13
39. The path to a second Athenian league
Sparta held the hegemony of the Aegean for ten years. The ephemeral experience of Spartan naval imperialism came to an end in 394, when the Persian fleet, under the orders of the Athenian admiral Conon, defeated the Spartans in a naval battle fought off Cnidus. This battle ignited, to use the words of Diodorus Siculus (14.84.3), an ‘eagerness for change’ amongst the subjects of Sparta, to whom Conon and Pharnabazus promised independence and freedom. Conon was the man of the hour. After his victory, the general triumphantly returned to Athens. The general employed his men to complete the rebuilding of the so-called Long Walls, the fortification which linked the asty to the Pyraeus. The walls were a famous symbol of the city’s naval dominance, which the Spartans had forced the Athenians to demolish as part of the peace terms imposed at the end of the Peloponnesian War [a, b].
The principles of liberty (eleutheria) and autonomy (authonomia) were to redefine the relationship between the poleis, and between the Greek world and Persia. In 386, the representatives of the major Greek powers gathered at Sardis to sign a peace treaty dictated by the Great King. Persia claimed possession of all the Greek cities of Asia and of the islands, while all the others were to remain autonomous: the time of the large symmachiai, like Sparta’s Peloponnesian League and the Delian League, was now over [c]. The years after the signing of the Peace saw a recrudescence of Sparta’s aggressive imperialism, culminating in the occupation of the Cadmaea, the acropolis of Thebes. Conversely, many cities began to attach themselves to Athens. The allies formed a new league (synedrion) of free and independent poleis, inspired by the principles of the peace of 386 [d]. In the late winter of 377, these principles were formally ratified by the Athenian ekklesia [e]. The decree of Aristoteles marked a notable departure of the new coalition from the excesses of fifth-century imperialism, which however occasionally resurfaced [f].
[a] Diod. 14.84.3–4: Athenian resurgence after Cnidus
After the naval battle Pharnabazus and Conon put out to sea with all their ships against the allies of the Spartans, and first they drove the people of Cos to secede, then those of Nisyros and Teos. And then the Chians expelled their garrison and joined the cities with Conon, and smilarly the Mitylenaeans and Ephesians and Erythraeans also changed sides. A kind of eagerness for change fell upon all of the cities, and some of them expelled their Spartan garrisons and maintained their freedom, while others attached themselves to Conon. As for the Lacedaemonians, from this moment they lost the hegemony of the sea. Conon, having decided to sail with his entire fleet to Attica, put out to sea, and after winning to his cause against the Cyclades, he sailed against the island of Cythera.
[b] Xen. Hell. 4.8.9: Pharnabazus, Conon and the revival of Athenian imperialism
Conon said that if he would let him keep the fleet, he would maintain it with the contributions from the islands and in the meantime he would sail down to his fatherland and aid the Athenians in the rebuilding of the Long Walls and the wall around the Piraeus. Conon said that nothing would be more grievous for the Spartans than this. ‘So’, he said, ‘at the same time you will do a favour to the Athenians and take vengeance upon the Spartans, by making all their efforts to attain what they most desired useless.’ Having heard this, Pharnabazus eagerly dispatched him to Athens and gave him additional funds to rebuild the walls.
[c] Xen. Hell. 5.1.30–1: The King’s Peace
When Tiribazus invited to be present those who wished to hear the peace treaty, which the King had sent down, they all immediately presented themselves. Once they had gathered together, Tissaphernes showed them the King’s seal and then read the text, which ran as follows:
‘King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia should belong to him, as well as Clazomenae and Cyprus among the islands, and that the other Greek cities, small and great, should be left independent, except Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros, which should belong to the Athenians as of old. Whichever of the two parties does not accept the peace, I will wage war upon them, together with those who desire to do this, by land and sea, with ships and money.’
[d] Diod. 15.28.2–5: The second Athenian league
The Athenians sent their most respectable citizens as ambassadors to the cities which obeyed the Spartans, and urged them to adhere to the cause of common liberty. For the Spartans, relying on the size of their military force, were ruling their subjects contemptuously and oppressively. For this reason, many of those subject to their power were turning to the Athenians. The citizens of Chios and Byzantium were the first to answer the plea to secede, and were followed by the Rhodians, the Mytileneans and some other islanders. As this movement gathered pace throughout Greece, many cities sided with the Athenians. The people, buoyed up by the good-will of the cities, established a council of all the allies, and appointed representatives for each city. It was agreed by common decision that the council should hold its meetings in Athens, but all the cities, big or small, should be equal and sovereign and each have one vote, accepting the Athenians as their leaders. The Spartans, seeing that it was impossible to control the cities’ movement to secede, nevertheless eagerly strove to reconcile their alienated subjects by means of embassies, friendly speeches, as well as promises of benefits. At the same time, they devoted all their thoughts to the preparations for war, foreseeing that the Boeotian War would be long and troublesome for them, since the Athenians and the other Greeks who took part in the council were allied with the Thebans.
[e] IG II3 43 = Tod II 123: The decree of Aristoteles
In the archonship of Nausinicus.
Secretary: Callibius sono of Cephisophon of the deme of Paeania.
In the seventh prytany of the tribe Ippotontis.
The boule and the assembly decreed.
Carinus of Atmos was president.
Aristoteles proposed: to the Good Fortune of the Athenians and of the allies of the Athenians; in order that the Spartans may leave the Greeks in peaceful enjoyment of liberty and autonomy and in secure possession of [the whole of their territory], and so that [the joint peace sworn to by the Greeks] and the King according to the agreements may be valid and [last forever].
The people have decreed: If any Greek or barbarian, either living on the mainland or an island, and is not subject to the King, so wishes, he is permitted to be a free and autonomous ally of the Athenians and of their allies, keeping to whatever constitution he wishes, neither admitting a [garris]on nor resident official nor paying tribute, on the same terms as the Chians, the Thebans, and the rest of the allies. To those who have made an alliance with the Athenians and their allies, the people will surrender all landed property privately or publicly owned by Athenians in the t[erritory of those join]ing the alliance, and the people is to give them a guarantee [of this. If there] exist at Athens stelai unfavourable to any of the cities allied with the Athenians, the council of the year shall have the authority to destroy them. From the archonship of Nausinikos it is forbidden, either privately or publicly, for any Athenian to acquire in the territories of the allies either a house or land, either by purchase, mortgage or in any other way. If anyone buys, obtains possession of or mortgages property in any way whatsoever, it is permitted for any of the allies who wishes, to give information to the allies’ representatives. The representatives are to sell the property, giving one half of the proceeds to the informant, while the other half is to belong to the joint funds of the allies. If anyone wages war either by land or sea, against those who have joined the alliance, the Athenians and their allies are to help them both by land and by sea with all possible strength. If anyone, either a magistrate or a private individual, proposes or puts to the vote any measure contrary to this decree so as to necessitate the repeal of any of the provisions stated in the decree, the people will punish him with the loss of citizen rights and the confiscation of his property, and the tenth part will be given to the Goddess, and he is to be put on trial before the Athenians and their allies on the charge of aiming to destroy the alliance; his punishment shall be death or exile from the territories of Athens and the allies. If he is condemned to death, he shall not be buried in Attica or in the territory of the allies. The Secretary of the Council is to record this decree on stone and set it up beside the statue of Zeus Eleutherios. Money towards the cost of inscribing the stele, sixty drachmae, is to be given from the Ten Talents fund by the Treasurers of the Goddess. On this stele are to be recorded the names of the cities at present allied and of any other city which may join the alliance. This is to be the inscription. But the people are to choose three envoys to go at once to Thebes to persuade the Thebans of whatever beneficial measures they can. The following were chosen: Aristoteles of the deme Marathon, Pyrrhander of the deme Anaphlystos, Thrasybulus of the deme Collytus. The following cities were allies of Athens: Chios, Tenedos, Thebes, Mytilene, Chalcis, Methymna, Eretria, Rhodes, Poiessa, Arethusa, Byzantium, Carystus, Perinthus, Icus, Peparethus, Pal…, Skiathos, Maroneia, Dion, Paros, Athenae, Diades.
[f] IG II3 111 = Tod II 142: Athens punishes the rebels of Iulis
Since the citizens of Iulis brought back to their fatherland by the Athenians have reported that the city of Iulis owes the Athenians three talents in silver according to the decree of the Athenian people proposed by Messenus, it has been decreed that the citizens of Iulis shall return this sum to the Athenians in the month of Scirophorion in the archonship of Caricleides.
In accordance with the treaties, all the public and private trials for sums superior to one hundred drachmas shall be carried out in Athens.
40. After the empire I: Imagining Athens as a capital of trades and peace
The Peloponnesian War put two different models of polis one against the other. In the post-bellum period, the ephemeral experience of Spartan naval imperialism and the renewed Aegean activism of Athens were followed by the emergence of new powers, like Thebes, and new patterns of social and political organization, which developed in the peripheries of the Greek world, from the federal state of Thessaly to the kingdom of Macedonia.
The experience of the second Athenian league came to an end in 355, when a group of rebellious members, supported by Mausolus, satrap of Caria, defeated the Athenian fleet off Embata. Athens came out of the ‘Social War’ impoverished and humiliated in its international ambition; the failure of empire inevitably called into question the validity of the traditional democratic government. What new role for the polis now? In a treaty called Poroi (‘Means’), Xenophon proposes to make the necessary investments to transform Athens into a vibrant cultural and economic hub, by taking advantage of the underused mines of Laurium and of the strategic location of the Piraeus. Isocrates’ speech On the Peace has a more political take on the crisis of Athens: the fall of the second Athenian league was the natural effect of the degeneration of the system based on radical democracy and aggressive foreign policies. In this fictitious speech to the pnyx, the orator criticizes the current state of Athenian democracy, where the most highly regarded orators are those who deliver the most calamitous advice, by calling for new wars and raising false hopes of Aegean domination. The Athenians may make the best orators in Greece, but they are unable to uphold clear and consistent policies. Isocrates then urges his fellow-citizens to listen to the grievances of their allies, and become the standard bearers of peace.
[a] Isoc. Pac. 3–9: War and peace in fourth-century Athens
I notice that you do not apply the same attention to all the speakers, but while you follow some with interest, others you cannot suffer to hear their voices. This behaviour of yours is not surprising. For in previous times you became accustomed to sending away all other orators, except those who advocate your desires. And someone might justly censure you, because you are well aware that many great houses have been ruined by flatterers, and while in your private affairs you hate those who practise this art, in the management of public business you are not so badly disposed towards them. On the contrary, while you denounce those who welcome and take pleasure in the company of these men, you appear to trust them more than your other fellow-citizens.
Indeed, it is you who made the orators take care of and study not what will be profitable to the city, but how to please you with their speeches, and most of them are now resorting to this kind of oratory, since it was clear to all that you are more delighted with those who call you to war than those who advise for peace, because the former create the expectation of regaining our possessions in the cities and of recovering the power which we happened to possess in the past, while the latter do not hold out such hopes, but say that we should stay in peace and not set our hearts upon great conquests contrary to justice, but be content with our present possessions, which is the most difficult thing to achieve for most men. We are so dependent on our hopes and so insatiably greedy in pursuing what we consider our advantage that not even those who possess the greatest fortunes are willing to stick to what they have, but are always running the risk of losing what they have for their desire of getting more. It is therefore appropriate that in the current circumstances we are afraid lest we might be trapped in this madness. For some of us seem to be excessively eager for war, as though they had heard not by improvised counsellors but by the gods themselves that we will succeed in all our enterprises and will easily overcome our enemies.
But wise people should not take advice when dealing with matters about which they are competent, for that would be superfluous, but act like men who know what to do, whereas in dealing with matters upon which they do need to take advice, they should not suppose that they have a perfect understanding of what the outcome will be, but to be minded towards these circumstances, like men who exercise their best judgement, but are not sure what the future may hold. But you are not doing either, and are in the most turbulent state of mind. For you have assembled as though you had to select the best course from those proposed by the orators, yet you are not willing to listen to anyone except those who are haranguing you for your pleasure, as though you had a clear idea of what ought to be done.
[b] Isoc. Pac. 49–56: The idiosyncrasies of democratic government
If one was to observe that the domestic policy of Athens were well managed, he might be confident as to our other affairs, but should not we be especially aggrieved about this very thing? For we claim to be autochthonous and that our city was founded before all the others, but although we should be an example of good and orderly government to everyone, we run our city in a worse and more disorderly manner than those who are just founding theirs. We magnify and take pride in the fact that we were born superior to the others, yet we share this noble birth with anyone who desires it more easily than the Triballians or the Leucanians share their low birth. We pass an enormous quantity of laws, but we care so little about them – for if you hear about one case you will judge of the others as well – that although we have established the death penalty for anyone who is judged guilty of bribery, we elect men who are most blatantly guilty of this crime, such as our generals, and we appoint to the most important offices the man who has managed to destroy the greatest number of citizens. We are no less concerned about our constitution than the safety of the whole city, and are aware that our democracy flourishes and endures in peace and security, while it has been overthrown twice in time of war, yet we do not like those who desire peace, as though they supported oligarchy, and consider those who advocate war benevolent, as though they cared for democracy. We are the best masters of public speaking and politics, but we are so inconsiderate that we do not hold the same opinion on the same matter in the same day. Rather, what we criticize before entering the assembly we vote for once we have gathered, and shortly afterwards, on departing for the assembly, we disapprove of the measures which have been voted for there. We pretend to be the wisest of the Greeks, but we resort to the sort of advisers whom anybody would despise, and we give these same men, whom nobody would put in charge of any of their private affairs, sovereign powers upon all public matters.
But the most miserable thing of all is that we consider those whom we should all regard as the most depraved of the citizens as the most faithful guardians of our constitution, and we consider the metics to be such as their chosen patrons, but do not expect that we shall be judged by the character of our leaders. We are so different from our ancestors because they appointed the same men to be leaders of the city and generals, thinking that the man able to give the best advice from the platform could also take the best decisions when he was alone. We do the very opposite: for the men we use as advisors in the most important matters we do not consider worthy of being appointed as generals, as though we did not trust their intelligence, while those whose advice nobody would seek for his private affairs or those of the state, we dispatch them to the field with plenipotentiary authority, as though they will be wiser there and will take counsel about the business of the Greeks more easily than on the matters put under discussion here. I say these things not in relation to all, but only to those who are liable to the charges which I have made. However, what remains of this day will not be enough, if I were to try to examine all the mistakes, which have been made in the running of our affairs.
41. After the empire II: Revamping the international role of Athens
Isocrates’ On the Peace is a call for moderate policies, against the excesses of empire-fuelled radical democracy. In the moment of deepest scepticism over the workablility of traditional democracy, the young orator Demosthenes urged the Athenians to take back their role of defenders of democracy, and answer to the call of a group of exiled democrats from Rhodes, who had taken part in the Social War, but had been now driven out of their town by the satrap of Caria. Any war against any democratic city is also a war against Athens.
Dem. Rhod. 17–18
You should also observe, Athenians, that you have waged many wars against both democracies and oligarchies, as you know well. But perhaps none of you considers what were the causes of war with either. So, what are these causes? With democracies, either private complaints, when these could not be settled by the city, or an issue concerning portions of land or boundaries, or an eager rivalry or a struggle for ascendancy; but with oligarchies, none of these things: you fight for your constitution and liberty. I should therefore not hesitate to say that I think it a more advantageous situation if all the Greeks were your enemies under democratic governments than your friends, but ruled by oligarchies. For I think that it would not be difficult for you to make peace with free men whenever you wished, but I do not think that friendly relations with oligarchies could ever be stable, since the few can never be well disposed to the many, nor those who want to rule to those who have chosen to live in equality.
42. The conflict against Philip: Polis v. tyranny
Demosthenes was one of the leading Athenian politicians at the time of the wars against Philip of Macedon, and had a key role in the pan-Hellenic coalition that would be defeated by the Macedonians at Cheronaea. The celebration of the superior civic spirit and patriotism of the democratic citizens is one of the most recurrent themes of his political oratory. Philip was a military maverick, who thought fast and acted fast. Still, he was not a genuine leader, heading an army of responsible citizens. He was like a master leading a posse of slaves [a]. Democracy had to be Athens’ main asset in the war against Macedon; if the Athenians were biting the dust, that was because they were failing to act as a healthy democratic community. As Pericles says in the funeral speech, the system based on public debate allowed the Athenians to take informed decisions quickly and efficiently, but that was no longer the case [b]; the orator accuses his fellow-citizens of having turned the democratic decision-making process into a parody of itself.
[a] Dem. Phil. III 72: The city against a tyrant
Since this war is against an individual and not against the might of an organized city, this delay is not unprofitable, nor were the embassies sent around the Peloponnese last year and those denunciations, when I and your good friend here, Polyeuctus, and Hesegippus and the other ambassadors went from city to city and managed to keep him in check, so that he never invaded Ambracia nor even set off against the Peloponnese.
[b] Dem. Answer Phil. 17: Philip misses no opportunity
You wonder why Philip was more successful than us in the past war? I will be frank with you: because he always serves in first person, sharing the toils and dangers of the campaign, never misses an opportunity, never wastes any season of the year, while we – if I have to tell the truth – sit here, wasting time, we cast our votes and go to the agora to learn what is news. And what could be more astonishing news than a Macedonian insulting the Athenians and sending to them such a letter as the one you have just heard read a moment ago?
43. Protecting democracy after Chaeronea
One thousand Athenian soldiers fell at Chaeronea and twice as many were made prisoners. One of them was the orator Demades, who, according to Diodorus, witnessed a curious act of hubris from Philip, when the King, raising the glass to his victory with his inner circle, scoffed at the Athenians’ obsession for democratic politics by singing the opening words of an imaginary decree of the ekklesia: ‘Demosthenes, the son of Demosthene proposed…’ (Diod., 16.87; Plut., Dem. 20.3). After the battle, the Athenians took every measure to defend the city from the inevitable attack from the Macedonians and to protect its democratic constitution from any attempt at setting up a tyrannical regime in support of Athens’ enemies, as in the aftermath of the Aegospotami [a, b].
[a] Lyc. Ag. Leoc. 36–7: Emergency measures after Chaeronea
So much for the challenge and the crime. I think you have clearly understood what can be taken for granted. But now I want to remind you of the circumstances and the situation of grave emergency which the city was facing when Leocrates betrayed it. Please, clerk, take the decree of Hyperides and read it [Decree].
You hear the decree, gentlemen. It provided for the council of the Five Hundred to go down to the Piraeus in arms and deliberate with regards to the defence of the harbour and be prepared to do whatever they considered expedient for the people. And yet, if the men who had been exempted from military service so that they could deliberate upon the state of the city were serving in the role of soldiers, do not you think that the alarms by which the city happened to be held down were indeed serious?
[b] SEG 12.87 (law against tyranny, 337/336)1
In the archonship of Phrynichos.
In the ninth prytany of Leontis,
Chairestratus, son of Ameinias, of Acharnai, was secretary;
Menestratus of Aixone, of the proedroi, put the question to vote;
Eucrates, son of Aristodimos, of Piraeus, proposed;
For the Good Fortune of the Athenian people. Be it resolved by the Nomothetai: If anyone rise up against the people to establish tyranny or join in establishing the tyranny or overthrow the Athenian people or the democracy in Athens, whoever kills him who does any of these things shall be blameless. It shall not be allowed to anyone of the Councilors of the Council from the Areopagus – if the people or the democracy in Athens has been overthrown – to go to the assembly or sit in the Council or deliberate about anything. If the people or the democracy in Athens have been overthrown and anyone of the Councillors of the Areopagus goes up into the Areopagus or sits in the Council or deliberates about anything, both he and his descendants shall be deprived of civil rights and his substance shall be confiscated and a tenth given to the Goddess. The secretary of the Council shall inscribe this law on two stelai of stone and set one of them by the entrance into the Areopagus, that entrance, namely, near where one goes into the Bouleuterion, and the other in the assembly. For the inscribing of the stelai the treasurer of the Demos shall give 20 drachmai from the state funds for the inscription of decrees.
44. Athenian independence and Alexander the Great
One of the most interesting aspects of the Athenian history after Chaeronea is the remarkable stability not just of the democratic constitution of the city, but also of the democratic culture of the citizens. It is significant that the proposal of granting citizenship to the metics and slaves who were willing to defend Athens in case of a Macedonian attack was turned down as contrary to the principles of the politeia.
Philip of Macedon was assassinated in 336. The following year, his son Alexander was proclaimed king. A conference of the Greek cities was then held at the Isthmus of Corinth in preparation of a new pan-Hellenic campaign against Persia. On that occasion, a new common peace was signed, whereby Alexander committed itself to respecting the independece and autonomy of the cities. In 331, while Alexander was in Asia, the king of Sparta Agis promoted a pan-Hellenic upheaval against the Macedonians. In the oration On the Treaty with Alexander, the anonymous orator replies to another politician who had spoken before him against joining the Spartans and the other Greeks in respect of the agreements of the Isthmus. For this proud democrat, Alexander, like any other tyrant, was a natural enemy of Athenian democracy [a].
In 336, Ctesiphon proposed to honour Demosthenes with a golden crown in recognition of his work for the city. In 330 Aeschines brought Ctesiphon to trial for a number of procedural irregularities in relation to the award of the crown. Demosthenes himself took over the defence of Ctesiphon, but his oration is first and foremost a passionate defence of his political activity and his struggle to protect the independence of Athens [b].
[a] [Dem.] Answer Alex. 8–12: Debate on the treaty with Alexander
The first article of the treaty provides that the Greeks shall be free and independent. For this reason, is it not absurd that, while the clause about freedom and autonomy stands first, one who has enslaved people is not thought to have acted contrary to the agreement? Athenians, if we are to abide by our oaths and the agreement and to behave justly, as the orators are urging you to do, as I said, it is our duty to take the arms and fight against the transgressors with those who are willing to join us. Or do you think that immanent circumstances sometimes are so powerful that expediency is pursued with no regard to justice: now, if justice, contingencies and expediency gather at the same place, will you really wait for another opportunity to claim your liberty and that of all Greeks?
I come to another principle established by the agreement. The text says: ‘If any of the parties shall overthrow the constitutions established in the various states at the time of the swearing of the oaths of the peace, they shall be held as enemies by all the parties who have sworn the peace.’ But note, Athenians, that the Achaeans in the Peloponnese had a democratic constitution, and the Macedonian has overthrown the democracy of Pellene by expelling the majority of the citizens, and has given their substances to their slaves and established Chaeron, the wrestler, as their tyrant. But we ourselves have sworn the peace treaty, which orders treating as enemies those who commit such acts. Therefore, we have to obey these dispositions and treat them as enemies, or will anyone be beastly enough to say no, someone in the paybook of the Macedonians, grown rich at your expense? Be assured that they are aware of these facts, but they have reached such heights of impudence, having the tyrant’s troops for their bodyguards, that they compel you to observe the oaths which have already been violated, as though he had absolute power overupon the crime of perjury as well, and compel you to abrogate your own laws, by releasing men who had been declared guilty by your courts, and forcing you to sanction a quantity of other illegalities.
[b] Demosthenes, On the Crown 61–5: The struggle against Philip
Among the Greeks, not some but all of them invariably, it happened that a crop of traitors and bribe-takers, odious to gods and men alike, had sprung up, more numerous than they have ever existed within human memory. Philip took these men as his accomplices and assistants. The Greeks were already at loggerheads and quarrelsome with one another, and he made the situation worse by cajoling some men, bribing others and corrupting some others in every possible way. Philip divided the Greeks into many factions, although they all had one common interest: to prevent him from becoming so powerful. Now, since all the Greeks were in such a dire situation, and ignored this growing and ever-gathering evil, you, men of Athens, should ask yourselves what policy or course of action was fit for the city to choose, and to hold me responsible for this, for I had taken over the responsibility for the constitution. Do you think, Aeschines, that the city should have let her pride and dignity fall, ranking itself with the Thessalians and Dolopians, and help Philip to establish his ascendancy over Greece, to obliterate the fine and just accomplishments of our ancestors? Or if Athens should not have done this – which would have been really atrocious – should she have looked on, while all that she saw would happen, if no one prevented it – all that she realized,it seems, at a distance – was actually taking place? But now, I would like to ask to the harshest critics of my actions which party he would have liked the city to join: the party of the accomplices in the miseries which has fallen upon the Greeks, let us call it the party of the Thessalians and their supporters, or the party of those who looked on these events, in the hope of gaining some advantage for themselves, in which we should place the Arcadians and Messenians and Argives? But in the end we have fared better than most of these, let us say all of them. For had Philip withdrawn immediately after his victory, and remained in peace, giving no trouble whatsoever to any of his allies or the other Greeks, then there would have been some ground for anger and accusations against those who had opposed his machinations. But seeing that he has deprived all of them of their dignity, ascendancy, and liberty, and so much so of their constitutions, wherever he could, can it be denied that the policy, which you adopted under my guidance, was the most glorious policy possible?
45. The decline of democratic politics and the last democratic hero
Fourth-century Athens could not count on the financial revenues of empire, and the control of the city’s finances became a pressing issue in its agenda. The city’s treasury was replaced by a number of funds, called merismoi (‘partitions’), allocated to different budgets; in 378/377 the richest citizens who paid the eisphora, a sort of income tax used to finance military operations, were organized into groups called symmories. A new elective body of magistrates was created to manage the theorikon fund. This turn had notable effects on the face of Athenian politics: gone were the days of the great leaders such as Pericles who brought together in themselves the roles of the orator and of the strategos. The new situation called for a higher degree of specialization. In the aftermath of the Social War, a time of great financial difficulty for Athens, the theorikon commissioners acquired great political relevance. Eubulus was the champion of this new breed of finance specialists, who opposed interventionist policies and focused their activity on restoring prosperity at home. Although Eubulus and others were successful in putting the Athens’ treasury back in shape, Demosthenes was very critical of such policies, which he considered unworthy of the polis’ past and international role as leader of the Greek democracies [a].
Athens briefly recovered its leading role among the poleis of Greece in the months following the death of Alexander, when the general Leosthenes led the insurgency against the Macedonian lieutenant Antipater. Leosthenes was killed while besieging the town of Lamia. The funerary oration in his honour was delivered by Iperides, one of the leading orators of the time. Leosthenes is celebrated as the worthy heir of Miltiades and Themistocles, and a symbol of the autochthnous virtues of Athens [b–d].
[a] Dem. Org. 30–1: The new democracy of fourth-century Athens
Today, men of Athens, while our city likes to provide roads, fountains, whitewash and balderdash out of the public treasury, and I do not blame those who proposed these measures, not at all, but you, if you think that this is all that is required of you. Some of the private individuals who are in control of any of the public funds have erected private residences, which are not just better than those of the majority of citizens, but even more stately than our public buildings, others have purchased and farmed estates bigger than they ever hoped for before. The cause of all this is that back then the people were master and sovereign of everything, and the others were happy to accept honours, offices and rewards as dispensed by them. Now, on the contrary, those men are in charge of all the goods, while the people are relegated to the role of lackeys and aiders, and you are happy to accept whatever they give you.
[b] Hyp. Ep. 2–3: Leosthenes’ heroes
Time itself will be witness to the words which are about to be spoken upon this grave, in honour of Leosthenes the general and the others who fell with him in the war, for they behaved as brave men … For time has never seen better men than these who are now dead or more magnificent actions. Indeed, what I am most afraid today is that my words may appear unfit to describe their deeds. This thought, however, gives me confidence: that you, who are listening, will add to what I say, for my words will not fall upon a random audience, but those who were the very witnesses of the actions of these men. It is indeed appropriate to praise this city of ours for having chosen a course of action on a par with its past achievements, if not more venerable and splendid, and the fallen for their bravery in battle, and for not dishonouring their forefathers. Leosthenes the general is twice worthy of praise: for he served as a guide to the city in its choices, and besides the commander of the citizens on the battlefield.
[c] Hyperides, Fun. Speech 6–7: Brave Athenian soldiers
As I said, I will not endeavour to describe the common achievements of the city; my speech will deal with Leosthenes and the others. Where shall I start my story from? Which exploit shall I remember first? Shall I pass through their ancestry? That would be guileless, I suppose. If one is celebrating men of a different stamp, such those who have gathered together from different places in one city where they now live, each bringing his own lineage into the common stock, then one should trace back their ancestry man by man. But for one who is speaking of the Athenians, a people born of their own land, with a lineage of unsurpassable nobility, celebrating the lineage of each man would be, I think, redundant.
[d] Hyperides, Fun. Speech 35–8: Celebrating Leosthenes
As we celebrate Leosthenes with wonder, do not you think that we should have before our eyes those of the so-called demi-gods who waged war against Troy? He may have delivered exploits akin to theirs, but indeed he surpassed them in so much as they seized but one city having the whole of Greece at their side, while he brought down the power ruling over Europe and Asia with the forces of his fatherland alone. They stood up for but one woman who had been outraged, while he prevented outrage from coming upon all the women of Greece, assisted by these men who are now being buried with him. And the men who lived after those heroes, who rivalled them in the bravery of their deeds, I mean the followers of Miltiades and Themistocles, who brought honour to their fatherland and glory to their lives by setting Greece free, Leosthenes so far rose above them in bravery and wisdom that whereas they fought back the might of the barbarians as they advanced, he even prevented them from advancing. They saw their enemy set off a struggle in their own land, while Leosthenes defeated his opponents in his enemy’s territory.