Chapter 10
Catulus and the Cimbric Invasion of Italy
While the Teutones and Ambrones moved to invade Italy from the west, via the Rhone Valley, the Cimbri planned to invade Italy from the eastern Alps (via modern Austria). To meet this dual thrust, while Marius was to intercept the western attack, his consular colleague of 102 BC, Q. Lutatius Catulus, who was in command of Italy, moved to the eastern Alps to intercept the Cimbri. What little detail we have from our surviving sources is further complicated by the fact that Catulus wrote a history of the conflict, widely available at the time and to later historians (see Appendix V), which naturally inflated his own contribution, as we shall soon see.
Aside from his literary endeavours, we know that Catulus hailed from a consular plebeian family, which we can trace back to the First Punic War.387 However, it appears that the family had fallen into the political wilderness, with no consuls recorded between 220 and 102 BC. Furthermore, Cicero informs us that he was defeated in the consular elections for three years running (106, 105 and 104) before securing election in 102, possibly (or only) with the assistance of Marius.388 We hear nothing of any prior military service or the prior offices he must have held. In short we know little of his record prior to his consulship, but we must assume that the Roman electorate had little faith in his abilities. Plutarch sums him up as ‘a worthy man, but too sluggish for arduous contests’.389
Nevertheless, Catulus’ initial strategy appears to have been to guard the eastern Alpine passes and prevent the Cimbri from crossing into Italy. Plutarch’s Life of Sulla once again furnishes us with some details of the activities of Catulus’ forces in the region, as by 102 BC, Sulla had been transferred to Catulus’ command.390
He [Sulla] not only subdued in war a large part of the barbarians of the Alps, but when provisions ran low, he undertook the task of furnishing them, and made them so abundant, that the soldiers of Catulus lived in plenty…391
As always, we treat Plutarch’s Life of Sulla with caution, given that it was partly based on Sulla’s own memoirs, but it appears that Catulus’ army conducted campaigns to subdue some of the local Alpine tribes, whose loyalty to Rome was always weak at best, not withstanding numerous defeats to the Cimbri. Plutarch tells us that he had an army of 20,000 men (legionaries and allies combined). Yet at some point, most likely during the winter of 102/101 BC,392 Catulus withdrew from the high Alps and took up a defensive position on the River Adige.
The latter [the Cimbri] drove back from the Alps and put to flight the proconsul Q. Catulus.393
For Catulus, who was facing the Cimbri, gave up trying to guard the passes of the Alps, lest he should be weakened by the necessity of dividing his forces into many parts, and at once descended into the plains of Italy. Here he put the River Atiso between himself and the enemy, built strong fortifications on both banks of it to prevent their [the Cimbri] crossing, and threw a bridge across the stream, that he might be able to go on the other side in case the barbarians made their way through the passes and attack the fortresses.394
Furthermore, Frontinus provides us with an interesting, and frustrating, fragment involving Catulus’ army:
When Quintus Lutatius Catulus had been repulsed by the Cimbrians, and his only hope of safety lay in passing a stream the banks of which were held by the enemy, he displayed his troops on the nearest mountain, as though intending to camp there. Then he commanded his men not to loose their packs, or put down their loads, and not to quit the ranks or standards. In order the more effectively to strengthen the impression made upon the enemy, he ordered a few tents to be erected in open view, and fires to be built, while some built a rampart and others went forth in plain sight to collect wood. The Cimbrians, deeming these performances genuine, themselves also chose a place for a camp, scattering through the nearest fields to gather the supplies necessary for their stay. In this way they afforded Catulus opportunity not merely to cross the stream, but also to attack their camp.395
Among modern historians, Lewis argued that this excerpt describes the first battle Catulus fought, as mentioned by the Periochae of Livy above, in which Catulus was repulsed from holding the Alps and forced to retreat to a defensive line on the Adige, managing a cunning counterattack on the Cimbri as he retreated.396 Plutarch’s account makes no mention of this first engagement and tries to argue that Catulus suddenly realized that there were a number of passes through the Alps and after marching his men up the hills, turned around and marched them down again.397
Given that we know the Romans were keeping a close watch on the army of the Teutones, we must assume that the same was true for the Cimbri and that Catulus had a good idea of the route they would take. This is especially the case given that the Cimbric force was composed of women and children and would have been far slower than any Roman army. Furthermore, Plutarch’s account seems to ignore his own evidence of the activities of Sulla in the Alps earlier in the campaign.
Thus, we can combine the various fragments to see the most logical strategy for Catulus. He initially moved into the Alpine region to meet and hopefully check the Cimbric advance through the Alps. Whilst he was waiting for the Cimbri, Catulus (via his legate Sulla) took the opportunity to ensure that the local tribes were reminded where their loyalties lay and did not aid the Cimbri. Nevertheless, when the Cimbri did arrive, it appears that the Romans were driven back and routed from whichever pass they were trying to hold (as stated by Livy, with added detail by Frontinus398, probably by sheer weight of numbers. Catulus’ ruse enabled him to regroup and gained him time to create a fresh defensive line on the River Adige, in a second attempt to halt the Cimbric advance.
However, it is clear from our few sources that this second defensive position was no more successful than the first. According to Plutarch, rather than an outright assault on the Roman position, the Cimbri apparently used their natural surroundings to their advantage:
After they [the Cimbri] had encamped near the river and examined the position, they began to dam it up, tearing away the neighbouring hills, like the giants of old, carrying into the river whole trees with their roots, fragments of rock and mounds of earth, and crowding the current out of its course. They also sent heavy objects whirling down the river against the piles of the bridge and made them shake with the impact, until at last the greater part of the Roman soldiers played the coward and abandoned the main camp and began to retreat.399
At this point in Plutarch’s narrative we have an outrageous pro-Catulan interpretation of the Roman retreat:
And now Catulus, like a consummately good commander, showed that he had less regard for his own reputation than for that of his countrymen. For finding that he could not persuade his soldiers to stand, and seeing them flee in terror, he ordered his standard to be taken up, and run to the foremost of the retiring troops, and put himself at their head, wishing that the disgrace should attach to himself and not to his country and that the soldiers, in making their retreat, should not appear to be running away, but following their general.400
According to Plutarch, when faced with a Roman army which broke in the face of the enemy, the Cimbri were allowed free access to Italy. Fortunately for Rome, not all of Catulus’ men showed the same sentiments as their commander, and both Plutarch and thePeriochae of Livy note a valiant stand made by the soldiers garrisoning the fort. Although both Plutarch and the Periochae of Livy report the incident, they differ quite markedly. First Plutarch:
The barbarians attacked and captured the fort on the farther side of the Atiso [Adige], and they so admired the Romans there, who showed themselves the bravest of men and fought worthily of their country, that they let them go, making them take an oath upon a bronze bull. This was subsequently captured after the battle and was carried, we are told, to the house of Catulus, as the chief prize of the victory.401
Livy, has it thus:
This cohort [at the fort] however, extricated itself by its own unaided gallantry and overtook the fleeing proconsul and his army.402
Not only do the two accounts clash, but the Periochae of Livy almost seems to be going out of its way to refute the story presented in Plutarch, which must have been in circulation in Livy’s day (see Appendix V). There is no way to combine the two accounts, other than to say that the garrison fought well against the Cimbri and managed to escape, whether by treaty or military prowess. There are several other short notes in the sources concerning the retreat. Whilst Pliny records a celebrated act of bravery in the part of a group of retreating soldiers, the more famous story concerned Catulus’ cavalry which retreated all the way back to Rome.403 The group were led by the son of M. Aemilius Scaurus, who refused to acknowledge his son for his cowardice, with the young man committing suicide in shame.
With Cisalpine Gaul lost to the Cimbri, Catulus retreated to yet another defensive position (his third), this time south of the River Po. Nevertheless, no matter how much Plutarch, or his source, may want to dress these events up with noble sacrifices and tales of heroism, once again a Roman army had been routed by the Cimbri. Catulus had failed to stop them on two occasions and took flight with his army, leaving the region (modern Venetia) to be sacked by the Cimbri. The stark facts are that despite everything a ‘barbarian’ army had successfully invaded Italy for the first time in a century. A century earlier it had been Hannibal, whose victories on Italian soil had been forever etched into the Roman consciousness. Before that it had been the Gauls, who had sacked Rome; now came the Cimbri.
Marius and the Cimbric Invasion of Italy.
During the winter of 102/101 BC, whilst Catulus was engaging the Cimbri and failing to hold them, it appears that Marius made his way back to Rome without his army. According to Plutarch, he was only summoned to Rome when news of Catulus’ reverses was received, but it was likely that he had made his way there following his victory at Aquae Sextiae. Plutarch further informs us that he did not celebrate his triumph for the victory as expected, which given the uncertain outcome of Catulus’ engagements was understandable.404 He entered into his fifth consulship (for 101 BC) and had with him a trusted old lieutenant, M. Aquilius, as fellow consul.
That he left his army is interesting; it is possible that he returned to Rome to await the result of Catulus’ engagement. If Catulus did manage to keep the Cimbri from crossing the Alps, then he would be able to rejoin his army and fight the decisive battle away from Italy. We are not told where he stationed his army, but he must have been aware of the distinct possibility that Catulus would not be able to stop the Cimbri and thus needed to keep his own forces on the Italian side of the Alps in readiness. Certainly, when called upon, his forces were able to intercept the Cimbri apparently with ease, though again the Cimbri would be far slower than Marius’ forces on the march, given the large numbers of women and children, not to mention baggage.
This leads us onto one of the key issues when dealing with the Cimbri in 101 BC, namely their actions, or the lack of them, after defeating Catulus, and their eventual location when they faced Marius in battle. Florus sums the situation up and contains a number of useful flaws:
If they had immediately marched on Rome with hostile intent, the danger would have been great; but in Veneteia, a district in which the Italian climate is almost at its softest, the very mildness of the country and of the air sapped their vigour. When they had been further demoralized by the use of bread and cooked meats and the delights of wine, Marius opportunely approached them.405
Thus Florus assumes that the Cimbri became enamoured of the soft life and could have attacked Rome, but did not. Yet Florus, as is quite common in this war, misunderstands the nature of Rome’s enemy. The Cimbri were not a foreign army on a set campaign, but comprised whole tribes, including women and children. In the past few years they had been driven out of Spain and marched across the Alps in winter. It is hardly surprising that they chose to make a protracted stay in a warm, safe and plentiful region. Furthermore, although we have no direct evidence for it, the Venetia region offered the Cimbri everything they needed for a new homeland to settle in. That region of Italy, north of the Po, had only been pacified by Rome earlier in the century and had for centuries been inhabited by Gauls.
Plutarch raises a different factor, namely that the Cimbri were awaiting the arrival of the Teutones and Ambrones, in order to combine their might, though he himself questions how they could remain ignorant of the result of Aquae Sextiae, which must have been common knowledge throughout the Alpine region. Plutarch does, however, state that when Marius met with the Cimbric ambassadors prior to battle, they once again demanded land to settle on.406 Given that they already occupied Cisalpine Gaul, it does add weight to the theory that they intended to settle in Italy, north of the Po, which would have returned Rome to the position of over 100 years earlier. Nevertheless, even if they had not been buoyed up by the victory at Aquae Sextiae, neither the Senate nor the People of Rome, let alone Marius himself, would have countenanced a hostile tribal presence in northern Italy, no matter how much the Cimbri would have professed future friendship. Once again Marius staked everything on a decisive battle.
The location of the battle is an interesting one for a number of reasons. For a start we are not even clear on the location nor the name of the battlesite. Both Velleius (writing less than 100 years after the battle) and Florus state that the battle took place at the Raudian Plain, with neither making any mention of Vercellae (the more commonly known name). The Periochae of Livy unhelpfully omits the name altogether. Plutarch, whose account is the clearest surviving one, names it as taking place on the plain of Vercellae, though even as late as the de viris illustribus (see Appendix V), it is referred to as the Raudian Plain.407
The events leading up to the battle can never be recovered from the few fragmentary, and sometime contradictory, sources we have. With the Cimbri remaining north of the Po, Marius recalled his army into northern Italy and met up with the fleeing/retreating Catulus. Their first thoughts must have been to intercept any Cimbri thrust south, but when none was forthcoming they moved north and crossed the River Po into Cimbric-held territory. As mentioned above, the Cimbri once more attempted negotiation, which proved fruitless. To counter this Plutarch reports that Marius worked on demoralizing the Cimbri by parading the captured Teutones chieftains in front of them.408
However, for both sides, negotiation was not an option. The Romans were not going to let the Cimbri settle and were buoyed by the victory at Aquae Sextiae. The Cimbri too would have believed that they had a strong hand. They had found an agreeable region to settle in and although their allies had met defeat, they themselves had defeated Roman armies on three previous occasions. A fourth would give them the peace they required to settle, at least in their eyes.
In the days leading up to the battle both sides were apparently manoeuvring. Plutarch reports that the Cimbri advanced against Marius, who refused to give battle. Frontinus also reports that Marius forced the Cimbri to march to him rather than the other way around.409 Thus Marius once again got to choose the ground and time of the battle, which he used to good advantage, as detailed below. Having led the Cimbri to his position, a meeting apparently took place between a Cimbric chief, Boiorix, and Marius, to agree when the battle would take place. Thus on the morning of what now equates to 30 July 101 BC, the two armies drew up on the Raudian Plain, for what was to become the final act of a long war.410
The Battle of the Raudian Plain (Vercellae)
Of all the battles in the two wars under examination, it is the Raudian Plain for which we have the best descriptions in our sources, giving us both numbers and tactics. The Roman forces comprised of two consular armies: the victorious army of Marius and the defeated army of Catulus. Plutarch, quoting Sulla’s memoirs, lists Marius’ forces as 32,000 and Catulus’ as 20,300.411 We are not told of the composition of these armies, between foot and cavalry. Opposing them, according to the sources, was at least twice that number, if not three times. Plutarch provides a total of 180,000 for the Cimbri as a whole (including women and children), whilst Orosius gives us a figure of 200,000 in total. Of these, Plutarch states that 15,000 were cavalry, which would far outnumber any Roman cavalry on the field.412
The two Roman armies were combined into one formation, with Catulus’ 20,000 soldiers in the centre and Marius’ army of 32,000 split between the two wings, with himself and Sulla in command of each. Marius was clearly in overall command, though Plutarch reports that Marius placed Catulus in the centre to keep him out of the way, expecting the heaviest fighting on the wings. Plutarch provides us with an excellent description of the Cimbri, based on two eyewitness accounts:
XII. The Battle of Raudine Plain/Vercellae (101 BC), Stage 1
XIII. The Battle of Raudine Plain/Vercellae (101 BC), Stage 2
XIV. The Battle of Raudine Plain/Vercellae (101 BC), Stage 3
their foot soldiers advanced slowly from their defences, with a depth equal to their front, for each side of the formation had an extent of thirty furlongs; and their horsemen 15,000 strong, rode out in splendid style, with helmets made to resemble the maws of frightening wild beasts or the head of strange animals, which, with their towering crests of feathers, made their wearers appear taller than they really were: they were equipped with breastplates of iron, and carried gleaming white shields. For hurling, each man had two lances, and at close quarters they used large heavy swords.413
As is customary in these cases, we have different versions of the battle in different authors. Plutarch’s account is by far the most detailed, but does take a notably different slant than is reported elsewhere. He clearly states that he uses the biographies of Sulla and Catulus for the account, both of whom had became estranged from Marius during their later careers, at the time of writing. This is clearly reflected in the accounts of the battle, with Marius’ role being clearly downgraded, along with a rise in the tension between Marius and Catulus.
According to Plutarch, the Cimbri opened the battle with a cavalry charge, which soon turned into a feint meant to lure the Roman infantry into breaking ranks and drawing them onto the Cimbric infantry. Plutarch then states that the Roman soldiers, despite their training, usual levels of discipline and direct orders, broke ranks and charged after the Cimbric cavalry thinking that they had broken. At this point the Cimbric infantry then attacked the ill-disciplined Roman soldiers. Even at this early stage we have to question Plutarch’s description, as such a set of circumstances are not only difficult to believe, but nearly always end with the broken side being routed. In response to their soldiers breaking ranks, Plutarch would have us believe that both Marius and Catulus, rather than deal with the situation at the front, then both took time to offer sacrifices to the gods, which should have come before battle commenced.414
It seems that Plutarch has welded two accounts into one as he then has the battle commencing, despite this aforementioned initial cavalry charge and infantry clash, which we hear no more about again. We are next treated to some of the clearest bias against Marius as Plutarch then reports that a giant cloud of dust was kicked up by the armies, which meant that Marius’ advancing wing missed the enemy altogether and spent a good part of the battle wandering around looking for someone to fight, lost in a cloud of dust. This naturally left Catulus and Sulla to do all the fighting, with their commander left to flounder in a quasi-comic turn on the battlefield.
Plutarch then reports that the Romans had the sun in their favour, as they were positioned with the sun at their backs, shining directly into the faces of the enemy, though Plutarch does not ascribe this to good tactical positioning on Marius’ part. Furthermore Plutarch would have us believe that the Cimbri were blinded by bright sunlight whilst Marius was still lost in a dust cloud so dense that he could not locate an army of 200,000 men!
Plutarch goes on to provide the detail that the Cimbri, being used to colder climes, were not used to the bright sunlight and sweated profusely, whilst the Romans were cool and unruffled. Although this is a nice stereotype it overlooks the fact that the Cimbri had spent the over a decade in the centre and south of France, not to mention a few years in Spain and were not fresh from a harsher clime; unless of course he is referring to fresh Cimbric reinforcements.
Despite these colourful details, Plutarch’s account is desperately short of tactical analysis or any detail to explain how 50,000 Romans were able to defeat an enemy so superior in both infantry and cavalry. In fact, his only tactical comments are the aforementioned Cimbric feint and Roman breaking of ranks. What we have for the end of the battle is thus:
The greatest number and the best fighters of the enemy were cut to pieces on the spot; for to prevent their ranks from being broken, those who fought in front were bound together with long chains which were passed through their belts. The fugitives, however, were driven back to their entrenchments; where the Romans beheld a most tragic spectacle. The women, in black garments, stood at the wagons and slew the fugitives; their husbands or brothers or fathers, then strangled their little children and cast them beneath the wheels of the wagons or the feet of the cattle, then cut their own throats…. Nevertheless, in spite of such self destruction, more than 60,000 were taken prisoner and those who fell were said to have been twice that number.415
Thus for Plutarch, Roman victory was inevitable; the Cimbri could not take fighting in the heat of the midday sun, or the brave stands of Catulus and Sulla. More lines are devoted to the fascination with the aggression of the Cimbric women and their unwillingness to be taken as slaves, than the battle itself. As for Marius, he seems to have spent the entire battle wandering around in his own personal dust storm.
The Periochae of Livy has no detail of the battle, but confirms Plutarch’s casualty figures for the Cimbri. The same goes for that of Velleius and Eutropius.416 Florus has an account that bears many of the same dramatic flourishes as Plutarch’s, but adds some additional detail:
The armies met in a very wide plain which they call the Raudian Plain. On the side of the enemy 65,000 men fell, on our side less than 300; the slaughter of the barbarians continued all day. On this occasion too our general [Marius] had added craft to courage, imitating Hannibal and his stratagem at Cannae. For in the first place, the day he had chosen was misty, so that he could charge the enemy unawares, and it was also windy, so that the dust was driven into the eyes and faces of the enemy; finally he had drawn up his line facing the west, so that, as was learnt afterwards from the prisoners, the sky seemed to be on fire with the glint reflected from the bronze of the Roman helmets. There was quite as severe a struggle with the women folk of the barbarians as with the men; for they had formed a barricade of their wagons and carts and mounting on the tip of it, fought with axes and pikes. Their king Boiorix fell fighting energetically in the forefront of the battle, and not without having inflicted vengeance on his foes.417
Thus we have the familiar elements of sun, dust and aggressive tribal women, but we also appear to have a surprise Roman charge, which took the enemy unawares. It is Orosius who adds some important details:
Following Hannibal’s clever plan of selecting not only the day for the battle but also the field, the consuls arranged their battle line under the cover of a mist, but later fought the Gauls in the sun. The first sign of disorder arose on the side of the Gauls [Cimbri], as they realized that the Roman line of battle had already been drawn up ready for action before they came on the field.
In the battle, wounded cavalrymen, driven backward upon their own men, threw into confusion the entire force that was advancing to the battlefield in irregular formation. The sun too was shining brightly in their faces and at the same time a wind arose. As a result, dust filled their eyes and the brilliant sun dimmed their sight. Under these conditions the casualties suffered were so terrible that only a few survived the disaster, whereas the losses on the Roman side were very slight. A 140,000, according to reports were slain in that battle, whilst 60,000 were captured….
Among these many wretched forms of death, it is reported that two chieftains rushed upon each other with drawn swords. The kings Lugius and Boiorix fell on the battlefield; Claodicus and Caesorix were captured.418
Finally, it is Orosius who preserves and transmits some idea of the tactics used and the events of the battle itself. Marius and Catulus drew up their armies into formation before the Cimbri realized what was going on or were fully prepared. There is also the faint trace of a surprise Roman attack on the Cimbri whilst they were still forming up. Even if there was no surprise attack, then it is clear that the Romans’ actions had forced the Cimbri to advance or alter their plans for the battle.
Orosius supports Plutarch’s point on the initial Cimbric tactic being a cavalry assault, though in Orosius it seems that they rushed forward to meet the Roman advance. The clear difference is that in Orosius’ account, the Romans held firm and broke the Cimbric assault which turned their cavalry into the path of the onrushing infantry, causing total chaos and a complete rout. Thus, what Plutarch had as a feint and an ambush, in Orosius apparently reflects the true situation, with the Cimbric cavalry broken and the Roman infantry moving forward to press home the attack.
Valerius Maximus preserves a fragment of an account, which is also of use:
In the heat of the battle he gave [Roman] citizenship contrary to treaty to two cohorts of Camertes [an Italian people] who were resisting the assault of the Cimbri with extraordinary valour.419
When taken from Orosius’ point of view, the tactics of the battle and its result became clearer: an initial surprise Roman assault; the breaking of the Cimbric cavalry, their retreat into their own infantry, which led to total chaos and slaughter amongst the Cimbri. Thus Marius chose his ground well and used his smaller army in a more disciplined manner, and utilized simple but effective tactics, all of which resulted in the annihilation of the Cimbric tribes, including the civilians.420
Aftermath – The Tigurini
As discussed earlier, there is some considerable confusion as to what role the Tigurini played in the events of 102–101 BC. Some sources dismiss them altogether from these events, as they were not a migrating tribe in the manner of the Cimbri, Teutones or Ambrones. Orosius clearly has them involved with the grand alliance of tribes that determine to invade Italy, though he, and he alone, places them with the Ambrones at Aquae Sextiae and has the Cimbri and Teutones at Raudian Plain (Vercellae).421 Florus, however, also has the Tigurini involved in these events. Rather than having them at either Aquae Sextiae or Raudian Plain, he states that they followed the Cimbri, but did not join them in invading Italy and so avoided their fate in battle:
The third body, consisting of the Tigurini, who had taken up a position as a reserve force among the Norican ranges of the Alps, dispersing in different directions, resorted to ignoble flight and depredation and finally vanished away.422
Thus the last of the four tribes of the anti-Roman alliance, slipped away, after discovering the destruction of their allies. It was not until the time of Caesar that Rome faced them again.
Summary – Rome
Whilst we will be dealing with the aftermath of the wars later (Appendix I), it is appropriate to consider the impact of the campaigns of 102 and 101 BC in ending a series of wars that had been plaguing Rome’s northwestern border for over a decade. Ultimately, we must assess the central figure of Marius himself, and his contribution.
As we can see, not only is our understanding of the campaign and the battle affected by the few meagre sources we possess, but these very sources are highly susceptible to the prejudices of their own original sources. Of the three key commanders in the final battle, two of them wrote memoirs, and did so at times when one had become estranged from Marius and the other had become his mortal enemy (see Appendix V). Both can be seen to downplay Marius’ role and enlarge their own contribution. In the particular case of the Battle of Raudian Plain, there is a constant attempt to downplay Marius’ role and increase Catulus’. This can be seen through the above examples and with an additional piece of information given by Eutropius and found nowhere else:
Another battle [Raudian Plain] was fought with them [the Cimbri], by Caius Marius and Quintus Catulus, though with greater success on the part of Catulus…
Thirty-three standards were taken from the Cimbri; of which the army of Marius captured two, that of Catulus thirty-one.423
Whilst we can clearly see that the histories took against Marius, both as a reaction to the man himself, and his later actions (see Appendix I) and due to the fact that his two subordinates wrote autobiographies whilst they were political enemies of him, we need to take a step back and analyse the situation. Raudian Plain/Vercellae was the fourth time a Roman army had faced the Cimbri in a set-piece battle, the previous three being heavy defeats, culminating in the Battle of Arausio, widely accepted as being one of the greatest defeats the Romans ever suffered. The key question we are faced with is what the Romans did on this occasion that they had not done before. The Roman army at Raudian was smaller than the one at Arausio and again seemed to suffer from a joint command.
However, there is a clear difference between quality and quantity. The army of Marius had been in the field since 104 BC and had received vigorous training and re-equipping (see Chapter 11), not to mention its having been battle hardened with the victory at Aquae Sextiae. Furthermore, the two Roman forces acted and fought as one, with a clear overall commander (despite the attempts by certain sources to play up the discord between Marius and Catulus).
In terms of Marius himself, the two battles of the Northern Wars he fought are both marked by a careful selection of ground and tactics to suit (unlike the Battles of Cirta in the Jugurthine Wars). The comparison is a useful one, as Jugurtha always sought to fight on his own terms to make up the deficiencies of a weaker army. It is an interesting question as to how much Marius learnt from his near defeat at the Battles of Cirta, and whether this convinced him never to fight unless it was on his own terms. Furthermore, there are elements of the Raudian battle that point to Marius forcing the enemy to fight before they were fully prepared, thus pushing them into mistakes, much as Jugurtha had tried.
In the end, his tactics in both battles (Aquae Sextiae and Raudian Plain) allowed the Romans to avoid being swamped by the enemy’s superior numbers, one by utilizing topography and the other by seizing the initiative and turning the enemy’s numbers against him. For the earlier Roman losses, we have little information about the tactics used, but both Noreia and Arausio smack of rash command decisions by the Roman generals and no real thought being given on how to negate the enemy’s numerical superiority.
Throughout this work the impression one receives, rightly or not, is that Marius was really no innovative tactical genius, but merely a superbly competent general, thoroughly grounded in the basics of Roman warfare, centered on the principal of fighting battles on his terms not the enemy’s. This included choosing his ground carefully, identifying his enemy’s strengths and negating them and always keeping an element of surprise. At Aquae Sextiae he had a force hidden in the woods which attacked the enemy from the rear, and at Raudian Plain it involved forming up before the enemy was ready and forcing their hand. Thus in short, Marius appears to have been thoroughly accomplished in the basics of warfare, which when applied to a Roman army were highly successful.
Summary – The Tribes
We have far too little information to analyse the Cimbric tactics, even though they are often dismissed as nothing more than a barbarian mass charge. Clearly, the Cimbric chieftains were now used to the Roman manner of fighting, but for all their supposed invincibility they had been defeated on numerous occasions throughout this period, though not by Roman armies; we hear of defeats en-route to Illyria, in Gaul and in Spain. Thus in mass pitched battles they seemed to be bested, yet possess an ability to defeat Roman armies. We must be careful not to dismiss this as merely the traditional Roman weakness against ‘barbarian’ enemies, as voiced by Polybius himself, as only a decade before their first encounter with the Cimbri, the Romans had defeated the massed armies of the Arverni and Allobroges.424 Thus, either the Roman commanders that faced the Cimbri in the battles were so much poorer than their earlier counterparts, which is always a possibility, or the Cimbri possessed some form of combat that was especially suited to defeating a more developed infantry army. This may have been something as basic as sheer weight of numbers or some variation which utilized their greater manpower.
Unfortunately, we do not possess enough evidence to judge, but that should never allow us to dismiss them as merely the nameless enemy Rome was fighting, as it takes two sides to fight a battle. One interesting indicator comes from Orosius, who provides the names of four separate Cimbric kings or chieftains. It is all too readily assumed that the Cimbri were a single mass and fought as such. However, with so many chieftains, the more likely situation is that they lived and fought as a number of separate tribes and thus may have been prone to the same problems of separated command as the Romans suffered. Whilst this may have not been a problem when the enemy was on the back foot, when they were under pressure, it may well have resulted in disruption – either at a rushed start of the battle at Raudian Plain or when the cavalry were turned back upon their own lines.
Whilst we know the Cimbri were battle hardened against Rome, we must not assume this for all the tribal groupings, especially if the Teutones and Ambrones were new to the region (prior to 102 BC) and had not fought the Romans before. This would perhaps explain the ill-disciplined stand the Ambrones made at the river of Aquae Sextiae and the rash uphill charge several days later.
Ultimately, we do not have the evidence to tell, but we must exercise caution when viewing the tribal enemies Rome faced, and not view them as being a single and homogenous entity, but a collection of different groups with different leaders and experience. In cases like this, then, their very size may well have worked against them.