In general organization and tactics, the Mongol army was not unique for the Inner Asian steppes. What was atypical was the unity and discipline of the Mongols. The Mongols were also fortunate in having some excellent leadership, which continued through several generations. The army was organized into a decimal system: groups of 10, then 100, then 1000, and finally, a Tumen of 10,000. Except as part of a strategy to incorporate allied tribes, these units were usually not based on tribal identity. Chingiz Khan worked to break up all old tribal unities and forge new loyalty to himself, in effect creating one new supratribe.
There is evidence that, very early in the process of creating the unified Mongol army, Chingiz Khan laid down numerous military regulations. Separate from the Yasa, these regulations covered the order of march into battle, the organization of night camps, the maintenance of weaponry, and relations among the Mongol tribesmen. We do not know whether these regulations were truly disseminated to all Mongol units at the time of Chingiz Khan, but later rulers attempted to have them strictly enforced.
Of all the innovations of Chingiz Khan, the most radical for the steppe nomads was the Keshig. This began as an elite personal bodyguard, possibly based on the bodyguard units of the Khitans (see Chapter 9), but its numbers expanded greatly over time. By 1206, the Keshig numbered exactly 10,000 and included a hand-picked group of 1000 called Baturs. The members of the Keshig were drawn from the ranks, but the officers of the guard all came from leading Mongol families, and especially from the families of the Khan’s subordinate commanders. Keshig officers were all younger brothers or sons of these leading commanders, meaning that besides being bodyguards for Chingiz Khan, they served as hostages for the good behavior of their relatives. Chingiz also apparently believed that their being younger sons and younger brothers would tie them to him personally. The Keshig did not go into battle except with Chingiz Khan himself, but it also served as a training ground for future Mongol leaders. This, not his birth family, was where the Great Khan went for leadership replacements, which was highly unusual in Mongolia. (See the Sources box “The Secret History of the Mongols” for more on his rules and regulations.)
Every able-bodied adult male Mongol was considered liable for military duty, making Mongolia truly a people in arms. In the first invasions, in addition to his kit, each Mongol had several ponies, but the army lived off the land, devouring the countryside to supply its needs. In later campaigns, more sophisticated logistics were called for as the Mongol armies at times included tens of thousands of non- Mongol auxiliaries, as well as siege engines and long baggage trains. These campaigns also were not always in lands that could be pillaged for supplies. Therefore, the Mongols established mechanisms for supplying armies on campaign through exploitation of the sedentary populations under their control.
The conquered lands and tributaries were required to provide the necessary foodstuffs, weapons, clothing, carts, draftsmen, and workers. On taking control of a region, the administrators of the land were ordered to create a thorough record of its population and resources. These reports were supervised by officials working directly for the Mongols. Usually, these officials were from distant lands, to prevent collusion with the locals. For example, Mongol officials in China were usually of Persian, Arab, Central Asian, or even European descent, while large numbers of Chinese were brought to Persia to administer that land. Once these reports had been confirmed, the Mongol court in Karakorum had a fairly good knowledge of the resources available throughout the empire. By the 1250s, some regions of the empire were being required to pay taxes in cash, with which the Mongols could purchase some of what they needed in regions closer to the planned invasion route. Thus, when launching the assaults on the Assassins, a fanatic Ismaeli sect that terrorized much of the Muslim Middle East, vast numbers of auxiliaries were raised from eastern Iran, the Caucasus, and Russia, and supplies were gathered from Armenia, Georgia, and Central Asia.
Mongol Horsemen Hunting
Hunting honed the skills of horsemanship and archery that the Mongols used effectively in combat.
The Mongol logistical achievement cannot be overstated. These steppe nomads imposed a uniform system of extraction on regions with widely varying traditions and administrative systems. They administered this system from their capital at Karakorum in the middle of the steppe lands, utilizing the services of vast numbers of officials with nothing in common other than their service to the Mongol Empire.
Like his steppe predecessor, the Mongol soldier was by any measure an incredible fighting man. His training really began at age 3, when he was taught to ride one of the excellent Mongol ponies. The young boy was tied to a horse by his mother until he could ride on his own. At age 5, the young Mongol was given his first bow and arrows; he was expected to spend a good deal of his time hunting on horseback. The boy practiced these skills until age 16, when he became a full-fledged Mongol warrior. During his training, he was also expected to learn how to ride for several days without stopping, sleeping in the saddle.
The Mongol bow was a common one in the steppe lands—a compound bow, with an effective range of 200-300 yards (see Chapter 6). The Mongol learned to use two types of arrows: those with small, sharp points for long range, and those tipped with heavier iron heads for short range. On campaign, the Mongol typically carried two bows and about thirty each of the two types of arrows with him. In his quiver were also a few specialized arrows, such as armor-piercing arrows and whistling arrows. Training in peacetime for adult Mongols consisted of great hunts in which a large area was cordoned off and beaters chased the animals toward a ring of Mongols. After all the animals had been killed, the commanders critiqued the hunt as if it had been a major military campaign.
When going into battle, the Mongol warrior took along at least three spare horses. These horses were trained to respond to voice commands and to maintain their speed and balance as the Mongol shot arrows toward both front and rear. Each Mongol also carried a short sword as well as a short lance with an attached hook, which he used to pull opponents out of the saddle. Other equipment included a hatchet, a file for sharpening arrowheads, a rope for pulling wagons, an iron cooking pot, leather bottles, and a leather bag that contained jerky, needles and thread, a fur helmet, a small tent, and other items that might be needed in the field. This leather bag was also waterproof, making it very handy when crossing bodies of water. As for armor, the Mongol was equipped with a steel helmet with a leather neckpiece and with body armor of layered hides lacquered to prevent damage from moisture or of overlapping scales of iron laced together. The hide armor was usually six layers sewn tightly together, boiled to soften, and molded to fit the body. Various types of shields were also available, though the Mongol usually carried only a small one when on the attack, used primarily to ward off enemy arrows.
Most Mongol strategy consisted of traditional forms of steppe warfare, especially the use of ambushes and feigned retreats. But the Mongols under Chingiz Khan also diverged from the traditional pattern in some notable respects. In particular, they relied on a significant amount of intelligence work and meticulous planning before launching a major attack on a region. For example, before invading the Khwarizm- ian Empire (see below), Mongol generals called in Muslim merchants the Mongols knew well and had them report all they knew about conditions in the region. Similarly, before attacking Jin China, they interviewed Chinese and other merchants and travelers. To aid in planning a campaign, Mongol scouts were also sent ahead to note roads, bridges, mountain passes, towns, fortifications, and anything else that might be militarily useful to know before attacking. The Mongols were not unique in this respect, but they were very systematic about it, not launching an expedition until they were fairly certain they knew what they were up against.
When the Mongols advanced on a target, they rode in several widely dispersed columns. These columns would time their advance so that all arrived at roughly the same time. This was an amazing feat, one not often replicated by premodern armies until the campaigns of Napoleon.
One other aspect that distinguishes the Mongols from just about any other premodern army was their willingness to improvise and utilize whatever might be helpful in achieving their aims. One tactic was to tie branches to their horses so that, when they rode, the dust kicked up would make it look like they had far more men than they really had. Or they would gather up thousands of local people while advancing and put these people in front of the army, making it appear that these thousands were part of the Mongol army; they would be the first to be hit when the enemy attacked. Another related tactic was to ally with the enemies of their targets. After such alliances had served their purpose, the Mongols often turned on their erstwhile allies. Possibly the most significant instance of this was their alliance with Southern Song China against Jin China, which diverted tens of thousands of Jin soldiers from the Mongol invasion. The only allies the Mongols themselves remained loyal to were those from the steppes, mainly other Turkic peoples. This willingness to innovate and to adopt the tactics of their opponents should not be underestimated. Militaries throughout premodern history were often reluctant to alter established patterns, strategies, and tactics because styles of warfare were so often expressions of deeper cultural patterns and social structures. Mongol military flexibility was one of their greatest weapons.
For example, the most serious problem the Mongols encountered in their early assaults was fortified cities. The fortifications around some Chinese cities were tremendously large and complex, and thus impossible for a cavalry force to take. For this task, they learned to employ those who could help, especially Chinese who were experienced in the art of siege craft. Thousands of Chinese were set to work building the siege engines and then traveling with the Mongol army to operate them. In the siege of Kaifeng, and again in Korea, the Mongols also used other Chinese inventions—namely, exploding bombs and flaming explosive devices. In later sieges, they employed Chinese rapid-fire explosive arrow launchers. In one siege in Persia, it is recorded that a heavily fortified city was assaulted by the Mongols with 3000 ballistas, 300 catapults, and 700 machines that hurled flaming naphtha over the walls. They also had 4000 scaling ladders, and literally tons of rocks were carried to the scene to be launched at the city walls. These duties were carried out by the large Chinese siege and artillery units in Mongol service.
After their conquests of Muslim lands, the Mongols began to utilize siege techniques from the Islamic world as well. When invading the Southern Song in the 1260s, they found that the Chinese siege devices they were using were not able to penetrate the extremely thick, high walls the Song Chinese had constructed there. Therefore, they imported thousands of Persians and Arabs with their specialized catapults and trebuchets, which were apparently the most effective in the world for launching projectiles at and over such walls. (See the Highlights box on page 260.)
In battle, the Mongols were experts at the feint, especially in weakening the center and having the flanks envelop the enemy. Signals were relayed by officers with flags or bugles or, at night, with lamps. The Mongols also perfected the arrow storm, a shock tactic designed to disorient the enemy while the heavy cavalry attacked. At times, this arrow storm would be directed at a central point or points of the enemy line.
Also, regarding strategy and tactics, a word must be said about terror and pursuit. Terror was a major instrument of Mongol military efforts, designed to demoralize the enemy and weaken its will to resist. The Mongols also emphasized from the time of Chingiz Khan that defeated enemies must be pursued and completely destroyed to prevent them from being able to regroup. Sometimes the Mongols would chase defeated enemies over 30 miles, and, in one recorded case, that of Salamiya in 1299, they pursued for over 200 miles. Only if they were too tired or it had been a marginal victory would they pass this up. The fear the Mongols inspired can be seen in this remark by a Chinese historian writing during the Mongol conquests: “People hide in vain among mountains and caves to escape the Mongol sword, hardly one or two in a hundred saving themselves, while the fields are strewn with the bones of human beings. Since the beginning of time no barbarians have been so powerful as the Mongols are today. They destroy kingdoms as one tears up grass. Why does Heaven permit it?” This was a sentiment expressed not only by Chinese but also by Muslims and Christians of the time.
The following passages from The Secret History of the Mongols, composed in the years immediately following his death, detail Chingiz Khan’s rules regarding combat and leadership.
[In the early years of Chingiz Khan’s career, he set rules for his soldiers regarding combat.]
At the end of that winter in the autumn of the Year of the Dog, Chingiz Khan assembled his army at Seventy Felt Cloaks to go to war with the four Tatar clans. Before the battle began Chingiz Khan spoke with his soldiers and set down these rules: “If we overcome their soldiers no one will stop to gather their spoils. When they’re beaten and the fighting is over then there’ll be time for that. We’ll divide their possessions equally among us. If we’re forced to retreat by their charge every man will ride back to the place where we started our attack. Any man who doesn’t return to his place for a counterattack will be killed.”
[In Chingiz Khan’s last years, he decided to announce his heir. He had delayed this decision until finally one of his favorite wives broached the subject.]
“When your body falls like an old tree who will rule your people, these fields of tangled grasses? When your body crumbles like an old pillar who will rule your people . . . ? Which of your four heroic sons will you name? What I’ve said everyone knows is true, your sons, your commanders, all the common people, even someone as low as myself. You should decide now who it will be.” Chingiz Khan replied: . . . I’ve been forgetting it as if I won’t follow my ancestors someday. I’ve been sleeping like I won’t someday be taken by death. Jochi, you are my eldest son. What do you say?” But before Jochi could speak, Chagadai spoke up: “When you tell Jochi to speak do you offer him the succession? How could we allow ourselves to be ruled by this bastard son of a Merkit?”
[This was in reference to the fact that Jochi had been born while his mother was a prisoner of the Merkits. There was always suspicion that his father was not Chingiz Khan, but Chingiz treated him as his son nonetheless.]
Jochi rose up and grabbed Chagadai by the collar saying: “I’ve never been set apart from my brothers by my father the Khan. What gives you the right to say that I’m different? What makes you any better than I am . . . ? If you can shoot an arrow farther than I can, I’ll cut off my thumb and throw it away. If you can beat me at wrestling, I’ll lay still on the ground where I fall. Let the word of our father the Khan decide.”
[The two brothers began to fight but were interrupted when others pointed out that they shared the same mother and should not treat each other this way.]
Then Chingiz Khan spoke: “How can you say this about Jochi? Jochi is my eldest son, isn’t he? Don’t ever say that again.”
Hearing this, Chagadai smiled and said: “I won’t say anything about whether Jochi is stronger than I am, nor answer this boast that his ability is greater than mine. I’ll only say that the meat you kill with words can’t be carried home for your dinner. . . . Brother Ogedei is honest. Let’s agree on Ogodei. If Ogodei stays at the side of our father, if our father instructs him in how to wear the hat of the Great Khan, that will be fine.” Hearing this, Chingiz Khan spoke: “Jochi, what do you say? Speak up!” And Jochi said: “Chagadai speaks for me.”
So Chingiz Khan made a decree: “Don’t forget what you’ve pledged today, Jochi and Chagadai. Don’t do anything that will give men cause to insult you. Don’t give men cause to laugh at your promises. In the past Altan and Khuchar gave their word like this and didn’t keep it. [They deserted Chingiz Khan and were later executed.] You know what happened to them.”
source: Paul Kahn, trans., The Secret History ofthe Mongols: The Origin of Chingis Khan (Boston: Cheng & Tsui, 1998).