Chapter 14
Introduction
The plains of Thessaly provide a stark contrast to much of Greece. The shrub-covered mountains that characterize the country give way to expansive fields that stretch as far as the eye can see. Much as in antiquity, these fields are still dominated by seemingly endless farms growing various grains and staple crops. In the summer, the plain is scorched brown by the sun, further contrasting the pallid green of the mountains. To the ancient army, these fields provided not only much-needed grain for sustenance, but also level ground on which to wage battles. For this reason, the area would see a number of the most important battles in antiquity, including the Battle of Pharsalus, the final confrontation between the armies of Julius Caesar and Pompey the Great. The outcome of this battle, which took place in 48 BCE, would usher in the dictatorship of Caesar and mark what many consider to be the end of the Roman Republic. Even in the ancient world, the cost of Roman life and resources expended in this protracted civil war was recognized as a cause for lamentation. The poet Lucan, writing a century after the battle, even imagined how great the Romans might have been had they turned their energy outwards, rather than submitting to internal conflict:
Oh, how much of the land and of the sea could have been obtained with this blood, which the sword-hands of citizens have shed … But now, with houses half ruined, the walls are crumbling in the cities of Italy, large stones lie among fallen defences, homes are protected by no guard, and in the ancient cities only the rare inhabitant wanders; Italy is wild with brambles, having remained unploughed through many years, and the hands needed for the fields which demand them are absent. You were not the cause of so many calamities, fierce Pyrrhus. Nor you, Carthaginian: our land has not come to be torn asunder by any foreign sword; rather, the sword hands of our own citizens strike these deep wounds. (Lucan, Pharsalia 1.14-15, 24-32)
Abraham Lincoln would echo this sentiment nearly two millennia later before the outbreak of another civil war:
At what point then is the approach of danger to be expected? I answer. If it ever reach us it must spring up amongst us; it cannot come from abroad. If destruction be our lot we must ourselves be its author and finisher. As a nation of freemen we must live through all time or die by suicide. (Lyceum Address, 27 January 1838)
Directions to the Site
The modern city of Farsala is not a common stop for tourists making their way through the country, though the city does boast a unique version of the traditional Greek dessert, halva, which is well worth a try. The battlefield of Pharsalus is also quite close to the site of the Battle of Cynoscephalae (covered earlier by this book), so both should be visited together. Farsala can easily be reached by taking the National Highway (NH/E 75) to Lamia and then following the Lamia-Larisa road north through Neo Monasteri into Farsala. From Lamia, the drive is about 70km to Farsala. The site can also be reached from Volos and Nea Anchialos, which offer comfortable seaside hotels in which to stay. The Karditsa-Volos road connects both of these cities directly to Farsala; one need only travel about 65km west from Volos to reach the site (45km from Nea Anchialos). The site of the Battle of Pharsalus has never been securely identified, so visitors should explore the plains both north and south of the Enipeus River; nevertheless, convincing recent scholarship has suggested that the battle was most likely fought north of the river, anywhere between the villages of Vamvakou and Iperia. This region can best be explored by travelling north from Farsala across the Enipeus River along the Lamia-Larisa road and then turning west toward Zoodochos Pigi (about 9km from Farsala). This minor roadway travels through Krini and into Iperia, but the best view of the plain below can be found from the small ruined church at Zoodochos Pigi, which is also very close to the Roman camp from Cynoscephalae.
Historical Outline of the Battle
According to ancient tradition, the Roman Republic was established in 509 BCE. Before this date, Rome had been ruled by a series of seven monarchs, the first of whom was the city’s mythic founder, Romulus. The last of the kings, one Tarquinius Superbus, was overthrown after his son raped the wife of a Roman nobleman. The outrage caused by this event led to a popular uprising that deposed the king and abolished the monarchy altogether. At the heart of this new Republican institution was the idea that no single individual should possess too much power. The kings, after all, held sole authority and their rules had become increasingly oppressive and corrupt. Under the new system, most positions were elected and collegial – that is, held by multiple citizens. For example, by the fourth century BCE the political leaders of the city would be a pair of consuls who called assemblies, offered sacrifices and led military campaigns. These consuls were then supported by a range of magistrates and officials who would oversee everything from public finances to the construction of roads and buildings. A group of leading citizens, the Senate, served as an advisory council to these magistrates, thus further diluting the individual authority of any office holder. The only exception to the collegial nature of this new order was the temporary appointment of a dictator in times of emergency or threat. In these instances, absolute authority could be bestowed on a single individual for a period of six months, after which time he was supposed to step down and return authority to the consuls and the Senate. Most famously, Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus was named dictator in 458 BCE when the Romans were under threat from the Aequi and Sabines. In what would later become a model of Roman virtue, Cincinnatus was said to have been found ploughing the fields of his farm when he was named dictator, and, upon the completion of his duties, to have returned to his humble trade. The temporary nature of this position was intended to serve as another protection against the return of the monarchy.
Nevertheless, as the Republic developed and Roman influence in the Mediterranean expanded, political and military power increasingly began to reside in the hands of individual, influential citizens. For instance, late in the second century BCE, Gaius Marius enacted a series of military reforms that led to the recruitment of soldiers from the lowest classes of Roman society for the first time. These soldiers were promised land-grants for their service, and it became the responsibility of the general to ensure that his soldiers were paid. As such, soldiers began to become more loyal to the general than to the Republic, and with the support of his soldiers and veterans Marius was elected to six successive consulships, an act forbidden by Roman law. By 100 BCE, Marius’ veterans were using force to compel the Senate to pass legislation that ensured payment to the soldiers for their service. Marius’ influence was so great that in 88 he was granted command of the Roman armies that were to wage war against Mithradates of Pontus in Asia Minor. This appointment was doubly surprising, as Marius was nearly 70 years old and a private citizen at the time, and the command had already been granted to the standing consul, Lucius Cornelius Sulla. The appointment of Marius and the rebuff of Sulla would set off a series of events that further strained the collegial principles of the Republic and highlighted the increasing power and authority of certain individuals, particularly generals.
In response to this affront, Sulla marched his legions against Rome itself, a possibility so unthinkable that the Romans did not even maintain a standing military force within the walls of the city. Sulla immediately made political exiles of his opponents and reclaimed his command in the East. After his campaigns against Mithradates (see the earlier chapter on Chaeronea in this book), Sulla again marched his armies into Italy and to the gates of Rome, this time hoping to ensure his own political and military power and authority. Despite resistance from Roman forces, Sulla was victorious in this civil war, and in 82 he was named dictator, though in another unprecedented act his dictatorship was granted without a time limit - Sulla was free to do as he pleased without legal ramifications. The Republican system had, in essence, collapsed. Sulla immediately set out to eliminate any remaining political opposition through a proscription list, which allowed him to execute citizens without trial and confiscate their property; he even forbade their descendants from serving in office. Sulla also enacted a number of reforms intended to restore the ‘traditional’ Republic, shifting power away from the equites and into the hands of the Senate. He would step down from the dictatorship in 81 and died shortly after in 79; nevertheless, a precedent had been set. Marius and Sulla had made it clear that powerful individuals, with the backing of the legions, could essentially control the state. This idea was not lost on the men who would lead Rome into yet another civil war and set in motion the events that would result in the final collapse of the Republic and usher in the establishment of the Principate. For Julius Caesar was the nephew of Marius, and Gnaeus Pompey was a commander under Sulla.
Pompey’s reputation as a fierce and effective military commander had been well established in his campaigns under Sulla. While leading armies in Sicily and Africa, he earned the nickname ‘the young butcher’, and he was awarded a triumph in 81, despite being only an eques and holding no official political position. In the years following this triumph, Pompey fought in Spain against Quintus Sertorius and was called to Italy for the final push against the uprising led by Spartacus. His reputation secured, Pompey was granted unprecedented military authority to rid the Mediterranean of piracy in 67. While he was originally appointed for a three-year command, we are told that he had brought piracy to an end in just three months. The following year, Pompey was appointed commander of Roman forces in the East. The Romans had once again found themselves in a conflict against Mithradates, the king of Pontus. The commander in charge, Lucius Licinius Lucullus, had been unable to bring the war to a successful close, and Mithradates still held influence in Pontus. Following a mutiny against Lucullus, Pompey was again granted extraordinary military authority, this time to prosecute the war in the East. With characteristic swiftness, Pompey defeated and expelled Mithradates and then turned his attention to Pontus, Syria and Judea, each of which he annexed as Roman provinces despite having no authority to do so. Upon his return to Rome in 62, Pompey hoped to have these annexations formerly ratified by the Senate and to have land set aside for his veterans, who were to be rewarded for their years of service. Despite his popularity and success, these requests were not immediately granted, in part because the city had become embroiled in the so-called Bona Dea affair, a scandal which involved the household of the pontifex maximus, Gaius Julius Caesar.
As the nephew of Marius, Caesar’s early political career was marred by the loss of his title and inheritance when Sulla was named dictator. Accordingly, Caesar began a military career and soon gained a name for himself after he was granted the civic crown for his part in the siege of Mytilene in 81. He continued his service in Bithynia and Asia and was eventually elected military tribune, the first political office which he would hold. In 69, he was elected quaestor and by 63 had risen to the role of pontifex maximus, one of the highest religious positions in the city. As pontifex maximus, Caesar’s home was to be the location of the rites of Bona Dea, ‘the Good Goddess’. These rites took place at night and were administered by the women of the household, as men were strictly forbidden from participating or even observing the secret ritual. Nevertheless, in 62 a man named Publius Clodius Pulcher, dressed as a woman, trespassed on the nocturnal rites, which had been organized by Caesar’s wife, Pompeia. It was rumoured that Clodius had desired an adulterous relationship with Pompeia (if he had not already begun one). Clodius was charged with desecration but soon acquitted, likely through the heavy bribery of the jury, and Caesar divorced Pompeia. Following this affair, Caesar was elected praetor and then chosen to govern the province of Hispania Ulterior. For his service, Caesar was proclaimed imperator and granted a triumph, an honour he refused so that he could stand for consul in 59.
To ensure his election as consul, however, Caesar would need considerable support. While he was immensely popular in Rome, it would take substantial finances to obtain the consulship, and so Caesar sought the support of Pompey and Marcus Licinius Crassus. Both men had tremendous wealth and were hoping to secure senatorial support for their own legislative agendas. Pompey still hoped to have his territorial annexations in the East recognized by the Senate, and the land grants he had sought for his veterans had still not been approved. Crassus, for his part, had hoped the Senate would approve a measure that would offer tax-collectors in Asia some relief from the money they promised to collect for the state. Crassus and Pompey had long harboured enmity toward one another because of their respective roles during the uprising of Spartacus (73-71). Crassus had led the campaign against the rebelling slaves and, for the most part, had put down the revolt - though with some embarrassing setbacks along the way. While Crassus eventually quashed the rebellion and crucified 6,000 of Spartacus’ supporters, 5,000 slaves had escaped and were still moving through Italy. Pompey caught and annihilated this small force, and for his actions he was awarded a triumph, while Crassus was only granted an ovation. It was not until Caesar proposed a mutually beneficial alliance that the tension between the two was finally set aside. The pact formed between these three men – Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar – was never a legal alliance, but rather a loose association through which each could achieve their individual political gains. This alliance has come to be known as the First Triumvirate.
With the compact in place, each of the men was able to obtain his political goals. Caesar was elected consul in 59; Crassus was able to negotiate a better deal for the tax-collectors in Asia; and Pompey had his territorial annexations ratified and land set aside for his veterans. These actions were not without opposition, however. Riots broke out in the city, and on more than one occasion Caesar bypassed the Senate by appealing to the Tribal assembly for approval. Nevertheless, the triumvirs benefitted greatly from Caesar’s term as consul, and, when his magistracy ended, he was appointed to govern Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul as well as Illyricum, with four legions at his disposal. In his absence, however, the triumvirate began to weaken as political opponents slowly chipped away at the authority and influence of Pompey and Crassus. In 56, the triumvirs renewed their alliance at Luca and again used their influence to great effect. Pompey and Crassus were named co-consuls in 55 and arranged to extend Caesar’s governorship of Gaul for another five years. In addition, at the end of their term, Crassus would govern in Syria while Pompey would oversee Spain.
Despite these political gains, the triumvirate soon began to crumble. In 54, Caesar’s daughter Julia died, and Pompey refused to renew a marriage alliance with Caesar. In the same year, Crassus and his armies were defeated in a disastrous campaign at Carrhae in Mesopotamia. Crassus and his son were killed, along with nearly 30,000 Roman soldiers, and the legionary standards were captured – these standards would not be returned for another thirty-five years. Just a year later, in 53, the city of Rome erupted into riots prompted by the assassination of Publius Clodius Pulcher, a popular if notorious politician. His death upset the populace so much that they took his body to be burned at the Senate house itself. The ensuing fire consumed that building, which, it was said, had been built in the seventh century by Rome’s third king, Tullus Hostilius. So dire was the situation in Rome that the Senate eventually declared Pompey sole consul with special authority to restore order in the city.
Pompey immediately began to pass legislation aimed at prosecuting those who had led the riots in Rome. As part of these legislative moves, Pompey also proposed two measures that affected how individuals ran for office. The first required anyone standing for office to appear in person in Rome, while the second required that there be a five-year interval between a term as a consul and service as a governor. Both of these measures directly affected Caesar, as he completed his Gallic campaigns in 51 and desired political office upon his return to Rome, in part to avoid prosecution for any misdeeds performed during his consulship in 59. A further strain upon the ties between the two remaining triumvirs occurred in 50, when a Parthian threat to Syria necessitated additional legions in the East. The Senate decreed that Pompey and Caesar should each send a legion to Syria to aid in the campaigns against the Parthians. Both agreed to send a legion, but Pompey chose to send one that he had lent to Caesar in 53, thus weakening Caesar’s military power by two legions instead of one. These legions, however, never left Italy but were instead stationed in Campania. Finally, a tribune by the name of Caius Scribonius Curio, a supporter of Caesar, proposed that the Senate compel both Caesar and Pompey to give up their commands. This movement was overwhelmingly favoured by the senators, but the consuls objected and immediately granted Pompey command of all the legions in Italy in order to protect the state against Caesar. A further attempt at compromise was brought to the Senate by another of Caesar’s close associates, Marc Antony, in January of 49. In his proposal, Caesar suggested that he and Pompey lay down their commands and submit themselves to the will of the Roman people, a somewhat problematic proposition since Caesar remained extremely popular in Rome. Instead, the Senate countered that Caesar alone should lay down his command or else be considered an enemy of the state. In the end, all attempts at compromise failed, and Caesar, now labelled an enemy of the state, crossed the Rubicon into Italy with his army.
With the crossing of the Rubicon in 49, the civil war between Caesar and Pompey had officially begun. With only one legion, Caesar rapidly marched south through Italy. Despite his considerable resources and influence, Pompey had only two legions at his disposal, and they were the two taken from Caesar and stationed in Campania. Without additional (and unquestionably loyal) troops with which to resist Caesar’s rapid advances, Pompey and the Senate left Rome for Apulia in south-eastern Italy and set sail for Greece to raise armies and gather resources. While Pompey was in Greece, Caesar moved to quell any resistance from loyal Pompeians in Italy, Sicily, Spain and Africa. By early 48, Caesar had successfully brought these regions under his control and set sail for Greece with seven legions in a daring winter crossing across the Adriatic from Brundisium to Apollonia. Marc Antony joined Caesar with an additional four legions by the early spring, and their combined armies were soon besieging Pompey’s forces at Dyrrhachium in modern Albania. Despite successfully transporting his legions across the Adriatic, Caesar’s supply lines were under constant threat from Pompey’s navy. His resources rapidly diminishing, Caesar’s forces were nearly defeated by a Pompeian assault. In need of grain to feed his troops, Caesar was forced to withdraw and moved his armies inland to the vast plains of Thessaly.
Pompey pursued Caesar’s army and soon established his camp in the hills near the city of Pharsalus, which was situated along the Enipeus River south of Larisa, the pre-eminent city in Thessaly. Pompey first strengthened his forces by combining them with the legions of Caecilius Metellus Scipio, which were stationed at Larisa. Caesar, for his part, set up camp in the plain and awaited further reinforcements. Our ancient sources for the battle that would follow are remarkably detailed, not least because Caesar himself recorded the events in his Civil War. A second eyewitness, Gaius Asinius Pollio, who was a legate of Caesar’s, also wrote about the battle. While his account does not survive, it was available to other historians, such as Plutarch and Appian, whose works do remain. As such, the historical record tends to be kind to Caesar, the victor in the confrontation, but it also provides unique insight into the strength and make-up of each army, as well as to troop movements and topography. We are told, for instance, that Pompey had 45,000 men at his disposal with as many as 7,000 cavalrymen, while Caesar only had 22,000 men and 1,000 horse. Despite such a great numerical advantage, Pompey was hesitant to engage. His position in the hills was far more secure than Caesar’s, and his troops were well supplied by both land and sea, while Caesar’s men had to forage daily. Recognizing this disadvantage, Caesar repeatedly attempted to draw Pompey into an open engagement on the plain. Pompey continued to resist, but his generals urged him to fight, arguing that they should secure their victory at once so that they could claim their rewards in Rome. So confident were his commanders, that they had reportedly already begun to distribute various titles and honours amongst themselves before the battle had even commenced. In the end, they prevailed, and Pompey moved his army into the plain to wage a pitched battle against Caesar.
Pharsalus Map 1. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
Pharsalus Map 2. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
Pompey hoped to use his superior numbers, particularly his cavalry, to bring the battle to a quick end. There is some debate amongst our sources of how exactly Pompey drew up his lines. Caesar contends that Pompey placed himself in command of his left wing, ahead of the First and Third Legions. He then stationed Scipio in command of the Syrian Legions at the centre and Lucius Afranius on the right wing with the Cilician and Spanish forces. Plutarch, however, places Pompey on the right wing with Lucius Domitius in command of the left and Scipio in the centre. Regardless of the exact deployment of these men, however, Pompey’s strategy relied on the strength of his cavalry, which he stationed on his left wing in the hope that they would overpower the enemy cavalry and quickly encircle Caesar’s line. To prevent his own army from being flanked and encircled, Pompey aligned his right wing along the Enipeus River. In answer to this, Caesar also drew up his forces in three divisions. Caesar himself would command the Tenth Legion on the right wing, with Antony leading the Eighth and Ninth Legions on the left and Gnaeus Domitius in the centre. Caesar then placed his cavalry on his right wing to face the cavalry of Pompey. Recognizing his disadvantage in horsemen, however, Caesar also stationed a fourth line of foot-soldiers to his right – their role would be to repulse the charge of Pompey’s cavalry and so protect Caesar’s line from envelopment. As with his opponent, Caesar also used the Enipeus River to protect his flank.
As the battle unfolded, Pompey ordered his men to stand firm and await the charge of Caesar’s lines. It was his hope that Caesar’s forces would become disorganized in the charge. Against a disordered line, Pompey believed his organized and ordered troops would hold a distinct advantage. Likewise, he had hoped that Caesar’s men would become exhausted by the charge and so not be at peak fighting strength. Caesar’s soldiers, however, maintained their formation, and Caesar contends that Pompey’s decision to hold his line was a mistake. As Caesar asserts, all men have a certain fighting spirit and adrenaline at the start of battle, and a good general allows them to express that enthusiasm, rather than holding it in check. Plutarch offers a more pragmatic explanation, suggesting that Caesar’s troops gained an advantage by throwing their javelins at a run, thus making their assault more powerful and effective. Despite the discipline of Caesar’s men, the battle, at first, unfolded just as Pompey planned. His cavalry quickly overpowered the horsemen of Caesar and began their enveloping movement, but they were surprised by the presence of Caesar’s fourth line, who repelled Pompey’s cavalry in short order. Plutarch tells us that they were able to overpower the horsemen by deliberately targeting their faces, a remarkably effective tactic, as the cavalrymen were particularly vain, and so more interested in self-preservation than victory. With his cavalry repulsed, Pompey’s left wing was soon enveloped and Pompey found himself attacked from both the front and rear. His lines quickly collapsed and Pompey himself fled to his camp.
Pompey’s camp had been well garrisoned, but Caesar soon overran the defences and Pompey was forced to flee yet again. The garrison made for high ground and prepared to resist, while Pompey fled north to Larisa. Caesar constructed earthworks around the hill occupied by the remnants of Pompey’s garrison, and with no access to water the resisting troops were also forced to withdraw toward Larisa. Caesar continued his pursuit, and a final resistance by Pompey’s men was quelled when Caesar cut off their water supply. With nowhere else to turn, Pompey’s men came down from the hills and surrendered their weapons to Caesar. According to Caesar, nearly 15,000 of Pompey’s men had been killed, while another 24,000 surrendered. He also claimed to have captured 180 military standards and nine legionary eagles, an impressive feat indeed. Not all of our sources agree on the casualties, however. Plutarch contends that only 6,000 of Pompey’s men had been killed, a number he says was recorded by Asinius Pollio, and Appian suggests Caesar lost as many as 1,200 soldiers. These discrepancies may depend on whether all casualties were counted by our sources, or simply those Italian soldiers who had been killed. As Cassius Dio points out, Caesar’s army may have prevailed because they were comprised predominantly of true Roman legions, rather than inexperienced subject peoples. If Pompey’s losses were sustained primarily by his auxiliaries, then their numbers may not have been reckoned by Asinius Pollio, whereas Caesar may have included all casualties in his figures.
Regardless of the exact numbers, Pompey found his armies shattered and was forced to flee. He continued north from Larisa through the Vale of Tempe before approaching the sea, where he found a merchant ship that carried him to Mytilene by way of Amphipolis. At Mytilene, which is on the island of Lesbos near the coast of Turkey, Pompey joined his wife and children, and together they set sail for the East. It is reported that Pompey considered defecting to Parthia, but hoped to join with Cato the Younger and his navy in Africa to continue the fight against Caesar. At Cyprus, however, Pompey found his way blocked and no assistance forthcoming from the inhabitants, so he and his family sailed for Egypt, where he hoped to find support from Ptolemy XIII, whom he had helped place on the throne. Rather than finding sanctuary and support, however, Pompey was assassinated and decapitated within sight of his wife and son. With his death, Caesar’s last great opponent was gone, and soon the Republic would also fall. The cost and repercussions of this civil war were recognized even in antiquity. As Cicero would lament (Orationes Philippicae 2.24), had Pompey simply refused to join with Caesar or refused to break away from him, then ‘the Republic would still be standing’.
Pharsalus Map 3: Battle reconstructed on the north bank of the river. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
Pharsalus Map 4: Battle reconstructed on the south bank of the river. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
The Battle Site Today
The small, ruined church at Zoodochos Pigi offers an excellent vantage point from which to view the spreading plain of Pharsalus. The church can be reached by following side streets up the hill from the village. A small cemetery that is still used by the locals lies in front of the church and provides a sombre setting from which to reflect upon the ancient battle. The church itself (N39° 22.072"; E022° 24.203") is of particular interest, since it contains spolia from numerous ancient structures. The mismatched columns and capitals that line the nave are clearly pulled from numerous earlier buildings, and a Roman mile marker from the time of Trajan has even been used in place of a column (a clear money-saving device). The inscription on this monument is still legible, though the mile marker was installed upside-down when the church was constructed. From this height, the plain sprawls to the south, east and west, and the modern city of Farsala can be clearly identified as it dwarfs the rest of the tiny villages scattered throughout the region. A thin sliver of greenery winds its way through the plain south of Zoodochos Pigi. This is the Enipeus River, which divides the Pharsalian Plain and beside which both Pompey and Caesar drew up their lines. The river is little more than a slow trickle in the summer, but it is worth stopping at the bridge which crosses it along the Lamia-Larisa road (N39° 19.933"; E022° 23.200"). The Battle of Pharsalus was fought in August of 48 BCE, and whether the river was actively flowing or not at the time, the broken and marshy terrain, along with the vegetation, would have provided some protection to the flanks of the opposing armies.
This river is also of particular significance because it lies at the heart of the modern scholarly debate surrounding the location of the Battle of Pharsalus. Two camps have emerged concerning the reconstruction of the battle - those who believe the final engagement was fought south of the Enipeus River in the shadow of the ancient town of Pharsalus (modern Farsala), and those who contend that it was fought north of the river in the plain beneath Zoodochos Pigi. The confusion arises from our ancient accounts of the battle. Appian, Plutarch and Dio all state that the armies of Caesar and Pompey met either in the plain of Pharsalus or near the town itself, each using the ancient city as a major point of reference. Caesar himself, however, says that the two forces met near Palaepharsalus (‘Old Pharsalus’), an assertion that is followed by Frontinus. As Caesar is our only surviving eyewitness account of the event, it may seem surprising that scholars do not simply accept his identification of Palaepharsalus as the site of the battle. Two major objections arise when examining Caesar’s account. The first is that he never names Pharsalus or Palaepharsalus in the Civil War, his first-hand account of his campaigns against Pompey. It is only in his Alexandrian War that Caesar briefly mentions that the final battle took place at Palaepharsalus. Likewise, other ancient sources cannot be so easily discarded, as they would have almost certainly had access to various eyewitness accounts of the battle. Appian, for instance, cites Asinius Pollio as his source for the number of casualties sustained by Caesar and Pompey. In the absence of a clear point of reference with which to situate the battle, scholars rely instead on the topographical details recorded in the ancient sources.
Fig. 14.1: View of battlefield, looking southwest from Zoodochos Pigi. Authors’ photo.
Those scholars who contend that the battle took place on the southern bank of the Enipeus River maintain that the town of Pharsalus is the key point of reference for situating the battle. They suggest that Palaepharsalus was most likely an earlier town on or near the site of Pharsalus itself. As such, they reconstruct the battle either directly north of Farsala or to the east of the city in the plain between Farsala and Ampelia. At Ampelia, the Enipeus River makes an abrupt turn to the south, and so delineates the boundary of the Pharsalian Plain. A short drive (12km east) from Farsala along the Karditsa-Volos road will take visitors through the plain south of the Enipeus and into Ampelia. If the battle was fought in this plain, then Pompey’s army must have approached from the east so that the river could protect his right flank. The terrain is broken by rolling hills, especially near Ampelia, and these hills could have served as the site of Pompey’s camp. There are, however, some serious objections to the ‘south bank’ theory. First, we are told that Caesar hoped to move his army north-east to Skotoussa before engaging Pompey. This would have required that Caesar cross the Enipeus River. Such a move would have been difficult with Pompey encamped either north or east of Pharsalus. Likewise, the sharp bend in the Enipeus near the town of Ampelia would have essentially trapped Pompey’s army on the hill, a surprisingly tactless decision from such an accomplished general. But most troubling is how to explain the haphazard retreat of Pompey and his men. We are told by our sources that Pompey immediately made for Larisa after his lines were turned and that his men, after some resistance, scattered to the hills toward Larisa as well. If the battle had been fought on the south bank of the Enipeus, then it is difficult to explain how this retreat would have been possible, not least because Pompey’s forces would have had to cross the Enipeus on their way to Larisa - a detail not mentioned by any of our ancient sources.
In more recent years, a number of scholars have offered an alternate theory for the reconstruction of the battle, namely that it took place north of the Enipeus River. This theory has much to recommend it. First, the plain north of the Enipeus between Vamvakou in the east and Iperia to the west is much wider than the plain south of the river. As such, it would better accommodate the large forces brought by Pompey and Caesar. Two roads allow for exploration of this plain. The higher road, mentioned above, travels from Zoodochos Pigi into Iperia, a drive of only 13km. From the hills, the entire plain can be observed and its scale fully appreciated. To actually drive through the proposed battlefield itself, one must travel along the small road between Dendraki and Iperia. This road can be found by travelling north from Farsala along the Lamia-Larisa road, crossing the Enipeus River and immediately turning west just outside of Dendraki. Visitors will travel through long stretches of cropland, but get a sense of the uniquely flat nature of the Pharsalian Plain and Thessaly. Apart from the scale of the plain north of the Enipeus, the ‘north bank’ theory also helps to explain how Pompey’s men could have fled toward Larisa through the hills. To the north, the plain abruptly ends and becomes a series of steep and scattered hills. The retreat would not have required crossing the river, and any number of hilltops could have served for the last resistance of Pompey’s men. Under this theory, the battle-lines would have been reversed, with Pompey approaching from the west, again so that the river could protect his right flank. Nevertheless, there are some objections to this theory as well. First, the site of Palaepharsalus has never been securely identified. Until it is, we may never know for certain exactly where the two armies met in the summer of 48 BCE. Furthermore, this reconstruction requires that we ignore the account of Appian, who says, quite specifically, that the battle took place between the city of Pharsalus and the Enipeus River – that is, on the south bank. While it is difficult to discard Appian’s assertion outright, it should be remembered that he was writing more than a century after the battle and may have never visited the site. In the end, the retreat of Pompey to Larisa, a detail not contradicted in any of our sources, makes the ‘north bank’ theory more likely, even if not certain.
Further Reading
Ancient Sources:
–Caesar, Civil War 82-99
One of the few first-hand accounts to survive of the campaigns of an ancient army. As such, Caesar is essential for an understanding and reconstruction of the battle. In addition to detailed descriptions of troop movements and battle-lines, Caesar also includes a wealth of topographical details, though he, frustratingly, never actually mentions the name Pharsalus. While a contemporary account of the event, it must be remembered that Caesar is writing as the victor and with himself as the main protagonist.
–Lucan, Pharsalia 7.214-872
An epic poem written in the first century CE about the civil war between Caesar and Pompey. Because of its epic format, the Pharsalia is not particularly useful for historical details. Nevertheless, it does provide insight to how the battle was remembered in the century following its completion. The work was never completed as Lucan was forced to commit suicide in 65 CE, but it does highlight the impact of Caesar’s victory, especially in the waning years of the Julio-Claudian line.
–Frontinus, Strategemata 2.3.22
A brief mention of the Battle of Pharsalus in a first-century CE handbook of military tactics. Frontinus outlines how Caesar and Pompey deployed their forces for the final engagement.
–Plutarch, Life of Caesar 42-47; Life of Pompey 68-73
Writing in the first and second centuries CE, Plutarch’s biographical work is often moralizing rather than strictly historical. Nevertheless, he provides a wealth of information about the battle, including the size of the armies, the disposition of the troops, the motivations for battle and the number of casualties.
–Appian, Civil Wars 2.10.64-11.82
Writing in the second century CE, Appian’s opinions have almost certainly been shaped by 150 years of imperial rule. Nevertheless, he offers a remarkably detailed account of the battle and makes known that he is using both Caesar and Asinius Pollio as sources, making Appian an indispensable source.
–Cassius Dio 41.53-63
Dio, active in the second and third centuries CE, offers only a brief description of the engagement and contends that Pompey lost because his armies were comprised predominantly of non-Romans – a criticism that may be a reflection of his own times rather than an accurate accounting of the battle.
Modern Sources:
Books
–Leake, W.M., Travels in Northern Greece (London, 1835).
An early traveller to Greece, Colonel Leake was swayed by Appian’s assertion that the Battle of Pharsalus took place between Pharsalus and the Enipeus River. As such, he may be the earliest proponent of the ‘south bank’ theory. His assertion, with minor adjustments, would be followed by many scholars, including Kromayer, Gwatkin, Bequignon and more. Below, sources will note whether they fall under the ‘south bank’ or ‘north bank’ theories.
–Kromayer, J., Antike Schlachtfelder antiken Kriegsgeschichte (Berlin, 1903-1931).
A ‘south bank’ proponent.
Articles
–Béquignon, Y., ‘Études Thessaliennes XII. Encore le champ de bataille de Pharsale’, Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique 98.1 (1974), pp.119-23.
The last of a long series of articles in which Béquignon defends the ‘south bank’ theory, particularly in response to Pelling’s article of the year before.
–Gwatkin, W.E., ‘Some Reflections on the Battle of Pharsalus’, Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 87 (1956), pp.109-24.
A ‘south bank’ proponent.
–Lucas, F.L., ‘The Battlefield of Pharsalus’, The Annuals of the British School at Athens 24 (1919-1921), pp.34-53.
One of the earliest proponents of the ‘north bank’ theory. While numerous scholars, including Rambaud, Pelling and Morgan, have suggested that Lucas was not exactly correct in his identification of specific hills for Pompey’s camp and retreat, his assertion that the battle must have been fought north of the Enipeus River has been largely accepted.
–Morgan, J.D., ‘Palaepharsalus – The Battle and the Town’, American Journal of Archaeoology 87.1 (1983), pp.23-54.
A more recent proponent of the ‘north bank’ theory, Morgan offers a useful overview of more than a century’s worth of earlier scholarship surrounding whether the battle was fought north or south of the Enipeus River.
–Pelling, C.B.R., ‘Pharsalus’, Historia 22.2 (1973), pp.249-59.
A ‘north bank’ proponent.
–Rambaud, M., ‘Le Soleil de Pharsale’, Historia 3.3 (1955), pp.346-78.
A ‘north bank’ proponent.