The Tiger I was usually employed in separate heavy tank battalions known as schwere-Panzer-Abteilung, and were so precious they were generally placed under army command. The heavy battalions would normally be deployed to critical sectors, for use either in breakthrough operations or, as the war wore on, more typically in local counter-attacks. A few favoured divisions, such as the Grossdeutschland and the 1st SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, 2nd SS Das Reich, and 3rd SS Totenkopf Panzergrenadier Divisions at Kursk had a Tiger company in their tank regiments. The Grossdeutschland Division had its Tiger company increased to a battalion as the III Panzer Battalion in Panzer Regiment Grossdeutschland. 3rd SS Totenkopf retained its Tiger I company through the remainder of the war. 1st SS and 2nd SS tank regiments lost their Tiger Companies which were incorporated into a SS Tiger Battalion, the 101st SS Tiger Battalion, which was part of 1st SS Panzer Korps.
The commanders chosen to be granted command of a Tiger I represented the very best of the candidates who passed through the gates of the tank training facility at Paderborn.
The Tiger was originally designed to be an offensive breakthrough weapon, but by the time they went into action, the military situation had changed dramatically, and their main use was on the defensive, as mobile gun batteries known as “the mobile fire brigade”. Unfortunately, this also meant rushing the Tigers constantly from location to location causing excessive mechanical issues. As a result, there are almost no instances where a Tiger battalion went into combat at anything close to full strength. Furthermore, against the Soviet and Western Allied production numbers, even a 10:1 kill ratio would not have been sufficient to turn the tactical tide. Some Tiger units did actually exceed the 10:1 kill ratio, including 13. Kompanie/Panzer-Regiment Grossdeutschland with a ratio of 16:1, schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 103 with a ratio of 12:1 and schwere Panzer-Abteilung 502 with a ratio of 13:1. These numbers must be set against the opportunity cost of the expensive Tiger. Every Tiger cost as much as four Sturmgeschütz III assault guns to build.
An English translation of a contemporary article from the Soviet Artillery Journal giving detailed instructions for the use of anti-tank weapons against the German Tiger tank, appeared in the U.S. intelligence periodical Tactical and Technical Trends, No. 40, December 16th, 1943. Vulnerability of various parts of the tank was cited in connection with directions for attack. At the time of publication, U.S. forces had only sporadically encountered the Tiger tank in Tunisia, Sicily, and Italy. The accompanying sketch shows vulnerable points and indicates weapons to be used against them. Material concerning the vulnerability of German tanks was published in Tactical and Technical Trends No. 8, p. 46 and No. 11, p.28. Detailed information about the Tiger tank was published in Tactical and Technical Trends No. 34, p.13. A translation of the Soviet Artillery Journal article follows in Contemporary View No.18.