Chapter 6
Introduction
On the southern edge of the Boeotian plain, against the foothills of Mt Kithairon that forms part of the boundary with Attica, sat the modest town of Plataea. Though their polis was small and seemingly insignificant, the Plataeans played an outsized role in Classical Greek history. The Plataeans sent 1,000 of their best men to stand against Persia’s invading force at Marathon in 490 BCE, the only allies to come to the help of the Athenians, and in 479 they hosted the final and decisive engagement that drove the Persians from Greece once and for all. Though Thermopylae and Salamis hold more sway in the modern imagination, the Battle of Plataea drew out the largest Greek coalition ever assembled up to that time – and rarely, if ever, matched in later periods – and delivered to the Persians the death blow. While today no monuments to the battle remain in Boeotia – including the famous Serpent Column, which now stands far off in the Hippodrome of Constantinople – from the ruined walls of ancient Plataea the broad and fertile plain still resonates with the clash of arms of 479.
Directions to the Site
The site of Plataea is easily reached from either Athens or Thiva (modern Thebes). While Thiva is closer, Plataea is only about an hour’s drive from the centre of Athens, and the drive itself follows the approximate route taken by the Greeks in 479 BCE and thus affords a fuller appreciation of the broader geography of the battle. Plataea is only 11km from Leuctra, making it easy to visit both sites in a single morning or afternoon. From Athens, take the National Highway (NH)/ Attiki Odos west towards Corinth, following the signs for Elefsina. Near Elefsina, turn off the NH and head north, following the signs for Thiva and taking the main road over Mt Kithairon. This road passes the ancient sites of Oinoi and Eleutherai, both well worth seeing, especially the latter, which is one of the best-preserved ancient forts in Greece. About 33km from the NH, the road descends into the Boeotian plain and reaches the village of Erythres. The road just above Erythres offers spectacular views of the battlefield, stretching to the north towards the Asopos River. At Erythres, turn left to go east towards Plataies. After 4km, the city walls of ancient Plataea will be visible on both sides of the road, just before the modern village of Plataies. The walls offer a great view of the extensive lower town of ancient Plataea and the battlefield itself to the east and north-east. Another worthwhile vantage point can be found by following the winding road ascending the slopes of Kithairon behind the modern village, though this is not a route for those prone to motion sickness.
Historical Outline of the Battle
After the Battle of Salamis in the early autumn of 480 BCE, in which the Persian navy was decisively defeated by the Greek coalition, Xerxes, the Great Persian King, fled to Asia with the majority of his invasion force. The Persian general Mardonius – who, Herodotus tells us, had convinced Xerxes to invade Greece in the first place – persuaded his master to leave him in Greece with a small part of the Persian army – 300,000 men, according to Herodotus. Herodotus’ figures are grossly exaggerated, and some scholars have argued that Mardonius was left with only 30,000-60,000 men. In other words, he might not have outnumbered the Greeks at all. It seems more likely, however, that he had in the order of 70,000-100,000 soldiers, and did outnumber the Greeks in terms of regular soldiers, though perhaps not overwhelmingly. With this still considerable force, Mardonius planned to bring the Greeks to heel in the following year.
While wintering in Thessaly, the Persian general sent an emissary to Boeotia, ostensibly to consult various oracles, but more likely to ascertain whether the Persians could still depend on their Boeotian allies. Mardonius also sent diplomatic overtures to the Athenians in the hope that they would capitulate without a battle. Since Athens had been sacked by Xerxes in 480, while the Athenians fled with their families to the nearby island of Salamis and across the gulf to Troizen, Mardonius calculated that the Athenians, having just returned to their homes, might be more willing to bargain lest their city be sacked a second time. For this task, he sent Alexander, King of Macedonia, who was an official friend of the Athenians. Alexander presented to the Athenians very generous terms that supposedly came straight from the Great King himself: the Athenians would be allowed to keep their own land and self-government, and have their destroyed temples rebuilt to boot; and they would have the option of choosing whichever additional territory they wished. Alexander added his own personal appeal, emphasizing that since the Athenians were unfairly bearing the brunt of the war while their Peloponnesian allies were relatively safe behind the Isthmus of Corinth, there would be no shame in coming to an equitable agreement with the Persians. The Spartans had envoys present for Alexander’s delivery of the Persians’ terms – a brilliant diplomatic move on the part of the Athenians, since what could better induce the Spartans to come to Athens’ aid? The Spartan envoys countered Alexander’s speech by entreating the Athenians not to abandon the cause of Greek freedom. The Athenians rebuffed the Persian offer in the grandest patriotic terms they could muster. But they added an appeal to the Spartans to meet the Persians on the field of battle in Boeotia, before Attica was invaded a second time.
Plataea Map 1. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
Spartan help did not materialize. When Alexander relayed the Athenians’ response, Mardonius rushed from Thessaly in the spring to occupy Athens a second time. Once again, the Athenians were forced to flee their homes as the Persians burned what was left of the city. From Athens, Mardonius sent another emissary to the Athenians on Salamis, presenting the same terms as had been offered by Alexander. One Athenian member of the council, a man named Lycidas, proposed that the offer be presented to the Athenian people. His fellow councillors were so enraged that they stoned Lycidas to death on the spot. When word of the summary execution spread outside the council meeting, a group of Athenian women spontaneously hunted down Lycidas’ wife and children and stoned them too, and tore down Lycidas’ house on Salamis. Traditionally, this story has been interpreted as demonstrating the Athenians’ steely resolve, even after their city had been sacked again. This episode might, however, bespeak a population at its breaking point, refugees for the second time in as many years and witnesses to the burning of their cherished homes, temples and shrines. Where were their Spartan friends? How could the Greek coalition have allowed Mardonius free passage into Attica again?
In these circumstances, the Athenians sent an embassy to Sparta, maintaining that the Athenians could still be trusted as patriotic Greeks, but hinting that the situation might force them to come to terms with Mardonius, however unwillingly. Initially the Spartans hesitated to send military aid because of the observance of a religious festival – the Spartans’ stock excuse for remaining isolationist. But they soon realized the reality of the strategic situation. Even with a wall across the isthmus, without Athens and its fleet the Persians would be able eventually to sail around the isthmus and land at any point on the Peloponnese that they wished. The position of Sparta and its Peloponnesian allies would quickly become untenable. At the last minute, the Spartans decided to send out their army, a force consisting of 5,000 full Spartans and 5,000 Lacedaemonians from the neighbouring towns. Each Spartan is said to have been accompanied by seven helots – Sparta’s state-owned serfs – which would mean that 35,000 attendants and light-armed troops marched out as well. This entire force was under the command of Pausanias, who was acting as regent for an under-aged king. Argos, the second most powerful Peloponnesian state, was in an alliance with the Persians and threatened to check any action of the patriotic Greeks. The Spartans therefore marched out under cover of darkness, and reached the isthmus before Argos became aware of what was happening. At the isthmus, the forces of several other Peloponnesian states joined the Spartans, some because they were eager to fight for Greek freedom, others because they feared to take a position against the Spartans.
When Mardonius learned from the Argives that a Greek army was on the march, he decided to retire to Boeotia, to have the friendly city of Thebes at his back and to fight in more open country suited to his cavalry. Before he left Attica, though, he sent a force, led by the cavalry, to the territory of Megara in order to harass an advance contingent of Greeks. In the process, the Persian cavalry ravaged the land around Megara and probably provided adequate cover for the Persian army to cross the passes into Boeotia, which they did by way of the route past Decelea, which exits Attica between Mt Parnes and Mt Pentelikon. Once in Boeotia, Mardonius took up a position on the Asopos River. Herodotus says that he chopped down all the trees in the region in order to build a wooden palisade on the banks of the river, an area of around two-and-a-half square kilometres. The palisade did not house the entire Persian force, but it served as a strongpoint to anchor the army.
The Greek coalition gathered at Eleusis in Athenian territory, and then crossed into Boeotia over the massif of Mt Kithairon, probably along the so-called Gyphtokastro Pass now forming the route of the modern highway. Upon entering the Boeotian plain, the Greeks moved into the vicinity of Erythrai (confusingly, 3-4km east of the modern village of Erythres) and took up positions along the foothills of the mountain. The Greeks’ location was quite advantageous, since they were well placed to protect the mountain passes to their rear over which supplies and additional soldiers could move freely, and the ridges emanating from Kithairon denied the Persian cavalry much room for manoeuvre. Mardonius, from the north bank of the Asopos River several kilometres away, sent a cavalry force nevertheless, under the command of the dashing and handsome Masistius. Perhaps Mardonius’ intention was to lure the Greeks out into the plain, or perhaps he simply meant to inflict enough injury to convince many of the Greeks to return home over the mountain rather than face the full Persian force. Whatever his reasons for sending the horse, the cavalry engagement did not turn out well for the Persians.
Masistius and his comrades thundered across the plain against the Greeks lodged against the mountain. In successive waves, the horsemen charged, loosed arrows and javelins at the Greeks, withdrew at speed and wheeled about for renewed attacks. Though they were protected by the rugged terrain, there seemed to be little the Greek hoplites could do against the much more mobile cavalry. The hoplites were at least smart enough not to be lured into the plain in a vain attempt to counterattack, which would have left them open to a total envelopment. Herodotus tells us that the Megarians were stationed in the most vulnerable part of the Greek position and bore the brunt of the Persian attack. Desperate, they sent a message to Pausanias, saying that they might soon be forced to abandon their post. The only Greeks to answer the call were the Athenians – perhaps reflecting Herodotus’ pro-Athenian bias – who responded with 300 elite troops supplemented by a corps of archers, the first such corps among the Greeks mentioned in our sources
Plataea Map 2: The move to Plataea. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
The Athenians rushed to the Megarians’ aid, and the fighting continued. Eventually, the Athenian archers showed their worth: Masistius’ horse was wounded by an Athenian arrow, throwing its rider. A darkly humorous episode followed in which the Athenians could not kill Masistius for some time, given the great amount of golden armour protecting him. Masistius himself fought vigorously for his life in the thick of his enemies. He was finally killed when a Greek soldier stabbed him in the eye. A truly Homeric struggle erupted around the body, reminiscent of the pitched battle for Patroclus’ body in the Iliad. Despite at first losing the body to the Persians, who fought fiercely to preserve the honour of their commander, the Athenians called to the other Greeks, who collectively rallied to regain possession of the body. Despondent, the Persian horse returned to their lines across the Asopos. While the Persian army erupted in ritualized mourning for Masistius, all along the Greek lines soldiers jostled against one another for a chance to see the Persian’s splendid corpse, which was paraded up and down the ranks on a cart.
Mardonius’ attack had failed, and the Greeks were able to hold their defensive position. A shortage of water, however, forced the Greeks to move down into the plain, towards the vicinity of the friendly town of Plataea. Passing Hysiai, the Greeks entered Plataean territory and spread out by national contingents over a front of 5km. The Spartans anchored the right, on the hills of the Asopos Ridge near the Gargaphia Spring, which was not far from Hysiai and became the main water source for the Greek army. The Greek allies stretched across the low-lying plain in an east-west direction. The Athenians were placed on the left – after a heated debate with the Tegeans, who also wanted this honourable position – and occupied a low hill close to the Asopos, a few kilometres due north of Plataea. The other patriotic Greeks took up positions in the centre of the line. We are not told where the Greek auxiliary and light-armed troops were stationed – some 70,000 men, including 35,000 helots – or what role they played in the battle itself, but they could have been deployed to protect the passes and to bring food and supplies. All told, the Greeks had around 38,700 hoplites and as many as 70,000 light-armed and irregular troops. For their part, the Persians spread out along the north bank of the river to match the Greek positions. The Persian elite with Mardonius took the left wing, anchored on the wooden palisade, so as to oppose the Spartans. The contingents of the many nations that comprised Persia’s Asian allies were placed in the Persian centre, while their Greek allies, dominated by the Thebans, held the right, opposite the Athenians. As already mentioned, the Persians probably had around 70,000-100,000 soldiers, outnumbering the regular Greek soldiers by perhaps two-to-one.
Plataea Map 3: Initial Persian cavaly attacks. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
Both the Greeks and Persians received omens to the effect that they would be successful if they remained on the defensive, but would meet with defeat if they attacked. Maintaining a defensive posture made tactical and strategic sense for both sides too. The Greeks could afford to wait, so long as supplies and men kept pouring in over the Kithairon passes. The Persians’ best chance of success was to lure the Greeks across the river, into even more open plains where the cavalry could make short work of the heavy-armed hoplites. Things naturally devolved into a stalemate, and neither side made a move for eight days. As before Salamis, Herodotus has various advisors – this time principally the Thebans – tell Mardonius to wait out the Greeks, and to grease the wheels of dissention by sending large sums of money to various members of the Greek coalition. The Greek coalition was indeed a fragile thing, and the Spartans and other Peloponnesians never could shake their instinct to hide behind the Isthmus of Corinth and the wall they had built across it, just recently completed. John Lazenby plausibly argues that Mardonius’ actions, from the very beginning of his campaign after Salamis, are best understood as attempts to avoid battle. Even after Salamis, far more Greeks were on the Persian side than against it, and the Persians were past-masters at achieving their geo-political aims through intrigue and bribery, and also battlefield theatrics that typically awed their opponents into submission without the need for full-scale combat. While Herodotus tells us that Mardonius spurned the various advisors who urged him to divide and conquer, he did try to make the Greeks’ situation desperate enough for them to give up or advance to a disadvantageous position.
A Theban advised Mardonius to watch the Kithairon passes, as there should be opportunities to intercept the Greek supply trains. Though the passes were behind the Greek position, the Greeks were separated from the mountain by several kilometres of plain, which offered plenty of space for the mobile cavalry to get around the Greek position and operate with relative impunity. It has been surprising to some scholars, including Peter Green, that Mardonius failed to exploit this situation for eight whole days. Ultimately, the reasons for the delay remain obscure. On the eighth day, however, Herodotus says that Mardonius eagerly took the Theban’s advice, and sent his cavalry to the passes. A caravan of 500 food-carrying mules was caught as it descended from a pass near Plataea, variously called the ‘Three Heads Pass’ or ‘Oak Heads Pass’. In their excitement, and perhaps frustration at having been idle for so long, the Persian horsemen slaughtered men and animals alike, until they drove the few beasts that remained alive to the Persians’ own lines.
Deprived of their supplies, the Greeks still did not take the bait to cross the river. Instead, the stalemate continued for two more days. The Persians, however, stepped up their provocations by advancing ever closer to the river and sending the cavalry to harass the Greeks constantly. Herodotus tells us that the Thebans initiated this harassment with their own force of cavalry since they were so eager to attack their fellow Greeks. Seeing the Thebans galloping to the attack, the Persians and other allied horse enthusiastically joined in too. Herodotus implies that these cavalry attacks began only after the capture of the Greek mule train, but it is reasonable to suppose that at least some cavalry strikes began as soon as the Greeks had taken up their positions in the plain. The Greek hoplites must have found it nearly unbearable to be the targets of slings and arrows launched by a fast enemy they could not hope to engage in a fair fight. Greek morale, though, held out. For now.
On the eleventh day, Herodotus describes one final appeal, this time from the Persian general Artabazus, for Mardonius to avoid battle and from the safety of Thebes to bribe the Greeks until they disbanded. Herodotus tells us that this advice served only to provoke Mardonius’ impetuous ire, and he determined to attack on the very next day. In this scene, Artabazus plays the role of the typically unheeded Herodotean wise advisor, and the entire exchange might be no more than literary embellishment. Despite his portrayal in the sources, Mardonius’ actions up to this point – including the sending of carefully chosen ambassadors to the Boeotians and Athenians, and the refusal to charge blindly across the Asopos – were not those of a rash commander, but were rather calculated to bring about the capitulation of the Greeks with minimal casualties on both sides.
During that night, when the Persian forces were preparing for battle in the morning, Alexander, King of Macedonia, once again addressed the Athenians. This time, however, Herodotus tells us that he acted on his own initiative, without the orders of Mardonius. The Macedonian king snuck over to the Athenian position in the dark, and demanded to speak with the Athenian commanders, the chief of whom was Aristides. Alexander warned the Athenians of the attack to come in the morning, and suggested that the Greeks stand firm and await the Persians. Should the Persians fail to attack as planned, he advised the Greeks to remain in their positions, since Mardonius had only a few days of supplies left. The Athenians took Alexander’s warning seriously, and immediately informed Pausanias. Alexander, it seems, was hedging his bets, wanting to ensure that if the Greeks happened to win, then he would remain in their favour. Peter Green suggests that perhaps Mardonius actually sent Alexander as a double agent, with the goal of convincing the Greeks to remain at their posts instead of retiring to the mountain to regain better control of their supply lines, which would have put Mardonius at a disadvantage. However, if water-supply issues had forced the Greeks to descend into the plain, it is difficult to imagine that the Greek force contemplated retiring to the foothills that they had of necessity abandoned in the first place.
Herodotus recounts that a strange episode took place once Pausanias was told of Alexander’s warning. With a battle seemingly imminent, the Spartans asked the Athenians to switch places with them in the line in order that the Athenians would face the Persian troops. The Spartans reasoned that the Athenians were the only members of the coalition who had fought Persian troops in the past, at Marathon ten years earlier. The only Spartans who had fought Persians on land were those who stood at Thermopylae; and they were all dead. The Athenians were only too happy to oblige, and so the Greek wings exchanged places during the night. In the morning, however, Mardonius, seeing what had taken place, countered the Greek movement by reversing his own wings, and sending a herald to mock the Spartans as apparent cowards. Seeing that their plan had failed, the Greeks decided to return to their original positions, and Mardonius matched this movement as well. All of these complicated manoeuvres thus came to naught. Readers of Herodotus, beginning with Plutarch in his screed, On the Malice of Herodotus, have faulted the great historian’s account of this episode, claiming that it amounts to no more than a slander against the Spartans based on Herodotus’ pro-Athenian sources. Most consider that the event did not take place at all, and, as Peter Green says, since the armies returned to their original positions anyway, it matters very little for our reconstruction of the battle. Perhaps, though, this event reflects a clumsy attempt on the part of the Greeks to confound the Persians and throw them off balance. A parallel might be the last-minute substitutions and changes of position undertaken by American football teams before the ball is snapped to the quarterback, manoeuvres which often do confuse the opposing team.
Mardonius exulted in the Spartans’ supposed display of cowardice, but he did not order a full attack. Instead, he sent his cavalry across the river in force, which sowed misery up and down the Greek line. The cavalry also managed a crucial feat: they choked off and fouled (by what methods we do not know) the Greeks’ water supply at the Gargaphia Spring. The Greeks were thus cut off from water, had grown short of food with the loss of the convoys over Kithairon, and were being killed and weakened by continual cavalry attacks. The time had come for drastic action. The Greeks held a conference and decided to retreat during the night – in order to prevent further cavalry attacks – to a patch of land called the ‘island’ to the south-west of Gargaphia, closer to Plataea. The island was so named because it was surrounded by two branches of a river flowing down from Kithairon. Nestled just below the foothills of the mountain, it would offer a water supply and some protection from the Persian cavalry. Once the Greeks had changed positions to be anchored on the island, Pausanias planned to send a large force – half of the entire army, according to Herodotus – to Kithairon in order to relieve the supply convoys that were still trapped on the mountain and unable to descend into the plain for fear of the enemy horse. As night fell and the cavalry ceased their attacks, the Greeks began to move.
Plataea Map 4: The Greeks change position. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
All did not go according to plan. Most of the Greeks, rather than head for the island, retreated to Plataea itself, halting just outside its walls. The dark and the distances involved prevented Pausanias from learning this. Rather, he assumed his allies were withdrawing to the agreed-upon spot. The Spartans ran into their own problems during the withdrawal. Herodotus says that a Spartan officer named Amompharetus refused to leave his position, considering even a tactical withdrawal to be a shameful retreat in the face of the enemy. No pleading on the part of Pausanias could change the intransigent Spartan’s mind. Instead, Amompharetus is said to have dropped a massive stone on the ground, which he declared to be his ‘voting pebble’, signifying his vote to stay put. The Athenians had also failed to move at the appointed time, since, according to Herodotus, they worried that the Spartans often said one thing and did another. Thus, the Athenians sent an envoy to the Spartans to ensure that the withdrawal really was taking place, only to find the Spartans in the midst of a heated argument with Amompharetus. The Athenians were told to scrap the original plan, move closer to the Spartan position in the plain and follow the Spartan lead. At his wits’ end, Pausanias decided to withdraw with the greater part of his army, thinking that Amompharetus and the troops under his command would not stand firm for long if the Spartans really did abandon him. The majority of the Spartans thus moved off along the high ground of the Asopos Ridge, in a south-easterly direction towards Hysiai, rather than towards the island. They halted a little way off, near a sanctuary of Demeter, to wait for Amompharetus, who did eventually come to his senses and begin a slow march to rejoin his comrades. This story has several problems, not the least of which is that voting by pebble was the practice in Athens, whereas in Sparta votes were conducted by shouting. Once again, Herodotus is here accused, perhaps rightly, of pro-Athenian bias. A more reasonable interpretation of this event is that Amompharetus was assigned the important and dangerous role as the rearguard to cover the Spartans’ withdrawal.
When the Persian cavalry commenced their attacks at dawn, it seemed that everything that could have gone wrong with the Greeks’ complicated manoeuvre – a night-time withdrawal involving nearly 40,000 troops from several independent contingents – had done so. No one had actually reached the island. Instead, most of the Greeks had retreated to Plataea; the Athenians were marching eastward across the lowest and least protected part of the plain, and were hidden from the sight of the Spartans by the intervening hills of the Asopos Ridge; and the Spartans were spread out over the Asopos Ridge and the foothills of Kithairon in the neighbourhood of Hysiai, and appeared to be dealing with dissension – or at least miscommunication – within their own ranks. Mardonius was elated. Seeing the Greeks scattered and apparently in full flight, he ordered a general attack of the Persian contingent under his direct command against the Spartans and Tegeans, who were stationed just next to the Spartans in the Greek line and had apparently maintained formation with the Spartans during the night. Seeing the Persians rushing across the river, the rest of Mardonius’ army followed suit, hurling themselves towards the Greeks without thought of order or formation. The decisive moment had come.
One of the more contentious scholarly questions regarding this battle is whether or not Pausanias feigned a retreat in order to entice Mardonius to attack at long last. The Spartans had, after all, engaged in tactically successful feigned retreats at Thermopylae the previous year. Most, however, now think that such a manoeuvre was well beyond the capabilities of the Greeks at Plataea. The Spartans at Thermopylae had numbered only in the hundreds, and performed their feat in the daytime. A night-time retreat involving tens of thousands of troops decidedly less trained than the 300 elite at Thermopylae would most likely have been impossible. Indeed, the scattered nature of the Greek army in the morning of the final battle at Plataea demonstrates clearly the natural result of such a move. It goes too far to credit Pausanias with a tactical genius the like of which has only been demonstrated in the peer-group of Alexander and Hannibal. To all appearances, Pausanias’ retreat had been a debacle, and only the superior tactics and equipment of the Greeks, along with the uncanny discipline of the Spartans, could save the Greeks from certain destruction.
Pausanias sent a call for help to the Athenians, who were hidden from view behind the hills, urging them to hurry across the plain to join the Spartans in the great struggle that was unfolding against the Persians. For their part, the Athenians picked up the pace but were checked by the ferocious attack of the Thebans and other Greek allies of Mardonius. The Spartans and their dogged Tegean allies would have to face Mardonius and the Persian elite alone. There was, however, a rather annoying problem: the omens from the pre-battle sacrifices were unfavourable. There was no choice but to keep sacrificing more victims until the omens turned out well. It is easy for us to discount such stories of the Greeks’ religious piety. Pausanias must have had solid tactical reasons to delay engaging the Persians, or so many argue. But the Greeks took the religious rituals of warfare seriously, and there is no reason to correct Herodotus’ account here. While the Spartans huddled behind their shields to await further sacrifices, the Persians constructed a wall out of their wicker shields, behind which they proceeded to rain arrows upon the Spartans. Astonishingly, this situation continued for some time. Animal after animal was slaughtered while the Spartans and Tegeans fended off the deadly darts of the enemy but refused to engage. Eventually, the Tegeans could stand it no more: they surged forward with their spears levelled against the foe. Just then, the omens miraculously turned in Pausanias’ favour, and he ordered his troops to attack. Seeing the Greeks advancing, the Persians threw down their bows and prepared to fight hand-to-hand.
Plataea Map 5: The final battle. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
The Persians were armed with swords and daggers, and were protected only by heavy tunics and light wicker shields, most of which had been used in constructing their ad hoc barrier. The Greek hoplites, on the other hand, were heavily armed with long thrusting spears, solid round shields, bronze helmets and, for many, bronze body armour as well. The Spartans were the best soldiers in Greece, used to standing shoulder-to-shoulder to fight in dense formation, while the Persians were used to loose and fluid formations, attacking in small detachments of only a few men. How and Wells argue in their classic commentary on Herodotus that these differences in tactics and equipment gave the Greeks a decisive edge over the Persians.
We can imagine the scene as the Spartans and their Tegean allies presented a hedge of spears and wall of shields as they marched deliberately towards the Persians, who at first hid behind their wicker wall. The iron points of the Greek spears quickly demolished the flimsy shields, and the Persian troops were forced to come toe-to-toe with the Greeks. Or rather, they tried to come toe-to-toe. With each spear protruding at least a metre in front of the Greek ranks, the Persians, valiantly throwing themselves against their enemy in scattered groups of ten or fewer, were skewered in great numbers as the hoplites surged forward. Herodotus credits the Persians with great bravery during this struggle. It was not in courage that the Persians were deficient, but in tactics and equipment. The battle lasted quite some time, principally because Mardonius, resplendent while fighting from a white charger at the head of his own elite bodyguard, was able to inspire his men. Eventually, though, he was killed along with most of his bodyguard, which broke the Persian morale. The battle on the Greek right then became a rout as Mardonius’ army fled in a panic to the wooden palisade across the river.
The Thebans and other Boeotian allies of Persia fought vigorously against the Athenians on the Greek left. Herodotus says that their bravery cost them 300 of their best men. The Athenian phalanx, however, was able eventually to push back the Boeotians, who fled to the walls of Thebes. In this action, the Boeotian cavalry especially distinguished themselves by skillfully covering their comrades’ retreat, keeping the pursuing Athenians at bay and surely saving many lives.
In the centre, Mardonius’ lieutenant, Artabazus, advanced cautiously, awaiting the result of the action in Mardonius’ quarter. Once the Persian left took to flight in the face of the Spartans and Tegeans, Artabazus wheeled his own considerable contingent around without striking a blow, and fled headlong past both the palisade and Thebes, trying to reach Asia as quickly as possible. The allies in the Greek centre, who had retired to the vicinity of Plataea during the night, eventually charged into battle but were roughly treated by the Theban cavalry, supposedly losing 600 men before withdrawing from the conflict and back to Kithairon. Herodotus is contemptuous of these Greek allies, especially the Corinthians and Megarians, and their role in the battle. Many scholars argue that Herodotus has bought into Athenian propaganda against these rival Greeks, and that the Corinthians, Megarians and others had fought well. In particular, these allies drew much of the Theban cavalry attack, which would have greatly relieved the Athenians. Others, however, particularly Lazenby, defend Herodotus’ account. With Artabazus’ retreat from the battle, along with most of the Persian army’s centre, the Spartans and Athenians, on the Greek wings, certainly played the greatest role in the battle.
The Spartans had always been inept at siege warfare. When they reached the Persians’ palisade, they were unable to breach it. Eventually, though, the Athenians arrived and were able to make an opening in the walls. The Greeks then poured into the enclosure, and the Persians were struck with fear and abandoned all semblance of order. The Greeks slaughtered their enemy in great numbers: Herodotus says that out of 300,000 men, not 3,000 survived (aside from those who fled with Artabazus). This is an exaggeration, but in any case the slaughter was horrific. By contrast, the Greeks lost relatively few men (unless one counts the 600 who were said to have been killed by the Theban cavalry): the Spartans lost ninety-one, the Tegeans sixteen and the Athenians fifty-two.
The sacrifice was more than worth it for the Greeks: the Persians were driven from Greece, never again to return. Plataea was indeed ‘the most splendid victory of all’, as Herodotus puts it. Tradition states that the Battle of Mycale, fought in Asia Minor to free the Ionian Greeks from the Persian yoke, took place on the very same day, compounding Persia’s ignominious defeat. If we can believe Herodotus’ claim that Mardonius was the principal instigator of the great invasion of Greece, the Persian general certainly paid a high price for his advice. Great parts of the Persian navy and army had been destroyed at Thermopylae, Artemisium, Salamis and now Plataea; and Mardonius himself lost his life on the bloody plain lying in front of a small but uniquely significant city in Boeotia.
The Battle Site Today
There are four good places from which to view the battlefield. The first is along the modern highway between Elefsina and Thiva as it exits the pass of Kithairon and descends into the plain above the modern village of Erythres. This point is the outlet of the so-called Gyphtokastro Pass, named after the Gyphtokastro fort, which has been identified as ancient Eleutherai. From the side of the road, you can look north and north-west across the entire plain from a spot due south of the main action of the battle on the Greek right. The prominent clump of trees to the north, along the high ground of the Asopos Ridge, surrounds the church of Ag. Demetrios, some 500 metres or so east of the Gargaphia Spring. Just down the slopes of Kithairon from this spot is the base of the Pantanassa Ridge, a little to the east of modern Erythres, where most scholars locate ancient Hysiai and the sanctuary of Demeter where Pausanias and the Spartans fought the main Persian contingent under Mardonius. Alternatively, some identify the church of Ag. Demetrios as the location of the Demeter sanctuary. In any case, the Spartan lines, with some 10,000 hoplites, probably stretched for around 1,200 metres, and would have covered much of the expanse along the high ground between Ag. Demetrios and the base of the Pantanassa ridge. The Greeks likely used this very pass to enter the plain of Plataea, before moving to the vicinity of ancient Erythrai, located 3-4km east of modern Erythres. Here, along the foothills of the mountain, the initial clash with the Persian cavalry took place in which the dashing cavalry commander Masistius was killed by a crack force of Athenian hoplites supplemented by a corps of archers.
After the battle with the Persian cavalry, the Greeks moved westwards towards the territory of Plataea, passing ancient Hysiai and taking up the positions that they would occupy for the next twelve days. The Spartans stationed themselves on the Greek right, along the Asopos Ridge near the Gargaphia Spring and Ag. Demetrios. The Athenians occupied the Greek left, some 5km to the west on the low Pyrgos Hill next to the Aspous River, while the other Greek allies held the centre, along the low-lying parts of the plain between the Spartans and Athenians.
The second viewpoint is from the walls of ancient Plataea through which the modern road runs (N 38° 12.843"; E 023° 16.492"). These impressive walls and towers were built in the fourth century BCE after the city was refounded by Philip of Macedonia. While tombs, a Doric temple and other structures can be seen in the extensive remains of the city to the north of the road, no monuments relevant to the battle have been identified. About 3.5km due north from this spot is the small hill on the Asopos marking the Athenian position.
The third and most comprehensive view of the plain can be gained by ascending the slopes of Kithairon behind modern Plataies. From this high point, you can look due north to the Athenian position, and to the east and north-east back towards modern Erythres, where the main battle between the Persians and Spartans took place on the Greek right. The Asopos Ridge, of which the prominent cluster of trees around Ag. Demetrios forms the midpoint, is clearly visible from here. The Persians and Thebans were encamped beyond this ridge, on the northern bank of the Asopos River. Just a few kilometres north of the Asopos lay Thebes, Persia’s base in Greece in 479.
Fig. 6.1: The plain of Plataea, looking north towards the Asopus Ridge from the walls of ancient Plataea. Authors’ photo.
The modern church of Ag. Demetrios, which is likely near where the most intense fighting took place, is the fourth viewing spot, and can be reached by following the agricultural roads due north of modern Erythres and just to the west of the highway to Thiva (N 38° 14.231"; E 023° 19.160"). Half a kilometre to the west of Ag. Demetrios is a large and clearly visible modern water source that is probably the site of the ancient Gargaphia spring, the main water supply for the Greeks until the Persian cavalry managed to choke it up. The grounds of Ag. Demetrios consist of a very pleasant grove of evergreens, from which many of the key points of the battle can be seen. It is likely that Amompharetus, the Spartan commander who was left behind either because of his intransigence or because he represented the Spartan rearguard, was here during the battle, while Pausanias on the extreme right was to the south and east beyond Erythres.
Looking to the south, there is a great view of Kithairon, the passes descending from the mountain, the spot Pausanias reached for the final clash, and further to the east the spot of the initial cavalry battle with Masistius. Looking west and southwest from Ag. Demetrios, back towards Plataea, you will see the series of hills which make up the Asopos Ridge and which caused the Spartans and Athenians to lose sight of each other during the lead-up to the battle and during the final clash itself. Continuing north from Ag. Demetrios, along the rough agricultural road, you will reach the modern irrigation canal, across which is the Asopos River (N38° 15.671"; E023° 19.040"). The Persian camp, two-and-a-half square kilometres in size and surrounded by a palisade, was on the north bank of the river, and its area is bisected by the modern highway to Thiva. It is to this spot on the north bank of the Asopos that the Greeks pursued the Persians once the battle had turned in the Greeks’ favour.
Fig. 6.2: The hills near Ag. Demetrios, blocking the line of sight between the Spartan and Athenian forces. Authors’ photo.
The ‘island’, to which the Greeks planned to retreat after the Persians choked the Gargaphia Spring, must have been a patch of land between Gargaphia and Plataea, in the midst of rivers that flow down from Kithairon into the plain. Two such rivers can be found on the road between Plataies and Erythres (eastern river, N38° 13.370"; E023° 18.386"; western river, N38° 13.263"; E023° 17.810"). Though small in midsummer when we visited the site, these rivers can be identified by the dense vegetation growing along their banks. The stretch of road between these two rivers likely crosses right through the middle of the ancient ‘island’ (midpoint of ‘island’, N38° 13.360"; E023° 18.211"). Few of the Greeks actually reached this spot, however, since the Spartans and Athenians were still in the plain, and many others chose to retreat to Plataea itself on the night before the battle.
In addition to surveying the main points of the battle itself, it is worthwhile to consider the road over Kithairon which the Greeks took to reach the plain. In the fourth century BCE, this crucial pass was fortified by the impressive walls of Eleutherai, still intact to a considerable height and well worth seeing. The site is signified by the typical brown Ministry of Culture sign. One branch of this pass, called the Oak Heads by the Athenians and likely located a little to the west of the modern highway, closer to Plataea, is where the Greek supply convoys were ambushed by the Persian cavalry. The Persian horse clearly had great freedom of movement in the plain, even behind the Greek position along the Asopos and Asopos Ridge. One of Pausanias’ motives for abandoning the advance position closer to the river was to relieve the supply wagons that were not destroyed in the action of the Persian cavalry but remained trapped on Kithairon. In the midpoint of the pass over Kithairon, along the modern highway between Elefsina and Thiva, there is a broad and flat expanse near ancient Oinoi, a site marked with a brown sign and with remains visible from the road. This flat area is perhaps where the Greek supply train awaited relief from the hoplites.
Further Reading
Ancient Sources
–Herodotus 9.1-81
Basically the only worthwhile source on the battle from antiquity, Herodotus’ account is essential reading. There are some difficulties with his narrative, however, including standardized and inaccurate measures of distance, the oft-criticized story of the Spartans and Athenians trading their places in the line at the last minute and the literary concerns that appear to be behind the attributions of motive to the central characters, especially Mardonius.
–Diodorus of Sicily 11.28-32
Writing in the first century BCE, Diodorus based his account of Plataea partly on Herodotus and also on the works of fourth-century historians, themselves writing a century or more after the battle. Herodotus’ version is to be generally preferred.
–Plutarch, Life of Aristides
Plutarch’s account, written in the second century CE, is focused on the experience of the commander of the Athenian contingent, Aristides. Plutarch’s topography seems somewhat confused, and several of the episodes he reports, including a possible insurrection within the Athenian ranks, are rather far-fetched.
Modern Sources
Books
–Cartledge, Paul, After Thermopylae: The Oath of Plataea and the End of the Graeco-Persian Wars (Oxford, 2013).
A concise and readable account of the Persian Wars, with a special focus on the controversial ‘Oath of Plataea’, the battle itself and its enduring legacy in the Western consciousness. Particularly useful is Cartledge’s extensive essay on further bibliography.
–Flower, Michael A., and Marincola, John (eds), Herodotus: Histories, Book IX (Cambridge, 2002).
A commentary on the Greek text of Herodotus’ ninth book, which treats the Battle of Plataea. Even those with no knowledge of Ancient Greek will benefit from the relevant sections of the English commentary.
–Green, Peter, The Greco-Persian Wars (Berkeley, 1996).
Offers an account of the battle that credits Pausanias with a brilliant feigned retreat that lured Mardonius to his doom. Green trusts Plutarch more than other scholars have tended to.
–How, W.W., and Wells, J., A Commentary of Herodotus, Vol. 2 (Books V-IX) (Oxford, 1912).
Though over a century old, the commentary of How and Wells should still be a standard reference for any student of Herodotus and the Persian Wars. The appendices of Volume 2 include useful discussions of the Battle of Plataea, as well as an argument for the superiority of the heavy-armed Greek hoplite to Persian troops.
–Lazenby, J.F., The Defence of Greece, 490-479 BC (Warminster, 1993).
Quite possibly the best single-volume treatment of the military history of the Persian Wars, with a sympathetic account of the Persian general Mardonius as a leader who sought to avoid battle if at all possible.
–Pritchett, W.K., The Greek State at War, Vol. 1 (Berkeley, 1965), pp.101-21.
An update to his influential 1957 article on the topography of the battle (see below).
–Rusch, Scott M., Sparta at War: Strategy, Tactics and Campaigns, 550-362 BC (London, 2011).
Geared for the general reader, this comprehensive treatment of the Spartan military has a very useful section on Plataea.
Articles
–Pritchett, W.K., ‘New Light on Plataea’, American Journal of Archaeology 61 (1957), pp.9-28.
A comprehensive survey of the topography around Plataea from a leading scholar of Greek topographical studies.
–Sears, Matthew A., ‘A Note on Mardonius’ Emissaries’, Mouseion 9 (2009), pp.21-28.
A defence of Mardonius as a skilled diplomat who tried all possible avenues to bring the Greeks onside without the need for military action.