By the second century bce, the Scythians had been replaced along the north shore of the Black Sea by a related group of people, the Sarmatians. Like their Scythian cousins, the Sarmatians were an Iranianspeaking people; they were organized into a number of tribes including the Alans, the Roxolani, and the Iazy- ges. During the first and second centuries ce, the Sar- matian tribes would come into repeated conflict with Rome. In these struggles with the Romans, the Sarma- tians employed another form of warfare that had developed on the steppes as well—cataphract warfare.
Sarmatians and Cataphracts By the third century bce, a new form of warfare had developed on the steppes, that of the cataphract, or fully armored horseman. This form of warfare emphasized different principles from those of the Scythians. Whereas the Scythians brought together mobility and firepower, the Sarmatian cataphracts combined the mobility of the horse with the shock effect of charging with the lance.
The Sarmatian cataphract was the descendant of the Scythian noble horseman. But, by the third century bce, advances in horse breeding allowed him to wear much more armor than had the Scythians. The major advance was the introduction of larger, stronger horses that could carry much more weight than the steppe ponies ridden by the Scythians. (The term steppe pony should not be taken too literally. It simply refers to a hardy horse no more than fourteen hands high, not to be confused with genuine dwarf breeds such as the Icelandic.) The Sarmatian horseman went to war armored literally from head to toe, equipped with a helmet of bronze or iron and protected by a corselet of horn or metal that reached at least as far as his knees. Depictions of Roxolani horsemen on the Column of Trajan in Rome show cataphracts with scale leggings that extend down to the toes, though such armor may be Roman artistic fancy in that it would have made it nearly impossible for the horseman to move when dismounted. In addition, the horse of the cataphract was fully armored, with scale armor covering not only the breast but, at least in some cases, the flanks as well.
For his offensive weapon, the cataphract relied on a heavy lance called the contus, which was often wielded with two hands. There has been considerable discussion about how effective these Sarmatian lancers could have been without stirrups. But as we have seen, the Romans more than compensated by developing an effective saddle, which allowed for the use of all types of weapons by mounted soldiers (see Chapter 4). Undoubtedly, a steppe folk such as the Sarmatians would also have developed such a saddle.
The charge of a body of cataphract cavalry was very dangerous, especially for infantry, as the sight of a mass of armored horsemen must have caused all but the best-disciplined foot soldiers to break and run. We are fortunate to have the orders issued by the Roman general Arrian to his troops when facing the Alans in 135 ce. These orders give us unique and valuable insights into the concerns of a commander facing a dangerous charge of cataphracts.
Arrian clearly had two concerns as he issued his orders. His first was that he halt the charge of the cataphracts with firepower so that they did not draw near enough to cause a panic among his troops. Thus, his heavy infantry was formed in close order and armed with a mixture of missiles, both the traditional Roman pilum and lighter throwing spears. Moreover, the main battle line was supported by archers drawn up with the legionnaries and artillery. It was his hope that the soldiers in the battle line would never be subjected to the psychological impact of the charge since, as he said, “because of the indescribable number ofmissiles . . . the Scythians . . . not even once come charging the infantry line.”
His second concern was that, after the Alan charge had been halted, his men did not break their formation and pursue the Alans. Arrian was obviously aware of the possibility of a feigned flight and was concerned enough to guard against it by taking great pains to ensure that there was no willy-nilly pursuit of the Alans. Instead, Arrian ordered that only half of his horsemen were to pursue, with the remainder to follow in formation so that, should the Alans’ flight be a ruse, they would not be able to wheel on only disordered troops. Moreover, he advised that his infantry “advance more swiftly than at a walk, so that if something stronger should be encountered from the enemy, once again the infantry formation . . . be placed as a bulwark in front of the cavalrymen.” Arrian clearly understood the danger of feigned flight.
It has been argued that the nomadic tactic of feigned flight was transmitted to Europe by the Alans when they settled there. Certainly, western European horsemen used the tactic regularly through the Middle Ages, including most famously at the Battle of Hastings in 1066 (see the Highlights box in Chapter 7).