PART VII

Ending the War in Iraq

Overview

The United States rejected early bargaining opportunities with former Saddam regime officials in 2003 and unwittingly encouraged sectarian violence.¹ Until 2007, US officials, often at the urging of Shi’a leaders, ignored or blocked opportunities to negotiate with Sunni leaders willing to turn on al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). As noted earlier, the US surge emphasized the importance of reconciliation—the increased troop levels combined with the Sons of Iraq movement (which spread from the Arab Awakening) resulted in steep reductions in violence.² US officials, however, may have misread Sunni intentions, believing that the latter supported the Iraqi government when actually they were allying with the Americans for survival against the two-fold threats of AQI and Maliki.³ The United States missed opportunities to foster and incentivize genuine political inclusion.⁴ The Iraqi government’s sectarianism and corruption undermined the prospects of a successful transition.

The United States by this time was tired of the war. Maliki backed the timeline Obama outlined during the 2008 US presidential campaign.⁵ The Obama administration’s determination to withdraw may have led Maliki to consolidate Shi’a political dominance more aggressively—the small American presence envisioned by Obama would be a political liability without the benefit of protecting against a Sunni resurgence.⁶ US forces left Iraq, as promised by Obama, at the end of 2011.

Maliki’s renewed efforts to marginalize Sunnis led to the growth of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).⁷ The group emerged from the remnants of AQI and newly disaffected Sunni tribes.⁸ ISIS took over the city of Mosul, and much of northern and western Iraq, in the summer of 2014 as the American-trained Iraqi security forces (ISF) fled, leaving large quantities of US military equipment, including tanks.⁹ In 2015, President Obama ordered American advisors back into Iraq.¹⁰

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The Surge Misunderstood

Why did the United States fail to achieve its desired outcomes in Iraq despite the apparent success of the surge? Most recent scholarship views the surge as a military success but a political failure.¹ The debate analyzes reasons for the significant reductions in violence, including US-centric reasons² (new troops, new doctrine, new strategy), Awakening-centric reasons,³ and synergy between the two.⁴ This debate matters, Stephen Biddle argues, because if policymakers adopt a US-centric view of the significant reduction in Iraq’s violence, they are likely to apply the same methodology elsewhere. If, however, political conditions on the ground interacted synergistically with the surge, as Biddle suggests, then a US-centric template will be necessary but not sufficient in other conflicts.⁵ These arguments would prove crucial during the Obama administration’s decisions on Afghanistan in late 2009.

The substantial reduction of violence in Iraq, however, was not accompanied by greater political inclusion. Outlining the goals of the new Iraq strategy, President Bush argued, “A successful strategy for Iraq goes beyond military operations. Ordinary Iraqi citizens must see that military operations are accompanied by visible improvements in their neighborhoods and communities.” A prosperous Iraq, he continued, would be “a functioning democracy that polices its territory, upholds the rule of law, respects fundamental human liberties, and answers to its people.”⁶ General David H. Petraeus saw reconciliation as critical for success: “Beyond securing the people by living with them, foremost among the elements of the new strategy was promoting reconciliation between disaffected Sunni Arabs and our forces—and then with the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government.”⁷ Understanding why political reconciliation failed is crucial in assessing war outcomes in Iraq.

The main explanations for the failure of political reconciliation focus on Maliki’s sectarianism and Obama’s inability to secure an agreement to extend US troop presence beyond 2011.⁸ The first explanation largely exonerates the US government from any substantive role in promoting durable political inclusion. Why leave such a critical element of the war entirely in the hands of the Iraqi government? The second argument assumes that a lengthier military presence would have eventually led to political reform and reconciliation. Did either administration have a political strategy to advance reconciliation that could address the chronic patron-client problems outlined in chapter 24?

Despite the reduction in violence, the United States was unsuccessful in fostering a durable political outcome in Iraq for three interlocking reasons. First, the US desire to withdraw to zero or to what was perceived by Iraqi leaders as an ineffectual presence reduced American bargaining leverage. Unless the United States could provide sufficiently compelling incentives for reform and reconciliation, Iraqi leaders would be unwilling to make painful sacrifices only to see the Americans depart. Second, the reduction in violence led US officials to overestimate Maliki’s inclusiveness, resulting in a significant shift in priorities under the Obama administration. Third, US leverage was further dissipated by civil-military tensions and strategic incoherence in theater, making coordination nearly impossible. As officials in Baghdad kicked problems to Washington, D.C., the National Security Council had to deal with highly complex issues that its officials had little bandwidth to navigate successfully. The results were often ham-fisted efforts that had unintended consequences.