Chapter 8
After the First Punic War and Rome’s takeover of Sardinia, the Romans were too involved with wars in Sardinia and Corsica, northern Italy, and Illyria to interfere in any serious way with what the Carthaginians were doing. In 220 b.c.e., however, with the two islands and northern Italy apparently secure, Carthaginian actions began to look more ominous, especially under the leadership of the charismatic general Hannibal in Spain. Relations between Rome and Carthage rapidly deteriorated. War between the two republics broke out once more in 218.
Carthaginian recovery after 238 b.c.e.
Shortly after the loss of Sardinia, Carthage made a strong recovery. Under the leadership of the Barcids (Hamilcar Barca, his son-in-law Hasdrubal, and his son Hannibal), the loss of the two islands was more than offset by conquests in Spain. During the First Punic War and, later, the Truceless War, Carthage had lost most of its Spanish possessions to native rebellions. Much of its western trade was taken over by the Greek colony of Massilia, which was located on the coast of Transalpine Gaul between northern Italy and northern Spain. In 237 b.c.e., Hamilcar landed in Spain at Cadiz. Then, by a judicious mixture of war and diplomacy, he founded a bigger and richer empire than Carthage had ever possessed.
Hamilcar Barca drowned while fleeing enemy horsemen in 229 b.c.e. His son-in-law Hasdrubal continued the work of empire building. He refounded the old city of Mastia as New Carthage (Cartagena). It became the capital, the navy and army base, and the arsenal of the Carthaginian empire in Spain. All the important mining districts were now brought back under Carthaginian control. The mines of Spain helped the Barcids to produce annual revenues of between 2000 and 3000 talents, an enormous amount of money that enabled them to wield great power and influence in both Spain and Carthage.
Some Romans may have watched these developments with suspicion. They knew that the Barcids, who had been so successful against Rome in the First Punic War, controlled a growing empire in Spain, a small but modern navy, and a fine army. The latter was well equipped and undergoing intensive training in constant warfare against the Spanish tribes. On the other hand, before 220 b.c.e., most Romans were too busy with the wars in northern Italy to concentrate on far-away events in Spain. That could be left to their Greek friends in Massilia. It was closer to Spain, and its interests were more directly affected.
Long bound to Rome by ties of friendship, and probably a formal alliance by this time, Massilia shared a common enemy with Rome in the Gauls. Also, the expanding power of Rome’s former Punic adversaries in Spain was threatening the trade that Massilia had expanded at Carthage’s expense during the First Punic War. It was not unreasonable for the Massiliots to fear the consolidation of Carthaginian power in Spain. Carthage might then ally with tribes in neighboring Gaul to eliminate Massilia as a rival altogether. The Massiliots communicated their fears to Rome. The Romans would have understood how an alliance of Carthaginians and transalpine Gauls could have posed a serious danger to them in struggles with the Gauls on their side of the Alps. The Gallic tribes in the Po valley were becoming increasingly restless and may already have been seeking help from their transalpine cousins. Apparently, Roman emissaries went to Spain to investigate Carthaginian intentions in 231 b.c.e. and came back satisfied: Hamilcar explained that he was only trying to explore new sources of revenue to enable Carthage to finish paying its indemnity (presumably the one imposed in 238 b.c.e.) to Rome.
The Ebro Treaty
Continued Carthaginian expansion in Spain under Hamilcar and then Hasdrubal evoked ever-louder complaints from Massilia. At last, in 226 b.c.e., when war with the Gauls of the Po valley and their transalpine allies was imminent, the Romans negotiated with Hasdrubal the famous Ebro Treaty. That treaty prohibited the Carthaginians from crossing the Ebro River with warlike intent but allowed them a free hand south of the river. Thus, the Carthaginians could operate unhindered in almost seven-eighths of the Iberian Peninsula. Massilia was guaranteed the security of its two coastal colonies lying between the Ebro and the Pyrenees and was not excluded from peaceful trade with Carthaginian Spain. The Romans could devote their entire attention to the Gauls on their side of the Alps. Massilia remained a strong check against those on the other side, who could expect no active help from Carthage.
Hannibal and the outbreak of the Second Punic War
After Hasdrubal had brought almost the entire Iberian Peninsula south of the Ebro River under Carthaginian control, a disgruntled slave murdered him in 221 b.c.e. Hannibal, the eldest son of Hamilcar Barca, succeeded him. Polybius (Book 3.11.5–7) tells the romantic story, perhaps true, that Hamilcar, sacrificing at an altar before departing for Spain, consented to take along the nine-year-old Hannibal only after the latter took hold of the sacrifices and swore never to be well disposed to the Romans. Later authors said that Hannibal swore eternal hatred of Rome. That wording implies a more active hostility than does Polybius’ version. It may represent postwar attempts to put all blame for the war on Hannibal and his family.
After the age of nine, Hannibal spent his entire life in the army. In ancient authors, he fits the stereotype of a good general: he ate with his men, dressed like them, and, covered only with a cloak, slept among them on the same hard ground. Whatever the details, Hannibal was an exceptional leader. For fifteen unbroken years, he commanded an army composed of Africans, Spaniards, Gauls, Phoenicians, and many other ethnic groups. They never once were known to mutiny or rebel. They followed him on long, fatiguing marches, across wide rivers, through swamps, and over the snow-capped Alps.
Upon succeeding Hasdrubal, Hannibal advanced northwest from the Carthaginian capital of Spain, New Carthage (Cartagena), toward what is now Salamanca. He conquered several tribes of the Upper Tagus and Douro rivers. Carthage now formally claimed all of Spain south of the Ebro, except Saguntum (Sagunto), a town perched on a rocky plateau overlooking the central eastern coast. It was a trading partner of Massilia and had become an ally of Rome sometime between 230 and 219 b.c.e. Since no mention was made of Saguntum in the Ebro Treaty of 226, Saguntum possibly became allied with Rome after 226, no doubt at the insistence of Massilia. In 219 b.c.e. Hannibal besieged Saguntum because of what he termed its unprovoked attacks on neighboring tribes subject to Carthage. After a desperate siege of eight months, the town fell. With its fall began the Second Punic War.
Causes of the Second Punic War
Although Polybius does make Barcid hatred of Rome one of the causes of the Second Punic War (Book 3.9.6–10.7), neither side seems actively to have brought it on. Between 238 and 219 b.c.e., both the Carthaginians and the Romans had adhered to the treaty of 241 and the Ebro Treaty of 226. The Romans’ acceptance of an alliance of friendship with the city of Saguntum, south of the Ebro, had broached the letter of neither treaty. A step taken primarily to keep the goodwill of Massilia, it indicated no official Roman hostility toward Carthaginian activity in Spain. Still, some senators may well have thought that Saguntum could provide a strategic base of operations in any unanticipated conflict. At the time, Hannibal seems to have taken no immediate offense when Rome had ruled against a pro-Carthaginian faction in arbitrating a civil dispute at Saguntum. By not provoking Saguntum at that point, he avoided angering the Romans. After the war, the simplistic story that Hannibal and the Barcid family had been planning to attack Rome for a long time out of a bitter desire for revenge was a convenient fiction for both sides. The Romans favored it because it absolved them of any blame. Many Carthaginians promoted it because it allowed them to make the Barcids alone their scapegoats in dealing with the Roman victors.
Much more useful for understanding the outbreak of the Second Punic War, in 218 b.c.e., are the mutual fear and misunderstanding that forced the two parties into a corner and made them willing to support a new war when they reached an impasse in their relationship. Fear arose on both sides because Saguntum—encouraged by Massilia, Carthage’s commercial rival in Spain—constantly complained to the Roman senate about Hannibal as he tried to advance his control up to the Ebro. In 220, probably to appease Saguntum and Massilia as well as to check up on Carthaginian intentions, the senate sent ambassadors to investigate the situation. It is unclear whether or not they pointed out to Hannibal that Saguntum enjoyed fides with Rome as Polybius claims (Book 3.15.5). In either case, Hannibal may well have feared that the Romans were now trying to use the Saguntines against Carthage, just as they had previously used the Mamertines on Sicily and the rebellious mercenaries on Sardinia. He immediately sent his assessment of the situation to the Carthaginian senate and asked for instructions. If his assessment was negative, the Carthaginian senate must have agreed, because his next act was to besiege Saguntum in early 219.
That the Romans had no immediate plans to use the Saguntine situation as a pretext for war against Carthage in Spain is clear. They were in the process of sending two consular armies in the opposite direction to deal with Demetrius of Pharos and the Illyrian pirates (p. 134). When news of Hannibal’s attack on Saguntum reached Rome, the senate, preoccupied with Illyria, took no action. The fall of Saguntum in early 218, however, must have stirred up public opinion against Carthage: Roman prestige was badly damaged by the destruction of a city that had fruitlessly claimed the protection of Roman fides. An embassy of leading senators and the two consuls went to Carthage to demand the surrender of Hannibal unless the Carthaginians wanted war. Many may have expected Carthage to capitulate in view of its past actions.
The majority of Carthaginian senators, however, probably could not tolerate the humiliation of abandoning a commander whom they had supported. Resentment must already have existed over the way in which the Romans at the end of the First Punic War had imposed a treaty harsher than the one originally negotiated. Rome’s perfidious seizure of Sardinia must have rankled even worse. Polybius makes it the principal cause of the war (Book 3.10.4). To give in meekly a third time now that Carthage was stronger would have been too much to bear, as Polybius indicates (Book 3.10.6). The Carthaginian senate chose war.
For numerous reasons, many Romans also favored war. There was probably a genuine fear, eagerly encouraged by Massilia, that the Carthaginians in Spain and the Celtic tribes in southern Gaul would eventually join against Rome. Also, as the lex Claudia of 218 reveals, a significant group of Romans now engaged in overseas trade (p. 170). With the revival of Carthage through expansion in Spain, Roman merchants and traders would have feared stronger competition and would have wanted to weaken Carthage once more. Finally, there were always ambitious aristocrats who sought to increase their prestige and power through successful military commands. Such men were the two consuls of 218, Publius Cornelius Scipio and Tiberius Sempronius Longus. Therefore, both sides accepted the challenge, and the Second Punic, or Hannibalic, War was on.
Hannibal’s war strategy
Hannibal had a splendid army but not a big enough navy to assist it. Roman naval superiority was so great that Carthage could neither safely transport and supply large armies by sea nor prevent the Romans from establishing beachheads anywhere. The Romans’ sea power permitted them to wage war on several fronts simultaneously and to invade Africa and Spain with several armies at the same time.
Hannibal’s only strong base and source of manpower and supplies was Spain. He had only one really well-trained and reliable army. His sole chance of success lay in establishing a single front, preferably in Italy. So long as Rome was in danger, the Romans would concentrate the bulk of their forces in Italy. Only an invasion of Italy would enable him to seize the initiative. Only an invasion of Italy would render useless the great Roman navy.
By invading Italy, Hannibal also hoped to cut at the roots of Roman military power, which was potentially six or seven times that of Carthage. Only by wrecking Rome’s system of alliances in Italy could he hope to paralyze and destroy that enormous war potential. Not coincidentally, the Gauls of northern Italy, only recently conquered, had revolted from Rome already and would rally around him. He hoped that Rome’s allies in central and southern Italy also would quickly forsake their obligations and join him as their liberator.
Roman war plans
The Romans planned to wage an offensive war. Their naval superiority would enable them to seize and hold the initiative at once. They could choose the theater of military operations. The consul Publius Cornelius Scipio actually landed at Massilia with one army for the invasion of Spain; another army assembled in Sicily for the invasion of Africa. The decision to land at Massilia was theoretically good. From there, the Romans could either invade Spain or intercept Hannibal in Transalpine Gaul should he decide to invade northern Italy. They also could use Massilia’s fleet for operations in Spanish waters.
Hannibal’s march to the Alps
Around the first of May in 218 b.c.e., Hannibal set out from New Carthage on the long march north to Italy. To protect his vital base in Spain, he left part of the Carthaginian army there under the command of his brother Hasdrubal (not to be confused with his dead brother-in-law). By late August or early September, he had crossed the Rhône on the way through Transalpine Gaul to the Alps. Scipio, who had been delayed by the revolts in Cisalpine Gaul, arrived at Massilia too late to intercept him. Wisely ordering his brother to lead the army into Spain, Scipio himself sailed back to Italy in order to lead the two legions in Cisalpine Gaul against Hannibal as he descended the Alps.
Scholars long debated where Hannibal crossed the Rhône and what route he took through the Alps. Now a combination of stratigraphic, geochemical, and microbiological evidence has lent strong support to the identification of the Col de la Traversette as the pass Hannibal took through the mountains. No matter which route he took, however, the journey would have been enormously difficult. His army is conservatively estimated to have included at the start about 30,000 infantry, 9000 cavalry, and at least 37 war elephants. To get it over the Alps under primitive conditions would have been a great feat even in summer. Hannibal did it at the start of the Alpine winter. His forces suffered great losses because of slippery trails, biting cold, and deep snows. Even worse were the sudden attacks of hostile mountain tribesmen. As he himself recorded on an inscription, only 20,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry reached the level plains of northern Italy in Cisalpine Gaul.1 There, the Insubres and the Boii eagerly joined his army and made up for the lost men. After a short rest, his army met that of Scipio at the Ticinus River.
FIGURE 8.1 Northern Italy.
Hannibal’s early victories, 218 and 217 b.c.e.
The Battle of the Ticinus (218) was a minor cavalry skirmish, but Scipio was wounded. The result would have been more serious if Scipio’s seventeen-year-old son, Publius Cornelius Scipio—the future Africanus, conqueror of Carthage, and victor over Hannibal—had not saved his father from capture. The father withdrew his army south of the Po, and the Romans recalled the other consul, Tiberius Sempronius Longus, from the planned invasion of Africa to reinforce Scipio. Hannibal’s attempt to maintain a single front was succeeding.
The battle at the Trebia, 218 b.c.e.
By December of 218, the two consuls had taken up a strong position with 40,000 men on the eastern bank of the Trebia (Trebbia), a small southern tributary of the Po. Against the advice of the wounded Scipio, Sempronius was eager for battle. Hannibal easily tempted him into an ambush and annihilated three-quarters of the Roman army. The rich Po valley fell to Hannibal.
The loss of northern Italy infuriated those who had promoted the conquest and settlement of that region. They helped to elect Gaius Flaminius as consul for 217 b.c.e. He had subdued the Insubres and placed Cisalpine Gaul under Roman control in his consulship of 223 b.c.e. Gnaeus Servilius was the other consul. New legions were called into service. The new consuls were instructed to hold the line and, if possible, recover northern Italy.
The Battle of Lake Trasimene, 217 b.c.e.
Always doing the unexpected, Hannibal invaded Etruria by a difficult, but unguarded, pass. Feigning a march against Rome itself, he lured Flaminius into a narrow spot between the hills and Lake Trasimene, near Perusia (Perugia). On a foggy morning, he ambushed the Roman army from the hills. Most of the 36,000 Romans were either killed or captured. Flaminius himself was slain. The same fate afterward befell 4000 cavalrymen whom Servilius had sent down the Flaminian Way, perhaps to support the legions at Trasimene.
The news of Trasimene filled Rome with fear of an imminent siege. The fear was groundless. Hannibal knew that the siege of a large fortified city without siege engines and a strong supply base would have been foolhardy. Also, the Romans still had field armies capable of intervening. Hannibal had another plan. He had invaded Italy in the hope of wrecking the Roman alliance system. Victorious battles were only a means to this end. So far they had produced satisfactory results only in the North and not in Etruria or central Italy. Hannibal decided to see what could be accomplished farther south.
Fabius Maximus, Cunctator, 217 b.c.e.
The defeat at Trasimene, the fear of a siege, the daily meetings of the senate, the death of Flaminius (the people’s idol), the eclipse of his faction in the senate, and the return of more conservative senators to power served to revive the dictatorship—an office defunct for thirty years—in the hands of Fabius Maximus (Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus). He was a man of illustrious lineage and decidedly conservative views on politics and war. For some unclear reason, Fabius was not appointed by a magistrate with imperium (perhaps they were all in the field). He was elected directly by the Centuriate Assembly. Nor was he able to appoint his own master of the cavalry (magister equitum). Instead, the Centuriate Assembly saddled him with M. Minucius Rufus, a rash, impulsive, and headstrong person who always disagreed with Fabius’ strategy.
Fabius’ strategy included avoiding battles because the Roman cavalry was much inferior to Hannibal’s. Fabius waited until Hannibal should inadvertently work himself into an impasse and be forced to fight under highly unfavorable conditions. Meanwhile, Fabius kept his army always on hilly terrain, where Hannibal could not use his superior cavalry to advantage. Fabius attempted to wear him down by constantly dogging his heels, hampering his movements, and preventing him from acquiring allies, feeding his army, or establishing bases. By this frustrating strategy, Fabius hoped to prevent Hannibal from destroying the Roman system of alliances.
Fabius’ cautious strategy is to this day known as Fabian. In his own time, he gained the title Cunctator, “the Delayer.” Minucius hated his caution, as did many others. The strategy of attrition is a naturally double-edged sword. It puts as hard a strain on the user as on the enemy. During the electoral campaigns of 217 b.c.e., popular speakers declared that Rome had not yet brought to bear its full force against Hannibal. They urged the election of men who would seek a speedy end to the war. After Fabius and Minucius duly stepped down from their posts, the newly elected consuls, Gaius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus, expected to make short work of the wily Hannibal.
The Battle of Cannae, 216 b.c.e.
The Roman commanders were overconfident in their superior numbers.2 They marched south to engage Hannibal near Cannae, a small fortress town in Apulia. Having a smaller infantry force, Hannibal concentrated his Gallic and Spanish soldiers in the center and posted his heavily armed African veterans in echelon behind them, while his superior cavalry protected the wings. During the battle, Hannibal’s center sagged inward. The Romans became trapped in a cramped pocket as they were outflanked by the Africans and cut off at the rear by Hannibal’s victorious cavalry. Rome’s loss was frightful. Only about 15,000 escaped death or capture. Many prominent men lay dead on the field with the consul Aemilius Paullus. Among those who survived were the consul Varro and two future Roman leaders, Marcus Claudius Marcellus and the young Publius Cornelius Scipio.
Marcellus and Scipio, along with about 10,000 of the other survivors, fled to Canusium. There, a wealthy woman named Busa provided them with clothes, money, and provisions at huge expense to herself. These supplies enabled the survivors to become a viable force for defending themselves and Canusium from the enemy. Later the senate honored Busa with a decree of thanks. The troops whom she saved, however, received no gratitude: Roman soldiers were supposed to win or die trying. The senate denied them their pay and sent them to fight in Sicily for as long as the war took. As for those who had surrendered to Hannibal, the senate refused his offer to return them for ransom. They were left to their fate.
Further Carthaginian successes
Never was the outlook brighter for Carthage than in the years between 216 and 212 b.c.e. The Roman allies were exhausted; some began to waver in their loyalty. Several towns in Apulia and most of Lucania and Bruttium went over to Hannibal. The big cities of Capua in Campania and Syracuse in Sicily revolted against their alliance with Rome and opened their gates to him. His capture of Tarentum in 213 was a major blow. Even some of the Latin towns and colonies began to complain about taxes and the terrific drain on their manpower and economies. More serious still, Philip V of Macedon, who was eager to drive the Romans from their bridgeheads in Illyria, had concluded a mutual assistance pact with Hannibal in 215 b.c.e.
The Roman recovery
After Cannae, the Romans returned to the Fabian strategy of attrition and the avoidance of set battles such as Cannae. They now began to concentrate on keeping their Italian allies loyal and winning back the cities that had gone over to Hannibal. The strategy was to prevent Hannibal from provisioning his army in Italy or obtaining reinforcements from Carthage. Meanwhile, the Romans vigorously prosecuted the war in Sicily, Illyria, and Spain. These tasks required the expenditure of enormous sums of money and manpower. A fleet of at least 200 ships had to be maintained. Twenty-five legions at home and abroad had to be fed and supplied.
With their enormous manpower and resources, the Romans not only checked Hannibal but also reconquered disloyal cities. Without an adequate navy to supply steady reinforcements from Carthage or Spain, Hannibal could not protect his Italian allies and keep an army in the field at the same time. He had to stand by helplessly and watch the Romans reconquer his new allies one by one. The Romans won back the Apulian cities and then laid siege to Capua. The fall of Capua in 211 b.c.e. restored all Campania to Roman control. Two years later, the Cunctator reoccupied Tarentum.
The siege of Syracuse
The year before Capua’s defeat, Syracuse fell to M. Claudius Marcellus after a long siege. Syracuse had been able to defend itself with artillery and other devices invented by the renowned mathematician and physicist Archimedes. During the siege, Carthage gave Syracuse little effective support except for some feeble naval assistance. The city was finally betrayed from within. It was sacked after its capture, and its independence was destroyed. Its art treasures were shipped to Rome, and its greatest treasure, Archimedes, was killed during the sack. After the capture of Agrigentum in 210 b.c.e., all Sicily fell under the Roman yoke once more.
The First Macedonian War, 215 to 205 b.c.e.
After allying with Hannibal, Philip V of Macedon attempted to seize the Roman protectorates and naval bases in Illyria and invade Italy with Carthaginian help. The Romans thwarted him with their superior naval power. They also created an anti-Macedonian coalition in Greece by an offensive alliance with the Aetolian League and other Greek states. Philip conducted four brilliant campaigns against the Greek coalition. Nevertheless, the Greek war kept Philip so occupied that he was unable to give Hannibal any effective assistance in Italy. A temporary stalemate in both Italy and the Balkans ensued. In 206, the Aetolians finally made a separate peace with Philip. The Romans were opposed to it but were forced to follow suit in 205 with the Peace of Phoenice.
The war in Spain, 218 to 211 b.c.e.
Having failed to intercept Hannibal at the Rhône, the consul Publius Scipio had sent his brother Gnaeus to blockade Hannibal’s brother Hasdrubal in Spain. After being defeated at the Trebia, Publius had joined Gnaeus and remained in command of Spain as proconsul. Together, the Scipios deprived Hannibal of any aid from Spain. They blocked the land routes, while the Roman navy, with aid from Massilia, controlled the sea. In 216 or 215, they actually defeated Hasdrubal near Dertosa, on the Ebro.
After that, many Spanish tribes went over to the Romans. The Carthaginian position further weakened when Hasdrubal was recalled to North Africa to suppress a revolt led by Syphax, an opportunist king of the Numidians. The capture of Saguntum in 212 was another blow. Then disaster struck the Romans. Hasdrubal returned in 211, recovered many of his Spanish allies, and mounted a three-pronged attack against the Romans. The Roman army was destroyed, and both Scipios perished.
Scipio Africanus
The future Scipio Africanus, son and nephew of the slain Scipios, had been a military tribune who had survived Cannae and persuaded the other survivors to keep fighting. That plus his earlier rescue of his father at the Battle of the Ticinus had earned him a reputation for courage and leadership by the time he was elected a curule aedile for 213 b.c.e. In 210 b.c.e., the Romans were desperate to find a commander with the qualities needed to rescue the situation in Spain. The Centuriate Assembly, acting in conjunction with the senate, took an unprecedented step. Although Scipio was then only a private person, had held no rank higher than that of a curule aedile, and was a mere twenty-five years old, he was granted imperium and the rank of proconsul, and assigned to his father’s old command.
In Spain, Scipio was careful to maintain the loyalty and harmony of his subordinate officers. He may have made some improvements to the Roman army. He is credited with its adoption of the well-tempered Spanish cut-and-thrust sword (the gladius) and the Spanish javelin. He probably required more drill and training than ever given to Roman legions in the past. His legions soon became efficient instruments of victory.
The conquest of Spain
After training his troops, Scipio boldly marched through enemy territory in 209 and captured the stronghold of New Carthage. The Carthaginian forces were too distant and spread out to oppose him. He was also able to take advantage of an unusual opportunity at New Carthage itself. The defenders had neglected the walls on the seaward side of the city, where the water usually was deep. A strong north wind, however, had pushed the water back enough for Roman soldiers to wade through and scale the walls. This piece of luck convinced Scipio’s soldiers that he was divinely inspired, a belief that he eagerly encouraged. From then on they carried out his orders with blind faith.
With the capture of New Carthage, Scipio acquired a fine base, access to local silver mines, a number of ships, and immense quantities of booty, money, and weapons. He even liberated 10,000 Spaniards whom the Carthaginians had held hostage to ensure the loyalty of their compatriots. Scipio generously allowed the hostages to return home with a share of the booty. That act earned him much valuable goodwill among the Spanish tribes.
Hasdrubal escaped with most of his army after Scipio defeated him in 208. He then crossed the Alps to join Hannibal in Italy. With Hasdrubal gone, however, it was easier for Scipio to defeat the other Carthaginian generals in Spain, especially since they did not get on well with each other. Carthaginian power finally collapsed after the Battle of Ilipa in 206 b.c.e., in which Scipio proved himself a master of encircling tactics. Soon, the Romans claimed all of Spain as theirs. Even the ancient Phoenician colonies of Gades (Cadiz) and Malaga voluntarily became Roman allies.
The battle at the Metaurus and the death of Hasdrubal, 207 b.c.e.
The years just before Hasdrubal’s crossing of the Alps had not been good for Rome. With so many farmers in the army, agricultural production had declined. Many fertile districts had been repeatedly devastated. Famine was widespread. Had Rome not succeeded in obtaining some wheat from Egypt, the food problem would have been acute. Some of the Italian and Latin allies were so exhausted by the war that they refused to supply Rome with any more men or money.
If Hasdrubal had succeeded in effecting a junction with Hannibal’s army, which was operating in Bruttium, Rome might have lost the war. Hannibal did move as far north as Apulia, but one of the consuls, Gaius Claudius Nero, barred further advance. The Romans intercepted Hasdrubal’s message asking Hannibal to join him in Umbria. Claudius Nero left just enough troops to watch Hannibal and headed north against Hasdrubal with the rest. Two Roman armies converged on Hasdrubal at the Metaurus River in 207. His army was destroyed, and he himself was slain. Several days later, his severed head was thrown into Hannibal’s camp. Hannibal sadly withdrew to Bruttium.
Two other misfortunes for Hannibal followed. His brother Mago had escaped from Spain and landed at Genua (Genoa) with an army in 205 b.c.e. That same year, however, the Romans destroyed a Punic fleet bringing reinforcements and supplies to Hannibal. In 203, Mago was defeated and wounded. He withdrew to Genua, where he received orders from Carthage to set sail for home. During the voyage, he died.
The end approaches
In 206 b.c.e., Scipio, who had held only one office of the cursus honorum, had returned to Rome and had been elected a consul for 205. The senate debated how to end the war. Scipio wanted to invade Africa. He had already made a pact with Masinissa and Syphax, two petty kings of Numidia. Fabius Maximus, the Cunctator, leader of the senate, did not like the young upstart and his bold strategy. He vigorously opposed the African venture. Finally, Scipio obtained the command of two legions in Sicily, which included any remaining disgraced survivors of Cannae. The senate reluctantly granted permission to go to Africa, but not to draft troops. Scipio appealed directly to the people for volunteers for the African expedition. About 7000 enlisted. They, together with the two legions already in Sicily, made up the African expeditionary force. Fabius was certain that the expedition would fail. He did not take into account Scipio’s extraordinary boldness, cunning, and charismatic leadership. Nor were those traits appreciated by the conservative-minded M. Porcius Cato (Cato the Elder). He had been praised for his efforts as a military tribune at the Battle of the Metaurus River. Then, as a quaestor for 204 b.c.e., he was assigned to Scipio in Sicily.3
In that year, Scipio landed near Utica in North Africa and immediately became involved in the quarrels of Syphax and Masinissa, both of whom were in love with Sophoniba (Sophonisba, Safonba’al), the beautiful daughter of Hasdrubal Gisco, the Carthaginian governor of Numidia. Syphax, the stronger of the two kings, won the hand of Sophoniba, deposed his rival, and allied himself with Carthage. Masinissa, now a king without love, land, or throne, found refuge in Scipio’s camp.
Scipio had perfidiously entered into peace negotiations with Carthage and Syphax for the sole purpose of lulling their suspicions and learning the nature and disposition of their camps. One night, after learning what he wanted, he surrounded Syphax’s camp and set it on fire. It was made of osiers and reeds. The fire spread fast. The Carthaginians, thinking that the fire was accidental, rushed out unarmed to help. Scipio then ambushed and destroyed both armies.
Masinissa then captured Syphax, returned to Numidia in triumph after winning back all that he had lost, and married Sophoniba. Scipio feared that Sophoniba might charm her husband into an alliance with Carthage. He insisted that she be turned over to him to parade in his Roman triumph. Masinissa did not dare to oppose Scipio but wished to spare Sophoniba humiliation as a captive. He provided her with a cup of poison. She proudly drank it.
The Carthaginians, imitating Scipio’s guile, opened peace negotiations with him but recalled Hannibal (along with Mago) from Italy. After Hannibal’s arrival in Africa, the peace talks suddenly ceased. The war continued until Scipio and Hannibal fought a great battle near Naraggara. It was a three-day march west of Zama, but Zama is the name conventionally given to the battle.
The Battle of Zama (Naraggara), 202 b.c.e.
Weak in cavalry, Hannibal hoped that his elephants would overcome the Roman legions. Scipio stationed the maniples of his battle lines directly behind each other. The light-armed velites were stationed between the gaps in the front line. They were to provoke the elephants to chase them down the lanes between the maniples. Some of the elephants panicked at the start of the battle and crashed into the cavalry of the Carthaginian left. Of the rest, some pursued the velites, and others turned and blundered into the cavalry of the Carthaginian right. The Roman cavalry wings were then able to drive off the Carthaginian cavalry and attack the flanks of Hannibal’s infantry. They turned the battle in Rome’s favor. Most of the Carthaginians were killed, but Hannibal escaped.
Peace terms
Hannibal himself advised the Carthaginians to accept Scipio’s unpalatable peace terms. In 201 b.c.e., Carthage was compelled to surrender all territories outside of Africa; to recognize the independence of Numidia and Masinissa’s alliance with Rome; to agree not to wage war either outside of or within Africa without Roman permission; to reduce its fleet to ten light triremes or coastguard vessels; and to pay an indemnity of 10,000 talents, spread out in fifty yearly installments. The power of Carthage to challenge Rome was broken forever. Peace declared, Scipio returned to Rome and celebrated a magnificent triumph, which his rivals in the senate had petulantly tried to deny him. He also received the proud title of Africanus.
Overview and reasons for Roman success
The Barcids had been able to restore Carthaginian fortunes through conquests in Spain from 237 to 221 b.c.e. They were not intent on a new war with Rome. The Romans were preoccupied with wars in Cisalpine Gaul and Illyria. Massilia, however, stoked Roman fears of a hostile alliance between the Carthaginians and Gauls. Roman worries were calmed by the Ebro Treaty of 226 b.c.e. In 218, however, Hannibal’s destruction of Saguntum precipitated the Second Punic War. Hannibal’s brilliant victories in Italy were not negated by lack of support at home. Carthage supported Hannibal and the war consistently to the best of its ability, which was limited by Roman naval superiority. Hannibal’s failure in Italy was determined by Roman successes in Spain and the tenacity of Fabius Maximus, the Cunctator. Fabius’ delaying tactics of harassment and attrition had utilized Rome’s enormous reserves of manpower to frustrate Hannibal’s main design of wrecking Rome’s system of alliances. By delaying, Fabius saved the state (cunctando restituit rem, to quote Rome’s first great poet, Ennius). Then, Scipio’s guile and generalship defeated Hannibal and Carthage in Africa.
Aftermath and the fate of Hannibal
Hannibal revealed unusual talents as an administrator during his postwar career. After the war, the Carthaginian aristocracy tried to protect its wealth by corruption and by forcing the burden of paying the war indemnity onto the lower classes. The people turned to Hannibal, the popular war hero remembered for his fairness and good treatment of ordinary soldiers. They elected him shophet, judge, in 196 b.c.e.
Hannibal established a system of taxation based on income and ability to pay. He also made the government accountable to the people for its expenditures. Hannibal’s financial administration was so efficient that in 191 b.c.e., only ten years after Zama, Carthage offered immediate payment of the forty remaining installments of its war indemnity. Rome refused the offer. Such a huge influx of revenue all at once would have been difficult to absorb. It seemed better to keep Carthage under continued obligation.
Carthage’s commerce and industry revived as never before. Carthage again became one of the busiest ports of the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, Carthage soon lost the benefits of Hannibal’s efficient administration. Powerful Romans became alarmed at Carthage’s remarkable recovery. When Hannibal’s political enemies accused him of planning another war, the Romans demanded his surrender as a war criminal. To save his life, Hannibal escaped from Carthage and took refuge in the East. Eventually, as the Romans added that part of the world to a then rapidly growing empire, they hounded him to death in 183 b.c.e. (p. 161). In the meantime, they focused their fears and resentments on King Philip V of Macedon.
NOTES
1 How many elephants survived he did not mention, but some did fight in his initial battles in Italy.
2 Estimates vary from 45,000 to 90,000 men. Somewhere around 50,000 seems reasonable. Hannibal had no more than 40,000, the equivalent of two fewer legions than the Romans probably had.
3 Some scholars date Cato’s quaestorship to 205 b.c.e., but that is probably too early, and the story that Cato and Scipio quarreled openly in 204 b.c.e.. is probably an anachronistic reflection of their later public hostility.
Suggested reading
Fronda , M. Between Rome and Carthage: Southern Italy during the Second Punic War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Garland , R. Hannibal. Ancients in Action. London: Bristol Classical Press, 2010.