Chapter 1
Before we assess the period in question, we need to understand the background to the crisis that faced Rome in what is now referred to as the late second century BC. Here we have a fundamental problem, namely the loss of a good narrative source for events after 167 BC (when our surviving books of Livy end1. Furthermore, the year 146 BC has tended to form a watershed in Roman Republican history, being the year that saw Rome defeat and destroy Carthage in the Third Punic War and annex Greece in the Achaean War. With the destruction of Carthage and the annexation of Macedon and Greece, our focus tends to shift towards domestic politics, aided by the survival of Appian’s work on the Civil Wars (detailing events from 133 BC) and Plutarch’s biographies of a number of prominent individuals from this period. However, this shift of focus to the domestic situation after 146 BC can also be found in a strand of Roman thought, best explained by Sallust:
“But when our country had grown great through toil and the practice of justice, when great kings had been vanquished in war, savage tribes and mighty peoples subdued by force of arms, when Carthage, Rome’s rival for power had been destroyed, every land and sea lay open to her.”2
Thus for Sallust, and many writers and historians who have followed him, after 146 Rome lay unchallenged and our attention should focus on domestic issues, along with narratives of decline (see Appendix V). Yet when we actually look at the period between 146 and the outbreak of the Jugurthine and Northern Wars, we see that this is not necessarily the case. In fact, the period was one of near constant warfare, albeit of a different manner, but one which saw Roman imperialism develop in many new and interesting ways.
Roman Warfare and Imperialism (c.146–120 BC)
i) Spain
The Viriathic or Lusitanian War (155–138 BC)
The Second Celtiberian War (153–151 BC)
The Numantine War (Third Celtiberian War) (143–133 BC)
Although the year 146 saw an end to Rome’s conflicts in the east (Greece) and the south (Africa), in the west (Spain) it was a different matter. Roman imperialism and warfare in Spain had always been of a different nature to that in the south or east. The Romans fought not a united people or country, but a vast array of races and tribes in a region that was only unified by its unique geography (a vast isthmus jutting out into the seas and cut off from mainland Europe by the Pyrenees). Although Rome had taken possession of the Mediterranean coastline from Carthage, annexing the interior was a different matter, and turned into a two hundred year process of annexation and assimilation, which was not completed until the time of Augustus. The nature of this warfare famously led Polybius to state that whilst wars in Greece or Asia were decided decisively by one or two battles, in Spain the warfare was continuous, and by implication less suited to the Roman style of warfare.3 Throughout the second century the Roman military effort in Spain was one of near-constant low-level warfare against the various native tribes and towns, punctuated by the occasional large-scale conflicts against a particular people, which we refer to as the wars, though the period between them could hardly be called peace, at least not in our understanding of the word.
As the Romans advanced northwards and westward from their coastal possessions, they encountered a number of hostile peoples; two of the most implacable of which were the Lusitanians and the Celtiberian peoples. Despite the fact that 184 BC saw two Roman commanders celebrate triumphs over both peoples, by the 150s BC, both once again rose to fight against the Roman occupation of their regions.4 Both wars highlighted the problems that Roman military forces faced with barbarian armies, with Appian detailing a number of Roman reversals in battle.5 The Lusitanian War saw the rise of Viriathus, who became one of Spain’s great rebel leaders and a noted opponent of the Romans. Throughout the 140s Viriathus waged a successful war against the Romans, inflicting a number of defeats on them. It must be admitted that he was aided by the fact that Rome’s most experienced commanders and seasoned troops were fighting in North Africa and Greece during this period, showing the dangers of Roman military overstretch; fighting no fewer than four major wars at the same time, two of which were in Spain.6
Following the success in Africa and Greece, Rome was able to devote more manpower and its finest commanders to the Spanish Wars. However, events soon soured when a fresh conflict arose with the Celtiberians, who, although initially pacified, rose up once more, stirred up by both Viriathus’ success against the Romans and aid provided by him. Throughout the 140s Viriathus managed to inflict a series of defeat on the Romans. The war against Viriathus reached a peak in 141/140 under the Roman commander Q. Fabius Maximus Servilianus (the consul of 142).
As part of his preparations he even contacted the King of Numidia (Micipsa, see next chapter), which saw a number of African elephants deployed against the Lusitanians. In 141, Servilianus managed to defeat Viriathus and drive him back into Lusitania, bringing the region back under Roman control.7 Unfortunately for Servilianus however, his pursuit of Viriathus was turned into an ambush and the Romans were soundly defeated.8 Having pinned the Roman forces against a cliff, Viriathus then sought to bring the war to a conclusion by seeking a treaty with Rome.
With little option Servilianus agreed and Viriathus became a ‘friend and ally of the Roman people’, with his people’s title to their lands confirmed, all of which capped a remarkable reversal in Rome’s fortunes. However, the new commander of the war, Q. Servilius Caepio, the brother of Servilianus, saw the peace as a dishonourable one and immediately set about undermining it, apparently with senatorial backing.9 War was soon re-declared and Viriathus, outnumbered and betrayed, embarked upon a guerrilla war against the Romans, proving impossible to either defeat or capture (much as Jugurtha himself would be some thirty years later). To end the war Caepio turned once again to underhand tactics and bribed two envoys sent by Viriathus to negotiate terms. Upon their return to Viriathus’ camp, they murdered him during the night as he slept. Thus Rome achieved through treachery and murder what they could not on the battlefield (again a foretaste of the Jugurthine War). Without Viriathus, the Lusitanians were soon pacified.
The fragments of Diodorus preserve an excellent eulogy to the man:
By common consent he was a most valiant fighter in battle and a most able and forward thinking general; most important of all, throughout his entire career as a general he commanded the devotion of his troops to a degree unequalled by anyone.
The proofs of his abilities are manifest; for in the eleven years that he commanded the Lusitanians, his troops not only remained free of dissension but were all but invincible, whereas after his death the confederacy of the Lusitanians disintegrated once it was deprived of his leadership.10
The Third Celtiberian War, or Numantine War as it is also known, also proved to be an embarrassment to Rome, though for different reasons. Instead of throwing up a charismatic figurehead, it spawned an infamous siege centred on the town of Numantia in Spain. The town itself was high in the mountains surrounded by woodland and two rivers, with only one clear access road. Sieges in 142 by Q. Caecilius Metellus ‘Macedonicus’ (see Appendix IV) and Q. Pompeius in 141–140 BC, both failed.11 The latter suffered such heavy casualties that he negotiated a secret peace treaty with the inhabitants for a cessation of hostilities.
Again such a treaty was greeted with contempt by the Senate and the war continued under a fresh commander, M. Popillius Laenas (the consul of 139), though he met with similar failure. He in turn was replaced by C. Hostilius Mancinus (the consul of 137), who not only continued his predecessors’ records of failure but managed to get his entire army trapped and surrounded in their own camp. The army was only saved from annihilation by a treaty of surrender, partly negotiated by a young Ti. Sempronius Gracchus (see below). Naturally, upon his return to Rome, the Senate refused to ratify the treaty and actually had Mancinus sent back to the Numantines bound and naked.12
To date the siege of Numantia had being continuing intermittently for six years, longer than it had taken to besiege Carthage, and had done nothing but expose a series of incompetent Roman commanders and humiliate the reputation of the Roman army.
In 135 BC, sensing a chance for further glory, P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus (Africanus), the conqueror of Carthage, entered the fray. Offering himself to the people as the solution to the crisis, he had the tribunes suspend the laws regarding second consulships (his first being in 147 BC) and was not only elected as consul for 134 BC, but had the tribunes pass a law giving him command against the Numantines.13 Such a process was to have resonance when we consider the career of C. Marius later on (see chapter seven).
The parallels continue as Scipio raised a fresh force of men to take with him to Spain. Appian states that this was due to the limited amount of manpower available at the time, though this is much debated (see below and Appendix III).14He recruited a number of his own clients into service as well as contingents from client kings and allies abroad, including a force of Numidians led by their prince Jugurtha.15 He then joined up with the existing forces in Spain, amongst whom was a certain C. Marius. Appian details the exhaustive preparations made by Scipio for the siege and the detail of the siege itself, which included the creation of a wall around the city.16 Under his clear leadership and with the Numantines suffering from exhaustion, the city fell to Scipio in 133 BC, bringing him more plaudits and glory. The surrender of the inhabitants was followed by the destruction of the city, taking his personal tally of destroyed cities to two: Carthage and Numantia. The fall of Numantia brought an end to a turbulent period of Roman warfare in Spain, which had resulted in a number of reversals and humiliations. It also saw the rise of a charismatic rebel leader who continued to elude Rome and a Roman general who used the situation for his own advantage, overturning established practice.
ii) Macedon and Illyria
Macedonian Revolt (143 BC)
Scordiscian War (c.141–130s BC)
For the campaigns in the east in this period we have little more than fragmentary notices, yet the annexation of Macedon proved to be problematic for several reasons. Firstly, although the pretender Andriscus had been defeated and Macedon annexed in 148 BC, another rebellion soon broke out, this time in 143 BC, led by a man claiming to be Philip VI, a son of Perseus. This pretender soon gathered an army of slaves, numbering 16,000, but was defeated by the quaestor L. Tremellius Scrofa.17
Nevertheless, it does show how tenuous a grasp Rome had on the newly conquered Macedon. As well as internal threats from Macedon there were numerous fresh external threats. By annexing Macedon, Rome now had a massive exposure to the tribes of Central Europe, and a responsibility to defend Macedon’s borders (such as they were).
One of the key threats to Rome’s new province came from the tribe of the Scordisci, who will be detailed more later on (see Chapter 3). Rome’s first contact with the Scordisci apparently came in a war in Dalmatia in 156 BC, when Rome defeated an invasion of Illyria, though the details of the Scordiscian involvement are obscure.18 However, by 141 we find references to a Scordiscian invasion of Macedon and Rome being defeated in battle by them; the Periochae of Livy called it a disaster.19 Interestingly, there is a note in Appian stating that an unknown Roman commander name Cornelius met with a disaster against some unidentified Pannonians at roughly the same period. He goes on to say that the disaster was so great that the peoples of Italy feared for their safety (expecting a resulting invasion), however fanciful that may sound.20 The two events have been linked by a historian who argues that the ‘Pannonians’ were the Scordisci and that they invaded Macedon from the 140s through to the 130s.21 Again we have few details of these wars, but in 135, a praetor M. Cosconius is recorded to have defeated the Scordisci over the border in Thrace itself. We still find him in Macedon in 133 indicating the length and severity of the campaign.
The history of Roman involvement in Illyria was much like that of Spain, a near-constant series of small-scale wars with the tribes of the region to establish Roman authority. In 135 BC, we find one of the consuls of 135, Ser. Fulvius Flaccus, defeating the Vardaei tribe, who had raided the region under Roman suzerainty.22 Roman armies can again be found being deployed in Illyria, when in 129 BC, one of the consuls, C. Sempronius Tuditanus, fought against a tribe known as the Iapudes. Though we only have two references to the campaign, it is clear that Sempronius was defeated by the Illyrian tribe, though the situation was rescued by one of his legates, D. Iunius Brutus, and the Iapudes were ultimately defeated. Sempronius then returned to Rome to celebrate an (ill-deserved) triumph.23
iii) Sicily
The First Servile War (135–132 BC)
A new and unusual threat arose in this period, in what had been one of the oldest provinces of Rome’s empire, namely Sicily. The threat was a full-scale slave uprising on a scale that had never been seen before, so much so that it is often refered to as the First Servile War. Slave revolts had been a common enough occurrence, but had always been sporadic and localized and never posed a serious military threat. We will never perhaps understand what sparked off such an uprising, but factors such as charismatic leadership, geography and an unusual harshness of treatment have all been raised as factors.24
Whilst we have no full narrative account of the conflict, there is a lengthy fragment of Diodorus which preserves a number of details. The rebellion began around the town of Enna, in central Sicily and was led by a Syrian slave named Eunus, who apparently had something of a mystical air to him:
he was an Apamean by birth and had an aptitude for magic and the working of wonders. He claimed to foretell the future, by divine command, through dreams and because of his talents deceived many.25
Eunus belonged to a Sicilian named Damophilus, who was especially cruel to his slaves, which was the initial spark. The original rebellion centred on just 400 slaves, but they successfully managed to attack the town of Enna, slaughtering the freeborn inhabitants, an action which soon brought fresh recruits and spawned a number of other revolts on the island. Soon Eunus had an army of 6,000. A second revolt led by a slave named Cleon was equally successful, raising a force of 5,000 slaves, all of whom fell under the overall command of Eunus, who proclaimed himself a king in the Seleucid Syrian manner, taking the title of ‘Antiochus, king of the slaves’ and even minting his own coins.26 What further marks this revolt out, and what turned it into a war, was its being the first (recorded) conscious attempt by a slave force to fashion and conduct itself in military style and attempt to take and hold territory of their own.
Given the importance of Sicily to Rome, it being the main domestic provider of grain, the staple food product of the populace, a Roman army was soon dispatched to deal with this threat under the command of L. (Plautius) Hypsaeus. However, given that he had only a force of 8,000 Sicilian troops at his command, it is not that surprising that he was soon defeated.27 He was followed by the consul of 134, C. Fulvius Flaccus, who met with no greater success, though the details are unclear.28
Given that the war was taking place at the same time as that in Numantia, and that Scipio decided/was forced to raise his own additional forces, it begs the question how able Rome was to contend with an additional war in its own core territories.
The first notable Roman progress came under a consul of 133 BC, L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi, who captured the town of Murgantia and attacked Enna itself.29 He was succeeded by a consul of 132 BC, P. Rupilius, who stormed and retook the towns of Tauromenium and Enna, the key slave strongholds, killing over 20,000 of the slave army, finally bringing the war to an end.30 Of the ringleaders, Cleon had been killed in combat and Eunus fled but was eventually captured by the Romans, dying in captivity.31
The war is notable for a number of reasons. Firstly, it was the first time that a slave rebellion had taken on all the trappings of a full-blown military campaign. It came at a time when Roman forces were already overstretched, with wars in Spain and Asia ongoing. Furthermore, it appeared to spark off widespread, though short-lived, slave rebellions across Rome’s empire. Orosius mentions outbreaks in Italy itself, at Minturnae and Sinuesa, while both he and Diodorus mention rebellions in Attica, all of which required military action.32 A further rebellion was crushed by the inhabitants of Delos.33 The vital importance of the grain from Sicily would also have had an important domestic effect in Rome, especially for the urban populace, and it is not a coincidence that this war formed the backdrop for the tribunate of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus.
iv) Asia Minor
The Asiatic War (132–129 BC)
It is all too easy to fall into a narrative of imperial decline, but the next two theatres of war actually reversed this trend and saw Rome expand into new regions, both of which were to have crucial consequences in the future. The first one concerns Asia Minor and the famous so called ‘inheritance’ of the Kingdom of Pergamum. Pergamum had been one of Rome’s closest allies in Asia Minor, initially borne out of a desire to counterbalance Seleucid power in the region. This alliance took an unusual twist in 133 BC when the King of Pergamum, Attalus III, died without a clear successor. A will was found, now supported by epigraphic evidence, which named the Roman People as his inheritors.34 The whole incident is more known for its involvement with Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, who attempted to lay claim to the kingdom’s wealth to fund his land distribution policy (see below) than the details of its annexation and wider foreign policy issues.
Initially, we have the issue of just what Attalus had in mind when he made such a bequest or what the Senate’s initial thoughts were towards this unique situation. It is clear that Attalus wished his old allies to protect his people from what was certain to be the avaricious desire of Pergamum’s Asiatic neighbours, including Pontus and Bithynia. We can perhaps also detect a certain maliciousness from the grave towards his kingdom’s enemies, by permanently shackling them with Rome’s presence in the region. The scope of his intentions are another problem though, as the remaining fragments of the will appear to relate only to the city of Pergamum itself, not the rest of the kingdom.35
An equally interesting question is whether Rome initially intended to annex the region and establish a permanent foothold in Asia Minor, bringing them into close contact with the near-permanently feuding kingdoms of the region or merely take an income from the king’s property and leave the region autonomous. As was usual in such cases, the Senate established a five-man commission to go to Pergamum, assess the situation and report their findings.36 The only member of the commission we know of was P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica, the man so closely involved in the murder of Tiberius Gracchus, in a clear attempt to get him out of the city and calm tensions. This policy worked only too well when Scipio died whilst at Pergamum of what were reported to be unknown causes, though foul play cannot be ruled out.37
What was initially a benign situation erupted into a full-scale armed insurrection, when a royal pretender to the vacant throne, by the name of Aristonicus, rose up to claim the throne aided by the lower strata of Pergamum’s social order, thus mixing up internal class struggle and external intervention.38 The commission, without an army, initially had to rely upon the armies of Pergamum’s neighbours, all Roman allies to one degree or another. These included Nicomedes II of Bithynia, Ariarathes V of Cappodocia, who died during the rebellion, and Mithridates V of Pontus. Although Aristonicus was driven back into the interior of the kingdom, consular armies had to be sent out in 131 and 130. The commander of the 130 campaign, P. Licinius Crassus Dives Mucianus (consul of 131 BC) made some initial headway but was attacked as he was leaving the province, defeated and executed by Aristonicus near Leucae.39 However, Mucianus was succeeded by M. Perperna (consul of 130) who defeated Aristonicus in battle and forced his surrender.40 He died, a prisoner in Rome, soon afterwards.
One of the consuls of 129 (M. Aquilius) now had the job of organizing a settlement in the region, aided by a new ten-man commission. The fertile plains formed the new Roman province of Asia, whilst the mountainous inland regions were divided up between Pergamum’s neighbours, as both an expedient method of getting rid of areas that would be hard to administer and rewarding their earlier assistance, though the process did stir up jealousies amongst the claimants, notably Bithynia and Pontus. Rome, however, took the prize, the coastal cities of Asia Minor, which soon proved to be one of Rome’s richest provinces. Whatever their original intentions, the rebellion of Aristonicus and the hard fought campaigns of 132–130 turned the Senate’s policy towards annexation, at least of the richer parts of the region. Thus Asia became the first province Rome had taken since 146 BC and added greatly to the wealth flowing into Rome’s coffers. It did, however, tie Rome more closely with the feuding kingdoms of Asia Minor, which would ultimately lead to the Mithridatic Wars.41 Nevertheless, in the short term it was a military and imperial success.
v) Gaul
The Gallic War (125–120 BC)
Whilst the phrase ‘Gallic War’ has become synonymous with the campaigns of C. Iulius Caesar in the first century, it was in the 120s BC that Rome made its first concerted effort to control Gaul, at least its southern region. Until this point, Rome had no formal control of the region between her provinces in Spain and Italy itself, relying on allies such as the city of Massilia (Marseille) to keep the route free. However, strategic necessity dictated that sooner or later the Romans would need to secure that vital route for themselves. The danger lay in becoming too entangled with the seemingly borderless region of Gaul and the vast network of tribes that lay within it.
As is usual with this period, we have no narrative history for the campaigns, merely a few fragmentary references to it. Nevertheless it represented a major Roman campaign in itself and set Rome towards the acquisition of new territories. The war began when Rome’s old ally of Massilia sent an appeal for assistance against the Gallic tribe of the Salluvii, whose territory surrounded their city. One of the consuls of 125, M. Fulvius Flaccus was dispatched42 and not only defeated the Salluvii, but also the Ligurians and the Vocontii as well, though we do not know how they became involved in the conflict.43 For this Fulvius celebrated a triumph on his return in 123 BC.
The celebrations proved to be premature as one of the consuls of 124 BC (C. Sextius Calvinus) can be found fighting the same enemies during the next few years as well.44 During the course of another victorious campaign, Calvinus founded the town of Aquae Sextiae (see Chapter 9). Once again a triumph was celebrated over the Ligurians, Salluvii and Vocontii, this time in 122 BC. Such campaigns were a standard part of Rome’ northern defensive system, and had been conducted against the same enemies in 154 BC.45
However, on this occasion the war escalated, when the Salluvian king (Toutomotulus) fled to the neighbouring tribe, the Allobroges, probably the leading tribal power in the region.46 Again, Rome dispatched a consul, Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, who defeated the Allobroges near the town of Vindalium. Yet it appears that the anti-Roman feeling merely spread and we find one of the consuls of 121, Q. Fabius Maximus ‘Allobrogicus’, fighting an alliance of the Allobroges and the Arverni. The battle (at an unnamed location) took place on what now equates to the 8th August 121 BC, and saw 30,000 Romans facing an army in excess of 125,000 (which is the total number given for the Gallic dead, if we are to believe Livy’s compiler47. This victory brought the war to an end, with both tribes surrendering and Bituitus, the Arvernian king, going to Rome to make peace and surrender in person (where he and his son were held as hostages). Both Domitius and Fabius returned to Rome in 120 and both celebrated triumphs for their victories.
Clearly these campaigns were major ones, four consuls taking the field and the war ending with a massive battle against an alliance of two of the most powerful Gallic tribes. The war has an incredibly-low profile today, due to the few surviving sources that mention it and the fact that it took place at the same time as the tribunate of Caius Gracchus in Rome.48 Nevertheless, this should not obscure its significance. In total, the Romans defeated some five Gallic tribes, including two of the regional powers, the Allobroges and the Arverni.49 Furthermore, the Romans then established a permanent presence in the region, founding the town of Narbo in 118 BC, and carving out the embryonic province of Transalpine Gaul, formally connecting Spain to Italy for the first time.50 This connection was cemented by the construction of the Via Domitia.51 From a logistical point of view, securing a land connection between Spain and Italy, rather than relying on the declining power of Massilia, makes good sense. From a military point of view, defeating the leading powers of southern Gaul and ensuring their loyalty to Rome would not only secure this route, but also eased any pressure on Rome’s Alpine borders. However, as soon became clear, it did link Roman interests and holdings more openly to the varying balances of power in the Gallic region, a danger that they would not resolve until the time of Caesar.
vi) Other Campaigns of the Period
Two other campaigns in this period are worth mentioning, though we only have scant references to them. Firstly, in 123 BC, one of the consuls, Q. Caecilius Metellus ‘Baliaricus’ (see Appendix IV), having been given command against the pirates inhabiting the Balearic Islands, invaded and annexed the islands for Rome, establishing two citizen colonies on Majorca (Palma and Pollentia), formed from Roman colonists in Spain. Florus preserves a brief account of the campaign.52This annexation merely cemented Rome’s dominance of the western Mediterranean, securing vital sea routes to Spain, but also continued the trend of an increasing Roman empire.
A second and less glorious campaign took place within Italy itself when in 125 BC the Italian town of Fregellae rose up in revolt against Roman control, stirred up over the issue of acquiring Roman citizenship. On its own, the revolt stood little or no chance of success and a praetor (L. Opimius) soon took the town by storm and destroyed it.53 Nevertheless, it was a sign that, even in Italy, Roman supremacy could be challenged.
Summary
Thus the events of the period 146–120 BC do not appear to meet the impression which we find in Sallust, namely that after Carthage had been defeated Rome lay unchallenged. With the more clear-cut wars against Macedon and Carthage won, we can see that Rome became entangled in a number of conflicts with tribes who bordered Roman territory. Although on a map both Spain and Illyria were Roman territories, the tribes of the regions had other ideas. In both the Viriathic and Numantine Wars, Rome tasted defeat and setback, with repercussions at Rome. Policing Illyria and Macedon brought Rome in contact with the numerous central European tribes, none of whom respected Rome’s territorial borders, such as they were. Furthermore, the period saw the first full-scale slave war break out in Sicily, as well as the revolt of an Italian city.
Nevertheless, the period also saw Rome make some major steps forward in expanding her empire, in both Asia Minor and Gaul, both of which would lead Rome into future conflicts. Of the two, it is clear that the Gallic War of 125–120 was a major war, where Rome faced and defeated an alliance of the leading Gallic tribes of the region and took the strategic view that it was necessary to annex the coastal region of southern Gaul. If anything, in both this annexation of the coast of Asia Minor and, to a lesser degree, the Balearic Islands, we can see the development of a more strategic view to Rome’s actions. Both Transalpine Gaul and the Balearics secured vital routes to Spain, whilst Asia gave them vastly-increased revenue and established a firm Roman presence on the far side of the Aegean, securing the route to Greece.
Thus, we have evidence for Roman successes and failures in this period, all of which are essential background for covering the main period in question (120–100 BC) as well as when looking at the more well known domestic situation.
Roman Domestic Politics (146–111 BC)
At the same time as the events detailed above, Roman domestic politics entered an unprecedented upheaval, spilling over into bloodshed on the streets of Rome itself. Although this topic has been the subject of perhaps more scholarly effort than any other in Roman Republican history, and falls outside the remit of this work, several key themes do need highlighting, notably around the issue of military recruitment and the highly-vexatious manpower question.
Just as the year 146 BC acts as an unwanted cut off point in Roman foreign affairs, the year 133 BC has the same effect in Roman domestic politics. However, the tribunate of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus was not the first time that issues of land and military recruitment had been raised on the domestic stage.
Pre-Gracchan Tensions & Scipio Aemilianus
As Taylor showed so well in her groundbreaking article,54 tensions in Rome over military issues were common throughout this period, with repeated clashes between the tribunate and the rest of the Senatorial oligarchy.55 The two most obvious examples of this came in 151 and 138 BC, when on both occasions tribunes had the consuls actually imprisoned during disputes over the military levy for the wars in Spain.56 Had we books of Livy which covered the period 167–133 BC then we would no doubt uncover a number of other such clashes between the two offices. Thus the issue of continued military service appeared to be weighing heavily on the citizen population, who got the tribunes to vent their frustrations at the increasing burden.
It is during this period that we also hear of a proposed a law by a C. Laelius57 concerning the ownership of the ager publicus (public land), an issue at the heart of Ti. Gracchus’ measures in 133 BC and which plays a central role in the debate over manpower issues (see Appendix III). This unknown measure was dropped by Laelius after encountering strong Senatorial opposition, for which he received the cognomen of sapiens (the wise). It is also note-worthy that Plutarch makes a point of introducing Laelius as being an ally of Scipio Aemilianus, who plays an important role in these proceedings.58
At the same time as these events, a number of tribunes also passed measures which affected Rome’s electoral and judicial systems. The initial and main measure came in 139 with the lex Gabinia, introducing secret ballot for elections, which went some way to reducing the nobility’s control over their clients’ voting.59 This was followed in 137 BC by a lex Cassia which extended the principle of secret ballots to all judicial trials, except treason.60
As well as these tribunician measures, we also have the figure of P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, twice consul and destroyer of Carthage and Numantia. As well as his noted military accomplishments it is instructive to review the methods he used in domestic politics. It is interesting to note that for both of his consulships (147 and 134 BC) he utilised tribunes to clear any constitutional objections raised to his election. In 148 unnamed or ‘anonymous’ tribunes threatened to remove the Senate’s supervision of the consular elections unless they allowed Scipio to stand (being below the minimum age). When this tactic did not meet with success, these tribunes then repealed the law on age restrictions, restoring them after Scipio had been elected.61 In 135 BC, Scipio again faced a bar on being elected consul, as a law prevented repeated consulships within a decade. Once again Scipio turned to the tried and trusted use of tribunes and had the law repealed for his election and then reinstated.62
On this occasion though, Scipio went far further than anyone had gone before, and had ‘anonymous’ tribunes pass a law granting him command in Spain against the Numantines. Such an act was unprecedented (though it would be repeated often in later times), utilizing the tribunes to have the assembly grant him an overseas command, which lay, by the power of custom and practice, in the hands of the Senate. Given that such practices are more normally associated with the various key figures of the late Republic, notably C. Marius himself, it is fascinating to find their origins in this period, especially given the connections between Scipio and Marius.
The Tribunate of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus (133 BC)
This period of tribunician activity hit a peak in 133 BC, with the election of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus. His tribunate remains one of the most contentious and written about periods of Roman history and whilst there is neither the space, nor the scope to do more than highlight some key themes, there exist a number of good works on the subject (see bibliography).
Ti. Sempronius Gracchus hailed from one of Rome’s most distinguished plebeian aristocratic families. His father had been twice consul and censor,63 his mother was the daughter of Scipio Africanus and his father in law was Ap. Claudius Pulcher, the Princeps Senatus.64 His tribunate and subsequent murder at the end of his term of office marked the first death as a result of a domestic political struggle and many say ushered in a new era of violence in Roman domestic politics.65
The root cause of his death and the controversy was a law he passed which set a limit on the amount of public land (ager publicus) a man could hold, with a confiscation of any of this type of land over the limit and its distribution to the poorer landless citizens.66It is said to have been similar in type to the law proposed (and subsequently dropped) by C. Laelius a few years earlier and allegedly harked back to ancient statues in the limits of ager publicus a man could hold.67
Gracchus’ stated motives, which have been the focus of scholarly argument for over 2,000 years, were that he was motivated by his awareness of the growing problem of Roman citizens losing their farms due to extended military service, leading to the twin problems of there being less available manpower and an increase in slaves. It is alleged that the citizens who lost their farms were selling them to rich landowners who amalgamated them into super-estates run by slaves, whilst the landless citizens were moving into the city. By virtue of their being landless then they were not eligible for military recruitment, as the law stated that a man must possess a certain amount of land to be eligible to fight for Rome. The argument being that Roman tradition believed that a man with land fought harder for his country than a man without, being little better than a mercenary (see Appendix III).
Thus, it was argued that Gracchus’ law was aimed at getting the citizens out of the city and a life of dependency, back onto the land, thus making them eligible for military recruitment (which, it must be pointed out, would only start the cycle of extended service, neglect of farm, sale and city dwelling all over again). Furthermore, it would reduce Rome’s dependence on vast slave estates, which brought with it the threat of slave rebellions. Given that his tribunate in 133 coincided with the First Servile War in Sicily (see above), we can understand that this was a palpable fear.
This ager publicus itself was a special category of Roman land, whose ultimate ownership rested with the state. During the earlier centuries when Rome extended her rule throughout Italy, a portion of land was usually confiscated by Rome from the defeated Italian states. The land was owned by the Roman state itself and rented out to various interested parties to farm it, with the title remaining in public hands. Naturally, over the decades and centuries, many of the families which owned this land came to view it as a hereditary possession, despite the state being the ultimate owner.
Under Gracchus’ law all ancient ager publicus would be assessed by a threeman commission and each owner limited to 500 iugera (slightly higher than an acre), plus an extra 250 iugera for any sons (up to a limit of two). The commission was composed of himself, his younger brother and his father in law.68
Naturally enough, there were going to be a number of prominent landowners who would lose land which they considered to be theirs by right of inheritance, even though they had no legal title to it. Furthermore, the three-man board and the whole issue did carry the trace of political factionalism and Tiberius himself would certainly have benefited from it in terms of public popularity.69 For these reasons it was not surprising that the law was opposed in both the Senate and the assemblies by some of his fellow tribunes.
If the law itself was controversial then Tiberius’ methods only inflamed the situation. Facing opposition in the Senate, he did not present the law to them, but took it straight to the assemblies, which, although constitutionally legal, was against the accepted tradition and a clear snub to the Senate. When faced with the veto of a fellow tribune, rather than see if it could be argued out70, he had his fellow tribune, M. Octavius, deposed from office by popular vote, claiming that he was betraying his office by preventing a measure which clearly benefited the people.71 This was perhaps the most outrageous step Tiberius took, claiming a theory of popular sovereignty, which had no precedent. Although in theory the assemblies could vote out a tribune, it had never been done and undermined centuries of Roman constitutional practice.
Tiberius followed this by going yet further. When the Senate voted his commission insufficient funds to carry out its task, he then sequestered monies from the recent bequest of Pergamum in the will of Attalus III, thus completely encroaching on the Senate’s prerogative to decide on foreign affairs. Given these actions, it is easy to see why so many in the Senate were opposed to Gracchus, including many who, given more reasonable actions, would have supported his proposals. For many the final straw came when Tiberius stood for re-election to the tribunate for 132 BC. Such a move was highly contentious and had not been done in 200 years, since the (in)famous tribunates of Licinius & Sextius in the fourth century.72 This would allow Tiberius to be elected for a second year in succession and prevent him from prosecution for any of his acts (for that additional year).
To many in the Senate, this represented a dangerous situation and, fearful of his intentions, a mob of Senators attacked Gracchus and his supporters at the elections and lynched them. It is said that Tiberius was killed by P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica, the chief pontiff of Rome (the Pontifex Maximus).73 The years that followed saw a continuation of this factionalism, with a number of Tiberius’ supporters being put on trial for their support of the dead man, combined with a popular backlash against his murderers.
As noted above, Scipio Nasica was sent to Pergamum to deal with the bequest, but died soon after. Scipio Aemilianus, who had been in Numantia throughout this year when he heard of the news, famously quoted Homer, ‘So perish all who commit such wickedness’, even though he was married to Tiberius’ sister.74 By 129 BC, the rift caused by Tiberius’ murder continued, with a number of tribunes voicing their support for his actions.75 The year was notable for the mysterious death of Scipio Aemilianus himself, who was found dead in his bed the morning he was due to advocate measures limiting the powers of the Gracchan land commissioners.76 At the time everything from murder to suicide was advanced as theory behind his death and certainly murder was widely suspected.
The Tribunates of C. Sempronius Gracchus (123–122 BC)
Thus we can see the atmosphere that formed the backdrop of the Roman political scene throughout the years that followed 133 BC. Another shadow hung over Roman politics in this period, namely Tiberius’ younger brother Caius, widely expected to take up his brother’s cause. Caius did not disappoint, being elected as tribune in both 123 and again in 122 BC. Throughout the two years he produced a raft of legislation with far wider aims than his brother. Again the chronology of these measures is confused, as are some of the measures themselves.
In terms of the land issue, he re-issued his brother’s law of 133, which was probably more symbolic than meaningful, but went further by proposing a programme of founding new colonies, including one on the site of Carthage itself (Iunonia).77 More direct military issues were tackled with laws that provided clothing and equipment for legionaries at public expense rather than the soldier’s own (though again this may have been more a case of formalizing existing practice, and will be discussed later, in Appendix II). A further law barred the recruitment of young men under the age of seventeen.78 Caius also passed a law stating that all consular provinces must be named in advance of the election, to stop the Senate manipulating consular commands to favour certain individuals. He also introduced the right to collect the taxes in the province of Asia being auctioned off to the business community, favouring the equestrian order of businessmen. Another notable measure was the issuing of corn, the staple diet of an average Roman citizen, to the inhabitants of Rome, at a subsidized rate.79
Following his re-election for 122, which passed remarkably smoothly considering the issues it had raised when his brother attempted it, he widened his scope and attempted a more lasting alteration of the balance of Roman politics. He passed a law allowing all juries in corruption trials to be drawn from the equestrian order, reducing senatorial influence over the outcomes and ensuring equestrian corruption was dealt with sympathetically. He then proposed extending the franchise of Roman citizenship throughout Italy, in stages.80 Both measures would have extended Caius’ powerbase and raised issues that were not to be solved until decades later, perhaps not until the Principate itself. He clearly favoured the equestrian businessmen, themselves not an altogether separate class from the senatorial elite, by his measures on the Asian taxes and juries.81 Perhaps his most fundamental issue was his raising the prospect of extending the Roman citizenship franchise throughout Italy (albeit in a controlled manner), which was a Pandora’s Box not dealt with until the Social War and the censorship of 70 BC.
Thus Caius went far beyond his brother’s scope in terms of legislation. Again scholars have spent two millennia arguing over his motives, but the scope of these laws and proposals shows a desire to alter the shape of the Roman political landscape in a remarkably short period of time. It is equally clear that many of those who stood to benefit from these proposals would back him personally as well. In response, the Senate initially adopted a more measured approach and set about undermining his support, certainly within Rome itself.
One of Caius’ fellow tribunes of 122, M. Livius Drusus, proposed his own programme of colony foundation, on a reduced scale and vetoed the measures on extending the citizenship throughout Italy.82 On this occasion there was no resultant deposition of Drusus, perhaps as the urban populace of Rome were not enamoured with the prospects of sharing citizenship rights with the inhabitants of Italy. Thus Drusus presented a more subtle opposition to Caius and not one that could easily be dismissed. Furthermore, Caius spent a period time out of Rome, organizing the foundation of Iunonia on the site of Carthage and clearly suffered in popularity on his return.83 The obvious sign of this decline was his failure to be elected for a third consecutive tribunate, for 121 BC.
With Caius no longer a tribune, the Senate made a move in 121, via a compliant tribune (Minucius Rufus), to annul some of his previous legislation.84 When the day came for the measure to be passed Caius and his supporters protested at the assembly, during which a servant of the Consul L. Opimius was killed. Opimius was a noted opponent of Gracchus and used this death to argue that Caius was attempting an armed sedition, a charge levelled against his brother. On this occasion, rather than resort to a religiously-sanctioned lynching, the Senate, at Opimius’ behest, passed a unique piece of legislation known as the senatus consultum ultimum (the ultimate/final decree of the Senate), equivalent to the Riot Act in Great Britain, or Martial Law; a suspension of the usual laws and the rights of the individual. Caius and his supporters were then hunted down and murdered, legally, though that can have been of little comfort to those involved.85
Thus the 120s saw another round of state-sanctioned murder, this time veiled in a legal framework. These murders form the backdrop to the period in question and highlight the divisive nature that reform, political, agrarian or military, had taken. The decade that followed Caius Gracchus’ death repeated the pattern of the early 120s, with individual tribunes taking up the Gracchan cause (as it had become). Further agrarian laws were seen, the latest being in 111 BC, all of which amended Tiberius’ original proposals in some way. A notable tribune of this period was a certain C. Marius who was tribune in 119 and tapped into this atmosphere (see Chapter 7). It was in such a febrile atmosphere as this that key decisions were taken with regard to the Jugurthine Wars.