Chapter 7
Introduction
The hoplite phalanx is supposed to have been the basis of ancient Greek warfare. Yet, during the twenty-seven years of the Peloponnesian War – the most famous of all conflicts between the Greek states – there were only two hoplite pitched battles: Mantinea in 418 BCE, in which the Spartans handily defeated a coalition arrayed against them; and Delium in 424, which, in a brutal slug-fest, demonstrated that the tough Boeotians were more than a match for the Athenians when it came down to spears and shields. Just as there were not as many hoplite battles during the Peloponnesian War as one might expect, so too the literary sources offer very few good descriptions of a clash of phalanxes. Delium is one of those rare hoplite battles described in any detail by a contemporary; thus it is an important event for military history. It also helped to turn the tide of the Peloponnesian War against Athens, which ultimately prolonged the war for many years. Delium showed that some clever tactical arrangements and a small bit of trickery could provide critical advantages in a hoplite clash, offering a preview of later military developments.
Directions to the Site
The ancient site of Delium is located at the modern village of Dilesi, a pleasant seaside resort about a half-hour drive east of Thiva and an hour north of Athens. From the National Highway, exit at Schimitari and drive east for about 8km until reaching Dilesi. The hills above the breakwater of the main harbour at Dilesi are where the ancient shrine to Delian Apollo was located, from which the place gets its name. The battle was fought on the plateau rising about 2km south of Dilesi. Simply head south to the plateau, travelling in the direction of Sikamino. The roads on the plateau are winding and often difficult to navigate, so a good survey of the battlefield will require a measure of adventurism. There are a few signs for Sikamino, which will help with navigation. The battlefield itself is located about 3km north-west of Sikamino, closer to the smaller hamlet of Neo Sikamino. The views from the plateau are beautiful, which is why many prosperous modern Athenians own country houses here.
Historical Outline of the Battle
Pericles, the leading Athenian statesman of the Classical period, had devised a clever strategy for waging the Peloponnesian War against the Spartans (431-404 BCE). The Athenians were the greatest naval power in the Mediterranean, and their city was protected by an impregnable system of walls. Bringing in by sea as many resources as they needed, Pericles urged the Athenians to wait out the Spartans, who would eventually grow tired of invading Athenian territory and run out of the money and material needed to continue the war. Under no circumstances were the Athenians to risk a pitched battle outside their walls and chance the outcome of the entire war on the events of an afternoon.
By 424, the seventh year of the war, Pericles had died, a victim of the ruinous plague that proved a grave and unforeseen consequence of his strategy of hunkering down behind the city walls. Despite the loss of their leader, things had gone well for the Athenians in the months before Delium. First and foremost, they had won a great military success at Pylos in 425 (the subject of another chapter in this book) and had established a permanent forward operating base in the Peloponnese, which left the Spartans reeling and boosted the Athenians’ confidence, probably beyond all reasonable measure. A new set of Athenian leaders decided to set up a similar base in neighbouring Boeotia, the region dominated by Sparta’s ally Thebes, and also foment revolt in several Boeotian cities, just as they hoped to sow rebellion among the Messenians subject to Sparta. The general Demosthenes, the tactician who captured the Spartan soldiers at Pylos, and Hippocrates, another Athenian general, devised a complicated scheme to extend Athenian influence into Boeotia and perhaps knock Thebes out of the war completely.
The Athenians were seduced into this plan by several Boeotian conspirators who wanted to establish democracies and bring Thebes’ hegemony to an end. A force under Demosthenes was to cross the Corinthian Gulf to help democratic uprisings in two Boeotian cities, which were a considerable distance from one another: Siphai, on the gulf, and Chaeronea, at the extreme western border of Boeotia. Hippocrates was to lead an army to Delium, the location of a small shrine to Apollo on Boeotia’s eastern coast, on the very day that Demosthenes landed at Siphai. If all went according to plan, the Boeotians, especially the Thebans, would have to divide their forces to deal with simultaneous threats, and would thus be unable to gather their full strength to oppose the Athenian army at Delium. The shrine to Apollo at Delium itself would be fortified and serve as a base for an Athenian garrison, along similar lines to the fortifications at Pylos.
Rarely do plans of such complexity go off without a hitch, and the Delium campaign was no exception. For various reasons, Demosthenes failed to achieve anything. Most critically, his timing was off and he arrived at Siphai before Hippocrates set out for Delium. The Boeotians, not having to deal with the simultaneous invasion of Hippocrates, and warned in advance of the Athenians’ plans, ensured that Siphai and Chaeronea were occupied by the time Demosthenes arrived. Without being able to rely on treachery from the inside of these cities, Demosthenes sailed back home, having accomplished nothing. But because the Greeks had no way to communicate quickly over long distances, Hippocrates left for Delium anyway, thinking that he could rely on Demosthenes’ invasion to the west to divide Boeotia’s forces. Out from the protection of Athens’ walls, Hippocrates led a hoplite army assembled from the entire Athenian citizen body and a vast number of irregular troops and non-citizens to help with the task of fortifying Delium. This force crossed into Boeotia by travelling between Mt Parnes and Mt Pentelikon into the territory of the major Boeotian city of Tanagra, where Delium was located. The fog of war prevented Hippocrates from knowing that his army was destined for a bad end.
Delium Map 1. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
Thucydides says that the expedition to Delium took five days. Work on the fortifications – which included digging a trench and bringing in wood and stone plundered from nearby buildings – began on the third day and continued through the fourth and into the fifth. By day five, most of the fortification work had been completed, so the light-armed troops set out in the direction of Athens, and the hoplites withdrew about 2km in the direction of Mt Parnes, where they rested to await Hippocrates, who had a few last-minute details to attend to at Delium. The Athenian army was heading home because they reckoned that given the uprisings that were supposed to be breaking out across Boeotia with the help of Demosthenes, only a small garrison force would be needed at Delium to support the pro-Athenian tide that was bound to wash over the region.
The Boeotians, though, had used the five days of the expedition to gather a large army at nearby Tanagra. When they learned that the Athenians had begun to head back home, and had likely crossed the border between Attica and Boeotia, most of the Boeotarchs, the area’s generals, were against a battle. One Boeotarch, however, a Theban named Pagondas, felt that this was the perfect opportunity to put the Athenians in their place. He gave a rousing speech to the troops to the effect that there was no more dangerous a neighbour than Athens, and if they failed to strike now, Athens would only grow bolder in its incursions into Boeotia. Honour, as well as practical necessity, dictated that the Boeotians respond to Athenian aggression in kind. Therefore, at a point late in the day, Pagondas persuaded his army to attack, and moved the soldiers into position behind a hill close to where the Athenian army had halted.
The numbers at Delium were roughly equal. Thucydides tells us that the Boeotians had 7,000 hoplites, 10,000 light troops, 1,000 cavalry and 500 peltasts. We are not given exact numbers for the Athenians, but we are told that they matched the Boeotian force. Though the Athenians had invaded Boeotia with several thousand light-armed and irregular troops, many of whom came from Athens’ sizeable population of foreigners, most of this force had already made its way back to Attica after finishing the fortifications at Delium. Neither side’s light-armed troops played a major role in the battle, since there were ravines at the flanks of the two armies where light-armed soldiers were usually placed. Some of the cavalry stayed out of the battle too, since once he learned that the Boeotians were threatening his army, Hippocrates had left 300 Athenian cavalry to guard the position at Delium, and Pagondas had sent a force of his own to waylay this Athenian rearguard.
Delium Map 2: The Boeotian route to the battle. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
Before offering battle, Pagondas arranged his battle line behind the hill, out of view of the Athenians, either out of convenience or to hide his unusual formation until the last minute. The light-armed troops and cavalry were placed on the wings, but, as mentioned, the ravines gave these soldiers precious little room for manoeuvre. The hoplites of Thebes’ Boeotian allies were placed on the left and in the centre, the brave Thespians entrusted with a position on the left wing. On the right wing were the Thebans, stacked twenty-five deep, more than three times the depth of the standard phalanx arrangement of eight ranks. This unconventional deployment continues to invite debate. What good would a deeper phalanx do in the battle, since only the first two or three ranks could actually reach the enemy with their spears? The final clash of phalanxes is often called the othismos or the ‘mass-shove’, conjuring up images of a rugby scrum or clash of offensive and defensive lines in American football. If shield really did press against enemy shield, did the rear ranks actually push against the men in front of them, to add weight to their side’s shove? Many scholars think that this kind of shoving would do little more than crush the men in the front ranks. Perhaps the numbers added weight of a moral kind. Those in front could fight more bravely, knowing that so many comrades were behind them. And if those in the front fell, there were many who could take their place, and keep up the pressure on the enemy. The other side of that coin was that the front ranks would have no choice but to fight, since retreat through so many ranks would be impossible: they might as well kill the enemy – or die trying. The events at Delium are a crucial piece of the puzzle concerning the mechanics of hoplite battle, even though this puzzle is far from being solved. However the historical phalanx behaved, at Delium and later at Leuctra, where the Theban left wing was stacked fifty deep, the added depth seemed to be decisive.
The Athenians hastily drew up in battle formation, relying on the standard depth of eight men. Like the Thebans, their cavalry was positioned on the wings, but also like the Thebans, there was little their cavalry could do because of the narrowness of the battlefield. Hippocrates gave a short speech of encouragement to his men, but was cut off when the Boeotians crested the hill and began to advance. Bravely, the Athenians charged uphill to meet the enemy. The phalanxes broke into a run before they clashed. Thucydides says that all along the phalanx, shield pressed against shield in a great othismos. The entire Boeotian left was quickly defeated by the Athenians, a remarkable outcome given the disadvantage posed to the Athenians by having to fight uphill. Most of the Boeotians on the left quickly fled before the Athenian onslaught, except for the Thespians, who held out to the end, only to be surrounded and cut down in great numbers. The Thespians, after all, had been the only Greeks to remain with the 300 Spartans to face certain death at Thermopylae. So complete was the Athenian victory in this part of the field that many Athenians circled back around after outflanking the enemy, only to be killed accidently by other Athenians still pressing forward.
In contrast to their broken left, the Thebans on the Boeotian right made the most of their deep formation. Thucydides simply says that the twenty-five-deep phalanx pushed the Athenians back step by step, and kept up relentless pressure. This description certainly sounds like a mass-shove, in which the weight of twenty-five men would be a great challenge for eight men to overcome. Indeed, the Battle of Delium is seen even by those who generally dismiss the idea of a mass-shove as one battle in which a literal shoving match is the only thing that makes sense of Thucydides’ account. Innovative tactics were joined by cunning leadership, since the Theban general Pagondas kept his head even in the midst of the struggle. Finding out that his left wing had been obliterated, he sent a detachment of cavalry around the hill, out of sight of the Athenians. These horsemen suddenly appeared in front of the victorious Athenian right wing, whose members reckoned that a fresh army had joined the battle against them. In a panic, the Athenian right wing fled, even though disciplined hoplites should have been able to hold their own against the Theban cavalry. The confusion and sheer terror of battle has often been a decisive factor in warfare, for which Delium provides even more evidence. The Boeotians thus became masters of the field. On both the right and left, the Athenians fled, some north to Delium, some east to Oropus and others south to Parnes. The Boeotian cavalry were joined by some Locrian horsemen in their pursuit of the Athenians. Many Athenians were killed by the swift riders, until nightfall mercifully brought an end to the slaughter. The battle had been short but brutal. The Athenians lost 1,000 men, and many baggage handlers and irregulars too. The Boeotians lost some 500 men, mostly from the contingent of stout but doomed Thespians.
During the retreat from the battlefield, at least one Athenian kept his resolve, which seems to have been the exception. Socrates, the great founder of Western ethical philosophy, served as a hoplite at Delium. His associate, the wealthy Alcibiades, a member of the cavalry and thus upon a horse, witnessed Socrates leaving the field, walking as calmly as if he were ambling about the Agora. Not so Socrates’ companion Laches, who was considerably more perturbed. Apparently the steely resolve Socrates displayed in the face of execution at the hands of his fellow Athenians in 399 was present also on the field of Delium.
Delium Map 3: The first phase of the battle. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
Delium Map 4: The second phase of the battle. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
In the era of hoplite warfare, tradition dictated that the loser petition for permission to recover the bodies of its dead, which was tantamount to admitting defeat. The victor was expected to allow the recovery of the bodies without hindrance. Tradition was not adhered to at Delium. Because the Athenians were seen to have committed great sacrilege by fortifying and militarizing the shrine to a god, the Boeotians said they would not allow the Athenian bodies to be collected until the Athenians abandoned the shrine. Aghast, the Athenians responded that Delium was now actually Athenian territory, so it was the Boeotians who were in the wrong. The Boeotians wryly replied that the Athenians could then come and get their dead, that is, if they thought it was within their power. Having lost the battle, the Athenians were of course unable and unwilling to force their way back onto the field. The Athenian dead languished in the sun for seventeen days, which was so revolting to the senses and jarring to the emotions that the Athenians changed the very way they depicted the war-dead on monuments in the years following Delium. Recovery of the bodies of fallen comrades became a prevalent theme on monuments such as the Temple of Athena Nike on the Acropolis.
In the meantime, calling in thousands of light-armed troops and allies from as far afield as Corinth, the Boeotians besieged the garrison at Delium, finally breaking the defenders by means of an ingenious flamethrower – a hollow beam that projected flame and pitch against the mostly wooden walls of the fortifications. Those Athenians who did not die in the resulting conflagration, or manage to slink away in rescue boats, were taken prisoner. The confidence the Athenians gained by their victory at Pylos, as well as any moral advantage they held over their enemies, including the Spartans, was erased at Delium. The advice of Pericles was proven right: the Athenians should never have wagered their success in the war on a hoplite battle, especially against the skilled and tough hoplites of Boeotia.
In terms of military history, Pagondas’ unique formation of twenty-five hoplites stacked on one wing proved quite effective. Fifty years later, another bold Theban general, Epameinondas, tried something similar at Leuctra, which broke the once invincible Spartan phalanx (discussed in another chapter in this book). Cavalry played a large role at Delium too, which was supposedly rare in hoplite warfare. The future of combined-arms warfare, and tactical ingenuity, was given a compelling preview at Delium.
The Battle Site Today
The Athenian army marching to Delium took roughly the same route as the National Highway heading north from Athens, between Mt Parnes (modern Parnitha) and Mt Pentelikon (modern Penteli). Delium itself, named after the shrine to Delian Apollo, was located on the hills rising above the breakwater of modern Dilesi (N38° 20.415"; E023° 40.619"). Looking east from the breakwater, you can see a hill overlooking the sea, on which Pritchett claimed to have found architectural blocks that were probably part of the ancient shrine. With the sea on one side, this hill would have been relatively easy to fortify for the Athenians wishing to install a garrison in Boeotia.
Thucydides says that the Athenian hoplites began to head back to Athens from Delium, and stopped for a rest and to await their commander Hippocrates after moving about 10 stades, or just short of 2km, from the shrine. The battlefield is said to have been bordered by steep ravines or watercourses, which prevented the light-armed troops and cavalry on both sides from operating on the flanks of the hoplite phalanx. Just south of Dilesi, at the exact distance described by Thucydides, there is a prominent plateau, on which modern Sikamino is located. The plateau is not flat, but consists of gently rolling hills; is approximately 1km or slightly less in width at the point where the hoplites would have rested; and is bordered on either side by steep ravines. The best way to access the plateau is to drive south of Dilesi, in the direction of Mt Parnes and Athens, on the small roads leading to the top of the plateau. This will take some adventurous driving, and probably some trial and error as well.
A crucial feature of the battlefield was a hill that was able to hide both the Boeotian and Athenian forces from one another, which prevented the Athenians from seeing how the Thebans had arranged their phalanx, and provided cover for the Theban cavalry which was able to surprise and rout the Athenian right wing after appearing suddenly at the crest of the hill. The Boeotian force would have marched to the battlefield from the direction of Thebes, almost due west, so this hill should be located at the western edge of the battlefield. It so happens that there is such a hill (N38° 19.441"; E023° 40.136"), which ascends sharply to the western edge of the plateau and would have provided plenty of cover for the Boeotian forces. In addition, the plateau descends considerably from its western point, which would explain why the Athenians had to charge uphill against the Boeotians once their opponents ascended the hill to offer battle.
Fig. 7.1: View from battlefield plateau, looking north towards Delium. Authors’ photo.
Fig. 7.2: The battlefield, looking towards Parnes. Authors’ photo.
A survey of the battlefield should include both the northern (N38° 19.389"; E023° 40.977") and southern (N38° 18.713"; E023° 41.134") ravines, which are formidable topographical obstacles and clearly would have prevented any real action on the flanks of the two armies. The edge of the northern ravine offers spectacular views back toward Dilesi and the sea, with Euboea visible beyond. The entire battlefield also affords a good look at Mt Parnes, where a great many Athenians fled once the battle had turned against them. The space between the ravines, where the battle was fought, is around 800-1,500 metres wide, broadening in a west-east direction. The field was just wide enough for a phalanx, but it did not provide space for any flanking manoeuvres on the part of cavalry or light-armed troops. Some have remarked on Pagondas’ boldness in stacking his right wing twenty-five deep, which would have narrowed his entire front, perhaps opening him up to a flank attack if his hoplites did not defeat the Athenians quickly enough. Since the plateau, however, widens from west to east, the Boeotians were arrayed in the narrowest part of the battlefield. The Boeotian flanks were thus probably not unacceptably exposed.
Further Reading
Ancient Sources
–Thucydides 4.89-101
A contemporary of the Peloponnesian War, and an experienced military leader himself, Thucydides offers a rich account of the Battle of Delium that represents one of the fullest descriptions we have of a hoplite battle.
–Diodorus of Sicily 12.70
Writing in the first century BCE, Diodorus’ account of Delium adds little to Thucydides’ text. Strangely, Diodorus says that there were chariots at Delium, which is highly unlikely. It seems that he relied not only on the work of earlier historians, but even the poetic battle descriptions of the tragedian Euripides.
–Euripides, Suppliant Women 674-718
This play includes an account of a mythical battle that strongly resembles the actual events of the Battle of Delium. It is likely that Euripides wrote the play very shortly after the battle, and that the Athenian audience would have been moved by his battle description. Though Euripides adds little to our understanding of the battle itself, he does offer an interesting example of how contemporary Greeks responded to important military events.
–Plato, Symposium 221; Laches 181b
In two of his fourth-century dialogues, Plato has his characters describe Socrates’ behaviour at Delium.
Modern Sources
Books
–Arrington, N.T., Ashes, Images and Memories: The Presence of the War Dead in Fifth-Century Athens (Oxford, 2015).
This stimulating book discusses the Athenian material and artistic response to the war dead, which is especially marked following the defeat at Delium and the horror of the dead lying on the battlefield for seventeen days.
–Hanson, V.D., A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War (New York, 2005).
A blow-by-blow description of the battle from one of the foremost scholars of hoplite warfare. Hanson captures the ‘face of Greek battle’ better than anyone, and follows his treatment of Delium with an overview of the role of the hoplite phalanx in Greek history.
–Lazenby, J.F., The Peloponnesian War: A Military Study. (London, 2004)
A useful approach to the Peloponnesian War from a purely military perspective, this book puts Delium in its tactical and strategic context.
–Lendon, J.E., Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity (New Haven, 2005).
A lively and readable account of the battle, emphasizing the importance of the use of trickery on the part of the Thebans, which marks a crucial step in the evolution of hoplite warfare.
–________, Song of Wrath: The Peloponnesian War Begins (New York, 2010).
A gripping treatment of the battle, situating it within the context of the early years of the Peloponnesian War.
–Pritchett, W.K., Studies in Ancient Greek Topography, Part II (Berkeley, 1969).
Starting with a first-hand exploration of the topography, Pritchett offers a plausible account of the location of the battle and major points related to the battle, including the position of the shrine of Delian Apollo itself.
Articles
–Toher, M., ‘Diodoros on Delion and Euripides’ Supplices’, Classical Quarterly 51 (2001), pp.178-82.
Toher argues that the presence of chariots in Diodorus’ account of Delium can be explained by the historian’s consultation of Euripides’ Suppliant Women, a play that includes a dramatic mythological battle with a striking resemblance to the real historical events of Delium.