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ALESIA was so situated that it would have been almost impossible to storm. Caesar remembered his defeat at Gergovia, and Alesia was built on a similar high plateau and was even more formidable. On all sides the ground fell away steeply, in some places precipitously, while two small rivers, the Ose and the Oserain, enclosed the area, forming natural defenses as well as ensuring a supply of water. Inside Alesia were Vercingetorix and some 80,000 men, as well as the permanent inhabitants. But herein lay his weakness for, although there was adequate water, there would hardly be enough provisions for so many people. Vercingetorix had counted on defeating Caesar by a scorched-earth policy combined with guerrilla tactics and then, when he thought that the Romans were retreating, by a major cavalry attack while they were on the march. He had not counted on his cavalry being defeated, nor on a siege, and there was no reason to imagine that the storerooms of Alesia contained enough provisions for such an army as well as the inhabitants. Caesar knew this and, while he had not been prepared to sit out a lengthy siege at Gergovia, he now counted on the legions being able to supply themselves from the country around Alesia and to reduce the citadel before reinforcements could come up to relieve Vercingetorix.
He settled down confidently for a lengthy siege as, on their very first day before the walls, the legionaries began digging. The tenacity and endurance of the Roman soldier was never shown to greater advantage than during the conduct of a siege, and their engineering skills as well as their perseverance became so well known throughout the world that those familiar with Roman techniques usually abandoned hope when they saw siege-works rising around their town or fortress. One Roman commander was said to have replied to a delegation from a town he was about to besiege, who told him that they had enough food for ten years, that in that case he would take it in the eleventh year. The delegation went back within the walls and the town at once capitulated. The process by which Caesar intended to reduce Alesia (described in detail in the Commentaries) was bicircumvallation—surrounding the town with two double lines of fortified trenches; the circumference of the outer being some fourteen miles and of the inner ten. Between these two great lines of entrenchments there was ample space for Caesar’s troops and cavalry as well as all the baggage and provision carts. Within this area, protected also by tall watchtowers, the troops could face both inward toward Alesia and outward, if and when Gallic reinforcements came to relieve the city.
Before the noose could close around the threatened fortress Vercingetorix decided to send all his horsemen out secretly by night to take word to their tribes that Caesar was besieging Alesia, and that their only hope for a free Gaul was to come in their thousands and break the siege. Once Caesar and his army had been in their turn surrounded and defeated, the Roman threat to the people of Gaul would be over. It has often been debated why Vercingetorix decided to send all his horsemen away from the threatened city—surely a hundred at the most would have been enough to take the word to the other tribes? Lack of forage seems an obvious answer, but the horses could have been methodically slaughtered for rations (and there is no evidence that the Gauls had the Roman aversion to horsemeat), while the horsemen themselves would have proved useful in the garrison force. In any case, they rode out through gaps in the unfinished entrenchments—with the knowledge that Vercingetorix had supplies for thirty days—and made their way throughout Gaul to summon help.
Then the noose closed, the days passed, and after a month starvation began to grip the besieged. The difficulty of summoning so many men from so many tribes (many of them at variance with one another) and the slowness of communications, all contributed to Vercingetorix’s next action. After an assembly of the Gallic leaders within Alesia, capitulation having been rejected, as well as a suggestion that the old and those unable to bear arms should be killed, the decision was taken for all the noncombatant civilians to leave the city. Vercingetorix may have hoped that the Romans would let them pass through their lines to the outside world; in which case he knew little about the real purpose of a siege. This was to ensure that the excessive numbers of those within a city or a fortress would lead to mass starvation and, in its turn, to capitulation. The strength of the besieging army lay in the numbers and weakness of the besieged. The inhabitants of Alesia were rebuffed when they came up to the Roman lines and when in desperation they turned back toward their own city, they found that the gates had been closed against them. So they wandered about between the encircling Roman cordon and the doomed garrison until they died.
The grain in Alesia had run out and the Romans were also reduced to minimal rations when the relief force finally arrived—a swirl of dust in the distance beyond the river Brenne into which the two tributaries that encircle Alesia emptied. Caesar estimated the relieving army at a quarter of a million infantry and eight thousand cavalry, but these figures—like others in the Commentaries—must be regarded with some suspicion. There could be no doubt, however, that the relief force by far outnumbered the besieging Romans, who were outnumbered in any case by Vercingetorix’s besieged army. Certainly, they represented a large part of that Gaul which the Romans had thought was willingly accepting the New Order, and they were led by senior chieftains: Commius of the Atrebates, Vercassivellaunus, an Arvernian cousin of Vercingetorix, and the two Aedui, Eporedorix and Viridomarus, who had been responsible for taking their tribe into the great revolt against Rome. Vercingetorix is reputed to have said that the Romans won their victories, not by superior courage, but by superior science. Certainly it was the scientific ingenuity of the bicircumvallation with all its outer defenses of staked pitfalls, calthrops and barbed spikes (the minefields of the day) which, combined with the courage of the legionaries, were to defeat the Gauls.
For four days, lashed by spears and arrows within their double lines, the Romans fought off wave after wave of attacks from both sides. Cavalry charges (in which the Germans again proved their superiority) were followed by massed infantry assaults in which both Caesar and Labienus showed not only their tactical abilities but their personal courage. At one moment, when the fighting had grown desperate around a weak point, Caesar “left his own station: he called up the reserves which had not yet been engaged, and he rode across the field, conspicuous in his scarlet dress and with his bare head, cheering on the men as he passed each point where they were engaged, and hastening to the scene where the chief danger lay.” The final attack came about noon on the fourth day. Caesar in person took charge of a legion plus an extra cohort, to fall upon the Gauls at their thickest point. The loyal German cavalry came to his assistance, taking the great mass of Gallic infantry from the rear, and the last major assault was over.
The relieving army, their morale shattered, turned in flight as the legionaries swarmed from their positions and took the offensive. By the end of that day—while thousands of Gauls dispersed throughout the countryside around—it was clear that Alesia would never be relieved. Seventy-four captured standards were piled at Caesar’s feet, while the broken Vercingetorix, seeing that the great relief force had failed in its purpose, turned back into Alesia, a man without hope. So many thousands had come to his assistance and yet they had been unable to break that cordon of steel which surrounded him… Too many thousands was perhaps the answer, for it seems as if many of them had never been able to get even near the Roman perimeter, while the problems of food and weaponry supply for so vast a number were beyond their simple logistics. The horsemen and foot soldiers, who now spread back into Gaul like a great ripple on a pond, carried with them a very different message from that which Vercingetorix had originally sent out. The message was that the Romans had triumphed at Alesia and that the dream of a free Gaul was over. The dream of a united Gaul was something that few had ever been able to understand.
On the following day, seated formally on a curule chair on the Alesia side of the encircling Roman defenses, Caesar accepted the submission of the defeated Gallic leaders. His own cool prose tells it all: “…the commanders were brought before him, Vercingetorix was given up to him, their arms were cast at his feet.” His verdict on the rebellion and on those who had taken part in it was pronounced. Vercingetorix was to be kept a captive in chains until the time came for his death. The other leaders were pardoned. The prisoners of war were to be divided among the Roman soldiers as slaves. (This meant that, if not personally wanted, they could be sold to the contractors.) The Aedui and Arverni, however, were separated from the other prisoners and, after a short detention, were restored to their states. The Arverni had to produce a large number of hostages, but the Aedui were even restored to their former position of free allies. Caesar’s magnanimity was to yield dividends, for his preferential treatment of the two major tribes secured them to his interest permanently. Nationalism was over for them, they had “swallowed the toad” and would remain faithful to Rome. And Caesar had every reason for requiring all the assistance he could find in the current tumultuous state of Gaul.
Although the dream of a single Gallic state had dissolved, it would be some time before he could be confident that the land was quiet. As for the defeated Vercingetorix, he had to wait for six years in Roman jails until his death after Caesar’s Gallic Triumph in 46. And the Roman soldiers on the vast perimeter around Alesia?
…they knew nothing of the victory till they heard the cries of the men and the lamentations of the women who were in the town, and had from thence seen the Romans at a distance carrying into their camp a great quantity of bucklers, adorned with gold and silver, many breastplates stained with blood, besides cups and tents made in the Gallic fashion. So soon did so vast an army dissolve and vanish like a ghost or dream…
(Plutarch)
The heart of the great revolt had collapsed with the defeat of Vercingetorix and the fall of Alesia, but the embers still smoldered in various parts of Gaul—most noticeably among the Belgae who had contributed little. Caesar, who had gone into winter camp at Bibracte, was soon compelled to take action against the Bituriges and, even though it was the depths of winter, to move in person at the head of two legions and occupy their country. He did it with that rapidity which had the customary effect of taking the enemy completely by surprise. After six weeks of what seems to have been more a manhunt than a campaign, the Bituriges “were brought to accept peace” and the legions could go back to winter quarters. They were rewarded, however, for this disturbance of their routine by what amounted to about half a year’s pay a man.
Early in 51 some of the Belgic states, including the tough Bellovaci, began—too late—to prepare for war, and Caesar was finally compelled to bring six legions against them (he had initially considered four to be enough). So bad at one moment was the situation that the news even got back to Rome that he had suffered a major disaster. But his enemies rejoiced too soon, and in the end Correus, the leader of the Bellovaci, who had been conducting a very intelligent guerrilla campaign, was killed in the fighting. Even with this defeat the resistance to the Romans did not end, other leaders and other tribes continued the struggle—proof enough that the Roman Peace was never desired but only forced upon the inhabitants of the land.
The final act in the great drama occurred in 51. The rebellious Belgae had all surrendered, handed over hostages and paid an immense tribute calculated on the proportion of their previous engagements against Caesar. From the land of the Eburones (devastated yet again) to the area of the Loire and the Treveri in the east, the people were brought back into the Roman allegiance and reminded by the marching legions of Caesar and Labienus, and his other lieutenants, of the consequences of “folly.” In only one place, and that far away in the Dordogne, was there any survival of the spirit of resistance that only a year before had swept through the land like a great fire. In the hill-fortress of Uxellodunum (Puy d’Issolu) a number of Gauls under two distinguished leaders were holding out, waiting for Caesar’s departure and hoping, once he had gone, to raise the revolt again. He determined to make an example of them “so that other cities, following their lead, should not try to regain their liberty…”
The siege and fall of Uxellodunum, told by Hirtius, Caesar’s friend and fellow-author (he completed the Commentaries of the Gallic War), is one of the most moving episodes in all the history of great sieges. The fortress-town built on almost solid rock held out throughout a hot summer against all the skill and ingenuity of the Romans, until their engineers finally managed to divert the underground stream that provided Uxellodunum’s interior water supply. Caesar had shown clemency after the fall of Alesia, but now he decided that an example must be made: he would show the other side of the Roman imperium. The lives of the inhabitants were spared, but all those who had borne arms against him had their hands cut off. The survivors would wander for the rest of their lives throughout Gaul, living witnesses of the fate of rebels.
One thing that is noticeable about the Commentaries, more even than their laconic style, is the shortage of reference to the many other men who made the conquest of this great country possible, although, of course, Labienus, young Crassus, a centurion, and one or two others are mentioned. These were the official accounts of the proconsul (Caesar always refers to himself in the third person), but they must also be seen as the report of a general of immense political ambition who wished to appear in the most favorable light to people in Rome. It was natural enough that Caesar, with his literacy and rhetorical ability (witness the accounts of his speeches), should inevitably show himself in a favorable light and, since he was the commentator, that the actions in which he himself was engaged should have a vivid quality that could hardly be extended to others. But there were a number of commanders—Labienus was an outstanding example—who clearly were extremely fine professionals and who, although their actions are necessarily recorded, fail to command the attention that they should. This may well be the reason why Labienus chose the other side when it came to the civil war.
There can be no doubt at all as to Caesar’s ability, and his place among the great commanders in world history is safe for all time, but the reader of the Commentaries should never forget the unknown legionaries and, above all, the centurions who made the victories possible. Caesar found in the legionary system (created by Marius) the ideal instrument for his purpose and honed it to perfection. The skill of the Roman engineers, whether at mining operations, bridge-building, or the construction of assault towers, battering rams and other weapons of war such as the missile-throwingballista, was outstanding. It is evidence of that “superior science” which, as Vercingetorix said, played so large a part in the Roman victories. Something else that must always be borne in mind—when Gauls were starving or short of weapons, the Romans remained supplied. The commissariat, the supply side of the Roman army, was brilliantly organized—from helmets, breastplates, swords and boots, to grain and all other provisions. Even when the conquerors were living off the country, the food available still had to be obtained and distributed.
Able men like Labienus and Balbus, who was Caesar’s personal adjutant for a time, made fortunes out of Gaul, and so too did Mamurra, who replaced him. Mamurra was a knight from Formiae who aroused the envy and hatred of the poet Catullus because he was nouveau riche and had at one time stolen the poet’s mistress. He was also reputed to be bisexual, and Catullus in one of his most savage poems accused him and Caesar of having sexual relations, calling them
…the pervert Mamurra and Caesar
…sharing the same vice, this pair of twins
Clever lads at love, sharing the same bed…
There must have been many others like Mamurra who
…squandered the wealth that once
To long-haired Gauls and farthest Britons belonged.
Every war produces its crop of profiteers—invariably able men, and usually hand in glove with politicians.