5

The Third Battle for Caen, 25–30 June 1944

25 June 1944¹

I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12:

At 1300 hours two platoons from each of the 2. and 4.Kompanien departed for Fontenay [-le-Pesnel]. The attack had to be aborted because the enemy proved to be too strong. Tank no. 217 was total loss. The Adjutant, Untersturmführer Heinz Schröder, was missing.² Tank no. 438³ was a total loss due to a hit from an anti-tank gun. Tanks no. 236 and 427 had to be abandoned because of anti-tank gun hits on the lateral countershaft and the running gear.

Regrouping of the Abteilung to Tessel-Bretteville. The new attack in the direction of Fontenay [-le-Pesnel] had to be suspended. The Abteilung was encircled and stood in a circular defence. The remaining tanks of the 2. and 4.Kompanien were drawn forward to Tessel-Bretteville and occupied securing positions. The 1.Kompanie was also withdrawn from its securing positions at St. Germain [-la Blanche-Herbe] in order to carry out securing tasks north and northwest of Tessel-Bretteville. The 2.Kompanie destroyed a Sherman.

War Diary Appendix no. 6.

12.SS-Panzer Division “Hitlerjugend”O.U., 15. 07. 1944

4. [Kompanie]/SS-Panzer Regiment 12

Attack towards Fontenay [-le-Pesnel] on 25. 06. 44

Situation:

The enemy succeeded in occupying Fontenay [-le-Pesnel] on the Caen–St. Lô main road with tanks and closing the road.

Grenadiers near a Panther from I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12, 25 June 1944. (Ullstein Bilderdienst)

Task:

The 4.Kompanie, within the force of the Abteilung, was to follow the 2.Kompanie, attack the village, then occupy and control the hill northwest of the village.

Course of battle:

The Kompanie, following the 2.Kompanie, advanced from the start position on the road leading to Fontenay [-le-Pesnel] through Rauray. Heavy fire from enemy artillery while passing the hill south of Fontenay [-le-Pesnel]. Unterscharführer Hanitsch’s tank no. 429 was out of order because of a hit on the running gear; the tank had to be towed away. Upon reaching the outskirts of Fontenay [-le-Pesnel], order of the Regiment on radio: “Outflank and attack the village from the left and reach the target of the attack!” Untersturmführer Helmut Flämmig’s II.Zug fanned out to the left, behind them the I.Zug occupied the southern perimetres of Fontenay [-le-Pesnel] and received heavy antitank gun fire from the direction of the church, which knocked out tank no. 427 of Unterscharführer Sedat. Untersturmführer Flämmig’s tank no. 425 destroyed the antitank gun, but reported by radio: “A sunken road is in front of me, cannot get in the village”. Tank no. 427 of Unterscharführer Sedat was already stuck in the sunken road. In addition to this, a watercourse was stretching athwart the direction of attack, which also formed an anti-tank obstacle. The new order of the Regiment: “The Kompanie crosses the brook in Tessel-Bretteville, and again attacks Fontenay and the hills north of the village left of this brook!”

The Kompanie effected communication with the Wehrmacht units of the Lehr-Division⁴ in Tessel [-Bretteville] and immediately launched the attack. The enemy entrenched and camouflaged itself well in terrain broken up with hedges and ditches; due to this, the attack made real progress only in the area of the II.Zug. The I.Zug on the left flank of the Kompanie had fallen across the small wooded area heavily controlled by the enemy, and faced heavy artillery, anti-tank gun and tank fire. Zugführer Oberscharführer Heinz Lehmann’s tank no. 415 had its radio disabled. Zugführer Oberscharführer Lehmann got into Panther no. 416 and reported by radio that the engineers of the Lehr-Division would not follow up the attack as they could not get through this small wooded area alone because of a heavy enemy presence there.

The Kompanieführer, Leutnant Erich Pohl’s order on the radio: “The I.Zug is to follow the II.Zug in the area of the latter!” The Kompanieführer reached the target of the attack with the II.Zug and secured the hill. The I.Zug established communication with the Grenadiers, came round the small wooded area and also attacked the hill behind the small wooded area. While mounting a hedge Panther no. 417 of Unterscharführer Ratka was hit three times by enemy armoured fighting vehicles which opened fire from well-camouflaged positions, and when the platoon resumed its way they hit and knocked out the Unterscharführer Meiss’s tank no. 438. The tank was burnt out. Oberscharführer Heinz Lehmann, I.Zugführer, got out, established communication on foot with Leutnant Pohl, and around 0200 hours the I.Zug with its two tanks reached the Kompanie.

The Kompanie within the force of the Abteilung established circular defensive positions. The enemy attacked the village of Tessel-Bretteville on 26. 06. with major armoured forces and cut the I.Abteilung off. According to the order of the regiment received by radio, the hill was to be kept at all costs until communication was reestablished. The enemy secured itself with tanks and anti-tank guns against our breakout from the circular defence, and with a direct hit Untersturmführer Flammig’s tank no. 425 was rendered disabled; the commander, the gunner and the loader were wounded. The anti-tank gun was destroyed.

Around 1400 hours the Abteilung received an order to break through to the lines running at Rauray and reconnect with our own forces. After thorough reconnaissance a spot was discovered in the riverbed that allowed the crossing of the armoured fighting vehicles. The 2.Kompanie headed the column, followed by the Aufklärungszug, the Abteilungsstab; the rearguard securing task was taken over by the 4.Kompanie at 0600 hours⁵.

With skilled command, despite extremely difficult conditions, they succeeded in crossing the riverbed and reached the hills beyond it. The enemy discovered the breakthrough attempt and placed artillery covering fire on the breakthrough point. The Kompanie with the mounted Grenadiers succeeded in breaking through the enemy lines and in reconnecting with the regiment; this was possible with skilled and determined movement. Following this, the Kompanie was deployed between Vendes and Tessel-Bretteville for securing tasks, to be relieved later by the 2.Kompanie; the Kompanie was sent to its previous quarters area for ammunition and fuel supplementation.

Pohl

Leutnant and Kompanieführer

II./SS-Panzer Regiment 12:

The II.Abteilung remained in its previous combat sector with securing tasks. Hours of heavy artillery fire was laid on the positions of the II.Abteilung which caused battle casualties and material losses.

During the day intensive aircraft activity over the positions. At 0805 hours the four tanks of the 8.Kompanie were drawn forward to Fontenay-le-Pesnel. Ammunition usage: 800 2cm anti-aircraft shells.

26 June 1944

I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12:

In the morning the 1. and 2.Kompanien stood in circular defence northwest of Tessel-Bretteville. The northern and north-western borders of Tessel-Bretteville were secured and held by the remaining tanks of the 2. and 4.Kompanien, the 1.Kompanie and the Aufklärungszug. The sweep forward of the Tiger tanks, intended to relieve the encircled Abteilung, was unsuccessful.

At 1500 hours the encircled Abteilung received an order to break out from the enemy encirclement independently. The manoeuvre was successful. In the afternoon the Abteilung was sent into action in the Tessel-Bretteville–Vendes sector to create a new main battle line. We knocked out 7 Shermans during this fighting. Total losses: tanks number 236, 438, 204, 419 and 427.

II./SS-Panzer Regiment 12:

At 0500 hours the II.Abteilung (without the 8. and 9.Kompanien) launched an attack on the wooded area west of Tessel-Bretteville against the enemy armoured fighting vehicles and infantry units that penetrated through Fontenay-le-Pesnel. Heavy artillery fire from the enemy at the onset of the manoeuvre.

0830 hours: attack of enemy tanks from the direction of Fontenay [-le-Pesnel] towards Rauray and on the area east of this road.

The Abteilung command post held until now had to be abandoned in the face of heavy artillery and tank gun fire. The withdrawal of all units of the command and control staff proceeded in order. Losses of the motorcycle dispatch rider unit due to artillery fire: two heavy motorcycles with sidecars, three medium motorcycles. The Abteilung commander’s vehicle (Kfz. 15) was severely damaged, but was able to retreat on its own.

The 5. and 6.Kompanien and the Kampfstaffel of the Stab were recalled before the assault on the wooded area west of Tessel-Bretteville, because there were only weak enemy forces on said wooded area, and they were sent into action against the enemy armoured fighting vehicles approaching from the north. Although facing extremely heavy resistance the 5. and 6.Kompanien succeeded in retaking their former positions, in order to be able to provide gunfire support for the Infanterie to gather and regroup.

The terrain in Normandy was especially suitable for establishing ambush positions. This photograph shows a heavily camouflaged towed 7.5 cm Pak 40 anti-tank guns of the German Army (Heer). It was barely possible for armoured vehicles moving through the dense vegetation of the Normandy bocage to spot and combat hidden anti-tank weapons before the first shots were fired. (Hungarian Institute and Museum of Military History 52835)

The Panzergrenadiers in Fontenay-le-Pesnel retreated southwards in the direction of Rauray to avoid artillery fire and the heavy pressure of the enemy. The 8.Kompanie covered their disengagement and slowly followed this retreat until the Rauray area. The 5. and 6.Kompanien held their former positions even in the face of the heaviest enemy pressure.

During the afternoon preparations for a counter-attack in cooperation with the Tiger Abteilung⁶ of the Korps. However this counter-attack was called off and the Tigers were withdrawn to be redeployed at another section of the division.

According to the reports of the adjoining troops on the right⁷ increasing enemy pressure is apparent towards Cheux, in the direction of Grainville [sur-Odon]. During the morning engagements Hauptsturmführer Ludwig Ruckdeschel (6.Kompanie Chef) was severely wounded. The command of the Kompanie was transferred to Untersturmführer Buchwald.⁸

2300 hours: new command post of the Abteilung 600 metres south of Rauray on the Rauray-Grainville [sur-Odon] road. Ammunition expenditure: 680 high explosive shells, 320 armour-piercing shells, 1,000 2cm anti-aircraft shells, 1,100 steel core [machine-gun ammunition], 14 smoke candles.

Grenadiers from 12.SS-Panzer Division near Caen, June 1944. (Cody Images)

27 June 1944

I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12:

The 1.Kompanie secured in its positions directly south of Tessel-Bretteville. By order of the regiment the 2.Kompanie was withdrawn from the securing sector of the Abteilung, in order to repulse the enemy tanks that broke through in the area of Grainville [sur-Odon].⁹ The 4.Kompanie was subordinated to the II.Abteilung, and secured directly southeast of Rauray.¹⁰

During the battle we destroyed 25 Shermans, two Churchills and one tank of unknown type. Unterscharführer Wolf destroyed one further Sherman with a Faustpatrone¹¹ Two small armoured vehicles¹² with machine guns were destroyed; three of our tanks are counted as total losses. Three tanks have to be sent to the repairs station because of anti-tank gun and artillery hits.

War Diary Appendix no. 7.

12.SS-Panzer Division “Hitlerjugend”O.U., 15. 07. 1944

4. [Kompanie]/SS-Panzer Regiment 12

Prevention of enemy tank attack against Rauray on 27. 06. 44

Situation

The enemy tried to push its attack opened in the direction of Fontenay [-le-Pesnel] and Tessel-Bretteville forward towards Rauray and exerted heavy pressure on the II.Abteilung securing positions there.

Task:

The Kompanie did not occupy positions in the former quarters area but returned immediately and was subordinated to the II.Abteilung. The Kompanieführer immediately went forward for briefing.

Course of battle:

The Kompanie was led by Oberscharführer Heinz Lehmann to the crossroad specified in the order and the Kompanieführer, Leutnant Pohl immediately directed them towards the sector to be secured. Securing began at around 0200 hours. In order to assess the circumstances, the Kompanieführer and the two Zugführers remained ahead by the Grenadiers¹³ to draw the tanks forward into the area of the Grenadiers and take over the securing tasks there. At this moment, around 0600 hours, the enemy was already attacking Rauray with heavy armoured forces, that is, 16 tanks. The Kompanieführer directed the tanks himself into the different positions, while the commander’s tank no. 405 became unusable because of engine failure. Tank no. 415 of Oberscharführer Lehmann knocked out a Churchill soon after the events described above. The Grenadiers abandoned the village and retreated into the Kompanie lines, meanwhile securing the exits of the village. Unterscharführers Sedat and Gerlinger knocked out two more enemy tanks. The enemy assault was halted in front of our positions. The infantry entrenched itself among the hedges 100 metres in front of our own positions; we barraged them with machine gun fire and high explosive shells.

Three short enemy artillery engagements followed in rapid succession, after which the enemy renewed their assault. The enemy attack was again repulsed, while Leutnant Pohl and Unterscharführer Burkert knocked out two armoured fighting vehicles. The enemy again answered by firing heavily until late at night, during which Unterscharführer Eiserloh, the radio operator of the Kompanie Chef was wounded. We destroyed an antitank gun from 15 metres away whilst it was directed into position. In the morning of 28.06. we received the order to retreat together with the Grenadiers which we completed with great success, remaining hidden from the enemy.

Knight’s Cross holder Hauptsturmführer Hans Siegel, Kompanie Chef of the 8./SS-Panzer Regiment 12 (see Appendix II and throughout text). (Mark C. Yerger)

Pohl

Leutnant and Kompanieführer

II./SS-Panzer Regiment 12:

The night of 26 June was spent relatively calmly. Apart from the heavy artillery fire no particular combat activity. In the morning hours a new enemy attack against the positions of the II.Abteilung and SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 26. The armoured Kompanien held their positions even in the face of the intensified enemy pressure and their own losses. The 8.Kompanie with its remaining three tanks and with some Panzer V tanks were deployed against the enemy coming from the direction of Cheux. Positions of the 8.Kompanie north of the railway, between Grainville [sur-Odon] and the overcrossing 600 metres west of Grainville [sur-Odon]. The fighting today indicated that the enemy attacks in the north-south direction, where three obvious directions of attack can be defined:

1. through Fontenay-le-Pesnel towards Rauray;

2. through Cheux towards Grainville [sur-Odon];

3. through Mouen towards Tourville.

The continuity of the frontline was secured by the II.Abteilung in the sector of SS-Panzer Regiment 12. There was communication with both the left and right side neighbours. The positions of the II.Abteilung were strengthened with the subordination of seven Panthers of the 4.Kompanie.

The Kompanien had the following operational tanks at 2100 hours, 27. 06. 1944:

• the 5.Kompanie: 7 tanks

• the 6.Kompanie: 6 tanks

• the 8.Kompanie: 4 tanks

• the 9.Kompanie: 8 tanks

• Stab: 3 tanks

• total: 28 tanks

During the heavy fighting today Obersturmführer Helmut Bando, 5.Kompanie Chef, was killed. The temporary command of the 5.Kompanie was assigned to Obersturmführer Karl-Heinz Porsch. Hauptsturmführer Hans Siegel, 8.Kompanie Chef, was seriously wounded.

Ammunition expenditure: 480 high explosive shells, 260 armour-piercing shells, 1,500 steel core [machine-gun ammunition]. The losses of 26–27. 06. 1944 are summarized in Appendix 7.

War Diary Appendix no. 7.

Losses on 26–27. 06. 1944

Total losses of Panzerkampfwagen IVs:

tanks with tactical numbers 505, 515, 518, 605, 616, 618, 835, 836, 715, 527 and 626.

Panzerkampfwagen IVs to be repaired: 21 Panzerkampfwagen IVs

Vehicle losses:

Two medium motorcycles with sidecars, two medium motorcycles, two cars (these are total losses); four cars (under repair).

Battle casualties:

28 June 1944

I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12:

At 0600 hours the Abteilung with all its Kompanien was regrouped to the area of Esquay with securing tasks, in order to block the road from the direction of Esquay northwards. The Kompanien were in securing positions north and northwest of Esquay. In the afternoon the 2.Kompanie was subordinated¹⁴ to the II.Abteilung¹⁵ and deployed south of Hill 112 in order to eliminate a local breakthrough. The 1./Panzer Regiment 3¹⁶, which has knocked out 8 Shermans¹⁷ at Mondrainville, was subordinated to the Abteilung; the said tanks are immediately burnt out. One tank is a total loss, one tank goes to the repairs station.

Sturmbannführer Erich Olboeter, commander of the III./SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 26 during the Normandy fighting (see Chapter 5 Footnote 20). (Mark C. Yerger)

War Diary Appendix no. 8.

12.SS-Panzer Division “Hitlerjugend”O.U., 15. 09. 1944

4. [Kompanie]/SS-Panzer Regiment 12

Prevention of enemy tank attack at Esquay on 28–29. 06. 1944

Grenadiers move forwards near Tilly, Normandy, 28 June 1944. In support are Panthers from I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12. (Ullstein Bilderdienst)

Situation:

The enemy had succeeded in breaking through in the south and occupied Gavrus, Baron and Maltot; the enemy tried to gain further ground in a southerly direction.

Task:

The 4.Kompanie reached Esquay at speed, arriving from the direction of Rauray, via Noyers–Evrecy, and secured the north-eastern perimetres of Esquay.

Course of battle:

The Kompanie reached the southern entrance to Esquay, the commander of the I.Abteilung held a briefing, and the head of the echelon reached the church of Esquay. There the tank commanders were ordered forward for briefing by the Kompanieführer. Directly after this the village was hit by heavy enemy artillery fire. The enemy already occupied the hill north of Esquay and stood with its tanks in positions behind the slope, so they were able to detect any movement. The Grenadiers suffered losses due to the artillery attacks. With skilful exploitation of the short intervals between the artillery fire strikes the Kompanie succeeded in occupying its observed securing positions, although the slightest movement or noise provided a reason to launch a new fire strike.

The enemy tried to enter the village with its tanks from the north, but we repulsed the attempt. During this Unterscharführer Sedat knocked out four enemy tanks (Shermans) in short succession and Unterscharführer Hellwig a further two. Artillery activity was heightened hour by hour, and went on all day and night. Because of this, the fire strikes took Sturmmann Seher unaware and he was seriously wounded while trying to have a tactical discussion with the other tanks, as was ordered. The heavy and constant artillery fire forced the whole Kompanie to remain in their tanks all day and night, until the units of the 10.SS-Panzer Division “Frundsberg” took back the hills on 29. 06., and with this, the securing tasks of the Kompanie also ended. ¹⁸ During the days of securing we knocked out nine enemy tanks in Esquay.

Pohl

Leutnant and Kompanieführer

II./SS-Panzer Regiment 12:

On the night of 27. 06. 1944 no combat activity apart from enemy harassing fire.

At 0500 hours the Abteilung received an order to withdraw all tanks, gather and direct them to a new frontline sector. The frontline sector held by the II.Abteilung until this time was taken over by a bataillon of the Regiment “Der Führer”.¹⁹ The relieving of the II.Abteilung by the Bataillon of Regiment “Der Führer” and the withdrawal of the tanks proceeded smoothly.

At the same time, the infantry from Einheit “Olboeter”²⁰ withdrew and mounted on the tanks of the II.Abteilung. The following route was given to the II.Abteilung: Noyers– Vacognes–Avenay–Vieux. The route of the Abteilung was disturbed by the attacks of British fighter–bomber aircraft, although without any effect. Already the head of the marching echelon discovered a significant number of enemy tanks²¹ on the hills in front of the village of Baron. This meant that the enemy had succeeded in advancing with its tanks until reaching these areas.

The tanks of the II.Abteilung immediately occupied positions northwest of Vieux in front of the enemy-occupied Hill 112, in order to prevent them advancing further.

The 5. and 6.Kompanien had launched a counterattack by 1300 hours, although they had to retreat following a short engagement.

The 8.Kompanie, that occupied positions behind the 5.Kompanie, was deployed on the right flank of the 6.Kompanie, and around 1630 hours again launched an attack against Hill 112. Einheit “Gaede”²² of the I. Battalion was also involved in this attack with 6 Panzer Vs. The Kompanie of Obersturmführer Helmut Gaede was placed on the right flank of the 8.Kompanie, and advanced from the east against the enemy behind Hill 112. Within a short time this attack was also stuck, and the armoured Kompanien had to retreat into their previous positions.

At 2030 hours a new attack was launched with the support of a Hummel²³ and a Wespe²⁴-Batterie. At 2045 hours, following artillery preparation the 5., 6. and 8.Kompanien launched a new attack towards the square-shaped forest in front of and towards Hill 112. The latter was reached though not taken. The extremely heavy enemy artillery fire forced our Kompanien to retreat. By order of the regiment they retreated into their departure positions. The success of this day lies in the fact that we stopped the forceful attacks of the enemy in the southern and south-eastern directions with the heavy counterattacks of the II.Abteilung. During these counterattacks the following were scored: 14 enemy tanks and 10 heavy prime movers knocked out. Abteilung command post in Vieux.

29 June 1944

I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12:

The Abteilung was in securing positions with the assigned Kompanien of the Army (one Kompanie of Panzer Vs and a Kompanie of Panzer IVs)²⁵ north and west of Esquay. During the day the 1.Kompanie knocked out a Sherman on the hill northwest of Esquay. The tank of the Nachrichtenoffizier²⁶ knocked out a further Sherman. The tank was damaged due to a hit to the lateral countershaft. During the night a tank of the 2.Kompanie was deployed in the securing sector of the 4.Kompanie; the tank knocked out a Sherman northeast of Esquay.

In the evening hours heavy battle noise on the left flank, at the assigned Army unit. The 1.Kompanie knocked out a Sherman. The 1./Panzer Regiment 3 destroyed 14 Shermans during the day, all of which are burnt out. An ammunition carrier truck was also destroyed.

II./SS-Panzer Regiment 12:

After the ceasing of the fighting of the previous day around 2300 hours the remaining hours of the night were spent without any notable events or close contact with the enemy.

On 29. 06. 1944 the Kompanien remained in their securing positions as occupied the day before. There was no combat activity. Anti-tank gun, tank gun and artillery fire laid on the positions all day. One tank was lost due to a direct hit. Untersturmführer Helmut Buchwald was killed by a hit to its escape hatch.

30 June 1944

I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12:

The day was spent without any particular events except the artillery fire strikes. During a reconnaissance mission the reconnaissance platoon captured two anti-tank guns and three small tracked vehicles that were abandoned by the British. Three prisoners of war were taken. The subordinated Army unit, the 1./Panzer Regiment 3, knocked out three Shermans²⁷. Three Shermans were destroyed by the 4.Kompanie, and one by the 2.Kompanie.²⁸

At 2300 hours regrouping of the Abteilung to the area east of Maltot.

II./SS-Panzer Regiment 12:

[No entry.]²⁹

1 Operation Epsom of the British–Canadian 21st Army Group commenced on this day and lasted until 30 June 1944. During the operation the task of the strengthened VIII Corps was to cross the Odon river, take the hills behind the river in control (especially Hills 112 and 113), and penetrate into the Orne valley. With this, the British–Canadian troops would separate Caen from the south, forcing the Germans to abandon the city. The VIII Corps consisted of the 15th (Scottish) and the 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Divisions, the 11th Armoured Division, the 4th Armoured Brigade, the 31st Tank Brigade and a special tank battalion, with more than 600 armoured fighting vehicles and 900 guns. The Shermans of the 4th Armoured Brigade supported the 43rd Infantry Division, while the Churchill heavy tanks of the 31st Tank Brigade supported the 15th Infantry Division. In case of a successful breakthrough the 11th Armoured Division was to develop the attack towards the Orne valley. The VIII Corps was further supported by three navy cruisers and the fighter–bomber group of the 2nd Tactical Air Force.

2 Untersturmführer Schröder was killed when getting out of his tank. See Meyer, p. 176.

3 This was the Panther tank which was successfully towed out of Rots by the Germans a few days earlier.

4 Units of the Panzer-Lehr-Division of the Army.

5 For tanks the direction is specified clockwise, and ‘1200 hours’ always shows the direction square to the glacis plate. In the case of ‘0600 hours’ direction the gun of the tank looks backwards, over the rear hull armour, parallel to the hull.

6 Namely schwere SS-Panzer Abteilung 101 fighting as Korps Truppen of the I. SS-Panzer Korps.

7 On the right flank of SS-Panzer Regiment 12 fought units of SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 26and SS-Panzer-Pionier-Bataillon 12.

8 Untersturmführer Helmut Buchwald was killed in action on 28 June 1944.

9 The Panthers of the 2./SS-Panzer Regiment 12 might have been deployed against the Churchill heavy tanks of the 7th Royal Tank Regiment (a battalion-sized unit) supporting the Scottish 9 th Cameronians (Scottish Rifles). The British lost three tanks there that day. See Reynolds, p.156.

10 Rauray was attacked by the 11th Durham Light Infantry Infantry of the British 70th Infantry Brigade, and was occupied that day with the support of the duplex drive (DD) Sherman tanks of the British 8th Independent Armoured Brigade.

11 The Faustpatrone was a recoilless shaped charge anti-tank projectile fired from an 80cm long 3.2kg launch tube. On impact the projectile produced a cumulative gas jet which could penetrate armour up to 140mm. It was accurate up to approximately 30 metres. The first Faustpatronen were sent to the troops in August 1943.

12 Presumably British Universal (or Bren Gun) carriers.

13 These were presumably units of SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 12.

14 The 2./SS-Panzer Regiment 12 knocked out a Churchill heavy tank that day. This was the 21st Allied tank defeated by the 2.Kompanie. See Meyer, p.217.

15 To the II./SS-Panzer Regiment 12 equipped with Panzer IV tanks.

16 The 1./Panzer Regiment 3 (2.Panzer Division) of the Army was temporarily subordinated to the I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12. The unit was also equipped with Panther tanks and its Kompanie Chef was Hauptmann Gottfried Jährig, who was killed on 29 June 1944 at Fervaches. From 27 June 1944 the other Kompanien of the I./Panzer Regiment 3 also fought subordinated to the 12.SS-Panzer Division “Hitlerjugend”. The Panthers of the I./Panzer Regiment 3 reported knocking out a total of 14 Allied tanks on 27 June 1944, as well as 53 tanks and 15 anti-tank guns on 28 June 1944. See also Strauß, Franz Josef, Geschichte der 2. (Wiener) Panzer-Division, Eggolsheim, p.166.

17 These tanks fought within the ranks of the battalion-sized 23rd Hussars armoured regiment of the 29th Armoured Brigade in the British 11th Armoured Division.

18 The 10. SS-Panzer Division “Frundsberg” was under the command of Brigadeführer Heinz Harmel who won the Swords to the Knight’s Cross for his leadership of the division on 15 November 1944.

19 I./SS-Panzer-Grenadier Regiment 4 “Der Führer” of the 2. SS-Panzer Division “Das Reich“.

20 Sturmbannführer Erich Olboeter was commander of the III./SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 26 equipped with armoured personnel carriers. The soldiers were forced to use the tanks as vehicles presumably due to the heavy losses in armoured personnel carriers. Attending Junkerschule Braunschweig from April 1937 to the end of January 1938, he became a Sturmbannführer on 30 January 1944. Olboeter won the Knight’s Cross for his command of that Bataillon on 27 July 1944 per his approved recommendation. Having been awarded the German Cross in Gold with the 4./Aufklärungsabteilung of the “Leibstandarte” on 21 March 1943, after being wounded he died in a Belgian hospital on 2 September 1944.

21 These were parts of the British 11th Armoured Division.

22 The 2./SS-Panzer Regiment 12.

23 The name of the 15cm self-propelled artillery gun used by the self-propelled Artillerie Abteilung of a German Panzer-Artillerie-Regiment.

24 The name of the 10.5cm self-propelled artillery gun used by the self-propelled Artillerie Abteilung of a German Panzer-Artillerie-Regiment.

25 These two units might have been the 1./Panzer Regiment 3 (2.Panzer Division) equipped with Panthers and a Kompanie of Panzer Regiment 22 (21.Panzer Division) equipped with Panzer IVs.

26 The Nachrichtenoffizier of the I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12 was Untersturmführer Rolf Jausch.

27 According to the KTB of Panzergruppe “West,” the Panthers of the 1./Panzer Regiment 3 had knocked out 89 Allied armoured fighting vehicles by 15 July 1944 while subordinated to the I.SS-Panzer Korps.

28 SS-Panzer Regiment 12 reported knocking out a total of 219 enemy tanks in the period of 7–30 June 1944, during the battles fought in the Caen area. See also Meyer, p.231.

29 In the surviving KTB of the II./SS-Panzer Regiment 12 there are no entries for the days from 30 June to 7 July 1944. The KTB was probably kept on these days, but for unknown reasons the entries are missing.