Chapter 1
Wars, especially civil wars, do not occur spontaneously, even if that’s how they may seem at the time. Historians, both ancient and modern, have spent millennia studying the causes of the catastrophe that struck Rome in this period. Sallust famously saw it in moral terms: the decline of the traditional Roman (aristocratic) spirit that followed Rome’s final victory over Carthage in 146 BC.¹ Others saw it as a madness caused by individuals; for Appian it began with Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, while others chose either C. Marius or L. Cornelius Sulla, or both.² Yet the interlocking wars that formed this period had common causes and roots, many of which had been present in the Roman system for some time. To gain a better understanding of the various conflicts that made up Rome’s First Civil War, one must be acquainted with the key issues that brought about these conflicts and that fuelled them for so long.
The Bloody Evolution of Republican Politics, 133–100 BC
Infamously, the previous four decades of Roman Republican politics had seen a number of unwanted innovations. On three occasions (in 133, 121 and 100 BC), Roman political arguments had ended in bloodshed and massacre. Technically, bloodshed in Roman politics was not a new feature. The Augustan poets took great pains to point out that Roman society had been founded on civil bloodshed, with Romulus slaying Remus, according to the most widely accepted tradition. Some variant traditions even had this act being the culmination of an earlier eighth century BC civil war between the brothers and their followers.³ It is true that the early centuries of the Republic had seen three prominent politicians executed: Sp. Cassius, Sp. Maelius and M. Manlius.⁴ Yet these second-century Republican murders and massacres had taken matters to a new level. Even within the span of thirty years, we can see the evolution of political murder. Ti. Sempronius Gracchus was lynched along with a handful of supporters. Yet commissions were established to try others who supported him.⁵ In retaliation, P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, the destroyer of Numantia and Carthage, was suspected of being assassinated by pro-Gracchan supporters.⁶ C. Sempronius Gracchus was murdered with the state’s full blessing under the senatus consultum ultimum along with a number of his supporters. By 100 BC, Marius had brought his veterans onto the streets of Rome to ‘restore order’.
This bloodshed was centred upon particular holders of the office of tribunate of the plebs, which had always had a radical history, but it too was undergoing a rapid period of evolution in these years.⁷ Ti. Sempronius Gracchus used it to depose another magistrate from office, overrule the Senate on foreign affairs and disrupt landholding patterns across Italy. C. Sempronius Gracchus used it to propose citizenship to the Italians (see below), undertake judicial reform and hand out subsidised grain to Roman citizens. An anonymous tribune of 107 used it to transfer a military command from one general to another against the Senate’s wishes. By 100 BC, L. Appuleius Saturninus was using it to exile his political enemies from Rome. Whilst the tribunate was never the quiescent office that many commentators would have us believe in the two centuries preceding 133 BC, this period was evolution on a massive scale in the practical application of its powers.
Thus, within the space of a few decades, Roman politics had evolved rapidly and seemingly out of the Senate’s control. Huge numbers of commentators, both ancient and modern, have attempted rational explanations for these changes, whether it be a Sallustian decline in morality or a symptom of the greater wealth that their empire had brought into the political system. Recently, Hölkeskamp has undertaken a fascinating analysis of the Roman senatorial culture and postulated that as the Republic grew more successful Roman politicians, who culturally were attuned to at least emulating if not outdoing the actions of their ancestors, had to take increasingly greater steps to match their illustrious forebears and this placed the self and family glory ahead of that of the state, to the exclusion of the common good.⁸ The rise of the powerful individual was nothing new to Roman history; their annals are littered with them. P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus took personal glory and popularity to new levels, yet was laid low by the combined actions of his senatorial rivals.
A common theme linking all of the key individuals of this period (the Gracchi, Marius or Saturninus) is the sense that, despite a range of individual motives, they all placed their own success at a higher cost than the common good. The Gracchi in particular seemed to have had the innate belief that their reforms were the best remedy for the Republic and that their opponents were damaging the Republic and therefore needed to be overcome. Factions and rivalries had always existed in Roman politics, but there seemed to exist a number of factions, not all by any means, that believed that for the ‘good of the state’ any actions were justified, whether it be the Gracchi or their opponents. With C. Marius it can be argued that he had an outsider’s perspective on the Roman system (he was an Italian nobleman with Roman citizenship) and could manipulate the system for his own ends, without worrying about the wider consequences. Saturninus and his political partner C. Servilius Glaucia were Roman noblemen through and through, yet appear to have understood that routes to personal power were available without having to wait until the age of 42 for a consulship and military command. Personal glory and power could be had through the domestic political route using a mixture of office and street violence.
Thus, by the end of 100 BC there were a range of factors in Roman politics that had not been present in previous generations, from the evolution of the powers of the tribunate as the chief domestic political office of state, consecutive consulships in times of military emergencies, through to murder as a legitimate means of ending political disputes. Other factors included the deposition of officials, the overriding of military commands, the use of armed supporters and military veterans on the streets of Rome, special commissions to root out enemies of the state and political exile of one’s domestic opponents. All of these factors were present and developed within this crucial thirty-year period and were to become staples of the war that followed.
However, as always, it must be stressed that this did not make a civil war inevitable; it is merely that these factors were all present in the background, a powder keg in need of a spark to explode.
Rome and Italy: A Changing Balance of Power
Crucial to understanding the wars of this period is an understanding of the nature of Italy at the time. Until this civil war period, Italy was not a unified country or a unified culture. Rome was not the capital of Italy, but one of several different cities, governments, peoples and cultures; these ranged from the Celtic races of northern Italy, to the Latins, Etruscans and Samnites of central Italy, through to the Greek cities of the south. The only factor that bound these disparate races and peoples together was the fact that they were all dominated by Rome. From Rome’s foundation in the eighth century the history of Italy was one of perpetual warfare between the various peoples of the region, only ending with the Roman conquest of the Gauls of northern Italy in the late third century BC. Rome’s early empire was first and foremost an Italian one and one which bore all the hallmarks of the Roman imperial mentality: an absence of close (or invasive) governance and a focus on ensuring military and economic supremacy.
In the early stages of the Roman conquest of Italy (in the regions closest to Rome), enemies had been destroyed and their peoples incorporated into the Roman citizenship system. However, as Rome exerted her control throughout the peninsula such full integration was not possible or even desirable. Thus was born the Roman system of control, with a fundamental inequality binding all the peoples of Italy to Rome. Each defeated city or people was bound to Rome by treaty. They retained their own language, culture and domestic governance but had to follow a centralized foreign policy dictated by Rome and, most important, had to supply manpower to fight in Roman armies. Thus was born a system unique to the ancient world, in which the Romans were able to harness the manpower of the whole peninsula to fight their wars, whilst leaving the individual peoples with a large degree of internal autonomy. In the early stages of this process, these treaties were supported by a series of Roman military colonies throughout Italy, built on captured land, to ensure a passive military dominance of the peninsula.
Such a system provided Rome with a near limitless supply of soldiers, enabling her to withstand massive military losses, which would have exhausted any single state, yet at the same time without the need to enforce strict Roman rule on the conquered peoples. This is not to say that the peoples of Italy meekly accepted Roman dominance or saw it as anything other than such. This system of alliances was the result of the dissolution of the Latin League, which followed a ‘revolt’ or civil war between the Latin States and Rome over their dominance (340–338 BC). The other notable revolt within the Roman alliance system came in the Second Punic War, when the Carthaginian general Hannibal correctly identified that the key factor in defeating Rome was not to be found solely on the battlefield, or by siege, but in destroying Rome’s system of alliances and thus limitless manpower. During the early stages of the war, a number of cities within the Roman system did defect to Hannibal, primarily the cities of southern Italy, most famously Capua. However, these rebels soon found themselves targeted by Rome, which sought to make an example of them and discourage the others.⁹
Key to this system was the extension of benefits and opportunities for the elites of the various peoples and regions of Italy, should they partake in the Roman system. Thus we see a steady stream of Italian noblemen gaining Roman citizenship, and within a generation or two moving to Rome and establishing themselves amongst the Roman nobility. The most notable examples of this were M. Porcius Cato (the elder), C. Marius and M. Tullius Cicero. The Roman oligarchic system gained fresh blood and the local elites kept their own communities quiescent in Rome’s name. McDonald perhaps sums this system up the most succinctly:
The Roman hegemony in Italy rested upon the alliance of the Roman senatorial nobility with the Latin and Italian aristocracy, in accordance with a set social structure and political organization in the Italian Confederation, and Roman and Italian nobility were of one mind in persevering the foundations of their power and authority.¹⁰
Two other key elements bound the peoples of Italy to Rome. One was shared experience in Rome’s military, in which Latin was the official language. This brought together a vast number of young men from the various peoples of Italy, all of whom served in Rome’s armies, a fact that created bonds between them and provided them with a rudimentary education in Latin. The other was the Roman citizenship system, which as the centuries passed became more and more disjointed. At its heart lay three categories of citizenship. At the highest level was Roman citizenship with full citizen status, the right to live and vote in Rome (if it could be afforded) and the full protection of Roman law, including the principal of protection from punishment without a trial. All citizens were enrolled into thirty-five tribes, for voting purposes. Whilst these tribes were originally geographically organized (including four tribes for those inhabitants of the city of Rome itself), by the first century BC the members of these tribes were scattered across Italy, with huge variations in each tribe in terms of both numbers and location. No new tribe had been created since 242 BC and any new citizens created were distributed across the existing thirty-five. Furthermore, the process of creating new citizens was haphazard and unplanned. Individuals could receive citizenship as a reward, as could whole communities. Even with a census every five years, determining who was, and who was not, a citizen became increasingly complex. The sources frequently report non-citizens moving to Rome and claiming some citizen rights.¹¹
This problem was exacerbated by the fact that the other two categories of citizenship, Latin and Italian, were of far lower status, at least in Roman eyes. Neither brought electoral rights in Rome and neither had the full protection of Roman law. However, it has to be pointed out that, away from a Roman context, these citizens could take full part in their own communities and were only of second-class status when they found themselves dealing with a Roman. Thus, when it was designed, this system was a sound one. The Italian peoples maintained domestic autonomy and their own laws, religion and culture, despite being militarily defeated. The Romans had an endless supply of manpower and a graduated system of citizenship, which limited the number of citizens who could vote in Rome’s elections, thus maintaining the oligarchy’s grip on the Roman political system but allowing for progression, which in turn encouraged compliance to Roman demands. By the second century BC the number of Roman citizens was between 300,000 to 400,000, out of a total Italian population in its millions.
However, as with many Roman institutions, what worked in the fourth century BC did not automatically work in the second century. From the Roman side, the system still worked perfectly, with available manpower, a limited number of voters and eager and compliant local elites. However, it was the other side of this pact that appeared to be increasingly under strain. By the mid to late second century BC, in most cases, well over 100 years had passed since these Italian peoples had been defeated, with time dulling the memory. All that remained was a military burden and an unequal citizenship system. Furthermore, a Roman system that had been designed to supply Rome’s armies with manpower to fight immediate threats in Italy now found itself being used to conquer and maintain a vast Mediterranean empire. Short summer campaigns within the peninsula now became decade-long wars in Spain, Africa, Greece or Asia Minor. To many, it must have seemed that the Italians supplied the manpower while the Romans (or at least the nobles) reaped the rewards. Furthermore, after 167 BC and the conquest of Macedonia, tributum(taxation) had been lifted from Roman citizens but not Latin or Italian ones.¹²
This inequality was not helped by an extension of Roman influence across the peninsula into domestic matters. Originally, the Romans had little interest in the internal laws or governance of an Italian state, aside from compliance to Rome’s demands. From the start, wherever Roman and Italian interests interacted (such as trade), Roman law and Roman courts took precedence, which naturally put the Italians at a disadvantage. However, as the second century progressed there was an increasing number of laws, made in Rome by Romans that affected communities across the whole peninsula.¹³ Perhaps one of the most famous examples of this was the laws suppressing the Bacchanal cults in Italy in 186 BC.
However, despite the fame of this example, its impact on the average Italian was limited. The case of agrarian legislation, however, was a different matter. Ironically, agrarian legislation, such as that proposed by the Gracchi (see above) was designed in Rome, by Romans, to solve a Roman problem: namely that the citizen soldiers were believed to be losing their land due to neglect while they were away fighting on long campaigns, thus making them ineligible for future service, and thus reducing Roman citizen manpower. However, the agrarian laws proposed and enacted, entangled Italian communities across the peninsula due to Roman repossessions of Roman public lands (ager publicus), on which many Italians had been living for generations. Exactly to what degree these laws affected the Italian communities has long been a matter of scholarly debate,¹⁴ but Appian records Italian communities making representations to P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus in 129 BC about the chaos caused by the Gracchan land commission.¹⁵ In fact, it is Scipio who first explicitly raises Italian concerns in Roman politics.¹⁶
This process reached a watershed in 125 BC when the consul M. Fulvius Flaccus, himself a member of the Gracchan land commission, proposed that Roman citizenship should be extended. We only have two references to this major proposal, so our details on its exact nature are unclear.¹⁷Mouritsen argues that the proposal was to extend Roman citizenship to those with Latin status only, as they were more integrated into the Roman system.¹⁸ Nevertheless, the details count less than the precedent; a Roman politician, and a consul at that, had proposed a mass enfranchisement (to whatever degree) of the peoples within the Roman alliance system. For the Latins and Italians, this meant that such an outcome was possible, and at the passing of a law. For the Roman elite it meant that the question of mass enfranchisement of the Italians was now in the political arena.
Furthermore, another precedent was set in 125 BC, when the majority of the Senate rejected Flaccus’ proposal. Not only did this send a clear message that citizenship was being denied to the Italians by the Senate of Rome, but the Latin town of Fregellae rose in revolt against Rome, possibly as part of a wider planned rebellion.¹⁹ Naturally, one lone town was soon crushed militarily, but the precedent had been set. Furthermore, Flaccus’ proposal has been linked to the passing of a law in 126 by M. Iunius Pennus, the tribune of that year, expelling non-citizens from Rome.²⁰ Nevertheless, within three years the issue of mass enfranchisement of the Italians was being proposed once more in Rome, this time by Flaccus’ ally, the tribune C. Sempronius Gracchus. However, once again, this hope was crushed by the Senate, as were Gracchus and Flaccus themselves, who were murdered. Thus the two men to propose Italian enfranchisement had both been murdered on the orders of the Senate. Whilst the Senate had far more to worry about than what message they sent to the Italian people of the Roman alliance, a message had been sent nonetheless: peaceful reform of the system would not be tolerated.
The Calm Between Storms; Rome in the 90s BC
The decade between the death of Saturninus and Marius’ sixth consulship (100 BC) and the tribunate of M. Livius Drusus is considered to be something of a quiet decade in Roman Republican history. There are two clear reasons for this. First is the lack of a detailed narrative source for this period (such as Livy) combined with very few snippets from other sources, leaving us in the dark about a great many events that must have taken place. The second reason is that these years were sandwiched between two of the most tumultuous periods in the Republic: the massive tribal invasions of Rome’s empire, which resulted in the invasion of Italy itself and the threatened destruction of Roman power; and the outbreak of the First Civil War itself. ²¹
Yet this apparent calm between storms may well be deceptive. The period saw the eclipse of both the Metellan clan, which had dominated Roman politics for the previous twenty years, and that of Marius himself, who had done likewise between 104 and 100. The Metellan dominance was based around a group of Metelli occupying the consulship and censorship within a few years of each other.²² Yet by 98 BC they had exhausted that generation of Metelli and had been eclipsed by the (temporary) dominance of Marius and Saturninus. The fallout from the murder of Saturninus and his followers seems to have dominated the first few years of this period, with a number of supporters and opponents of Saturninus being put on trial.
Lurking throughout this decade is the figure of Marius himself. Regardless of the fallout from the murder of Saturninus, Marius’ powerbase had been built on military success. The end of the Northern Wars had brought glory, power and wealth to Marius and established him as a major player in Roman politics, but it also robbed him of his monopoly of high office and the very reason for his success and his toleration by other factions in the Senate. With both the Metelli and Marius removed from their dominant positions, a large amount of manoeuvring between the individuals, families and factions appears to have taken place.
The surviving sources for these years are dominated by court cases, and one case in particular, that of P. Rutilius Rufus.²³ The Rutilius case seems to have been a notorious one, and it highlighted a growing additional rift in domestic politics at Rome between the Senate and the equestrian orders. By the late Republic the equestrian order was the business class. Traditionally, trade was seen as being beneath the senatorial class and law prevented any senator from indulging in it. However, given the vast opportunities and huge profits to be made from trade in Rome’s growing empire, a number of rich Romans, many of them from aristocratic backgrounds, forsook a political career for a business one.
Until the tribunate of the younger Gracchus, this class of businessmen had remained in the shadows of Roman politics, not taking an active role; if they were involved at all, they limited themselves to financing allies and kinsmen. Gracchus, however, wanting to counterbalance the Senate’s power, made the equestrians the majority of the jurors on each trial, thus giving them control of the courts. Whilst in most cases this was not an issue, it did give them control of trials involving charges of corruption and fraud, especially in cases from the provinces, and especially ones involving their colleagues.
During this period, Rutilius (Cos. 105) had served as legate to his friend Q. Mucius Scaevola (Cos. 95) who served as governor of Asia, Rome’s richest province. Thanks to C. Gracchus, the collection of taxes in the Roman province of Asia was tendered to the highest bidder, with cartels of equestrian businessmen eager for the contract. The principle was a simple one: the winners had to deliver the winning amount to the Roman treasury and anything above that which they managed to collect in taxes they kept. Thus the equestrian tax collectors became universally loathed throughout the Roman province of Asia and used every method they could to extract taxes from the inhabitants. Both Scaevola and Rutilius set about clamping down on these practices, winning respect in the province and the enmity of certain equestrian cartels. In 92 BC, Rutilius himself was put on trial for extortion by equestrian jurors, despite his famous reputation as an honest and upright man.²⁴ Unsurprisingly, he was found guilty and chose exile from Rome, eventually settling in Smyrna, where he remained until his death after 78 BC. The case scandalized Rome at the time and showed the growing rift between the senatorial and equestrian orders, with the courts now a political weapon.
Another issue that seems to have dominated the domestic scene was that of Italians living in Rome and usurping citizen rights. This phenomenon appears to have been a part of the drift from Italian towns and countryside to live in Rome. This caused consternation in both the Italian and Roman elites, one losing clients, the other being swamped by them, with all the fears that such an influx of ‘foreign’ immigrants created in the minds of both the urban elites and the urban plebs, jealous of their privileges. In truth, this was not a new phenomenon, and various attempts had been made to return these non-citizens back to their place of origin.²⁵ In 95 BC, however, the consuls and Senate decided to act decisively and passed the Lex Licinia Mucia, which ordered the expulsion of all those who held Latin or Italian citizenship from Rome and the prosecution of any who determined to usurp citizens’ rights. In an already tense situation, this could be seen as provocative or at least using a sledgehammer to crack a nut. Asconius, in fact, ascribes this as one of the key factors in the Italian rebellion and civil war that followed.²⁶ Once again, the Senate (or at least a majority of it) had seemingly failed to grasp the potential consequences of their actions.
Whilst Rome was occupied with political manoeuvrings, courtroom battles and the expulsion of immigrants, military matters were far from peaceful. Again, we suffer from a lack of solid narrative sources, but we must remember that the Roman army had taken heavy losses (over 100,000) in the various defeats inflicted on them by the invasions of Spain, Gaul and Italy by the Cimbri and Teutones, a few years earlier. Not only did Rome suffer numerical losses, but Gaul and Spain had been overrun and Italy invaded. Although ultimately successful, this must have created an impression that Rome’s vaunted military superiority was at least shaken. Both provinces and northern Italy must also have been recovering from the devastation caused by these invasions. The same could have been said for Sicily, itself recovering from the Second Servile War (104–101 BC).
Throughout the 90s, we hear of military campaigns by Roman commanders in Spain.²⁷ The year 93 BC saw two separate triumphs celebrated for Spain, one for each province, by T. Didius (Cos. 98) and P. Licinius Crassus (Cos. 95). Both of these seem to have been lengthy campaigns, indicating the severity of the rebellions. Furthermore, it seems that these triumphs did not mark the end the rebellions, as Spain still remained a consular command. By 92 BC, we are told of C. Valerius Flaccus (Cos. 93) fighting a major campaign there.²⁸ Thus Spain seemed to have been a perpetual conflict zone throughout this period.
Macedonia also appears to have been a problem for Rome in this period. Diodorus reports an uprising led by a man claiming to be a descendant of the Kings of Macedon and attempting to restore Macedonian independence, although this soon petered out.²⁹Military activity is recorded against the Thracians and Illyrian tribes in both 97 and 92 BC, the latter when the Macedonian governor C. Sentius was defeated in battle by Thracian incursions.³⁰ In northern Africa, Rome technically acquired fresh territory in 96 BC, when King Ptolemy Apion of Cyrene died and bequeathed his kingdom to Rome (see Map 1). At the time the Romans did not annex it, but left it to govern itself (see Appendix I).³¹
Asia Minor too appeared to be falling into instability. Although Rome only had the one province (Asia) their policy, such as it was, was for a series of weak client kings in the region (creating a buffer zone between Rome and the other rising power of the ancient world, the Parthian Empire³²). Unfortunately for Rome’s policy, there was one man in particular who did not share their view. This was the King of Pontus (on the south coast of the Black Sea, see Map 1), Mithridates VI, who harboured ambitions of creating a Pontic Empire. He began quietly enough (from Rome’s point of view) by invading and annexing the Crimea. However, by the 90s he soon turned his attention back to Asia Minor and his weak neighbours. On two occasions during the 90s (the exact chronology is confused) he contrived to annex the neighbouring kingdom of Cappodocia, first by allying with Nicomedes III of Bithynia (who subsequently double crossed him) and then with Tigranes of Armenia. On each occasion puppet kings were installed on the Cappodocian throne and on each occasion Rome intervened to restore a ‘free’ Cappodocia.³³
Whilst Mithridates may have been a minor nuisance to Rome at the time, the potential for conflict did not seem to elude C. Marius, who in 98 BC left Rome and met with Mithridates during a tour of Asia. Plutarch records that Marius issued him with what could be construed as either a warning or a challenge, that he should either be stronger than Rome or do her bidding, in other words ‘to put up or shut up’.³⁴ Whilst Plutarch is clearly using his knowledge of future events, the meeting between the two is an interesting encounter and may indicate that Marius had an Asian campaign in mind.³⁵ Coincidently, one of the Roman interventions over Cappodocia was led by L. Cornelius Sulla, Marius’ deputy in the Jugurthine War.³⁶ As well as restoring client kings in Asia, Sulla received an envoy from the Parthian Empire the first formal meeting between representatives of the two growing empires of the ancient world.³⁷
Thus, on both the domestic and foreign fronts, although we have no clear narrative for the events, it is clear that this period was both eventful and important. In Rome, the various factions were jostling for position and clashes were breaking out between senators and equestrians over the control of the courts. Furthermore, the Senate seemed to be fanning the flames of Italian discontent over citizenship, more by short-sightedness than design. Further afield, Rome was still recovering from the devastating Northern Wars and was suffering from rebellions and tribal uprisings, accompanied by heavy fighting in Spain and to a lesser degree Macedonia. Compared to these, events in Asia seemed to pale in comparison, yet Mithridates was intent on disrupting Rome’s influence in the region and now Parthia appeared to be taking an interest in the region.³⁸ It was against this backdrop, with a mixture of volatile domestic and foreign issues, that M. Livius Drusus stood for a tribunate for 91 BC and unveiled a programme of political reforms.
The Powderkeg and the Spark: The Tribunate of Livius Drusus
However, despite all of these factors, there was nothing that made a collapse into civil war inevitable; they remained in the background and had done so for a number of years. It was the tribunate of M. Livius Drusus in 91 BC that turned these from being background factors into a crisis the likes of which the Republic had never seen, and which led to the collapse (albeit temporarily) of the Roman Republican system.
M. Livius Drusus was no radical maverick politician in the mould of L. Appuleius Saturninus. In fact, he had impeccable senatorial credentials. His father had been the tribune who had opposed C. Sempronius Gracchus in 122 BC and had earned a consulship (in 112 BC). Cicero, who was a young man during this period, informs us that Drusus was one of a group of young men who belonged to one of Rome’s leading political factions, led by the eminent senators: Q. Mucius Scaevola (Cos. 95), M. Antonius (Cos. 99) and P. Licinius Crassus (Cos. 95). Cicero specifically states that these men had a programme of political reforms designed to strengthen the power and position of the Senate and sponsored Drusus as tribune for 91 BC to introduce them. They also had two friends of Drusus, C. Aurelius Cotta and P. Sulpicius, to stand as tribune for 90 and 89 BC, to ensure the smooth introduction of these measures.³⁹
These proposals contained a number of measures.⁴⁰ There was a variety of lesser reforms, such as colonies for the urban plebs, corn laws, some coinage reform and measures to allow equestrians to be tried for bribery. At the heart of the programme, however, lay two major reforms: firstly, the addition of 300 equestrians to the Senate, with this enlarged body supplying jurors for the courts; and secondly, the extension of Roman citizenship to the Italians.⁴¹
Thus this grouping had proposed a series of reforms that offered, on the face of it, some benefits to all groups, and they hoped to solve the various issues that had been raised in recent years. However, they faced two key problems. Firstly, although the proposals offered a little something to everyone, they seemed to alienate more groups than they mollified. Appian provides an excellent summary of the main objections. Many in the Senate were apparently opposed to adding 300 equestrians to their number, while the equestrians disagreed on who the 300 should be and objected to the bribery laws, and even elements among the Italians objected to the new colonies proposed for Italy.⁴² Furthermore, there would have been elements of the urban populace who would not want to leave Rome for colonies or share their citizenship privileges. Finally, there would have been those in the Senate who simply mistrusted the motives behind these reforms.
The second major problem was that this once again raised the hopes of the Italians, who wanted greater recognition for their efforts. In fact, it is recorded that prominent Italian noblemen came to Drusus’ house and discussed the proposals with him. Notable amongst them was a Marsic nobleman, Q. Poppaedius Silo.⁴³ Diodorus even reports that a group of Italians swore an oath to Drusus personally to consider him their benefactor if he gained them citizenship, though, as always, such evidence must be questioned.⁴⁴
Naturally enough, this legislation soon ran into difficulties in both the Senate and the assemblies. The principal opponent seems to have been L. Marcius Philippus (Cos. 91 BC). Philippus used his position as an augur to declare the auspices unfavourable whenever legislation was due to be voted on, making any measure passed technically null and void. In a familiar pattern, Drusus seems to have reacted badly to being opposed in such manner, and on one occasion attacked Philippus in the assembly, throttling him and giving him a bloody nose.⁴⁵ He also allegedly threatened to hurl another opponent (Q. Servilius Caepio) from the Tarpeian Rock.⁴⁶
Interestingly, the sources record that Poppaedius took a young M. Porcius Cato to the roof and threatened to hurl him off it if he did not assist Drusus.⁴⁷ The Periochae of Livy reports that by using violence, and in defiance of the auspices, Drusus passed laws on currency reform and, more importantly, on rebalancing juries between senators and equestrians.⁴⁸
However, Drusus’ methods seem to have alienated the vast majority of the Senate and a number of the People, and his proposal on Italian enfranchisement was blocked. This stalemate seems to have been the final straw for a number of Italian nobles who engaged in a conspiracy to remove what they saw as the main obstacle, the consuls. Florus reports a plot being hatched to murder both Philippus and his colleague Sex. Iulius Caesar while sacrificing on the Alban Mount during the Latin Festival.⁴⁹ The de viris illustribus reports that it was Drusus who discovered this conspiracy and actually warned Philippus of the danger, and so it came to nought.⁵⁰ However, it seems that he became tainted by this conspiracy, being seen as a prime motivator, if not actually being a part of it, and was denounced in the Senate House.
Diodorus alone reports an extraordinary incident in which Poppaedius, the Marsic nobleman and friend of Drusus, assembled a force of 10,000 supporters, armed with concealed swords, and marched them on Rome. The intention was apparently to enter Rome and then surround the Senate (or assembly) and force them to pass legislation enfranchising the Italians. Upon their approach to Rome they encountered a senator named Domitius (possibly Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, Cos. 96) who was able to persuade Poppaedius that the Senate would never give way to force, but that they could gain what they desired through legitimate political means. Given the fragmentary nature of these books of Diodorus, we have no clear chronology for this incident within the year 91 BC. Whilst Poppaedius may have truly been marching against the Senate, he did apparently state that he was bidden to Rome at the invitation of the tribunes, and these 10,000 may have been intended to flood the assembly for the crucial votes and ensure that Drusus’ proposals were passed.⁵¹
However, whilst bloodshed may have been averted on this occasion, shortly after his denouncement in the Senate, Drusus was assassinated at night by unknown assailants as he returned to his own house, thus adding to the list of murdered tribunes.⁵² Following his death, the two laws that he had managed to pass were overturned by the consul Philippus, with a senatorial decree, as being passed against the auspices.⁵³ Appian reports that this murder was the final straw for a number of Italian communities who, convinced that Rome would never willingly grant them Roman citizenship, agreed that force was the only option. Thus a number of peoples and cities sent envoys to each other and formed an alliance with the purpose of opposing Rome by force.⁵⁴
Given that they were aware of the failed Italian conspiracy to murder the consuls, the Senate was well aware that the feelings amongst certain Italian communities close to Drusus would be running high. Thus a number of Roman commanders were sent across Italy to communities that were considered to pose a potential risk. As it turned out, this action had the opposite effect. One of these emissaries was a praetor named Q. Servilius, who was dispatched to Asculum in Picenum (see Map 2). According to the few surviving sources, Servilius adopted a high-handed and contemptuous manner in his dealings with the Picentines. Whether in a pre-planned move or an act of spontaneity, Servilius, his legate Fonetius and the rest of his entourage were slaughtered by the inhabitants of Asculum, whilst at a festival. This was followed by the slaughter of all Roman citizens in the city.⁵⁵ This murder signalled the beginning of the rebellion of a number of Italian peoples against Rome. Servilius had become the first casualty of Rome’s First Civil War, soon to be followed by hundreds of thousands more, in a war which would last twenty years and cause the temporary collapse of the Roman Republic.