For the purposes of this study I will use the term Anatolia to describe the region more or less coterminous with the modern country of Turkey (into which Turks first migrated in the eleventh century CE). Background on Neolithic Anatolia can be found on pp. 24–7. The following chart (Table 11.1)1 outlines the major archaeological and historical periods of ancient Anatolia.
Chalcolithic Anatolia {5500–3000}2
Overall the evidence for military activity in Chalcolithic Anatolia is certainly sketchy, but does fit a basically consistent pattern. The transition from the Neolithic to the Chalcolithic period in Anatolia is not only defined by the appearance of copper casting of large objects, but also by the spread of militarism. The number and size of settlements expands, as does trade and other forms of contact between city-states. Competition develops between these small city-states, culminating in the building of increasingly sophisticated fortifications, along with an increasing frequency of arsenic-copper weapons. A number of sites show evidence of destruction in war, sometimes repeatedly. Cities that are destroyed in war are rebuilt, generally with larger fortifications, indicating a perception of increasing military threat.
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Table 11.1 Simplified archaeological chronology of Anatolia |
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Period |
Phase |
Date |
Historical |
|
Neolithic |
Early Neolithic (Pre-pottery) |
11,000–6500 |
|
|
Late Neolithic |
6500–5500 |
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|
Chalcolithic |
Early |
5500–5000 |
|
|
Middle |
5000–4500 |
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Late |
4500–3000 |
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|
Early Bronze |
Early Bronze I |
3000–2700 |
|
|
Early Bronze II |
2700–2300 |
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|
Early Bronze III |
2300–2000 |
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|
Middle Bronze |
Middle Bronze I |
2000–1800 |
Old Hittite |
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Middle Bronze II |
1800–1600 |
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Late Bronze |
1600–1200 |
New Hittite |
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A number of specific sites and finds point to spreading militarism. Fortification building expands, with the best-preserved Chalcolithic Anatolian fortress at Mersin, which was strongly fortified with a wall, gate, and glacis, dating from about 4500. Storerooms near the gate had piles of sling stones ready for use by defenders of the walls, with quarters for a garrison. The fortress was destroyed in war in about 4300.3 Arslantepe was another major site in southern Anatolia during the late Chalcolithic (EA 1:212–15). From 3300 to 3000 it seems to have been part of the Uruk expansion from Sumer, and may have been colonized in part by the Sumerians; twenty-one copper spears and daggers were found at this site. The city was violently destroyed in 3000 by a group from eastern Anatolia who rebuilt a fortified city on the ruins. A “warrior” burial at late Chalcolithic Korucutepe {3500–3000} included a copper dagger and a mace made of iron ore (ET 137). A royal tomb from about 2900 included metal weapons, with royal retainers buried alongside as human sacrifices. Thus, although a true military history of Chalcolithic Anatolia cannot be written, the evidence hints that Anatolia may have crossed the warfare threshold by the fifth millennium, and was possibly the first region in the world to do so. If so, military history can be said to begin in Anatolia.
Early Bronze Age Anatolia {3000–2000}4
The Early Bronze Age was a period of significant change in Anatolia. As a major source of copper and silver for the Near East, Anatolian city-states became increasingly wealthy; the famous treasures of Troy are a striking example.5 The lack of almost any military art or written records from the Early Bronze Age makes a detailed reconstruction of a specific military history impossible, but broad general trends are clear. All major Anatolian cities of the Early Bronze Age were strongly fortified, generally with high, thick, citadel-like stone walls. This, along with arsenic-copper and eventually bronze weapons, shows the perception of serious military threat.
By the middle of the Early Bronze Age a number of city-states had risen to positions of prominence in Anatolia, including Troy (Willuša; Hisarlik) (DANE 302–3; CANE 2:1121–34) in the north-east and Beycesultan (DANE 51–2) in the south-east. Troy {level II, 2500–2300} was well fortified by a stone wall with brick superstructure, where sixteen rich treasure troves were found in Schliemann's famous excavations. Schliemann mistakenly identified this level of the city as Homer's Troy. Troy II was destroyed in war around 2300, perhaps by the invasion of the Luwians (see p. 289). Related Early Bronze fortresses were found at Poliochni on Lemnos and Emporio on Chios (C1/2:374), fleshing out our understanding of fortifications of the period, which included narrow tower-flanked gates and arrow slits (C1/2:374). In some ways these fortresses should be conceived more as palace-fortress complexes designed for the royal residence of a dynasty ruling over a more rural population. The size and population of these sites tends to be limited, often measuring from 100 to 250 meters in diameter (C1/2:387). In central Anatolia Hattusas (Bogazkoy) (EA 1:333–5) – destined later to become the capital of the Hittite empire – was a major city-state in the Early Bronze period, ruled by an ethnic group known as the Hattians. Other city-states which have been excavated include Alisar (Amkuwa), Zalpa, and Kanesh (Nesha; Kultepe) (EA 3:266–8) in south central Anatolia. Demirci Hoyuk is an Early Bronze fortress city built in a circle 70 meters in diameter. The wall is of mud brick with a stone foundation, defensive ditch, fortified gates, and projecting round towers (ET 164). Overall, Anatolian Early Bronze II {2700–2300} is characterized by opulent war-like dynasties ruling strongly fortified citadels.
Map 3 Bronze Age Anatolia
Weapons in Anatolia include the standard Early Bronze arsenal of dagger, spear, and axe, supplemented by stone maces (C1/2:377–8). One set of controversial artifacts, has sometimes been associated with this period. In 1959 James Mellaart claims to have been shown the so-called “Dorak Treasure”, a collection of weapons that were said to have been taken from a royal grave in northern Anatolia (DANE 94–5). The weapons included the standard axes, maces, and daggers, but also included iron weapons, and short swords about 60 cm long. Mellaart produced drawings of these weapons, but the actual weapons were never photographed, nor were they ever seen again. Although Mellaart claimed they were authentic,6 most scholars now believe the artifacts either never existed or were forgeries which the forger was planning to sell, but eventually panicked and withdrew from the market.
Early Bronze Age III {2300–2000}
The Indo-European invasions {2300–2200}7
The twenty-third century witnessed widespread destruction in western and southern Anatolia. Three-quarters of the Early Bronze II sites were destroyed and abandoned (C1/2:406–10). Of those sites that survived, many were greatly reduced in size, and were inhabited by peoples with new types of pottery and other material culture. Although the lack and ambiguity of evidence makes certainty impossible, many scholars associate this devastation with the migration of Indo-European peoples into Anatolia (KH 10–11). The designation “Indo-European” is a linguistic concept based on the fact that many languages spoken in India, Iran, Central Asia, and throughout most of Europe are all linguistically interrelated. It is assumed that all these languages developed from an archaic Proto-Indo-European language, and that the ancestors came from a single “homeland” generally placed north or east of the Black Sea in the fifth millennium. From there, the Indo-Europeans are thought to have migrated in all directions. In the ancient Near East Indo-European languages are found in Anatolia and Iran. There are two fundamental methodological problems relating to the study of these archaic Indo-European migrations solely from non-written archaeological evidence. First, language and ethnicity cannot be determined by material culture – that is to say, we cannot tell the language a person spoke by the type of pot or tool he used. Second, language and material culture are not coterminous – people using the same type of pot or tool may speak different languages, while people speaking the same language may use different types of pots or tools (DANE 153; EA 3:149–58).
Thus, although it is clear that there was widespread warfare and devastation in Anatolia in the twenty-third century, in the absence of written records we cannot determine with certainty the ethnicity of the peoples involved.8 Here I will assume the theory that there was a major migration of Indo-European-speaking peoples into Anatolia in the mid-to-late third millennium. Two possible routes of a twenty-third-century Indo-European invasion are posited. One is from the Balkans into western Anatolia; this group is generally called the Luwians, assuming they are the ancestors of the Luwian ethnic group inhabiting western Anatolia in the Middle Bronze Age. Another possible route was over the Caucasus Mountains into northern Anatolia, which may have been the path of migration for the ancestors of the Hittites, who will be discussed on p. 292. From the vague evidence we have it appears that the Indo-Europeans were warlike, bronze-using, cattle-breeding peoples formed into loose tribal confederations.
From the military perspective, it is clear that there was widespread devastation in Anatolia in the late Early Bronze period, resulting in the dissolution of the old political and military order. When we begin to have the first written records in Anatolia of the Middle Bronze Age, the names of the peoples of Anatolia and the languages they speak are largely Indo-European, divided into three groups: the Luwians in the south and west, the Palaians in the north, and the Nesites in the central area around the city-state of Nesha (Kanesh), of whom the Hittites were a part (KH 10–20). In addition, the Hurrians, a non-Indo-European ethnic group, appear to have originated in eastern Anatolia. They are first mentioned in the Akkadian period {2334–2190}, when they are seen migrating southward out of Anatolia into northern Mesopotamia and Syria, quite possibly under military pressure from Indo-European migrants further to the north (see pp. 303–4).
At roughly the same time that Indo-European tribesmen were devastating much of Anatolia, the southern regions of Anatolia bordering on Syria and Mesopotamia faced invasion by the Akkadian empire. Late Mesopotamian traditions remember Sargon {2334–2279} defeating Nur-Dagan, the Anatolian king of Purushanda. Later Naram-Sin {2254–2218} fought against a rebellious coalition of seventeen kings; the list of rebel kings included Zipani, king of Kanesh and Pamba, king of Hatti, both Anatolian rulers (KH 9, 24–5). The nature of Akkadian rule in south-central Anatolia is unclear, but it appears that the Akkadians had established some type of hegemony over those regions – probably to insure access to silver and other metal resources. The overall result of the combination of Indo-European migration, Hurrian migration, and Akkadian militarism was several centuries of military anarchy in Anatolia in the late third millennium.
Though the Indo-European invaders devastated much of Anatolia, they did not completely destroy urban civilization. Though many sites were abandoned, other cities were burnt but rebuilt. The Indo-European-speaking peoples intermarried with local conquered peoples, and adopted many beliefs and practices from them, laying the foundation for the revival of large city-states and the rise of empire in the Middle Bronze period. Overall the basic pattern of scattered regional independent city-states continued.
Middle Bronze Age Anatolia {2000–1600}
By the beginning of the Middle Bronze Age a number of new city-states in central Anatolia were rising to importance, among them Nesha, Zalpa, Purushanda, Wahsusana (Nigde), Mama, and Kussara. Writing makes its first appearance in the form of an archive of Old Assyrian merchants at the city of Nesha. The key to the success of the new central Anatolian kingdoms was the two-way tin–silver trade with Mesopotamia. Anatolia was rich in silver and copper, but lacked tin, the key ingredient in bronze-making. The most reliable source of tin in that period was Afghanistan. Mesopotamian merchants, whose homeland lacked copper, silver, and tin, acted as middle-men in the tin trade, creating a “Tin Road” stretching from Afghanistan to central Anatolia. Those kings who participated in the silver–tin trade were able to receive more tin at a cheaper price. They could thereby create more bronze weapons and equip larger and better-armed armies, giving them military predominance in the region. Initially the city of Nesha controlled this trade, making it the predominant power in central Anatolia. However, the city-state destined to transform the military history of Anatolia and the Near East was Hattusas, capital of the newly rising Hittites.
Nesha (Kanesh) {2000–1750}9
The military history of Middle Bronze Anatolia is illuminated to some degree by the discovery of an Old Assyrian colonial archive at Nesha (Kanesh, modern Kultepe) in Anatolia. Although most of the 15,000 tablets from this archive are legal and commercial, there are a number of important military implications of this remarkable colony. In the wake of the collapse of the Ur III political order in Mesopotamia, merchants from the newly independent Assyria gained control of the rich tin trade to Anatolia, founding a merchant colony at Nesha which flourished from roughly 2000 to 1750. Twenty-one Assyrian merchant settlements are mentioned in the texts. Some, known as karum, were large trading colonies, while others, the wabartum, were apparently military garrisons assigned to secure the trade routes. These Assyrian colonies did not represent an actual military conquest by armies from Assyria, but a network of alliances and power-sharing with local Anatolian city-states, who benefited greatly by being the recipients of the Assyrian tin trade. The system was perhaps broadly analogous to the early European colonies in south Asia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
The Assyrian merchants traded tin (ultimately transshipped from Afghanistan) and Assyrian and Babylonian textiles for the gold and silver of Anatolia. The trade was undertaken by donkey caravans, taking three months for the journey from Nesha to Ashur. Over the fifty years described by the archive, 80 tons of tin was exported to Anatolia, enough to make 800 tons of bronze (KH 27); certainly not all of this was devoted to bronze weapon making, but the large quantity of tin imports permitted the development of true bronze-armed armies. It is a longstanding principle of military history that, where merchants travel, armies are eventually able to follow. As we shall see, Hittite armies would eventually march along this “Tin Road” opened by Assyrian merchants and their caravans, culminating in the sack of Babylon in 1595.
The city of Nesha {level II, 1920–1850} was strongly fortified with a wall 2.5–3 kilometers long, one of ”the largest in the Near East” at that time (EA 3:266). The Assyrian colonies flourished during the period covering the reign of Erishum II of Assyria through his great-grandson Puzur-Ashur II, but was destroyed around 1850 by the rival Uhna, king of the city-state of Zalpuwa (Zalpa) to the north, who may have been assisted by allies from Hattusas (CS 1:183a; KH 34). After this, the city was abandoned by the Assyrians for a number of decades.
The merchant colony was re-established {level Ib, 1810–1750} during the reign of Shamshi-Adad {1813–1781}; the control of this tin and textile trade to Anatolia may have provided an important supply of gold and silver which helped Shamshi-Adad in his remarkable conquests (see pp. 168–71). A few of the military activities of the kingdom of Nesha can be reconstructed from hints in the Assyrian merchant letters (KH 34–9). There were two kings of Nesha at this time whose names we know: Inar {c. 1810–1790} and his son Warsama {c. 1790–1775}.10 King Inar established predominance in the region, making a number of rulers his vassals, and besieging the city of Harsamma for nine years (KH 36). Thereafter Warsama had tense relations with a rival king, Anum-hirbi of Mama, who saw himself as Warsama's equal: both are described as “kings” who ruled over “dogs” – their vassals (KH 35). These vassal kings would often raid each others’ lands for cattle and other plunder. One such occasion caused Anum-hirbi to complain to Warsama of Nesha that one of Warsama's vassals had perfidiously attacked Anum-hirbi while he was engaged in warfare on another front:
When my enemy [invaded my country and] conquered me, the Man [vassal king] of [the city of] Taisama invaded my country, and destroyed twelve of my towns, and carried away their cattle and sheep … Did my people invade your land [as provocation for this attack], and did they kill a single [of your] ox or sheep?
(KH 35–6)
The kings negotiated and agreed to “take an oath” of peace in order to “free the road” for the all-important tin and cloth trade from Asshur (KH 36). Sometime thereafter, Warsama was overthrown by an invasion by the king of Kussara, the ancestral homeland of the Hittites.
The early Hittites {2300–1600}11
Origin of the Hittites {2300–1900}
The basin of the Halys River (Kizil Irmak) in north-central Anatolia was known to the ancients as Hatti-land, from the name of the early non-Indo-European inhabitants, the Hattians (M = CAM 139). The Hattians, although they gave their name to the land and later empire of the Hittites, were not, in fact, the ethnic ancestors of the Hittites. Rather, sometime around 2300, Indo-European tribesmen migrated into the Halys River basin, settling among and eventually coming to dominate, intermarry with and eventually assimilate the local non-Indo-European Hattian peoples. In the process the new invaders adopted the name “the people of the land of Hatti”, or Hittites (KH 16–20).
The most important kingdom of north-central Anatolia in Early Bronze III was not the eventual Hittite capital of Hattusas, but the nearby city-state of Alaca Hoyuk (DANE 9–10), which flourished in the last centuries of the third millennium {2300–2100}. The royal dynasty of the city was buried in thirteen shaft graves containing splendid treasure and numerous weapons. Finds at Alaca Hoyuk include standards with bulls, stags, and lions; these were possibly religious, but may have been military clan or regimental standards (AH 2, 17–23, §1–12). Some scholars view Alaca Hoyuk, and related sites such as Horoztepe and Mahmatlar, as Indo-European centers of power which had newly come to dominate the area (KH 12).
The conquests of Pithana and Anitta {1775–1750} (KH 36–43)
The original homeland of the Hittite royal dynasty, however, was Kussara, a city to the south-east of their later capital at Hattusas. Our major source for this period, the Anitta inscription (CS 1:182–4; MHT 24–7), describes the rise to power of Pithana {c. 1790–1770}, king of Kussara, and his son Anitta {c. 1770–1750}, rough contemporaries of Shamshi-Adad of Assyria and Hammurabi of Babylon (KH 36–43). Kussara, the Hittite ancestral home, was a city to the south-east of Nesha on the Tin Road to Ashur. Around the year 1775, probably in an attempt to gain more control of the tin trade, Pithana …
the king of Kussara came down out of the city [of Kussar] with large numbers [of soldiers] and took Nesha during the night by storm. He captured the king of Nesha [Warsama] but did no harm to any of the citizens of Nesha. He treated them [with mercy as if they were his] mothers and fathers.
(CS 1:182)
By protecting the city and the Assyrian merchant class, Pithana guaranteed that the valuable tin trade would continue unabated, but with the profits in his hands. Pithana moved his capital to Nesha, where his son Anitta built a great palace, mentioned in an inscription on a dagger (MHT 22).
When Pithana died a few years later {c. 1770} while still in the process of consolidating his new conquests, a revolt broke out in a number of his vassal cities which his son Anitta ruthlessly crushed. The major rebel cities were “devoted” to the Storm god, and were left completely desolate and depopulated, with a curse placed upon anyone who would rebuild them (CS 1:183a). Thereafter Anitta devoted himself to transforming his kingdom into an empire. His first campaign was northward against the alliance of Zalpuwa and Hattusas in the basin of the Kizil Irmak river, which had earlier sacked Nesha around 1850. It appears that Anitta was victorious, making “the sea of Zalpuwa [Black Sea] my boundary [to the north]” (CS 183a) {c. 1765?}.
It was not a decisive victory, however, for Huzziya king of Zalpuwa, and Piyushti king of Hattusas, remained on their thrones as Anitta's vassals, and quickly rebelled against him. Anitta marched north again and met the army of Piyushti of Hattusas and his vassals, forcing them to flee into Hattusas and fortify it for a siege. Zalpuwa was captured and sacked, after which Anitta blockaded Hattusas. “Subsequently, when [Hattusas] became most acutely beset with famine, the goddess Halmassuit gave it over to me, and I took it at night by storm.” Anitta's revenge against this rebel vassal was again ruthless; Hattusas was sacked and sown with weeds and perpetually cursed: “Whoever after me becomes king and resettles Hattusas, let the Stormgod of the Sky strike him!” (CS 1:183b). Ironically, the city would eventually become capital of the Hittite empire.
With the north secure, Anitta turned westward against Salatiwara, whose army met Anitta in the field and was defeated and made vassal; he celebrated his triumph with a great hunt of wild boar, lions, and leopards (CS 1:183–4). With the plunder from his campaigns Anitta naturally dedicated wealth to the gods and built great temples at his capital of Nesha. He also strongly fortified the city, which became one of the great fortresses of the age (EA 3:266). Anitta's triumph was short-lived; Salatiwara revolted and marshaled his army on the Hulanna River. Anitta evaded this army, and “came around behind him [the king of Salatiwara] and [captured and] set fire to his city.” Seeing their city in flames, the army of the king of Salatiwara apparently escaped with “1400 infantry and 40 teams of horses [for chariots], and [his] silver and gold” (MHT 27). This incidental reference gives us the interesting figure of 1400 men and forty chariots as the potential size of an army of a Middle Bronze Age Anatolian city-state, or about thirty-five infantrymen per chariot; it further implies that chariot warfare was a part of the Anatolian military system in the mid-eighteenth century, an issue that was discussed in Chapter Five.
Where did the king of Salatiwara go? Anitta does not say, but it is possible that he fled to his ally the king of Purushanda, a west-central Anatolian city-state near Lake Tuz, since Anitta's next campaign was an attack against that king. The king of Purushanda, however, quickly sent tokens of submission and vassalage – an “iron throne and scepter” to Anitta forestalling a major confrontation (CS 1:184b). By the end of his reign Anitta was lord over all of central Anatolia.
A period of anarchy {1750–1670} (KH 64–65)
Anitta's empire was not to last, however; around the time of his death {c. 1750?} his erstwhile vassals unanimously rose in successful rebellion. Nesha was destroyed by fire around the time of Anitta's death, and his empire collapsed, with the political order of Anatolia returning to feuding city-states. The last of the Assyrian merchant letters bemoan the toll taken on their trade by the unsettled conditions in Anatolia (KH 42), and at some point the tin trade ceased, adding economic problems to political anarchy. Hurrian peoples migrated into the south-eastern fringes of central Anatolia, while the warlike Kaska mountain tribesmen, who would later repeatedly raid and invade the Hittite empire, make their first appearance on the north-eastern frontier; the Luwians dominated the south-west. The gap of about 80 years between the death of Anitta and the rise of Labarna is essentially a blank in terms of specific military history. It seems, however, that during this period Anitta's dynasty lost control over its original city-state of Kussara, which passed into the hands of either a collateral branch of the royal family or a rival Hittite clan whose dynasty would found the Hittite empire. Kussara remained one of many petty city-states in central Anatolia until the reign of Labarna, the founder of the Hittite empire.
Labarna (Tabarna) {c. 1670–1650}12
When Labarna came to the throne, he was only the ruler of the city-state of Kussara, whose “land was small”. During the course of his reign, Labarna claimed to have conquered seven rival city-states south of the Halys (Marrassantiya) river to the Mediterranean Sea, establishing his sons as kings in these cities (CS 1:194a). It appears that he also campaigned to the north-east of Kussara, capturing the citystate of Sanahuitta, where he also installed one of his sons as king. As he neared his death Labarna attempted to secure the succession to his throne for a son, also called Labarna, who was governor of Sanahuitta. However, a large faction at court supported a rival son, Papahdilmah, who seized the throne in a coup (CS 2:81a; KH 70–1). The details of the factional fighting or even civil war are not known, but it appears the state was split in two, with one faction ruling from Sanahuitta and the other ruling Kussara and the southern domains. This was the political situation at the succession of Hattusilis I, said to be the grandson of the first Labarna.
Hattusilis I {c. 1650–1620}13
Hattusilis described himself as “son of the brother of [the] Tawananna [Queen Mother]” (KH 73).14 He also implied that he was the grandson of Labarna. The exact genealogical relationship of the Hittite royal family at this time is muddled (MHT 57). In the Wars of the Roses-style political crisis following the coup attempt by Papahdilmah, Hattusilis somehow became the prime candidate for one branch of the family, and ascended to the throne at Kussara, while a rival branch of the family under Papahdilmah (or his successor) ruled at Sanahuitta.
The military historian is fortunate to have two fairly detailed records from the court of Hattusilis – his Annals and his Testament – though, as is not unusual with ancient Near Eastern historical documents, they often create more questions than they answer. Early in his reign, perhaps in his first year, Hattusilis moved his capital from the traditional Hittite homeland in Kussara to the ancient ruined city of Hattusas (Bogazkoy), which had been destroyed and ritually cursed by Anitta a century earlier (KH 73). This city was to become the imperial capital of the Hittites for the next four centuries, and would eventually become one of the great cities of the ancient Near East, whose ruins still awe visitors today.15 Hattusilis apparently took his throne-name at this time from the name of the city he made his new capital. The “land of the Hatti”, from which is derived the dynastic name of the Hittites, occupied the region around the city of Hattusas. It is not certain why Hattusilis moved his capital. It may have been initially planned as a temporary move to be closer to the rival dynasty at Sanahuitta; on the other hand, his own hold on the throne was probably still dubious, and he may have moved to escape from the powerbase of rival political factions at the old capital of Kussara.
The first order of business upon his enthronement was to deal with the rival Hittite faction to the north.
He [Hattusilis] marched against Sanahuitta. He did not destroy it, but its land he did destroy. I left my troops in two places as a garrison. I gave whatever sheepfolds were there to my garrison troops.
(MHT 50)
Although unable to conquer his rival at Sanahuitta, Hattusilis plundered the territory, leaving the city blockaded by two garrisons and hoping to starve it into submission. His reason for not undertaking a more rigorous siege of the city was apparently a threat from the king of Zalpuwa (Zalpa) to the north, the rival of the earlier proto-Hittite king Anitta. Hattusilis destroyed and plundered Zalpuwa, taking the statues of its gods and three divine chariots captive to his royal temple at his new capital of Hattusas (MHT 50–1).
With the north secure, Hattusilis turned his attention to Syria – the first-known time a major Anatolia military power intervened outside Anatolia. At this period northern Syria was ruled by the powerful kingdom of Aleppo (Yamkhad, Halpa; see pp. 257–60). No reason is given by Hattusilis for his invasion of Syria, and perhaps none was needed. It may be, however, that Aleppo had been allied to Hattusilis’ rivals for the Hittite throne, or to another of his enemies. On the other hand, he may have simply needed a new source of plunder to keep his soldiers and supporters satisfied. Whatever the motivation, the Syrian war would inaugurate a half century of Hittite military adventurism in Syria which would culminate in the sack of Aleppo {c. 1600} and Babylon {1595} by Hattusilis’ grandson Mursilis. At his point, however, Hattusilis’ immediate goal was more modest. He sacked one of Aleppo's vassals, Alalakh (Tell Atchana; EA 1:55–9; DANE 10–1) – leaving a precious cache of cuneiform tablets in the ruins (AT) – and plundered the surrounding countryside (MHT 51; KH 75–7).
Hattusilis’ third campaign was against Arzawa, the land of the Luwians in southwestern Anatolia. There, as he was plundering the countryside, he received shocking news. The king of the Hurrians, an ally of Aleppo which Hattusilis had attacked the previous year, had invaded central Anatolia from the south-east. Hittite vassal city-states in that region, whose loyalty was nominal at best, seized the opportunity to rise in rebellion, and most of the region south of the Halys river was swiftly lost. Hattusilis retired at speed to his capital of Hattusas, where he regrouped and launched a counter-attack against the rebel cities (MHT 51).
The Sun Goddess of Arinna put me in her lap and took me by the hand and went before me in battle. And I marched in battle against Ninassa [which had rebelled], and when the men of Ninassa saw me before them, they opened the gate of the city [and surrendered without a fight].
(MHT 51)
He subsequently attacked the cities of Ulma (Ullamma) and Sallahsuwa:
Thereupon I marched in battle against the Land of Ulma, and the men of Ulma came twice in battle against me, and twice I overthrew them. And I destroyed the Land of Ulma and sowed weeds [as a ritual symbol of a divine curse]. I brought the [statues of the] seven gods [of Ulma as symbolic prisoners] to the temple of the Sun Goddess of Arinna …. I marched against the Land of Sallahsuwa … and on its own it delivered itself by fire.
(MHT 51–2)
The act of the city of Sallahsuwa “delivering itself by fire” apparently has reference to burning the city gates as an act of submission, thereby rendering the city indefensible (HW2 67).
By this swift response Hattusilis prevented the complete collapse of his kingdom, but his situation was still far from fully stabilized. His dynastic rival still controlled the city of Sanahuitta, which Hattusilis had blockaded four years earlier. He now undertook a full-scale six-month siege at the end of which he finally sacked the city, removing his potential rival as a possible focus for rebellion. Thereafter a number of cities submitted, and the few that still resisted were ruthlessly sacked and destroyed (MHT 52–3; KH 81–2).
With internal stability restored in Anatolia, Hattusilis undertook a second campaign against northern Syria, in which he crushed the army of the coalition of Aleppo in open battle. With the field army defeated, Hattusilis was able to conquer a number of cities in the region.
In the following year I marched against Zaruna and destroyed Zaruna. And I marched against Hassuwa and the men of Hassuwa came against me in battle. They were assisted by [their allies, the] troops from Aleppo. They came against me in battle and I overthrew them. Within a few days I crossed the river Puruna and I overcame [the city of] Hassuwa like a lion with its claws. And when I overthrew it I heaped dust upon it [in a ritual burial mound] and took possession of all its property and filled Hattusas with it. I entered [the city of] Zippasna, and I ascended [the walls of] Zippasna [by stratagem] in the dead of night. I entered into battle with them and heaped dust upon them.… I took possession of [the statues of] its gods and brought them to the temple of the Sun Goddess of Arinna. And I marched against Hahha and three times made battle within the gates. I destroyed Hahha and took possession of its property and carried it off to Hattusa. Two pairs of transport wagons were loaded with silver [from the plunder of the victories].
(MHT 52–4; KH 82–4)
Hattusilis’ force then briefly raided crossed the Euphrates, allowing him to boast that he had surpassed the military achievements of Sargon of Akkad, who had crossed the Euphrates from the other direction, and whose martial fame was still pre-eminent 600 years after his death.
No one had crossed the Euphrates River [with an army], but I, the Great King Tabarna [i.e. Hattusilis], crossed it on foot, and my army crossed it on foot. Sargon also crossed it [600 years ago], but although he overthrew the troops of Hahha, he did nothing to Hahha itself and did not burn it down, nor did he offer the smoke [of the burning city as a sacrifice] to the Storm God of Heaven.
(MHT 55; KH 84)
Hattusilis’ army made no attempt at permanent occupation of Syria at this point, but, rich with plunder (MHT 54–5), withdrew back into Anatolian Hittite territory. Although he had devastated part of the kingdom of Aleppo, and defeated their army in battle, he had not decisively defeated them nor taken their strongly fortified capital. Unfortunately his detailed Annals end at this point and we are left with only vague references to later campaigns against both Arzawa and Aleppo (KH 88–9). A later document, the “Alaksandu Treaty”, possibly alludes to the subjugation of Arzawa late in Hattusilis’ reign (MHT 89), but stalemate seems to have ensued on the Syrian frontier. Overall, Hattusilis’ victories established the Hittites as the pre-eminent power in Anatolia, and one ofthe leading empires in the Near East, allowing Hattusilis to claim the title of “Great King” (MHT 100, 107).
Part of the reason for Hattusilis’ failure to fully capitalize on his initial victories in Syria may have been factional feuding among his potential heirs, as described in his deathbed Testament (CS 2:79–81; MHT 100–7; KH 89–99). As the old king began to age, he lost control of his kingdom:
Each of his sons went to [rule] a [conquered] country; the great cities were assigned to them. Later on, however, the servants of the princes [the sons of Hattusilis] became rebellious, they began to devour their [the princes’] houses; they took to conspiring continually against their lords, and they began to shed their [lords’] blood.
(CS 1:194)
One son, Huzziya, who had been made governor of Tappassanda, unsuccessfully rebelled against Hattusilis and tried to seize the throne (CS 2:80). A daughter in the capital Hattusas plotted with some of the nobility of that city to overthrow her father and place her son on the throne. She seems to have been temporarily successful, massacring her opponents in the capital, but was eventually overthrown and banished (CS 2:81). Another son, Labarna, plotted with his mother – “that snake”, as Hattusilis describes her – to murder the king and seize the throne. Considering Hattusilis’ record of devastation and massacre against his enemies, it is with no apparent irony that he criticises his son: “He showed no mercy. He was cold. He was heartless.” Labarna's plot was exposed and he too was banished (CS 2:79–80). Despite these plots and rebellions, Hattusilis is never said to have ordered any of his children to be executed; banishment was the usual punishment.
This type of dynastic instability, presumably occurring when the Great King was either away from the capital on campaign, or mentally or physically debilitated with age, seriously undermined the military potential of the Hittites by regularly requiring the king to abandon a campaign and rush back to the capital to secure the throne. It would be a problem that would plague the dynasty throughout its history. Hattusilis finally called an assembly of all the “army and dignitaries” of the kingdom and formally adopted his grandson Mursilis as his heir: “In the place of the lion [Hattusilis] the god will establish only another lion [Mursilis]” (CS 2:80a). At the time, Mursilis was still a young man, and was placed under the regency of Pimpira, a minister, for three years (CS 2:80a; KH 101).
Hittite siegecraft: the siege of Ursha (Warsuwa) {1620s?}16
Although the precise date is unclear, at some point in Hattusilis’ reign he undertook a major siege of the city of Ursha in northern Syria (MHT 65–6; SHP 76–7). It may have been during his second Syrian campaign, or in one of his later unrecorded campaigns. When an enemy army invaded, some cities preferred to meet the enemy in open battle rather than having their countryside ravaged while they retreated into their main fortified city (HW2 66–7; CS 1:183b). Other cities, seeing no hope of victory, would simply submit without a fight and become vassals (CS 1:184b).
The city of Ursha decided to resist. It was apparently a vassal of a Hurrian king (KH 78; SHP 76), but was also in alliance with the king of Aleppo, both of whom provided support during the siege. When a siege began, the besieger would build a fortified and entrenched camp near the city (HW2 67). Thereafter a siege ramp was constructed, providing access to the upper walls for battering rams and siege towers (HW2 67–8). A later literary account describes some of the events surrounding the siege of Ursha, giving us insight into the nature of Middle Bronze siegecraft. The first part of the text is lost, and the account begins in the middle of the siege:
The [defenders of Ursha] broke the [Hittite] battering ram. The king [Hattusilis] was angry and his face was grim: “They constantly bring me bad news; may the Weather-god carry you away in a flood! Be not idle! Make a [new] battering-ram in the Hurrian manner and let it be brought into place. Make a ‘mountain’ [siege-ramp] and let it also be set in its place. Hew a great batteringram from the [large trees in the] mountains of Hassu and let it be brought into place. Begin to heap up earth [into an assault ramp]. When you have finished let everyone take post. Only let the enemy give battle, then his plans will be confounded.”
(GH 148)
It is not clear why the first battering ram broke; it could have been destroyed by a sortie from Ursha, but it seems that it was poorly made out of inferior materials. Hattusilis therefore ordered a new ram constructed “in the Hurrian manner”, implying that Hurrian and Mesopotamian siege technology was superior to that of the Hittites at that time. He also ordered the new battering-ram to be made from trees from the “mountains of Hassu”, implying that the local trees were too small and the wood too soft to make a sturdy enough ram. There is a lacuna in the text, with some missing events, in which a Hittite ally or vassal named Iriyaya apparently failed to bring promised reinforcements. Hattusilis then complained:
Would anyone have thought that Iriyaya would have come and lied saying: “We will bring a tower and a battering-ram” – but they bring neither a tower nor a battering-ram, but he brings them to another place. Seize him and say to him: “You are deceiving us and so we deceive the king.”
(GH 148)
This combination of siege-ramp, tower, and battering-ram was the standard siege equipment for the Middle Bronze Age. Following another lacuna, in which the siege did not progress well, Hattusilis again berated his officers for their failures:
“Why have you not given battle? You stand on chariots of water, you are almost turned into water yourself… You had only to kneel before him [the enemy king in Urshu] and you would have killed him or at least frightened him. But as it is you have behaved like a woman.” … Thus they [the kings officers] answered him: “Eight times we will give battle. We will confound their [defensive] schemes and destroy the city.” The king answered, “Good!”
(GH 148)
Despite these assurances, the siege still dragged on interminably. In the meantime, the Hittite army had not fully blockaded Ursha and the agents of allied kings – and presumably reinforcements and supplies – were continually entering the city under the eyes of the Hittite army.
But while they did nothing to the city, many of the king's servants were wounded so that many died. The king was angered and said: “Watch the roads. Observe who enters the city and who leaves the city. No one is to go out from the city to the enemy.” … They answered: “We watch. Eighty chariots and eight armies [one army for each gate?] surround the city. Let not the king's heart be troubled. I remain at my post.” But a fugitive [enemy deserter] came out of the city and reported: “The subject of the king of Aleppo came in [to Ursha] five times, the subject of [the city-state of] Zuppa is dwelling in the city itself, the men of Zaruar go in and out, the subject of my lord the Son of [the Hurrian war-god] Teshub [the Hurrian king, overlord of Usha] goes to and fro.” … The king [Hattusilis] was furious.
(GH 148–9)
The text ends here, but there is no evidence that Hattusilis was successful in the siege. The use of eighty chariots, ten for each of eight companies, to patrol the entrances to Ursha emphasizes that, although the Hittites seem to have inferior siegecraft at this time, they are none the less at the forefront of chariot warfare.
The weakness of Hittite siegecraft in this early period is reiterated by an examination of the overall ineffectiveness of their sieges (HW2 67–9). The siege of Harsamma by king Inar of Nesha lasted for nine years (KH 36); Sanahuitta was blockaded for four years, after which it was actively besieged for six months (MHT 52); Zalpa was besieged for two years (CS 1:182b). On the other hand, cities could fall quickly to a surprise assault, sometimes at night (CS 182–3). In comparison, sieges in the Mari documents often proceed relatively rapidly (see Chapter Eight).
Mursilis I {c. 1620–1590} (KH 101–5; SHP 80–3)
Militarily, Mursilis was one of the most successful kings of the Middle Bronze period. Unfortunately, our records for his reign are few and short. None the less, the basic outline of his campaigns can be determined. His succession to the throne seems to have been a last-minute decision by his grandfather, Hattusilis, in response to the plots and intrigues of his children (CS 2:79–81). Mursilis’ father had been killed in Hattusilis’ wars against Aleppo (KH 102), leaving Mursilis a minor upon his succession to the throne; he ruled for three years under the tutelage of a regent (CS 2:80a). Presumably the political instability plaguing the Hittite royal family continued in the first years of Mursilis’ reign, but, if so, no records of such disturbances have been preserved. Rather, later historical recollection idealizes Mursilis’ rule:
When Mursilis was King in Hattusas, his sons, his brothers, his in-laws, his extended family members and his troops were united. They held enemy country he subdued by his might, he stripped the [enemy] lands of their power and extended his borders to the sea.
(CS 1:195a)
The emphasis on “subduing” and “stripping” enemy lands “to the sea” may imply that the vassal states of Anatolia rebelled at the death of Hattusilis, requiring military campaigns to bring them back into submission, extending Hittite borders back to both the Mediterranean and Black Seas.
Upon subduing any last rivals for the throne and restoring order in Anatolia, Mursilis, by now probably in his twenties, turned his attention to the unfinished conquest of Syria, which had been begun by his grandfather and father.
Mursilis set out against Aleppo to avenge his father's blood [who had earlier been killed in a war with Aleppo]. Hattusilis had assigned Aleppo to his son [Mursilis’ father] to deal with. And to him [Mursilis] the king of Aleppo made atonement.
(KH 102)
This laconic text leaves many questions unanswered, but it appears that in his old age Hattusilis had ordered his unnamed son – Mursilis’ father – to continue the wars against Aleppo. While on one of these campaigns Mursilis’ father was killed in battle, and, as a dutiful son, Mursilis invaded Syria on the pretext of avenging the death of his father. In the coming campaigns the king of Aleppo, whose kingdom had been devastated during Hattusilis’ wars, finally agreed to become the vassal of Mursilis, thereby “making atonement” for the death of Mursilis’ father. This state of vassalage did not last, however. Presumably at some point the king of Aleppo rebelled against Mursilis, requiring a new campaign to punish the rebellious vassal, probably around 1600, which is only briefly described in Hittite records: “Mursilis went to the city of Aleppo, destroyed Aleppo, and brought Aleppo's deportees [as slaves] and its goods [as plunder] to Hattusas” (CS 1:195a).
With all of Syria subdued, Mursilis faced two enemies to the west: the Hurrians in northern Mesopotamia and the Babylonians in central and southern Mesopotamia. Again the details are scanty, but in 1595 Mursilis marched to Babylon, and destroyed and sacked the city. On his return march he was apparently attacked by the Hurrians, but defeated them as well: “Now, later, he went to Babylon, he destroyed Babylon and fought the Hurrian troops. Babylon's deportees and its goods he kept in Hattusas” (CS 1:195a; MHT 143–5). Mesopotamian records confirm the fall of Babylon: “In the time of Samsuditana [king of Babylon], the Man of Hatti marched against Akkad [i.e. Babylon]” (MHT 143).
The capture of Babylon by Mursilis was the most audacious military achievement of the Middle Bronze Age. Given the relative technological and logistical capacities of Middle Bronze armies, Mursilis’ victory probably appeared to contemporaries rather like Alexander's conquests 1300 years later. On the other hand, the long-term impact of Mursilis’ conquest of Babylon was ephemeral, for he was murdered by his brother-in-law, Hantilis, in a palace coup shortly after returning to Hattusas in triumph.
Now Hantilis was cupbearer [to king Mursilis] and he had Mursilis’ sister Harapsilis for his wife. Zidanta had the daughter of Hantilis for a wife, and he plotted with Hantilis and they committed an evil deed: they killed Mursilis and shed his blood.
(CS 1:195a; MHT 145)
Although his sister Harapsilis was able to seize his throne after this murder, the Hittite state collapsed into quasi-anarchy, with several successive coups; the Hittite records claim the gods abandoned these wicked Hittite kings, and “wherever their troops went on campaign they did not come back successfully” (CS 1:196a; KH 101–30). By the time that Hittite stability and military power were restored in the fifteenth century, the political situation in Syria had changed dramatically. The Kassite dynasty in Mesopotamia (DANE 164–5; EA 3:271–5) and the Hurrians of Mitanni in Syria (see pp. 303–7) became the real benefactors of early Hittite imperialism.
Hittite military ideology
The Middle Bronze Hittite records present a consistent pattern of military ideology. The Hittite king was chosen by the gods to rule the land of Hatti and subdue all enemies (KH 87–8; HW2 71–2). He was successful in battle when he properly served the gods, and was “beloved of the gods” (MHT 24, 51), but failed in battle when the gods turned against him for his sins (CS 1:195–6). Victories were won “with the help of the Sun God” (MHT 25). Hattusilis, the “Great King”, was the “beloved of the Sun Goddess of Arinna”; “she put me [in her lap as her son] and took me [by the hand] and went before me in battle, granting victory” (MH 51). Hittite kings might also attack under direct oracular instructions from the gods, presumably pronounced by temple prophets. One oracle read: “the Sun goddess is sitting [on her throne in the temple] and sends out [her] messengers [the prophets to the king, saying]: ‘Go to [attack] Aleppo!’ “ (CS 1:185a). Cities that resisted the Hittite king were resisting the gods; rebellion was tantamount to apostasy and resulted in complete devastation of a city, often with a ritual curse forbidding its future rebuilding (MHT 26; CS 1:183). This curse was symbolized by sowing the land with weeds (MHT 26), or covering the ruins with dust (MHT 53–4).17
In return for military victory, Hittite kings shared their plunder with the gods, just as they would with any other military ally: “I delivered [the plunder] up to the Storm God of Heaven” (MHT 25). The “deeds” of warfare and destruction are themselves “offerings” to the gods (MHT 52–3); the rising smoke of a sacked and burning city ascends to heaven like the smoke of a burnt offering on an altar (MHT 55). New temples were built by slave labor captured in war and from the plundered wealth: “whatever possession I brought home from the field [of battle] I thereby supplied [to the temples of the gods]” (MHT 27, 50–5). Part of the plunder dedicated to the gods included the images of the gods of conquered cities, which were taken captive and brought to serve the gods of the Hittites in their temples, symbolized by setting up the captured statues in subservient places in the Hittite temples (MHT 26, 51–2, 54).
Early Hittite military system18
While Late Bronze {1600–1200} artistic and textual sources for Hittite military history are quite rich, for the Middle Bronze period our materials are still rather scanty. While most Hittite soldiers were infantry (HW2 55–7), chariots none the less began to make an appearance in both art and texts. Middle Bronze Hittite infantry are depicted with the standard Near Eastern weapons: mace (AH §20), javelin, axe (AH §35c-d, §44; WV §29), and thrusting spear (FI §737). Some warriors are shown with helmets and shields (FI §737). From the few examples where numbers of soldiers are recorded, Hittite armies seemed to have numbered in the low thousands: numbers mentioned include 300, 700, 1400, and 3000 (HW2 72–3).
When details are mentioned, most Middle Bronze Hittite armies are described as consisting of both infantry and chariots (HW2 57–8; MHT 27; GH 149). Texts from this period mention capturing enemy chariots (MHT 54, 55); thirty chariots are part of the spoil at the fall of a city (HW2 59). One Anatolian army consisted of 1400 infantry and 40 chariots, a ratio of 1 to 35 (MHT 27). Another early Late Bronze text mentioned 200 chariots (HW2 73). Middle Bronze Hittite chariots should not be confused with the later Late Bronze chariots depicted on the famous thirteenth-century Kadesh battle-reliefs of Ramses II, which show three-man crews for many Hittite chariots (EAE 2:219–20). Contemporary depictions of Anatolian chariots show standard Middle Bronze two-horse, spoked-wheel vehicles with either one or two riders (see Chapter Five). One charioteer has an axe, while others use the bow from the chariot.19 Horseriding was also known among the Hittites; a cylinder seal shows two helmeted men on horseback with reins; the context is apparently military, since they are accompanied by a man on foot with shield and spear (FI §737).
The importance of plunder in Hittite warfare is emphasized in many of the texts (HW2 69). When a country was first invaded, if the enemy king and his army withdrew to their citadel, the countryside was stripped of livestock and foodstuffs and small, poorly defended villages and towns were plundered (HW2 69–70; MHT 51). These captured supplies were used to feed the army during the forthcoming siege (MHT 50). People who were captured were enslaved; some were put to work at forced labor to support the army in such tasks as building a siege ramp. Others, however, were simply rounded up and deported back to the capital, creating large displaced slave populations (CS 2:195a). When a major city was captured it was looted of all valuable possessions, and frequently burned. The Hittites paid special attention to captured gold and silver, which is sometimes described in great detail in lists of plunder sent back to the capital (MHT 51–55). This plunder is naturally shared with the gods – the most important allies of the Hittite kings – and presumably with the soldiers as well, though this is generally not explicitly mentioned.
The Hurrians20
Early Hurrian conquests {2400–2190}21
The Hurrians first appear in historical records as mountain tribes of south-eastern Anatolia. From surviving linguistic evidence, philologists have determined that the Hurrian language is non-Indo-European; they appear to be related to the later Urartians who also inhabited south-eastern Anatolia in the first millennium (DANE 311–12). Around the twenty-fourth century, Hurrian names began to appear in the records from the Khabur Triangle region of north-eastern Syria and northern Mesopotamia. It was likely that the Hurrian conquest of that region was a complex phenomenon including peaceful migration, infiltration by mercenary bands in the pay of local city-states, followed by the rise to power of Hurrian mercenary warlords over predominantly Semitic inhabitants, and culminating in the eventual full-scale migration of Hurrian herding tribes out of the mountains into the more fertile river valleys (HE2 160–4). The lack of Hurrian names at Ebla in the twenty-fourth century indicates that they were still restricted to the Khabur triangle at that time (AS 285).
Although the precise sequence of military conquests cannot be determined, dynasties with Hurrian personal names and worshipping Hurrian gods – particularly the storm god Teshub and goddess Shauskha – appear in a number of Northern Mesopotamian city-states, including Kharbe, Nagar, and Urkesh.22 Tupkish, king of Urkesh, is the only Hurrian ruler known from this period (AS 284–5), during which Hurrians for the most part adopted the urban culture of the city-states they conquered. We have no evidence of a distinctive Hurrian military system.
Hurrian migration and domination of northern Mesopotamia and Syria was temporarily slowed during the period of Akkadian imperialism (HE2 161–3). Sargon {2334–2279} campaigned in northern Mesopotamia, probably in part against Hurrian city-states (R2:12, 15, 28–31; WH 7–8). His grandson Naram-Sin {2255–2218} also campaigned in the north, capturing a number of Hurrian city-states (R2: 91, 141; LKA 176–87; WH 8–9). The names Tahishatili of Azuhinnum and Puttim-atal appear to be Hurrian city-state rulers who were among the rebellious vassals of Naram-Sin (WH 8). Naram-Sin made the Hurrian citystate of Nagar his regional capital, where he built a large administrative palace (AS 278–81).
The second phase of Hurrian expansion {2190–1900}
The power vacuum left in Mesopotamia in the wake of the fall of the Akkadian empire in 2190 was filled in part by two non-Mesopotamian peoples: the Gutians in the south (see pp. 102–4) and the Hurrians in the north. Throughout this period Urkesh seems to have been the principal Hurrian city-state. We should not, however, think of a Hurrian “empire” during this period. Rather, there were a number of northern Mesopotamian city-states ruled by independent Hurrian dynasties, perhaps in some sort of loose confederation, sometimes allied together but sometimes feuding. We have only vague hints from scattered fragmentary records alluding to Hurrian-ruled city-states (WH 9–10). Talpus-atali ruled Nagar in the twenty-second century, one of the first independent Hurrian rulers after the fall of the Akkadians. The most important Hurrian ruler of this period was Atal-Shen {21C}, who was king of the two major Hurrian cities of Urkesh and Nagar, and probably of other cities as well (WH 9).
Hurrian arms met a second setback during the Ur III period {2112–2004}. After the Gutian warlords had been overthrown and driven from Mesopotamia by king Utuhegal of Uruk {2117–2111}, the successor Third Dynasty of Ur attempted to expand Sumerian power into northern Mesopotamia as well. Shulgi of Ur {2094–2047} in particular is noted for his campaigns up the Tigris river, where he engaged and conquered several Hurrian cities (see pp. 109–11).23 Lists of war-slaves obtained by the Sumerians during Shulgi's wars include numerous Hurrian names (WH 10). Shulgi's grandson Shusin {2037–2029} continued campaigning against the Hurrians in the north until his attention was diverted by the Amorite threat from the west (WH 10–11). Despite their success in the Tigris valley, neither of these two kings were able to capture the Hurrian heartland in the Khabur triangle, nor take the Hurrian's capital city of Urkesh.
In the last decades the Ur III dynasty, Hurrian fortunes revived under their great king Tish-atal {Y3 of Shusin = 2034}, who ruled from his capital Urkesh but included the cities of Nagar and Nineveh in his domain (WH 11–12). He seems to have successfully resisted further Ur III expansion into northern Mesopotamia, and wrote a temple dedicatory inscription, the oldest document in the Hurrian language:
Tish-atal, endan [god-king] of Urkesh, has built a temple for [the god] Nerigal.… Who destroys it, him may [the god] Lubadaga destroy.… May the mistress of Nagar [the goddess Shauskha?], the sun-god, and the storm-god [Teshub] [destroy] him who destroys it.
(WH 11)
An exasperating piece of evidence is a seal of unknown date and provenance which mentions “Tish-atal, king of Karahar [Harhar]” (WH 11). It is sometimes assumed that this has reference to the city of Harhar in western Iran, north-east of Babylon. A maximalist interpretation of this data is that the Hurrian king Tishatal's domain included not only the Khabur Triangle and the upper Tigris valley, but also part of western Iran in the Zagros Mountains. The minimalist interpretation is either that the city is misidentified, or that the king is a later Tish-atal. Unfortunately, the issue cannot be resolved with our limited evidence (WH 11–12).
Another source has recently come to light giving us additional evidence of Hurrian militarism at the end of the Early Bronze Age. Based on a recently discovered Hurrian mythological text on the fall of Ebla, Astour sees a description of an historical war between Ebla and the Hurrian kingdom of Ikinkalish (HE2 145). In the course of the war the Hurrian god Teshub ordains the destruction of Ebla for attacking Ikinkalish and enslaving some of its citizens (HE2 142):
I [Teshub] will smash the outer wall [of Ebla] like a goblet
I will trample the inner wall like a heap of refuse.
In the middle of the market I will crush the menfolk like a goblet
I will cast the incense burners of the upper city into the lower city
And cast the incense burners of the lower city into the river.
(HE2 156–9)
In response to the oracle from the gods, a coalition of three Hurrian kings, Arib-Ibla, Paib-Ibla, and Eshe-pabu, gathered their armies and captured and sacked Ebla. Astour believes that the city was subsequently ruled by a dynasty of Hurrian descent (HE2 164). Others attribute this destruction of Ebla in around 2000 to the Amorites.
The subsequent history of the kingdom of Urkesh is obscure due to lack of textual sources. Based on later Hurrian traditions tracing their kingship back to Urkesh (WH 12), it is presumed that the kingdom or confederation lasted several generations. By the eighteenth century the rulers of most of the city-states in northern Mesopotamia and north-east Syria were still Hurrian.
Hurrian expansion into Syria {1900–1600}
In the nineteenth through the sixteenth centuries Hurrian names begin to appear in records throughout Syria, indicating ongoing migration. Much of this migration was probably through the peaceful movement of merchants, mercenaries, craftsmen, nomads, slaves, or farmers. There is also, however, a good deal of evidence for ongoing and increasing Hurrian militarism. During these centuries Hurrian names appear in the texts of Mari, Emar, Ugarit, and Alalakh – where 50 percent of the names are Hurrian – indicating the migration of either groups or individuals into these areas. In some of these areas Hurrians appear to have risen to positions of power; the king of Ursha in northern Syria seems to have a Hurrian name (WH 15). By the seventeenth century some Hurrian clans have also migrated as far as Canaan, where their descendants later appear as the Horites (or Hivites) of the Bible (Gen. 34.2, Josh. 9.7).24
Hurrians were also active on the south-eastern fringes of Hittite central Anatolia, and strongly resisted Hittite imperialism in Syria. A letter from the Nesha archive {18C} mentions a Hurrian king Anumhirbi, king of Mama, a city apparently near modern Maras in eastern Turkey (WH 12). When Hattusilis I {1650–1620} campaigned against Arzawa (south-west Anatolia), the army of”the enemy of the city of the Hurrians entered my land” and attacked him from the rear (MHT 51). Throughout the Hittite wars, the Hurrians seem to have been strong allies of Aleppo. The city of Ursha, which strongly resisted a Hittite siege by Hattusilis as described above (pp. 298–300), appears to have been ruled by a Hurrian dynasty (KH 78; WH 15). During the siege, Hattusilis ordered his soldiers to “Make a battering-ram in the Hurrian manner”, indicating that he recognized the superiority of Hurrian siege technology (GH 148). On his campaign against Babylon in 1595, Mursilis mentions fighting Hurrians (CS 1:195a); he does not, however, claim to have conquered their land nor destroyed their cities. The later, more famous wars between the Hittites and the Hurrian kingdom of Mitanni were thus merely the continuation of an ongoing struggle which began in the seventeenth century.
By the late sixteenth century, the Hurrian city-state confederations of northeastern Syria and northern Mesopotamia appear to have coalesced into a major kingdom, destined to become one of the most powerful states of the Late Bronze Age: the kingdom of Mitanni (Hanigalbat), whose capital was Washukanni.25 During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the Hurrian king of Mitanni was considered the equal and rival of the other contemporary “Great Kings” of Egypt, Babylon, Assyria, and the Hittites.