is quite clear to me this is going to be most important in the near future, and we must try not to be taken by surprise by events.

I should be glad to have a fortnightly report.

Prime Minister to C.I.G.S.

20.XII.40.

Please let me know the earliest date when the 2d Armoured Division (a) will land at Suez, and (b) can be available for action in the Western Desert.

Prime Minister to C.A.S.

20.XII.40.

I hope you will try to take a few days’ rest, and seize every opportunity of going to bed early. The fight is going to be a long one, and so much depends upon you. Do not hesitate to send your deputy to any meetings I may call.

Pray forgive my giving you these hints, but several people have mentioned to me that you are working too hard.

* * * * *

The possible use and counter-use of poison gas, should invasion come in the New Year, rested heavily upon me. Our progress in this sphere was, however, considerable.

Prime Minister to Minister of Supply.

21.XII.40.

You will remember that the War Cabinet ordered an inquiry into the fact that bulk storage for two thousand tons of mustard gas which had been ordered by the Cabinet in October, 1938, was still not ready in October, 1940.

The latest information which I have received from your Ministry shows that the bulk stock of mustard gas on December 9 was 1485 tons. I was also informed through your Ministry that 650 tons of additional new storage was to have become available last week, and that production was being increased accordingly. Was this promise fulfilled?

Meanwhile, I note that the filling of the new twenty-five pounder base-ejection shell has at last begun in earnest, and that 7812 of this type of shell had been filled by December 9. I should be glad to know how this figure compares with the total reserve of this type of shell required by the Army, and when this reserve is likely to be attained.

None of the new six-inch base-ejection shells has yet been filled. What reserve does the Army require of this type of shell, and when is this reserve expected to be ready?

I am sending a copy of this Minute to the Secretary of State for War.

Prime Minister to Minister of Supply.

22.XII.40.

I learn that the Central Priority Department has been conducting a special investigation into the requirements of materials likely to be short.

I am told that much the most serious case is that of drop-forgings, on which the production of airplanes, tanks, guns, and transport all depend. Requirements for 1941 are estimated at 441,000 tons. Home production is now at the rate of 208,000. I am informed that there are orders in the United States for 7000 tons, and that these are likely to rise to an annual rate of 25,000 by the end of 1941. Even if the requirements are considerably overstated, the deficiency is very serious.

Some moderate rate of expansion at home is expected, but we need to double the output. There are 14,000 workers in the industry, but it is reported that only 300 recruits have been received since August, that the industry alleges that it cannot absorb more than a thousand new workers in each quarter, and that it is difficult to get recruits. All this needs looking into.

Meanwhile, the only possible immediate action seems to be to increase purchases of drop-forgings in America, if necessary sending a special expert there for this purpose.

Prime Minister to Minister of Works and Buildings.

22.XII.40.

I understand that there is a serious shortage of accommodation for welfare services of all kinds to meet the needs of the homeless as well as of the evacuation schemes, and that you, in conjunction with the Minister of Health, have undertaken to seek for premises.

I hope that you will use your utmost endeavours to press on with this work.

I should be glad if you would let me have a return of commandeered premises which have not yet been used for war purposes, and which might be suitable for use in this way.

Prime Minister to Lord Chatfield.

22.XII.40.

I am grieved to find how very few George Medals have been issued. I had hoped there would be ten times as many. The idea was that you would go about and get into touch with local authorities where there has been heavy bombing, and make sure that recommendations were sent forward which could be sifted, and that you would stir the departments on the subject. Can you not do something more in this direction? You ought by now to have a number of typical cases which could be circulated to the authorities and departments concerned, who would thereafter be asked to match them from their experience.

Let me know if I can be of any assistance.

Prime Minister to First Sea Lord.

22.XII.40.

Very soon the Baltic will be frozen. Let me know its state and future prospects.

What has been happening to the Swedish ore during this summer? The Naval Staff should make the necessary inquiries.

What traffic has been moving down the Leads?

How has the position of German ore supplies been affected by the events of the last eight months? Is there any reason why we should not sow magnetic mines in the Leads, even if we do not lay a regular minefield? We seem to have forgotten all about this story.

I should be glad to have a note upon this, and whether anything can be done.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

22.XII.40.

The work of the Joint Planners divides itself naturally into two parts: (a) all the current work they do for the C.O.S. Committee, and (b) the long-term future projects which are indicated to them, and on which they are already at work. It is to these latter that I now turn. I think it would be well to appoint a Director of Future Schemes, or some other suitable title, who would guide and concert the preparation of the special schemes, preside over any meetings of the Joint Planners engaged upon them, and have direct access to me as Minister of Defence. I think Major Oliver Stanley (the former Secretary of State for War), with his experience of foreign politics and Cabinet government, would be able to impart to all this work a liveliness which I cannot supply except at rare intervals. He would have to be given a temporary Army rank to make him senior.

Pray make me proposals for giving effect to this idea.

Prime Minister to Minister of Aircraft Production.

22.XII.40.

I am disturbed to see from reports sent to me by the Minister of Sup ply that deliveries to the Royal Air Force of bombs and containers charged with gas have dropped very noticeably during the past month, the total during the four weeks from November 11 to December 9 being:

I understand that the reason for this decline is that factories have been bombed, and that difficulties have been encountered in the supply of certain component parts.

Nevertheless, it is of vital importance that we should have the largest possible supply of aircraft gas-containers for immediate retaliation if need be, and I should be glad to know what steps are being taken to improve the delivery of these containers and what is the forecast of these deliveries over the next three months.

I was concerned at the grave affronts to the rights and liberties of the individual which the safety of the State had required. Having been brought up on the Bill of Rights, habeas corpus, and trial by jury conceptions, I grieved to become responsible, even with the constant assent of Parliament, for their breach. In June, July, August, and September our plight had seemed so grievous that no limits could be put upon the action of the State. Now that we had for the time being got our heads again above water, a further refinement in the treatment of internes seemed obligatory. We had already set up an elaborate sifting process, and many persons who had been arrested in the crisis were released by the Home Secretary, who presided over this field.

Prime Minister to Home Secretary.

22.XII.40.

It must be remembered that these political détenus are not persons against whom any offence is alleged, or who are awaiting trial or on remand. They are persons who cannot be proved to have committed any offence known to the law, but who because of the public danger and the conditions of war have to be held in custody. Naturally I feel distressed at having to be responsible for action so utterly at variance with all the fundamental principles of British liberty, habeas corpus and the like. The public danger justifies the action taken, but that danger is now receding.

In the case of Mosley and his wife there is much prejudice from the Left, and in the case of the Pandit Nehru from the Right. I particularly asked that the rigorous character of the latter’s imprisonment should be removed. In foreign countries such people are confined in fortresses – at least, they used to be when the world was still civilised.

These reflections led me to look into the details of Mosley’s present confinement, as well as others of that category. Does a bath every week mean a hot bath, and would it be very wrong to allow a bath every day? What facilities are there for regular outdoor exercise and games and recreation under Rule 8? If the correspondence is censored, as it must be, I do not see any reason why it should be limited to two letters a week. What literature is allowed? Is it limited to the prison libraries? Are newspapers allowed? What are the regulations about paper and ink for writing books or studying particular questions? Are they allowed to have a wireless set? What arrangements are permitted to husbands and wives to see each other, and what arrangements have been made for Mosley’s wife to see her baby, from whom she was taken before it was weaned?

I should be grateful if you would let me know your own view upon these matters.

Prime Minister to Prime Minister of Australia.

23.XII.40.

1. I am most grateful for your promised help at Singapore in respect both of troops and of equipment and ammunition, and hope that you will make these available as proposed. If so we will arrange to relieve your troops in May by the equivalent of a division from India.

2. The danger of Japan going to war with the British Empire is in my opinion definitely less than it was in June after the collapse of France. Since then we have beaten off the attacks of the German Air Force, deterred the invader by our ever-growing land strength, and gained a decisive victory in Libya. Since then the Italians have shown their weakness by sea, land, and air, and we no longer doubt our ability to defend the Delta and the Canal until or unless Germany makes her way through Turkey, Syria, and Palestine. This would be a long-term affair. Our position in the Eastern Mediterranean is enormously improved by the possession of Crete, where we are making at Suda Bay a second Scapa, and also by our victories and those of the Greeks, and the facilities we now have for building up strong air bases in Greece from which Italy can be attacked.

3. The naval and military successes in the Mediterranean and our growing advantage there by land, sea, and air will not be lost upon Japan. It is quite impossible for our Fleet to leave the Mediterranean at the present juncture without throwing away irretrievably all that has been gained there and all the prospects of the future. On the other hand, with every weakening of the Italian naval power, the mobility of our Mediterranean Fleet becomes potentially greater, and should the Italian Fleet be knocked out as a factor, and Italy herself broken as a combatant, as she may be, we could send strong naval forces to Singapore without suffering any serious disadvantage. We must try to bear our Eastern anxieties patiently and doggedly until this result is achieved, it always being understood that if Australia is seriously threatened by invasion, we should not hesitate to compromise or sacrifice the Mediterranean position for the sake of our kith and kin.

4. Apart from the Mediterranean, the naval strain has considerably increased. When Bismarck and Tirpitz join the German Fleet, which they may have done already, the Germans will once again be able to form a line of battle. The King George V is ready, but we do not get Prince of Wales for several months, nor Duke of York till midsummer, nor Anson till the end of the year 1941. For the next six months we must keep more concentrated at Scapa Flow than has been necessary so far. The appearance of a raiding pocket battleship in the Atlantic has forced us to provide battleship escort again for our convoys, and we are forming hunting-groups for the raiders in the South Atlantic, and if necessary in the Indian Ocean. We have always to consider the possibility of the undamaged portion of the French Fleet being betrayed by Darlan to Germany.

5. For all these reasons we are at the fullest naval strain I have seen either in this or the former war. The only way in which a naval squadron could be found for Singapore would be by ruining the Mediterranean situation. This I am sure you would not wish us to do unless or until the Japanese danger becomes far more menacing than at present. I am also persuaded that if Japan should enter the war, the United States will come in on our side, which will put the naval boot very much on the other leg, and be a deliverance from many perils.

6. As regards air reinforcements for Malaya, the Conference at Singapore recommended the urgent despatch of considerable numbers of aircraft. With the ever-changing situation it is difficult to commit ourselves to the precise number of aircraft which we can make available for Singapore, and we certainly could not spare the flying-boats to lie about idle there on the remote chance of a Japanese attack when they ought to be playing their part in the deadly struggle on the northwestern approaches. Broadly speaking, our policy is to build up as large as possible a fleet, army, and air force in the Middle East, and keep this in a fluid condition, either to prosecute war in Libya, Greece, and presently Thrace, or reinforce Singapore should the Japanese attitude change for the worse. In this way dispersion of forces will be avoided and victory will give its own far-reaching protections in many directions.

7. I must tell you finally that we are sending enormous convoys of troops and munitions to the Middle East, and we shall have nearly 300,000 men there by February. This again entails heavy escort duties. But great objects are at stake, and risks must be run in every quarter of the globe, if we are to emerge from all our dangers, as I am sure we shall.

8. I am arranging for details as regards shipping and equipment, etc., to be taken up direct between the War Office and Army Headquarters, Melbourne.

With all good wishes.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

23.XII.40.

Please see that I have a good supply of photographs of war places. For instance, Sollum, Barclia, etc.

One of your staff might be told off to give some attention to this.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee. Note for M. Dupuy, travelling to North Africa.

23.XII.40.

Should you see Generals Weygand or Nogues you should explain that we now have a large, well-equipped army in England, and have considerable spare forces already well trained and rapidly improving, apart from what are needed to repel invasion.

The situation in the Middle East is also becoming good. If at any time in the near future the French Government decide to resume the war in Africa against Italy and Germany we would send a strong and well-equipped Expeditionary Force to aid the defence of Morocco, Algiers, and Tunis. These divisions could sail as fast as shipping and landing facilities were available. The British Air Force has now begun its expansion, and would also be able to give important assistance. The command of the Mediterranean would be assured by the reunion of the British and French Fleets, and by our joint use of Moroccan and North African bases. We are willing to enter into staff talks of the most secret character with General Weygand, or any officers nominated by him.

On the other hand, delay is dangerous. At any time the Germans may, by force or favour, come down through Spain, render unusable the anchorage at Gibraltar, take effective charge of the batteries on both sides of the Straits, and also establish their air forces in the aerodromes. It is their habit to strike swiftly, and if they establish themselves at Casablanca the door would be shut on all projects. We are quite ready to wait for a certain time, provided that there is a good hope of bold action, and that plans are being made. But the situation may deteriorate any day and prospects be ruined. It is most important that the Government of Marshal Pétain should realise that we are able and willing to give powerful and growing aid. But this may presently pass beyond our power.

Prime Minister to Minister of Shipping.

24.XII.40

I see you made a speech about the Americans taking foreign ships. Could you let me have the text of it, together with any reactions you may have noticed in the American Press? I have the impression that the Americans were not quite pleased with the request addressed to them, as they do not consider that sufficient use is being made of British tonnage at the present time. In this connection you will remember my repeated inquiries as to the amount of British tonnage now plying exclusively between ports not in the United Kingdom.

According to the latest monthly report of the Ministry of Shipping, two and one-third million tons of British non-tanker shipping of over sixteen hundred tons is trading between overseas countries. Pray let me have a full explanation of this. About two million tons of Norwegian, Belgian, Polish shipping, excluding tankers, is also trading abroad.

Prime Minister to Sir Edward Bridges and General Ismay.

25.XII.40.

With the new year, a fresh effort must be made to restrict the circulation of secret matters in Service and other Departments. All the markings of papers in the Service Departments, Foreign Office, Colonial and Dominions Offices, etc., should be reviewed with a view to striking off as many recipients as possible.

The officials concerned in roneo-ing the various circulations should be consulted, and a return made for me showing how many copies are made of different secret documents.

Pray report to me how this object can be achieved.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for the Dominions.

25.XII.40.

No departure in principle is contemplated from the practice of keeping the Dominions informed fully of the progress of the war. Specially full information must necessarily be given in respect of theatres where Dominion troops are serving, but it is not necessary to circulate this to the other Dominions not affected. Anyhow, on the whole an effort should be made not to scatter so much deadly and secret information over this very large circle…. There is a danger that the Dominions Office Staff get into the habit of running a kind of newspaper full of deadly secrets, •which are circularised to the four principal Governments with whom they deal. The idea is that the more they circulate, the better they are serving the State. Many other departments fall into the same groove, loving to collect as much secret information as possible and feeling proud to circulate it conscientiously through all official circles. I am trying steadily to restrict and counteract these tendencies, which, if unchecked, “would make the conduct of war impossible.

While therefore there is no change in principle, there should be considerable soft-peddling in practice.

I wish to be consulted before anything of a very secret nature, especially anything referring to operations or current movements, is sent out.

* * * * *

Prime Minister to Minister of Health and Minister of Home Security

25.XII.40.

I enclose Minutes of our meeting yesterday on which action is being taken.

I am convinced there should be only one authority inside the shelters, who should be responsible for everything pertaining to the health and comfort of the inmates. This authority should be charged with sanitation and storing of the bedding, etc. I cannot feel that the Home Security and Home Office, with all its burdens and duties under the enemy attack, ought to be concerned with questions affecting vermin and sanitation. These ought to be in the province of the Ministry of Health, who should be made responsible for the whole interior life of the shelters, big or small.

Prime Minister to Sir Edward Bridges and Professor Lindemann

26.XII.40.

I must examine the Import Programme for 1941 next week. 5 P.M. in the Lower War Room, Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday. Agenda to be drawn up by you and Professor Lindemann. Let me see by Saturday night here the immediate lay-out of the shipping programme in relation to food and supply and the demand for the Services in the face of present losses. Professor Lindemann will present me by Saturday night with the salient facts and graphs. To be summoned to the meeting the following: Lord President, Lord Privy Seal, Minister without Portfolio, Minister of Aircraft Production, Minister of Supply, Ministers of Food, Transport and Shipping. (Ministers only.)

Prime Minister to Ministry of Supply.

26.XII.40.

The discrepancy between weapons and ammunition is terrible in the case of the anti-tank rifles, two-inch and three-inch mortars, the climax being reached with the three-inch mortars. We have enough A.T. rifles to equip twenty-three and a half divisions, but only enough ammunitionat 32,000 rounds per month to equip five and a half. We have enough two-inch mortars at 108 per division to equip thirty-three divisions, but ammunition at 32,400 rounds per month suffices only for four and a half divisions. The worst of all is the three-inch mortar, where, oddly enough, we have at eighteen per division enough to equip nearly 40 divisions, but at 14,000 rounds per month only enough ammunition for one and a half divisions.

Prime Minister to First Lord.

26.XII.40.

Provided that it can be arranged that four of the fifteen-inch can be cocked up within six months from now, and all other repairs be completed, I agree to abandon my long-cherished hope, in which I have been so continuously frustrated, of making Resolution into an effective fighting ship for inshore action.

The story of these four ships since the war began ranks with the story of the two-gun turret of the K.G.V. class in the most melancholy pages of the Admiralty annals.

I hope I may have your positive assurance that the six months condition will be fulfilled, barring enemy action, of course.²⁵

Prime Minister to First Sea Lord.

26.XII.40.

I consider a greater effort should be made to interrupt the ore traffic through the Leads during January and onwards. This should certainly come before the Iceland-Faroes channel, which is a vast operation under taken chiefly to use mines made for quite a different purpose, in conditions which have passed away. Now that we have not to give notice, and can lay secretly anywhere, conditions are much more favourable for mining the Norwegian coast than they were last year, but the need to act seems to be almost as great.

Pray let me have a further report.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee. and others concerned.

26.XII.40.

Tactical requirements must be paramount during invasion. I am deeply anxious that gas warfare should not be adopted at the present time. For this very reason I fear the enemy may have it in mind, and perhaps it may be imminent. Every precaution must be kept in order, and every effort made to increase retaliatory power.

Sometimes I have wondered whether it would be any deterrent on the enemy if I were to say that we should never use gas ourselves unless it had first been used against us, but that we had actually in store many thousands of tons of various types of deadly gas with their necessary containers, and that we should immediately retaliate upon Germany. On the whole, I think it is perhaps better to say nothing unless or until we have evidence that the attack is imminent. After all, they can make the calculations to which Professor Lindemann refers for themselves. They would certainly say we had threatened them with gas warfare, and would soon invent a pretext. Thirdly, there would be too much bluff in any such statement. If anyone is of a different opinion I shall be glad to know. The subject causes me much anxiety.

Prime Minister to Home Secretary.

26.XII.40.

I read in the papers of many people being sentenced for various offences against war regulations and for doing things which would not arise in peace-time. I am curious to know how the prison population compares with pre-war, both for imprisonment and penal servitude cases.

I should be much obliged if you could give me a few very simple figures. Are there a great many more now in gaol? ²⁶

Prime Minister to Minister of Shipping.

27.XII.40.

Let me have on one sheet of paper the main heads of your programme as at present settled of imports (a) in the next four months, (b) for the year 1941. f should be glad to have this during tomorrow (Saturday).

(Action this day.) Prime Minuter to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee.

27.XII.40.

1. I do not recognise at all the account of my views given about “Marie.” ²⁷ I was under the impression that I had given a written Minute. Pray let this be sought for. It is very unusual for me to give any directions other than in writing. To avoid further misunderstanding, the following is set forth:

2. The “Operation Marie” has been regarded by the Chiefs of the Staff, and is considered by me, to be valuable and important. For this purpose not only the Foreign Legion Battalion but two other French battalions should be sailed in the January 4 convoy, and deposited at Port Soudan, where they can either intervene in Marie or in Egypt. There is no use sending only the Foreign Legion without any other troops of the French forces. Therefore, I have asked for proposals to sail transports capable of taking the other two battalions empty from here to Freetown, so that the whole French force can go round together.

Pray let me have today the proposals for giving effect to this.

There will be plenty of time to consider the political aspects when these troops have arrived at Port Soudan.

Prime Minister to Lord Privy Seal.

27.XII.40.

You very kindly sent me a report about cold storage of meat, dated November 14, and I wonder whether you would care to bring it up to date in the light of later happenings. I am very much concerned about the meat position.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War and C.I.G.S.

27.XII.40.

1. Hitherto the production of anti-tank rifles has been a bright spot, and we have nearly 30,000 already made. On the other hand, the ammunition for this weapon is deplorably in arrear, being in fact less than one-fifth of the proper proportion. The failure to “marry” the ammunition and the A.T. rifle is one of the worst blots on our present munition programme. It is little less than a fraud on the troops to issue these large quantities of A.T. rifles, which would quickly become useless and worth no more than old iron through ammunition shortage. In many cases it has not been possible to allow any rounds for practice at all, these having to be saved for actual use against the enemy.

2. In these circumstances one would expect that the War Office would have concentrated their desires on ammunition, instead of increasing the already gigantic disproportion of A.T. rifles to ammunition. On the contrary, however, for reasons which I have never heard mentioned, the Army requirement of A.T. rifles is suddenly raised from 31,000 to 71,000 for the same number of divisions. When was this decision taken? by whom? and what were the arguments? Was any attempt made at the time to make sure that the ammunition, already lagging so far behind, could catch up this enormous increase in rifles? Let me have a full report on this transaction.

3. However, the Germans have now twice bombed the Small Heath factory and checked the output of A.T. rifles in a most decisive manner. There can be no possibility of fulfilling the increased War Office demand of 71,000 at the date desired. On the other hand, it is to be hoped that the ammunition supply will now have a chance of overtaking the weapons. It would therefore appear that a valuable and necessary readjustment of our programme has resulted from enemy action.

4. Arising out of the above, I wish to be informed when any large changes are made in the existing programmes for the Army, particularly when these necessitate setting up new plants which can only be set up at the expense of other urgent work. All important modifications of the equipment tables set out in my diagrams are to be reported to me before action is taken.

* * * * *

Prime Minister to C.A.S. and Air Ministry.

29.XII.40.

It seems odd that only one machine should have been despatched from Takoradi during the week ending December 27, when no fewer than forty-four are piled up there waiting. Is there a breakdown in the handling work at Takoradi? Could we have a special report on conditions there? Quite soon they will have the second instalment from the Furious upon them.

{Action this day.) Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air, C.A.S., and Minister of Aircraft Production. (Secret.)

30.XII.40

1. I am deeply concerned at the stagnant condition of our bomber force. The fighters are going ahead well, but the bomber force, particularly crews, is not making the progress hoped for. I consider the rapid expansion of the bomber force one of the greatest military objectives now before us. We are of course drawing upon the bomber force for the coastal command and for the Middle East. If the bottle-neck is, as I am told, crews, we must either have the pilots and personnel we are sending out to the Middle East returned to us after they have delivered their machines, or, what would be less injurious to formed squadrons, have other pilots and personnel sent back from the Middle East in their place. The policy is to remount the Middle East, and this must be achieved before reinforcements of a permanent character can be indulged in. Even before the recent reinforcements there were one thousand pilots in the Middle East. Air Marshal Longmore must be told to send back an equal number of good men of the various classes, and not add to his already grossly distended personnel.

2. In order to increase the number of crews available, the training must be speeded up and a certain measure of dilution accepted.

3. The figures placed before me each day are deplorable. Moreover, I have been told on high authority that a substantial increase in numbers available for operations against Germany must not be expected for many months. I cannot agree to this without far greater assurance than I have now that everything in human wit and power has been done to avert such a complete failure in our air expansion programme.

4. So far as aircraft are concerned, the question arises, from constant study of the returns, whether sufficient emphasis is put upon bomber production. The fighters are streaking ahead, and it is a great comfort that we have so good a position in them. We must however increase our bomb deliveries on Germany, and it appears some of the types and patterns most adapted to this are not coming forward as we had hoped.

I am well aware of the damage done by enemy action, but I ask whether it cannot be remedied, and what further steps are possible.

5. I wish to receive a programme of expansion week by week, and also a plan set forth showing what measures can be taken to improve the position, which at present is most distressing and black.