Chapter 32
Diocletian and Constantine had helped to save the Roman Empire from the chaos that had threatened to engulf it in the last half of the third century. They had single-mindedly mobilized Rome’s diminishing resources for the supreme effort of self-preservation. As a result, the Empire survived intact for the rest of the fourth century, despite many destructive problems: bloody feuding among Constantine’s heirs, two serious military defeats, distracting struggles among Christians and between Christians and pagans, and the increasing need to man the armies with Germanic recruits or mercenaries.
Murder and civil war
Although Constantine believed that he had provided for the safe transfer of his soul from the earthly to the heavenly realm, he could not provide for the safe transfer of power within the earthly realm. After his death, bloody rivalries and power struggles soon erupted. His two half-brothers and most of their sons were butchered by troops acting on false rumors that the half-brothers had murdered Constantine. Only two young nephews of Constantine survived, the half-brothers Gallus and Julian.
The false rumors allegedly originated with Constantius II (337–361), second son of Constantine and Fausta. Previously appointed as Caesars, Constantius II and his two brothers, Constantine II (337–340) and Constans (337–350), assumed the rank of Augusti and divided the Empire among themselves. Constantine II, the oldest brother, received the western half of the Empire. Under his supervision, Constans, the youngest brother, governed Africa, Italy, and Illyricum. Constantius II held the East. In 340, a quarrel led Constantine II to attack Constans in Italy. Constantine II was killed, and Constans took over the West. Constans vigorously defended the British and German frontiers, but his harshness as a commander and his inability to relieve inflation made him unpopular. In 350, Magnentius, a high-ranking officer of British and Frankish ancestry, overthrew and executed Constans. Meanwhile, Constantius II had been defending the East against the Persian King Shapur (Sapor) II (309–379). He disengaged himself from the Persians and defeated Magnentius in a series of battles beginning in 351. Magnentius finally committed suicide in 353 and left Constantius II as sole emperor.
Constantius’ search for a partner
Soon after moving west, Constantius II realized that he needed a loyal subordinate to hold the East. Even Constantine had relied on his sons to help him hold together the vast Empire, whose unity was constantly threatened by external forces and internal pressures. Yet, close ties of blood did not guarantee harmony between or among those who shared power. Consider, for example, Constantine executing his son Crispus, the murder of Constantine’s half-brothers and nephews, and the civil war between Constantine II and Constans. Still, it was too dangerous not to have someone share the burdens of power, and family ties were usually the most reliable.
In 351, after much hesitation, Constantius II chose Gallus, one of his two surviving cousins, as Caesar and put him in charge of the East. Constantius gave his sister Constantina (sometimes called Constantia) to Gallus in marriage to bind the Caesar more closely to the Augustus. Ironically, Constantina may have encouraged Gallus to aim higher. Moreover, Gallus’ success against the Persians, his hot temper, and his actions against powerful interests at Antioch aroused the jealousy and suspicion of Constantius. Therefore, Constantius recalled Gallus to Italy in 354. Gallus sent Constantina to intercede for him with her brother, but she died on the way. The mausoleum that she had previously provided for herself at Rome still stands, and her magnificent porphyry sarcophagus now rests in the Vatican Museums. Gallus was arrested and beheaded. His younger half-brother, Julian, came under suspicion, too. With some help from Constantius’ wife Eusebia, however, he was spared.
By the next year, 355, it became clear that Constantius needed another partner. While he was fighting restless tribes along the Danube, Gaul was thrown into turmoil by a combination of military rebellion and Germanic invasion. Eusebia and others urged him to appoint the twenty-three-year-old Julian as Caesar. Julian did not have Constantius’ complete trust. He was a totally inexperienced young man who had spent all but his last four years under close house arrest in an atmosphere of suspicion and intrigue. Constantius, however, was finally persuaded by those who favored Julian. Having been made a Caesar, Julian received Constantius’ other sister, Helena, for a wife.
Julian had the advantage of a congenial personality and a sharp intellect well trained by his tutors in rhetoric, history, and philosophy. Without repeating Gallus’ political mistakes, he became a popular commander and administrator and methodically restored Roman defenses all along the Rhine between 357 and 359.
By 359, court intrigue and the death of the Empress Eusebia began to weaken Julian’s position and arouse Constantius’ jealous suspicions. Using a threat from Persia as an excuse, Constantius demanded many of Julian’s troops. The troops refused to go. In February of 360, they proclaimed Julian emperor, ostensibly against his will. Then, Helena died childless. For the next year, while Constantius was securing the eastern frontier, Julian negotiated for a peaceful settlement with him. Constantius adamantly refused all offers of joint rule and set out to attack Julian in 361. Julian had already seized the initiative by marching east first. Before their two armies could clash, Constantius suddenly became ill and died. There was no son to succeed Constantius. He and Eusebia had been childless. His new wife, Faustina, would produce a posthumous daughter, Constantia. She would eventually unite the dynasty of Constantine the Great briefly with that of Valentinian I (p. 601). The Empire, however, needed a proven leader immediately. Julian became sole emperor without a struggle.
The Empire under Constantius II
Although not one of history’s more pleasing characters, Constantius II had not been a bad emperor. In many ways, he was a Tiberius to Constantine’s Augustus. Insecure and indecisive, he was often unduly influenced by unscrupulous members of his court and resorted to deviousness to secure his ends. To the best of his limited abilities, however, he had dutifully followed the path marked out by his father. “One Empire” and “one Church” were the foundations of his policies, as they had been for his father. The former helps to explain his role in the cold-blooded actions of 337, his subsequent refusal to recognize either Magnentius or Julian as co-emperors, and his willingness to resort to civil war in each case. Constantius II never neglected the arduous duties of protecting the frontiers. Most of his reign was spent in the military camp, not the sumptuous accommodations of the new capital. He was not so bold a general as his father or his rival Julian, but he did maintain the Empire’s territorial integrity.
As an administrator, Constantius II continued the centralizing tendencies of Diocletian and Constantine. At the same time, his legislation shows an honest attempt to mitigate the abuses of bureaucratic power that the system fostered. Finally, he zealously encouraged the union of the Christian Church and Roman State that Constantine had begun. He reaffirmed Constantine’s earlier ban against pagan sacrifices and ordered the closing of all pagan temples in 356. Theologically, Constantius II espoused a moderate Arian position and promoted doctrinal unity from that perspective. In 359, he summoned two regional councils of bishops—in the West at Ariminum (Rimini) on the Adriatic coast of Italy and in the East at Seleucia on the Calycadnus in Cilicia. Both councils eventually accepted a creed that declared Christ to be “like the Father,” and this creed was confirmed by a general council at Constantinople in the following year. Had Constantius lived longer and defeated Julian, he might have been able to make the compromise stick, but his death in 361 quickly threw religious matters into turmoil once more.
Julian the apostate emperor (361 to 363 c.e.)
As was the case with all of his relatives, Julian had been raised a Christian. His secondary education had been supervised by Bishop George of Cappadocia. He had even taken lower orders as a lector in the Church. George, however, had a fine library of Classical literature and Greek philosophy, especially Neoplatonist philosophy. Julian found the spirit of Hellenism in these works more attractive than the Christianity espoused by those who had murdered his family and forced him to endure years of lonely exile. When released from exile, Julian had gone to Pergamum to study rhetoric and then to Athens and the study of philosophy. Sometime in the course of these studies, he became convinced that paganism was the path of true religion and secretly converted. Soon after he entered Constantinople in 361, however, Julian openly proclaimed his devotion to the old ways by rescinding laws hostile to paganism.
Officially, Julian merely proclaimed religious toleration for all; in practice, he used all the subtle powers of his office to advance paganism at the expense of the Church. While he hoped that toleration would produce the unedifying spectacle of uncompromising adherents of the Nicene Creed fighting with Arians, he worked to create a Neoplatonic syncretism of pagan cults with the sun god as the Universal One. He even tried to give this unified Neoplatonic paganism an ethical emphasis and organizational structure modeled on those of the Church that he had renounced. To Christians, Julian was a demonic agent of Satan, an impression reinforced by his emphasis on magic, divination, omens, theurgy, and elaborate sacrifices, which even many of his friends thought excessive. Nevertheless, the sudden and dramatic turn that his fortunes had taken since 354 had convinced Julian that the gods were on his side, and he forged ahead. He decreed an end to imperial financial support for Christian churches and rescinded privileges previously granted to the Christian clergy. He also forbade Christians to teach the classic works of Greco-Roman literature and philosophy, a move that was intended to marginalize Christians in terms of the dominant culture.
The Persian War
Convinced of his own destiny, Julian did not want to wait to prove his prowess. He quickly prepared to invade Persia in order to gain permanent security for the neighboring provinces and glory for himself as another Alexander the Great. While he was using Antioch as a base for preparations in 362, Julian promoted his pagan revival among the inhabitants of this great city, one of the most staunchly Christian in the whole Empire. At best, the Antiochenes ignored him; at worst, they laughed at him. For the first time since his meteoric rise, Julian met failure, and it shook his self-confidence.
Confidence returned with the success of his initial invasion of Persia (March, 363). He was tempted to push on into the interior, although he had not brought the main Persian army to battle and had no clear strategic objective. He crossed the Tigris to Ctesiphon but failed to take it. Retreating north in the deadly heat of summer and low on supplies, the Roman army was now constantly harassed by the main force of King Shapur II. While riding off without his breastplate to rally the troops in a sudden attack on the rear guard, Julian received a mortal spear wound in the side. He lingered into the night before dying (June 26, 363). Some say that the spear was hurled by a Christian in his own ranks. In the days following, the Persians taunted the retreating Romans with this idea to undermine morale. In the confusion of battle, however, no one had been able to tell who threw the spear, and certainty can never be attained.
The early death of Julian was a major turning point in Roman history. Had he enjoyed a long reign like Diocletian’s or Constantine’s, his policies would have had a great effect. Certainly, he would not have been able to eliminate Christianity, as he fervently wished. Still with official support, the kind of theologically and institutionally unified paganism that he advocated could have become a strong counter force to the Christian Church. It might have jeopardized the whole Empire by splitting it between two large, antagonistic, and well- organized religious camps.
Jovian (June 363 to February 364 c.e.)
Julian had no heir, and, as did his hero Alexander, he refused to designate a successor while he talked on his deathbed with friends. Upon his death, Julian’s generals, the legionary commanders, and cavalry officers met to choose a successor. Their first choice was Julian’s close advisor Saturninus Secundus Salutius, praetorian prefect of the East, a moderate pagan and a popular individual in general. Old and unambitious, however, he refused. After considerable further debate, the officers finally settled on a Christian officer ironically named Jovian.
The Romans struggled on. They reached a crossing point on the east bank of the Tigris, but rough water held them back. Shapur, who still feared a pitched battle, offered to negotiate. Jovian, irresolute, insecure, and perhaps anxious to confirm his claim to the throne at home, accepted very disadvantageous terms. They included the surrender of Nisibis, the almost impregnable stronghold that was the anchor of Roman defenses in Mesopotamia; abandonment of Roman provinces beyond the Tigris; cessation of the Roman protectorate over Armenia; and payment of an annual subsidy to Persia to defray the expenses of defending the Caucasus. In return, Shapur granted peace for thirty years.
Jovian died after reigning only eight months. His one major act after negotiating the treaty with Shapur was to rescind Julian’s anti-Christian legislation. Though pro-Christian, he did not pursue repressive policies toward pagans. Julian’s pagan friends and supporters did not suffer for their earlier allegiance, and all were free to worship as they wished.
Valentinian I (364 to 375 c.e.) and Valens (364 to 378 c.e.)
With the death of Jovian, the chief military officers and civilian officials chose Valentinian (Flavius Valentinianus) as the next emperor. He was an experienced Christian Pannonian officer, though only of secondary rank. His backers also insisted that he choose a co-emperor, so that equal imperial attention could be given to problems in the East and West. Valentinian chose his brother Valens and left him in charge of the East while he oversaw the West from Milan. Julian’s old Gallic legions, pagans, and many who favored the house of Constantine the Great—including Constantius II’s widow, Faustina—supported Procopius, a relative of Julian’s mother. He attempted to usurp the throne in late 365 but was suppressed and executed in early 366. Faustina disappeared from history.
As military men, Valentinian and Valens energetically defended the Empire. Unfortunately, Valentinian died in 375 after suffering a stroke during angry negotiations with the Quadi. He left his share of the imperial title to his sixteen-year-old son Gratian. A year before, Valentinian had reinforced Gratian’s imperial legitimacy by marrying him to Constantius’ posthumous twelve-year-old daughter, Constantia.
In the East, Valens fought back the Goths in Thrace from 365 to 369. He turned his attention to Persia in 371. He had managed only to restore Roman control over Armenia before he needed to rush back to face a rising tide of Goths on the Danube.
The Battle of Adrianople, August 9, 378 c.e.
Fleeing the terrifying raids of the Huns (pp. 657–8), thousands of Goths begged Valens for permission to resettle in Roman territory. Welcoming such an increase in manpower for Rome, Valens agreed, on the condition that they surrender their arms. The Romans were not prepared to handle such a vast influx of refugees. Corrupt officials mercilessly exploited their plight. The Romans sold them bad food, even dog meat, at high prices or in exchange for other Goths, whom they sold into slavery. Abused and frustrated, the Goths rose up in mass revolt in 377. An incompetent Roman commander soon lost control of the situation. Other Goths and even some Huns crossed into the Empire to join the fight against the Romans.
Valens, who had marched off against the Persians again, had to bring his army all the way back to Thrace. He arrived in the summer of 378 to take charge of the situation. Impatient and not wanting to share the laurels of victory with his young nephew Gratian, Valens sought battle without waiting for Gratian’s reinforcements.
After a morning’s march, he met the Gothic army on August 9, 378, near Adrianople (Adrianopolis) in Thrace (map, p. 571). The Goths offered to negotiate to gain enough time for their cavalry to arrive. The Roman soldiers stood waiting in the sun on a hot, dusty plain. By afternoon, smoke from brush fires set by the Goths and the lack of a midday meal compounded the Romans’ discomfort. Suddenly, in the midst of negotiations, some Romans in the front line broke ranks. A battle erupted. Gothic horsemen arrived just in time to drive off the cavalry protecting the Romans infantry’s flanks. After that, the Romans did not have a chance. Out of an army of 30,000, two-thirds of the troops, scores of officers, and the foolish emperor himself perished. The Balkans were the Goths’ for the taking.
The policies of Valentinian I and Valens
Except for the disaster at Adrianople, the joint reign of Valentinian I and Valens had been militarily successful. They had strengthened the Roman army by recruiting mercenaries from the warlike tribes along Rome’s frontiers. Then they had successfully defended those frontiers until Valens’ foolish haste at Adrianople. In civil matters, however, they had been much less successful. Men of the camp, they had little sympathy for the civilian upper class and vice versa. They tended, therefore, to choose as their civil administrators less educated and more opportunistic men of their own social class.
By their legislation, the two did try to protect the poor, ensure justice, and prevent fiscal abuse. For example, Valentinian created an empire-wide office of defensor civitatis, an ombudsman, whose duty was to protect citizens from arbitrary officials. Nevertheless, the good intentions of the co-emperors were frequently thwarted by ruthless and rapacious officials like those who so fatefully abused the Goths. Honest officials had little chance against the influence of the corrupt. For example, when Theodosius, a general who had put down a revolt by Firmus in Africa, uncovered official wrongdoing in that province, powerful men at the western court turned against him, and he was executed in 376 (p. 615).
On matters of religion, both emperors were tolerant of pagans and banned only sacrifices and the attendant practices of magic and divination. In the West, Valentinian was an orthodox adherent of the Nicene Creed (p. 589), but he kept out of theological disputes and allowed the religious authorities to work out their own problems. He did, however, forbid unscrupulous clerics from taking advantage of widows and unmarried women to obtain lucrative gifts. In the East, Valens adhered to the official moderate Arianism established by Constantius II in 359. Unfortunately, he tried to impose it forcibly and caused clerical discontent, popular unrest, and persecution of dissenters.
Gratian (375 to 383 c.e.) and Theodosius the Great (379 to 395 c.e.)
When Valens died, the young Gratian was at a disadvantage. He had received a good education and was guided by competent advisors. As a young man, however, he was in a precarious position despite his marital connection to the dynasty of Constantine. To ensure the loyalty of Illyricum after the debacle at Adrianople, the troops of Illyricum had proclaimed Gratian’s four-year-old half-brother Valentinian II as co-emperor. Gratian accepted their move. Yet, he gave Valentinian II no further territory and left him with his mother (Justina, Gratian’s own stepmother [p. 615]) and a Frankish general named Merobaudes as regents. Gratian himself created a second colleague in 379 by recalling from exile the son of the Theodosius who had been unjustly executed three years previously after suppressing Firmus’ revolt.
The son was named Theodosius, also. His first task was to confront the Visigoths, a group of Goths who had been plundering the Balkans since the defeat of Valens. Theodosius pursued them for three years without inflicting a decisive defeat. Unwilling to prolong the costly conflict, he agreed to let the Visigoths settle within the Empire as autonomous federate allies with their own kings. In return, they agreed to fight for Rome under their own national commanders. The settlement of foreign tribesmen after capture in war or after terms of military service in Roman armies had been a common occurrence. Nevertheless, to grant anyone autonomous status within imperial territory was a radical departure from previous policy. At the time, there was little else that Theodosius could have done. Unfortunately, his innovative settlement to meet the needs of the moment set a precedent that would tempt other invaders to press for similar treatment later on and thus further undermine the integrity of the Empire.
Magnus Maximus overthrows Gratian, 383 c.e.
In the West, Gratian’s education gained him the respect that the upper classes had denied his father. He put his own, more refined friends in place of the rougher Pannonian advisors whom his father had provided. He became more interested in the pursuit of game on royal estates than of the enemy on the frontiers. He also was intensely interested in promoting orthodox Christianity. After issuing an edict of general religious toleration upon the death of Valentinian I, he had soon rescinded it. Probably he did so under the influence of the talented and zealous Bishop Ambrose of Milan. In 382, Gratian renounced the title pontifex maximus, removed the Altar of Victory from the senate house at Rome, and confiscated the endowments of the Vestal Virgins and ancient priestly colleges. A senatorial embassy led by Symmachus (see pp. 633–4) went to Milan to petition for a reversal of these measures but was rebuffed: the senators were not even admitted into the Emperor’s presence. Symmachus was no more successful two years later, after the death of Gratian, when he wrote to Valentinian II about the issue. Pope Damasus and Ambrose successfully opposed his efforts.
Absorbed in other interests, Gratian fatally neglected his troops. His position also may have been weakened by the fact that he and Constantia had not produced an heir in nine years of marriage. In 383, very shortly after Constantia had died (in childbirth?), soldiers in Britain proclaimed Magnus Maximus, their commander, as emperor. Maximus then seized Gaul, captured Gratian, whom the army had promptly abandoned, and had him executed before he and his new wife had been able to have any children. Meanwhile, Theodosius faced hostility from the Persians and another group of Goths, the Ostrogoths. Not risking the complications of a civil war, he accepted Maximus as his colleague in charge of Britain, Gaul, and Spain. Valentinian II, under the sole regency of his mother, kept Illyricum and received Italy, Dacia, and Macedonia as well.
In 387, however, after Theodosius had defeated the Ostrogoths and reached a settlement with Persia, Maximus tried to seize Italy. Theodosius gave refuge to young Valentinian II, married the boy’s sister Galla, and marched west. After two defeats, Maximus’ own troops surrendered him to Theodosius in 388. Theodosius’ Frankish master of the soldiers, Arbogast, recovered Gaul from Maximus’ son Victor. Subsequently, Valentinian II was placed in charge of the West under the guidance of Arbogast.
The revolt of Arbogast
Arbogast was one of many Germans to reach high rank under Theodosius, who relied heavily on Germanic tribes to make up for the chronic shortage of military manpower. In 392, Arbogast quarreled with the young Valentinian. Now twenty, the latter was eager to assert his own independence as a ruler. He failed in his confrontation with Arbogast and was found hanged soon after; whether by his own or another’s hand is not clear. Arbogast, however, had little to gain under the circumstances. He did not dare to proclaim himself, a “barbarian,” as emperor. Only after his overtures expressing loyalty to Theodosius were rebuffed did he set up a puppet in the West, the rhetorician Eugenius, head of the secretarial office and a tolerant Christian, if not a secret pagan.
To gain support from powerful pagan senators in Rome, Eugenius sanctioned a revival of the traditional public cults. His attempts to come to terms with Theodosius failed. Theodosius reluctantly prepared to invade the West again. On September 6, 394, the two armies finally met at the Frigidus River near Aquileia. After an initial repulse, Theodosius gained the victory with timely aid from a storm and the defection of some enemy troops. Eugenius was killed, and Arbogast committed suicide, whereupon Theodosius became sole emperor of the reunited Empire.
The death of Theodosius and the division of the Empire, 395 c.e.
Theodosius’ health had been failing for some time, although he was only forty-eight. He died at Milan in early 395, five months after his victory. Some say that by leaving the West to his ten-year-old son Honorius and the East to his seventeen- or eighteen-year-old son Arcadius, Theodosius permanently split the Empire, whose unity he had so recently preserved. Still, Theodosius was probably convinced of the strategic necessity of having an equal representative of imperial authority in both the East and the West. It was the illegitimacy of Eugenius’ rule in the West that Theodosius could not countenance, not the division of authority, which had long become an accepted principle. He had shown no predisposition to challenge the legitimate western emperors Gratian and Valentinian II, and it is clear that he intended his dynasty to be the vehicle for continued unity between East and West.
Much more difficult for Theodosius were the expenses of civil wars and the defense of frontiers. The taxes and manpower required were more than the economy and population could safely bear. The situation was also made worse by Theodosius’ return to an elaborate court and the inauguration of a costly building program to increase the splendor of Constantinople. The operation of an already vast bureaucracy needed to meet the increased military, administrative, and fiscal burdens of the times produced ever more problems as numerous officials corruptly sought their own interests at the expense of everyone else.
It was primarily because of his religious activities that later, Christian ages called Theodosius “Great.” A pious orthodox Christian, he increasingly supported those who accepted the Nicene Creed, which he reinforced by summoning the First Council of Constantinople in 381. In his efforts, he was encouraged by the zealous Bishop Ambrose of Milan. At first, he applied his orthodox piety only to Christians themselves. Then, late in his reign, edicts of 391 and 392 legally banned the outward expression of pagan worship. Theodosius did not reverse the long-standing official Roman policy of religious freedom for the Jews. Yet, he was often unable to protect them from the ethnic and religious bigotry of their neighbors. By withholding communion, Ambrose even forced Theodosius to rescind an order that a Jewish synagogue in Callinicum be rebuilt at the town’s expense after a mob of fanatical monks had destroyed it.
Paganism certainly did not disappear in the face of Theodosius’ official hostility. Still, without governmental sanction and financial support, its public manifestations gradually decayed. Many representatives of old families kept hoping for a restoration of the old religious order. Their political and social prominence had been reinforced by their control of time-honored priesthoods, cults, and ceremonies. Their hopes were momentarily raised when Arbogast and Eugenius sought their support by sanctioning a revival of public pagan cults. Those hopes were quickly chilled by Theodosius’ victory at the Frigidus River and were doomed in the long run by the general transformation taking place.
Suggested reading
Cameron , A. The Later Roman Empire, AD 284–430. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993.
McEvoy , M. A. Child Emperor Rule in the Late Roman West, AD 367–455. Oxford Classical Monographs. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.