Chapter 22
Augustus established the longest and most complex family of Roman emperors until the dynasty of Constantine and that of Valentinian and Theodosius in the fourth and fifth centuries c.e. The dynastic successors of Augustus are called the Julio-Claudians because of their connections with his Julian family and the Claudian family of his wife Livia. Of the four Julio-Claudian emperors, Augustus’ immediate successor, Tiberius, son of Livia by her first husband, was the only one born without Julian ancestry. The other three, Gaius (popularly known as Caligula), Claudius, and Nero, were members of both families. The four reigns fall conveniently into two pairs, each of twenty-six-and-a-half years: Tiberius and Gaius (14–41 c.e.) and Claudius and Nero (41–68 c.e.).
In order to understand fully the characters of these important emperors and the intrigues and complexities of their reigns, it is necessary to keep in mind the intricate relationships of the Julio-Claudian family (chart on facing page). Augustus tenaciously sought a successor closely related to himself. His manipulation of marriages and adoptions created a confusing web of relationships as well as jealousies, rivalries, and intrigues that bedeviled and even warped those who managed to attain the office of princeps that he created.
Sources for the Julio-Claudians
Only two surviving ancient writers give significant accounts of the whole Julio-Claudian period: Suetonius, in his Lives of the Twelve Caesars, and Cassius Dio, in Books 57 to 63 of his Roman History. Both authors lived after the events described. Suetonius was born about 69 c.e., around the end of Nero’s reign, and died about 140. As a child, he would have heard some firsthand information about the Julio-Claudians from his elders. Also, as Emperor Hadrian’s secretary in charge of correspondence, he had access to archival documents, which he often quotes. Cassius Dio, a Greek aristocrat of Nicaea in Bithynia, was born about 150 c.e. He died around 235 after a distinguished senatorial career. As a high-ranking senator, Dio had access to much official information, too, but he seems to have made little use of it. Both he and Suetonius were dependent primarily upon earlier narrative accounts. Because the earlier writers were mainly senatorial aristocrats, who resented their loss of real power and privileges under the Principate, the works of Suetonius and Dio frequently reflect a bias against the Julio-Claudians. Moreover, both Suetonius and Dio enjoyed the sensational and the scandalous. Therefore, in their works, the plain, unvarnished truth often takes a back seat to the baseless rumors, damaging innuendoes, and malicious fabrications that they frequently found in other writers.
FIGURE 22.1 The Julio-Claudian dynasty (emperors are shown boldface).
Other important literary sources exist for individual Julio-Claudian emperors. Velleius Paterculus was a loyal cavalry officer under Tiberius. He gives a highly favorable account of Tiberius’ reign in the last part of the second book of his History of Rome. For Caligula, the Jewish historian Flavius Josephus, in his Jewish Antiquities, Books 18 and 19, and the Jewish scholar Philo of Alexandria, in his Against Flaccus and Embassy to Gaius, present valuable contemporary or nearly contemporary accounts of certain events. Book 19 of Josephus’ Jewish Antiquities and Books 2 to 7 of his History of the Jewish War cover some events under Claudius and highlight the Jewish revolt under Nero. The philosopher Seneca the Younger, who had been exiled under Claudius, is believed to have written a scathing satire of that emperor, the Apocolocyntosis (Pumpkinification). The various philosophical and literary works of Seneca and the numerous nonhistorical writings of other authors reveal much about the social, economic, cultural, and even political history of the period (pp. 477–89).
A far more influential source than any of these works is found in the surviving books of the Annals of Tacitus. The Annals originally covered events from 14 to 69 c.e. Now, only Books 1 to 6 (with most of Book 5 missing), covering the reign of Tiberius, and Books 12 to 16, covering the reign of Nero to 66 c.e., survive. Tacitus, just as his modern admirer Edward Gibbon, has exercised a profound influence on historians of the Roman Empire because of a superb literary style combined with an intense personal viewpoint.
Still, a conscientious historian cannot uncritically accept what Tacitus says. He came from the ranks of conservative senators who resented the loss of independence and prestige that the senate suffered in the shadow of the emperors. Having experienced increasing despotism during the last years of Emperor Domitian (81–96 c.e.), he tended to interpret the actions of previous emperors accordingly. In fact, he became rather cynical and disillusioned about life in general.
Trained as an advocate in rhetoric and law, Tacitus believed that “the role of history is to make sure that virtues are not passed over in silence and that evil words and deeds have the fear of infamy among later generations” (Annals 3.65.1). It is often necessary, therefore, that Tacitus’ modern readers act the roles of both attorney and jury: the one to highlight evidence that Tacitus usually concedes as he rhetorically builds a case against it, the other to arrive at a balanced judgment.
Modern historians are aided by abundant archaeological research that has brought to light numerous coins, artifacts, monuments, inscriptions, and the remains of whole cities and towns from the period. This physical evidence illustrates the social, economic, and administrative developments that the ancient literary sources slight in favor of investigating the emperors’ personalities, high politics, court intrigue, and wars. From the nonliterary evidence, it is possible to estimate what was happening to the more ordinary inhabitants of the Empire under their rulers, whose lives and deeds are the main focus of the literary sources.
Tiberius (14 to 37 c.e.)
The full name of Tiberius was Tiberius Claudius Nero. At fifty-five, he was no longer a young man when he succeeded Augustus in 14 c.e. His lengthy experience in life was both a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, his long public service, first as a successful general on the frontiers and then as Augustus’ virtual understudy for ten years, made him uniquely fitted to step into the role of princeps. On the other hand, his difficult personal experiences had left him ill-suited to the role he had to play. Born during civil war in 42 b.c.e., Tiberius had spent his first two years with his parents in fearful exile. The divorce of his mother, Livia, who was pregnant with his younger brother, Drusus I, and her hasty remarriage to Augustus also must have been stressful. Augustus appreciated the serious and cautious Tiberius but seems to have preferred Drusus I, a more jovial, appealing personality. As an adult, Tiberius was saddened and embittered by the forced divorce from his wife Vipsania (Agrippa’s daughter) and disastrous marriage to Augustus’ daughter (Agrippa’s widow), Julia (p. 377).
Moreover, Augustus had made it clear in his will that he had chosen Tiberius as his successor only when there was no other choice. Even then, Augustus had tried to arrange that his sister Octavia’s grandson Germanicus (son of Drusus I) would be preferred to Tiberius’ own son once Tiberius died. Perhaps Tiberius was merely imitating Augustus’ politic reluctance of 27 b.c.e. when he expressed hesitation over assuming the post of princeps. Still, he may have been genuinely ambivalent and lacking in self-confidence after his earlier experiences.
Agrippa Postumus, Julia, and Scribonia
The execution of Augustus’ grandson/adopted son Agrippa Postumus soon followed Tiberius’ accession. He was the only surviving son of Agrippa and Julia. He had become an angry, rebellious youth, and Augustus had banished him to an offshore island. It is not known who ordered the killing. Tacitus points to Tiberius and calls the execution the “first crime of the new principate” (primum facinus novi principatus [Annals, 1.6.1]). Nevertheless, there is a good reason why Augustus might have left instructions to execute Postumus: fear that he would be used for rallying opposition to Augustus’ succession arrangements and that dangerous instability would ensue.
At this point, Julia had been divorced from Tiberius and had also been banished by Augustus (p. 377). Tiberius once tried to have her recalled. Now, probably he, Livia, and their advisors considered her dangerously useful to those who disliked Tiberius and would favor her son. Julia’s mother, Scribonia, may have been one of them.
Before he became Augustus, Julia’s father had humiliatingly divorced Scribonia in favor of Livia (p. 309). It would be natural for Scribonia to have wanted the imperial dynasty to descend from her through Julia’s son, not from Livia through Tiberius or Drusus. Scribonia had voluntarily joined Julia in banishment. In 14 c.e., Tiberius cut off the funds that had supported Julia before Augustus’ death. Soon thereafter, she died of starvation, perhaps intentionally to blacken the reputations of Tiberius and Livia. Unless Tiberius had forbidden Scribonia to help (the sources are silent), Julia would have had enough resources to keep herself alive had she wanted to.
Scribonia herself remained active. In 16 c.e., when she was probably about ninety, her grandnephew M. Scribonius Libo Drusus was accused of plotting against Tiberius. Perhaps not coincidentally, a freedman posing as Agrippa Postumus was then raising a rebellion in Italy and was about to march on Rome. Scribonia urged Libo Drusus not to avoid execution by committing suicide but to confront Tiberius in a trial. Her advice was not taken. To avoid stirring up more trouble, Tiberius did not investigate further. There is no record of Scribonia after that.
The mutiny of the legions
Shortly after Tiberius’ accession, the legions stationed in Pannonia (Hungary) and the lower Rhineland mutinied. Tiberius sent his natural son, Drusus II, to Pannonia, where the mutiny was quickly suppressed. Germanicus, Tiberius’ nephew and adopted son, soon restored order in the Rhineland, too.
Germanicus and Agrippina
Three major campaigns east of the Rhine from 14 to 16 c.e. gave Germanicus the chance to solidify his reputation as a worthy heir apparent. The last, a defeat of the German Arminius, made it possible to boast that Rome had avenged the defeat of Varus in the Teutoburg Forest (p. 367). Tacitus is unfair to Tiberius in claiming that he jealously prevented Germanicus from making permanent conquests across the Rhine. They probably agreed with Augustus’ assessment that Rome did not yet have the manpower and resources to conquer and hold down a large piece of new territory there. Germanicus’ campaigns were designed to destabilize and weaken the Germans, not conquer them permanently. It was a wise policy. Arminius and Maroboduus, king of the Marcomanni in what is now Bohemia, began to fight. Maroboduus lost his kingdom and fled to Italy. Arminius was assassinated. Bohemia became virtually a client kingdom of Rome.
Tiberius gave Germanicus a splendid triumph and sent him to the Near East with extraordinary powers in 17 c.e. Germanicus was to help cities damaged by earthquakes in Asia and superintend the annexation of the kingdoms of Cappadocia, Cilicia, and Commagene as imperial provinces.
At the same time, Tiberius appointed the experienced senator Cn. Calpurnius Piso as governor of Syria to assist the young Germanicus. The two did not get along. Without obtaining the required authorization from Tiberius, Germanicus left Syria and went to Egypt, where he helped to alleviate starvation in Alexandria by opening reserve granaries to relieve. The popularity this generated for Germanicus, combined with his failure to request permission to visit the province in the first place, disturbed Tiberius, who complained bitterly to the senate. That complaint encouraged Piso’s disrespect for Germanicus. Upon returning to Syria, Germanicus found that Piso had contemptuously disobeyed all his orders. Germanicus’ hostility caused Piso to abandon his post. Shortly after that, Germanicus became ill and accused Piso of attempting to kill him. Then, calling upon his wife and children to avenge his murder, he died.
Germanicus’ wife was Agrippina the Elder, Augustus’ granddaughter by Julia and Agrippa. She set out for Rome with her husband’s ashes. Piso seized the opportunity to regain control of Syria by force. He was defeated and taken to Rome to face trial on charges that included poisoning Germanicus, stirring up civil war by trying to reenter the province of Syria after Germanicus’ death, and corrupting military discipline. After the trial began, Piso committed suicide. Nevertheless, Tiberius requested that the prosecution continue, with Piso’s sons acting for the defense. Piso was condemned posthumously. In the late 1980s, a well-preserved inscription of the senatorial decree announcing his punishments, the Senatus Consultum de Cn. Pisone Patre, was found in Spain.
Agrippina suspected Tiberius of complicity in Germanicus’ death. She believed that he was jealous of Germanicus’ popularity and wanted to clear the way for his own son, Drusus II, to succeed. Piso’s suicide convinced others that he really was guilty of poisoning Germanicus. Piso probably was only trying to avoid execution so that his property would go to his heirs instead of being forfeited to the state. His friends in the senate, however, suspected that he had been made a scapegoat for Tiberius. Therefore, Tiberius had to contend with the hostility of Piso’s influential family and friends and the suspicions of Agrippina for much of his reign. The children of Germanicus, who himself had shown a serious interest in Stoicism, became the hope of Stoic-inspired aristocrats who wanted to return to more republican principles.
Livia
Tiberius also had to contend with his mother, Livia. Always an important advisor to Augustus, she exemplified on a larger scale the great informal power that women of major aristocratic households often wielded. She attained even greater prominence after Augustus’ death. In his will, she was accepted into the Julian gens and proclaimed Augusta.
Until her death at the age of eighty-six in 29 c.e., Livia sought to exercise influence commensurate with her status as virtual Empress of Rome. Through patronage, she had high standing with important cities and client kings. She seems to have supported Augustus’ wishes that Tiberius’ successor be from the line of her other son, Drusus I, that is, one of her great-grandsons via Germanicus and Agrippina the Elder. Their youngest son, Gaius (Caligula1), was raised in her house until she died. He even delivered the eulogy at her funeral.
Tiberius came to resent Livia. After she died, he even refused to execute her will, which, for example, included 50 million sesterces for Servius Sulpicius Galba, later the first non-Julio-Claudian emperor (pp. 438–9). Nor did Tiberius permit Livia’s deification. The next two emperors respectively carried out those actions.
Sejanus
A man whose attempts at self-aggrandizement made things worse for Tiberius was L. Aelius Seianus, usually called Sejanus in English. His father, an eques, had risen to be prefect of the Praetorian Guard. Sejanus eventually became his colleague. After the father’s death, Sejanus made the Praetorian Guard his own base of power by persuading Tiberius to make him sole prefect. Then, he convinced Tiberius to concentrate all of the Guard’s nine cohorts, hitherto partially dispersed in neighboring towns, into new barracks on the eastern outskirts of Rome. Acting as a loyal aide, Sejanus presented himself as the protector of Tiberius from the real or imagined plots that plagued him.
When Drusus II died suddenly in 23, Sejanus attempted to marry his widow, Livilla (Livia Julia, sister of Germanicus). Despite allegations that the two had murdered Drusus II, Sejanus may simply have taken advantage of what was a fortuitous death in hopes of maneuvering himself into some kind of imperial partnership with Livilla’s young son, Tiberius’ grandson, Tiberius Gemellus. Tiberius, however, refused to permit the marriage. In the meantime, Agrippina the Elder was doing everything that she could to advance the claims of her three sons by Germanicus: Nero (not the future emperor), Drusus III, and Gaius (Caligula).
In 26, Sejanus successfully urged Tiberius to enter semi-retirement on the island of Capreae (Capri) near Naples. At Rome, Sejanus used his power and influence as a praetorian prefect to drive Agrippina’s highly placed friends into exile or procure their deaths by execution or suicide. After the death of Livia in 29, he apparently convinced Tiberius that Agrippina and her two adult sons were plotting against the throne. Agrippina and Nero were banished to desert islands, and Drusus III was cast into prison.
In early 31, the tide was flowing Sejanus’ way. He became Tiberius’ consular colleague for the first few months of the year. Tiberius consented to let Sejanus marry either Livilla or her daughter by Drusus II, the princess Julia. After their joint consulship, things turned against Sejanus. At the end of August in 30, a letter from Agrippina’s mother-in-law, Antonia, the younger daughter of Marcus Antonius, may already have aroused in Tiberius some fear and suspicion of Sejanus. The murder or forced suicide of Agrippina’s son Nero in prison later in 31 may have caused more concern. At any rate, Tiberius summoned Caligula, who had been living with Antonia since Livia’s death, to Capri. With Tiberius Gemellus being too young, Caligula was the only remaining practicable alternative to Sejanus as Tiberius’ successor. Tiberius now permitted him to put on his long-delayed toga of manhood in preparation for public life.
Sejanus took up his scheduled proconsular imperium. Also, he and his eldest son, Strabo, each received a priesthood. Sejanus may have sensed the ground shifting when Tiberius commended Caligula for one, too, and thereby indicated that he was becoming eligible for the throne. Still, Tiberius led Sejanus to believe that he would be granted the tribunicia potestas (tribunician power), a sure sign that he would be Tiberius’ immediate successor. Then, in October of 31, Tiberius sprang a carefully laid trap. He sent the senate a letter which Sejanus believed would recommend him for receiving the tribunicia potestas. Naevius Sutorius Macro, prefect of the vigiles, delivered the letter. While Sejanus waited for it to be read in the senate, Macro, under Tiberius’ orders, took command of the Praetorian Guard. The letter began with mild praise of Sejanus. Praise became criticism, criticism reproof, and reproof sharp denunciation and a peremptory order for arrest.
The senate at once voted condemnation and death. The populace hailed the fall of Sejanus, pulled down his statues, dragged his body through the streets, and flung it into the Tiber. Many of his friends and supporters became victims of the mob. The execution of his children soon followed. Still, nothing changed for Agrippina and Drusus III: Agrippina died in exile. Drusus III starved to death in prison.
The law of treason (maiestas)
Stories that Sejanus and Livilla had murdered Drusus II only increased Tiberius’ the fears and suspicions. As a result, the law of treason was increasingly used to prosecute suspected enemies. Maiestas had come to include not only high treason (perduellio) but also such things as arrogance, sacrilege, slander, extortion, adultery, incest, rape, and murder. Maiestas could even include consulting astrologers and soothsayers about the future health and welfare of the emperor.
Tiberius himself had the astrologer Thrasyllus of Rhodes as one of his principal advisors. He knew, however, that enemies could use the predictions of astrologers and popular prophets to stir up the masses or subvert the loyalty of the legions. Augustus, who also had appreciated Thrasyllus’ skills, once ordered the destruction of 2000 prophetic books, forbade astrologers to predict when anyone would die, and made it illegal for anyone to consult astrologers in private. In 16 c.e., one of the bases for charging Scribonia’s grandnephew M. Scribonius Libo Drusus with conspiring against Tiberius was that he consulted with astrologers, diviners, and magicians. Tiberius executed two of them and expelled all of their kind from Rome. Three years later, the suspicious emperor took similar action against Jews and the worshipers of Isis.
Tiberius and informers (delatores)
Private informers (delatores) eagerly accused people under the law of treason because the accuser would usually receive one-fourth of a convicted person’s property. Unfortunately, delatores were necessary because the government’s practical capacity to initiate investigations was limited. Tiberius has been accused of using informers’ accusations of maiestas to institute a tyrannical reign of terror. Nevertheless, the number and successes of delatores often have been exaggerated at Tiberius’ expense. Out of 106 known prosecutions for maiestas, only 35 succeeded. Often, Tiberius favored acquittal or disallowed convictions handed down in lower courts. There were also serious penalties for false and malicious accusations. Tiberius even exiled some unscrupulous delatores.
Tiberius and the senate: the increasing power of the princeps
Nevertheless, the number of delatores and treason trials did increase in the latter part of Tiberius’ reign. The increase embittered his already precarious relations with many senators. Indeed, the relationship between Tiberius and the senate reveals a serious paradox in the nature of the Augustan Principate, one that could not be resolved except in the direction of increased power for the princeps. Earnestly following Augustus’ model, as he always tried to do, Tiberius attempted to make the senate a meaningful partner in governing the Empire. He styled himself as an equal citizen with the senators and refused such honors as the praenomen Imperator and the title pater patriae. If a worthy senator fell into such financial difficulties that his senatorial status was threatened, Tiberius provided money to remedy the problem. Before abandoning Rome for Capri, Tiberius had tried to attend all meetings of the senate. He encouraged freedom of speech and debate. At least once, he ended as a minority of one.
Tiberius also increased the powers and responsibilities of the senate. For example, he transferred to it the Centuriate Assembly’s age-old function of electing the consuls and praetors. He made the senate a supreme court of justice, especially for the trial of influential persons accused of treason and for trials of both imperial and senatorial provincial governors accused of extortion and corruption. He also consulted the senate on all affairs of state. Yet, efforts to make the senators responsible partners in government did not really work. They knew that in the last analysis, Tiberius’ powers as princeps were far greater than theirs. His very attempts to encourage senators to speak their minds freely only added to the suspicion that he was trying to set traps for those who did not like him.
An insoluble problem
It is easy to accuse many senators of servility. Tiberius himself is said to have often called them “men prepared for slavery” (Tacitus, Annals 3, 65.3). There was, however, no real incentive to counteract the pressures in that direction. A well-intentioned emperor like Tiberius could try to uphold the prestige of the senate or encourage the senators to take responsibility and act independently. Nevertheless, he could not give them the real power and rewards that conferred prestige and were incentives for assuming responsibility.
The office of princeps depended upon a monopoly of the highest powers, greatest military forces, and most strategic provinces—the very marks of prestige for which senators eagerly strove under the free Republic. If an emperor were to share them with other senators now, he would inevitably create rivals for himself. That was something a conscientious emperor could not risk, and an insecure or autocratic one would not tolerate. As a result, even under a respectful emperor, the tendency was for senators to abdicate the responsibilities that he was willing to let them have. Therefore, even a well-meaning emperor had to assume more direct responsibility himself. Thus, the senate was only weakened further and was even less able to resist the usurpations of a less politic princeps. Eventually, the power to flatter an emperor was all that the senate had left.
Stoic opponents
Of course, a significant number of senators resented this situation bitterly. They were descendants of the old republican nobility or were members of newer senatorial families from places like the conservative districts of northern Italy. They idealized the virtues of the old Republic. Their heroes were those who had opposed Caesar: men like Cato the Younger and the assassins Cassius and Brutus. They often professed the philosophy of Stoicism, which became associated at Rome with republican opposition to the Principate. When persecuted for their opposition, they frequently sought a martyr’s death in suicide, their ultimate, though futile, act of protest.
The historian Cremutius Cordus was such an individual under Tiberius. He wrote a history of Rome in which he praised Brutus and called Cassius “the last of the Romans.” As a result, in 25 c.e. he was prosecuted for maiestas. Tiberius attended the trial in the senate. His grim face showed that he disapproved of Cremutius’ defense. Cremutius, therefore, gave up and starved himself to death. A majority of senators then sought favor with the emperor by ordering the aediles to confiscate all copies of Cremutius’ history and burn them. Secretly, however, some saved copies that were published after Tiberius’ death (see Box 22.1). They helped to inspire more such martyrs under later emperors.
22.1 Publishing in the Roman world
Publishing a book in the Roman world was a rather different process from what it is today. There were no publishing companies that could produce, advertise, and sell physical copies of new works and that would share the proceeds with the author. Most ancient authors were men of elevated social status who did not write for money: literature was generally a gentleman’s pursuit. Once a writer finished dictating drafts of his new project to his slave secretary (librarius), he would have it copied by other highly trained slaves (his own or some on loan from someone else) and sent to a small number of friends whose opinions he valued. After the author had the opportunity in incorporate their comments and criticisms, he would arrange a recitatio, an event at which he or someone hired for the occasion would read the new work to an invited audience, who would offer suggestions for improvement. A work might go through several rounds of presentation and revision before reaching its final form. Once the author deemed it sufficiently polished, the work would again be copied and sent to its dedicatee and others who had asked for a copy of the final product. This last step was “publishing”: this was the moment that the book was able to circulate among the reading public, and this was the moment that the author lost control of the text. Anyone in possession of a copy was free to have copies made for distribution. Bookshops seem mostly to have made on-demand copies of published works for their customers. There is no evidence that authors made any money directly from the sale of their work: for authors of less elevated status, literary fame could bring with it patronage that would support further artistic endeavors.
Tiberius the administrator
Any positive assessment of Tiberius rests chiefly on his ability in imperial administration. He followed the foreign policy of Augustus by relying on a combination of diplomacy and the cautious application of military force. For example, he pursued limited military goals in Germany and took pains to avoid involving Rome in a war with Parthia. The Augustan conquests in central Europe and the East required a pause for consolidation. By strengthening the defenses along the Rhine and other frontiers and by suppressing revolts in Gaul, Thrace, and North Africa, Tiberius kept the Empire largely at peace and at an unprecedented peak of prosperity.
To promote the material welfare of the provinces, he kept tribute and taxes to a minimum. By strict economy (e.g., the curtailment of expensive spectacles and ambitious building projects), he was able to halve the 1 percent tax on auctions and still build up a large surplus in the treasury. Unfortunately, his reduced spending on games, spectacles, and grandiose building projects made him unpopular among the common people of Rome. In an effort to procure a more honest and efficient collection of provincial taxes, he restricted the tax-farming companies to the collection of customs dues. To reduce provincial discontent, he severely punished all provincial governors guilty of extortion, floggings, confiscation of private property, or having a corrupt administration in general. Some of the governors found guilty of such injustices committed suicide rather than face the wrath of the emperor.
Tiberius appointed able and conscientious men to govern the imperial provinces. To inspire honest administration, he increased governors’ salaries. He also lengthened their terms of office, perhaps as much out of necessity as by choice. In either case, governors became increasingly familiar with their duties and with local conditions. Many of the governors held office from five to ten years, some even longer. As a result of this policy, cases of extortion and corruption arose less frequently in the imperial provinces than in the senatorial ones, where governors normally held office for only one year. In both the imperial and senatorial provinces, Tiberius encouraged provincial assemblies (concilia, koina) to send delegates to Rome to lodge complaints before the emperor and the senate about the conduct of governors, legates, and procurators.
Policies such as promoting uniform silver coinage and building roads, bridges, and canals not only benefited soldiers and frontier defense but also promoted commerce and provincial prosperity. Increasing prosperity in the provinces, the efficient collection of taxes, and careful financial administration all contributed to increased revenues and a large surplus in the treasury. That surplus enabled the emperor to give prompt and liberal relief to disaster-stricken areas in both Italy and the provinces. Even after making these and other large grants from the treasury, Tiberius was able to leave behind a surplus of 2.7 billion sesterces (3.3 billion, according to some authorities).
Tiberius’ last years and the succession
Tiberius spent the last ten years of his reign in almost continuous residence on the Isle of Capri. His preference for Capri led to malicious rumors that he spent his time in every vice and debauchery that a perverted mind could invent. Suetonius delighted in publicizing them, but they are highly exaggerated at best. Tiberius actually spent much of his time dealing with questions of state or in the company of scholars and artists.
One of the most serious questions of state in Tiberius’ last years was that of a successor. The only dynastic choices left were Germanicus’ son Gaius Caligula and Tiberius’ own grandson, Tiberius Gemellus, son of Drusus II. Tiberius probably would have preferred Gemellus to be his sole immediate successor, but Gemellus, only sixteen, was still the less practical choice. Caligula was older by six or seven years and had already been made an augur, a pontiff, and a quaestor. He was connected to the families of Augustus and Caesar through both parents. Gemellus was connected only through his mother. Moreover, as the son of the popular Germanicus, Caligula enjoyed great support from the common people and the soldiers. It would have been too dangerous to pass over Caligula completely. Therefore, Tiberius made Gemellus and Caligula his joint heirs in 35 c.e.
In 37, Tiberius fell into a coma and died. It was rumored that when he had momentarily revived, the praetorian prefect Sutorius Macro had ordered him smothered in his bedclothes. The story was probably fabricated after Caligula turned out to be a ruler whom many saw as a murderous tyrant. It did receive circumstantial support: Macro had been the one who nominated Caligula to be sole princeps at a meeting of the senate right after Tiberius’ death. The accommodating senators set aside Tiberius’ will and declared Caligula his only heir. They also showed their disapproval of Tiberius’ later years by refusing the deification granted Caesar and Augustus. On the other hand, they had great hopes for the last surviving son of the popular Germanicus. That their hopes were disappointed may help to explain the intense hostility toward Caligula in the sources.
Gaius Caligula (37 to 41 c.e.)
Sensationalistic ancient sources paint Caligula as a mad tyrant after a serious illness cut short a promising beginning to his reign. Modern historians have often accepted that picture to one degree or another. Some, however, have tried to penetrate beyond the hostility and rhetorical stereotyping of the sources to find more method and less madness in his actions, mean and vicious though he could be.
As a young child, Caligula had experienced his father’s popularity and the heady fondness shown him by his father’s troops. Then, his father’s controversial death, his mother’s distrust of Tiberius, and Sejanus’ plottings against his family must have been traumatic. They certainly did nothing to build a trusting and magnanimous character. In his later teens, he lived with his grandmother Antonia in the constant companionship of three young Thracian princes; the young Herod Agrippa I, heir to the throne of Judea; and Ptolemy of Mauretania, the son of King Juba II and grandson of Marcus Antonius and Cleopatra. From them, some speculate, he may have acquired a more absolutist conception of monarchy than the position of princeps implied.
Certainly, as a relatively inexperienced youth of twenty-five, Caligula conceived of the office that he inherited more autocratically than did Augustus and Tiberius. Their long experience gave them a sense of how tightly they could hold the reins of power without provoking deadly hostility among powerful senators. Moreover, youth and inexperience probably made Caligula feel vulnerable to more mature and experienced senators who might believe that they were better qualified to rule than he. Not surprisingly, he soon began to assert his power, insist upon expressions of loyalty and deference, and strike down real or perceived threats to himself. To many in the senate and imperial household, he came to appear as a harsh tyrant. Their view, often vividly and maliciously embellished in the accounts that justified his assassination and legitimized his successor, is reflected in the literary sources.
A popular princeps at first
After Tiberius’ long, stern, and parsimonious reign, Caligula delighted the populace by distributing the legacies of Livia and Tiberius, by abolishing the 0.5 percent tax that still remained on auctions (p. 412), and by holding splendid spectacles, games, chariot races, and wild beast hunts. He even restored to the popular assemblies their ancient right of electing high magistrates, but that practice soon proved unworkable.
Caligula pleased the senate with his deference and courtesy and with his conciliatory attitude toward the nobility. He relieved the fear of those whom Tiberius had suspected of treason when he publicly burned Tiberius’ private records, although he falsely denied having read them. He curbed the infamous delatores, recalled Tiberius’ exiles, and piously interred the bones and ashes of his brother Nero and his mother, Agrippina the Elder, in the mausoleum of Augustus. He even adopted his cousin and former joint heir, Tiberius Gemellus, as his own son and heir, shared the consulship with his uncle Claudius, and had his three sisters honored throughout the Empire. He ensured the loyalty of the Praetorian Guard by doubling the 500 sesterces promised each guardsman in Tiberius’ will. To cap it all, he stirred the patriotic fervor of all classes by announcing preparations for the conquest of Britain and Germany. In October of 37 c.e., however, a serious illness forced him to postpone this enterprise and prompted enormous public outpourings of anxiety and affection.
Problems in the palace
It is not necessary to see this illness as affecting Caligula’s mind. It remained sharp and agile. Caligula had already shown his vindictive nature. For example, his ill-treatment of his grandmother Antonia, who tried to give him sound advice, seems to have led to her death. Still, Caligula’s illness may have brought to the fore certain issues, such as a fear of being removed in favor of another should he fall sick again. At any rate, it was probably in late 37, right after his recovery, when he accused Tiberius Gemellus of conspiracy and forced him to commit suicide. In 38, he made Sutorius Macro, who had engineered his accession, do likewise. Also that year, he forced the suicide of the distinguished consular senator M. Junius Silanus, father of his deceased first wife, Junia Claudilla. Several others, members and partisans of the Claudian family, eventually fell, too. Caligula’s uncle Claudius escaped only because he seemed to be a harmless dolt.
Tales of depravity and incest in the palace are part of the rhetoric surrounding the stereotype of a tyrant. In Caligula’s case, they were probably inspired by how he controlled and used those close to him to reinforce his position and prevent the rise of rivals among his relatives and in-laws. For example, he took his sister Drusilla (Julia Drusilla I) away from her first husband and gave her to his close friend M. Aemilius Lepidus. That he gave his signet ring to Lepidus during his grave illness and had Drusilla deified after her death in September of 38 probably are the bases for stories of sexual relationships with them. Also, that he kept close to his two other sisters, Agrippina the Younger and Julia Livilla, most likely had to do with politics more than with lust or affection.
Caligula’s first wife, Junia Claudilla, had died in childbirth, and the child did not survive. Caligula’s next two marriages were capricious, short, and childless. In 39, he formally married his fourth wife, Milonia Caesonia, on the day she bore him a child, Julia Drusilla II, named after his dead sister. Now, the establishment of his direct line seemed assured. Therefore, he was even more ruthless in rooting out others with possible claims to the throne. Caesonia, to whom he seems to have been devoted, probably took an active part. Early in the fall of 39, Caligula marched north with a large force, charged the commander of the legions on the upper Rhine with conspiracy, and executed him. Caligula had also brought with him Lepidus, Livilla, and Agrippina, recently widowed and mother of the future Emperor Nero. Charging them, too, with plotting against him, he executed Lepidus, who was portrayed as Agrippina’s lover, and exiled his two sisters.
Tensions with the senate
By now, Caligula’s relations with many senators were bad. The consuls of 39 had not even offered the customary prayers for him on his birthday (August 31). Sometime in late 39 or early 40, he removed the legion in Africa Proconsularis from the command of the senatorial proconsul L. Calpurnius Piso. About the same time, he gravely offended another member of this powerful family, Gaius Calpurnius Piso. He insisted on sleeping with Piso’s wife, apparently a relative of Caligula’s great-grandmother Livia, so that the paternity of her children would be doubtful.
It is not clear how much credence can be given to stories that Caligula forced individual senators to swear that they would lay down their lives for him and his sisters, to dress as slaves and wait upon his table, to trot beside his chariot in their togas, and even to kiss his feet in homage. Nevertheless, they reflect many senators’ perception of their humiliation. It was reinforced by the reinstitution of slandering the emperor as a treasonable offense.
Caligula’s military operations
After completing his purge on the upper Rhine, Caligula launched military operations that ancient sources ridicule with stories of faked battles and bogus captives. In fact, Caligula and the future Emperor Galba conducted several successful operations across the Rhine. They had the intended effect of reinforcing respect for Roman might among the free German tribes. True, in 40, Caligula’s long-planned invasion of Britain in imitation of Julius Caesar’s exploits became only a march to the Strait of Dover and the erection of a lighthouse 200 feet high at Gesoriacum (Boulogne). There are hints that a mutiny may have spoiled his plans. (Perhaps the story of his ordering the troops to gather seashells on the shore reflects some sort of punishment.) It is also possible that the political situation in Britain was no longer favorable, or money may simply have run out.
Fiscal problems
Caligula had already spent enormous sums of money before he incurred the expense of raising two more legions for his operations in the North. The huge surplus that Tiberius had left in the treasury was gone. At the same time, abolition of the 0.5 percent tax on auctions had reduced revenues. In 40, Caligula needed to replenish the imperial coffers. To obtain new funds, he resorted to extraordinary taxes on foodstuffs, lawsuits, and the earnings of porters, panderers, and prostitutes. When auctioning off his exiled sisters’ property and some of his own possessions did not suffice, he further alienated many senators by seizing their estates in Italy. He also confiscated the estates of wealthy landowners in Gaul. Finally, a desire to take over the revenues of Mauretania as well as to eliminate another close family member may explain why Caligula summoned his cousin Ptolemy to Gaul and then executed him.
Caligula’s foreign and provincial policies
The treatment of Ptolemy was quite at variance with Caligula’s usual approach to foreign and provincial affairs. He generally favored the policies of Pompey and Marcus Antonius rather than those of Augustus and Tiberius. In the East, for example, he preferred client–kings with close ties to himself: Provincial governors might enter into conspiracies and create armies for rebellion against him. He abandoned the kingdom of Greater Armenia as a Roman sphere of influence and allowed Parthia to control it. In exchange, Parthia recognized Rome’s interests in the East. Commagene, which Tiberius had annexed as a province, Caligula restored to its former king, Antiochus; he made his three young Thracian friends, who probably were his cousins, the respective client rulers of Thrace, Pontus and Bosp(h)orus, and Lesser Armenia; and he gave Herod Agrippa I control over some Jewish territory once ruled by the latter’s grandfather Herod the Great.
Caligula’s religious policies
Caligula’s vigorous promotion of the imperial cult has often supported his depiction as a megalomaniacal madman trying to impose a divine Oriental monarchy on Rome. One may be skeptical of stories that he believed that his horse Incitatus was a reincarnation of Alexander the Great’s Bucephalus, that he once wanted to make him a consul, and that he actually had him appointed high priest of his cult. Still, building on Roman practices and precedents, Caligula made up for not being able to call himself divi filius (Son of a God) after Tiberius’ posthumous failure to be deified. He emphasized his own personal divine nature and that of close family members as a way of legitimizing and strengthening his rule. On the other hand, perhaps not wishing to risk Tiberius’ fate, Caligula did violate Roman norms by insisting on being recognized as a living god and by building a temple to himself at Rome. Such honors would have been permissible in the provinces, but not in Rome.
Neither were his policies acceptable to the Jewish population. In Alexandria, where there was a large Jewish community, a Greek mob sacked the Jewish quarters and forced the survivors to eat pork in the theater during the celebration of Caligula’s birthday. In 40, the Alexandrian Jews sent a delegation headed by the scholar Philo to Caligula but obtained no redress. Meanwhile, Caligula had instructed Petronius, his legate in Syria, to install his statue in the Temple at Jerusalem. The prudent delaying tactics of Petronius and the diplomacy of Herod Agrippa I avoided the implementation of this disastrous order. Caligula’s death prevented further trouble.
Caligula’s assassination
Caligula’s brief, but controversial, career came to an abrupt end during the Palatine Games on January 24, 41 c.e. The first blow against Caligula was struck by Cassius Chaerea, a tribune of the Praetorian Guard. Caligula had often obscenely insulted him. With Chaerea were prominent members of the senate, administration, and army. Although Caligula had remained popular with the common people, he had alienated too many others whose support he needed to survive. To make sure that Caligula left no living legacy, the Praetorians mercilessly cut down Milonia Caesonia and dashed out the brains of Julia Drusilla II against the palace wall.
Overview and prospect
A long, distinguished career of service to Augustus had given Tiberius a thorough grasp of the Empire’s military, diplomatic, administrative, and fiscal needs, which he satisfied very well. Unfortunately, his lack of Julian blood and a reserved personality always made him Augustus’ second choice as a successor. His life had been complicated by Augustus’ relentless manipulation of Julio-Claudian marriages and adoptions plus the imperious actions of his mother, Livia. The unfortunate circumstances surrounding the death of Tiberius’ nephew Germanicus caused further problems. They spurred opposition to Tiberius and his line among powerful senators who disliked him and favored the children of Germanicus’ widow, Agrippina the Elder.
A happier man may have managed relations with the senate better, but his earnest efforts to make the senate a meaningful partner in running the Empire were undercut by the paradoxical nature of the Principate itself. When the ambitious praetorian prefect Sejanus played upon Tiberius’ fears of conspiracy and promised relief from his burdens, Tiberius’ relations with the senate were embittered even more. Later, Tiberius awoke to the danger that Sejanus posed. He protected Agrippina’s sole surviving son, Gaius Caligula, who eventually thwarted a joint succession with Tiberius’ grandson and ruled alone.
Caligula had a warped and nasty personality, but he was not insane. His military and diplomatic policies followed previous precedents and kept the frontiers safe during his brief reign. Internally, however, his obsessive pursuit of personal security through exalting himself above all mortals, eliminating perceived threats, and buying popularity with the masses produced political and fiscal disaster. The result was his assassination in 41. Those who still preserved the traditions of the free Republic hoped to restore it, or some better semblance of it. The futility of such fantasies in the post-Augustan world was quickly brought home, however, by the circumstances surrounding the accession of the next Julio-Claudian.
Note
1 Literally, “Little Boot,” a name bestowed on him as a child in the Rhineland by his father’s soldiers because his mother, Agrippina, liked to dress him in the uniform of a legionary soldier, complete with little military boots, caligulae, the diminutive of caligae, leather military boots.
Suggested reading
Barrett , A. A. (ed.). Lives of the Caesars. Malden, MA and Oxford: Blackwell, 2008.
Levick , B. Tiberius the Politician. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 1999.
Winterling , A. Caligula: A Biography. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011.