Chapter 9
The Return of Marius
Having been given this extraordinary position in such a time of national emergency, Marius’ return to Rome and entry into his second consulship was stage-managed to perfection. He timed his army’s return to Rome to coincide with his first day of office (1 January 104 BC) and entered Rome to both celebrate his triumph over Jugurtha and his assumption of the consulship. To the people of Rome, such a triumph must have been a welcome sight after the news of Arausio. At the head of the triumph was the figure of Jugurtha himself, along with his two sons, visible proof of both Roman and Marian military success. Marius continued this theme by convening the Senate on the Capitol and entering whilst still in triumphal dress. This was the first time this had been done and is detailed by Plutarch thus:
After the procession was over, Marius called the Senate into session on the Capitol, and made his entry, either through inadvertence or with a vulgar display of his good fortune, in his triumphal robes; but perceiving quickly that the Senators were offended at this, he rose and went out, changed into the usual robe with the purple border, and then came back.”341
Having been a senator for at least fifteen years and with an array of advisors, it is inconceivable that Marius made this gesture by mistake.342 There was a clear message, namely that he was the man for the moment and that he was an ‘outsider’, but a highly successful one, who they needed right now.
Following Arausio, the few surviving sources swiftly move on to the year 102 and the first battle between Marius and the tribes. However, although the sources manage this in a sentence, we are left with the years 104 and 103 BC to understand, as they form a crucial backdrop to the battles that were to come, for a number of reasons. It is clear that Marius left Rome with his army soon after his triumph and headed north for southern Gaul. As it happened, the tribes did not make an attempted invasion of Italy, but dispersed. Again, we have no clear chronology for this, but by early to mid-104 BC, it appears that Marius had established a defensive position on the Rhone, based at Arles, where he awaited the return of the tribes. As it turned out, he would have to wait until 102 BC.343
Again, what few sources we have inform us of the Cimbri, but not their allies the Teutones or Ambrones. It is possible that the three tribes separated, with the Teutones or Ambrones going off either together or separately to some other part of Gaul. It is also possible that the other two tribes had not yet become involved in these wars.
The Cimbric Invasion of Spain (105–103 BC)
Following the victory at Arausio in October 105 BC, the Cimbri moved on once more, not invading Italy, as many in Rome expected, but instead turning west and invading Spain. This was an important new development and one that requires some discussion, even though it is little covered in the sources.344 There are several questions that need discussing. Firstly, why did the Cimbri not invade Italy, something that they later attempted? Secondly, with reference to our earlier discussion of the possible evolution of the Cimbric tactics, why did they not settle in the region of southern Gaul, now that it had been ‘freed’ from Roman rule?
In both cases, the ultimate answers to these questions lie forever in the discussions of the Cimbric leaders at the time and will never truly be known. Nonetheless, we can briefly afford ourselves some speculation on their possible motives. As to the first question, regarding Italy, the Cimbri would have known that any invasion of Italy would have been met with continued Roman resistance and that it would have resulted in a fight to the finish for one side or the other. At the time, the defeat of the Roman armies at Arausio had given them a valuable breathing space from Roman resistance and there were still other options available. As to the issue of remaining in Gaul, as events showed, yet another Roman army soon turned up in Gaul with revenge in mind and again no settlement would ever be free from Roman interference. Furthermore, they had already marched through central Gaul and been driven out by the native tribes. With the north, east and south (the Mediterranean) all discarded, the west was an attractive and nearby alternative.
Thus, we have the short note from the Periochae of Livy:
The Cimbri devastated all the land between the Rhone and the Pyrenees, crossed through a pass into Spain and there after devastating many districts…345
As Evans has pointed out, we have no other evidence for this devastation, but this may have resulted in the destruction of the Roman colony at Narbo, severing the land link between Italy and Spain.346 We have little clear idea of the state of Spain at this time, again poorly served by our few remaining sources, with the focus being elsewhere, as we have seen. Nevertheless, it appears that Rome was once again at war with the Lusitanians (see Chapter 1). The Praetor of 109 Q, Servilius Caepio, is recorded as fighting them between 109 and 106, when he returned to Rome to celebrate a triumph.347 However, it appears that whoever succeeded him in Spain met with disaster, as Obsequens records this for the year 105 BC (based on Livy):
A Roman army was slaughtered by the Lusitanians.348
The only surviving narrative history for Spain in the period is Appian, who has one section on the period in question.
After this time [the Numantine War] there were other revolts in Iberia and Calpurnius Piso was chosen general.349 Servius Galba succeeded him, but as the Cimbri were invading Italy [101 BC], and Sicily was also embroiled in the Second Servile War [seeAppendix II], they [the Romans] did not send an army to Iberia, because they were so preoccupied with these matters, but sent legates to put an end to the war by whatever means possible. Once the Cimbri had been driven away, T. Didius came and killed 20,000 Arevaci, and moved Termessus, a large city, which had always been disinclined to obey the Romans…350
Furthermore, around 102 BC, we find an M. Marius, possibly the younger brother of the consul, commanding a Roman force in Spain:
There lived in another city near Colenda a mixed race of Celtiberians, whom M. Marius had settled there five years earlier [c.102 BC], with the agreement of the Senate, after they had fought with him against the Lusitanians.351
We can see that at the start of the Cimbric invasion of Gaul, Spain appeared already to be unsettled, and that after the Northern Wars had been concluded a major campaign was required to restore Roman rule. If we are to believe the Obsequens reference then as well as a defeat in Gaul at Arausio, another Roman army had been destroyed in Spain. We have no other details, but throughout the period of 113–105 BC, Roman military effort was focused primarily on Gaul and Macedon, not Spain, and successive defeats only served to undermine Rome’s position in Spain, much as it had done in Gaul. Thus it appears that the Lusitanians at least had taken advantage of Rome’s defeats elsewhere to revolt once more. During this period all the evidence points to the Romans after 105 BC being unable to send troops to quell the rebellious peoples of Spain and having to co-opt friendly tribes to their service, as seen with M. Marius using the Celtiberians of Colenda against the Lusitanians.
Added to this mixture of rebellion and inter-tribal fighting came a massive Cimbric invasion. Whilst the Cimbri may have believed that Spain offered them the best location to settle and defend themselves from Rome, once again they underestimated the reaction of the natives to this new threat. Whilst the phrase ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ has always been a valid one in warfare, this did not extend to ‘friends’ settling in your homeland and the Cimbri found themselves under attack from the Celtiberian natives, repeating the reception they had received throughout Gaul. Again we have no details of the fighting which occurred, but the Periochae of Livy line quoted above, ends thus:
The Cimbri devastated all the land between the Rhone and the Pyrenees, crossed through a pass into Spain, and there after devastating many districts, were routed by the Celtiberians. They returned to Gaul and in the land of the Vellocasses joined the Teutones.352
Given that Plutarch dates their return to Gaul in late 103 BC, we can see that the Cimbri spent nearly two years in Spain, adding to the rebellions in progress and probably stoking up many more, reducing Spain to a wreck of a province with a three-way fight between the Romans and their allies, the rebels and the Cimbri. When the Cimbri were finally defeated and driven out of Spain by the natives, the province must have been in ruins and for all intents and purposes out of Roman hands, along with southern Gaul and Sicily at this time (see Appendix II).353
104–103 BC: The Cold War in Gaul and Domestic Unease
Whilst Spain bore the brunt of the Cimbric invasion, it did provide Marius with an invaluable opportunity to prepare. Whilst the Cimbric plan was to settle in Spain, in Roman eyes it was only a matter of time before they returned and attempted what all enemies of Rome attempted: an invasion of Italy. Whilst ultimately the Romans proved to be correct and the Cimbri did return, at the time this was by no means a certainty. Had the Cimbri been successful in their attempts to settle in Spain, then ultimately Marius, or his successor, would have had to lead this northern Roman army into Spain to dislodge them.
One important question concerns the nature of the army that Marius took command of. Given his reforms of the recruitment criteria in 107 BC (see Appendix I), it has been suggested that Marius again raised fresh forces from Italy by this method. Furthermore, there is a reference in Diodorus to him requesting fresh troops from overseas.354 Regrettably, Plutarch ignores this issue. The clearest evidence comes from a short passage of Frontinus:
When Caius Marius had the option of choosing a force from two armies, one of which had served under Rutilius, the other under Metellus and later under himself, he preferred the troops of Rutilius, though fewer in number, because he deemed them of trustier discipline.355
On the face of it this seems strange, given that Marius had gone to great lengths to assemble a large force for his war in Numidia and that those troops were now battle-hardened veterans, rather than raw recruits thrown together in the panic after Arausio.
Furthermore, he apparently deliberately chose the smaller of the two armies to face the Cimbri (under the expectation that they would soon be attacking Italy). One possible solution to this problem is the fact that Frontinus could be referring to the forces which he inherited from Metellus who had been taken to Numidia in 109 BC. Thus Marius discharged those men who had served the longest and added Rutilius’ men to those he raised in 107 BC. Ultimately, however, there is no clear answer to this conundrum.
Regardless of this, the absence of the Cimbri gave Marius vital breathing space. Having been given this time without an immediate opponent, Marius utilized it to maximum benefit in training and modifying his army (the details of which will be discussed inChapter 11). Nevertheless, despite the few details provided by our remaining sources for these years, they represented a golden opportunity for Marius to integrate his army of fresh recruits and veterans, train them up and hone his tactics for what the Roman saw as the inevitable battles to come with the Cimbri. Inevitably, this would lead to slack periods, with Marius having to find work to keep his men occupied, as noted by Strabo, when he tells us that Marius had his men dig a canal from the Rhone to the Mediterranean to ease his supply route.356
On a more positive note, both the absence of the northern tribes and the presence of the Roman army must have helped stabilize Roman influence in the region. Whilst Plutarch, in his biography of Marius, is equally impatient to move onto the battle of 102 BC, in his biography of Sulla he actually offers us some details of the lesser military and diplomatic activities of the Romans during the period 104–103 BC.
Having served as Marius’ deputy in the Jugurthine Wars, Sulla continued this role in the Northern Wars, first as a legate then as a military tribune. Plutarch records that as legate in 104 BC, Sulla captured the chieftain of the Tectosages tribe, a man named Copillus. Thus it seems that whilst he was waiting for the return of the northern tribes, Marius had his army subdue the rebellious local tribes and secure the region for Rome once more. Frontinus adds the following story:
During the war with the Cimbri and Teutones, the consul Caius Marius, wishing to test the loyalty of the Gauls and Ligurians, sent them a letter, commanding them in the first part of the letter not to open the inner part, which was specially sealed, before a certain date. Afterwards, before the appointed time had arrived, he demanded the same letter back, and, finding all seals broken, he knew that acts of hostility were afoot.357
This brief story not only confirms that Marius spent this period ensuring the loyalty of the local tribes, but also the extent of the potential rebellion against Rome, for this is the only evidence that the Ligurians (who occupied the Alpine region joining Gaul and Northern Italy, and had only been subdued by Rome less than a century earlier358 were also disloyal to Rome. Though we have no evidence that the Ligurian tribes joined the Cimbri, it is important to understand that Northern Italy and Southern Gaul were now potentially hostile territory for the Romans. These two years Marius had would have been invaluable in ensuring that when the tribes did eventually move on Italy the locals had been re-subjugated.
Nevertheless, despite all this, Marius would have faced a political problem as 104 BC passed, concerning his position for 103 BC. He had been elected as consul for 104 in the face of an expected Cimbric invasion of Italy, which then had not materialized. Although it appears that his army was actively pacifying the region, it cannot have been the glorious victories that either he, or the people of Rome, had in mind. Under normal circumstances, Marius’ command would have become a proconsular one and two fresh consuls would be elected. Yet this is not what happened; instead, we find Marius being elected to a second consulship in a row (his third overall). Plutarch explains this as being due to the expected arrival of the northern tribes in the spring of 103, though whether this was based on genuine intelligence or rumour, possibly even spread by Marius’ own supporters, we will never know. In any event, Marius set another milestone with back-to-back consulships, a far more unprecedented act than two consulships in a decade. His colleague for 103 BC was an L. Aurelius Orestes, about whom little is known.
However, as 103 BC passed, still with no sign of the tribes, Marius’ position became more open to criticism, with the defeat at Arausio now two years in the past and still no sign of an invasion of Italy. Again the only military activity we hear of comes from Plutarch’s biography of Sulla, who as military tribune this year apparently persuaded the tribe of the Marsi to ally with Rome, though the identity of this tribe is open to question.359 However essential this work was to Rome, it was not what he had been elected for, at least in the eyes of the people.
The death of his colleague during the year meant that he had to return to Rome to hold the consular elections for 102 BC. This gave him a wonderful opportunity to secure his position further, by reconnecting with the people of Rome first hand. Once in Rome it appears that Marius reverted to his old tactic of finding a popular tribune to agitate on his behalf. On this occasion he chose L. Appuleius Saturninus (see Appendix I). Plutarch reports:
L. Appuleius Saturninus, who had more influence with the people than any other tribune, was won over by the flattering attentions of Marius, and in his harangues urged the people to elect Marius consul. Marius affected to decline the office and declared that he did not want it, but Saturninus called him a traitor to his country for refusing to command the armies at a time of such great peril. Now it was clear that Saturninus was playing his part at the instigation of Marius, and playing it badly too, but the masses, seeing that the occasion required the ability as well as the good fortune of Marius, voted for his fourth consulship, and made Catulus Lutatius [Q. Lutatius Catulus] his colleague.360
Thus Marius was able to secure a fourth consulship in a row, but it was clear that without forthcoming military success his support was diminishing. It was at this point, 102 BC, that the tribes made their return to southern Gaul.
The Tribal Alliance against Rome
With the defeat of the Cimbri in Spain, the bulk of the tribes crossed the Pyrenees once more and returned to Gaul. As always we have no idea of how many of the Cimbri actually crossed into Spain, nor what their losses were. Upon this return from Spain, however, it is apparent that the Cimbri evolved their strategy in a bold and decisive manner. Having been repulsed from Central Europe, Gaul and now Spain, it is clear that they decided upon the final course of action open to them: the invasion of Italy. Whilst they had suffered setbacks at the hands of the other tribes, they had on three occasions proved to be superior to the Roman military. Italy was fertile and had been the location of previous Gallic migrations, showing it to be a viable and defensible location. To accomplish this, though, required the total defeat of Rome and the dismantling of the Roman system. It is also possible that the Cimbric leaders assumed that once they had defeated Rome and settled there then Rome may have become accustomed to their presence, though ultimately we will never know.
We have no evidence for the decision-making process that the Cimbri went through, only their ultimate actions, but clearly this attack on Italy represented both a change in policy and one which they had shied away from for a number of years. Having taken this decision, however, it is clear that the Cimbric leaders realized that to accomplish the invasion and settlement of Italy they needed even greater manpower, possibly due to their losses in Spain, but certainly in order to deliver a single knock-out blow to Rome. To those ends the Cimbri made contact with a number of other tribes and co-ordinated a strategy for the invasion of Italy.
As stated earlier, the sources are too few and too confused to allow us to construct a timeline for the other tribes’ participation with the Cimbri in the years preceding 103/102 BC. It is perfectly possible that the tribes of the Teutones and Ambrones were part of the great Cimbric host all the time, but in the scenario presented here, it makes the most sense that the Cimbri, having finally decided on the great step of invading Italy, called for allies in this enterprise and that now the other, lesser, tribes appear in matters. All we have in our sources for this alliance between the tribes is one line from the Periochae of Livy.
They [the Cimbri] returned to Gaul and in the land of the Vellocasses [Gaul] joined the Teutoni.361
Had we Livy’s fuller account then no doubt we would have a narrative for the meeting between the tribes, the agreement to this course of action and far greater detail on the planning. As it is we have no such details. All we do have is the ultimate course of action, a two-pronged attack on Italy, with the Teutones and Ambrones attacking Italy from the northwest and the Cimbri and Tigurini attacking from the northeast.362
Rome’s Tribal Enemies
Before we move onto the attacks of the two armies and the battles that resulted, it would be beneficial to briefly analyse the tribes that made up this grand tribal alliance:
i) The Cimbri
They are the most familiar to us, having fought Rome on three previous occasions (113, 109/108 and 105), each time resulting in a greater Roman defeat. As acknowledged earlier, we have no clear evidence for why the Cimbri fought Rome on three occasions and finally invaded Italy only on the fourth campaign. A theoretical framework was put forward based on an evolution in the Cimbric attitude towards Rome, which began with them being unaware of Rome, requesting the right to settle in Italy, a desire to eliminate Roman influence from mainland Europe and finally the need to dismantle Roman control of Italy. We will never know the fine details of this planned invasion, whether an attack on Rome itself was planned or whether they intended to destroy the Roman military to such an extent that their settlement became an accepted fact. Given the events of 101 BC, when the Cimbri settled in northern Italy and did not advance on Rome, it is possible that the latter is the more likely, though again we will never know.
ii) The Teutones
The Teutones also hailed from the North Sea region and are mentioned by Pytheas in his voyages of that region in the 320s BC. Again the immediate tendency is to take their name, Teutones and derive the Teutonic description from it, but again we have no firm evidence whether they were German or Celtic. Evidence from nomenclature again points towards a Celtic origin. We do not know whether they were forced to migrate due to rising sea levels or some other reason, whether they travelled the same route as the Cimbri or whether they simply answered the Cimbric call for allies in their invasion of Italy.
iii) Ambrones
The Ambrones are even more mysterious, only appearing in our sources in this middle period of the wars. They appear to have been far less in number than either the Cimbri and Teutones and it has been speculated that they were a small allied tribe from the Zuiderzee region of Holland (now a large North Sea inlet). Festus reports that they were a Gallic tribe, displaced by rising sea levels that took up with the larger tribal movements, and seem to have been more closely affiliated with the Teutones.363
iv) Tigurini & Toygeni
The Tigurini and Toygeni stand out from the above named three tribes, coming from the region of Helvetia (Switzerland). They were not part of the tribal migration from the North Sea region, but invaded the region of southern Gaul for different, and now unknown, reasons. It is possible that they became swept up by the Cimbric movements through the region or that they initially acted separately from the Cimbri and saw their chance to expand their territory at their neighbours’ expense and gain plunder. By 102/101 BC, they had evidently become part of the grand alliance against Rome, though their reluctance to invade Italy perhaps showed a more pragmatic streak; certainly, they were not under the same pressures as the other tribes as they were not looking to settle. Although the Tigurini are mentioned by several sources, Strabo is the only one to mention that a lesser Helvetian tribe, the Toygeni also joined them, on their attacks on Rome.364
v) Local Gallic Tribes
We have already seen that a number of Gallic and Spanish tribes had taken the opportunity presented by the reversals suffered by Rome at the hands of the Cimbri to re-assert their independence. Although a number had been subdued in the shadowy campaigns of 104 and 103 BC it is possible that a number of tribes joined this two-pronged attack on Italy, though none appear in our few surviving sources.
Thus the stage was set for a massive attack on Italy by the native tribes of Europe, one far greater than Hannibal was able to mange a century earlier. If it succeeded then Roman power would have been severely diminished if not crushed. Had Rome itself survived then it would have a new and permanent Celtic presence in North Italy, overturning several centuries of subjugation of the region. Certainly, North Italy and Gaul would have been outside of Roman power, in the short term. What the knock on effects for the rest of the Roman Empire would have been, we can only speculate. It is also possible that Rome may have ultimately overcome these disasters and incorporated these new tribes into the Roman military and political system. Such a move would have anticipated the changes that the Roman Empire underwent by 300 to 400 years and forever altered the history of Western Europe, and Western Civilization. That it didn’t ultimately rested on the shoulders of one man, Caius Marius, who had been impatiently awaiting the return of these tribal armies for more than three years.
The Battle of Aquae Sextiae – The Prelude
It appears that Marius was still in Italy when he heard of the advancing tribes, but moved swiftly across the Alps and met up with his army and built a fortified forward position along the Rhone, though Plutarch does not make it clear where this forward base was. Orosius, however, places Marius’ fortified camp further north at the confluence of the Isère and Rhone rivers, thus securing the Rhone valley, there to await the arrival of the tribal forces.365 Plutarch provides us with a colourful story concerning Marius’ intelligence gathering, with a young Sertorius apparently being sent undercover amongst the tribes and reporting on their movements.366
Again there is some argument in the sources over exactly who Marius faced in the initial clash. Orosius would have it that the initial encounter was the whole combined might of the Cimbri, Teutones, Ambrones and Tigurini, whereas Plutarch has Marius facing the combined forces of the Teutones and Ambrones, the lesser of the three northern tribes.367 Of the two, Plutarch’s version is the more consistent, with the Cimbri choosing another route into Italy, and being met by another Roman army, led by Marius’ consular colleague, Q. Lutatius Catulus.
Both Plutarch and Orosius are consistent in the fact that upon the approach of the tribal force down the Rhone valley, Marius did not move out to engage them, but remained in his fortified position on higher ground.
Marius, now consul for the fourth time, pitched his camp near the confluence of the Isère and Rhone rivers. The Teutones, Cimbri, Tigurini and Ambrones fought continuously for three days at the Roman camp, trying by every means to dislodge the Romans from their ramparts and drive them out onto level ground.368
They covered a large part of the plain and after pitching their camp challenged Marius to battle. Marius, however, paid them no heed but kept his soldiers inside their fortifications…
But he [Marius] would station his soldiers on the fortifications by detachments, bidding them to observe the enemy, and in this way accustomed them not to fear their shape or dread their cries which were altogether strange and ferocious; and to make themselves familiar with their equipment and movements, thus in the course of time rendering what was only apparently formidable familiar to their minds from observations.369
Despite the obvious desire of the Roman soldiers to get to grips with the enemy, Marius held them firm and remained in his defensive position, thus frustrating the Teutones/Ambrones and denying them an encounter on their terms. Furthermore, he forced them to wear down their forces attempting to dislodge him, being unwilling to leave a large Roman army in their rear.
But the Teutones, since Marius remained where he was, attempted to take his camp by storm; many missiles however were hurled against them from the fortifications and they lost a number of their men. They therefore decided to march forward, expecting to cross the Alps unopposed. So they packed up their baggage and began to march past the Roman camp. Then, indeed, the immensity of their numbers were made evident by the length of their line and the time required for their passage; for it is said that they were six days in passing the Roman fortifications.370
Whilst we must treat this tale with extreme scepticism, Plutarch does make his point well, for the combined force of the Teutones and Ambrones, together with their women and children apparently passed the 200,000 mark, vastly outnumbering the Romans. Once the tribesmen had marched past the Romans, Marius too broke camp and trailed them along the Rhone valley:
Once the barbarians had passed by and begun to move forward, Marius also broke camp and followed after them, never losing contact with them and always stopping for the night close beside them, but fortifying his camps strongly and keeping difficult ground between himself and the enemy, so as to be able to pass the night in safety. So they went on until they reached a place called Aquae Sextiae.371 From here it was a short march to the Alps and it was here that Marius prepared to give battle.372
Thus we can see that Marius kept his head, in all senses of the phrase, when he first encountered the northern tribes. Rather than rush headlong in battle with them at the time and ground of their choosing, he waited it out. Certainly, it would have been unpopular with his soldiers, but he could see the benefits of both assessing and frustrating the enemy and fighting at his time of choosing on ground that favoured the Romans. Furthermore, having been positioned in the region for nearly two years, he would have had plenty of time to choose ground that favoured him. If that created the impression in the tribes’ minds of a Roman reluctance to fight or cowardice then all the better to lull the enemy into a false sense of security.
Certainly, Marius had chosen his ground well; Aquae Sextiae was a wide plain by the river, which sloped steeply upwards, covered in woodland (see diagram). Marius chose to occupy the higher ground, overlooking the tribes, with the river behind them. The only drawback to this position was that it placed the tribesmen between his men and the sources of fresh water, which both Plutarch and Orosius comment on. Both note that upon Marius hearing his men’s complaints, he allegedly told them that if they wanted drinking water they would have to fight for it.373
As Plutarch records, when the first encounter did take place, it apparently happened by accident. According to his account a group of camp servants made an attempt to get to the river to gain fresh water but stumbled on a party of Ambrones who were enjoying the hot springs at that spot. The group had been drinking and eating and were taken by surprise and not in prime fighting condition. At this point it appears that a force of Ligurians in Marius’ army broke from the main force and rushed to engage the Ambrones.374 Plutarch numbers the Ambrones at 30,000 at this particular stretch of the river.
The Ambrones became separated by the river. Before they could form up on the other side the Ligurians had quickly rushed down on those who had been the first to cross and engaged them in hand-to-hand fighting. Then the Romans came to the aid of the Ligurians and charged down on the Ambrones from the higher ground, forced them back and routed them. Most of them herded and jostled together in the stream and were cut down on the spot and the river was filled with their blood and with the bodies of the dead. The Romans then crossed the river and finding that the enemy would not stand up to them, continued killing them as they fled right up to their camp and their wagons. Here the women came out against them, armed with swords and axes and making the most horrible shrieking, attacking both the pursuers and the pursued; the former as their enemies and the latter as the men who had betrayed them. They threw themselves into the thick of the fighting, tearing at the Romans shields with their bear hands or clutching at their swords, and though their bodies were gashed and wounded, their spirits remained unvanquished to the end. So then, as we are told, the battle at the river was brought about by accident rather than by the intention of the commander. After destroying many of the Ambrones, the Romans withdrew as night fell.375
Thus first blood had been drawn by the Romans. Whatever the merits of the story about the clash being started by the camp servants, it is clear that the Romans had spotted a vulnerable section of the enemy force, isolated from the main body and had utilized the two key strengths they had in this position: attacking downhill and trapping the enemy with the river at their back. Certainly, the initial encounter had gone to Rome, but the Ambrones’ losses would not have altered the fact that tribes still massively outnumbered the Romans. Nevertheless, it was a morale boost for the Romans and the first success of any sort against this previously-undefeated enemy.
Orosius also has the same story, but in a much simpler form:
The camp servants, shouting loudly were the first to rush into the fray; then the army immediately followed. Lines of battle were quickly formed for regular combat. An engagement was fought in which the Romans were victorious.376
An interesting variation can be found in Frontinus:
When Marius was fighting against the Cimbrians and Teutons, his engineers on one occasion had heedlessly chosen such a site for the camp that the barbarians controlled the water supply. In response to his soldiers’ demands for water, Marius pointed with his sword towards the enemy and said ‘There is where you must get it’. Thus inspired, the Romans straightway drove the barbarians from the place.377
The latter variation is interesting; with engineers instead of camp servants and confusion over whether it was a deliberate or accidental location, as although it states that the location was chosen by accident, Marius clearly knew that it would force his men to fight. Thus we must question whether the elaborate story in Plutarch is a more embroidered version of events. Clearly, this initial engagement between the Romans and the Ambrones ended in a Roman victory and control of this stretch of the river.
The Battle of Aquae Sextiae (102 BC)
Nevertheless, Orosius goes on to tell us that the main battle was fought on the fourth day, presumably since the Romans had arrived and camped.378 This elapse of time was crucial to Marius, who drew up a careful battle plan utilizing the terrain to his advantage, though he had possibly already chosen the ground in the previous few years. The battle that followed was the first one that had been fought on Roman terms and after due consideration, rather than having been rushed into.
As can be seen from the diagram, Marius occupied the higher ground, with tribesmen in the plain below. To engage the Romans they would have to attack uphill and be funnelled towards them by the nature of the slopes and the wood on them. Thus at a stroke Marius went a great way to negating the vastly superior numbers of the enemy. They could not easily surround or flank him and the funnelling effect meant that when the two sides clashed, far fewer tribesmen would be able to engage the Romans. Marius further used the terrain to his advantage by secretly deploying a force of 3,000 legionaries, under the command of M. Claudius Marcellus, on the side of the hill under the cover of the wood, with orders not to reveal themselves until battle had commenced and then attack the enemy in the rear, once they had passed.
X. The Battle of Aquae Sextiae (102 BC), Stage 1
XI. The Battle of Aquae Sextiae (102 BC), Stage 2
Marius’ plan hinged on the tribesmen taking the bait and attacking his position uphill, rather than waiting until the battlefield was more favourable. If the enemy had refused to fight and moved on to find flatter ground, which favoured their vastly-superior numbers, then he would have been undone.
Plutarch himself notes that the tribesmen rashly attacked the Romans, rather than waiting:
he [Marius] led out at daybreak and drew up in front of the camp, and sent his cavalry out into the plain. The Teutones seeing this, could not wait for the Romans to come down and fight with them on equal terms, but quickly and angrily armed themselves and charged uphill.379
Thus Marius played on the tribes’ frustration at his previous unwillingness to fight and at his ambush a few days before to force them into a rash action, using his cavalry as bait. Furthermore, the uphill charge also favoured the Roman method of initial assault with the pilum.
[Marius] exhorted the soldiers to stand their ground and when the enemy had gotten within reach to hurl their javelins, then take to their swords and crowded the barbarians back with their shield; since the enemy were on precarious ground, their blows would have no force and the locking of their shield no strength, but the unevenness of the ground would prevent them from standing firm in a line.380
Thus, the tribesmen rushing up the hill were met with a hail of pila and slowly forced back down the hill into the plain, with heavy casualties. As they were forced down, Marcellus sprung the ambush and attacked the tribesmen from the rear, thus trapping them between the two Romans forces and throwing the whole opposing force into chaos.
Those in the rear forced along those who were in front of them, and quickly plunged the whole army into confusion, and under this double attack they could not hold out long, but broke ranks and fled. The Romans pursued them and either slew or took alive over 100,000 of them.381
Orosius quotes higher figures for the enemy losses:
Two hundred thousand of the Gallic soldiers, according to reports, were slain in the battle, 8,000 were captured and barely 3,000 fled. Their general [chieftain] Teutobodus was killed.382
Whether it was 100,000 or 200,000, the tribal casualties were massive and must have included a large number of civilians, caught up in the fighting or the flight. In one battle the Teutones and Ambrones who had left their homeland had been wiped out. By any measure it was a massive victory for the Roman Republic and for Marius.
The extent of the tribal casualties can be seen by a story reported by Plutarch:
it is said that the people of Massilia fenced their vineyards round with the bones of the fallen, and that the soil, after the bodies had wasted away in it and the rains had fallen all winter upon them, grew so rich and became so full to its depths of the putrefied matter that sank into it, that it produced an exceedingly great harvest in the years that followed.383
Plutarch further reports that the kings, or chieftains, of the Teutones and Ambrones survived the battle and fled, but were captured in the Alps by a Roman allied tribe, the Sequani.384 This is confirmed by Florus who interestingly names one of them as Teutobodus, despite the fact that Orosius reports him dead in battle.385 We are not told of how many casualties the Romans sustained, or even what their total force was in the battle. Following the battle, Marius set up a massive pyre of enemy weapons and possessions as an offer to the gods. Plutarch reports that just as he was about to light the pyre messengers arrived confirming his re-election as consul for 101 BC.386 Whatever the timing, the confirmation that the remaining tribes were moving towards Italy would have meant that Marius would have no longer needed subterfuge and tricks to secure a continuation of his consulships. Nevertheless, he would not have had too much time to savour the victory as the other tribal army of the Cimbri, by far the larger and most dangerous of the northern tribes, was also heading for Italy by a separate route and he would have to support his colleague Catulus in his defence of Italy.
Summary
After a period of over ten years of fighting in the Northern Wars, Rome had finally won a victory in the northwest. Furthermore, this was not just any victory, but had seen one of the two main tribal armies, albeit the smaller of the two, obliterated. We have to ask ourselves what was it that separated Marius from all of his predecessors, who had overseen catastrophic failures. The one factor that strikes any observer of this campaign of 102 BC is the extraordinary patience and level-headedness that Marius showed. On the three previous occasions of 113, 109 and 105, the Roman commanders had apparently attacked the enemy without putting any thought into how they were going to negate the vastly superior numbers they faced. They faced the tribesmen on open ground, with apparently nothing more than a firm belief in the superiority of the Roman legionary. Whilst this was certainly the case in a one-on-one situation, the tribes they faced had sheer weight of numbers of their side, which could translate itself into steamrollering the Romans in a face-to-face charge, or the ability to flank or surround them.
Marius on the other hand showed incredible patience, firstly by not meeting the enemy in the Rhone valley, and then by carefully selecting a battleground that negated the enemy numbers and brought his infantry superiority into play. Whether this counts as tactical genius or simple common sense is for each individual to decide. Furthermore, as was always the case, the Romans benefited from having one sole commander, who had been with his army for a period of time, establishing discipline and a bond of trust between the two. This allowed for greater discipline when Marius’ cautious tactics seemed like an unwillingness to fight and for a greater awareness of his tactics and how the soldiers would benefit from them.
On the Teutones/Ambrones side, they made the basic mistake of underestimating their enemy, poor intelligence (not scouting the sides of the battlefield) and the fundamental error of allowing the enemy to choose the ground that played to his strengths and weakened them. If their superiority came from their vast numbers then attacking uphill and on a narrow field played right into Marius’ hands. Had they remained in the plain or moved on and forced a battle elsewhere, then we may well have seen a different outcome.
Furthermore, we have to question the two-pronged attack on Italy which divided the tribes’ numbers. Although this was designed to split the Roman forces, it also split their numbers and allowed Marius the opportunity to face the two main tribes separately, though we must always be watchful for the benefit of hindsight creeping in. Nevertheless, although the Teutones and Ambrones had been wiped out the Cimbri presented a different matter, being the largest of the three northern tribes and by far the most deadly.