6

The Rush for the Spoils

Traditional British and Italian Friendship — Advantages to Italy and Mussolini of Neutrality — My Message to Mussolini on Becoming Prime Minister — His Hard Response — Reynaud’s Visit to London of May 26 — France and Britain Invite President Roosevelt to Intervene — My Telegram Conveying the Cabinet Decision of May 28 — Preparations to Strike at Italy Should She Declare War — Italy and Yugoslavia — The Italian Declaration of War — The Attack on the Alpine Front Stopped by the French Army — Ciano’s Letter to Me of December 23, 1943 — President Roosevelt’s Denunciation of Italy — My Telegram to Him of June 11 — Anglo-Soviet Relations — Molotov’s Congratulations upon German Victories — Sir Stafford Cripps Appointed Ambassador to Moscow — My Letter to Stalin of June 25, 1940 — The Soviet Share of the Spoil.

THE FRIENDSHIP between the British and Italian peoples sprang from the days of Garibaldi and Cavour. Every stage in the liberation of Northern Italy from Austria and every step towards Italian unity and independence had commanded the sympathies of Victorian Liberalism. This had bred a warm and enduring response. The declaration in the original Treaty of Triple Alliance between Italy, Germany, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire stipulated that in no circumstances should Italy be drawn into war with Great Britain. British influence had powerfully contributed to the Italian accession to the Allied cause in the First World War. The rise of Mussolini and the establishment of Fascism as a counter to Bolshevism had in its early phases divided British opinion on party lines, but had not affected the broad foundations of good will between the peoples. We have seen that until Mussolini’s designs against Abyssinia had raised grave issues, he had ranged himself with Great Britain in opposition to Hitlerism and German ambitions. I have told in the previous volume the sad tale of how the Baldwin-Chamberlain policy about Abyssinia brought us the worst of both worlds, how we estranged the Italian dictator without breaking his power and how the League of Nations was injured without Abyssinia being saved. We have also seen the earnest but futile efforts made by Mr. Chamberlain, Sir Samuel Hoare, and Lord Halifax to win back during the period of appeasement Mussolini’s lost favour. And finally there was the growth of Mussolini’s conviction that Britain’s sun had set and that Italy’s future could with German help be founded on the ruins of the British Empire. This had been followed by the creation of the Berlin-Rome Axis, in accordance with which Italy might well have been expected to enter the war against Britain and France on its very first day.

It was certainly only common prudence for Mussolini to see how the war would go before committing himself and his country irrevocably. The process of waiting was by no means unprofitable. Italy was courted by both sides, and gained much consideration for her interests, many profitable contracts, and time to improve her armaments. Thus the twilight months had passed. It is an interesting speculation what the Italian fortunes would have been if this policy had been maintained. The United States with its large Italian vote might well have made it clear to Hitler that an attempt to rally Italy to his side by force of arms would raise the gravest issues. Peace, prosperity, and growing power would have been the prize of a persistent neutrality. Once Hitler was embroiled with Russia, this happy state might have been almost indefinitely prolonged with ever-growing benefits, and Mussolini might have stood forth in the peace or in the closing year of the war as the wisest statesman the sunny peninsula and its industrious and prolific people had known. This was a more agreeable situation than that which in fact awaited him.

At the time when I was Chancellor of the Exchequer under Mr. Baldwin in the years after 1924, I did what I could to preserve the traditional friendship between Italy and Britain. I made a debt settlement with Count Volpi which contrasted very favourably with the arrangements made with France. I received the warmest expressions of gratitude from the Duce, and with difficulty escaped the highest decoration. Moreover, in the conflict between Fascism and Bolshevism there was no doubt where my sympathies and convictions lay. On the two occasions in 1927 when I met Mussolini our personal relations had been intimate and easy. I would never have encouraged Britain to make a breach with him about Abyssinia or roused the League of Nations against him unless we were prepared to go to war in the last extreme. He, like Hitler, understood and in a way respected my campaign for British rearmament, though he was very glad British public opinion did not support my view.

In the crisis we had now reached of the disastrous Battle of France, it was clearly my duty as Prime Minister to do my utmost to keep Italy out of the conflict, and though I did not indulge in vain hopes, I at once used what resources and influence I might possess. Six days after becoming Head of the Government I wrote at the Cabinet’s desire the appeal to Mussolini which, together with his answer, was published two years later in very different circumstances.

Now that I have taken up my office as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, I look back to our meetings in Rome and feel a desire to speak words of good will to you as Chief of the Italian nation across what seems to be a swiftly widening gulf. Is it too late to stop a river of blood from flowing between the British and Italian peoples? We can no doubt inflict grievous injuries upon one another and maul each other cruelly, and darken the Mediterranean with our strife. If you so decree, it must be so; but I declare that I have never been the enemy of Italian greatness, nor ever at heart the foe of the Italian lawgiver. It is idle to predict the course of the great battles now raging in Europe, but I am sure that, whatever may happen on the Continent, England will go on to the end, even quite alone, as we have done before, and I believe with some assurance that we shall be aided in increasing measure by the United States, and, indeed, by all the Americas.

I beg you to believe that it is in no spirit of weakness or of fear that I make this solemn appeal, which will remain on record. Down the ages above all other calls comes the cry that the joint heirs of Latin and Christian civilisation must not be ranged against one another in mortal strife. Hearken to it, I beseech you in all honour and respect, before the dread signal is given. It will never be given by us.

The response was hard. It had at least the merit of candour.

I reply to the message which you have sent me in order to tell you that you are certainly aware of grave reasons of an historical and contingent character which have ranged our two countries in opposite camps. Without going back very far in time I remind you of the initiative taken in 1935 by your Government to organise at Geneva sanctions against Italy, engaged in securing for herself a small space in the African sun without causing the slightest injury to your interests and territories or those of others. I remind you also of the real and actual state of servitude in which Italy finds herself in her own sea. If it was to honour your signature that your Government declared war on Germany, you will understand that the same sense of honour and of respect for engagements assumed in the Italian-German Treaty guides Italian policy today and tomorrow in the face of any event whatsoever.

From this moment we could have no doubt of Mussolini’s intention to enter the war at his most favourable moment. His resolve had in fact been made as soon as the defeat of the French armies was obvious. On May 13 he had told Ciano that he would declare war on France and Britain within a month. His official decision to declare war on any date suitable after June 5 was imparted to the Italian Chiefs of Staff on May 29. At Hitler’s request the date was postponed to June 10.

* * * * *

On May 26, while the fate of the Northern Armies hung in the balance and no one could be sure that any would escape, Reynaud flew over to England to have a talk with us about this topic which had not been absent from our minds. The Italian declaration of war must be expected at any moment. Thus France would burn upon another front, and a new foe would march hungrily upon her in the South. Could anything be done to buy off Mussolini? That was the question posed. I did not think there was the slightest chance, and every fact that the French Premier used as an argument for trying only made me surer there was no hope. However, Reynaud was under strong pressure at home, and we on our side wished to give full consideration to our Ally, whose one vital weapon, her Army, was breaking in her hand. M. Reynaud has published a full account of his visit, and especially of his conversations.¹ Lord Halifax, Mr. Chamberlain, Mr. Attlee, and Mr. Eden were also at our meetings. Although there was no need to marshal the grave facts, M. Reynaud dwelt not obscurely upon the possible French withdrawal from the war. He himself would fight on, but there was always the possibility that he might soon be replaced by others of a different temper.

We had already on May 25 at the instance of the French Government made a joint request to President Roosevelt to intervene. In this message Britain and France authorised him to state that we understood Italy had territorial grievances against them in the Mediterranean, that we were disposed to consider at once any reasonable claims, that the Allies would admit Italy to the Peace Conference with a status equal to that of any belligerent, and that we would invite the President to see that any agreement reached now would be carried out. The President acted accordingly; but his addresses were repulsed by the Italian dictator in the most abrupt manner. At our meeting with Reynaud we had already this answer before us. The French Premier now suggested more precise proposals. Obviously, if these were to remedy Italy’s “state of servitude in her own sea,” they must affect the status both of Gibraltar and Suez. France was prepared to make similar concessions about Tunis.

We were not able to show any favour to these ideas. This was not because it was wrong to examine them or because it did not seem worth while at this moment to pay a heavy price to keep Italy out of the war. My own feeling was that at the pitch in which our affairs lay, we had nothing to offer which Mussolini could not take for himself or be given by Hitler if we were defeated. One cannot easily make a bargain at the last gasp. Once we started negotiating for the friendly mediation of the Duce, we should destroy our power of fighting on. I found my colleagues very stiff and tough. All our minds ran much more on bombing Milan and Turin the moment Mussolini declared war, and seeing how he liked that. Reynaud, who did not at heart disagree, seemed convinced or at least content. The most we could promise was to bring the matter before the Cabinet and send a definite answer the next day. Reynaud and I lunched alone together at the Admiralty. The following telegram, the greater part of which is my own wording, embodies the conclusions of the War Cabinet:

I have with my colleagues examined with the most careful and sympathetic attention the proposal for an approach by way of precise offer of concessions to Signor Mussolini that you have forwarded to me today, fully realising the terrible situation with which we are both faced at this moment.

2. Since we last discussed this matter the new fact which has occurred, namely, the capitulation of the Belgian Army, has greatly changed our position for the worse, for it is evident that the chance of withdrawing the armies of Generals Blanchard and Gort from the Channel ports has become very problematical. The first effect of such a disaster must be to make it impossible at such a moment for Germany to put forward any terms likely to be acceptable, and neither we nor you would be prepared to give up our independence without fighting for it to the end.

3. In the formula prepared last Sunday by Lord Halifax it was suggested that if Signor Mussolini would co-operate with us in securing a settlement of all European questions which would safeguard our independence and form the basis of a just and durable peace for Europe, we should be prepared to discuss his claims in the Mediterranean. You now propose to add certain specific offers, which I cannot suppose would have any chance of moving Signor Mussolini, and which once made could not be subsequently withdrawn, in order to induce him to undertake the rôle of mediator, which the formula discussed on Sunday contemplated.

4. I and my colleagues believe that Signor Mussolini has long had it in mind that he might eventually fill this rôle, no doubt counting upon substantial advantages for Italy in the process. But we are convinced that at this moment, when Hitler is flushed with victory and certainly counts on early and complete collapse of Allied resistance, it would be impossible for Signor Mussolini to put forward proposals for a conference with any success. I may remind you also that the President of the U.S.A. has received a wholly negative reply to the proposal which we jointly asked him to make and that no response has been made to the approach which Lord Halifax made to the Italian Ambassador here last Saturday.

5. Therefore, without excluding the possibility of an approach to Signor Mussolini at some time, we cannot feel that this would be the right moment, and I am bound to add that in my opinion the effect on the morale of our people, which is now firm and resolute, would be extremely dangerous. You yourself can best judge what would be the effect in France.

6. You will ask, then, how is the situation to be improved? My reply is that by showing that after the loss of our two [Northern] armies and the support of our Belgian ally we still have stout hearts and confidence in ourselves, we shall at once strengthen our hands in negotiations and draw the admiration and perhaps the material help of the U.S.A. Moreover, we feel that as long as we stand together our undefeated Navy and our Air Force, which is daily destroying German fighters and bombers at a formidable rate, afford us the means of exercising in our common interest a continuous pressure upon Germany’s internal life.

7. We have reason to believe that the Germans too are working to a time-table, and that their losses and the hardships imposed on them together with the fear of our air raids is undermining their courage. It would indeed be a tragedy if by too hasty an acceptance of defeat we threw away a chance that was almost within our grasp of securing an honourable issue from the struggle.

8. In my view if we both stand out we may yet save ourselves from the fate of Denmark or Poland. Our success must depend first on our unity, then on our courage and endurance.

This did not prevent the French Government from making a few days later a direct offer of their own to Italy of territorial concessions, which Mussolini treated with disdain. “He was not interested,” said Ciano to the French Ambassador on June 3, “in recovering any French territories by peaceful negotiation. He had decided to make war on France.” ² This was only what we had expected.

* * * * *

I now gave daily a series of directions to make sure that if we were subjected to this odious attack by Mussolini we should be able to strike back at once.

Pray bring the following before the C.O.S. Committee:

What measures have been taken, in the event of Italy’s going to war, to attack Italian forces in Abyssinia, sending rifles and money to the Abyssinian insurgents, and generally to disturb that country?

I understand General Smuts has sent a Union brigade to East Africa. Is it there yet? When will it be? What other arrangements are made? What is the strength of the Khartoum garrison, including troops in the Blue Nile Province? This is the opportunity for the Abyssinians to liberate themselves with Allied help.

2. If France is still our ally after an Italian declaration of war, it would appear extremely desirable that the combined fleets, acting from opposite ends of the Mediterranean, should pursue an active offensive against Italy. It is important that at the outset collision should take place both with the Italian Navy and Air Force, in order that we can see what their quality really is, and whether it has changed at all since the last war. The purely defensive strategy contemplated by Commander-in-Chie£ Mediterranean ought not to be accepted. Unless it is found that the fighting qualities of the Italians are high, it will be much better that the Fleet at Alexandria should sally forth and run some risks than that it should remain in a posture so markedly defensive. Risks must be run at this juncture in all theatres.

3. I presume that the Admiralty have a plan in the event of France becoming neutral.

We must have eight battalions from Palestine home at the earliest moment. I regard the Mediterranean as closed to troopships. The choice is therefore between the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Let this alternative route [across the desert to the Gulf] be examined this afternoon, and Admiralty be consulted, and report to me on relative times and safety. The Australians can be left in Palestine for the moment, but the High Commissioner, like others, must conform to the supreme requirements of the State.

Admiralty should say whether it would be possible to pick these men up at the Cape in the big liners for extra speed.

What measures have been taken to seize all Italian ships at the moment of war? How many are there in British ports, and what can be done about them on the seas or in foreign ports? Will you kindly pass this to the proper Department immediately.

At the Supreme War Council in Paris on May 31, which has already been described, it was agreed that the Allies should undertake offensive operations against selected objectives in Italy at the earliest possible moment and that the French and British naval and air staffs should concert their plans. We had also agreed that in the event of Italian aggression against Greece, of which there were indications, we should make sure that Crete did not fall into enemy hands. I pursued the same theme in my minutes.

It is of the utmost importance, in view of the [possible] raids on Lyons and Marseilles, that we should be able to strike back with our heavy bombers at Italy the moment she enters the war. I consider therefore that these squadrons should be flown to their aerodromes in Southern France at the earliest moment when French permission can be obtained and when the servicing units are ready for their reception.

Pray let me know at our meeting tonight what you propose.

It is of the highest importance that we should strike at Italy the moment war breaks out, or an overbearing ultimatum is received. Please let me know the exact position of the servicing units which are on their way to the southern aerodromes in France.

An early Italian plan, favoured particularly by Ciano, had been that Italian action in Europe should be confined to the launching of an attack on Yugoslavia, thus consolidating Italy’s power in Eastern Europe and strengthening her potential economic position. Mussolini himself was for a time won over to this idea. Graziani records that at the end of April the Duce told him, “We must bring Yugoslavia to her knees; we have need of raw materials and it is in her mines that we must find them. In consequence my strategic directive is – defensive in the west (France) and offensive in the east (Yugoslavia). Prepare a study of the problem.” ³ Graziani claims that he advised strongly against committing the Italian armies, short as they were of equipment, particularly of artillery, to a repetition of the Isonzo campaign of 1915. There were also political arguments against the Yugoslav plan. The Germans were anxious at this moment to avoid disturbing Eastern Europe. They feared it would provoke British action in the Balkans and might inadvertently tempt Russia to further activity in the East. I was not aware of this aspect of Italian policy.

I have hitherto argued against going to war with Italy because she attacked [i.e., if she were to attack] Yugoslavia, and have wished to see whether it was a serious attack upon Yugoslavian independence or merely taking some naval bases in the Adriatic. However, this situation has changed. Italy is continually threatening to go to war with England and France, and not by “the back door.” We are so near a break with Italy on grounds which have nothing to do with Yugoslavia, that it would seem that our main aim might well be now to procure this Balkan mobilisation. Will you think this over?

* * * * *

In spite of the extreme efforts made by the United States, of which Mr. Hull has given an impressive account in his memoirs,⁴ nothing could turn Mussolini from his course. Our preparations to meet the new assault and complication were well advanced when the moment came. On June 10 at 4.45 P.M. the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs informed the British Ambassador that Italy would consider herself at war with the United Kingdom from 1 P.M. the next day. A similar communication was made to the French Government. When Ciano delivered his note to the French Ambassador, M. François-Poncet remarked as he reached the door: “You too will find the Germans are hard masters.” The British Ambassador, Sir Percy Loraine, received the announcement with perfect composure and apparent indifference. He asked only one question: Was Ciano’s statement early news or was it in fact the declaration of war? Ciano replied it was the latter. Loraine then made a formal bow and left the room without another word.⁵ From his balcony in Rome Mussolini announced to well-organised crowds that Italy was at war with France and Britain. It was, as Ciano is said to have apologetically remarked later on, “A chance which comes only once in five thousand years.” Such chances, though rare, are not necessarily good.

Forthwith the Italians attacked the French troops on the Alpine front and Great Britain reciprocally declared war on Italy. The five Italian ships detained at Gibraltar were seized and orders were given to the Navy to intercept and bring into controlled ports all Italian vessels at sea. On the night of the 12th our bomber squadrons, after a long flight from England which meant light loads, dropped their first bombs, upon Turin and Milan. We looked forward, however, to a much heavier delivery as soon as we could use the French airfields at Marseilles.

It may be convenient at this point to dispose of the brief Franco-Italian campaign. The French could only muster three divisions with fortress troops equivalent to three more to meet invasion over the Alpine passes and along the Riviera coast by the western group of Italian armies. These comprised thirty-two divisions under Prince Umberto. Moreover, strong German armour, rapidly descending the Rhone Valley, soon began to traverse the French rear. Nevertheless the Italians were still confronted and even pinned down at every point on the new front by the French Alpine units, even after Paris had fallen and Lyons was in German hands. When on June 18, Hitler and Mussolini met at Munich the Duce had little cause to boast. A new Italian offensive was therefore launched on June 21. The French Alpine positions, however, proved impregnable, and the major Italian effort towards Nice was halted in the suburbs of Mentone. But although the French army on the southeastern borders saved its honour, the German march to the south behind them made further fighting impossible, and the conclusion of the armistice with Germany was linked with a French request to Italy for the cessation of hostilities.

* * * * *

My account of this Italian tragedy may fittingly be closed here by the letter which the unlucky Ciano wrote me shortly before his execution at the orders of his father-in-law.

Verona, December 23, 1943.

Signer Churchill.

You will not be surprised that as I approach the hour of my death I should turn to you whom I profoundly admire as the champion of a crusade, though you did at one time make an unjust statement against me.

I was never Mussolini’s accomplice in that crime against our country and humanity, that of fighting side by side with the Germans. Indeed the opposite is the truth, and if last August I vanished from Rome it was because the Germans had convinced me that my children were in imminent danger. After they had pledged themselves to take me to Spain, they deported me and my family, against my will, to Bavaria. Now, I have been nearly three months in the prisons of Verona abandoned to the barbarous treatment of the S.S. My end is near, and I have been told that in a few days my death will be decided, which to me will be no more nor less [than] a release from this daily martyrdom. And I prefer death to witnessing the shame and irreparable damage of an Italy which has been under Hun domination.

The crime which I am now about to expiate is that of having witnessed and been disgusted by the cold, cruel, and cynical preparation for this war by Hitler and the Germans. I was the only foreigner to see at close quarters this loathsome clique of bandits preparing to plunge the world into a bloody war. Now, in accordance with gangster rule, they are planning to suppress a dangerous witness. But they have miscalculated, for already a long time ago I put a diary of mine and various documents in a safe place which will prove, more than I myself could, the crimes committed by those people with whom later that tragic and vile puppet Mussolini associated himself through his vanity and disregard of moral values.

I have made arrangements that as soon as possible after my death these documents, of the existence of which Sir Percy Loraine was aware at the time of his Mission in Rome, should be put at the disposal of the Allied Press.

Perhaps what I am offering you today is but little, but that and my life are all I can offer to the cause of liberty and justice, in the triumph of which I fanatically believe.

This testimony of mine should be brought to light so that the world may know, may hate and may remember, and that those who will have to judge the future should not be ignorant of the fact that the misfortune of Italy was not the fault of her people but due to the shameful behaviour of one man.

Yours sincerely

G. CLANO

* * * * *

A speech from President Roosevelt had been announced for the night of the 10th. About midnight I listened to it with a group of officers in the Admiralty War Room, where I still worked. When he uttered the scathing words about Italy, “On this tenth day of June, 1940, the hand that held the dagger has struck it into the back of its neighbor,” there was a deep growl of satisfaction. I wondered about the Italian vote in the approaching presidential election; but I knew that Roosevelt was a most experienced American party politician, although never afraid to run risks for the sake of his resolves. It was a magnificent speech, instinct with passion and carrying to us a message of hope. While the impression was strong upon me, and before going to bed, I expressed my gratitude.

We all listened to you last night and were fortified by the grand scope of your declaration. Your statement that the material aid of the United States will be given to the Allies in their struggle is a strong encouragement in a dark but not unhopeful hour. Everything must be done to keep France in the fight and to prevent any idea of the fall of Paris, should it occur, becoming the occasion of any kind of parley. The hope with which you inspire them may give them the strength to persevere. They should continue to defend every yard of their soil and use the full fighting force of their Army. Hitler, thus baffled of quick results, will turn upon us, and we are preparing ourselves to resist his fury and defend our island. Having saved the B.E.F., we do not lack troops at home, and as soon as divisions can be equipped on the much higher scale needed for Continental service they will be despatched to France. Our intention is to have a strong army fighting in France for the campaign of 1941. I have already cabled you about aeroplanes, including flying-boats, which are so needful to us in the impending struggle for the life of Great Britain. But even more pressing is the need for destroyers. The Italian outrage makes it necessary for us to cope with a much larger number of submarines which may come out into the Atlantic and perhaps be based on Spanish ports. To this the only counter is destroyers. Nothing is so important as for us to have the thirty or forty old destroyers you have already had reconditioned. We can fit them very rapidly with our Asdics, and they will bridge the gap of six months before our wartime new construction comes into play. We will return them or their equivalents to you, without fail, at six months’ notice if at any time you need them. The next six months are vital. If while we have to guard the East Coast against invasion a new heavy German-Italian submarine attack is launched against our commerce, the strain may be beyond our resources, and the ocean traffic by which we live may be strangled. Not a day should be lost. I send you my heartfelt thanks and those of my colleagues for all you are doing and seeking to do for what we may now, indeed, call the Common Cause.

* * * * *

The rush for the spoils had begun. But Mussolini was not the only hungry animal seeking prey. To join the Jackal came the Bear.

I have recorded in the previous volume the course of Anglo-Soviet relations up till the outbreak of war and the hostility, verging upon an actual breach with Britain and France, which arose during the Russian invasion of Finland. Germany and Russia now worked together as closely as their deep divergences of interest permitted. Hitler and Stalin had much in common as totalitarians, and their systems of government were akin. M. Molotov beamed on the German Ambassador, Count Schulenburg, on every important occasion, and was forward and fulsome in his approval of German policy and praise for Hitler’s military measures. When the German assault had been made upon Norway he had said (April 7) that “the Soviet Government understood the measures which were forced upon Germany. The English had certainly gone much too far. They had disregarded completely the rights of neutral nations…. We wish Germany complete success in her defensive measures.”⁶ Hitler had taken pains to inform Stalin on the morning of May 10 of the onslaught he had begun upon France and the neutral Low Countries. “I called on Molotov,” wrote Schulenburg. “He appreciated the news, and added that he understood that Germany had to protect herself against Anglo-French attack. He had no doubt of our success.” ⁷

Although these expressions of their opinion were of course unknown till after the war, we were under no illusions about the Russian attitude. We nonetheless pursued a patient policy of trying to re-establish relations of a confidential character with Russia, trusting to the march of events and to their fundamental antagonisms to Germany. It was thought wise to use the abilities of Sir Stafford Cripps as Ambassador to Moscow. He willingly accepted this bleak and unpromising task. We did not at that time realise sufficiently that Soviet Communists hate extreme left-wing politicians even more than they do Tories or Liberals. The nearer a man is to Communism in sentiment, the more obnoxious he is to the Soviets unless he joins the party. The Soviet Government agreed to receive Cripps as Ambassador, and explained this step to their Nazi confederates. “The Soviet Union,” wrote Schulenburg to Berlin on May 29, “is interested in obtaining rubber and tin from England in exchange for lumber. There is no reason for apprehension concerning Cripps’s mission, since there is no reason to doubt the loyal attitude of the Soviet Union towards us, and since the unchanged direction of Soviet policy towards England precludes damage to Germany or vital German interests. There are no indications of any kind here for belief that the latest German successes cause alarm or fear of Germany in the Soviet Government.” ⁸

The collapse of France and the destruction of the French armies and of all counter-poise in the West ought to have produced some reaction in Stalin’s mind, but nothing seemed to warn the Soviet leaders of the gravity of their own peril. On June 18, when the French defeat was total, Schulenburg reported, “Molotov summoned me this evening to his office and expressed the warmest congratulations of the Soviet Government on the splendid success of the German armed forces.” ⁹ This was almost exactly a year from the date when these same armed forces, taking the Soviet Government by complete surprise, fell upon Russia in cataracts of fire and steel. We now know that only four months later in 1940 Hitler definitely decided upon a war of extermination against the Soviets, and began the long, vast, stealthy movement of these much-congratulated German armies to the East. No recollection of their miscalculation and former conduct ever prevented the Soviet Government and its Communist agents and associates all over the world from screaming for a Second Front, in which Britain, whom they had consigned to ruin and servitude, was to play a leading part.

However, we comprehended the future more truly than these cold-blooded calculators, and understood their dangers and their interest better than they did themselves. I now addressed myself for the first time to Stalin.

At this time, when the face of Europe is changing hourly, I should like to take the opportunity of your receiving His Majesty’s new Ambassador to ask the latter to convey to you a message from myself.

Geographically our two countries lie at the opposite extremities of Europe, and from the point of view of systems of government it may be said that they stand for widely differing systems of political thought. But I trust that these facts need not prevent the relations between our two countries in the international sphere from being harmonious and mutually beneficial.

In the past – indeed in the recent past – our relations have, it must be acknowledged, been hampered by mutual suspicions; and last August the Soviet Government decided that the interests of the Soviet Union required that they should break off negotiations with us and enter into a close relation with Germany. Thus Germany became your friend almost at the same moment as she became our enemy.

But since then a new factor has arisen which I venture to think makes it desirable that both our countries should re-establish our previous contact, so that if necessary we may be able to consult together as regards those affairs in Europe which must necessarily interest us both. At the present moment the problem before all Europe – our two countries included – is how the States and peoples of Europe are going to react towards the prospect of Germany establishing a hegemony over the Continent.

The fact that both our countries lie not in Europe but on her extremities puts them in a special position. We are better enabled than others less fortunately placed to resist Germany’s hegemony, and as you know the British Government certainly intend to use their geographical position and their great resources to this end.

In fact, Great Britain’s policy is concentrated on two objects – one, to save herself from German domination, which the Nazi Government wishes to impose, and the other, to free the rest of Europe from the domination which Germany is now in process of imposing on it.

The Soviet Union is alone in a position to judge whether Germany’s present bid for the hegemony of Europe threatens the interests of the Soviet Union, and if so how best these interests can be safeguarded. But I have felt that the crisis through which Europe, and indeed the world, is passing is so grave as to warrant my laying before you frankly the position as it presents itself to the British Government. This, I hope, will ensure that in any discussion that the Soviet Government may have with Sir S. Cripps there should be no misunderstanding as to the policy of His Majesty’s Government or of their readiness to discuss fully with the Soviet Government any of the vast problems created by Germany’s present attempt to pursue in Europe a methodical process by successive stages of conquest and absorption.

There was, of course, no answer. I did not expect one. Sir Stafford Cripps reached Moscow safely, and even had an interview of a formal and frigid character with M. Stalin.

* * * * *

Meanwhile the Soviet Government was busy collecting its spoils. On June 14, the day Paris fell, Moscow had sent an ultimatum to Lithuania accusing her and the other Baltic States of military conspiracy against the U.S.S.R. and demanding radical changes of government and military concessions. On June 15, Red Army troops invaded the country and the President, Smetona, fled into East Prussia. Latvia and Estonia were exposed to the same treatment. Pro-Soviet Governments must be set up forthwith and Soviet garrisons admitted into these small countries. Resistance was out of the question. The President of Latvia was deported to Russia, and Mr. Vyshinsky arrived to nominate a Provisional Government to manage new elections. In Estonia the pattern was identical. On June 19, Zhdanov arrived in Tallinn to instal a similar regime. On August 3/6, the pretense of pro-Soviet friendly and democratic Governments was swept away, and the Kremlin annexed the Baltic States to the Soviet Union.

The Russian ultimatum to Rumania was delivered to the Rumanian Minister in Moscow at 10 P.M. on June 26. The cession of Bessarabia and the northern part of the province of Bukovina was demanded, and an immediate reply requested by the following day. Germany, though annoyed by this precipitate action of Russia, which threatened her economic interests in Rumania, was bound by the terms of the German-Soviet pact of August, 1939, which recognised the exclusive political interest of Russia in these areas of Southeast Europe. The German Government, therefore, counselled Rumania to yield.