Chapter 15
Introduction
Surrounded by the peaks of Mt Pangaion, Mt Lekanis and Mt Phalakro in northern Greece, the city and plains of Philippi lie at the crossroads between Europe and Asia. Established by Philip of Macedonia, the father of Alexander the Great, the city of Philippi is perhaps best known as an important early Christian site. Paul’s letter to the Philippians, which comprises one of the canonical books of the New Testament, outlines the early teachings of the Church, and the city of Philippi is still very popular with tourists who are following in the footsteps of Paul. The impressive remains of numerous early Christian basilicas only reaffirm the city’s important place in the development of European Christianity. In the centuries before Paul’s visit, the city marked a pivotal strategic location along the Via Egnatia, a major Roman roadway that stretched across northern Greece, facilitating trade between Asia and, eventually, Rome. It is perhaps for this reason that, in 42 BCE, the armies of Antony and Octavian met the troops of Brutus and Cassius here in a battle that would determine once and for all whether Rome would lie in the hands of the Republican assassins of Caesar or begin a new trajectory toward empire in the care of Caesar’s successors. The battle that followed would become a focal point for discussion of tyranny, patriotism and loyalty, and would be forever memorialized in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar (Act V, Scene 1, 2,436-2,445):
Coming from Sardis, on our former ensign
Two mighty eagles fell, and there they perch’d,
Gorging and feeding from our soldiers’ hands;
Who to Philippi here consorted us:
This morning are they fled away and gone;
And in their steads do ravens, crows and kites,
Fly o’er our heads and downward look on us,
As we were sickly prey: their shadows seem
A canopy most fatal, under which
Our army lies, ready to give up the ghost.
Directions to the Site
Because of its popularity as a tourist site, the ancient city of Philippi is easily reached from Thessaloniki and Kavala. From Thessaloniki, the trip to Philippi takes just under two hours. Take the National Highway (NH) between Thessaloniki and Kavala, which is part of the Egnatia Odos (E 90), the major highway in northern Greece. After about 142km, turn west on the NH between Dramas and Kavala in the direction of Dramas. This road cuts through the plain of Philippi, skirting what was, until recently, a large marsh. It is along this route that the armies of Octavian and Antony likely marched to meet Brutus and Cassius. The archaeological park is well signed, and after about 12km along the Dramas-Kavala road, signs will lead to a large parking area and the entrance to the ancient city of Philippi. From Kavala, simply follow the Dramas-Kavala road to Philippi, around 17km distant. This road winds through a pass flanked by prominent peaks that may have been identified as the ‘gates’ between Europe and Asia in antiquity. As the road descends into the plain, it passes through the towns of Stavros and Amygdaleonas, which are surrounded by numerous hillocks where Brutus and Cassius may have once set up their camps in anticipation of Antony and Octavian.
Historical Outline of the Battle
Following his victory over Pompey the Great at the Battle of Pharsalus in 48 BCE, Julius Caesar was, for all intents and purposes, the sole ruler of the city of Rome. While the city was still ostensibly a Republic overseen by the consuls and the Senate, few remained who could oppose Caesar on a political level. After subduing remaining pockets of Pompeian resistance in Egypt, Africa and Spain, Caesar returned to Rome in 45 and began to enact a number of political reforms and public works programmes. In 44, he was named dictator for life (dictator perpetuo), an unprecedented honour that granted him unilateral control of the state without fear of prosecution for his actions. Traditionally, the power of the dictator was reserved for times of emergency and limited to a term of only six months, after which the temporary dictator was to return power to the consuls, thus restoring collegial authority in the state. Most famously, the statesman Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus was granted this power twice, each time relinquishing his authority as soon as the threat to Rome had passed and then returning to his farm. These actions made Cincinnatus a legend and a model of Roman virtue. Caesar’s appointment as dictator for life, however, flew in the face of Republican ideals, particularly the notion that no one man should wield too much power. The Roman Republic was, after all, established to prevent the return of monarchy to the city.
While it is unclear whether Caesar ever truly had designs on monarchy, his actions were enough to make many of his opponents sceptical of his intentions. For example, Caesar began to mint coins with his own image on them, and the Senate even approved of a temple to be built for the worship of Caesar as a god. Neither of these honours had ever been granted to a living Roman, but they were common practice for Hellenistic kings. We are even told that Marc Antony, one of Caesar’s closest supporters, tried several times to crown Caesar while at a public festival. Whether out of sincerity or as part of political theatre, Caesar refused this honour, stating that Jupiter was the only true king of Rome. Regardless, these actions did not sit well with Caesar’s opponents, particularly staunch Republicans in the Senate, and, on 15 March 44 BCE, Caesar was assassinated during a meeting of the Senate. Ironically, the assassination occurred in an assembly hall associated with the Theatre of Pompey, the very man who once so vigorously opposed Caesar.
Any goodwill the assassins thought they might receive by ridding the Republic of a tyrant was short-lived, especially after Caesar’s will was made public. In it, he left the people of Rome 300 sesterces apiece and set aside a large tract of land to be used as a public garden. The public outcry against the assassins was so great that the leaders of the conspiracy, Marcus Junius Brutus and Gaius Cassius Longinus, had to leave the city and were soon granted governorships in Crete and Cyrene. In his will, Caesar also named his grand-nephew, Gaius Octavius, as heir and adopted him posthumously as his son. After some initial disputes and wrangling with Marc Antony, Octavius - now named Gaius Julius Caesar Octavianus (Octavian) - soon joined with Antony as well as Marcus Aemelius Lepidus to form the Second Triumvirate. This triumvirate was made legal at Rome and tasked with ‘the restoration of the state’ (triumviri reipublicae constituendae), a task they could pursue without support from the Senate or the people. The three men quickly divided Roman territory amongst themselves and turned their attention to the pursuit of Brutus and Cassius, who were condemned as enemies of the state in 43.
Many of the opponents of the triumvirate had begun to find their way to Brutus and Cassius, in large part to escape the series of proscriptions enacted by Antony, Lepidus and Octavian. These proscriptions allowed the triumvirates to assassinate their political opponents and confiscate their property, thus eliminating potential threats to their authority while simultaneously increasing their own wealth. Meanwhile, Brutus and Cassius had begun to raise armies and campaign in the eastern portions of the Roman world. Cassius in particular was engaged with Publius Cornelius Dolabella, a former Roman consul who had been sent to Syria to campaign against the Parthians. Upon his arrival in Asia, Dolabella assassinated the proconsul and began to plunder his way through the province. Still acting as an agent of Rome, Cassius pursued Dolabella and soon defeated him at Laodicea in Syria (43 BCE). Soon after this victory, Brutus and Cassius met to discuss joining their forces to resist Antony and Octavian, who had begun to move their army across the Adriatic Sea to engage the Republican assassins of Caesar.
In anticipation of a battle against the forces of Octavian and Antony, Brutus and Cassius first campaigned against Lycia and Rhodes. Lycia, a region along the southwest coast of Turkey, and Rhodes, a prominent island west of Lycia, both provided friendly ports-of-call for the fleets of Octavian and Antony. The Republicans needed first to subdue these regions so that their armies would not be subject to attack from the rear and in order to cut off the supply lines of the enemy forces, who were steadily moving into the northern regions of Greece. It was the hope of Brutus and Cassius that the legions of Octavian and Antony would quickly find themselves without supplies or resources, and so have to retreat back to Italy with little to no engagement. In addition, the Republicans were able to exact considerable funds and resources from the defeated regions, with which they could supply their own legions.
Late in the summer of 42, Brutus and Cassius, along with their combined forces, crossed the Hellespont and marched into northern Greece. We are told by Appian that the Republican forces numbered nineteen legions, comprising around 80,000 foot soldiers. In addition, they had mustered nearly 8,000 cavalrymen and 4,000 mounted bowmen from regions as far afield as Spain in the west and Parthia in the east. Having skirmished with local tribes during their march through Thrace, the Republican force found itself north of the island of Thasos, separated from Macedonia and the plains of Philippi by the rugged foothills of Mt Lekanis. Meanwhile, Antony and Octavian had sent an advanced force of eight legions under the command of Gaius Norbanus Flaccus and Decidius Saxa. This vanguard moved through the region of Macedonia and soon occupied an important pass near Mt Symbolon, which Appian describes as the only route between Asia and Europe. From this advantageous position, Norbanus and Decidius would be able to delay the Republicans while the full force of Antony and Octavian proceeded through Macedonia. Wary of an engagement with the entrenched Norbanus and Decidius, Brutus and Cassius were shown an alternate route through rough and waterless terrain that would bring them to the plains of Philippi undetected, thus outflanking Norbanus and Decidius. After a four-day march during which the Republican forces had to carry their own water and cut their own path, they arrived in the plain, utterly surprising the troops camped at the pass near Symbolon. Norbanus and Decidius immediately retreated to Amphipolis, where they joined with the rest of the army of the triumvirates.
The stage was now set for the final confrontation between the Republicans led by Brutus and Cassius and the Caesarians led by the triumvirates Antony and Octavian. Our ancient sources are actually surprisingly detailed about the two battles that occurred between the Republicans and Caesarians in the autumn of 42. In particular, Appian, Cassius Dio and Plutarch outline troop movements and topographical features, with Appian offering the most detailed description. Upon expelling Norbanus and Decidius from the narrows near Symbolon, Brutus and Cassius then set up camp on two hills some eighteen stades (approximately 3.5km) from Philippi itself. These hills were about eight stades (1.5km) from one another, and the Republicans built fortifications between the two, essentially forming a single camp. The hills themselves, we are told, flanked the main pass between Europe and Asia, standing over it as though gates. From this position, Brutus and Cassius were able to maintain lines of communication and supply with their depot on Thasos by way of the port city at Neapolis (modern Kavala). It was still the hope of the Republicans that they could essentially ‘starve out’ the opposing forces, who were far from their supplies. The plain of Philippi stretched out in front of them. To the north were the mountains and woods through which they had made their treacherous four-day march; to the east, the pass to Neapolis and the sea. In the distance to the west stretched a fertile plain that reached the very banks of the Strymon River, while to the south was a marsh, which has since been drained to facilitate more agriculture. This marsh, in particular, would feature prominently in the engagements to come.
While these events were taking place around Philippi, Antony had moved his forces east through Macedonia and occupied Amphipolis, an important city controlling the Strymon River south of Philippi. We are told that Octavian had been left behind at Dyrrachium (modern Durrёs on the coast of Albania) due to illness – a remarkably common occurrence for the young heir of Caesar – while Antony rushed to Amphipolis. With the withdrawal of Norbanus and Decidius, Antony moved north to engage with Brutus and Cassius near Philippi. By all accounts, Antony was at a great disadvantage upon his arrival at Phillipi. Without the army of Octavian, he was outnumbered by the Caesarians, his position in the plain was inferior to the hills occupied and fortified by Brutus and Cassius, his water supply was limited and he did not have ready access to supplies, which had to be transported from Amphipolis (some 60-70km away). Despite their advantage, however, Brutus and Cassius did not engage with the forces of Antony. Presumably, they still had hope of simply waiting him out while his supplies diminished. In the meantime, Antony fortified his camp, which was located near the marsh, with a ditch, wall, palisade and a number of towers. In response, the Republicans extended their own fortifications, but only minor cavalry skirmishes occurred. These delays allowed time for Octavian to arrive with his own legions, bringing the forces of the triumvirates up to nineteen legions, the same as Brutus and Cassius, though the Republicans were nevertheless outnumbered, since many of their legions were incomplete.
Eager now for an engagement, Antony drew his men into a battle formation each day, all the while constructing a passage through the marsh so that he could outflank the strong position of the Republicans. Because of their limited resources, the Caesarians were hoping for a speedy outcome to the conflict. Realizing the risk of this flanking movement, Cassius constructed a counter-wall through the marsh so as to stop the progress of Antony’s men. Antony aligned his army against these counter-fortifications in turn and engaged with the forces of Cassius. While all of this was taking place, Brutus’ men, perhaps without receiving official orders, attempted to outflank Antony and engaged with the army of Octavian. Now, much as the triumvirates had hoped, a full-scale battle had begun. Octavian’s army was soon overrun by the forces of Brutus, who were able to capture the camp of Antony and Octavian. Despite this setback, Antony’s men were successful against Cassius and soon captured his camp. As such, the battle had essentially ended in stalemate. Brutus had successfully pushed back the army of Octavian and captured the camp of the triumvirates, while Antony had defeated the forces of Cassius and also captured his camp. As always, numbers in ancient battles are very difficult to know for certain, but we are told that Brutus and Cassius lost around 8,000 men, while the Caesarians suffered 16,000 killed. Despite these numbers, the Republicans suffered a far greater loss in the battle. In the commotion of the fighting, communication between Brutus and Cassius was severed, and neither knew the outcome of the other’s engagement. Seeing his own misfortune and fearing the same for Brutus, Cassius committed suicide, depriving the Republicans of one of their two leaders.
Philippi Map 1: Routes to Philippi. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
Philippi Map 2: Two proposed sites for the battle. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
The following day, both armies again drew battle-lines, but no engagement followed. Brutus still wanted to delay a battle, hoping the triumvirates would withdraw as their supplies diminished. Octavian and Antony were now awaiting further reinforcements, though these never arrived, having been captured or destroyed by the fleet of the Republicans on their way to Greece. For nearly three weeks, battle-lines were drawn up daily without engagement. Eventually, though, during the night, the army of Octavian occupied a hill near the camp of Brutus. This hill had been avoided by the Caesarians because it was within range of enemy arrows and missiles, but with Brutus’ forces now diminished and their morale dwindling, the opportunity presented itself. Octavian moved ten legions to the hill, constructing fortifications in an attempt to cut Brutus’ supply lines. Brutus constructed counter-fortifications, but continued to avoid a direct engagement, despite repeated challenges from the forces of Antony and Octavian. While this delaying tactic was strategically sound, Brutus’ army became increasingly discontent, calling for a final, decisive battle. In the end, Brutus yielded to the complaints of his officers and men, drawing up his lines to face the Caesarians. After a long struggle fought in close quarters, without the use of javelins or missiles, Brutus’ army was sent into disarray, scattering into the hills surrounding the plain. Seeing that no hope for a counterattack remained, Brutus, like his counterpart, committed suicide.
Philippi Map 3: Battle at traditional site. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
Philippi Map 4: Alternative battle site. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
What became of Brutus’ body varies in our sources. According to Plutarch and Appian, Antony had the body of Brutus cremated and his remains sent back to his mother, Servilia, in Rome. Cassius Dio, however, tells us that Antony buried the body of Brutus, with the exception of his head, which was to be sent back to Rome. En route, the ship bearing his head encountered a storm and the head was subsequently thrown overboard. The wife of Brutus, overcome by the news of his death, also desired to commit suicide but was under the constant and wary watch of friends and family. In her grief, she swallowed a burning hot charcoal and so ended her life. The remaining forces of Brutus and Cassius were soon granted clemency by Antony and Octavian, subsequently being added to the Caesarian forces. For his role in the initial victory over Cassius, and because Octavian was delayed by illness, Antony was given greater credit for the victory at Philippi, an outcome that must have rankled Octavian and further magnified the already present competition between Caesar’s right-hand-man and adopted heir. In the years following the Battle of Philippi, the two would become increasingly divided, eventually meeting on the waves of Actium (covered later by this book) to settle their quest for dominance once and for all.
The Battle Site Today
The best vantage point by far from which to view the battlefield is the acropolis at the ancient site of Philippi (N41° 01.171"; E024° 17.064"). The acropolis is accessible by way of a steep and somewhat rugged path that begins at the museum within the archaeological park. The guards at the museum will point you in the right direction and warn of snakes along the trail. They will also likely be surprised that someone is attempting to climb to the acropolis, as few tourists choose to brave the steep slopes. The trail can be difficult to find and there are few signs to show the way, but there are many accessible routes that will lead to the top of the peak, even if it is not along the ‘official’ trail. Atop the acropolis are the remains of a number of medieval towers, built in part from stones once used in the ancient walls, and from amongst these remains one can look down upon the site of Philippi and the plain spreading out into the distance. To the south-west, the plain meets the impressive slopes of Mt Pangaion. To the south-east, the modern roadway to Kavala cuts across the plain. This road passes through the towns of Amygdaleonas and Stavros before being lost in the hills that separate the plain from the sea. To the south can be seen the small town of Eleftheroupoli, which lies at the mouth of the pass that leads past Mt Pangaion to the Strymon River and the important site of Amphipolis. It is in the plain framed by these topographical features that the final confrontation between the Triumvirs and the Republicans took place. At one time, a large portion of this plain was covered by a great marsh, though it has been drained and is now used as farmland. The lush, green farmland (which remains verdant even in the heat of summer) attests to the well-watered nature of the plain.
Two questions shape how we reconstruct the ancient battle which took place in 42 BCE at Philippi. Firstly, how did Antony and his army arrive in the plain? The base of operations for the Triumvirs was the city of Amphipolis, which is located south-west of Philippi; however, Mt Pangaion blocks any direct route between the two cities. Antony, then, was left with two choices. He could have marched to the west of the mountain by way of the modern towns of Nea Mpafra, Agia Paraskevi and Kalamonas, or, he could have marched east of Mt Pangaion, following the course of the modern Via Egnatia and arriving in the plain near the modern town of Eleftheroupoli. Both of these routes can still be driven today and will reward the adventurous traveller with a much clearer understanding of the movements of ancient armies. Secondly, where were the camps of Brutus and Cassius? We are told by our ancient sources that the Republicans fortified two hills, described as the gates between Asia and Europe, linking the hills in order to form what was essentially a single camp. We are also told that Brutus and Cassius had a distinct advantage over Antony and Octavian: they occupied the high ground, had ready access to their supplies on Thasos and had an ample supply of water and fuel (i.e. brush and timber). To fully understand the ancient battle, we must identify these features in the countryside around Philippi.
Scholars have traditionally argued that the battle must have taken place in front of the ancient city of Philippi. They reason that the city was the most prominent and important feature in the plain. It controlled passage along the ancient Via Egnatia and overlooked the farmland of the surrounding plain, an essential resource for any army trying to supply itself on campaign. In addition, our ancient sources tell us that the battle occurred near Philippi, and so the city is a reasonable point from which to begin. Under this reconstruction, Antony must have entered the plain of Philippi from the south-west, taking the route west of Mt Pangaion. Again, this is a reasonable assertion, as the westward route is far more level and certainly easier to traverse with a large army. A problem, however, does arise with this reconstruction. As mentioned above, there is another accessible route through which an army could reach the plains of Philippi. This route is more mountainous, but, as the modern road attests, it is certainly passable. The road leads from Amphipolis through the modern town of Eleftheroupoli and runs parallel to the modern highway connecting Thessaloniki and Kavala. While it is not necessary that Antony took this pass, the presence of an alternate route to the plain would have presented a serious strategic problem for Brutus and Cassius, if they were indeed encamped at Philippi. The pass through Eleftheroupoli would have allowed the Caesarians to flank Brutus and Cassius, thus severing their supply lines to the east. No ancient source mentions this risk; in fact, we are repeatedly told that Brutus and Cassius remained well supplied by way of Thasos and Neapolis (Kavala) throughout the engagement.
If, however, the Republicans were camped outside the ancient city of Philippi, we must also identify the two hills that stood as the gates between Asia and Europe and served as the camps of Brutus and Cassius. What will strike visitors looking down upon the plain from the acropolis is that these hills are not immediately apparent. Scholars have long struggled with this problem, and recent developments in the plain have not helped in understanding the topography of the area around Philippi. In particular, the draining of the marsh has dramatically transformed the area and potentially raised the level of the plain. Nevertheless, scholars typically place the camp of Brutus in the foothills of Mt Lekanis, almost due north of the ancient site of Philippi, somewhere in the vicinity of modern-day Lidia, a small village in the foothills of Mt Lekanis. Lidia is accessible from the NH Dramas-Kavala, though accessing the hills will require driving along farm-roads and some hiking. The location of the camp of Cassius has most frequently been placed on a small hillock rising from the plain due west of Philippi (N41° 00.795"; E024° 15.235"). This hill can be reached by travelling west from the NH Dramas-Kavala toward Kalamonas. The ‘Hill of Cassius’ lies just to the north of a small spa hotel called the Loutra Megalou Alexandrou, which is popular for its mud baths. This ‘Hill of Cassius’ rises only about 20 metres from the plain, and the entire hill is less than 500 metres in diameter. It now mostly houses bee-hives and does not strike the visitor as a worthy candidate for one of the gates between Asia and Europe. Despite its diminutive proportions, however, this hillock is most commonly identified as the location of Cassius’ camp, in large part because a second small hill rises from the plain just south of this spot (N41° 00.554"; E024° 14.847"). This second hill is typically identified as that occupied by Octavian in the waning days of the engagement, though it too seems too small to house the ten legions that Octavian purportedly took with him to occupy the hill. These two small hills are the only elevated points in the plain surrounding Philippi, and so they remain the most commonly referenced topographical features in scholarly reconstructions of the ancient battle.
While scholars continue to place the Battle of Philippi within the area of the plain directly in front of the ancient city, there is little in our ancient sources to say that this is necessary. In fact, Plutarch tells us simply that the battle occurred somewhere in the ‘Fields of Philippi’, which stretch for miles to the west, south and east of the city, and so it is not clear that the battle had to have taken place within the shadow of the city itself. As mentioned above, a second pass enters the plain east of the ancient city of Philippi. This pass, which leads from Amphipolis into the plain by way of the modern town of Eleftheroupoli (N40° 53.897"; E024° 14.770"), can still be driven today. From the ancient site of Philippi, follow the NH Dramas-Kavala toward Kavala. Once you have reached the small town of Stavros, turn west, following signs toward Eleftheroupoli along the Eleftheroupoli-Folias road. While this pass is far more mountainous and rugged than that skirting the western edge of Mt Pangaion, it would certainly have been passable for an ancient army and would have provided the Caesarians with a unique opportunity to sever the supply lines of the Republicans, if the Republicans were in fact encamped near Philippi. This, however, seems unlikely, not only because it would have been a strategically tenuous position, but also because the small hills near the city do not seem to align with our ancient descriptions of the topography of the battle. Rather, a second possible location for the site of the battle presents itself along the eastern edge of the plain.
Fig. 15.1: Traditional site of the battle, looking east towards acropolis of Philippi, visible on the top of the rightmost hill. Authors’ photo.
If the Caesarians did indeed take the pass east of Mt Pangaion and the Republicans were nevertheless able to maintain their supply lines to Thasos, then Brutus and Cassius must have been camped somewhere along the eastern edge of the plain of Philippi, not directly in front of the city. The best candidate for this location lies near the village of Amygdaleonas. This village lies on the National Highway Dramas-Kavala at the outlet of the pass to Kavala. As such, it controls the north-south road leading from Eleftheroupoli and overlooks the east-west road leading from Kavala to Philippi. In addition, it is surrounded by large, dramatic hills that could not only have supported sizeable armies, but also more convincingly present a picture of the gates between Asia and Europe. The most likely candidate for the ‘Hill of Brutus’ lies due north of the city of Amygdaleonas (N40° 58.265"; E024° 21.695"). This hill is accessible by car, but requires some adventurous driving through winding and narrow roads that lead upward through residential neighbourhoods. The top of the hill is marked by an abandoned park and playground with a small parking area. From the parking area, it is possible to explore the hill by foot. The hill is littered with the remains of various buildings and walls, and from many spots presents a commanding and impressive view of the plain below. A second hill is visible to the south-east and may have housed the camp of Cassius. These two hills flank the road to Kavala (ancient Neapolis), and control of this road would have allowed the Republicans to easily maintain their supply line to Thasos. In addition, the hills are big enough to have supported large armies, steep enough to have provided a clear tactical advantage and even today well-watered enough to remain green even in the summer. These hills provide a dramatic break from the plain below and do seem to stand as gates controlling the road between Asia and Europe. As such, it is quite possible that the battle in 42 BCE took place here, in the eastern portion of the plain, rather than outside the walls of Philippi.
Fig 15.2: View from our proposed “Hill of Brutus”, looking north towards the acropolis of Philippi on the hill in the center of the photo. Authors’ photo.
Fig 15.3: View of the plain from the modern highway behind Kavala. Our proposed ‘Hill of Cassius’ is the low hill in the centre, while the ‘Hill of Octavian’ rises sharply to the left. Authors’ photo.
Further Reading:
Ancient Sources
–Appian, Civil Wars 4.86-138
By far the most detailed account of the battle and so essential for any reconstruction of the movements of the Caesarians and Republicans. Appian includes many specific topographical descriptions, though (as with all ancient sources) his numbers and distances are questionable. As with most of our sources for the Battle of Philippi, Appian is writing well after the fact (nearly two centuries), and so his account will have been shaped by 150 years of imperial history.
–Cassius Dio, Roman History 47.35-49
As with Appian, Cassius Dio is writing long after (almost three centuries) the events of the Battle of Philippi. His account is not as lengthy or as detailed as that of Appian, but he does include numerous topographical descriptions that are helpful for reconstruction of the battle. For the most part, Dio’s account aligns well with that of Appian.
–Plutarch, Life of Brutus 38-53
Plutarch wrote his Parallel Lives nearly a century and a half after the Battle of Philippi, and so, like our other sources, has the advantage of hindsight and over a century of imperial history to shape his views and accounts. In addition, his Lives are interspersed with moralizing additions that do not necessarily represent history, but rather the morals that the author was trying to present. Nevertheless, his account is helpful for understanding the numbers and movements of troops, as well as some topographical details.
Modern Sources:
Books
–Collart, P., Philippes, ville de Macédoine (Paris, 1937).
Detailed description of the city and environs of Philippi with emphasis on the topography of the region; for the battle, Collart likewise maintains the position of Heuzey and Daumet.
–Heuzey, L., and Daumet, H., Mission Archéologique de Macédoine (Paris, 1876).
One of the earliest sources to argue that the battle took place in front of the city of Philippi. Since its publication, this theory has been almost universally accepted and is maintained, with slight alterations, by Kromayer, Collart, Koukouli-Chrysanthaki and others.
–Koukouli-Chrysanthaki, Ch., Philippi (Athens, 2006).
Modern archaeological guide to the site of Philippi. This book can be purchased at the site and is useful for understanding the history and layout of the city. The small section on the battle in 42 BCE mirrors the reconstruction of Heuzey and Daumet.
–Kromayer, J., and Veith, G., Schlachten-Atlas zur antiken Kriegsgeschichte, vol. 3 (Leipzig, 1924).
Influential atlas of ancient battlefields with detailed maps and descriptions. As with other sources following Heuzey and Daumet, Kromayer maintains that the battle occurred within sight of the ancient city of Philippi.
–Leake, W.M., Travels in Northern Greece (London, 1835).
An early traveller to Greece, Colonel Leake, a military man, topographer and antiquarian, theorized about the location of the Battle of Philippi, despite having never visited the site. Leake actually proposed that the battle took place not in front of the city, but rather on the eastern edge of the plain. Following an influential theory by Heuzey and Daumet, Leake’s theory has largely been forgotten.
Articles
–Butera, C.J., and Sears, M.A., ‘The Camps of Brutus and Cassius at Philippi, 42 BCE’, Hesperia 82 (2017), pp.359–377.
A recent argument by the authors to relocate the location of the ancient battle to the eastern edge of the plain of Philippi, revisiting the early claims of Colonel Leake and reassessing the arguments of Heuzey and Daumet and those who have adopted their reconstruction.
–Georgoula, O., and Kaimaris, D., ‘Photogrammetric and Photo Interpretation Research in the Plain of Philippi’, To Archaiologiko Ergo ste? Makedonia kai Thrake? 16 (2002), pp.119-29.
Using modern surveying equipment, Georgoula and Kaimaris claim to have discovered the remains of the fortification walls connecting the camps of Brutus and Cassius, but systematic excavations have proven inconclusive.
–Provost, S., and Tirologos, G., ‘Prospection topographique dans la plaine de Philippes’, Bulletin de correspondence hellénique 132 (2008), pp.707-13.
Report on the excavations of the ‘cuttings’ first seen by Georgoula and Kaimaris. In the end, while the presence of trench-like structures is confirmed, their exact nature and function remains unclear, as does the date.