2
Military intelligence 509–264 bc
Rome, the small agricultural community on the Tiber, would become in little more than three centuries the leading military and political force on the Italian peninsula. In their early encounters with hostile neighbors, the Romans had shown a limited tendency to rely on spies and scouts to forewarn them of an approaching enemy. Rome’s rapid growth brought with it new military commitments, political challenges, and, of course, new intelligence requirements. It is not surprising that we find concomitant changes in their government and military institutions to cope with the ever-growing intelligence needs.
Military reforms, outside the realm of intelligence, were significant during the sixth through fourth centuries bc. In central Italy during the fifth century there seems to have been little difference in practice between warfare and brigandage.1 But as Rome spread throughout the Italian peninsula, this began to change. Roman warriors who originally had not differed much in appearance from their opponents, and who probably employed similar battle tactics, adopted the Greek hoplite phalanx from their enemies, the Etruscans.2 Wars fought in these formations were won by the clash of heavily armed, tightly packed, close-ordered combat formations.3 Operational intelligence may not have been of supreme importance in this era, because as long as such formations were used, neither surprise and speed, nor detailed reconnaissance could have contributed much to the success of a phalanx if it really was, as described by many authors, a rigidly marshaled, slow-moving army that met in pitched battle on level ground. That is not so say that either the Greeks or the Romans used this type of formation exclusively, but as long as the hoplite phalanx remained the sole infantry formation, little or nothing could be done to take advantage of weaknesses in the enemy’s disposition – for instance, by improvising an ambush or a surprise attack.4 When ambushes or surprise attacks were planned, they were usually done by small groups of skirmishers, by night attacks, or attacking other armies on the march.5
The hoplite phalanx, as it is described in the classical Greek era of the fifth century, had three major shortcomings that rendered it less than useful for surprise tactics. The first was clumsiness. Everything depended on the whole phalanx maintaining its alignment, thereby precluding any extempore performance of sudden maneuvers. Secondly, inflexibility. Holding no reserves, and with no authority being delegated to subordinates, the phalanx could fight only one type of battle. And thirdly, susceptibility to confusion. With so much hinging on the unbroken line, this cumbersome body could not seek out an enemy, only a battlefield.6 For the phalanx to be operational, the antagonists must share an identical doctrine. This type of ritual combat gave the warriors an opportunity to demonstrate their solidarity with their fellow citizens, as much as it did their own prowess. But unless both sides played by the same rules, using a phalanx could actually be a disadvantage.
By the fourth century the Romans realized that they needed another change. The wars against the Samnites marked the turning point that gave Roman commanders the impetus to formulate a new, more flexible system, one that would operate on uneven terrain, anticipate enemy attacks before they took place, and utilize surprise and speed as components of its overall strategy. Rome abandoned the concept of the Greek phalanx, which against lightly armed, fast-moving opponents like the Samnites, had made them “a tortoise in a rat race.”7 Intelligence not only would be required to implement the new tactics, but could, if used correctly, help avoid disasters such as the one at the Caudine Forks in 321 bc, when the Roman Army was ambushed in a remote mountain glen and forced to surrender (see Map 4).8 How telling that Livy’s version of the story has the Romans being led into a trap by a disinformation operation set up by the Samnites. Keeping their own camp a secret, the Samnites sent out ten agents disguised as shepherds, all with the same story: that the Samnite levies were in Apulia. Every time the Romans interviewed prisoners, they received the same account and thus the Romans headed off to Luceria through the Caudine Forks, believing they were safe.9 Gavius Pontius, general of the Samnite league, had more accurate intelligence and followed the movement of the Roman troops. He placed his men carefully on the ridges lining a defile on the Roman axis of advance and barricaded the narrow exit of the defile (the end toward Caudium) with a roadblock of trees and boulders. Once both Roman legions were inside the defile, he obstructed the narrow entrance (the end toward Calatia) as well. After some days of unsuccessful attempts by the ambushed Romans to fight their way out, the consuls believed that they had no option but to surrender their forces.10 The Romans were only set free after being forced to march, unarmed and half-naked, under a “yoke of spears.”11 Livy tries to save face by emphasizing the “good fortune” of the Samnites, ascribing their victory to Samnite treachery rather than to Samnite valor (or better intelligence), but this is merely the mask of Roman rhetoric covering over the fact that the Romans were caught by surprise; a miserable apologia for their own reconnaissance being so inadequate. Livy, understandably, is silent on the issue of the poor intelligence collection that allowed Roman troops to be led into such an untenable position. He quotes the bitter, and no doubt justified, complaints of soldiers who had not been provided with guides or patrols, but were “driven blindly, like wild beasts into a trap.”12
Map 4 Central Italy: the Caudine Forks.
The Caudine Forks debacle thus became one of the catalysts that prompted a reorganization of the army and led to the creation of a new command structure and the beginning of the Roman legion as we know it. These new legions were subdivided into smaller maniples, all armed with short swords and javelins. The restructuring of combat units was coupled with fresh operational thinking that now called for heavier reliance on reconnaissance missions to prevent ambushes and surprise attacks.13 Such a fundamental revision in their mode of fighting shows the Roman talent for adaptability, although we see that in some ways they were left with no choice but to make adjustments. The new formations, by their very nature, were better oriented to intelligence collection. Small, lightly armed units enjoyed the advantage of increased mobility and flexibility in action. Reconnaissance played a greater role in mountainous terrain, where ambush and surprise attacks would naturally be more common.14
Spies and scouts
The heightened sensitivity to the importance of intelligence is further underscored by the appearance of exploratores or scouts as regular assignments in the Roman Army. Livy mentions their use at least seven times against the Gauls and Samnites.15 In short, the Romans appear better placed to meet their intelligence needs in the third century bc than even a half-century before. Livy, in describing a surprise attack on the Samnites, gives a very simple statement on the importance of scouting: “The troops were commanded to arm, and marching out of camp, were led by a more open route – for, thanks to their exploratores, the forest was now better known to them – in the direction of the enemy” (italics mine).16 Because of advance intelligence, the Samnite outposts were routed. Collecting intelligence from Etruscan deserters from Clusium allowed the Romans to thwart an attack by Etruscans, Gauls, and Umbrians. On another occasion, when Quintus Fabius sent out scouts and discovered the enemy was careless and unguarded, the result was 30,000 enemy dead; no small stakes involved here. Livy is replete with stories of surprise attacks launched by the Romans that would have been impossible without advance intelligence on the whereabouts and intentions of the enemy. They defend themselves against attacks in the same manner – by receiving information through spies and deserters. When the enemy scouts are more efficient, it is the Romans who fall into the ambush.17 Although one may debate the Livian accounts, especially their numbers, it is not such a stretch of the imagination to suggest that the Romans, in these early wars, collected their intelligence by the tried and true methods used by other armies since time immemorial.
Transmission
Another area where the Romans needed to improve their intelligence collection was in establishing a system for the transmission of intelligence between headquarters and the field, or laterally among army groups. The Roman commanders traditionally encountered considerable difficulty in communicating with each other, as well as with the Senate, because no organized courier service was in place, not even between the front and the capital. This handicap put a strain on Roman diplomacy and military decision-making, especially if senatorial authority was to be exercised. Instead, decisions were very often made in the operational area and relayed to Rome much later, then approved by the Senate and endorsed as state policy after the fact. The greater the distance between the capital and the theater of operations, the more likely it was that a military commander would be making de facto foreign policy in the field.18 In the early Republic this state of affairs probably seemed natural and satisfactory. As long as consuls and senators were in agreement as to general goals and procedures, they certainly saw no pressing need for a single centralized intelligence system.
Another factor that affected Rome’s ability to make long-term policy was the absence of a standing army, a situation that obviously precluded any methodical and coherent planning of long-term defense arrangements, such as the stationing of garrison forces. The Roman Senate determined each year where to send troops and in what numbers. This system was far from ideal, for the Senate might misjudge the need, or worse, it might “play politics” and vote troops only for areas that suited the personal interests of influential senators. The degree of senatorial control over events varied widely from region to region. Dependence on the judgment of local commanders was an inevitable corollary of poor communications and the nonexistence of a central intelligence system to facilitate the creation of policy formulation. The Senate was unable to transmit fresh instructions quickly from the capital to the war zone; the field commander equally could not receive timely advice from Rome once operations had commenced. Coordination of efforts between home and the front clearly was impossible. The ad hoc nature of decision-making was symptomatic of the Roman state’s lack of a “grand strategy.” Even if a grand strategy had been drawn up, however, how could it have been implemented while the decision-making body in Rome had only piecemeal communications with its military staff at the scene of action?19
New institutions
From a sheepherder’s village in the eighth century bc, Rome had become the capital of a sizable empire by the second century.20 Within seventy years, the territory under Roman control had grown almost seventy-fold, from 734 square miles in 340 bc to 50,200 square miles in 270 bc.21 In the wake of such territorial acquisitions, the administrative machinery of government obviously needed expansion. Additional administrators were needed both at home and abroad to manage state affairs. The two magistrates, or consuls, in whom the supreme executive authority was annually vested, were simply unequal to the task of overseeing both domestic wars and foreign operations. Some extraordinary measures were therefore taken to formalize procedures for the appointment of a high command that was designed to possess the requisite competence to cope with Rome’s increasingly complex military role. In 444 bc the Romans instituted for the first time military tribunes with consular powers, an added reserve of field commanders. The year 443 bc saw the nomination of censors, who shared some of the duties of the consuls, such as supervising the lists of those eligible for cavalry service. Finally, from the time of the Second Samnite War (326–304 bc), consuls were permitted to retain a field command after their one-year tenure had lapsed. They were empowered to act pro consule, “in the place of a consul.”22 This legal piece of semantic subtlety enabled a consul to extend his tour of duty, without interruption, past his first year in that posting. Such an arrangement satisfied the demand for higher levels of manpower at the most senior posts without inflating the number of magistrates or sacrificing the statutory principle of annual tenure. The desire to avoid breaking precedent is characteristic of Roman thinking; they needed more commanders, not new institutions.23 Similarly, once the reserve of magistrates had been exhausted, former magistrates with war experience were given propraetorian imperium – the power to act in place of a praetor. This instrument of prorogation was designed to project Rome’s magisterial authority to the farthest reaches of Roman territory.24 Any of these officers in the field were capable of collecting intelligence, but how were they able to communicate with the capital and with each other? As we shall see, they did so on their own initiative and with difficulty.
Colonies and intelligence
Another mechanism by which Rome expanded into the Italian peninsula and collected intelligence on its allied territories was by means of the colonies it planted in Italy. Conquered land on the Italian peninsula was allotted to colonists, who were organized into a new political community. In the long term this was the most important feature of the Roman commonwealth – its potential for further growth. These self-governing communities enabled the Roman state to go on extending its territory and incorporating new communities without having to make any radical changes to its rudimentary system of centralized administration, and at the same time acted as the eyes and ears of the central government. The state was able to consolidate its conquests by planting strategic garrisons in troublesome areas that acted as intelligence centers for the region.
Colonies established at strategic points throughout the Italian peninsula acted as military strongholds as well as Romanized enclaves in which Latin was spoken and the Roman way of life could be practiced. These colonies contributed to the consolidation of Roman conquests, the unification of Italy under Rome, and the collection of intelligence from Italy, which enabled Rome to protect its holdings.25 The fourth century bc witnessed the consolidation of Roman hegemony in central Italy. This was not merely a question of gaining political ascendancy. The extension of Roman citizenship and Latin rights with the establishment of colonies expedited the integration of peoples. This led to political solidarity and opened up new areas for recruitment of personnel by the Roman Army. Rome’s intelligence collection facility was embodied in this relationship. Romans believed that by relying on their allies for useful intelligence, they were keeping themselves safer and less vulnerable to attack. This Roman amicitia was a flexible concept, invoking military action when it suited Roman purposes. They could occasionally disregard some obligations, provided that the network of obligations as a whole remained in good repair.
Strategic intelligence and foreign policy
As a growing commercial and industrial center, Rome’s overseas entanglements became more frequent. The archaeological remains of the middle Republic show a “construction boom” of unprecedented scale, and further development of the commercial and industrial sectors of the economy that were now dependent on sea-borne grain.26 Not only trade, but wars too would be conducted abroad, highlighting the multiple need for information about distant places and the intentions of rival powers. Accurate and timely intelligence would surely have facilitated the formulation and execution of both foreign policy and military strategy. But this again assumes that policy and strategy were conducted in a coherent manner by the Senate in the first place. Scholars time and again have been struck by how little coordination there actually was.27 The Romans were painfully slow in adapting both their institutions and their external policies to the city’s new status as ruler of the Italian peninsula, and this failure persisted even after Rome had become overlord of the Mediterranean.
Three questions have interested scholars of the Roman Republic who have written on intelligence issues:
1. Was Roman territorial expansion the product of a deliberate imperialist policy? Much scholarly controversy has surrounded the question of whether the Romans were consciously aggressive toward their neighbors, or were merely acquiring territory as a defensive countermeasure.28 If the Romans had a deliberately expansionist policy, how capable were they of executing their plans, and what role did intelligence gathering play in their schemes? One cannot explain how Rome began to acquire its empire without also considering the kinds of information it needed to make decisions that led to that acquisition.
2. What institutions were set up to collect this intelligence? With the Roman government handicapped by a low level of sophistication in its decision-making, and the communications network being so rudimentary, how did Rome manage to subdue all of Italy, and, eventually, most of the Mediterranean?
3. What was the Roman attitude toward the use of spies? Did “intelligence operations” include simply gathering intelligence, or did it also include covert operations, deception, deceit, and subterfuge?
The way we answer these questions has changed radically in the last twenty-five years. Francis Dvornik, in his book The Origins of Intelligence Services, offered two explanations as to why the Romans did not develop an intelligence organization. First, he followed Livy’s assertion that the Romans were descendents of Latin peasants who early on showed utter disdain for anything that appeared artificial or disingenuous. Dvornik was convinced that the Romans did not establish an intelligence service because they were simple, honest, and would not contemplate devious intrigue. His second characterization of the Romans was that they were basically nonaggressive in their foreign policy. He adopts the traditional position on “defensive imperialism,” which believes all Roman conquests were in defense of Rome’s territorial integrity.29 Such a policy would not call for a vigorous collection of foreign intelligence, he suggests, a pursuit more befitting a truly imperialistic power.
Both of these hypotheses have been put to rest in recent years. In the first place, the Romans were no less aggressive than other Mediterranean peoples. Neither the Romans nor any other imperialists ever backed into their empires inadvertently. While they were probably not following a “grand strategy,” the Romans could not by any stretch of the imagination gain these vast territories by accident. William V. Harris has explained the mechanisms by which the Romans went to war virtually every year to the middle Republic, inflicted massive violence on others, and then acquired territory. Going to war was the primary way for the aristocracy to gain laus and gloria and the triumphal procession was the most impressive manifestation of that glory.30 Generation after generation of aristocrats striving for the consulship and then using that position to obtain personal glory through war added up to an aggressive foreign policy. Whatever their motives for forging ahead may have been, economic, political, or military, those motives drove them on to take over the Mediterranean world.31 While they may have done so in a manner that seems to us often clumsy and with no apparent overall strategy, nevertheless they ended up with an empire. In the end, the question of whether territorial expansion was the product of a deliberate imperialist policy or was the outcome of unintentional developments is actually not relevant to the discussion of Roman intelligence per se. The need for intelligence was demonstrably there, and intelligence was collected and used by the Romans, whether or not empire-building was a conscious effort. One can explain how Rome acquired an empire, and also consider the kinds of information needed to make the decisions which led to that acquisition, no matter what one decides Rome’s ultimate motives were.
Deception, stratagem, deceit, subterfuge
As for Roman attitudes toward subterfuge, another recent study lays to rest the notion that the Romans were too honest to “stoop” to clandestine operations.32 The Romans came to know and use all manner of deception schemes. Clever stratagems based on surprise and speed invariably depend on the possession of relevant intelligence. Even had this not been confirmed by philological analysis, common sense alone would have dictated that a military power as successful as Rome would not have passed up the opportunity of employing smart tactics in order to gain psychological and military advantage over an opponent, to neutralize the opponent’s strengths, to conserve Roman resources and energies, or to boost the morale and confidence of Roman troops. Ambushing, for instance, is a device much too effective not to be used.33 Despite their propaganda claims to the contrary, Romans could be just as cunning in war as Greeks or Carthaginians, and cunning was a craft the Romans learned not necessarily from foreigners.34 Espionage and covert action are millennia old, and most societies figured out for themselves the fine art of getting the jump on their adversaries. We cannot hope to prove how or when such techniques were acquired. Although we do not find the word stratagem in Latin until Cicero, or speculator until Caesar, it does not follow that stratagems and spies had been unknown before the late Republic. The Latin vocabulary of stratagem is not inferior in size to the Greek. Nor should we assume that the Romans borrowed all their ideas about stratagem from the Greeks.35 Surprise attacks, clandestine operations, and espionage were just as likely conceived and refined independently by the Romans during their early wars in Italy.
The Romans did not eschew duplicity in war or in foreign policy. We see them repeatedly engaging in propaganda, psychological warfare, and covert action. For the subversion of cities such as Sora, they relied upon betrayal, prearranged meetings, secret signals, and, finally, a surprise attack.36 Mucius Scaevola infiltrated the Etruscan camp on a clandestine mission to assassinate the King, but killed the wrong person.37 Trickery was used to lift morale; bogus refugees subverted the enemy from within; psychological ploys were contrived by the besieged to demoralize their besiegers; diversionary feints threatened the enemy force at one point while the Romans struck with double strength elsewhere.38 They staged maneuvers to baffle the enemy, then launched a surprise attack; and they laid siege to enemy cities while the enemy was attacking a Roman installation. Such methods were known to Valerius Maximus, who composed his book of memorable deeds and sayings under the reign of the Emperor Tiberius, when he observed: “Truly that aspect of cunning is illustrious and far removed from all reproach.”39 It was recognized that psychology was an important factor in hostilities – unsettling the enemy’s mental disposition, while holding one’s own.40 The Romans understood full well that stratagem sometimes was the ideal means of accomplishing more without arms than by force of arms, even of achieving goals which arms completely failed to achieve. And they countenanced such acts as were in their own best interests. Then, in an amazing about-face, they would hurl moral or ethical censure at others for doing the same thing. Trickery against the Romans was base, but trickery by the Romans was prudence. When they dishonorably cheated the Samnites over the terms of surrender at the Caudine Forks in 321 bc, the Samnites remonstrated with the Romans: “You constantly practice deception under the specious pretext of legality.”41 The Romans lied, cheated, broke treaties, and committed massacres and atrocities on the battlefield; in short, they were not a people whose sensibilities would be offended by a little espionage or the occasional dirty trick. Any attempt at anachronistically inserting modern conventions or Christian mores into Roman history will be futile. Like most military organizations, the Romans did have a distinct preference for setpiece battles, but this was by no means synonymous with “abhorrence of deceit.” The classic presentation of the “old Roman virtues” played up by Livy and Polybius serve as a counterpoint to later Roman condemnation of such practices.
Not by ambushes and battles by night, they thought, nor by pretended flight and unexpected return to an enemy off his guard, nor in such a way as to boast of cunning rather than real bravery, did our ancestors wage war; they were accustomed to declare war before they waged it, and even at times to announce a battle and specify the place in which they were going to fight… these are acts of Roman scrupulousness, not of Carthaginian artfulness, nor of Greek slyness, since among these people it has been more praiseworthy to deceive an enemy than to conquer by force. Occasionally a greater advantage is gained for the time being by trickery than by courage, but final and lasting conquest of the spirit overtakes one from whom the admission has been extorted that he has been conquered, not by craft or accident, but by the hand-to-hand clash of force in a proper and righteous war.42
The hypocrisy of this posture is made apparent by specific Roman actions, where they broke treaties when convenient,43 or resorted to political assassination.44 And this double standard is manifest not only in their conduct of external relations, but also in their attitudes toward ruses de guerre. At any rate, purity of mindset would have been incompatible with their intelligence activities. The stratagems employed may have been inconsistent with Roman propaganda, but they were never discarded.45
In some ways the reputation Rome had gained for fides (faith), as a city famous for its strong support of friends and allies, did serve its intelligence interests.46 These very allies were expected to provide much of the foreign intelligence that Rome had neither the capacity nor the inclination to collect for itself. Romans opted to surround themselves by a progressively widening ring of friendly (or subordinate) states, who came to identify their own self-interest with sustaining and sometimes extending the Roman dominion. This strategy had been successful on the Italian peninsula, and continued to be the effective policy elsewhere. Pro-Roman regimes, especially oligarchic ones, held subjects under control. The Romans fostered cliques, and power-wielding aristocracies of the various tribes were cultivated as sources of information and bases of support47 This issued in a regular flow of embassies and appeals, and with them information. The Romans, now prisoners of their own self-created reputation, were compelled to respond, sometimes, though not always, with force. The ideal of fides Romana, Rome’s loyalty to her allies, was as characteristic of Roman propaganda as deceit was considered alien or “un-Roman.” And while the Romans were duty-bound to provide protection, the allies in turn were expected to keep Roman officials informed of events that might threaten both parties. When the allies became hostile to Rome, this “distant early warning system” simply collapsed.
The last conspicuous fallacy in arguments like Dvornik’s stems from the implied and sadly common perception that republics and democracies are mutually exclusive with intelligence services. The truth, of course, is that intelligence organizations are neither the product nor a feature of any one particular form of government. All governments need intelligence upon which to base their decisions, be their posture defensive or offensive, be they at war or at peace. Intelligence gathering is just as natural to democracies as it is to dictatorships. Although totalitarian regimes very often misuse their intelligence services, notably by taking advantage of domestic surveillance capabilities, nevertheless every government, authoritarian or representative, needs information about neighboring countries in order to consider its options and make educated decisions.48 All states, as well, must have an effective internal security apparatus for their own protection. The Romans did not have an institutionalized intelligence service, yet they were patently receiving and processing intelligence. Although they were inherently disinclined to set up new offices for this purpose, their intelligence requirements nonetheless were being met by other means. The Romans obviously thought their information was adequate, and they continued to collect it through traditional channels, with no conscious need to centralize their effort by establishing a specialized agency for intelligence purposes.
The early and middle Republic
In its era as a republic, Rome did not have a political climate that required a great deal of internal espionage. There certainly was no lack of political intrigue in Roman politics, but within the confines of the senatorial elite, government affairs were generally conducted openly, policies made openly, and wars mostly planned and prosecuted openly. Protecting the secrecy of intelligence or counterintelligence operations can be particularly difficult in such an environment. The very operating procedures of the Roman government, therefore, hindered the development of certain kinds of intelligence activity.
We have very little if any reliable evidence about the internal workings of the Roman military in the early Republic. Livy’s descriptions can never give us more than a vague outline of events, and we will never be able to fill in the gaps without other sources coming to light. What we have in early Rome is an era seen through a glass darkly. Livy’s history can only suggest what might have happened in Rome in the absence of a formal intelligence structure. His stories of surprises, ambushes, and the movement of intelligence are plausible for the citizen army of a small city-state. In the years before the Punic Wars, much of the Senate’s agenda at this time had to do with colonized regions inside Italy. Subject peoples within Italy had to be watched for signs of revolt, and ever-present was the menace of invasion by hostile tribes, especially the Gauls. But that was all about to change. Rome was about to become a major player in the international political arena by initiating a series of wars against the major naval power of the Mediterranean – Carthage. Rome’s ability to collect intelligence against a foreign enemy in wartime would be tested in new ways and sometimes with deadly results. We shall see in the next chapter how the rudimentary Roman apparatus fared against a military power equipped with a well-functioning intelligence service, and led by a military genius named Hannibal, a man who undoubtedly deserves recognition as one of the great spymasters of antiquity.
Notes
1. See Livy 2.21.1; 2.26.1, who acknowledges that for long periods there was “neither peace nor war.” See Cornell, Beginnings of Rome, p. 309, who shows that these “wars” were little more than predatory raids by highland peoples upon the relatively prosperous and advanced settlements on the plain.
2. Archaeological evidence from warrior graves show that the hoplite phalanx had been widely adopted by the communities of the Tyrrhenian lowlands by c. 625 bc. Representations of the phalanx exist from before 600 bc and the Romans certainly adopted it by the sixth century. See Cornell, Beginnings of Rome, p. 184 and n. 39.
3. M. Nilsson, “The Introduction of Hoplite Tactics at Rome: Its Date and its Consequences,” Journal of Roman Studies 19 (1929), pp. 1–11; A.M. Snodgrass, “The Hoplite Reform and History,” JHS 85 (1965), pp. 110–22. This is not to imply that either the Greeks or the Romans used this formation exclusively. See, for example, Louis Rawlings, “Alternative Agonies: Hoplite Martial and Combat Experiences Beyond the Phalanx,” in H. van Wees (ed.), War and Violence in Ancient Greece (London: Duckworth, 2000), pp. 233–59.
4. On the slowness of the phalanx and its inappropriateness for surprise operations, see C. Herzog and M. Gichon, Battles of the Bible (London: Greenhill Books, 1997), p. 271. See also the remarks of W. Kendrick Pritchett, The Greek State at War (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1974), vol. 1, pp. 132–3. See also Hunter’s edition of Aeneas Tacticus (Oxford, 1927), p. 118. For recent discussions of the nature and use of the phalanx in Greek combat, see: V.D. Hanson, “Hoplite Battle as Ancient Greek Warfare: When, Where, and Why?,” in Wees (ed.), War and Violence in Ancient Greece, pp. 201–32; P. Krentz, “Fighting by the Rules: The Invention of the Hoplite Agon,” Hesperia 71 (2002), pp. 23–39; H.V. Wees, Greek Warfare: Myth and Realities (London: Duckworth, 2002).
5. On deception in Greek warfare, see P. Krentz, “Deception in Archaic and Classical Greek Warfare,” in Wees (ed.), War and Violence in Ancient Greece, pp. 167–200; J. Roisman, The General Demosthenes and his use of Military Surprise (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1993); Wheeler, Stratagem and the Vocabulary of Military Trickery.
6. Krentz, “Fighting by the Rules”, pp. 23–39 shows that this description dates not to the seventh century but only after 480 bc, when nonhoplite armies came to be excluded from the phalanx. See Cornell, Beginnings of Rome, p. 184, who writes: “the hoplite was only truly effective when fighting in a line alongside other hoplites.” For nonhoplite Greek warfare, see Pritchett, Greek State at War, vol. 2, especially Chapter 8, on surprise attack, and Chapter 9, on ambuscades; see also Krentz, “Deception in Archaic and Classical Greek Warfare,” pp. 167–200.
7. G. Webster, The Roman Imperial Army (Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble, 1985), p. 5; Cornell, Beginnnings of Rome, pp. 187–8 believes that when the citizen body of Rome was divided into five propertied classes, the centurionate organization was detached from the field army. Legions were from then on recruited indiscriminately from all five classes. This change thus coincided with the introduction of new tactics and the so-called manipular system in place of the old hoplite phalanx.
8. This is one of the most famous and questionable episodes in Roman history. See Cornell, Beginnings of Rome, p. 465, n. 23; N.M. Horsfall, Papers of the British School at Rome 50 (1983), pp. 45–52; CAH, vol. 2, pp. 370–1.
9. Livy 9.2.6–8. E.T. Salmon points out that marching right across the entire breadth of enemy territory to relieve beleaguered Luceria (which was not even friendly toward the Romans, much less a beleaguered ally) is a military absurdity. Other historians have accepted the account. See E.T. Salmon, Samnium and the Samnites (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 224, n. 6.
10. For Pontius, see Livy 9.10.2; 9.10.6; 9.12.9. Appian, Samnite History 4.2; Zonaras, 7.26. Cicero, Cato Maior de Senectute 12.41; de Off. 3.30.109. Dio. 8.11.14. Many scholars regard this defile as either too small to accommodate the 12,000–16,000 men involved, or too exposed to make Pontius’s surprise at all plausible. Appian’s version with 50,000 men is even more unbelievable.
11. The yoke of spears was a symbol of humiliation and defeat; the yoke was made of two upright spears with a third laid transversely upon them, under which vanquished enemies were made to pass. Cicero, de Off. 3.30.109; Caesar BG 1.12; 1.7; Quintilian 3.8.3; Livy 1.26.13, See Ogilvie, Commentary, p. 117; Zonaras 7.17.
12. Livy 9.5.7, B.O. Foster translation, Loeb Classical Library edition.
13. For the date of introduction of the manipular legion, see A.J. Toynbee, Hannibal’s Legacy: The Hannibalic War’s Effects on Roman Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), vol. 1, p. 518 with references. Webster, Roman Imperial Army, p. 5 remains skeptical. See also M.C.J. Miller, “The Professionalization of the Roman Army in the Second Century bc”, Ph.D. diss. (Loyola University of Chicago, 1984), pp. 80–4; J.M. Carter, War and Military Reform in the Roman Republic 578–89 bc (Manhattan, KA: Military Affairs/Aerospace Historian Publishing, 1980); M.J.V. Bell, “Tactical Reform in the Roman Republican Army,” Historia 14 (1965), pp. 404–22.
14. On the problem of Roman military reorganization and the resulting formations, see E.L. Wheeler, “The Legion as Phalanx,” Chiron 9 (1979), pp. 303–18.
15. For use of scouts against the Samnites and Gauls, see Livy 7.36.11; 8.17.7; 8.30.3; 9.23.3; 9.24.10; 10.17.1.
16. Website: Ibid., 7.36, B.O. Foster translation, Loeb Classical Library edition.
17. Website: Ibid., 8.35.10.
18. Two works, A.M. Eckstein, Senate and General (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987), and A.N. Sherwin-White, Roman Foreign Policy in the East 168 bc to ad 1 (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984), both stress the vital role played in Roman foreign relations by field generals. Eckstein, p. xix, especially emphasizes the primitiveness of the Roman Senate as an institution for decision-making in foreign policy. See also A.E. Astin, “Politics and Policies in the Roman Republic,” Inaugural Lecture, Queen’s University, Belfast, 1968.
19. Eckstein, Senate and General, p. xvii.
20. See J.E. Stambaugh, The Ancient Roman City (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), p. 101.
21. C.G. Starr, The Beginnings of Imperial Rome (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1980), p. 1.
22. F.E. Adcock, The Roman Art of War Under the Republic (Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble, 1940), pp. 12, 71.
23. See Stambaugh, Ancient Roman City, pp. 102–6 on urban administration under the Republic.
24. The earliest known instance, the appointment of Q. Publilius Philo pro consule against Naples in 326 bc, was the result of a popular vote: Livy 8.23.11–12. See Cornell, Beginnings of Rome, p. 370 on the emergence of the Senate as the principal organ of government and of the nobility as the controlling element within it. In the second and third centuries the Senate’s right to terminate or extend the imperium of a serving commander (prorogatio) was an important weapon in its arsenal, as Polybius 6.15.6 points out. In the fourth century, on the other hand, prorogatio hardly existed.
25. Arnaldo Momigliano believed that Rome went from war to war without giving a single thought to whether the wars were meant to gain power for Rome or to keep the allies busy. Alien Wisdom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 45–6. Cf. Cornell, Beginnings of Rome, p. 467, n. 49.
26. Starr, Beginnings of Imperial Rome, esp. Ch. 3.
27. E.g., Gruen, Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome, Ch. 1.
28. For three radically divergent treatments of Roman imperialism, see Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome; Gruen, Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome; E. Badian, Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968). See also the comments of J.S. Richardson in Hispaniae: Spain and the Development of Roman Imperialism 218–82 bc (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 1–10; see also Eckstein, Senate and General.
29. Dvornik, Origins of Intelligence Services, pp. 49–53.
30. This was the triumphal procession of a Roman general who had won a major victory to the Temple of Jupiter on the Capitol. For a full description of the procession, see Oxford Classical Dictionary, 3rd edn, “triumph,” p. 1554; see also, Harris, War and Imperialism, p. 26.
31. For the most recent discussion see Isaac, Limits of Empire, p. 1.
32. See Wheeler, Stratagem and the Vocabulary of Military Trickery, passim.
33. See Livy 2.11 for the Etruscans being ambushed by Titus Herminius. See Ogilvie’s discussion in Commentary p. 261, who says “It is one of those classic ruses which belongs to the world of heroic tales.” He believes the names of the commanders were taken randomly from the Fasti and that all the military details are anachronistic.
34. As suggested by Brizzi, I sistemi, who believes the Romans were innocent of such tactics before the Second Punic War.
35. Wheeler, Stratagem, p. 50.
36. Livy 9.24.10. 310 bc.
37. Website: Ibid., 2.12.
38. Website: Ibid., 10.41.5–10; Frontinus, Strat. 2.4.1, where Papirius Cursor wins a battle at Aquileia by faking the approach of reinforcements and creating a dust cloud and sufficient noise to fool the enemy.
39. Val. Max. 7.4, trans. Wheeler, Stratagem, p. 14.
40. Livy 10.14; Frontinus, Strat. 2.4.2 on the surprise staged against the Samnites in 277 bc by the consuls Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus and P. Decius Mus.
41. Livy 9.11.7.
42. Website: Ibid., 42.47.4–9, Sage and Schlesinger translation, Loeb Classical Library. Cf. Diod. 30.7.1 and Polybius 13.3.
43. As with the repudiation in 316 bc of the treaty ending the Second Samnite War.
44. Polybius 18.43 shows Flamininus’s complicity in the assassination of Bracchylus: Livy 33.27.5–28.15 plays down Flamininus’s role. F.W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957–79), vol. 2, pp. 608–9.
45. Wheeler, Stratagem, p. 193.
46. G. Brizzi, I sistemi, Ch. 1.
47. Livy 23.1.2 describes them as “families made powerful by Rome.”
48. P. Veyne, “Y a-t-il eu un impérialisme romain?” MEFR 87 (1975), pp. 793–855 may find the Romans isolationist, self-absorbed, inward-looking, and not interested in empire, but such national traits have never in history prevented other states, ancient or modern, from conducting extensive intelligence activities, and a point can be made that the more isolationist a nation’s policy is, the more persistent is its intelligence collection efforts, both at home and abroad, to buttress and protect its “splendid isolation.” There simply is no cause-and-effect relationship between the idiosyncrasies of national temperament and the fundamental need for intelligence.