During the first millennium of its military history, Egypt continued to face its four basic military problems: potential for internal revolt, the Nubian frontier to the south, the Libyan frontier to the west, and the Canaanite frontier to the northeast. All of the military campaigns of the Old Kingdom can be related to one of these four strategic issues.
Sources
As with much of the ancient Near East, the sources for a military history of the Old Kingdom are fragmentary and unsatisfactory. Royal inscriptions give only laconic references to the king “smiting” his enemies, but can provide a rough chronology of military activity. Military art memorializing the great martial deeds of the king or his commanders is potentially a valuable source of information for the Old Kingdom. This can be organized into two types: royal temples and tombs; and the private tombs of nobles. Unfortunately, neither source is very fruitful for the Old Kingdom. For the most part, both royal and private tomb art was concerned with funerary ritual, prayers and offerings preparing the tomb's occupant for the afterlife. Kings were generally depicted as divine figures fulfilling their cosmic religious functions. From surviving architecture and fragments of murals from royal temples, however, it is clear that they once contained important reliefs of royal military campaigns broadly similar to the massive monumental military murals of the New Kingdom. Unfortunately, Old and Middle Kingdom temples were used for centuries as quarries by later builders, and only fragments of these have survived, which will be discussed in this chapter (BSMK; NEA 21–3).
The biographical inscriptions of Egyptian nobles have proven to be our most important sources for military history (EAE 1:184–9). The purpose of the autobiographical inscriptions in ancient Egypt was threefold: first, to insure that the proper funerary rituals, offerings, and prayers were conducted; second, to describe the moral perfection of the deceased as one worthy to obtain a happy afterlife; and finally to memorialize the greatest achievements of the deceased (AEAB, 5–7). The earliest archaic prototype of the funerary autobiography is the inscription of Merka {2850?}, which amounts to little more than a list of titles including the military offices he held (EDE 148–9). More detailed autobiographies begin during the Fifth Dynasty {2513–2374} (AEAB 5–20; ARE 1:99–127). For the most part the earliest biographies contain little military information, dealing instead with ritual and courtly functions, and honors received by the deceased from the king. By the Sixth Dynasty {2374–2191}, however, some autobiographies begin to emphasize the military exploits of the deceased, providing us with the major sources of information on military campaigns and organization during the Old Kingdom.
Third Dynasty {2687–2649}2
Despite the cultural and architectural splendors of the beginning of the Pyramid Age, the Third Dynasty is very poorly documented in military matters. Indeed, the cultural magnificence of the Pyramid Age is based in part on the absolute military predominance Egypt had achieved during the Early Dynastic Period over any potential rival military power. The exact order and length of reigns of the kings of the Third Dynasty is only poorly understood. Whatever military activities occurred were either left largely unrecorded, or such records have perished – for example, the section of the royal annals known as the Palermo Stone dealing with Third Dynasty kings is lost. This may in part be because there were relatively few military campaigns during this era. Given the great resources and military potential of Egypt during this period, its military strength probably seemed overwhelming to its possible enemies. On the other hand, since the major royal inscriptions of this period relate to the ritual and religious functions of the kings, military matters may have been deemed unimportant for the funerary cult, and may thus be under-represented in surviving funerary evidence. It should thus be emphasized that it is likely that Third Dynasty kings undertook unrecorded military expeditions, and the picture we have of Egyptian military history is thus a minimal one.
The major source of military information is a sequence of victory reliefs and inscriptions at the Egyptian malachite, turquoise and copper-mining camp and military outpost at Wadi al-Mughara in the south-western Sinai.3 Turquoise was a highly prized gemstone for jewelry and ornamentation (DAE 297). Copper was an increasingly important metal for tools and weapons, and was thus at least in part a military resource. The pharaohs of the Third Dynasty therefore made every effort to keep control of their mines in the Sinai, and to protect the caravan routes connecting those mines with the Nile Valley. The scarce water and food resources at Wadi al-Mughara in the Sinai meant that only a limited number of men could be maintained as a garrison in the area. It is likely that many of them served double duty as both quarry-men and soldiers.
The precise nature of the relationship between the Second and Third Dynasties is uncertain. There is some evidence that the first king of the Third Dynasty, Djoser, was the son of Khasekhemwy, the last king of the Second Dynasty from his wife Nimaathap. Whatever the exact interrelationship, there was strong continuity between the two dynasties, indicating a peaceful transition.4
Djoser (Netjerikhet) {2687–2668}5 is rightly renowned for constructing the first great stepped pyramid at Saqqara. Militarily, his only major recorded expedition was to the mines at Wadi Maghara in south-west Sinai, where he claims to have defeated bedouin raiders (PSE Figure 11). His successor Sekhemkhet (Djoser-Tety) {2668–2662} recorded three expeditions to the Sinai, where stylized reliefs show the king smiting the cowering bedouins.6 Sanakht (Nebka) {2662–2653} has two victory reliefs at Wadi al-Mughara. The first depicts the king carrying a mace, worshipping at a shrine of Horus with a banner of the wolf war-god Wep-wawet, while the second is the traditional “smiting-the-enemy” pose.7 Huny (Qahedjet) {2653–2649}, the last king of the dynasty, probably built or expanded the fortification at Elephantine,8 perhaps against a rising Nubian threat which would be fully faced by Sneferu, first king of the Fourth Dynasty. A statue base from an unknown king of the Third Dynasty depicts the king standing on the bearded heads of executed Canaanite war prisoners (ISP 95).
A very late Egyptian legend recorded by Manetho claims that, during the reign of a Third Dynasty king called Necherophes, “the Libyans revolted against Egypt, and when the moon waxed unseasonably, they were terrified and returned to their allegiance” (Man. 11–12). Assuming that this incident is not entirely legendary, it is not clear with which king of the Third Dynasty Necherophes should be equated. The Horus name of Djoser, Netjerikhet, is a weak possible parallel; if so, this Libyan war may refer to the final subjugation of the western delta or desert in the wake of Khasekhemwy's reunification of Egypt at the end of the Second Dynasty, described on p. 323.
Fourth Dynasty {2649–2513}9
Although military records for the Fourth Dynasty are still fragmentary, we begin to see, for the first time in Egyptian history, details on military affairs beyond variations of the stylized “smiting-the-enemy” motif. The transition from the Third to the Fourth Dynasty seems to have been relatively peaceful, with power passing from Huni to Sneferu, his son by a concubine Meresankh.
Sneferu {2649–2609}10
The founder of the Fourth Dynasty was also its greatest martial king, who was active in all aspects of Egyptian military affairs. In part this may represent the fact that we are fortunate to have Sneferu's reign relatively well preserved in the Palermo Stone and related annalistic fragments. Other kings may have been just as militarily active, but records of their campaigns, if any, are lost. None the less, Sneferu's military achievements are impressive. During his reign he campaigned against Nubia, Libya, and the Sinai, built fortifications in the north and south to strengthen the defense of Egypt, and engaged in a substantial naval building program. His military successes and expansion of trade laid the foundation for the cultural glories of his successors in the Pyramid Age.
In twelfth year of his reign {2637} Sneferu invaded northern Nubia, “smiting Nubia, bringing 7000 male and female live captives [as slaves], [and] 200,000 sheep and goats”.11 Assuming such figures are not exaggerations, this would represent a catastrophic defeat of the northern Nubians. Northern Nubia seems to have been temporarily occupied by Sneferu, for following his invasion he “built of the wall of the south” (PS 141), apparently referring to the construction or expansion of the great Egyptian fortress at Buhen.12 At the same time Sneferu also built the “wall of the north” (PS 141), a reference to unknown fortifications on the fringes of the delta for defense against either Libyans or Canaanites. Two reliefs at the Egyptian mining outpost at Wadi al-Mughara in the Sinai show that Sneferu was also militarily active in that region, describing “Sneferu, the great god … subjugating foreign countries”.13
Later in his reign, in a campaign against Libya, the military pattern was the same, with Sneferu describing “what was brought [as plunder] from Libya [Thnw]: 1100 live captives [and] 23,000 sheep and goats”.14 Such raids against Libyans in the Western Desert were probably not uncommon during the Old Kingdom. Sneferu's brief account provides our first glimpse of the scale of such operations; the total number of Egyptian soldiers involved was probably a few thousand at most.
Sneferu also greatly strengthened the Egyptian navy, building a number of ships up to 100 cubits (c. 50 meters) long, and a fleet of “sixty ‘sixteener’ royal boats of cedar” – a “sixteener” probably refers to a boat propelled by sixteen oars per side.15 A trading expedition to Byblos in Lebanon returned with forty shiploads of cedar wood for naval and building construction (PS 141; EWA 26a). Although these expeditions appear to have been solely trading voyages, there was often little distinction in the Egyptian view between military, trading, exploration, or mining expeditions; there was probably a military component to these merchant fleets, both for their protection and for “influencing” Egypt's trading partners. At the very least this incident demonstrates the development of the Egyptian navy, which by this time could man and supply a fleet of forty large ships and sail to Lebanon, foreshadowing more purely military expeditions in subsequent reigns. The full military implications of the rise of Egyptian naval power in the Mediterranean will become clearer in the reign of Pepi I in the Sixth Dynasty (pp. 336–40).
Khufu (Khnum-Khufu, Cheops) {2609–2584}16
As builder of the great pyramid of Giza, Khufu – better known by the Greek mispronunciation Cheops – is rightly one of the most famous kings of ancient Egypt. From the military perspective, however, he is an undistinguished successor to his martial father Sneferu. It may be that Senferu's many military victories left Egypt with a period of predominance and peace, but, whatever the reason, Khufu's reign records few military activities.
A relief at Wadi al-Maghara in Sinai describes “Khnum-Khufu, the great god smiting the nomads”.17 Another inscription records a similar expedition to the quarries at Hatnub on the west coast of the Red Sea (LHAE 249). A third expedition seems to have been undertaken to diorite quarries to the west of Abu Simbel in Nubia, perhaps indicating a continuation of the hegemony over northern Nubia that had been established by Sneferu (HAE 71; C1/2 167). We have no information during this period of the size of these mining expeditions, nor the details of their activities. In general, however, such expeditions had three major functions: protecting caravans going to and from the mines; protecting the miners and mining operations outside the Nile Valley; and undertaking punitive operations against bedouin raiders (LA 2:55–68).
Two other military artifacts from the age of Khufu merit attention: an archery scene, and the royal ship of Khufu – which will be discussed in detail on p. 366. The archery scene is a fragment of battle relief from Khufu's mortuary complex depicting archers drawing their bows (AW 1:146; EWA 29). This scene is remarkable in a number of ways. The mere existence of this fragment from the temple murals implies that Khufu undertook unrecorded military expeditions, once depicted on now-lost murals. Artistically it represents the first surviving example of the stylized representation of Egyptian warfare that would, broadly speaking, remain the normative style for Egyptian martial art for the next 2500 years. It is stylistically quite different than the martial representations of the Early Dynastic Period, yet obviously has a long period of artistic development behind it. Such a highly developed style might indicate that it is quite likely that more martial art was created during the Old Kingdom, although only fragments survive. Third, in contrast to the rough-and-tumble chaos depicted in Early Dynastic martial art, the archers in the Old Kingdom are in orderly ranks drawing their bows in unison, possibly pointing to the development of more formalized organization and tactical formations. Finally, the bows themselves are self-bows, with braided strings; several arrows are held by each archer; the bows are drawn only to the elbow.
Successors of Khufu {2584–2513}18
We have almost no information concerning the military affairs of Khufu's successors. Khufu's son Djedefhor {2584–2576} succeeded his father to the throne; there are no known military activities of this rule, but some scholars speculate, based on deliberate damage to tombs and inscriptions, that there may have been some type of power struggle for the throne with his half-brother Khafre (HAE 72–3). However this may be, Khafre {2576–2551} – better know by his Greek name Chephren – came to the throne and ruled for a quarter of a century, and is renowned for building the Sphinx and the second pyramid of Giza.19 We have no information about any military campaigns save for a fragmentary relief of a bound war-captive from Khafre's pyramid causeway (NEA 22). Under Khafre, mining expeditions were sent to Toshka, in Nubia, and the Sinai (EAE 2:231). The military affairs of Khafre's son Menkaure (Mycernius) {2551–2523} – builder of the third pyramid of Giza – and grandson Shepseskaf {2523–2519} are likewise obscure.20
The exact genealogical relationship between the Fourth and Fifth Dynasties is somewhat uncertain, but succession seems to have passed through Khentkawes, Menkaure's daughter, whose descendants formed the Fifth Dynasty.
Fifth Dynasty {2513–2374}21
As with most of the Old Kingdom, we have only limited and fragmentary information about the military history of the Fifth Dynasty. It is not until the end of this dynasty that we begin to see details of military history emerging. There are a number of indications of the increasing importance of the solar cult and the power and wealth of the priesthood of the Sun-god Re at Heliopolis (ancient Iunu, biblical On). The annals from the Palermo Stone record numerous large gifts to the cult of the Sun-god (PS 152–80). Theophoric names of the pharaohs associated with Re, the rise to prominence of the sun-temple of Heliopolis, and changes in funerary ritual and practice all indicate a shift in religious ideology and power.22 From the perspective of military history the rise of the power of priestly elites reflects a decentralization of royal authority to both priestly and secular regional powers. This trend is confirmed late in the Fifth Dynasty when we see provincial authorities gaining greater local autonomy, the ability of ministers and courtiers to make their offices hereditary, and the building of magnificent and richly endowed tombs (mastabas) for important court officials. These trends, beginning in the Fifth Dynasty, culminated in the collapse of a united Egypt at the end of the Sixth Dynasty.
The first king of the Fifth Dynasty, Userkaf {2513–2506}, is believed to have carried out expeditions into the Eastern Desert and against Nubia (EAE 598a, 588b). He recorded that 303 prisoners from an unnamed campaign were given to his pyramid, probably to serve as slave laborers for its construction (PS 217–18), as well as 70 foreign women as tribute (EWA 30). Sahure {2506–2492}23 carried out three recorded military expeditions. The first was to the mines in the Sinai, which returned with “6000 measures of copper”, and which also hailed the king as the “smiter of all countries”.24 The second two are campaigns against Libya and Canaan, which were memorialized in his funerary temple (AEA 207); they are the first surviving examples of fully developed martial murals, and remain a mainstay of Egyptian military history and ideology for the next 1500 years. The first mural, on the south wall, depicts an expedition against Libya,25 showing the king in his stylized mace-smiting scene. There are a number of registers showing Libyan captives and spoils being brought before the gods, including the wife and children of the Libyan chieftain (AAK 2/1:5). There are no surviving scenes of actual combat. The emphasis is on how the gods granted victory to Sahure, who in return gave slaves and tribute to the gods (presumably via donations to temples). The second mural, on the east wall, depicts an expedition to Syria, which shows a fleet departing, and returning in glory, hailing the king as “God of the living”.26 This may have been an entirely peaceful trading expedition, but is important evidence of the rise of Egyptian naval power, which will be discussed on pp. 366–7.
We have no military information about Sahure's two successors, Neferirkare Kakai {2492–2482} and Shepseskare {2482–2475}. Raneferef (or Neferefre) {2475–2474} undertook military expeditions into southern Canaan and Nubia, depicted in fragmentary statues of Nubian and Canaanite prisoners from his funerary temple.27 At his death there may have been a struggle for succession between rival branches of the royal family. The details are not known, and the struggle may have been peaceful, but it could have included some military operations in association with an attempted coup. The next two kings of the dynasty, Newoserre Any {2474–2444} and Menkauhor {2444–2436} each record expeditions to the mines at Wadi Mughara in the Sinai (ARE 1:114, 120; PSE Figure 17); Newoserre also has a statue of a bound Canaanite captive in his mortuary temple, perhaps alluding to a campaign in Canaan (EWA 34; PSE Figure 18).
Djedkare Izezi (Isesi) {2436–2404}28 campaigned twice in the Sinai, declaring himself in memorial inscriptions to be the “Great God [who] smites the Canaanites” and the “smiter of all countries” (ARE 1:121; EWA 36; PSE Figure 19). He also continued his predecessors’ maritime relations with Byblos, and with Punt, which may have included a military component (EWA 36a). Punt is a somewhat vague geographical term referring to lands on the south-west coast of the Red Sea – broadly the coasts of modern southern Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia – and was the source of many highly prized exotic trade goods such as aromatics and panther skins (DAE 231–2; EAE 3:85–6). The expedition to Punt was under the command of the “seal-bearer Bawerded”, who brought back a “pygmy of the god's dances” to court, an event remembered at court a century later (AEL 1:26). Statues of bound Canaanite captives were found in Djedkare's funerary temple, with an inscription describing “the prostration of all the multitudes [and the] overthrowing of the foreign lands” (EWA 36–6a). A mining–military expedition was also sent to the diorite quarries to the west of Abu Simbel (HAE 79). The date of the important military mural from the tomb of Inty at Deshasheh is uncertain; some scholars think it may represent a campaign by Djedkare; others date it to the early sixth dynasty (NAE 30; EAE 2:590b). It will be discussed on pp. 358–9 in the broader discussion of Old Kingdom siegecraft.
The final king of the Fifth Dynasty, Unas (Wenis){2404–2374} (HAE 80; EAE 2:590, 600–1), is noted for his pyramid at Saqqara containing the earliest Pyramid Texts, which will be discussed on pp. 353–4, and fragmentary murals from its associated causeway (EWA 38). From the military perspective the most important mural is a battle scene depicting Egyptian soldiers armed with bows and daggers “smiting the Shasi”, or eastern bedouins, while the mortuary temple contains statues of bound Canaanites (NEA 24–5; EWA 38–9; PSE Figure 22b). The causeway also depicts maritime expeditions to Byblos. Unas is said to have met for negotiations with chieftains of the Nubians at Elephantine. It is sometimes inferred from this that there was increasing unrest in Nubia as Egyptian domination began to subside – instead of issuing the standard claim that the king had crushed the Nubians, Unas was forced to negotiate (EAE 2:590a). The most famous mural from Unas's causeway depicts starving people begging for food (ISP 120); one of the figures is bearded, possibly representing a Canaanite (ANEP §102). The precise context for this scene is unknown, but is probably meant to memorialize Unas's beneficence in providing food to the hungry. From the military perspective, it reminds us that starvation has frequently been associated with war, either because natural disasters leading to hunger can be a contributing cause of war, or because war frequently brings hunger and deprivation in its wake.
Sixth Dynasty {2374–2191}29
The exact relationship between the fifth and sixth dynasties is obscure; some scholars assume that Teti {2374–2354}, its first king, was the son-in-law of Unas, last king of the Fifth Dynasty (EAE 3:379–81). Teti's Horus name, Seheteptawi, means “He who pacifies the two lands”, and has been taken by some scholars to imply a contested succession to the throne which required some “pacification” to secure completely. A number of Teti's important ministers, including Mehu, Kagemni, and Isi, all had served in the administration of the former king Unas, however, indicating a strong continuity between the dynasties. Military activities during Teti's reign are poorly documented. His mortuary temple includes stylized statues of bound captives, indicating the defeat of Canaanites (EWA 41a–2); there is also mention of an expedition to the alabaster quarries at Hatnub. Maritime expeditions to Punt and Byblos are implied in surviving artifacts (C1/2:190). Graffiti found at Tomas in Nubia indicate caravans to Nubia were active in this period (EAE 3:380). Later legends – which cannot be confirmed by contemporary sources – claim that Teti was murdered by one of his guardsmen (Man. 19–20). Teti was briefly succeeded by an ephemeral and poorly attested ruler, Userkare, who may have been the instigator of the palace coup.
Pepy I (Phiops) {2354–2310} (EAE 3:33–4; LA 4:926)
Whatever the authenticity of the legends of assassination, Teti's legitimate and stable successor was his son Pepy I. Inscriptions record expeditions to the Sinai, the Hatnub quarries, and Wadi Hammamat (ARE 1:136–40; PSE figs 20–1). Most of these expeditions had at least a military component to them, and for the first time we begin to see the names and deeds of the actual commanders. The Sinai rock relief shows the traditional head-smiting scene, with an inscription, “The Great God [Pepy I] it is that smites and subdues the Montiu [mntw] of all foreign lands” (EWA 43). In reality, the Sinai expedition was under the leadership of the “commander of the army Ibdu, son of the commander of the troops Merire-onekh” (ARE 1:139). The Wadi Hammamat expedition likewise had a military escort, commanded by “God's [Pepy's] seal-bearer, overseer of the army … overseer of foreign lands” (EWA 44). At least one maritime expedition to Byblos was also undertaken (EWA 45), as well as a gold-seeking expedition to Nubia (HAE 81).
Pepy's court, however, was not without intrigue, perhaps reflecting ongoing instability spun off by the usurpation of Userkare. Pepy's first wife was charged with conspiracy, and tried in a secret tribunal (AEL 1:19). He thereafter married two daughters of Khui, a noble of Abydos, one of whom was the mother of Merenre, Pepy's successor. The fact that Pepy was succeeded by a younger son has led some to speculate that the elder heir apparent was involved in the coup attempt associated with his mother, and thereby lost the throne, if not his life. In any event, through its marriage to the royal family, the clan of Khui would come to play a prominent role in the rest of the Sixth Dynasty (HAE 83), providing further evidence of the rising power of the regional nobility that would eventually destabilize Egypt. Pepy I is also noted for his decentralizing reforms of the Egyptian administration. A large portion of royal property devolved into the hands of private courtiers or temple priesthoods, encouraging the cults of local deities. This included exemptions from taxes and labor obligations to the king, as well as giving increasing autonomy to regional governors and priests. This culminated in the rise of semi-independent nomarchs (governors of nomes or provinces, EAE 1:16–20; LA 2:385–417), whose growing power is symbolized by their large rock-cut tombs and mastabas (brick tomb mounds, EAE 3:433–42). Pepy attempted to secure the loyalty of these rising nomarchs by intermarriage with them, including the marriage of his daughter to his vizier Mereruka. In one sense these actions certainly strengthened the immediate power of Pepy I and his dynasty by binding regional strongmen to his family. On the other hand, the rise of these semi-independent nomarchs laid the foundation for the fragmentation of the Egyptian state in the First Intermediate Period (see p. 368).
A life-size copper statue of Pepy I was found at Hierakonpolis, the earliest copper statue discovered in Egypt (TEM 89). From the military perspective it represents the expansion of the availability of copper, and hence the potential for more copper-based weapons. None the less, it is likely that the average Egyptian soldiers were still largely armed with stone weapons at this time; copper remained a metal for the elites. As is traditional in Old Kingdom mortuary temples, Pepy's temple contains statues of bound captive Canaanites and Nubians, emphasizing the military exploits of his reign (EWA 46, EAE 3:33). His copper statue also depicts Pepy trampling the “Nine Bows”, a symbolic name of Egypt's traditional enemies (HAE 84). Since such statues are stylized, and perhaps even ritual in purpose, they may simply represent the ideal order of the universe rather than actual military expeditions that returned with real captives. However, that the captive statues in Pepy's mortuary temple could represent the results of real campaigns is confirmed by the most important military document of the Old Kingdom, the autobiography of Weni.
Weni's campaigns to Canaan {c. 2350–2330}30
With the reign of Pepy I we begin, for the first time, to see written details of Egyptian military campaigns. The most extensive and important source is the autobiography of Weni of Abydos {c. 2375–2305?},31 one of the leading generals and courtiers of the age. It is the first eyewitness account of any detail of warfare in Egypt. Weni's battle narrative of his campaigns to Canaan begins with a description of the mobilization of the army of Egypt:
When his majesty took action against the Eastern Sand-dwellers, his majesty made an army of many tens of thousands from all of Upper Egypt: from Yebu [Aswan] in the south to Medenyt [Aphroditopolis] in the north; from Lower Egypt: from all of the Two-Sides-of-the-House and from Sedjer and Khen-sedjru; and [mercenaries] from Irtjet-Nubians, Medja-Nubians, Yam-Nubians, Wawat-Nubians, Kaau-Nubians; and from Tjemeh [southern Libyans].
(AEL 1:19)
This text first tells us that, unlike later pharaohs, king Pepy did not go on this campaign himself. It is not clear if this was the norm for the Old Kingdom, but there is little evidence from this period for kings engaging in actual combat. The enemy was the “Sand-dwellers” an Egyptian ethnonym referring to the peoples of the Sinai and southern Canaan. We are not told the background to the campaign, but apparently it was a fairly serious matter, for the army allegedly consisted of “many tens of thousands”. This may be an example of the hyperbole that sometimes infects the tomb autobiographies of Egypt, but certainly the army would have numbered in the thousands. It is also unlikely that the entire force was composed of combatants. Areas of recruitment were divided into three categories: troops of Upper Egypt, of Lower Egypt, and Nubians. There is no direct evidence of a standing army in the Old Kingdom, and it is not clear from this text if the soldiers were professional or militia – or, most likely, a combination of both. Faulkner argues that there must have been some type of standing army for policing the country, royal security, responding to raiders, and maintaining control of Nubian mercenaries (EMO 33). At any rate, most nomes in the country were required to supply men for military service for the war in Canaan.
Weni's description of the Nubian mercenaries is interesting for a number of reasons. There are five specific Nubian tribes mentioned: Irtjet, Medja (or Medjay), Yam, Wawat, and Kaau. These names represent regions or clans in Nubia from between the First and the Third Cataracts.32 The most famous of these are the Medjay, from the Eastern Desert and eastern banks of the Nubian Nile, who served as light infantry mercenaries in later periods. The final group of auxiliary troops was from “Tjemeh-land”, generally thought to be Libyans from the deserts to the west of southern Egypt and northern Nubia. The exact political relationship between Egypt and northern Nubia is unclear. Egyptians probably had some sort of hegemony over these tribes, but apparently did not have direct administrative control over the region. As tributary tribes the Nubians were required not to raid southern Egypt, but instead to serve as Egyptian mercenaries, probably for both pay and plunder. Using Nubians as mercenaries had a number of advantages for the Egyptians. First, it limited Nubian raids against Egypt. Second, it provided a source of war-like manpower. The Nubians could be used as border guards to defend the southern frontier against other raids from rival Nubian tribes, as well as troops for campaigns elsewhere, as in Weni's invasion of Canaan. The Egyptians were thus employing for the first time what would become the time-tested tactic of “using barbarians to fight barbarians”.33 A strong force of Nubian mercenaries could also provide a counter-balance to the growing independent military power of the nomarchs.
Weni next provides a list of the various Egyptian officials who took part in the campaign:
His majesty sent me at the head of this army, there being counts, royal seal-bearers, sole companions of the palace, chieftains and mayors of towns of Upper and Lower Egypt, companions, commander of foreigners, chief priests of Upper and Lower Egypt, and chief district officials at the head of the troops of Upper and Lower Egypt, from the villages and towns that they governed and from the Nubians of those foreign lands.
(AEL 1:20)
34
Weni's purpose here is to describe his own remarkable authority, listing all the mighty officials of Egypt who were under his command. But, from the military perspective, this text also tells us two other important things. Most of the leaders of the expedition had some type of normal non-military function, and were doubling as military leaders. For the offices listed by Weni, only “commander of foreigners” seems to be a military title. The regional governmental administrators and officials were in command of the military units raised in their villages and nomes. This is perhaps an indication that the provincial Egyptian army was a militia force, but it also implies that local nomarchs had command over their own regional military units; this apparent regional military autonomy would culminate in full independence of warring nomarchs during the First Intermediate Period.
Weni took his duties as commander seriously, boasting of the logistical efficiency with which the army operated.
I was the one who commanded them – while my rank was that of overseer of [royal tenants] – because of my rectitude, so that no one attacked his fellow, so that no one seized a loaf or sandals from a traveler, so that no one took a cloth from any town, so that no one took a goat from anyone. I led them from Northern Isle and [gate] of Iyhotep [in] the district of Horus-lord-of-truth [north-eastern Delta] while being in this rank.… I determined the number of these troops [through a military census]. It had never been determined by any servant.
(AEL 1:20)
Weni's emphasis on the fact that under his command the army was orderly and did not plunder Egyptian villages through which it passed on the way to Canaan could be seen as an indictment of the typical behavior of an Egyptian army in this age, which presumably engaged in precisely these types of activities – otherwise, why would Weni boast of accomplishing something that was the norm for Egyptian armies on campaign? This passage also implies that the Egyptians were well aware of logistical issues – an army needed bread, sandals, clothing, and goats, and if they were not provided by the leader, the soldiers would plunder them from the people. In this regard Weni emphasizes that he actually “determined the number of these troops”, something which “had never been determined by any servant” before. In other words, his ability to prevent the army from plundering was directly related to the fact that he had numbered his army, and therefore knew something of the order of magnitude of supplies that would be required – something that had apparently seldom been done before. In a sense Weni's former functions as a court administrator prepared him for the logistical demands of his military campaign to Canaan. We see, in other words, the birth of logistics – the fact that getting an army intact to the battlefield was in many ways just as important as tactical leadership during the battle.
Weni also provides us with the world's first example of martial poetry. While not giving any tactical details of actual battles, Weni makes the overall results of the campaign very clear.
This army returned in safety,
It had ravaged the Sand-dwellers’ land.
This army returned in safety,
It had flattened the Sand-dwellers’ land.
This army returned in safety,
It had sacked its strongholds.
This army returned in safety,
It had cut down its figs, its vines.
This army returned in safety,
It had thrown fire in all its [dwellings].
This army returned in safety,
It had slain its troops by many ten-thousands.
This army returned in safety,
[It had carried] off many [troops] as captives.
(AEL 1:20)
In this poem, already discussed on pp. 275–6, Weni provides us with no geographical specifics of which cities were attacked, but the descriptions of capturing fortresses and destroying agriculture makes it clear that the war was with the urban city-states of southern Canaan rather than merely bedouins. An Egyptian army of as many as ten or twenty thousand would have been an overwhelming force to the Canaanite city-states of the twenty-fourth century; Weni's description of devastating the land, capturing fortified cites, destroying agriculture, burning, plundering, and enslaving is probably an authentic picture of an Egyptian army marauding through southern Canaan.
With booty and slaves, Weni and his army returned to praise and triumph in Egypt: “His majesty praised me for [this victory] beyond anything” (AEL 1:20). Unfortunately, from the Egyptian perspective, the invasion only served to further inflame anti-Egyptian sentiments – “rebellion” as the Egyptians viewed it – requiring four additional campaigns, in which Weni also claimed victory.
His majesty sent me to lead this army five times, to attack the land of the Sand-dwellers as often as they rebelled, with these troops. I acted so that his majesty praised me [for it beyond anything].
(AEL 1:20)
The fact that the Egyptians were compelled to make five major expeditions into Canaan demonstrates that, even with their overwhelming military might, they were either unable to, or uninterested in, establishing permanent stable control over Canaan.
Weni's biography provides additional strategic details for one of his five campaigns – though which one is uncertain.
Told there were marauders among these foreigners at the nose of Gazelle's-head, I crossed in ships with these troops. I made a landing in the back of the height of the mountain range, to the north of the land of the Sand-dwellers, while half of this army was on the road [approaching from the south]. I came and caught them all and slew every marauder among them.
(AEL 1:20)
This passage first tells us that the Egyptians had some type of intelligence available concerning Canaan, whether from returning merchants, collaborating kings of city-states, or, possibly, Egyptian garrisons. However the information was obtained, the Egyptians responded quickly. Splitting his force in two, Weni sent half by sea and half by land in a strategic double envelopment, crushing Egypt's enemies. The location of the “Gazelle's-head” mountain is uncertain, but most scholars associate it with Mt. Carmel near modern Haifa in Israel. If this is correct, the Egyptians were able to mobilize a fleet capable of transporting at least hundreds, and possibly several thousand men, for several hundred miles. While it is likely that soldiers had accompanied earlier trading expedition both for the protection of Egyptian merchants and the intimidation of trading partners, this is the first account we have of transporting a major army by sea. Large-scale maritime trade, which had begun at least three centuries earlier during the reign of Sneferu {2649–2609}, who received forty shiploads of timber from Byblos (PS 141–3), had by now developed into the capacity to successfully transport major armies across the Mediterranean Sea, illustrating the important military principle that where merchants go, armies can eventually follow.
Weni's remarkable autobiography thus provides us with a number of Egyptian military “firsts”. It is the first example of a detailed eyewitness military memoir, the first evidence of the extensive use of foreign mercenaries, the first recognition of the importance of logistics, the first martial poetry, the first example of strategic double envelopment, amphibious operations, and combined operations by land and sea. But although Weni's autobiography provides the first surviving recorded examples, centuries of military development lay behind Weni's remarkable achievements. There were undoubtedly earlier examples for which no evidence has survived.
Merenre II (Antyemsaf) {2310–2300} and Nubia35
Merenre, son of Pepy I, had a short but eventful reign. The redoubtable Weni again appears in the reign of Merenre again as governor of Upper Egypt, where he records leading quarrying expeditions to Aswan for granite and Hatnub for alabaster (AEL 1:21). More importantly, however, he constructed “five canals” designed to allow boats to float around the First Cataract at Aswan for transporting granite. The “foreign [Nubian] chiefs of Irtjet, Wawat, Yam and Medja cut the [acacia] timber” for the boats used on the canal (AEL 1:21–2); these are precisely the same tribes who sent troops with Weni on the Canaanite expeditions described above, further emphasizing their probable tributary status to Egypt. In theory these canals could have had military applications by floating troops and supplies around the First Cataract, thereby facilitating Egyptian military operations in Nubia. The building of this canal may thus in part be connected to Merenre's overall Nubian policy; we shall see that direct Egyptian dominance of Nubia increased in the following centuries.
The expeditions of Horkhuf (Harkhuf) {2310–2300}36
However that may be, it is clear that, whereas Pepy had focused his attention on Canaan with the five campaigns of Weni, the reign of Merenre is closely associated with the foreign affairs of Nubia. Several inscriptions at Tomas, in the modern northern Sudan, record the passing of Egyptian expeditions through the region (HAE 85). The most important record of Egyptian intervention into Nubia was the autobiography of Horkhuf, apparently Weni's successor as governor of southern Egypt. Horkhuf's autobiography is important because it provides the clearest evidence as to how Old Kingdom trading, exploring, and mining expeditions were often indistinguishable from military operations. Horkhuf was governor of Upper Egypt, as well as a royal administrator, mayor of Nekheb, and a lector-priest (AEL 1:23–5), again reflecting the wide range of civil, economic, religious, and military offices held by Egyptian officials. From the military perspective, Horkhuf's major offices were “commander of foreigners” and “governor of all mountain lands belonging to the southern region”, meaning the desert and mountain regions outside the Nile valley. In this function, Horkhuf claims to have “cast the dread of [the war-god] Horus into the foreign lands”, or, in other words, to have intimidated the Nubian and Libyan tribes of the region to acquiesce to Egypt's wishes (AEL 1:25).
Horkhuf undertook three expeditions into Nubia, which provide the most detailed surviving accounts of the trade–military expeditions of the Old Kingdom. The major purpose of these expeditions was trade or tribute – the two are barely distinguishable in the Old Kingdom. As Horkhuf put it, he was to “bring the produce of all foreign lands to his lord” king Merenre (AEL 1:25).
In his first expedition, Horkhuf went with his father Iri, who may have had actual command of the expedition. In his second expedition Horkhuf was clearly in charge.
The majesty of Merenre, my lord, sent me together with my father, the sole companion and lector-priest, Iri, to Yam [between the Second and Third Cataracts], to open the way to that country. I did it in seven months; I brought from it all kinds of beautiful and rare gifts, and was praised for it very greatly.
His majesty sent me a second time [without my father]. I went up on the Yebu [Aswan] road and came down via Mekher, Terers, and Irtjetj (which are in) Irtjet in the space of eight months. I came down bringing gifts from that country in great quantity, the likes of which had never before been brought back to this land. I came down through the region of the house of the [Nubian] chief of Setju and Irtjet, I explored those foreign lands. I have not found it done by any companion and commander of foreigners who went to Yam previously.
(AEL 1:25)
These two journeys each took seven to eight months, covering a route along the Nile of 300–350 miles each way, or 700 miles for the round trip. This gives an average travel distance of only 100 miles a month, 25 miles a week, or only four miles a day. Obviously Horkhuf's men spent a great deal of time trading, but probably also explored side wadis such as the Wadi ’Allaqi, which could have added several hundred miles to the overall journey. The tribal names mentioned in the text – Mekher, Terers, Irtjetj, and Setju – are all tribal areas between the First Cataract at Aswan and the Second Cataract near Buhen; the entire region has been flooded by Lake Nasser since the building of the Aswan Dam in the 1960s. Given that Weni had constructed a canal around the first cataract a few years earlier, it is possible that the expedition was accompanied by a river fleet on part of its journey.
The first expedition was essentially a trading operation to bring back “all kinds of beautiful and rare gifts”. The second, however, although it was also concerned with trade, or “gifts”, was much more focused on exploration – Harkhuf “explored those foreign lands” that had never been explored before. From the military perspective, we find an Egyptian armed caravan seemingly operating with impunity in the lands of ostensibly autonomous, and possibly hostile Nubian chiefs, implying that there was a strong military component to the second expedition, which is explicitly mentioned in Horkhuf's third expedition. This Egyptian predominance seems to have been possible because of disunity among the Nubian tribes of the region. The presence of father and son together on the first expedition is another indication that provincial authority was becoming increasingly hereditary in the late Old Kingdom.
From the military perspective, Horkhuf's third expedition is the most interesting. The date is not given, but it is generally assumed that it occurred near the end of the reign of Merenre {2300}.
Then his majesty sent me a third time to Yam. I went up from the nome of This [Abydos] upon the Oasis road [via the Kharga Oasis]. I found that the ruler of Yam [the land between the Second and Third Cataracts] had gone off to Tjemeh-land [deserts west of the Nile valley, home of the Tjemeh tribe of Libyans], to smite the Tjemeh [Libyans] to the western corner of heaven. I went up after him to Tjemeh-land and satisfied him, so that he praised all the gods for the sovereign [king of Egypt].
I sent a report with a [Nubian] man from Yam to the retinue of Horus, to let the majesty of Merenre, my lord, know [that I had gone to Tjemeh-land] after the ruler of Yam.
Now when I had satisfied this ruler of Yam, I came down through [the Nile Valley and the Second Cataract] south of Irtjet and north of Setju. I found the ruler of [the Nubian confederacy of] Irtjet, Setju, and Wawat. I came down with three hundred donkeys laden with incense, ebony, hknw-oil, s3t, panther skins, elephants’ tusks, throw sticks, and all sorts of good products. Now when the ruler of Irtjet, Setju, and Wawat saw how strong and numerous the [allied Nubian mercenary] troop from Yam was which came down with me to the residence together with the [Egyptian] army that had been sent with me, this ruler escorted me, gave me cattle and goats [for supplies], and led me on the mountain paths of Irtjet [on the ridge to the west of the Nile valley] – because of the excellence of the vigilance I had employed beyond that of any companion and commander of the foreigners who had been sent to Yam before.
(AEL 1:25–6)
Reading a bit between the lines, we can broadly outline the military relations on the Nubian frontier as follows. Around 2330 Weni was using Nubian mercenaries from the Irtjet, Medja, Yam, Wawat, and Kaau tribes for Egyptian campaigns in Canaan. It is unclear if the Nubians participated because of coercion or were voluntarily seeking adventure and a share of the plunder of Canaan; most likely a combination of both. By around 2310, however, relations on the Nubian frontier seem strained. Horkhuf is able to operate relatively freely in northern Nubia, but the passage of his expedition was probably expensive and disruptive. The Nubians therefore formed a confederacy of the disunited Nubian tribes of Irtjet, Setju, and Wawat to unite under the leadership of the “chief of Irtjet”.
This forced Horkhuf's third expedition to take the Oasis Road (LA 4:541–2) through the desert, thereby bypassing northern Nubia between the First and Second Cataracts, to reach Yam, the land between the Second and Third Cataracts. There Horkhuf“satisfied” the chief of Yam, apparently allying with the chief of Yam against his Libyan Tjemeh enemies, and greatly strengthening his overall position. In return the chief of Yam agreed to send a mercenary force back to Egypt with Horkhuf. The Nubian confederacy between the First and Second Cataracts was now surrounded by Egyptians to the north, and the allied chief of Yam to the south. Facing a large Egyptian–Yam Nubian army that accompanied the expedition, the chief of the Irtjet confederacy agreed to provide supplies for Horkhuf's force and permitted Horkhuf to return to Egypt through his lands – not through the Nile valley itself, but rather on the Mountain Road along the ridges to the west where the Egyptian army would be unable to plunder or harass the Nubians. This type of fluctuating state of affairs on the Nubian frontier was probably the norm in Egyptian–Nubian relations during most of the Old Kingdom. These relations are brought into focus here only because of the fortunate survival of the tomb autobiographies of Weni and Horkhuf.
Thanks in part to the efforts of Horkhuf, the Nubian frontier seems to have stabilized, at least temporarily. Following the success of Horkhuf's second expedition, Merenre went in person in the last year of his reign {2300} to Aswan to receive the submission of the northern Nubian chiefs. An inscription from the First Cataract at Aswan shows Merenre flanked by the god Khnum receiving the submission of the Nubian chiefs. The inscription reads “the coming of the king [Merenre] himself … while the chiefs of the Medja, Irtjet and Wawat did obeisance and gave [him] great praise” (ARE 1:145–6); again we see three of the same tribes (excluding Yam and Kaau, who dwelt further south) in a formal act of submission to the Egyptian king. This Nubian peace, however, was not to last.
The logistical capabilities of the Egyptian army are also made manifest by Horkhuf's expedition. First, we see the Egyptians could keep a small army in the field in foreign lands for up to eight months, in part by plundering or requisitioning supplies from the local people. They could also march through the open desert, using the Sahara oases as supply bases, with hundreds of donkeys for carrying supplies, equipment, and trade goods. We also see Harkhuf marching west into the open desert following the Nubian chief of Yam in his pursuit of Libyan Tjemeh raiders. Thus, by 2300 the Egyptian army had developed the logistical and technological capacity to operate by land and sea in all types of terrain, to keep armies in the field for months, and to move troops up to at least 500 miles by land or sea from their nearest frontier bases in Egypt.
The Western Desert and Libyans37
Horkhuf's decision to take the desert road through the oases of the Western Desert highlights the role of the Libyans of the Western Desert in Egyptian military history. Unlike the Eastern Desert, with its rich natural resources, the Western Desert is a vast region of barren dunes and dry rock, essentially devoid of resources to attract Egyptian attention. Also unlike the Eastern Desert, the West has five oases that can sustain agriculture and human and animal life; today these are known as Siwa, Bahriya, Farafra, Dakhla, and Kharga. Further south opposite the Nubian Nile is a sixth oasis, Selima (M = AAE 13, 287; HAAE 27). In Islamic times (after 640 CE) the route from the Nile through Kharga to Selima was called Darb al-Arba'in – the “Forty-[Day] Trail”. The entire desert journey from Abydos to the Nubian Nile was roughly 430 miles. Since the camel was not available in Egypt until Hellenistic times, the ancient Egyptians would have made the journey by donkey caravan, which would not only have added several days to the trip, but would have compounded the logistical problem of water supply for both men and donkeys. None the less, Horkhuf's expedition, along with other evidence, demonstrates that this route was practicable to both donkey caravans and their military escorts.
The Western Desert was inhabited by peoples the Egyptians called Tjehenu and Tjemehu (or Tjemeh), terms used for both the land and its peoples that are generally translated as Libyan.38 The Tjehenu occupied the Western Desert from the Mediterranean south through the Fayyum; the Tjemehu from the Fayyum south to the Selima Oasis and the Third Cataract of the Nile. Both of these groups were pastoralists, eking a slight subsistence from the fierce Saharan desert. The Tjehenu centered on the Mediterranean coast of Libya, where the marginal rainfall was sufficient to sustain their herds. It is possible that some of the people living in the north-western delta of the Nile were also linguistically related to the Tjehenu. The Tjemehu focused on the oases of the Western Desert, and a few scattered wells and other scanty water resources.
Strategically speaking, the Libyans of the Old and Middle Kingdom periods were not a serious military threat to Egypt. The pastoral economy of the Western Desert simply could not sustain a sufficient number of people to seriously threaten the Nile Valley. Although there are no records of any major attacks by Libyans against Egypt before the New Kingdom, it is likely that they occasionally raided the Nile valley or plundered caravans passing on the Desert Road to Nubia.
On the other hand, the Libyans offered the Egyptians a potential source of plunder through livestock and slaves. From Pre-Dynastic times through the end of the Old Kingdom, we have eight accounts of wars between Egyptians and Libyans.
· The “Battlefield Palette” {c. 3200} depicts what appear to be slain and captured Libyans (EWP 29, MB 119–44).
· The “Cities” or “Libyan Palette” {c. 3100} depicts an assault on Libya (or perhaps Libyans in the north-western delta) and rows of livestock plundered during the campaign.39
· King Djer (Zer) {3000–2977} of the First Dynasty has a stele showing him smiting a cowering Libyan (AE 60).
· Sneferu {2649–2609} gives us the earliest written account of such a raid, describing the plunder “from Libya [Thnw]: 1100 live captives [and] 23,000 sheep and goats” (PS 235).
· The mortuary temple of Sahure {2506–2492} contains a relief depicting the submission of a Libyan chieftain and his family, along with plunder or tribute from the Libyans (PE 161–2; AEA 207).
· Weni's autobiography {c. 2340} mentions the Egyptians using Libyan mercenaries from the southern “Tjemeh-land” in his campaign against Canaan (AEL 1:19).
· Horkhuf's third expedition {c. 2296} allied with the Nubian chieftain of Yam in a war with the Tjemeh Libyans in the deserts west of Nubia (AEL 1:25).
· Pepy II {2300–2206} has a stylized “smiting-the-Libyans” scene in his mortuary temple, which seems to be an exact duplicate of Sahure's earlier relief, discussed above (PE 181; AEA 173).
These records indicate sporadic warfare between Egypt and Libya, essentially taking the form of plundering expeditions by Egyptians against Libyans. The absence of accounts of Libyan attacks against Egypt does not necessarily mean they did not occur. The records for this period are quite fragmentary, and the Egyptians seldom recorded accounts of defeats at the hands of their enemies; Egypt is always portrayed as victorious. Some of these Egyptian attacks on Libyans may also have been essentially retaliatory expeditions in response to Libyan raids. None the less, the picture derived from the sources is not one of Libyans threatening Egypt, but of Egyptians plundering Libyans.
This general picture is partially confirmed by archaeological evidence, which indicates that the Dakhla and Kharga oases were colonized by the Egyptians by the Sixth Dynasty. Dakhla, in particular, had a Sixth Dynasty fortress, which served both as protection for Egyptian colonists in the oases, control of the desert trade route to Nubia, and probably as a base for offensive or retaliatory operations against Libyans (AEA 26; EAE 2:290). The Pyramid Texts mention a fortress “which keeps Libya out” of Egypt (PT 665C); although its location is not identified, it may refer to the Dakhla Oasis fortress, or perhaps border forts on the western edge of the Delta.
Thus, throughout the Old Kingdom there was internecine warfare between Egyptians and Libyans, generally taking the form of raids and counter-raids. Although the Libyans lacked the manpower seriously to threaten the stability of the Egyptian kingdom itself, they were strong enough to require fortification of the oases, and their martial qualities were such that they were used as mercenaries by the Egyptians. The role of the Libyans as mercenaries for the Egyptians would expand greatly during the First Intermediate Period and the Middle Kingdom.
Pepy (Phiops) II {2300–2206}40
Pepy II came to the throne at the age of six, and had a reign lasting an incredible ninety-four years, making him the longest-reigning ruler in world history.41 We first meet him at the age of ten, when he sends a letter (transcribed onto Horkhuf's tomb wall) congratulating Horkhuf for his successful third expedition. In it, young Pepy was not overly concerned with trade, war, or the affairs of state. He was most interested in …
the pygmy of the god's dances from the land of the horizon-dwellers [at the end of the earth] …. Hurry and bring with you this pygmy … get worthy men to be around him on deck [of the boat], lest he fall in the water [on the trip down the Nile]! When he lies down at night, get worthy men to lie around him in his tent. Inspect him ten times at night!
(AEL 1:26–7)
The arrival of a dancing pygmy, however entertaining to the boy-king, did not represent a solution to the problems of the Nubian frontier.
A few inscriptions and reliefs point to military activities during Pepy II's long reign. Murals at Pepy II's funerary complex show the king as a mythic sphinx trampling his defeated Libyan enemies, along with statues of bound captives from foreign lands. This scene seems to be a close duplicate of the funerary relief of Sahure. While it may represent an actual campaign against the Libyans – which for simplicity's sake was merely copied from Sahure's temple in a stylized form – it is also possible that it is a ritualized depiction of the royal ideal of the king as ruler of the world and victor over all enemies (PE 181; AEA 173; PSE Figure 22a). Inscriptions also record an expedition to Sinai (ARE 1:156–7), along with additional trading–military expeditions to Nubia and Punt mentioned in an inscription by Khui (ARE 1:164). In a passage from the Pyramid Texts dating to the reign of Pepy II, the god Horus “sets Upper Egypt in order for [the King], he sets Lower Egypt in order for him, he hacks up (b3) the fortresses of Canaan for him, he quells for him all the hostile peoples under his fingers” (PT 650, EWA 51). Although this is a mythical text, it may contain an allusion to a historical campaign. The most important historical source, however, is the autobiography of Pepinakht.
The campaigns of Pepinakht42
The tomb complex at Qubbet el-Hawa at Aswan contains two autobiographies of courtiers during Pepy II's reign – Pepinakht Heqaib and his son Sabni – that contain accounts of military affairs along the Nubian border. The career of Pepinakht again demonstrates the overlapping of religious, civilian, and military offices in the Old Kingdom – indeed, it is probably anachronistic to impose such modern categories on ancient Egyptian officials. Pepinakht's titles include Lector Priest, Scribe, Royal Seal-Bearer, and “Commander of the Foreigners” (AEAB 15–16), which meant both that he was responsible for border affairs, and that he commanded Nubian mercenary troops. In this capacity he “brought the produce of foreign lands to his lord [Pepy II]” and went on punitive military expeditions to “cast the terror of [the wargod] Horus into foreign lands” (AEAB 15).
The submission of the Nubian chiefs of Wawet and Irtjet to king Merenre (ARE 1:145–6), described on p. 341, was nominal at best. We do not know the exact cause, but Pepy II ordered two campaigns against some of these Nubian tribes. The first was a raid to plunder and devastate (“hack up”) northern Nubia:
The majesty of my lord [Pepy II] sent me [Pepinakht] to hack up [the Nubian principalities of] Wawat and Irjet. I acted to the satisfaction of my lord. I slew a large number of them, [including] sons of the ruler, and excellent troop leaders. I brought a large number of them to the [royal] residence as captives, while I was at the head of numerous and strong troops in boldness of heart.
(AEAB 16)
The second campaign was more successful, resulting in the capture of the Nubian chiefs.
[Pepy II] also sent me to pacify these lands [Wawat and Irjet].… I brought the two rulers of these lands to the residence [of Pepy II] with offerings of live cattle … together with the sons of the rulers and the troop leaders who were with them.
(AEAB 16)
They thus ritually renewed the submission that had earlier been given to Merenre. Some of the captured “sons of the rulers” may have been kept at court as hostages for future good behavior.
The importance of military affairs in Nubia during the reign of Pepy II is also reflected in Execration Texts found at Giza.43 Clay figurines of Nubians were made, inscribed with ritual curses, and then shattered and buried as a means of “sending” the curse to the inscribed victim. Some of the curses were generic, against the entire people and country of Nubia. The following is typical:
[Let a curse fall upon] every rebel of this land [Nubia], all people, all nobles, all commoners, all males, all eunuchs, all women, every chieftain, every Nubian, every strongman, every messenger, every confederate, every ally of every [foreign] land who will rebel in [the Nubian provinces of] Wawat, Zatu, Irjet, Yam, Yanakh, Masit, and Kaw, who will rebel or who will plot by saying plots or by speaking anything evil against Upper Egypt or Lower Egypt forever.
[Let a curse fall upon] every Nubian who will rebel in [the Nubian provinces of] Irjet, Wawat, Zatu, Yam, Kaw, Yanakh, Masit, Medja, and Meterti, who will rebel or who will make plots, or who will plot, or who will say anything evil.
(MAEM 139)
44
Other, smaller clay figurines, representing specific named individuals – possibly enemy rulers or commanders – were also cursed. The Execration Texts will be discussed more fully on pp. 415–8, but it is important to note both that magic power was considered an important supplement to military power in foreign affairs, and that the Nubians were perceived as posing a serious enough threat to warrant these types of curses.
Pepinakht's third recorded campaign was a punitive expedition to the Sinai, which offers our first insight into the nature of combat in that region, and the first indirect indication that Egyptian combat with foreigners was not aways the victorious triumph of the king and his soldiers that funerary inscriptions and reliefs unusually claim.
[Pepy II] also sent me to the land of the Easterners [in the Eastern Desert and Sinai], to bring him the sole companion, ship's captain, and Commander of the Foreigners An-Ankhet, who had been equipping a ship there for Punt when the Easterners belonging to the Sand-dwellers slew him together with the company of soldiers that was with him … [text lost] I drove to flight and slew some of their men, I together with the company of soldiers that was with me.… [I] cast the terror of [the wargod] Horus into foreign lands.
(AEAB 16)
Before Pepinakht's punitive expedition, an earlier mission under the command of An-Ankhet had apparently crossed from the Nile to the western shore of the Red Sea, where they were preparing a ship to sail to Punt, when they were attacked by nomad raiders who killed most of the soldiers and plundered the merchandise and other equipment and supplies. Since Egyptian texts almost never mention defeat by enemies, this allusion is instructive, and no doubt reflective of an ongoing threat from nomads that is generally obscured by the sources.
Pepinakht's account reflects a number of realities of Old Kingdom warfare. First, the Eastern nomads, while generally not a threat to Egypt itself, were a constant potential threat to any Egyptian expedition into the Eastern Desert or Sinai. Nearly all of these expeditions would thus have to have been accompanied by a strong military escort. The relative proportion of soldiers to workers is illuminated in two inscriptions from Wadi Hammamat with reference to the quarrying of stone. The first included 200 soldiers and 200 workers (ARE 1:174).45 The second mentions 1100 men and 1200 soldiers, with 200 donkeys for carrying supplies and returning with the quarried stone (ARE 1:175). If typical, these numbers indicate that the standard proportion for these types of expeditions was 50 percent soldiers and 50 percent laborers, with about one donkey per ten men. We should, however, assume that the workers would fight when needed, and that soldiers would often form part of the labor force.
Pepinakht's mission had not only been to punish the nomads for daring to attack Egypt, but also to recover the bodies of the dead for proper burial in Egypt. Dying in a foreign land, and thereby missing a proper burial in Egypt, was of serious eternal concern to ancient Egyptians. Without a proper burial, ritual, and grave goods, the soul of the departed would suffer in eternity.46 This would have been of great concern to soldiers and officers going on foreign military expeditions. To die and have one's corpse left rotting in a foreign battlefield was tantamount to a condemnation to hell, probably creating a type of “leave no man behind” mentality among Egyptian soldiers.
Other Egyptian texts confirm the importance of proper burial to the Egyptians. The mortuary inscription of Sabni, son of Mekhu, the governor of southern Egypt – not to be confused with Sabni, son of Pepinakht, discussed on p. 350 – describes a similar expedition to Nubia to retrieve the body of his father who had died in Wawat, apparently of natural causes. Sabni brought a group of his personal retainers, along with 100 donkey loads of incense, honey, clothing and oil as presents for the Nubians, probably to “ransom” his father's corpse. The line between gifts, trade goods, and bribes is greatly blurred in these texts; trade with Nubia often seemed a combination of extortion, tribute, the ritual exchange of gifts, along with more mundane economic business. There are naturally hints of military activity in the text, with the mention of soldiers accompanying the expedition and the “pacification” of Nubia (ARE 1:166–9). The Middle Kingdom “Tale of Sinuhe” (see pp. 430–3) also emphasizes this fear; the desire for a proper burial in Egypt was one of the prime motives for Sinuhe to return from exile (TS 40). If the corpses of the dead were not recovered and returned to Egypt, the morale of future expeditions could seriously suffer. Thus Pepinakht's expedition was more than merely punitive. It was also necessary to maintain the morale of the Egyptian army. This fear of being left behind and unburied may in part account for the expansion of the use of non-Egyptian mercenaries in foreign campaigns during the Old Kingdom, mercenaries who, with different religious traditions, might not have felt this concern to the same extent as the Egyptians.
Sabni
Sabni (Sebni), the son of Pepinakht, succeeded his father as “Commander of the Foreigners” on the Nubian frontier (AEAB 17 = ARE 1:164–9). Like his father's, Sabni's autobiography recounts his command of a military expedition to Nubia. As military commander of the Nubian frontier, or the “southern gate” to Egypt as it was often called, Sabni was ordered by the king to “build two great barges in [the] Wawat [province of Nubia], in order to convey two great obelisks to On [Helio-polis, near Cairo]”. Despite the earlier claims that Nubia had been “pacified”, the animosity of the Nubians continued, forcing special tactical arrangements to protect the barges and their obelisks.
I went forth to Wawat [in northern Nubia] with two troops of soldiers, while the [Nubian mercenary] scouts who I had paid were on the west and east [banks of the Nile] of Wasat, so as to bring back my troops of soldiers in peace. Never did I let a man's sandal or loaf be stolen [by the Hostile Nubians].
(AEAB 17)
47
It appears from this description that the Egyptian army was divided in two, with half on each bank of the Nile accompanying the flotilla bringing the obelisks. In addition to the Egyptian troops in the Nile valley, however, Nubian mercenaries were enlisted. It is not clear if they were paid protection money to allow the expedition to pass, or if they were more permanently hired mercenaries to accompany the Egyptian force. At any rate, the Nubians were apparently sent to the edges of the Nile valley on the desert ridges and fringes, to protect the far flanks and scout for possible hostile movement. This account gives the distinct impression that the armed expedition was undertaken without the permission of the Wawat Nubians and in the face of a potential serious threat of attack.
The collapse of the Old Kingdom {2206–2191)48
There were a number of factors at work in Egypt that undermined the strength of the monarchy. One major problem was the devolution of power and the wealth of the king to the regional nomarchs. Land, titles, authority, and wealth were naturally given to loyal and successful soldiers, ministers, and nomarchs throughout the Old Kingdom. Since government office and land could on occasion be inherited by a nomarch's successors, this wealth often became permanently alienated from the crown. Furthermore, pious and for the most part perpetual endowments were made to temples. There were also rising numbers of mortuary temples for the ever-increasing numbers of royal ancestors; many of these were exempt from taxes or other forms of royal service. The land and wealth necessary to maintain the cult of the dead divine ancestors thus progressively increased. The construction of temples and pyramids and great funerary complexes absorbed an increasing portion of state revenue and resources. The priestly bureaucracy necessary to run the estates designed to maintain the proper rites for the temples and pyramids likewise grew in size while decreasing in efficiency. Thus, slowly, the resources of the central state were diffused to regional rulers and religious institutions. At some point the resources of the state became insufficient for the demands placed upon them. Some speculate that the advancing age and possible incapacity of Pepy II at the end of his reign may have left rival ministers and governors increasingly independent. At the death of Pepy II {2206} a succession crisis erupted, culminating within fourteen years in the fragmentation of Egypt into a number of small regional kingdoms, inaugurating what is know as the First Intermediate Period.
Economically, this period seems to have been one of extended drought and low flooding levels of the Nile, decreasing food production and creating the potential for famine, while increasing competition for decreasing food resources. Furthermore, drought and food shortages undercut both the real economic power of the king and his ideological legitimacy, which was based on the claim that the king was the divinely sanctioned sustainer of moral and natural order. The transition to the First Intermediate Period was also characterized by the devolution of power from the centralized royal court to provincial governors and mayors, who increasingly claimed the credit for regional administration and building projects and who chose to be buried in their own provinces rather than near the king. Provincial rulers also managed to make succession to their offices hereditary, thereby further undermining central control. To some extent these developments are simply a matter of degree, since regional leaders were also prominent and semi-autonomous during much of the Old Kingdom. None the less, during most of the Old Kingdom provincial rulers at least nominally submitted to royal authority.
Pepy II's death, after a reign of 94 years, left numerous sons as possible rival heirs to the throne. The declining power of the Sixth Dynasty is apparent in the succession of ephemeral short-reigning rulers during its last half-century {2206–2165}. Pepy II was succeeded by his son Antyemsaf II, who, given his father's ninty-four-year reign, was apparently already an old man at his ascension. He ruled for only a year, and was succeeded by his wife, Nitokerty (Nitocris) {2205–2200}, apparently the first woman to rule Egypt independently.49 Her brief rule was followed by possibly five ephemeral rulers over the course of nine years {2200–2191}. The details are not known, but it seems clear that provincial nomarchs rapidly asserted independent power, fragmenting the kingdom into a number of separate regional warring nomes. The collapse of royal authority was probably accompanied by decreasing security on the frontiers; there is evidence of incursions of Easterners into the north-eastern delta shortly after the death of Pepy II (HAE 139–40). This collapse of royal authority inaugurated what historians call the First Intermediate Period {2190–2061}, which will be discussed in Chapter Fifteen.