3
The Second Punic War offers numerous examples of the advantages good intelligence can give military and political leaders. In a contest that severely strained all of Rome’s resources – political, military, economic, and social – the Romans found themselves locked in deadly warfare for nearly two decades with a master tactician whose use of intelligence was unmatched. Hannibal’s abilities as a general became legendary. In fact, the Carthaginian made such a lasting impression on history that the conflict was branded “Hannibal’s War.”1 Yet, in all the narratives of the war and in biographies of Hannibal, his role as spymaster has been generally ignored.2
The Carthaginians had long been experts in communications and intelligence gathering. Their city was founded by the Phoenicians, the premier sea-traders of the ancient world, and through them intelligence techniques known in the Middle East may have been imported to Carthage and the North African coast. And although they may not have had a formal intelligence service like the kings of Babylon, Assyria, and Persia the Carthaginians, as daring seafarers, had “applied the principles of good information service to their foreign trade.”3 Techniques for collection and transmission of intelligence at the time were primitive, but we know, for instance, that the Carthaginians had long used signaling in their commercial dealings.4
That the Carthaginians carefully guarded their trading secrets also demonstrates their early awareness of the need for security and counterintelligence. Their tin mines in northern Spain, for example, were kept secret from the Greeks, themselves no amateur seafarers. The location was concealed so effectively that the Greeks long believed the tin came from islands off the northwestern coast of Spain. Strabo illustrates to what great lengths the Carthaginians went in keeping their commercial secrets. One ship captain deliberately drove his ship off course and into a shoal, so as not to reveal his route. The state rewarded him with the value of the cargo lost.5 Such was the shrewdness of the Carthaginians, who now had a naval hegemony in the Mediterranean. Their tradecraft would lend itself admirably to military application. The Romans’ own racial prejudices lent credence to this image. Their stereotype of the Carthaginians was that of a people with a reputation for duplicity and trickery. The Romans believed that their African location as well as their Punic origins gave them a propensity for fraudulence and mendacity, or, as the Romans contemptuously dubbed it, fides Punica – Punic faith. Being a harbor city and trade center, the haunt of merchants and foreigners with their minds set on profit, Carthage was viewed as a hotbed of deception and subterfuge.6
Polybius informs us of the military applications of these Carthaginian skills. He tells us that Punic generals communicated by fire signals and through messengers, which presumably was true.7 Hamilcar Barca, Hannibal’s father, is credited with inventing one of the earliest known forms of secret correspondence.8 He supposedly wrote messages on a wooden tablet, which was then covered with fresh wax to look like a blank message board – ordinarily the text was inscribed in the wax. In reality, the practice probably long antedates Hamilcar; its putative attribution to him is an instance of the Romans’ ascribing the design of clever stratagems to their defeated enemies.9
Swift and dependable communications were of paramount importance to Carthaginian commanders, who needed to know clearly what their home government expected of them. They paid a high price for failure: several Punic officers were put to death merely for making assumptions or a bad guess in emergency situations. During the First Punic War, Hanno was bidden by the Mamertines, under threat of force, to leave Messana. A subordinate officer, Hanno dared not risk hostile action, and he had received no directive from his government to remain there regardless of Marmertine opposition. Yet, when he consented to leave, the Carthaginians had him executed for allegedly betraying the state’s interest. Nor was it healthy for a Carthaginian commander to disappoint his troops: when the admiral Hannibal (son of Gisco, not the famous general) was forced to beach his ships, his men, disgruntled by this naval officer’s ineffective leadership, crucified him.10
Polybius convincingly states that during the First Punic War both sides relied heavily on ambush: “The causes or the modes of their daily ambuscades, counter-ambuscades, attempts, and assaults were so numerous that no writer could properly describe them.”11 These tactics inevitably demanded that combat intelligence was continually collected and used. If the Carthaginians did enjoy the advantage of superior intelligence skills, that in itself was not enough to assure Punic victory. The Romans, who knew comparatively little about seamanship, and who were often helpless in storms, built a fleet that won six of its seven battles against the naval power that hitherto had dominated the Mediterranean sea-lanes for centuries.12 With the exception of Xanthippus’s victory in the Bagradas Valley, Punic forces won no important engagement on the ground during the twenty-four years of this war.
Hannibal's war
The loss of Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica to the Romans in the First Punic War led the Carthaginians to seek a new province to replace the sources of revenue and coopted manpower, of which they had recently been deprived. They began building a new empire in Spain, which would help pay off their sizable war indemnity and which would serve as a future base of operations against the Romans. Their opposition to the Romans took clandestine form for the time being. For example, Carthaginian agents were blamed for the Sardinian revolt against Roman rule in 235 bc.13
The intelligence network, which had been so valuable an asset to the Carthaginians in Sicily, was now extended to Spain. Hannibal regularly sent reports to the Carthaginian Senate, and they appear to have been well informed about the situation in Spain or, at least, the situation as depicted by Hannibal. Polybius and Appian both assert that Hannibal was transmitting false reports to Carthage in justification of his drive to occupy Saguntum.14 Evidently a well-organized service of messengers and diplomatic couriers operated both by land and by sea. Relating an encounter between the Romans and troops under the command of Hasdrubal (Hannibal’s brother), Livy gives us a glimpse of how their early warning system worked.
The Spaniards have numerous towers built on heights, which they use both as watchtowers and also for protection against pirates. From one of these the hostile ships were first descried, and on a signal being made to Hasdrubal, the alarm broke out on land and in camp before it reached the sea and the ships; for no one yet had heard the beat of the oars or other nautical sounds, nor had the promontories yet disclosed the fleet to view when suddenly horsemen, sent off by Hasdrubal, one after another galloped up to the sailors, who were strolling about the beach or resting in their tents and thinking of nothing so little as of the enemy or of fighting on that day, and bade them board their ships in haste and arm themselves, for the Roman fleet was even then close to the harbor.15
The rapid transmission of the news that the Romans were approaching saved the Carthaginians from disaster in Spain. Another Roman writer, Pliny the Elder, describes how in the first century ad, “Spain still sees the watchtowers of Hannibal and the turrets of earth placed on the mountain ridges.”16 The Carthaginian intelligence network thus comprised a signaling service, watchtowers, diplomatic pouches, and numerous messengers who traveled remarkably fast.
In 221 bc the 25-year-old Hannibal was placed in charge of the Spanish command, and his intentions toward Rome were hostile. Within two years he subdued all of Spain south of the Ebro River (see Map 5), which, by treaty, was the demarcation line between the Roman and Carthaginian spheres of influence.17 In 219 bc he laid siege to Saguntum, an unconquered enclave on the northeast coast of Carthaginian Spain, some 90 miles south of the Ebro. By attacking the city of Saguntum, Hannibal provided the flashpoint for the Second Punic War. Hannibal’s intentions were unmistakable: he was advancing toward Italy by land, and Saguntum was a pocket of resistance strategically situated on his line of supply and communication. He could not afford to leave this regional capital independent or in hostile hands as he moved forward to Gaul.18
Map 5 Saguntum and the Ebro River.
A flurry of diplomatic activity began with a Roman embassy arriving in Carthage late and ill-informed. The Romans sent their own envoys along with representatives from Saguntum to impose on Carthage their terms for a peaceful solution to the crisis, but Hannibal’s messengers arrived there first and had time to “prepare the minds of Hannibal’s adherents, and to prevent the opposing party from giving any concessions to the Romans.”19 A second Roman embassy went to Carthage in March 218 bc, so poorly briefed about local sentiments that the envoys naively asked the Carthaginian Senate to turn Hannibal over to them as the price for preventing war. The Carthaginians, of course, had no intention of handing over their leading military figure, nor would they have the power of enforcing such a decision upon Hannibal.20 News of the official declaration of war and the Senate’s refusal to surrender him reached Hannibal while he was in winter quarters at New Carthage (Cartagena). With a successful campaign in Spain behind him, and with his men paid and nestled in winter quarters, he could begin his grand plan of conquest with support at home. Rome’s unwillingness or inability to defend Saguntum had only jeopardized its reputation and bolstered Carthaginian morale.
Since open warfare was imminent, discovering each other’s master plan was the major strategic-intelligence objective of both sides. Neither power could rely on just a messenger service or diplomatic correspondence; once hostilities broke out, a clandestine war also began. Through his spies in Rome, Hannibal learned that the Romans were planning a two-pronged attack on the Carthaginian capital and their Spanish empire. The Romans were outfitting a new fleet and the consul, P. Cornelius Scipio, had been assigned the province of Spain.21 The Roman plan was to transport legions by sea via Massilia (Marseilles) to invade the Carthaginian empire south of the Ebro River, while a second consul was sent south to strike directly at the Carthaginian capital. Hannibal had to prevent this opening of a second front in North Africa, and the best way to pull back the two consular armies was to invade Italy.
Knowing he would have the advantage of being on the offensive once he crossed the Pyrenees, Hannibal left his brother Hasdrubal with the Spanish command at New Carthage, and in May 218 bc moved his own troops north. The Romans never imagined that Hannibal would cross the Pyrenees and then the Alps to invade Italy.22 The Roman plan to strike at the heart of the Carthaginian empire in the west was sound, except for the unanticipated twist that Hannibal would not be there. Hannibal’s superior intelligence and the audacious attack on northern Italy succeeded in neutralizing the Roman plan. Both consuls were pulled back from their original routes and Hannibal got the advantage of fighting the war where he wanted to – in Rome’s backyard. Knowing the enemy’s intentions while keeping his own a secret gave Hannibal an untold advantage and enabled him to achieve a remarkable strategic surprise.23 That field security was weighing heavily on Hannibal’s mind is clearly demonstrated by his dismissal of 7,000 Carpetanian infantrymen, whose reliability he had reasons to suspect after 3,000 of their fellow tribesmen had requested, and were granted, discharge from his army once they had guessed their destination was Italy.24
The Romans, still dependent on their allies in Saguntum and Massilia for information, very often received too little, too late. Livy’s account shows us that Roman diplomacy and intelligence were poor. The Senate instructed its legates to contact various Spanish and Gallic tribes to induce them into alliance with Rome, apparently not knowing that Hannibal’s agents had already called and persuaded the Spanish tribesmen to turn the Romans away. When Roman envoys visited Gaul, they met with an even more contemptuous response: the Gauls burst into laughter. Their magistrates and elders could scarcely keep order among the younger men. To them, it seemed a stupid and impudent proposition that the Gauls should try to stop the invaders from passing into Italy. Why should they bring down the war on their own heads and have their own fields pillaged instead of Rome’s?25
The envoys’ mission failed miserably. Only Massilia, an established ally, responded to the Roman cause. The Massiliotes feared that a Carthaginian victory would ruin their trading, and so passed on to the Romans as much information as they had about Hannibal’s plans. It was from Massilian envoys that Scipio, prior to his departure from Rome, learned that Hannibal’s army had crossed the Ebro.26 Only after Scipio’s arrival at Massilia with sixty warships did he receive the news that Hannibal was already past the Pyrenees, and would soon be crossing the Rhone as well. Scipio, on the other hand, postulated that Hannibal’s advance from the Pyrenees would be slowed down by hostile Gallic tribes and that there was no immediate cause for alarm. In reality, Hannibal was now less than 50 miles away, ferrying his army across the Rhone north of the delta, using smoke signals to coordinate the crossing (see Map 6).27 The Romans were unaware that Hannibal had moved 50,000 men, together with cavalry, baggage, and elephants to the east bank of the river at a point so close to Massilia.
Map 6 Gaul and northern Italy.
Scipio discovered Hannibal’s whereabouts only by chance. A Carthaginian reconnaissance patrol of 500 Numidian horsemen stumbled into 300 of Scipio’s cavalry on a similar mission.28 After a savage encounter in which the Numidian horsemen were defeated, the Romans pursued Hannibal’s men back to their camp. The Roman reconnaissance group reported the size of Hannibal’s encamped army to Scipio, who assumed that Hannibal was about to attack. Scipio concentrated his forces and returned to the enemy camp, only to find it abandoned. Finally, the horrifying truth dawned on him: Hannibal’s destination was Italy. The Carthaginian was again one step ahead. Scipio left his brother Gnaeus in charge of the legions bound for Spain, and returned to northern Italy to meet Hannibal when he descended from the Alps.
Hannibal’s intelligence network abetted his crossing of the Alps. His spies had already reconnoitered the terrain over which the Carthaginians would pass, and they made local contacts to seek friendly tribes who would be willing to provide troops, supplies, and guides. Although the Carthaginians were familiar with the coastal areas of Spain and Gaul, they knew little about the Alpine passes. Hannibal needed this information to safeguard his huge army on its long and hazardous journey. His reconnaissance effort covered a vast area, and he received satisfactory reports.29 The Tricorii, between the Rhone and Durance rivers, were friendly, would not deter his army, and would furnish supplies, while farther north the Allobroges had not committed themselves but seemed unlikely to cause much trouble. Hannibal paid close attention to the spies he had sent into Cisalpine Gaul. He learned that the Boii and Insubres in the Po Valley would provide both men and supplies. Some Gallic tribes constituted a ready-made intelligence unit, because their regular passage between Italy and France gave them access to the latest news on either side of the Alps. Many of these tribes also resented Roman rule and happily supplied information to a power that promised to liberate them. Other tribes, with no specific grievances against Rome, would fight for a promise of money or booty. Hannibal’s advance information enabled him to use the most appropriate manner of persuasion with each tribe.
Hannibal’s legendary crossing of the Alps was a political and military gamble, but based on the intelligence he had, the venture appeared no more perilous than any other course of action. It certainly was safer than trying to land a fleet on the western coast of Italy. The difficulties he faced were mostly military – hostile tribes, as well as the tactical disadvantage and logistic inconvenience of marching an army in column through narrow passes. True, he could have avoided some hardship had he crossed a month earlier when the weather was more clement, but we can only guess that resistance north of the Ebro had impeded his progress, or that wrong information about the Alpine passes caused unexpected delay. After all, even the most reliable intelligence is never perfect. Moreover, circumstances and the situation on the ground can change after the receipt of intelligence and before the commencement of operations. Native resistance may have been encountered where tribesmen had previously pledged cooperation, and some of the Alpine guides eventually proved treacherous. Our judgment of his plan should be governed by the fact that he did make every effort to obtain quantity and quality intelligence, well in advance of his march. And he did it on an impressive scale, covering virtually his entire theater of operations and adjacent areas of interest. If his intelligence was imperfect, it is nonetheless safe to assume that without it he would not have been able to embark on his expedition.
In the end, the risks he had taken paid off handsomely; the news that Hannibal had encamped his army south of the Alps panicked the Romans. The consul T. Sempronius Longus, already down in Sicily and ready to invade Carthage, now raced to northern Italy; but the first clash between Romans and Carthaginians in Italy was over before he even arrived. This initial skirmish at Ticinus left the consul Scipio severely wounded and established the superiority of Hannibal’s cavalry. Hannibal pursued the fleeing Romans relentlessly. The 2,000 Celtic allies and cavalry serving as auxiliaries with the Roman Army in the Po Valley defected to Hannibal’s camp.30
Intelligence and psychological warfare
Once in Italy, Hannibal continued to isolate Rome from its allies. Most of Italy at this time was not yet Roman territory, but a conglomeration of independent, autonomous states joined under Roman primacy. Hannibal, devising his own brand of psychological warfare, strove to drive a wedge between Rome and the other indigenous communities of Italy. From his first appearance on Italian soil, he announced that he had come not to fight against the peoples of the peninsula, but to liberate them from Roman domination. After every battle he released without ransom any non-Romans who had been taken prisoner, so that they would spread the word in their native regions about Hannibal’s political goals and his generosity. Such gestures were instrumental in recruiting local troops and depriving Rome of potential allies. This policy appears to have been more effective in luring converts to Hannibal’s cause from among non-Italian auxiliaries of Rome, rather than among natives of the Italian peninsula.31
A different aspect of psychological warfare to which Hannibal gave much attention was the construction of personality profiles: learning the frame of mind of the Roman commanders and exploiting their attitudes to his own advantage. Matching one’s actions to the “mood” of an enemy commander is a highly speculative business, even when it is founded on accurate intelligence. Hannibal’s successful application of this concept on more than one occasion speaks well for his intelligence people.32 For example, when the consul Longus finally arrived in northern Italy with his troops, Hannibal was able, through his Celtic agents, to discover what the consul intended to do. After the recent Roman defeat, Longus was desperate for a spectacular victory to vindicate the Romans. Hannibal’s Gallic spies were very productive sources, since there were Gauls in both camps. They reported that the Roman was anxious to join the battle, and Hannibal built on Longus’s impatience by luring him into a trap at the Trebbia River.33 Hannibal carefully selected an ambush site, and made maximum use of surprise and maneuver. The battle was fought utilizing every advantage of terrain, weather, and psychology that Hannibal could bring to bear. Longus and his troops were annihilated, and the victory sent the Carthaginians on their way through the Apennines.
Meanwhile, Hannibal was preparing his next move by judiciously evaluating the information that flowed in from his agents. As usual, his decision was based upon sound appraisal of both the terrain and his opponents, and we are given another example of his aptitude for capitalizing on the enemy commander’s state of mind. The Roman citizens elected as one of the consuls for 217 bc the popular and experienced general Gaius Flaminius. His mandate was to intercept and stop Hannibal, and to do it quickly and surgically before the invader caused any serious damage.34 Flaminius positioned himself on the west coast road to Rome along the Tyrrhenian coast, hoping to block Hannibal’s march south and thereby to make himself champion of the city.35 Hannibal simply ignored Flaminius, bypassed his zone, and left the embarrassed consul behind to receive accounts of Hannibal’s men descending on the rich Tuscan villages like locusts. The psychological torture of watching but doing nothing was too much for Flaminius. He was lured into direct combat at a location of the enemy’s choosing: a trap set for him at Lake Trasimene (Map 7). Nature had designed an ideal site for an ambush, and Hannibal took full advantage of the opportunity. From information brought by his cavalry scouts and, perhaps, from Etruscan peasants who knew the district, he acquired an accurate picture of the terrain. This intelligence enabled him to lure Flaminius into a narrow defile along the north shore of the lake. The slaughter was appalling. Over 15,000 Romans were killed, an equal number taken prisoners, and Hannibal now had virtual control over all of northern Italy.36 His planning in this campaign exemplifies his masterly coordination of topographical knowledge with profound insight into his enemy’s character. News of the battle reached Rome two days later, and the disaster was by no means the end of bad tidings. Hannibal’s intelligence network discovered that a Roman force of 4,000 cavalry was marching down the Via Flaminia. Neither the details nor the exact location of this second engagement are known, but Hannibal’s advance knowledge of its approach allowed him to destroy or capture the entire force.
Map 7 Lake Trasimene.
When the command of the Roman troops again changed and Q. Fabius Maximus became dictator, he avoided meeting Hannibal in pitched battle and instead began a long, tedious game of cat and mouse, which earned him the nickname Cunctator, “the Delayer.” The strategy itself was quite clever, because he was not just avoiding Hannibal but restricting Hannibal’s movements and therefore his ability to provision his army.37 The strategy annoyed many Romans, who wanted to see the honor of their legions upheld. Rumors spread that Fabius was in the pay of the Carthaginians. Hannibal used the situation for a shrewd psychological manipulation. When his scouts picked up these rumors, Hannibal deliberately avoided lands owned by Fabius while burning everything around them. That Hannibal could identify which lands belonged to Fabius was in itself an impressive feat of intelligence gathering. Not only did this scheme lend credence to the stories, but it also made Fabius so conscious of the damage to his own credibility that he signed over his lands to the state to prevent further speculation against him.38 Such clever stratagems suggest a continuing ability to obtain intelligence on the Romans that could be used to affect the Roman troops psychologically.
Hannibal demanded accurate intelligence, and the punishment for not meeting his requirements was severe. When he asked guides to take him to Casinum, they misunderstood and led him instead to Casilinum. The terrain there was such that Hannibal was nearly trapped. He rounded up the guides and had them crucified.39 His famous escape from that area through the pass called Iugum Calliculae was only one of many instances where a seeming Roman victory was snatched away. Unable to withdraw through the Casilinum road, which was tightly blocked, Hannibal had to move up the mountains and cross the ridges of Callicula, knowing that the Romans might fall on his troops as they were marching through the gorges (Map 8). He decided to approach the heights under cover of darkness. Before dusk the Carthaginians had tied bundles of dry wood to the horns of 2,000 head of cattle, and Hasdrubal was detailed to drive this herd by night on to the mountains, climbing above the pass held by the Romans. On a given signal, they lit the wood and the screaming cattle stampeded, igniting bushes and shrubbery along the way. When the Roman sentries saw the fires overhead, they thought they were surrounded and abandoned their posts. Hannibal brought his entire army safely through the pass, killing Romans along the way. Fabius had heard the commotion but thought it was an ambush and kept his men close at hand, since he disliked night combat. By daybreak the Carthaginians were gone except for a contingent of Spaniards whom Hannibal had left behind to cover his rear, and these troops were better than the Romans at mountain fighting. The Romans lost several thousand men, while Hannibal sustained hardly any casualties, except the poor cattle.40
Map 8 Iugum Calliculae and Casilinum.
At the end of his year as consul, Fabius handed over command of half of his forces to M. Minucius Rufus, the Master of the Horse, in 217 bc. He did so with a warning to avoid a pitched battle at all costs. But Rufus represented a faction in Rome that badly wanted a victory over the Carthaginians. Hannibal’s spies were able to follow the dissension between the two generals and capitalize on it to set another trap.41 Rufus swallowed the bait and would have been annihilated, were it not for the arrival of Fabius’s army to save him. Whether Hannibal received his intelligence from deserters, prisoners of war, or by merely questioning nearby residents, he managed to obtain precisely the information he needed. Over and beyond these elementary modes of collection, placing spies inside the enemy camp is at once the most profitable and most difficult undertaking in the cultivation of sources, yet a feat which Hannibal accomplished with remarkable success. In addition to penetrating Roman military camps, Hannibal’s spies also operated in the Roman capital. One of these, according to Livy, had been active in the city of Rome for two years, but was eventually caught and his hands cut off.42 Other spies stayed undetected and reported back to Hannibal about a dispute within the Roman leadership over the conduct of the war. Hannibal hoped to exploit this disagreement to stage one last impressive victory on the battlefield and finally to convince Rome’s remaining allies to come over to him.
Hannibal found his victory on the plains of Cannae in 216 bc (Map 9). He met the Romans in battle and used a double envelopment maneuver that has become famous among military historians.43 In just over five hours of battle he killed more than 50,000 Roman troops, his most triumphant engagement on Italian soil.44 The consequences of Cannae were momentous. For the first time, Roman allies showed signs of disloyalty; defections now began.45 Italy’s second largest city, Capua, was the first to defect, followed by Tarentum. Even the Gauls responded: one of the consuls designate was ambushed near Mutina and his army destroyed. His head decorated the sacred sanctuary of the Boii.46 Almost half of Rome’s allies in Italy had been won over by Hannibal; but these defections mark the high point of Hannibal’s campaign. He has been criticized for not attacking Rome itself. His own cavalry commander told him he “knew how to gain a victory… [but] you know not how to use one.”47 But Rome was a large, densely populated, walled city. Hannibal’s army had failed in assaults on even small forts. Hannibal had neither the manpower, the artillery, nor the financial resources for a protracted siege of a metropolis the size of Rome, and besides, that had never been his intention. Plus his strategy had very frequently relied on the element of surprise; this time, the Romans were expecting him.48
Map 9 Cannae and Salapia.
The road to defeat
After Cannae the tide slowly began to turn against him, owing in part to disagreement between Hannibal and the Senate at Carthage regarding the conduct of the war. Hannibal wanted all available reinforcements sent to him in Italy, and to have his brother join him from Spain. The Carthaginian Senate, on the other hand, allowed him only a few thousand men, while the bulk of additional reserves were apportioned to Spain and Sardinia.49 Without these reinforcements, Hannibal could not permanently hold what he had gained by fighting. Without a permanent base of supply, he was also severely restricted in his freedom of action. No system of supply by plunder would work in southern Italy for an army as large as Hannibal’s. Meanwhile, the obvious need for reliable communications had to be addressed. Hannibal sought a seaport through which he could be resupplied from the East or from Africa, and which could also serve as a communication link.50 He attempted to capture Naples, only 350 miles from Carthage, but the Romans had the city too well garrisoned. This was the same problem Hannibal faced throughout southern Italy. Although he was undisputed master of the land and could ravage it at will, he nevertheless commanded an army of conquest, not of occupation. He developed no siege-warfare capabilities – no towers, no battering rams, no catapults, all of which were essential for reducing strongly garrisoned cities. Under these circumstances he could conquer but not consolidate. Even with a long-range intelligence effort it would have been extremely hard for Hannibal to predict with certainty whether Italian communities would desert Rome and join his cause prior to his arrival at the regions in question. If he had a contingency plan prepared in the event that the Italian cities did not realign themselves with him, we are not aware of it.
Hannibal continued to surprise the Romans even while he was pinned down in southern Italy and when Roman communications, by runners or other means, should have provided adequate forewarning. When Hannibal tried to draw the Romans away from their siege of Capua, by an attack on Rome itself, he managed to startle and panic the city in spite of the fact that a messenger from Fregellae had alerted the Romans in advance of his arrival.51 Hannibal himself stealthily reconnoitered the city with a bodyguard of three men and observed the scarcity of Roman forces and the confusion. By suddenly materializing at the city walls of Rome, Hannibal maintained a psychological edge and damaged Roman morale, though scoring no victories on the battlefield. Hannibal’s indirect tactics also included frequent harassment of Roman personnel; Numidian scouts more often than not were successful in capturing Romans who wandered too far from camp, and in assailing targets of opportunity. The consul Marcellus was killed in just such an ambush.52
On the counterintelligence front, Hannibal took pains to avert security leaks. The ability to carry out clandestine operations was of the utmost importance when taking walled cities without siege equipment. Polybius’s account of how Hannibal conferred with his sympathizers in Tarentum in 212 bc, when it was occupied by the Romans, again illustrates how he could communicate with his confederates and take cities without striking a blow. He positioned himself within striking distance of the city, but employed a screening force of Numidians to prevent any news of his approach from escaping. The conspirators inside the city set a day for its betrayal. At midnight on the appointed date, fire signals were exchanged between the conspirators and Hannibal, who was standing by at the tomb of Apollo Hyacinthus, three-quarters of a mile away. After a well-ordered series of signals, the gates were opened and the Roman garrison was lured into the streets. By morning the city was in Carthaginian hands. The success of this venture encouraged Metapontum to throw off its allegiance to Rome and to join Hannibal.53
Captured documents revealing actions or intentions that require a strategic response do not occur frequently in the sources, but Livy relates at least one incident in which the Romans seem almost to stumble across vital information. The ambassadors of Philip V of Macedon, on their way to Hannibal’s camp carrying a proposal of alliance, were intercepted by a Roman patrol near Capua and brought before the Roman praetor, Valerius Laevinus. They were able to convince him that their intention was to make an alliance not with Carthage but with Rome. Laevinus was fooled by the story and provided them not only with food but also with the exact location of Hannibal’s camp. The ambassadors went directly to Hannibal with Philip’s offer of alliance.54 The envoys had no such luck on their return trip: the presence of Carthaginian ambassadors aboard their ship did little to impress a Roman naval boarding party that these Macedonians were allies of Rome. When the ship was searched, the agreement and a letter from Hannibal to Philip were confiscated by the Romans; the ambassadors were taken prisoner and transported to the Roman Senate.55
The same gullibility shows up when Hannibal used his expertise in forging documents to send a letter to Fabius, made to look as if it had come from the leading citizens of Metapontum. It assured Fabius that they would surrender the city to him personally, and were only awaiting his arrival there. Had it not been for unfavorable auspices, which induced the Romans to postpone their march, they would have walked straight into Hannibal’s ambush outside the city walls. Plutarch is clear: the Romans were saved by the gods, not by their good intelligence.56
Slowly the Romans began to copy Hannibal’s tactics. The first indication we have of a Roman signaling system is from the Battle of Arpi in Apulia in 213 bc, where the Romans operated their own network of relays to transmit military information.57 Other incidents also suggest that they were learning how to counter some of Hannibal’s ploys. When Hannibal defeated and killed the consul Marcellus, he immediately took the consul’s ring. The Romans, remembering Hannibal’s skill at forging correspondence, acted swiftly and broadcast to neighboring city-states that Marcellus had died, that his ring was in enemy hands, and that henceforth no letters ostensibly written by him should be trusted. Just such a letter reached the city of Salapia, carried by a Roman deserter pretending to be the late consul’s messenger. The dispatch, sealed with the consul’s ring, asked the Salapians to be ready for Marcellus’s arrival. When a phony “advance guard” turned up, in reality a unit of Roman deserters, it was welcomed into the city; the Salapians then closed the gates, set upon the deserters, and killed them. Salapia was thus spared, thanks to prompt dissemination of the warning about Marcellus’s captured seal (see Map 9).58
Still, the Romans direly needed a competent leader who could be left in command for the duration of the war and who could act as a central coordinator and chief of intelligence; someone who would not be too squeamish about adopting the very methods that had afforded Hannibal such success. They found their man in P. Cornelius Scipio, a formidable commander who would soon launch an aggressive campaign against the Carthaginians, a man who was willing to imitate Hannibal’s modus operandi and turn it to Rome’s benefit. Conservatism and constitutional niceties had to be laid aside; the Romans were desperate.59 For the first time they now had a military strategist who was a match for the enemy. Blending the efficient use of advance intelligence with vigorous offensive operations produced quick results. Scipio deserves credit for one of the most daring exploits in the Hannibalic war, a dash and surprise attack on the Carthaginian base at New Carthage.60 The city had an excellent harbor, and served as a logistics center, where the Carthaginians kept the bulk of their money and war materiel for the Spanish theater, as well as hostages taken in Spain. Scipio’s reconnaissance was meticulous. He studied the plan of the city, and also observed that the level of water in the lagoon fell each evening. He took advantage of this natural phenomenon in timing his action: 500 men with ladders scaled the walls in a frontal assault at a moment when they were least expected, and the city was taken (Map 10). The following year, 208 bc, Scipio’s prowess showed again at the Battle of Baecula, where he defeated Hannibal’s brother Hasdrubal and destroyed most of his cavalry. The battle marked the “coming of age of Roman military tactics.”61 After Hasdrubal’s flight from Baecula, Scipio continued the Roman offensive in Spain, routing two Carthaginian armies at Ilipa in 206 bc (Map 11). Even Polybius admits that Scipio was emulating Hannibal’s tactics in holding the enemy forces while his cavalry wings outflanked them.62
Map 10 Carthago Nova, the Lagoon.
Map 11 Baecula and Ilipa.
Meanwhile Hasdrubal had broken out of Spain and had made his way to Italy in an endeavor to bolster Hannibal’s war effort there. Counterintelligence would provide the key to a Roman victory. Hannibal, trapped in southern Italy, sent messengers north to look for his brother and urge Hasdrubal to bring him reinforcements. His brother wrote back describing his route along the Adriatic (Map 12). They agreed to meet in Umbria near the sea, and together march on Rome. The bearers of this letter, four Gallic horsemen and two Numidians, crossed the entire peninsula without being detected. When they lost their way in southern Italy, however, they were captured by a Roman detachment near Tarentum and tortured.63 Intercepting the message enabled the Romans to locate Hasdrubal at the Metaurus River. Hannibal learned of his brother’s defeat and capture when C. Claudius Nero, the Roman victor, threw Hasdrubal’s severed head into Hannibal’s camp. Without doubt, Hannibal now realized his last hope of reinforcement had perished.
Map 12 The Metaurus River.
The war moves to Africa
With Carthaginian forces defeated in Spain and Sicily, but with Hannibal still active in southern Italy, the Roman Senate assigned the province of Sicily to Scipio. He was expected to extend the theater of operations from there across the Mediterranean into Africa. The Romans calculated that an imminent threat to Carthage itself would entice Hannibal out of Italy and back to the defense of his home city. Scipio dispatched a fleet under the command of G. Laelius to obtain information about the present state of affairs in North Africa. Carthaginian reconnaissance detected a night landing by Laelius’s fleet at Hippo in 205 bc. Their fast messenger relay covered the 150 miles from Hippo to Carthage overnight, and the Carthaginian Senate was informed the next day. Laelius hurried back to Sicily and promptly reported his findings to Scipio. He strongly recommended that Scipio carry the war into Africa without undue delay, while Carthage was still shaken by its recent defeats elsewhere and its home defenses weak in Hannibal’s absence. Scipio was rightly convinced that this was the time to strike and he led an expeditionary force to the North African coast in 204 bc. The intelligence war now shifted from Europe to Africa.
In conducting espionage, Scipio seems to stand out as an exception among Roman commanders. When his siege of Utica was stalled, he sent a legation to the camp of the Numidian King Syphax. Scipio’s emissaries were accompanied by centurions disguised as slaves. The legate Gaius Laelius was fearful that one of these men, Lucius Statorius, might be recognized since he had visited the camp before. To protect his agent’s cover, Laelius caned him publicly. This episode plays upon the known Roman practice of subjecting only social inferiors to corporal punishment, and is of particular interest because it specifically identifies centurions and tribunes as active participants in espionage missions. While the legates were in conference, the “slaves” were to wander about the camp in different directions and reconnoiter the premises, taking note of entrances, exits, and the location of each division. They were to look for the outposts and sentries, and to determine whether the camp was more vulnerable to attack by day or by night. On each visit, a different group of “slaves” made the trip, so that every centurion would have an opportunity to familiarize himself with the grounds. When all the information was at hand, Scipio decided to bum the Carthaginian and Numidian camps. The Carthaginians, thinking it was an accidental fire, ran out unarmed, only to be slaughtered by the Roman column that was ready and waiting. The camps of Hasdrubal Gisco and Syphax were completely destroyed (Map 13). By this daring stroke, which claimed no Roman casualties, Scipio delivered a crippling blow to a superior force, but not without criticism of his sneaky behavior.64
Map 13 The camps of Masinissa and Syphax.
Following a successful mopping-up operation by Scipio at the Great Plains, Hannibal was recalled from Italy and set up a winter camp in Africa, at Lepcis, where he reorganized his troops and recruited additional soldiers and horsemen. By the following spring, the antagonists were ready to face each other in their ultimate showdown. Hannibal arrived at Hadrumentum in 202 bc, and lost no time in deploying his spies to collect the intelligence he needed. Reports confirmed that all the territory surrounding Carthage was occupied by the Romans. Hannibal had to ascertain the size and location of the Roman forces, especially the strength of Scipio’s cavalry, since his own was still very weak. Spies sent to reconnoiter the Roman camp were caught, and, according to Polybius,65 were shown around the site, entertained, and then released and sent back to Hannibal. The story has often been doubted because similar incidents elsewhere are recounted by Herodotus and Dionysius of Halicarnassus and historians suspect a borrowing of the tactic for effect.66 But it is not at all improbable that the ruse may have been used more than once, when one considers the psychological effect this ploy would have had on the Carthaginians. Scipio wanted his enemy to know he was supremely confident, and that Massinissa had not yet arrived with his 6,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry. The decisive encounter at Zama was the first time Hannibal was ever out-generaled in a pitched battle. Copying Hannibal’s tactics at Cannae, Scipio performed the double-envelopment maneuver and routed the Carthaginian Army in this final engagement of the sixteen-year war.
Winning the battles but losing the war67
Hannibal’s talent as a general is self-evident and this was due, in no small part, to his effective utilization of all the intelligence resources at his disposal. He raised tactical maneuver on the battlefield to new heights, while also adding the element of surprise. No other army commander in antiquity combined these two factors as cleverly as Hannibal. This unique blend is regarded as his trademark and the most distinctive feature of his generalship.68 Without sound intelligence, none of it would have been possible. Granted intelligence collection was a rudimentary affair in the third century bc. But what Hannibal lacked in technology he made up for in originality and guile. His victories, which brought Rome to the brink of physical, economic, political, and moral collapse, were products of timely information gathered on his enemy’s location, intentions, and capabilities. With no Punic documents surviving, we are unable to tell exactly how his intelligence network was organized, but Roman records show that it served him well at several levels. His signaling and relay systems provided contact between his field headquarters and the capital. Secret signs and signals were skillfully used for clandestine communication, and he frequently misled the enemy with forged seals and documents. Hannibal’s counterintelligence was also superb. He kept the Romans in the dark about his own movements, and could trick them into believing he was somewhere he was not. He continually practiced psychological warfare, and his stratagems left the enemy baffled.
Commanders depend on intelligence, first and foremost, to minimize the risk of being surprised while maximizing the impact of surprise upon the enemy. The other major role of intelligence is to provide for the optimum employment of one’s forces by evaluating the enemy’s strengths, weaknesses, and objectives. Hannibal’s successes testify to his subtle understanding of these concepts. His intelligence information enabled him to determine when and where he could most profitably pursue his campaign against a numerically superior opponent, inside the opponent’s own territory. In all his Italian battles Hannibal was outnumbered, sometimes by ten to one. He relied on cavalry scouts to identify new sources of manpower for his mercenary army, as well as to seek battlegrounds that would afford him topographic advantage. Hannibal makes the planning of the ambush like that at Lake Trasimene look so simple, we tend to forget how unique an ambush on such a scale is in warfare. Even Cannae, which was executed in full view of the enemy, was little more than a large trap.69 Hannibal relied on speed, maintained the initiative, and mobilized a variety of intelligence expedients in support of limited goals. The Romans, on the other hand, had to cope with the military paradox of being strategically on the defensive, while tactically on a perpetual search for Hannibal’s elusive army. Even had their intelligence capabilities been comparable, Hannibal would still have enjoyed an operative advantage reminiscent of that which guerrilla groups have over regular armed forces, ancient and modem. However, guerrillas do not ordinarily win wars unless the regular army they are fighting against makes egregious mistakes, or loses its political base.
Hannibal’s positive attitude toward intelligence was as much a function of his own genius as it was a reflection of a Carthaginian system. His personality traits, more than anything else, gave the Second Punic War its epic quality. “The adequacy of the intelligence that a commander has available is in direct proportion to his interest in intelligence and his use of it.”70 Hannibal had an extraordinary capacity for leadership while commanding a mercenary army amid danger and defeat. It is not surprising that he complemented his mercenary army with an outstanding intelligence apparatus. It took another individualist, Scipio, to take heed of Hannibal’s example and put it into practice for the Romans. What the Romans learned from Hannibal was that an experienced and responsible general simply does not move into a region about which he knows next to nothing without having first obtained thoroughly detailed geographical, political, and military intelligence.71 Hannibal never allowed the enemy to pin him down for long, never squandered his men in useless engagements, never tried crudely to batter his way through a check or a difficulty, but always kept his options open.
The adversaries in the Second Punic War had very dissimilar perceptions of intelligence requirements. Rome’s use of intelligence assets early in the war was lacking, and thus, not surprisingly, the Roman war effort is all too often punctuated with intelligence failures and military disaster.72 Only a paucity of information can account for the Romans’ walking into so many traps set by Hannibal, but themselves laying so few traps for the Carthaginians. The Romans, it must be said, made little of the assets they had, notably scouts and scouting vessels, guides, and reconnaissance units, until after Scipio.73 Even when they did use their assets, sometimes the result was ineffective. While personal observation can be useful, it is often dangerous for a leader. One of the most notorious examples of this occurred when the two consuls of 208 bc, M. Claudius Marcellus and T. Quinctius Crispinus, decided to scout out a hill facing Hannibal’s camp near Venusia by themselves. They were accompanied by only 220 cavalry. They were spotted by the Carthaginian lookouts immediately and were ambushed by Numidian skirmishers. Their escort was put to flight, Marcellus was killed immediately, and Crispinus escaped but died of his wounds a few days later. Amateurish scouting techniques had cost the Romans both of their supreme commanders in one skirmish, and the subsequent siege of Salapia failed.74
One factor that militated against a coherent direction of Roman intelligence efforts was the annual cycle of senior appointments: new commanders were posted from Rome each year or so, thus many of them would have to master the intelligence function from the ground up, especially if their previous military experience had been minimal. Hannibal, by contrast, was his own chief of intelligence for fourteen years. Interestingly, as far as style of leadership is concerned, Scipio once again stands out as the exception among Roman Army commanders of the third century bc – a strong individual personality in a society that still was more accustomed to corporate action. In the end, however, Scipio won because he had the better army, not because he had the superior skill.
One Roman habit that was discussed earlier was relying on allies to provide intelligence. Rome still had others acting as its eyes and ears. Hannibal’s activities in Spain in the 240s, before the Second Punic War, were reported to Rome by her ally Saguntum.75 During the war itself, Scipio informed the Senate of Hasdrubal’s departure from Italy in 208 bc, but it was Rome’s allies the Massiliots who confirmed that he had indeed crossed the Pyrenees and was raising troops in Gaul.76 They were still acting as Rome’s eyes and ears in the area half a century after the war ended, when they reported Ligurian incursions in 154 bc.77 This method worked well as long as the allies stayed loyal. Should they have decided to switch sides, the Romans would have been left without an important intelligence asset.
If Hannibal had such good intelligence, why then did he lose the war? He failed because the political and strategic advantages were intrinsically in Rome’s favor. Hannibal lost and lost badly on the strategic level. Skills such as tactical brilliance, competent leadership, and effective intelligence gathering were not enough to beat the Romans. What Hannibal did not have was better strategic intelligence or control of the war. His idea of invading Italy directly was a valid plan of action, but it could not neutralize the Roman superiority at sea and in manpower, the loyalty of Rome’s allies, their ability to bar reinforcements from reaching Hannibal, and finally, Scipio’s counteroffensive. Few of these developments could have been predicted in advance, even with the best intelligence. When the wider objectives of Hannibal’s original invasion plan were obviously not being accomplished, and the subsequent attempts at opening new fronts to encircle Rome had failed, he was stalled. Hannibal lost the strategic advantage when the scene of action moved to Spain and Sicily.78 Carthage, as a whole, lacked any clearly thought out political aim in the war, except recovering the status quo ante bellum. Hannibal was fighting not to occupy Italy but to win a peace that would restore Sicily, Spain, Sardinia, and Corsica to Carthaginian control. A vital ingredient of Hannibal’s strategy was to drive a wedge between Rome and her allies, but he offered nothing to the allies in Rome’s place, beside “liberation.”79
Hannibal’s inventive craftiness certainly contributes to the admiration he receives from soldiers and historians. His mastery of the art of tactics, including ruses de guerres such as concealment of forces and surprise attacks, very often demonstrate the stupidity of the Roman leaders, so not surprisingly the Romans attributed it to Punic treachery. The Romans were certainly not guiltless when it came to the use of treachery themselves. While fides had a great deal of propaganda value as the catchword for Rome’s reputation as an ally, it was not an ideal that would restrain the Romans from using dirty tricks. There is a continuous history of the use, albeit limited, of covert operations by the Romans when they believed it was necessary. That Rome did not use its intelligence assets better had nothing to do with “moral scruples” about the rules of war, and had everything to do with orthodox mentality and the absence of any great vision or long-term planning in the intelligence field. The surprise attack on New Carthage in 210 bc, and the initiative that culminated in the burning of the Carthaginian and Numidian camps in 203 bc, are measures that show the sophistication of Roman tactics under Scipio.80
After the Second Punic War Hannibal continued to devise original ploys, ever fresh and innovative, that helped turn the tide of battles. To recount just one episode, after leaving Carthage Hannibal offered his services to Prusias I, king of Bithynia. In the war between Bithynia and the far stronger Pergamum, Hannibal was asked by Prusias to contrive a stratagem that would outwit his powerful foe in a naval battle. Anticipating that the crews would be scantily dressed since in action the rowers were often naked, Hannibal filled pottery jars with venomous snakes and hurled them at the enemy ships. When these “bombs” exploded, the shoeless crews were panicked and jumped overboard to avoid the snakes. The Bithynians then took control.
Even Hannibal’s death was to cheat Rome of satisfaction. In 183 bc, nineteen years after Zama, the Roman Senate decreed that Hannibal should no longer remain at large. Roman agents tracked him down in Bithynia and surrounded his villa. Their intention was either to kill him or to transport him alive to Rome, where he would be a central figure in a triumph procession. That the Romans would take the trouble to hunt down a 64-year-old man, at an obscure town by the Sea of Marmara, indicates that he was still a valuable symbol if not indeed an actual threat. They would never rest as long as Hannibal was alive. His last words reportedly were: “Let us release the Romans from their long anxiety since they think it too long to wait for the death of an old man.”81 When the Roman soldiers entered the villa they found him dead, a suicide. Once again, and for the last time, he was one step ahead of his enemies.
Notes
1. See J.F. Lazenby’s Hannibal’s War (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998) with its updated bibliography, and J. Peddie, Hannibal’s War (Phoenix Mill: Sutton, 1997).
2. For the sole exception, see R.M. Sheldon, “Hannibal’s Spies,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1, 3 (1987), pp. 53–70.
3. Dvornik, Origins of Intelligence Services, p. 54.
4. Herodotus 4.196 describes how the Carthaginians summoned the native West Africans by smoke signals, and then retired to their ships while the natives examined goods laid out on shore. Dvomik, Origins of Intelligence Services, p. 54.
5. Strabo 3.5.11.
6. Cicero, de Leg. 2.95; De off. 1.150. Note this charge of perfidy is coming from the Romans, who violated faith at Messana, treacherously seized Sardinia and Corsica, showed despicable deceit in disarming Carthage prior to the Third Punic War, and had an infamous record of warfare and diplomacy in Spain.
7. Polybius 1.19.6.
8. Justinus 21.6.5 attributes it to Hamilcar Barca; Polyaenus 2.20 attributes it to Demaratus.
9. See Dvomik’s comments, Origins of Intelligence Services, p. 57.
10. Polybius 1.24.5.
11. Website: Ibid., 1.57.3, W.R. Paton translation, Loeb Classical Library edition.
12. Roman marine engineering, specifically the invention of a novel boarding mechanism, the corvus, is considered a major contributor to Roman naval victories of that war: W.L. Rodgers, Greek and Roman Naval Warfare (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986), pp. 275–6; H.T. Wallinga, The Boarding Bridge of the Romans (Groningen: J.B. Wolters, 1956). Other authorities demonstrate that the corvus was a device more dangerous to its users than to the enemy, and a liability rather than an asset, because it rendered the boat unstable on the high seas, thereby causing Roman defeats and heavy casualties in later maritime engagements: C.G. Starr, A History of the Ancient World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 481. An example of how Roman blundering could paradoxically end in victory is given by G.K. Tipps, “The Battle of Ecnomus,” Historia 34 (1985), pp. 432–65.
13. Carthaginian complicity in this revolt is mentioned in Orosius 4.12.1 and Zonaras 8.18.
14. Polybius 3.15.11–13; Appian 6.2.10, 7.1.3.
15. Livy, 22.19.6–8, B.O. Foster translation, Loeb Classical Library edition.
16. Pliny the Elder, HN 35.48.169, H. Rackham translation, Loeb Classical Library edition. The expression “watchtowers of Hannibal” does not necessarily suggest these were built by the Carthaginians; observation posts on high ground along the Spanish coast, as elsewhere, had long antedated Hannibal. For the identification of the “watch-towers of Hannibal,” see R.C. Sanchez, “La Segunda Guerra Punica en la Bética,” Habis 6 (1975), p. 215, citing J. Bernier and J. Fortea, Recintos y fortificaciones ibéricos en la Bética (Salamanca, 1970).
17. On the so-called Ebro River Treaty, see Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, pp. 22–3. On the causes of the war, see J. Rich, “The Origins of the Second Punic War,” in T. Cornell, B. Rankov and P. Sabin, The Second Punic War: A Reappraisal (London: Institute of Classical Studies, 1996), pp. 1–37, which notes that there are at least 33 major studies of this issue.
18. For the roles of Rome, Carthage, and Massilia in the Saguntum affair, see A.E. Astin, “Saguntum and the Origins of the Second Punic War,” Latomus 26 (1967), pp. 577–96, with earlier bibliography.
19. Livy 21.9, B.O. Foster translation, Loeb Classical Library edition.
20. There was in Carthage a small faction hostile to the Barca family. That faction opposed the war and did advocate handing Hannibal over to the Romans. See Hanno’s speech in Livy 21.10.4–13.
21. Website: Ibid., 21.21.1–2.
22. E.T. Salmon, in “The Strategy of the Second Punic War,” G&R 7 (1960), p. 135, has suggested that the Romans were aware of Hannibal’s intention to invade Italy by land, and that they could not have been so deficient in strategic foresight. The fact remains, however, that they took no preparatory defensive measures in anticipation of such an invasion, and indeed seem to have been altogether panicked by Hannibal’s arrival. They thought the battlefields would be in Spain and North Africa, where the bulk of the Roman troops were being shipped. Cf. Polybius 3.61–62 and Walbank, Commentary, vol. 1, p. 396. Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 50 says: “The Romans seem to have had no inkling of his plan.”
23. E. Kam, Surprise Attack (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 7, points out that in most cases the victims of a surprise attack do not ignore the presence of a threat, or the existence of a potential threat, but rather deem an imminent attack to be unlikely in actuality. Even if the Romans considered the possibility of a land invasion, the fact remains that when it did occur they were caught unprepared.
24. Livy 21.23.4–6. On the logistical problems of moving the men and elephants through the Alps, see J.F. Shean, “Hannibal’s Mules: The Logistical Limitations of Hannibal’s Army and the Battle of Cannae,” Historia 45 (1996), pp. 167–75.
25. Livy 21.20.2–5.
26. Website: Ibid., 21.21.1.
27. Polybius 3.43.6; Livy 21.27.7
28. Polybius 3.44–45; Austin and Rankov, Exploratio, p. 53.
29. The area included the Insubres, with their capital at Milan, and the Boii, with their capital at Bologna. Hannibal was in touch with both of these tribes before he began the campaign. Whether or not those agents split up to cover all the territory, Polybius tells us they came back to Cartagena together. Polybius 3.34.4–7.
30. On the Battle of Ticinus: Polybius 3.65–66 and Walbank, Commentary, vol. 1, p. 399 with bibliography; Livy 21.46–48; Zonaras 8.23, Appian, Hann., 5; Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, pp. 53–4. Hannibal’s supply situation improved sharply after the battle; see Shean, “Hannibal’s Mules,” p. 179.
31. Polybius 3.67.1–7 has 2,000 infantry and 200 cavalry of the Celts desert after beheading some Romans. The Cenomani, however, remained loyal to Rome, and other Celts attempted to remain neutral. In Polybius 3.68.8 the Celts provision Hannibal, while in Polybius 3.69.5 the Celts between Po and Trebbia are allied with Hannibal but negotiate with Rome after Hannibal’s raids.
32. See Polybius 3.81.2: “For there is no denying that he who thinks that there is anything more essential to a general than the knowledge of his opponent’s principles and character, is both ignorant and foolish.” W.R. Paton translation, Loeb Classical Library edition.
33. Livy 21.48–53; Polybius 3.70–74 and Walbank, Commentary, vol. 1, pp. 403–4 on the motives of Sempronius, P. Scipio and Hannibal.
34. B.S. Strauss and J. Ober, The Anatomy of Error. Ancient Military Disasters and their Lessons for Modem Strategists (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), p. 145.
35. The other consul, Gnaeus Servilius, took up a defensive position on the Adriatic littoral at Ariminum, to intercept Hannibal’s force should it move south along the east coast of the peninsula – a route Hannibal ultimately did not follow: Polybius 3.77.1. Conversely, Livy 22.2.1 has Servilius at that time recruiting extra troops in Rome. For troops numbers, see Walbank, Commentary, vol. 1, p. 410.
36. Livy 22.7.2, following Fabius Pictor, has 15,000 killed and 10,000 scattered over Etruria, with 2,500 Carthaginian dead; Polybius 3.84.7 has 15,000 prisoners with 1,500 Carthaginian dead; see Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 67.
37. Shean, “Hannibal’s Mules,” pp. 181–2.
38. Livy 22.23. The information about land ownership was provided by Roman deserters. The same trick was supposedly used by Coriolanus to create bad blood between the patricians and plebeians: Livy 2.39.6.
39. Plutarch, Fabius Maximus 6; Walbank, Commentary, vol. 1, p. 424, who considers this a “worthless anecdote”; Livy 22.13.
40. Livy 22.15–17; Plutarch, Fabius Maximus 6; Polybius 3.93–94; Walbank, Commentary, vol. 1, p. 429–30; Sililius Italicus, Punica 7.311ff.; Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 70. On this and other strange phenomena in Hannibal’s engagements, see A. Dawson, “Hannibal and Chemical Warfare”, CJ 63 (1967), pp. 117–25. On Hannibal’s need to move in order to feed his army, see Shean, “Hannibal’s Mules”, pp. 181–5.
41. Livy 22.28.1. Livy mentions that, besides Hannibal’s spies, this information was brought to him by deserters. Plutarch simply says: “Hannibal kept a watchful eye on everything.” Fabius Maximus 11.
42. Livy 22.33.1.
43. Polybius 3.111ff.; Livy 22.47–49. R.E. Dupuy and T.N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 2nd edn, p. 66 say it provided military theorists with “a symbol of tactical perfection.” See Walbank, Commentary, vol. 1, pp. 435–49.
44. The rings from upper-class Romans were said to have filled three bushels; Livy 23.12.1. For the casualty figures, see Polybius 3.117.4; Livy 22.49, 22.59.5, 60.14, 25.6.13; Eutropius 3.10; Appian 7.4.25; Plutarch, Fabius Maximus 16; and Quintilian 8.6.26. On the discrepancies in the numbers, see P.A. Brunt, Italian Manpower (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 419; B.O. Foster, in the Loeb edition of Livy, pp. 362–3; H. Delbrück, History of the Art of War (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1975), vol. 1, pp. 325–31; Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, pp. 84–5.
45. Arpi, Salapia, Aecae and Herdonea went over immediately after Cannae. Most of the Samnites, except the Pentri, also threw in their lot with Hannibal. Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 89; Peddie, Hannibal’s War, pp. 105–6. A. Goldsworthy, Cannae (London: Cassell, 2001), pp. 162–3.
46. Livy 23.24.11–13.
47. Website: Ibid., 22.51.4, B.O. Foster translation, Loeb Classical Library.
48. There are many historians who still think it was possible. See Shean, “Hannibal’s Mules,” pp. 159, 184–5, who believes this is a historical tradition perhaps started by Livy himself.
49. There has always been a controversy over whether Hannibal was sabotaged by a hostile government at home. For the two sides, see Peddie, Hannibal’s War, pp. 191–2 contra B.D. Hoyos, “Hannibal: What Kind of Genius?” Greece and Rome 30, 2 (1983), pp. 171–80.
50. Did Hannibal underestimate the importance of seapower? See D. Proctor, Hannibal’s March on History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 49–51 and Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 89; B. Rankov, “The Second Punic War at Sea,” in T.J Cornell, B. Rankov and P. Sabin, The Second Punic War. A Reappraisal (London: Institute of Classical Studies, 1996), pp. 49–56. Shean, “Hannibal’s Mules,” pp. 166–7.
51. According to Livy 26.9.6, the messenger from Fregellae rode to Rome (a distance of 60 miles) in a day and a night. Also see Polybius 9.6.1–3 on the suddenness and unexpectedness of Hannibal’s appearance outside Rome; Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 122.
52. Livy 27.27.3.
53. Polybius 8.24–33. Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 111; Walbank, Commentary, vol. 2, pp. 105–6.
54. Polybius 7.9 gives the treaty agreement; Walbank, Commentary, vol. 2, p. 42ff. Livy 23.33; Appian, Mac. 1.
55. Livy 23.33; Appian, Mac. 1.2–3; Zonaras 9.4.2–3; Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 159.
56. Plutarch, Fabius Maximus 19; Livy 27.16.12–16; Polybius 10.33.8 and Walbank, Commentary, vol. 2, pp. 244–5; Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 176.
57. Livy 24.46.3: a system of trumpet signals.
58. Website: Ibid., 27.28; Plutarch, Marcellus 9.4; Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 179.
59. Scipio never held any office higher than curule aedile. He was given imperium pro-consule in Spain while he was technically a private citizen. Normally such authority was only granted to an outgoing consul or praetor. See Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, pp. 132–3.
60. Polybius 10.2ff.; Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, pp. 134–6.
61. H.H. Scullard, Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1970), p. 74; Livy 26.45–47.
62. Polybius 11.23–24.
63. Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 183 suggests the letter contained disinformation that was actually intended to mislead the Romans. If so, the messengers did not know the contents or the intent of the letter, or they would have not let themselves be tortured. Livy 27.43.1–4 accepts the message at face value.
64. Some Roman historians find Scipio’s conduct distasteful. Livy 30.4–6; Polybius 14.1.13; Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, pp. 206–7.
65. Polybius 15.5.1–11; cf. Livy 30.29.3; Appian, Lib. 39.
66. Polybius 15.5.4–7. The story is often dismissed because of its resemblance to the actions of Xerxes (Herodotus 7.146.7) and Laevinus (Dion. Hal. 19.11), who treated spies in the same manner. But, as Walbank, Commentary, vol. 2, p. 450 points out, Scipio may have known about those previous case histories and decided to use similar tactics. Cf. Zonaras 8.3.6; Eutropius 2.11; Frontinus 4.7.7. Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 219 accepts the story. Livy 30.29.4, on the other hand, says the captured spies did report Massinissa’s arrival.
67. B.S. Strauss and J. Ober, The Anatomy of Error. Ancient Military Disasters and their Lessons for Modern Strategists (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), pp. 133–61.
68. G. de Beer, Hannibal (New York: Viking Press, 1969), p. 199; E. May, G.P. Stadler and J.F. Votaw (eds), Ancient and Medieval Warfare (Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing Group, 1984), p. 56; Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 257.
69. Lazenby, “Was Maharbal Right?” in Cornell, Rankov and Sabin, The Second Punic War, A Reappraisal, p. 40.
70. I. Heymont, Combat Intelligence in Modem Warfare (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing, 1960), pp. 2–3.
71. Austin and Rankov, Exploratio, p. 13; Polybius 3.48; Vegetius 3.6.
72. A recent study has noted: “On the tactical side, the Second Punic War saw little or very poor use of scouting until after Scipio Africanus and other Roman commanders learned from the most painful experiences at Hannibal’s hands.” Austin and Rankov, Exploratio, p. 10.
73. For activity of Roman and Massiliot scouting vessels (speculatorae naves) see Livy 30.10.6 and 30.10.13. Austin and Rankov, Exploratio, p. 10 on Caesar. Brizzi, I sistemi, Ch. 1 attributes this to a Roman attitude against spying, but there has been little acceptance of his interpretation. See J. Briscoe, review of Brizzi in Journal of Roman Studies 73 (1983), p. 205.
74. Polybius 10.32.1–6 even admits that “Marcellus… brought this misfortune on himself by behaving not so much like a general as like a simpleton.” W.R. Paton translation, Loeb Classical Library; his account disagrees with Livy 27.26.7ff. See also Valerius Maximus 1.6–9; Plutarch, Marcellus 29; Appian, Hannibalic War 50; Austin and Rankov, Exploratio, pp. 63–4; Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 178.
75. Polybius 3.15.1–2.
76. Zonaras 9.8; Livy 27.36.1–2. Austin and Rankov, Exploratio, p. 90.
77. Polybius 33.8.1–2; Austin and Rankov, Exploratio, p. 90.
78. It is generally believed that Hannibal regarded Spain as a means to an end, a forward base by which to conquer Italy, while the Punic Senate saw Spain as its ultimate goal. This disagreement over strategic objectives, rather than plain jealousy of the Barca family, is thought to be at the root of the fatal split which cost Carthage the war. See Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 88. B.D. Hoyos, “Hannibal. What Kind of Genius?” G&R 30 (1983), pp. 171–80, in a dissenting view, finds no evidence that Hannibal’s efforts were sabotaged by a hostile government at home, and holds him solely responsible for the choice of strategy.
79. Livy 30.30.25. 23.5.13 has Varro himself trying to persuade the Capuans to remain loyal to Rome rather than see Italy become “a province of Numidians and Moors.” See also the comments of J. Boardman et al. in The Oxford History of the Classical World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 408.
80. See n. 6 above; H.V. Canter, “The Character of Hannibal,” Classical Journal 24 (1929), pp. 564–77.
81. Livy 39.51.9.