At the time of the unification of the Mongols under Chingiz Khan in the early thirteenth century, China was divided into two realms. Northern China was under the rule of the Jin dynasty, led by the Jurchen peoples of Manchuria (see Chapter 14). Southern China was under the Song dynasty and was by far the larger and wealthier land. But bordering Jin China and to the southwest of Mongolia was the sinicized state of Xi Xia, or “Western” Xia. Chingiz launched several campaigns against Xi Xia in 1207-1209, but each time he was faced with the fact that the Mongols at this time were not well equipped to conduct sieges of cities. The enormous destruction of the lands of Xi Xia convinced its rulers to at least accept nominal subordination to the Mongols, and Chingiz was able to acquire the large amounts of loot he needed to reward his followers. Without these rewards, the new Mongol unity would have proved just as fragile as all the previous nomadic confederations. The subjugation of Xi Xia also protected Chingiz’s right flank as he prepared for the main assault against the wealthy lands of Jin China.
The Mongol assaults on Jin China began in 1211, and many scholars believe that at this time Chingiz Khan’s goal was not the occupation of China, but the acquisition of loot with which to reward his followers. He was aided from the beginning by defections from within the Jin ranks. The Jurchens were actually a fairly small proportion of the Jin army, and the other tribal peoples, and especially the Chinese in their ranks, were little trusted. Yet the Jurchens were not so far removed from their steppe origins and usually were not taken in by the Mongol’s use of feigned retreats and other typical steppe warfare tactics. Most Mongol victories over the Jurchens resulted from the mobility of the Mongol forces and Chingiz Khan’s ability to get more men to the point of battle than his enemy could. The destruction of northern Chinese farmland was immense, and far more died from famine and disease than from Mongol weapons. Each year the Mongols would launch their raids against Jin China but at the end of the year would return to Mongolia.
Figure 13.1 The Mongol Empire
In 1215, the Mongols seemed to change their focus from raiding to invading and occupying. In the intervening years, Chingiz Khan had acquired large numbers of captured or defected Chinese troops, including units of siege specialists, which he used in the assault on Jin cities. That year Chingiz’s forces took the city of Beijing and torched it; flames from the burning city reportedly were observed from afar for as long as a month. Jin forces were very weak by this time, especially since large numbers were posted along the frontier with Song China. By 1218, the once- mighty Jurchen Jin dynasty ruled over little more than a province, with the rest of northern China subject to Mongol whim. However, it was not until 1234 that north China was firmly within the Mongol Empire (Figure 13.1).
To the west of Chingiz Khan’s empire lay the Iranian empire of Khwarizm, with its capital at Samarkand. This empire, which included much of central Asia and Persia, was ruled in 1218 by Ala al-Din Muhammad, who had only recently taken control of the empire and was interested in its expansion. At this time, Chingiz Khan was not interested in war or expansion to the west, and so he sent envoys to Muhammad requesting normal trade relations. There are various stories of the contents of Chingiz’s letter to Muhammad, but whatever he wrote, Muhammad took it as an insult and ordered his governor at the city of Utrar to kill most of the envoys and send the rest back after shaving off their beards. Whatever Chingiz’s plans had been regarding China, he then initiated a major military operation against Khwarizm.
In the summer of 1219, Chingiz Khan collected a large military force that included several Turkish and Central Asian allies, for a total force of probably about 100,000. This was sent into Khawarizm in three columns, with Chingiz leading the northernmost. Muhammad could count on an army many times the size of the Mongols, but it was scattered in garrisons throughout the region. Muhammad’s failure to take advantage of his dominance in numbers was partly a strategic blunder; but it was partly calculated on Muhammad’s part, as he could not count on the loyalty of many of his generals. Also, due to conflicts within the Muslim world, the caliph in Baghdad, Al-Nasir, refused to support Muhammad and even expressed hope for a Mongol victory.
The Mongols were tightly disciplined and took the Khwarizmian garrisons one by one. As usual, those fortresses or fortified cities that surrendered without contesting Mongol rule were mostly spared, while those that resisted were invested, taken, and destroyed, often with frightful slaughter. Chingiz Khan’s column reached the city of Bukhara in February 1220 and so frightened the defenders that they fled without a fight. After looting and burning the city, Chingiz marched on to Samarkand, where he linked up with the other two Mongol columns. Samarkand held out a little longer, and, for its efforts, an enormous number of the population were slaughtered. Reportedly, each Mongol soldier was assigned a set number of people that he was expected to take out of the city and kill. Muhammad had managed to escape the destruction but was eventually tracked down and killed by a Mongol detachment.
In the spring of 1221, Chingiz led his army across the Amu Darya River into Afghanistan and Kurasan, the remaining lands of the Khwarizmian Empire. Within only a few weeks, many of the major cities of the region had been destroyed, including the city of Merv. Mongol terror tactics were particularly fierce in the taking of Kurasan, even more so than in the easternmost regions of Khwarizm. Many of the forces arrayed against the Mongols were Turkish or other steppe tribes, which were culturally and militarily similar to the Mongols. However, they lacked the numbers and discipline of the Mongol forces, and most of these tribesmen were killed in battle, fled further westward, or were incorporated into the Mongol military structure. One Oghuz Turkish tribe that fled the Mongols eventually settled in Anatolia, where it went on to form the Ottoman Empire.
Possibly because they faced armies with similar traditions, the Mongols wielded terror to a greater extent here than in most of their conquests. The hope—often realized—was that when word of the Mongol terror spread, enemy armies would become not so much demoralized as preoccupied with maintaining order among a panic-stricken population. Also, in most cases, the Mongols did not bring up their Chinese siege artillery, and so saw terror as a replacement tactic. In one recorded instance, the Mongol general Tolui—the youngest son of Chingiz Khan whose descendants would later become the longest-lasting Mongol dynasty—sat on a golden throne on a hill observing as his men systematically slaughtered the population of Merv. In addition to the many thousands of city-dwellers slaughtered, the Mongols de - stroyed the irrigation works of the region, leading to the death through starvation of possibly millions. In many ways, this region of Central Asia has still not recovered from the Mongol depredations.
The almost endless rounds of Mongol success and consequent destruction were marred only by a continuing resistance led by the son of Muhammad, Jalal al-Din. A very competent field commander, Jalal al-Din organized his resistance from a mountain fortress in Ghazni in Afghanistan. In late 1221, he defeated a Mongol force near Ghazni but abandoned that city on the arrival of another Mongol army under Chingiz Khan. Soon, Jalal al-Din’s army was slaughtered or drowned in the Indus River, but legend has it that Jalal al-Din escaped by swimming across the Indus under a hail of Mongol arrows.
Apparently, Chingiz did not intend to incorporate the lands of Khwarizm into his empire. In 1223, after placing puppets in positions of authority and ordering that his name be invoked in the kutba, he led his main armies back into Mongolia. Jebe and Subodei were left in command of about 25,000 men and ordered to reconnoiter the lands of the Caspian Sea.
Moving swiftly, Jebe and Subodei left a swath of destruction that included such Iranian cities as Rai and Qum; Tabriz was spared only because its ruler bribed the Mongol generals with enormous loads of precious jewels. Without Chinese siege engines, the Mongols were forced to use various ruses in order to capture cities. One of their most successful strategies was to besiege a city for a certain period of time and then leave in ostentatious disgust. After spies had informed them that the defenders were sufficiently relaxed, the Mongol armies executed a rapid return, catching the city unprepared and usually taking it.
After ravaging the Azeri lands, the Mongols moved up through the Caucasus into Georgia, at the time defended by a well-regarded army centered on mounted knights more in the western European fashion than the Turkish or Iranian. A feigned retreat by Subodei led the Georgian knights into an ambush where they were destroyed by the Mongol horse-archers of Jebe’s force. Several Georgian towns and cities were then razed, though the Mongols were forced to end the siege of Tiflis on meeting stubborn resistance.
The Mongols went on to achieve several more victories, most notably against a Kipchak army that saw many of its members defect to the Mongols. The remaining Kipchaks, a people who were cultural and linguistic cousins of the Mongols, fled into Russian territory and requested Russian assistance. Several Russian princes, not quite sure what to make of the Mongols, combined their forces and, in alliance with the Kipchaks, forced the Mongols to withdraw. The Russian and Kipchak force probably outnumbered the Mongols three or four to one, and the Mongol withdrawal may have been simply a modified feigned retreat, for after the Russian force had become somewhat strung out and its lead elements had wearied, the Mongols stopped their withdrawal. At a spot along the Kalka River, the Mongols turned and attacked the Russian-Kipchak force before they could establish their camp. The main fighting was between the Mongols and the Kipchaks, who were forced back on the Russians, causing a great deal of confusion. Many were killed, but one of the Russian princes, Mstislav of Kiev, was able to effect an orderly retreat and construct some sort of fortification on the other side of the Kalka River. After several days of fighting, Subodei allowed Mstislav and his men an honorable surrender. However, once the Mongols were in possession of the camp, Mstislav and all his men were slaughtered.
The remaining Russian princes were in disorganization, but, fortunately for them, the Mongols were not on a march of conquest at that time. Jebe and Subodei returned to Mongolia, and the true invasion of Russia occurred about twelve years later. Still, how had this relatively small Mongol force reaped so much battlefield success? The usual Mongol discipline, skill, and tactics such as the feigned retreat certainly account for much of the Mongol success. But, as in many of their other campaigns, they were assisted by the disunity of their enemy. And Russia was more divided than nearly anywhere else the Mongols advanced. The Russian force that confronted the Mongols at the Kalka River was actually four independent armies led by their respective princes. There was little coordination, as each sought to attain victory for himself and deny it to his fellow princes. Indeed, a fifth Russian army under Duke Yuri of Vladimir was expected to be part of the force, but Yuri was late, and the others pursued the Mongols without him. This turned out to be fortunate for Yuri, who returned to his lands with his army intact.
The Mongols were also assisted by good intelligence. According to some reports, whole units of Russians went over to the Mongols and provided them with information about the true situation in Russia. Other reports say that Venetian traders provided intelligence to the Mongols in return for their plundering Genoese trading posts along the Crimea. And still other reports insist that it was the Kipchaks who provided the intelligence. Whatever the source, the Mongols were clearly much better informed about the Russians than the Russians were about them.
Not until 1236 did the real invasion of Russia take place, and it was a meticulously planned assault. The total numbers in the Mongol invasion army are estimated to have been somewhat over 150,000, but this figure includes allies, guards on the supply train, and Chinese and Muslim siege and artillery units. The total number of Mongols and Turkish allies was probably not more than about 60,000. Spies preceded the main army, spreading rumors and tales of terror.
Leading the invasion force was Batu, Chingiz Khan’s grandson, but the real organizer of the expedition was the redoubtable Subodei. In the usual Mongol manner, the invasion force was split into two columns, and its initial assault was not on Russia but against the Bulgars and some Kipchak tribes along the Volga River to the east of the main Russian principalities. Batu and Subodei led one column against the city of Bulgar, a wealthy trade city, while the Mongol general Mangu went farther south to attack the Kipchaks. Both assaults proved successful, and those Kipchaks not integrated into the Mongol army fled to Hungary where they were given sanctuary on converting to Christianity.
In 1237, Subodei determined to destroy the Russian principalities even though it was the dead of winter. The Mongols were once again immensely aided by the disunity of the Russian princes. Two main cities, Riazan and Kolumna, stood directly in their path, but the Russian princes remained in their respective cities and refused to aid each other. Some Russian units did meet the Mongols in battle but were swiftly defeated. Next, to take the city of Riazan, the Mongols first devastated the countryside and then constructed a wooden wall to encircle the city to prevent anyone from escaping or providing relief to the defenders. Then, the Mongols bombarded the walls of Riazan with Chinese siege missiles. After several days of this battering, flame projectiles were used against the wooden walls. Within a few days, the Mongols were inside the city, it was looted and burned, and the population was slaughtered. Soon after, the same fate was meted to Kolumna. The relief column sent by Duke Yuri of Vladimir failed to arrive in time to help but was in time to be destroyed by a large Mongol force. In the process, Yuri’s son, Vladimir, was captured.
For the assault on Yuri’s capital at Vladimir, the Mongols moved with their customary swiftness to block any relief forces from arriving. The rest of the army arrived a few days later with thousands of prisoners, who were set to work constructing a wooden wall to surround Vladimir as had been done at Riazan. After several days of bombardment by siege missiles, the Mongols launched a furious assault on February 14, 1238, taking the city by storm. The city was burned while many of the population remained inside. Reportedly, the stench of thousands of burning bodies was overpowering even to the hardened Mongol warriors.
With the main Russian armies destroyed, Mongol columns were sent against the remaining princes and into the Ukraine. After more death and destruction, the main Mongol armies returned to the steppes in late spring to regroup and plan the next phase of the invasion. This came a few months later, and the main object of attack was the Ukrainian city of Kiev. Once again, Mongol cavalry swiftly laid a cordon around the city to prevent reinforcements while the siege machines were moved up to weaken the walls and the will of the inhabitants. In November 1240, Kiev and several other Ukrainian cities fell to the Mongols, and Russia was now a part of the Mongol imperium. The next targets were Hungary and Poland.
The invasion of Poland and Hungary was carefully planned as a campaign of conquest, not a raid for plunder. Mongol scouts and spies flooded the marked territory, apparently making no secret of their intentions. Fear gripped much of central and western Europe, and merchants and other travelers stayed away from the eastern lands. Reportedly, even fishermen feared to take their boats into the eastern Baltic Sea, preferring to have their livelihood ruined than to possibly confront the Mongols.
The Mongol army began its campaign in February 1241 and, as it left Russia, divided into two forces. The smaller one marched into Poland, and the larger into Hungary. We do not have a clear idea of the numbers involved, but the smaller force probably had no more than 25,000 while the larger force had 40,000 or so. Poland was not united at this time, but attempts had been made to organize a combined force to confront the Mongols. The leading Polish lord was Prince Henry of Silesia, who commanded at most 20,000 men. Several other Polish and German lords also contributed forces, but Henry’s best soldiers were knights of various military orders, including units from the Knights Templar and the Teutonic Knights. Unfortunately for Henry, he had only a few hundred of these elite fighters.
Henry gathered his forces near the city of Liegnitz while the Mongols ravaged the countryside. After winning a couple of small battles, the Mongols took the city of Kracow, which had already been abandoned by its inhabitants. There they learned the location of Henry’s forces and that he was waiting for reinforcements from Bohemia. Henry probably had by this time a force of at least 40,000 men, which helps explain why he chose to initiate an attack on the approaching Mongol forces. The battle was fought on April 9, 1241, with Henry sending his knights directly at the lead Mongol units. As they had done many times in the past, the Mongols used feigned flight to lure the enemy into an ambush. At one point during the battle, the Mongols released smoke on the battlefield between Henry’s cavalry and infantry forces, further contributing to the confusion. Thousands were killed, including Henry and many of the Polish nobility. Several more towns and cities were destroyed before the Mongol force turned to assist the larger force that had invaded Hungary.
On April 9, 1241, ironically the same day Duke Henry was losing the battle of Liegnitz, King Bela of Hungary marched with about 80,000 men to meet the Mongols. Hungary’s weaknesses were similar to Poland’s: a lack of unity compounded by years of infighting among the Hungarian princes. Still, a semblance of unity had been forged in order to meet the Mongol threat, although Bela had stupidly chased away several of the tribes of Kipchaks who had offered to fight for him. Over several days, Bela’s force followed the Mongols as they seemingly retreated. The Mongols had lured Bela to a carefully chosen field of battle near the River Sajo. The resulting battle was another major Mongol victory, this time involving the use of catapults to hurl flame and smoke pots to disrupt and divide the Hungarians. The slaughter went on for days, and Hungary was added to the Mongol territories.
The pope preached another crusade, and knights from throughout western Europe prepared for the expected Mongol onslaught. However, in December 1241, the Great Khan Ogodei died, and the Tumen in central Europe were ordered to pull back to more defensible positions in Russia while their leader, Batu, returned to Karakorum to join in the choice of the next Great Khan. There would be numerous Mongol raids of plunder into both Poland and Hungary over the next decades, but no occupation or campaigns further west.
Nothing illustrates the success of Chingiz Khan’s new tribal system better than the fact that, after his death, the empire remained united and continued to expand, and it did so under his sons, as he had intended. He had accomplished the task of transferring loyalty from tribe and family to the tribe of Chingiz Khan. Certainly, the extraordinary successes of the Mongols in the field had helped cement their loyalty to their Khan, as had the vast amounts of loot distributed to the Mongol warriors. That the conquests continued for several decades after the founder’s death is further tribute to the organizational skills of Chingiz Khan.
The first few years after Chingiz Khan’s death saw the Mongols first preoccupied with completing the conquest of Jin China and then the conquest of Russia and eastern Europe (see above). By the 1250s, however, they were ready to return to the lands of Islam. They had not exactly left, since much of Central Asia and Korasan was ruled by Mongol puppets. The only Muslim powers left were the Mamluks in Egypt and Syria; the Abbasid caliph, based in Baghdad but claiming the allegiance of several Turkish and Kurdish Muslim lords in Iraq and western Iran; and the Assassins, the Ismailis in their fortresses.
At a Quriltai in 1251, the Great Khan Mongke sent Qubilai to conquer Song China (see Chapter 14) and Qubilai’s brother Hulegu to conquer western Asia. His instructions were to first destroy the Ismailis and their castles, destroy the independent Muslim lords, force the Abbasid caliph to submit, and then incorporate Syria and Egypt into the Mongol Empire. There is some speculation that the main reason for the desire to destroy the Ismailis was that they had sent 400 Assassins to Karakorum (the new Mongol capital) to kill Mongke.
Hulegu’s expedition left for Persia in 1253 and didn’t arrive until 1256. This was an exceptionally slow advance for a Mongol army, but it displays the Mongol ability to adapt and modify their tactics to fit the circumstances. The provisioning of the army was organized by Mongol parties riding in advance of the main army. Principalities along the way were encouraged to submit and supply the army. In addition to roughly 60,000 Mongol and other allied steppe warriors, Hulegu brought with him several tens of thousands of Chinese infantry as well as a large complement of Chinese siege artillery. These were to be used to batter down the stone castles of the Assassins.
Most of the Muslim rulers in the region quickly submitted to Hulegu, including the lords of the strategic Iranian province of Fars. Hulegu led his army to the castle of Rukn ad-Din Kunshah, the young grand master of the Ismailis. Hulegu immediately began a bombardment of the castle with his Chinese siege missiles. Rukn ad-Din was reportedly terrified of the consequences of a Mongol victory and decided to surrender and hope for mercy. Hulegu was delighted to ensure the young master’s safety in return for his surrender, and most of the remaining Assassin castles were taken without a struggle after Rukn ad-Din was marched in front of them to order their surrender. Thus, Hulegu was spared many years of siege warfare.
Hulegu next turned his attention to Baghdad and demanded that the reigning caliph, al-Mutasim, submit to the Mongols. The letter was apparently very insulting, so the caliph, despite not being in any position to make demands, refused to submit and instead demanded that Hulegu and his Mongol army submit. Hulegu responded by sending his army in two columns (the usual Mongol manner) to besiege Baghdad. One column arrived on the west bank of the Tigris side of Baghdad, and Hulegu led the main column, which arrived to the east of Baghdad. In January 1258, after swiftly scattering a small Abbasid force that had attempted to prevent the two Mongol armies from encircling the city, Hulegu tightened his noose around the city.
At this point, the caliph realized that resistance was futile and attempted to negotiate the departure of the Mongols. His Shi’ite vizier was sent out to parlay with the Mongols, but this man was probably already working with the Mongols against his master. In any case, the inhabitants of Baghdad began to panic as the Mongols closed in. By February 5, the Chinese siege artillery had battered down the outer walls along the eastern side of the city. People who tried to escape were caught and killed by the Mongols, the idea being to put more pressure on the caliph to surrender. This he did on February 10, arriving in person in front of Hulegu. The Mongols ordered the entire population to leave the city, carrying nothing with them. They then began another of their horrific slaughters of those who had not obeyed their order to leave. The city was burned, and reportedly over 90,000 were killed, though the Christian inhabitants were allegedly spared the Mongol sword. The caliph himself was rolled in a carpet and trampled by horses, though not before he had disclosed the hiding place of his vast fortune.
Hulegu moved on to the next step in his mission, which was to incorporate Syria and Egypt into the empire. The devastation thus far to the Muslim world was practically incalculable. In addition to the massive death and destruction, the Mongols had utterly destroyed the Caliphate, the symbol of the Dar al-Islam since the time of the Prophet. Muslims were psychologically as well as physically overwhelmed by this annihilation of their symbolic leader. To many at the time, it seemed that only the Mamluk kingdom in Egypt stood in the way of the Mongol elimination of the world of Islam. Mamluk victory at Ayn Jalut (see the Highlights box “The Battle of Ayn Jalut, 1260”) thus not only stemmed the Mongol tide but was seen as the salvation of Islam.
Siege of Baghdad
A Persian manuscript illustration shows Mongol forces besieging Baghdad with stone- throwing machines. The outnumbered defenders look out from behind the city walls.
Even while at war in various other theaters, the Mongols in 1231 sent an army to subjugate Korea. After the Korean armies were swiftly swept from the field, their remnants took to the numerous hills and mountains of Korea, constructing stone fortresses both for defense and as bases of offensive operations. Meanwhile, the Korean royal court fled to the small island of Kanghwa, near Seoul. Korean resistance frustrated the Mongols, who were forced to bring in Chinese siege experts to reduce the Korean fortresses. In this campaign, we see one of the first recorded uses of gunpowder to create explosive flame pots, which were hurled into the Korean forts by catapults. By 1236, the Mongols had control over most of the country, but it was not until 1241 that the Korean court ordered its remaining forces to surrender and accept Mongol overlordship. Even then, the royal court remained on Kanghwa for nearly thirty more years.
At the same meeting at which Hulegu was sent to subdue Persia, it was also decided to complete the conquest of Southern Song China. Although the Mongols had firm control of northern China, they had great difficulty obtaining sufficient grain and other food supplies from the land. The destruction caused by the conquest had been extensive, and northern China was in any case relatively poor agricultural land. Adequate supplies could only be obtained through control of wealthy southern China. The Great Khan Mongke personally led the armies in this campaign, with Qubilai, one of Chingiz Khan’s grandsons, as his chief lieutenant.
Fairly early in the campaign, Mongke died, and the assaults on Song China halted while Qubilai contested for the throne. After finally succeeding as Great Khan, Qubilai spent almost as much time combating rival claimants as he did subduing Song China. The latter task required incorporation into the Mongol military system of Chinese infantry and naval forces and still took nearly forty years to complete. Even before Qubilai had consolidated his rule, he turned his attention to extending Mongol rule to even more distant lands. For the invasions of Japan and Java, the Mongols were forced to take to the sea for the first time, a radical departure for the steppe nomads, although they had had some experience fighting in the rivers of China.
The invasion of Japan was to be launched from Korea. The preparations for the invasion were an onerous burden on the Koreans, for they were re - quired to construct the ships and provide the sailors for the expedition. At first, the Koreans were also ordered to provide the supplies, but devastated Korea was unable to, and so supplies were brought from China. The Mongols used the efficient Chinese transport systems to deliver massive quantities of foodstuffs and weapons.
The first invasion of Japan took place in November 1274 and was composed of roughly 20,000 Mongol soldiers (with some Jurchens) and several thousand very unhappy Korean soldiers. Landing first at Hakata Bay on Kyushu’s west coast, the Mongols made a significant impression on the unprepared Japanese samurai (see Chapter 14 for the rise of the samurai in Japan and their response to the Mongol invasions). While the Japanese charged out to engage in individual combat, the Mongols fought in tight ranks and overwhelmed the Japanese with arrow storms. In addition, the Mongols had brought Chinese siege engines and bombarded the Japanese with exploding projectiles. The stunned Japanese were forced to retreat behind fortifications, but their strong resistance had been unexpected, and, as night fell, the Mongols withdrew to their ships. A raging storm destroyed much of the Mongol fleet, and Qubilai was forced to wait several years before reinitiating hostilities.
The second Mongol invasion, in 1281, was not only much better prepared but included tens of thousands of Chinese and Korean troops in addition to the core force of Mongols. By this time, the Japanese samurai had learned the lesson of how inadequate their style of warfare was against this enemy, and they were far better prepared as well. The first waves of the Mongol assault in June and July were beaten back, and the Mongols were unable to get a firm beachhead. Nearly as many Mongols were felled by disease on the cramped ships as were killed by samurai, but they were heartened by the arrival in mid-August of several thousand shiploads of reinforcements. However, as this enormous armada prepared its assault, a typhoon arose and devastated the fleet. The Japanese believed the gods themselves had saved them, and the typhoon even at the time was called the “Kamikaze,” or “Divine Wind.” Qubilai made preliminary preparations for a third invasion, but this was never carried out.
The invasion of Java in 1293 met with only somewhat more success than had the invasions of Japan, even though, like the earlier campaign, it was very well prepared. The ships departed Quanzhou with about 30,000 Mongol and Chinese soldiers, and supplies of food, weapons, and ammunition to last at least a year. The expedition also left with a quantity of silver with which to purchase any additional supplies that might be needed. Unlike Japan, Java was not a united kingdom, and the Mongol expeditionary leaders were able to follow one of their long-tested strategies and ally with one faction against another. The combined forces met with resounding victory, but before the Mongols could turn on their allies, the Javanese struck. An ambush destroyed much of the Mongol invasion force, and the remainder barely managed to withdraw to its ships. The fleet then sailed back to China.
While the Mongol campaigns against Japan and Java were generally unsuccessful, they do more than show us the limits of Mongol military success. These campaigns involved the dispatch of thousands of ships across the seas and displayed the capacity the Mongols had to distance themselves from their steppe origins and to use the resources of their vast empire.
One of the key battles of history was fought in 1260 at Ayn Jalut in Syria between the Mongols and the Mamluks of Egypt. Many historians (then and now) believe that a Mongol victory in this battle would have threatened the very existence of Islam. The Mamluk kingdom was the last large organized outpost in the Islamic world, and their victory over the Mongols, then, was seen as having provided the Islamic world with time to recover after the devastating Mongol invasions. Other present-day historians feel that the stakes at Ayn Jalut were not nearly so dire, that even had the Mongols won this battle, there was little chance that they could have followed up with the conquest and occupation of Egypt. The land, so goes this argument, was not suitable as pasture for the herds of Mongol ponies.
Probably the key factor that helped determine the outcome of the Battle of Ayn Jalut was that the Mongol side was represented, not by one of the main Mongol armies, but by an advance guard of at most 12,000 men. By early 1260, the Mongol army under Hulegu had reaped consistent success in its campaigns in the Middle East, having taken not only Baghdad but a good portion of Syria as well. However, the Great Khan Mongke had died in 1259, and word of this reached Hulegu in early 1260. Since he was concerned about the possibility of a hostile Great Khan being chosen, Hulegu moved his army closer to Mongolia to ensure that he had some say in the selection. He left about 12,000 men with his chief lieutenant, Kitbuka, but it is unclear why so few were left to manage such a large territory with a potentially hostile enemy close by.
Kitbuka led his reduced force deeper into Syria and sent an insulting letter to the Mamluk sultan, Qutuz, demanding that he submit. Qutuz responded by killing the Mongol envoys and displaying their heads outside the walls of his encampment. This action ensured that war with the Mongols would follow, and all of Qutuz’s subordinate emirs were aware of how angry the Mongols became when their envoys were killed. Unlike many of the Mongols’ opponents, however, the Mamluks were actually united in the face of the Mongol threat, and Qutuz was able to confront the Mongols without concern over treachery. Qutuz also decided not to wait for the Mongols to arrive in Egypt but to confront them farther north.
Kitbuka and his Mongol army, supplemented by units of Armenians and some Turks, arrived at a place called Ayn Jalut in early September 1260. The Mamluk force of probably over 20,000 arrived soon thereafter. Qutuz had arranged for safe passage through Crusader territory. The Crusader nobility had decided that the Mongols were by far the bigger threat and, of course, hoped that they themselves would ultimately benefit from a Mongol-Mamluk confrontation. They not only granted safe passage but provided provisions for Qutuz’s transiting force of Mamluks.
Skirmishing began between the advance guards of the two forces, but actual battle did not take place until dawn of September 3. It was long believed that the Mamluks had lured the Mongols into a trap, but recent examination of the evidence shows that this was not so. The Mongols charged first and threatened to break through and destroy the Mamluk left. But the Mamluk left wing held, supposedly due to the exhortations of Qutuz and his chief lieutenant and rival, Baybars. In any case, the Mamluks launched a counterattack that was, in turn, repulsed by the Mongols. Kitbuka then led his Mongols in a second attack that once again threatened to roll up the Mamluk army but was repulsed through the discipline of the Mamluks and the leadership of Qutuz. When it was once more the turn of the Mamluks to charge, they were helped by the sudden defection of Kitbuka’s Turkish allies. This time, the Mongols broke, and Kitbuka himself was killed. Soon, the Mongol defeat turned into a rout, and the surviving Mongols fled the field.
The Mamluk victory was due partly to the fact that they outnumbered their Mongol opponents, and, of course, the Mamluks were helped by the timely defection of part of the Mongol force. Yet, the main reason for the Mamluk dominance at Ayn Jalut was that, although both sides were composed of military forces that were essentially horse - archers, the Mamluks were much better suited to the climate and terrain of the region. Mamluk armor was sturdier than that of the Mongols, providing more protection; but, also, Mamluk horses were much larger and sturdier than the Mongol ponies. Simply put, as the battle wore on, the Mongols became exhausted, and their ponies could not continue the extreme level of exertion in the heat of Syria. The larger, more plodding, Mamluk horses were much better adapted for this type of fighting. In effect, the Mamluks were able to outlast and wear out the Mongols.
Even if it was not the history-making victory that historians through the ages have made it out to be, the Battle of Ayn Jalut was certainly an important psychological victory. The myth of Mongol invincibility that had served the Mongols so well over the years was now broken. There were several more battles between the Mongols and the Mamluks, but the Battle of Ayn Jalut marked the end of Mongol expansion to the west.
How can we assess the Mongol legacy? Historians have argued over the relative impact of the Mongols, especially about whether the pan-Eurasian trade facilitated by their unified control of the steppe caravan routes outweighed the economic destruction they caused.
Certainly, one result of the Mongol Empire was the creation of one vast Eurasian trading market, such as had never been seen before (Figure 13.2). The Mongols encouraged trade and respected traders, probably because steppe nomads traditionally had depended on trade for many of the goods they could not produce or loot from nearby sedentary civilizations. Merchants from the Islamic world and even Europe traveled fairly securely throughout Mongol lands. Goods from China were brought to Europe in quantities not seen for centuries, and the loss of these products with the collapse of the Mongol Empire would help spark European attempts to find a sea route to Asia. In addition to trade, as we saw in an earlier section, merchants sometimes acquired the provisions that supplied the Mongol armies on campaign.
On the other hand, the facilitation of trade throughout the Eurasian world was of minor importance in comparison with the unprecedented death and destruction that attended the Mongol expansion and conquest. Cities were left in ruins, farmlands were made desolate, and untold millions died from Mongol slaughters or, more often, the diseases and famine that accompanied the invasions. The early decades of the Mongol onslaught saw the Mongols apparently confused as to what to do with cities. Chingiz Khan feared the consequences of his nomadic horsemen becoming influenced by urban civilization, and so he encouraged the destruction of cities and their inhabitants. Slaughter and devastation became the norm in such cities as Samarkand, Bukhara, Beijing, and Kiev. These massacres were often conducted in a deliberate manner: the population herded into nearby fields, forced into groups, divided among the Mongol units, and then methodically slaughtered. Yet it was not only cities that felt the Mongol wrath. Myriad towns and villages also suffered, frequently from Mongol destruction of essential irrigation works or deliberate burning of croplands to starve enemy populations. In one instance, millions perished in northern China from famine caused by the destruction of Yellow River dikes. Not until the campaigns against Song China would the Mongols revise this strategy; but, in the lands of the Golden Horde and Chagadai’s Khanate, policies of willful destruction of lands and people continued. Also, Mongol taxation policies led many times to the starvation of hundreds of thousands and even millions.
Mongol devastation was often accompanied by epidemics of disease. For example, a large majority of the over 100,000 who died during the Mongol capture of Kaifeng in Jin China perished as a result of disease. In fact, far more people died as a result of disease than from direct Mongol actions. The most devastating of these epidemics was the Mongol facilitation of the spread of the Black Death throughout several regions of the world. In the 1330s, untold millions died in China from the Black Death, and soon the disease appeared in the Middle East with terrible consequences. By the late 1340s, the disease had reached Europe, resulting in the death of a third to a half of that population.
Figure 13.2 Mongol-Era Trade Links
The world was a different place after its encounter with the Mongols. The expanded trade proved ephemeral, whereas the destruction proved long- lived. China lost its preeminent position as the major center of world trade and scientific development, even if in later centuries it recovered some of
its prominence. The complete destruction of the Abbasid Caliphate meant that the Islamic world was no longer even technically a united civilization. Persia would take centuries to recover from the devastation of the Mongols, and the devastation of the civilization centers of Central Asia has been all but permanent. The Mongols themselves eventually either assimilated to the lands they had conquered or returned to Mongolia. They contributed little to the civilizations within their empire, and the unique military unity they provided the Inner Asia nomads was never again duplicated.