Chapter 4
With an examination of the background completed, we can now turn our attention to the Jugurthine War itself. Whilst Sallust’s short work provides a good narrative of the war, it does lack in-depth analysis. For this purpose we can break the war down into three phases, each under a different overall commander. This chapter will examine the initial two commanders, L. Calpurnius Bestia and Sp. Postumius Albinus, and the early phases of the war.
Initial Roman Aims
Though Rome had declared war on Jugurtha, as we have seen it was not one that the Senate had desired. As detailed in Chapter 2, the impetus for war had come from the equestrian order and the people, via the tribunes. This being the case, we must focus on the questions of what the Senate desired from this war and what instructions were given to the first commander of the war, L. Calpurnius Bestia.
With regard to the Roman aims, it is important to understand the dilemma which faced both the Senate and the consul responsible for pursuing the war. On the one hand Roman domestic outrage had to be appeased; Jugurtha had flagrantly disobeyed the Senatorial commission’s orders to end the Numidian Civil War peacefully and had massacred Italian citizens at Cirta, causing outrage, feigned or real, amongst both the people and the equestrian class. This was being exploited for political capital by a number of tribunes determined to undermine the Senatorial oligarchy and re-opened divides that had been exposed by the Gracchan crises in the previous decades. Thus there was a clear need for Jugurtha to be, or be seen to be, severely punished for his actions.
Yet, when considered from the wider perspectives, the Senate had reason to be cautious. Numidia represented no immediate threat to Roman interests in the region and Jugurtha was an apparently-staunch Roman ally. Certainly there would have been some Senators worried at the prospect of Numidia as the dominant power in North Africa, but given the close ties between the two powers, this would not have been a major concern. If anything, diverting military resources to a war in Africa was exactly the opposite of what current Roman foreign policy demanded. As detailed in Chapter 3, for the previous decade all of Rome’s military efforts had been focussed on securing her fragile northern borders from barbarian threats. This was not the time to commit troops overseas when Italy itself was potentially at risk (which given the Cimbric threat, must have been a real concern).
Furthermore, given that Rome already occupied the fertile plains of North Africa, there was no impetus for turning this into a war of conquest. Added to this was the problem of who would rule Numidia, if Jugurtha were to be removed. Adherbal’s death in Cirta had removed the last of the triumvirate of Micipsa’s children who had been kings of Numidia, though there were a number of other descendants of Massinissa who could have been elevated to the throne, possibly of a freshly-divided Numidia. In fact, given the previous ruling of the Senatorial commission and the fact that if Jugurtha remained sole king then he would have profited by his actions, it is most likely that the re-division of Numidia would have been a desired Roman outcome.
Therefore, for the Senate and its commander this war was to be a punishment campaign, to bring Jugurtha to submission and ensure that the Senate’s vision for Numidia be enforced, all to be accomplished in the shortest possible timescale and with the minimum of effort. The nature of Jugurtha’s submission is an interesting question, given both his crimes and his previous loyalty to Rome. It is unlikely that the Senate would have considered stripping him of his throne completely, merely humbling him and gaining his public submission.
The Roman Commander - L. Calpurnius Bestia
These were the complicated circumstances which faced the consuls of 111 B.C. The two men elected were P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica and L. Calpurnius Bestia. It is interesting that a Scipio managed to get elected for 111 BC, despite the overall decline in prominence of the family, given their close family ties to the Numidian royal family. If this link was in the mind of the electorate then the lot which decided the consular commands at random denied them their intention, as the command for Africa fell to Calpurnius Bestia. It is no surprise that the other consular command was Italy, covering any possible return of the Cimbri.
Bestia himself was of the plebeian nobility and appears to have been the first of his family to achieve high office. He is the earliest recorded member of his family to achieve an office of the cursus honorum and the first to achieve the consulship.184 He had been a tribune, but we know nothing of his praetorship and thus have no knowledge of his military record to date or how competent an officer he was185. On the positive side, we are told that he choose an experienced group of noblemen as his legates for the campaign, which included M. Aemilius Scaurus, the former consul of 115 BC (see Chapter 2).
Again, one of the hallmarks of Sallust’ narrative is a lack of military detail. We are not told the size of the army levied by Bestia to take to Africa. However, for the events of the following years we are told that the Roman army was 40,000 strong.186 Given that Bestia’ campaign was only intended to be a punitive expedition, and given concerns elsewhere, notably Italy, it may have been that the army of 111 BC was considerably smaller, but we simply have no firm evidence. We are also informed that the army was freshly levied in Italy, as was the norm.187
Initial Jugurthine Aims
It is clear that Jugurtha had not expected Rome to declare war on him for his attack on Cirta. Whether this was due to his financial largesse amongst the Senate or the more prosaic reasons surrounding Roman indifference towards events in Numidia and focus on the north we will never know. What is clear is that even at this stage he hoped to avoid a military confrontation and to these ends he sent an unnamed son as an emissary to Rome to negotiate with the Senate. However, the Senate refused him entry into the city and ordered his party to leave Italy within ten days unless they could offer Jugurtha’s unconditional surrender. They left Italy, clearly having not been authorized to make such an offer.
If it was to be war then, given Jugurtha’s detailed knowledge of the Roman political and military systems, we must examine what his options and strategies would have been. It is clear from the sending of further emissaries that he realized that although war had been declared, the situation did not necessarily have to result in open warfare. Clearly his best option lay in avoiding full-scale warfare and negotiating a settlement that left him with at least a throne of Numidia, if not the only one. If he engaged Rome in combat, regardless of the outcome, Rome would have no option but to remove him. Thus any Roman invasion would have to be met by a policy of falling back and negotiating a limited submission. Whether this would involve illicit payments to Roman commanders is unclear, but it certainly would have helped.
Again, we have no clear idea of the scale of the Numidian army. What we must acknowledge is that the terrain of Numidia was desert plains, which suited the Numidian light cavalry rather than the Roman heavy infantry.
The Campaign of 111 BC – The Phoney War
Given the above points it is not surprising that the campaign of 111 BC turned into a ‘phoney war’, with neither side committed to full-scale warfare. Sallust only provides brief details of the campaign. Bestia gathered his army at Rhegium and transferred them from there to Sicily and from Sicily to Roman Africa. Once in Roman Africa he mounted a swift offensive against the nearest Numidian towns, though again we are not told which ones. The only details we are given is that a number of towns were taken by storm, resulting in a large number of prisoners being taken.188
This is all we know about the military events of 111 BC. A number of other sources briefly mention the campaign, but nearly all omit even these basic details. However, we should not follow Sallust’s lead and dismiss this campaign. In both military and political terms, Bestia was pursuing a sound policy. He had with him an inexperienced army, operating in a region that no Roman soldier had fought in for a generation (since the Third Punic War). Thus, it was imperative that they be blooded in combat without being put at risk, hence some basic siege operations to build up experience and confidence, as well as allowing the opportunity for quick booty. For the purpose of the expedition the sacking of Numidian towns was an excellent method of punishing the Numidian people for the transgressions of Jugurtha. Even Sallust, who seems to have been loath to say anything good about Bestia, admires the swiftness of the initial campaigning.
Following these initial attacks, Jugurtha adopted a familiar tactic and opened negotiations with Bestia. It is here that Sallust immediately condemns Bestia and his deputy Scaurus, a condemnation that has echoed throughout all of the surviving sources. Sallust immediately saw this as nothing more than blatant bribery and lambasts Bestia and Scaurus thus:
the consul’s mind, demoralized as it was by avarice, was easily turned from its purpose. Moreover, he took Scaurus as an accomplice in all his designs: for although at first, even after many in his own party had been seduced, Scaurus had vigorously opposed the king, a huge bribe turned him from honour and virtue to criminality.189
As pointed out earlier, negotiating with the Romans was a sound policy for Jugurtha. Despite the Roman invasion of Numidia, full disaster could be averted by submitting to Rome and doing penance for the massacre at Cirta. The only irreversible act would be to engage the Romans in battle. Thus we hear of no Numidian military activity at this time. If some cities had to be sacrificed to the Roman appetite for glory, it was a small price to pay for keeping his head and his throne.
However, given the earlier Roman demand for an unconditional surrender, what can be said of Rome’s attitude towards fresh negotiations? Leaving aside Sallust’s view that negotiating with Jugurtha was nothing more than blatant corruption, it can be argued that Bestia was actually acting in Rome’s best interests. In the first few months of campaigning, Jugurtha had shown no sign of engaging the Roman forces, which raised the clear prospect of a long-drawn-out desert war with the enemy refusing to give battle. This was exactly the type of situation which the Senate would have hoped to avoid. If Jugurtha could be humbled by a show of force and be publicly brought back into the Roman fold, then there was no reason for the war to continue; Roman power and Roman honour would have been satisfied. This is not to say that monies did not change hands between the two parties, merely that it was not the cause of the negotiations and the treaty that followed.
These negotiations led to an armistice and then a settlement. ‘Armistice’ is a bit of a misnomer given that to date the war had been nothing more than the Romans attacking and plundering towns near the Numidian/Roman African border. The price of the armistice was the gift of grain from the Numidians to the invading Roman troops, which was both logistically astute and an obvious token of submission. With that achieved, Jugurtha appeared before a Roman council of war, formed from amongst the senior commanders of the Roman army, and made his offer of submission and surrender. In practical terms this included thirty elephants, a number of cattle and horses and an amount of silver.
Thus the war appeared to be over in less than a year. Numidia was at peace and Bestia was able to return to Rome to hold the elections for the consuls of 110 BC. This was slightly unusual, but his colleague Scipio, who had been assigned Italy as his province had died and we hear of no suffect consul being elected in his place. For Bestia, the war had been an apparent success; his army had launched a punitive attack on an errant ally and brought him back into line with the submission of the king and the payment of an appropriate indemnity. Thus it was short, successful and profitable. Whether there had been further secret donations provided by Jugurtha, we will never know. Nevertheless, given Bestia’s probable instructions for the ‘war’, he had achieved them admirably.
Matters of War and Peace in Rome
However, it was at this point that the change in Roman domestic politics became apparent. Once again the tribune C. Memmius stirred up the urban populace by claiming that this settlement, which from a logical point of view had achieved the limited Senatorial aims, was a betrayal of the Roman people and the result of Senatorial corruption. Unsurprisingly, this matter is given in great detail by Sallust, who reports what purports to be Memmius’ speech on the matter.190
Having agitated the urban populace into believing that this was a dishonourable peace, achieved by foreign bribery, Memmius once again usurped the Senate’s control of foreign policy and had the popular assemblies pass a plebiscitumordering the praetor L. Cassius to go to Numidia to bring Jugurtha back to Rome to give evidence against the nobles accused of accepting his ‘bribes’. Thus, the war against Numidia and the peace negotiations were put on hold and Jugurtha, who had been declaimed as an enemy of Rome by Memmius, was now being called as a witness to substantiate his accusations. Thus it is clear that foreign affairs were now clearly at the mercy of the domestic clashes between the Senate and other sections of the population. It was a clear indicator of things to come and though Memmius was the first to manipulate the Numidian crisis for his own ends, he was not to be the last.
Sallust reports the effect that this unorthodox delay had on the Roman army in Numidia, with reports of desertion, attacks on the locals and the sale of the donated elephants back to the Numidians.191 Once again it appears that the much-vaunted Roman military discipline was breaking down. What effect the arrival of Cassius had on Jugurtha we can only speculate. The Romans had declared war on him, invaded Numidia, attacked his towns, forced his surrender and were now calling him as a witness in a corruption hearing. The latter placed him in a highly awkward position. He clearly needed both the Senate and People to ratify his peace treaty, but could not afford to antagonize either of them. Certainly, even if there was bribery, he could not implicate his own allies within the Senate.
Fortunately for Jugurtha, this situation was salvaged when a tribunician colleague of Memmius, C. Babeius, utilized his right to intervene (intercessio) to prevent the king from speaking. As is to be expected, Sallust attributes this intervention to a large Jugurthan bribe, but in reality there were a number of senators who would have not wished potentially-damning evidence to be given. Thus the year ended with stalemate, both in military terms in Numidia and political terms in Rome, with one being beholden to the other.
This uneasy peace between Rome and Numidia was shattered by one act: the murder of a Numidian prince, Massiva, who was reportedly being touted as a rival candidate to Jugurtha for the Numidian throne. Massiva was a son of the Numidian co-regent, Gulassa, brother of King Micipsa, and thus a cousin to Jugurtha. We know nothing about his age or upbringing, but he had clearly been excluded from Micipsa’s plans for the succession. Sallust tells us that during the Numidian Civil War he was a supporter of Adherbal, who had fled to Rome after the latter’s murder. With war between Rome and Jugurtha, attention turned to him as a possible new co-regent of Numidia or a straight replacement for Jugurtha.192
These hopes were apparently fostered by Sp. Postumius Albinus, who was elected as one of the consuls of 110 BC and who had received Numidia in the lot for provinces. Here we again see the drawback of Rome’s annual system of rotating command. L. Calpurnius Bestia had successfully led a punitive campaign and brought about Jugurtha’s submission. His successor, eager for glory himself and without an approved peace between Rome and Numidia, appeared to be eager to renew the war.
It appears that as Massiva had been in Rome since 112 BC, and it is likely that he had been advocating his own elevation to either the sole or joint kingship for some time, what he now had was consular backing for this desire. Sallust reports that a proposal making Massiva king of Numidia (though whether this was as sole or joint king is unclear) was apparently in preparation to be brought before the Senate.193 Certainly, Massiva’s elevation would have allowed the Senate to return to their earlier settlement and divide Numidia once more, most probably with Massiva receiving Adherbal’s kingdom of Eastern Numidia.
This action or even rumoured action would have placed Jugurtha in a terrible position. If he did nothing, at best he would return to the position of 118 BC, and at worst he would be ousted altogether. Yet he had spent months in Rome witnessing the chaos that Rome’s political system had descended into. Therefore, he took a gamble and ordered a subordinate (Bomilcar) to arrange the murder of Massiva. The murder succeeded, but the gamble failed when the assassin was caught and confessed, with Bomilcar duly being put on trial. Here Jugurtha made his final fateful decision, and chose to protect his subordinate by secreting him back to Numidia. This proved to be the final break with the Senate who ordered Jugurtha out of Italy and a renewal of hostilities. As Jugurtha left Sallust has him looking back and saying, ‘A city for sale and doomed to speedy destruction if it finds a purchaser,’ though this is more likely to have been Sallust’s view rather than Jugurtha’s.
The Campaign of 110 BC – Renewal of War and Roman Disaster
Roman Aims
With the breakdown of negotiations and the blatant act of treachery committed in their own midst, the Senate would have had no option but to be committed to a full-scale war in Numidia with the aim of removing Jugurtha. Despite Massiva’s assassination there were enough members of the Numidian ruling family from whom a pliable client-king could be found. Thus it was only in 110 BC, nearly eighteen months after war had been declared, the Roman state was fully committed to the war.
The Roman Commander – Sp. Postumius Albinus
The new Roman commander hailed from a patrician family which had a record of consulships dating back to the fourth century BC and a distinguished (if unspectacular) military record. It is clear from his actions in Rome that he was committed to a war in Numidia, which he would have been seen as an opportunity for personal military glory. Thus the war now had a fully committed Roman commander with clear aims.
Jugurthan Aims
For Jugurtha, the murder of Massiva and facilitating the escape of the organiser of the plot from Roman justice had been a step too far. This was a clear affront to Roman dignity and one which would have been difficult to justify. Yet even at this point, he would have had a clear sense that he still had a number of factors in his favour. The terrain suited the fast ‘hit and run’ type of warfare favoured by the Numidians, with their light cavalry. Furthermore, knowing the Roman military as he did, it was clear that he would have to avoid a full-scale pitched battle and frustrate the enemy. Albinus’ command was only for a year and then Jugurtha would be facing a fresh Roman consul, who may have been more open to negotiation/bribery (at least in Jugurtha’s mind).
The Campaign of 110 BC
Postumius arrived in Numidia to take charge of the army stationed there, along with fresh pay and supplies, but no fresh troops. We are not told what measures he took to restore discipline, but it seems unlikely there were major changes given the events that followed. Once again Sallust is light on the details of the campaign of 110 BC, but what is clear is that it followed the familiar pattern of vigorous thrusts from Postumius’ forces being met with a Numidian refusal to give battle.194It can be said that Jugurtha copied the classic Roman ‘Fabian tactic’ of refusing to give battle when faced with a superior fighting force.195 At the same time as refusing to give battle, Jugurtha continued with his offers to negotiate a settlement, whilst harrying the Roman forces with lightning raids. These would have served a two-fold purpose: to frustrate the Roman forces and convince them that there would be no military solution to the war, whilst bolstering the morale of his own forces, showing them how slow and ineffectual the Roman method of warfare was.
Again, here we have a perfect example of the flaws in the Roman military machine; when faced with a static enemy, such as an opposing army or a town, the Roman heavy infantry had no equal. When faced with a guerrilla army, be it in the forests of Spain or the deserts of North Africa, the Romans had little response. The recent defeats suffered at the hand of the Scordisci and Cimbri highlighted the Roman vulnerability to foes that did not give battle in the same manner.
For Postumius it was a frustrating campaign, with the Numidians refusing to give battle and prevaricating over submission. This in turn resulted in dissatisfaction in Rome about the time it was taking to finish what was meant to be an easy war. As the year passed by, we can easily understand Postumius’ growing frustration, knowing that with the election of fresh consuls, he would lose his chance for victory and his consulship would end in relative failure. Obviously frustrated and feeling the pressure from Rome, Postumius left Africa to conduct the consular elections for 109 BC, leaving his forces in camp under the command of his brother A. Postumius Albinus.
However, Spurius’ absence turned out to be longer than expected, again resulting from trouble in Rome with tribunes. This time it was P. Licinius Lucullus and L. Annius who were attempting to seek re-election to the tribunate, which, whilst not illegal, was strenuously opposed by many who sought to avoid entrenched tribunes and a return to the days of the Gracchi.196 In the deadlock that followed, all elections for 109 BC were delayed, with Sp. Postumius remaining in Rome. Once again Roman military activities in Numidia became beholden to domestic political infighting, centred on the tribunes.
The Battle of Suthul
In his brother’s absence, Aulus Postumius saw an opportunity to restore his family’s glory (and his own) and planned a knockout blow at Jugurtha by moving to attack his treasury, at the town of Suthul, during the winter of 110/109 BC.197However, the town’s defences proved to be formidable and the initial assault failed, with the Roman army digging in for a winter siege. It was at this point that Jugurtha made a fateful decision and one which changed the course of the war. Abandoning his previous policy of not engaging the Romans in battle, and seeing the opportunity of a weak Roman army, led by an inexperienced commander, he decided to commit his forces fully to the war and attack the Roman forces.
In secret, he amassed his own forces and marched them to a position near Suthul, then sent emissaries to Aulus Postumius promising a favourable settlement. Using these promises he got Aulus to break his siege of Suthul and lead his army into following Jugurtha’s. Why Aulus did this will never be known. The most plausible explanation is that he shadowed Jugurtha’s army, hoping that if the offer of a settlement proved to be false, he could at least engage Jugurtha’s army in battle. Thus Aulus allowed himself to be led straight into a trap. The key problem for the Romans here being that the most experienced Roman commander was leading the Numidian army not the Roman one. As the two armies shadowed each other, Jugurtha put his knowledge of the Roman soldiers to good use and sent agents amongst apparently disaffected Roman forces. Such disaffection is easy to understand, given that they were now coming to the end of a second year with little to show for their efforts, apart from a collapsed peace treaty of the previous year and another year spent chasing shadows around the desert.
At a set time (again we are not told when), Jugurtha sprung his trap. As the Romans made camp for the night, Jugurtha was able to secretly surround them with a large Numidian force, catching them unawares. From Sallust’s description the Numidian attack on the Roman camp turned into an utter Roman rout; unprepared, inexperienced and suffering from a number of either pre-planned or spontaneous desertions, Aulus’ army fled from the camp with little resistance, seeking shelter in the nearby hills.198 The attack was a spectacular victory for Jugurtha who had routed a Roman invading army with minimum casualties. Once again he stuck to his policy of not meeting the Romans in open battle and defeated a force of 40,000 Romans (if we are to believe the figures provided by Orosius199, though we are not given Roman casualties.
The next day, Jugurtha sent an emissary to Aulus Postumius and made clear his terms. In return for their lives, Aulus would agree to evacuate all Roman forces from Numidia and the survivors of his army would have to pass under the yoke as a sign of submission. Faced with little alternative and no real chance of resisting, Aulus agreed to the shameful terms and agreed a treaty with Jugurtha. Thus the winter of 110/109 BC saw the complete defeat of the Roman invasion of Numidia and a Roman commander agreeing to a unconditional surrender to Jugurtha rather than the other way around.
Summary of the Early Campaigns – Rome
Although we posses little detail of the military campaigns of the first two years, there can be no denying that the Romans had a poor start to the war. A number of factors can be seen throughout these first two years. First and foremost is that Rome appears to have had no clear plan of what they were hoping to achieve in the war and this is reflected in their military activities. This lack of direction was a direct result of the circumstances surrounding the outbreak of the war; was Jugurtha an enemy of Rome or an errant ally?
At no point did either Calpurnius Bestia or the Postumii Albinii treat the war as though they intended to defeat Jugurtha and ensure his capture, as they would with an outright enemy king. All three commanders acted as though they were on punitive expeditions designed to bring Jugurtha to heel. The people, or at least a section of them stirred by the tribune Memmius, may have wanted an aggressive war with Jugurtha, but the Senate did not. Jugurtha and Numidia had always been allies of Rome and in the Senate’s view there were more pressing issues. In 111 BC Jugurtha appeared to have agreed with the Roman view and soon negotiated himself into an armistice. After the events of 110 BC in Rome, the matter became more serious, but as the disaster with Aulus Postumius showed, Jugurtha was still not seen as an implacable enemy of Rome. With the defeat and humiliation of a Roman army however, this was bound to change.
This lack of a clear plan for the war was supported by the chaotic political situation in Rome during both years, which only contributed to the uncertainty. In 111 BC Memmius stoked up the desire to treat Jugurtha as an enemy of Rome and then called him to Rome under the protection of the people, as a witness in a political witch-hunt. The following year, the chaos surrounding the tribunician elections kept the consul in Rome for far longer than he was meant to be, which left his army in the command of his even more inexperienced brother.
This brings us onto our third point, the quality of the commanders chosen to face Jugurtha. Although both Calpurnius and Postumius seem to have been perfectly competent commanders in their own rights, both were inferior in military experience and tactics to Jugurtha. In fact Jugurtha probably had more experience in Roman warfare than either of his two opponents, having served though the Numantine War (though we do not know where either man served prior to their consulships).
The next obvious point concerns the quality of the Roman army in Numidia. Despite Sallust’s work on the war, he provides little in the way of military details. The only clear figure we have for troop numbers comes from Orosius, writing in the fifth century AD (though he may have used Livy – see Appendix V), who puts Postumius’ Roman forces at 40,000 strong, which is perhaps a higher figure than we would expect for a campaign of this nature, at this time. The only other detail comes from Sallust who states that the Third Legion was present at the Roman defeat in 110. However, aside from the numbers and identities, the most important observation regarding the Roman army in Numidia concerns their quality, or lack thereof.
Both during the winter of 111/110 BC and the winter campaign of 110/109, the sources report that discipline, both in camp and in the face of the enemy, was poor.
In the first winter we have reports of desertions, banditry and collusion with the enemy, whilst in the following year, even allowing for Sallust’s usual charges of bribery, there was desertion and flight in the face of the enemy, and the ineptitude (or bribery) involved in allowing the Numidians to draw up a large force to attack the Roman camp undetected. In short, this was a continuation of the poor quality and training of the recruits that had been seen in the Numantine War some twenty years before. In this case, it contributed to the Romans withdrawing from Numidia in defeat and disgrace.
Summary of the Early Campaigns – Numidia
For the Numidians, at first glance the war to date had been a complete success. The Roman invasion of 111 BC had soon been blunted by negotiation and its renewal in 110 BC had resulted in a complete Roman defeat. However, as Jugurtha would have well known, the point of no return had been passed in the winter of 110/109 BC. As pointed out above, for the majority of the first two campaigns the Romans did not know what type of war they were pursuing and this was partly down to Jugurtha’s skill in not overtly appearing as Rome’s enemy. This was aided by his sensible decision not to face the Romans in battle, knowing only too well their military superiority in face-to-face conflict and their weaknesses when faced with a guerrilla campaign (of the type he had witnessed first-hand in Numantia). This policy meant that even by the winter of 110/109, he was still not an implacable enemy of Rome and that is the main reason why Aulus Postumius was still willing to negotiate, rather than solely due to the familiar allegations of bribery.
However, in attacking and routing a Roman army, not to mention forcing them under the yoke, he had clearly abandoned this previous policy and crossed the line into becoming a full-blown enemy of Rome. He would have known only too well what the reaction in Rome would have been and that now he truly was at war with Rome. There are two possible reasons for this change of tactic. Firstly, he saw an unparalleled opportunity to inflict an easy defeat on Rome, which would not come again nor could be easily passed up. Secondly, it was likely that he was under pressure at home to stand up to the Romans rather than prevaricating, however successful it had been. For the Numidians as a whole, they had just gone through a long civil war and now had Roman armies attacking their cities, ostensibly for the actions of their king. It is entirely possible that Jugurtha was under pressure to deliver, which he did in spectacular form. Orosius notes that following this victory he consolidated his position in North Africa by adding a number of smaller territories to his own, but no details are given.200 Certainly, this victory would have enhanced his reputation as a great African leader.
This leaves us with the question of what his long-term aims were now that he had crossed the line and gone into direct conflict with Rome. Jugurtha would have been only too well aware that ultimately he could not win a war against Rome, given the massive disparity in resources. Yet, he possessed a good understanding of the Roman mentality (or at least that of the Senatorial elite). The war was unpopular in the Senate and if he could make it as uncomfortable as possible, by denying them quick victories and using hit-and-run tactics then it was just possible to arrange a negotiated settlement, especially if he could hold out until the barbarian crisis became more acute. However, weighing heavily against this option was his defeat and humiliation of Aulus’ army and the reaction of the forces opposed to the Senate in Rome.
Backlash at Rome
When news of the defeat and humiliating treaty reached Rome, the shock and outrage was understandable. In the Senate, focus immediately shifted to the treaty Aulus Postumius had agreed to and whether the Senate would ratify it. Naturally, this placed the consul Sp. Postumius in an impossible decision. Supporting his brother meant supporting his treaty, which no Roman would ever agree to. Unsurprisingly, the Senate refused to ratify the treaty, using the dubious excuse that no treaty could be binding without the agreement of the Senate and People of Rome. Spurius then made attempts to recover the situation in Africa by raising fresh forces in Rome and from the allies. However, unnamed tribunes prevented him from taking them to Africa.201 He thus returned to the Roman province of Africa himself, to try to rebuild his army, but could take no immediate action against Jugurtha.202
However expected the reactions of the Senate were, the tribunes went a stage further. Not only did they prevent fresh reinforcements from reaching the province, but one tribune, C. Mamilius Limetanus, proposed an extraordinary piece of legislation which created a special court to try those deemed to have aided Jugurtha, either directly or indirectly. Sallust gives examples of those soldiers and officers who sold the Numidian elephants back to Jugurtha, those who deserted the army and Aulus Postumius himself, who had agreed to the disgraceful treaty. This was the first such special court to try those who were suspected of betraying Rome and the looseness of the wording brought all those who were suspected of having been bribed by Jugurtha under its remit.203