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Misapplying the Iraq Formula

Heuristics are rules of thumb that people use to find adequate, albeit imperfect, answers to difficult questions.¹ These efforts to simplify complex and difficult-to-understand issues sometimes work very well, but at other times they lead to significant decision-making errors. The availability heuristic, for instance, is the reliance upon recent or very vivid memories to make judgments.² This rule of thumb can be useful in many cases. A person who burned their hand on a stove one day will think twice before touching the stove again. It can also lead to errors in judgment. Although flying remains by far the safest mode of travel, ticket sales tend to drop significantly after a plane crash or terrorist incident involving an aircraft. The vivid image of the event creates an impression of risk that is far greater than the statistical reality. Heuristics can simplify complex national security decisions but may lead to significant errors.

The perceived success of the surge in Iraq affected the Obama administration’s decision-making about the troop uplift and withdrawal timeline in Afghanistan. The availability heuristic and confirmation bias kept the White House fixated on the withdrawal timeline, undermined assessments of the war’s progress, impeded efforts to explore a negotiated outcome, and heightened civil-military tensions. General David Petraeus, the CENTCOM commander, was selected to replace McChrystal. Still recovering from prostate surgery, Petraeus brought with him vast experience and a brilliant reputation from Iraq. Petraeus’s view was that enough military pressure on the Taliban, plus a reintegration effort that could turn former insurgents into local police, could work in Afghanistan as it did in Iraq. Petraeus tweaked his “Anaconda” concept from Iraq for application to Afghanistan and brought in many members from the Multi-National Force—Iraq (MNF-I) and CENTCOM teams to execute his plan.³ His reliance on the Iraq experience to guide his approach to Afghanistan has come under some criticism.⁴ A joke around the ISAF staff that summer was that every sentence began with the same two words: “In Iraq. . . .” Petraeus recognized, though, that time was short and that he needed to produce unambiguous results if there was any hope of convincing Obama to delay the withdrawal timelines and allow more time for his theory of success to work. He needed everyone on board, not questioning the logic.⁵

There were good reasons, however, to doubt that the formula used in Iraq could be replicated successfully in Afghanistan.⁶ The prevailing interpretation of the Iraq experience was that the surge in forces plus application of the new counterinsurgency doctrine and a reconciliation program convinced the Sunni tribes to turn against al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).⁷ Reductions in violence were evident within a year.⁸ The command assumed that a similar effort in Afghanistan should produce like results.

No other cases, however, were used for comparison, nor was the Iraq thesis examined critically.⁹ Escalations of the war in Vietnam or the Soviet war in Afghanistan, for instance, failed to achieve success. The sharp downturn in violence in Iraq was more complicated than portrayed by the military at the time and relied on political and social factors that were not present in Afghanistan. It would also turn out to be temporary. Stephen Biddle examined the cause and effect relationships between the surge and the Awakening. He cautioned against a formulaic belief that more troops plus the new doctrine would lead to success.¹⁰

The conflict in Afghanistan differed substantially from the one in Iraq. The former was atomized and localized. Tribal cohesion had broken down during 30 years of war and efforts by the communists and the Taliban to replace tribal identity with political or religious conformity.¹¹ Convincing a Pashtun tribal leader to switch sides and bring thousands of people with him would not work in Afghanistan because hardly any tribal leaders commanded such a following. The Taliban, since 2009, were placing increased emphasis on governance and were using the full range of coercion and persuasion to gain control and support.¹² Their political program was far more sophisticated than AQI’s. The Taliban had a strong constituency in many rural areas of the south and east, and among Pashtun enclaves in the north and west. Unlike in Iraq, the conflict did not break down into distinct ethnic and sectarian lines. Turning former insurgents into local police was likely to produce government-sanctioned predatory actors.¹³

To add to the challenges, the Afghan government ran the reintegration program. The Afghan government had no intention of using the program as a forcing function for good governance and local dispute resolution. Reintegration councils were often cronies of the governor, police chief, or local power broker, the same actors who drove people to fight the government in the first place. The program soon resembled the bribery schemes of the past.¹⁴ It was absorbed by the kleptocracy, as government officials and reintegration councils extorted money and made false reintegration reports. Curiously, the majority of “reintegrees” were ethnic Tajiks from the north and west, where the Taliban had no presence whatsoever.

In some cases, local elites co-opted predatory militias to declare themselves to be Taliban so they could “reintegrate” and become a coalition-funded Afghan local police that continued their abusive practices.¹⁵ ISAF could not demonstrate a correlation between reintegration numbers and lower levels of violence.¹⁶ Nonetheless, military officials continued to claim it was taking Taliban fighters and leaders off the battlefield.¹⁷ Such confirmation bias meant that ISAF made no efforts to reform a program that the command viewed as central to success. There would be no Sons of Iraq equivalent in Afghanistan. And yet, US officials continued to argue that the war was on track, citing examples of progress within their bureaucratic silos.