This impactful study of a Tiger I on the move creates a strong impression of the power of the Tiger I. Faced with the prospect of engaging with a fast moving and strongly equipped monster such as this it is easy to understand how the Tigerphobia condition grew and spread.
The Tigers forged an impressive combat record in Russia during 1943 and 1944. They destroyed tremendous amounts of enemy equipment especially anti-tank guns. Eventually it was held that often the mere sight of a Tiger was enough to cause Russian tank crews to withdraw from the battlefield. The Tiger enjoyed a similar psychological success in North Africa and Italy, creating a powerful negative effect on the morale of both British and US troops. The mere rumour that the troops were up against Tigers was often enough to spread panic.
The debilitating influence of the Tiger on allied morale was so widespread the condition was given its own name and was widely known as Tigerphobia. The grip which the Tiger held on the popular imaginations of allied soldiers was so severe that British Field Marshall Montgomery banned all reports of the Tiger which made any reference to its prowess in battle. There were times when even Monty couldn’t prevail over the cold facts. In the right hands the Tiger was a ferociously weapon system. The Tiger’s greatest moment of fame was one such moment. Michael Wittmann gained lasting notoriety with his amazing exploits in a single action on 13th June 1944 in Normandy where the famous commander destroyed an entire column of 25 tanks, 14 half-tracks and 14 bren-gun carriers in a few short minutes with one Tiger I handled with deadly efficiency.
Panzer crewmen inspect the combat damage inflicted by enemy rounds which have just failed to pierce the strong side armour of the Tiger.
This press photo does a great job of conveying the strength of the frontal armour of a Tiger I which, although not efficiently sloped, was strong and robust enough to deal with the direct hit from a large calibre shell, the evidence of which can be seen on the front mantlet to the right of the figure in the helmet.
NOTES ON TIGER TANKS IN THE BATTLE FOR FLORENCE
A field conference in the summer of 1943 , the half hearted camouflage and relaxed attitude suggest that soviet air cover was not percievd to be a threat by these tank men.
As a rule, the Tigers were well sited and well camouflaged with natural foliage. To delay the New Zealand infantry and to pick off tanks, the Tigers were used in hull-down positions. Another enemy method was to send Tigers by covered routes to previously selected positions. From these positions the Germans would fire a few harassing rounds, withdraw, and move to alternate positions. Tigers also were used to provide close support for German infantry, to lend additional fire power to artillery concentrations, and to engage buildings occupied by the New Zealanders. These troops noted that almost invariably a Tiger would be sited with at least one other tank or a self-propelled gun in support. The supporting tank or gun would remain silent unless its fire was absolutely needed. Sometimes a Tiger would be accompanied by infantrymen - often only 6 to 12 of them - deployed on the flanks as far as 50 yards away from the tank.
The New Zealanders were of the opinion that the Tiger’s heavy front and rear armour made it unlikely that the tank would be knocked out by hits on these parts. Simultaneous frontal and flank attacks were considered desirable. The New Zealanders found the Tigers’ side armour definitely vulnerable to fire from 17-pounders. Other weak spots, it was reported, were the rear of the tank, just over the engines, and the large exhaust hole, also in the rear and just over the left of centre. Some commanders found high explosives the most effective ammunition against these rear parts.
As a rule, the Tigers were placed in position so skillfully that the New Zealanders found it difficult to employ a sniping anti-tank gun or a towed gun for stalking purposes. Unless very careful reconnaissance was carried out to site the gun to the best advantage, and so as to detect German supporting tanks or self-propelled guns, the effort was likely to be fruitless. For this reason, the New Zealanders concluded that maximum time for reconnaissance, and the maximum amount of information, were essential for a battery commander who was called upon to engage a Tiger. The German tank-and-gun combination seemed to be slow at manoeuvring and firing, and also very susceptible to blinding by U.S. 75mm smoke ammunition. On one occasion, two smoke rounds, followed by armour-piercing projectiles, were enough to force a Tiger to withdraw.
Sometimes the Germans used their Tigers with marked recklessness, the crews taking risks to an extent which indicated their extreme confidence in their vehicles. This rendered the latter vulnerable to New Zealand tank-hunting squads armed with close-range antitank weapons. When Tigers were closed down, and were attacking on their own at some distance from their supporting guns, the tanks’ vulnerability to those close-range weapons was increased correspondingly.
Tigers were effectively knocked out, or were forced to withdraw, by concentrations of field artillery. It was clear that German tank crews feared the damaging effect of shell fire against such vital parts as tracks, suspension, bogie wheels, radio aerials, electrical equipment, and so on. The New Zealanders incorporated medium artillery in several of their artillery concentrations, and decided that medium pieces were suitable when a sufficiently large concentration could be brought to bear. However, owing to a dispersion of rounds, it was considered preferable to include a good concentration of field guns, to “thicken up” the fire. The division in question had no experience in using heavy artillery against Tigers.
It was admittedly difficult to locate stationary, well camouflaged Tigers which had been sited for defensive firing. Worth mentioning, however, is the performance of an artillery observation post, which was notified by Allied tanks that a Tiger was believed to be in a certain area. The observation post began to range. A round falling in the vicinity of the suspected tank blasted away the vehicle’s camouflage, and the Tiger promptly retreated.
Several of the New Zealand antitank gunners’ experiences in combating Tigers will be of special interest:
(1) A Tiger was observed about 3,000 yards away, engaging three Shermans. When it set one of the Shermans afire, the other two withdrew over a crest. A 17-pounder was brought up to within 2,400 yards of the Tiger, and engaged it from a flank. When the Tiger realized that it was being engaged by a high-velocity gun, it swung around 90 degrees so that its heavy frontal armour was toward the gun. In the ensuing duel, one round hit the turret, another round hit the suspension, and two near-short rounds probably ricocheted into the tank. The tank was not put out of action. The range was too great to expect a kill; hence the New Zealanders’ tactics were to make the Tiger expose its flank to the Shermans at a range of almost 500 yards, by swinging around onto the antitank gun. The Tiger did just this, and, when it was engaged by the Shermans, it withdrew. The enemy infantry protection of half a dozen to a dozen men was engaged by machine guns.
(2) At the junction of a main road and a side road, a Tiger was just off the road, engaging forward troops in buildings. Another Tiger, about 50 yards up the side road, was supporting the first. A field-artillery concentration was called for. It appeared to come from one battery only. Although no hits were observed, both Tigers withdrew.
(3) A Tiger on a ridge was engaged by what appeared to be a battery of mediums. After the first few rounds had fallen, the crew bailed out. (It is not known why.) Shortly afterward, while the tank still was being shelled, a German soldier returned to the tank and drove it off. About 10 minutes later, the remainder of the crew made a dash along the same route their tank had taken.
(4) A tank hidden in the garage of a two-story house ventured out for about 20 yards, fired a few harassing rounds, and returned to its shelter. Many hits on the building were scored by 4.2-inch mortars firing cap-on, but little damage was visible. Each night the tank was withdrawn from the area, even though it was in an excellent concealed position and was protected by infantry. Later the house was examined. Although it had suffered appreciable damage — and there were several dead Germans about there was no evidence that damage had been done to the tank itself.
A tank man inspects the combat damage inflicted by enemy rounds which have failed to pierce the strong side armour of the Tiger tank turret.