PART I
CHAPTER 1
Adolf Hitler once said, “What good fortune for those in power that people do not think.” In the early 1960s, Yale psychologist Stanley Milgram conducted an experiment on obedience to determine if Americans would be as ready to blindly follow the orders of an authority figure as were the Nazis.
In Milgram’s experiment, subjects were led to believe that they were delivering a series of increasingly painful electric shocks as part of an experiment on the effect of punishment on learning. In fact, the person who was playing the role of the learner was an accomplice of the experimenter and was not actually receiving the shocks. When the subjects balked upon hearing the screams of pain from the learner, they were urged to continue by a person wearing a white lab coat. Despite the feigned protests of the learner, about two-thirds of the subjects obeyed the experimenter and continued delivering what they believed were potentially fatal electric shocks.
The findings of this experiment suggest that people can be persuaded to torture, and perhaps even kill, another person simply at the urging of an authority figure. A film made of the experiment revealed that those who were most likely to give in to the urging of the authority figure knew that what they were doing was wrong but were unable to articulate why it was wrong.1 Those who were able to resist the authority figure, on the other hand, were able to provide justifications, in the form of moral principles and moral theory, for their refusal; they were able to say why continuing to deliver the shocks was wrong. Milgram wrote of his findings:
Ordinary people, simply doing their jobs, and without any particular hostility on their part, can become agents in a terribly destructive process. Moreover, even when the destructive effects of their work become patently clear, and they are asked to carry out actions incompatible with fundamental standards of morality, relatively few people have the resources needed to resist.2
Like the subjects in the Milgram experiment, many of us also lack the resources necessary to critically analyze moral issues. For example, in a study of how college students judge social issues, such as abortion, pornography, and homosexuality, researchers found that many students had inconsistent “informational assumptions”; they were unable to offer a well-reasoned justification for their position on an issue, shifting positions depending on the questions asked.3 This inability hinders many of us from engaging in thoughtful discussions of issues such as euthanasia, abortion, capital punishment, animal rights, and environmental ethics. Like the Milgram subjects, simply deferring to those in authority or refusing to take a stand can contribute to a life-and-death decision for those affected.
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MORAL PHILOSOPHY
Moral philosophy is the study of the values and guidelines by which we live, as well as the justification of these values and guidelines. There are two traditional subdivisions in moral philosophy: (1) normative ethics and (2) theoretical ethics.
Normative ethics is concerned with the study of the values and guidelines by which we live. Normative ethics also includes the study of moral issues—the primary focus of this text. Applied ethics is the application of normative ethics to actual cases. The emerging field of global ethics, for example, is concerned with the application of normative ethics to global issues such as the disparities of wealth between nations, international trade and immigration policy, war and peace, and global warming.
Theoretical ethics, also known as metaethics, is concerned with the justification of these values and guidelines. These justifications involve skill in moral reasoning and critical thinking. The study of moral issues and applied or normative ethics is built on an understanding of moral reasoning and theoretical ethics.
A good moral theory is both universal and impartial; that is, moral principles of right and wrong apply equally to everyone in the same or similar circumstances. If we simply begin debating moral issues without first establishing this foundation, our arguments may be weak and can easily collapse like the proverbial house built on sand. Without the ability to critically analyze or offer theoretical underpinning for our position on an issue, we are unable to effectively defend it or respond to others’ arguments. This inability contributes to the feeling that our position is simply a matter of personal opinion. “Well,” we may say with a shrug of the shoulders, “we all have a right to our opinions.” Having a right to our own opinion, however, is not the same as saying that all opinions are equally reasonable.
Or, in our frustration, we may resort to using logical fallacies, glaring at our opponents in an attempt to intimidate them, or attacking their character; we may make wild generalizations that we are unable to back up, or we may simply change the topic. We see this especially in highly polarized issues such as abortion where emotions run high. See page 3 for a list of some of the most common fallacies.
The moral rightness or wrongness of a position or action, such as delivering potentially lethal shocks to a subject in an experiment, is not a matter of personal feeling or opinion but of reason. The study of moral theory and reasoning helps us recognize and organize these general principles and moral concerns. It is up to us as critical thinkers to decide which arguments are the strongest and to come up with a well-reasoned position that takes into account the strengths of all sides of the argument.
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF MORAL THEORIES?
Most people, if given a choice, would prefer to skip moral theory and get on with discussions of real-life moral issues. Theory is often contrasted with action. This is a false dichotomy, since it is theory that informs our actions. Knowing how to ground discussions of moral issues in moral theory and good moral reasoning will make us less vulnerable to persuasive, but logically incorrect, thinking.
A theory is a conceptual framework for explaining a set of facts or concepts. In moral philosophy, theory explains why a certain action—such as torturing babies—is wrong and why we ought2to act in certain ways and be a certain type of person. Moral theory also helps us clarify, critically analyze, and rank the moral concerns raised by particular moral issues.
EIGHT COMMON INFORMAL FALLACIES
Informal fallacies are psychologically persuasive but incorrect arguments.
1. Equivocation: A key term shifts meaning during the course of an argument.
2. Abusive (ad hominem): We attack our opponent’s character rather than address his or her conclusion.
3. Appeal to force: Force, threat of force, or intimidation is used to coerce our opponents into accepting our position.
4. Popular appeal: The opinion of the majority is used as support for our conclusion.
5. Hasty generalization: Our conclusion is based on a few atypical cases.
6. Irrelevant conclusion: Our argument is directed at a topic other than the one under discussion.
7. Naturalistic: We argue from what is nature, or what is, to what ought to be the case.
8. Appeal to tradition: We argue that something is moral because it is the tradition or custom.
A good theory should also be able to explain the whole range or scope of morality, not just particular types of actions. For example, the theory that morality is a private choice is inadequate for dealing with choices such as rape, torture, and genocide, since these actions affect other people. In addition, a theory should take into account what we, upon reflection, believe to be right. Aristotle (384–322 B.C.E.), for example, takes as the starting point in developing his moral theory the moral intuitions of ordinary people (see reading by Aristotle at the end of this chapter). Moral theory, however, goes beyond our everyday notions about morality. It requires consistency in our thinking and the weeding out of those commonly held beliefs about morality that are inconsistent or superfluous.
Moral theories can be compared to road maps. A good theory offers guidance or signposts for thinking about and resolving moral issues. Although we may just happen to come upon a good solution, a moral theory, like a road map, makes it more likely that we will reach our destination with the least amount of wrong turns and aggravation. Like maps, not all theories are equally good. Some may be good as far as they go, but they leave out too much. In this case we may want to combine them with other theories or “maps.” Other moral theories, such as ethical subjectivism, lead us down dead ends. Knowing about the strengths and weaknesses of the different moral theories can save us from heading down these dead ends!
Theories also shape our worldviews. We all approach the world with certain assumptions that, loosely, form our theories about what to expect in the world. In any culture there are certain theories that are so embedded in the cultural worldview that they are uncritically assumed to be true. For example, in Western culture the theory that humans are superior to and separate from other animals (anthropocentrism) is rarely questioned. This is reflected in our language, where the common use of the term animal does not include humans. Rather than uncritically adopting the prevailing theories of our culture, we need to ask first if their assumptions can be justified or if they embody false views.
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THE TYPES OF MORAL THEORIES
There are two main types of moral theories: (1) ethical relativism and (2) universalist or objectivist. An ethical relativist claims that morality is invented or created by people; therefore morality, like fashion, cultural custom, or personal feeling, can vary from time to time and from person to person. Universalist or objectivist moral theories, in contrast, state that there are fundamental, objective moral principles and values that are impartial and universally true for all people, independent of their personal beliefs or culture. Because many people confuse morality with cultural customs or personal feelings, we begin our discussion of moral theory with ethical relativism.
In his study of moral development, psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg found that 90 percent of adult Americans believe that, for the most part, morality is relative to or created by society.4 For the majority of Americans, being morally good means following the norms and values of their society or culture—whether this be their peer culture, their church,5 their country, or a combination of these. For example, according to Gallup Poll public opinion on the morality of same-sex marriage shifted from 55 percent favorable in 2014 to 64 percent in 2017 following the Supreme Court ruling legalizing same-sex marriage nationwide.
The theory that morality is relative to societal norms is known in moral philosophy as cultural relativism. Rather than promote tolerance as a universal moral value, ethical relativism breeds suspicion of those who are different and allows exploitation of the weak by the powerful as long as it is culturally sanctioned.
Because of this, it is important that we learn how to analyze different moral theories. As critical thinkers and students of moral philosophy, we cannot be content with simply accepting the norms of our culture or dismissing morality as a matter of personal opinion. Rather than depend on the opinions of others and risk getting off course, we can use theory as a guide as we make our way through the often bewildering morass of moral issues that confront us in modern life.
EXERCISES
1. What do you mean when you say that something is morally right or morally wrong? Use specific examples from your life experience to illustrate your answer.
2. Make a list of guidelines and values you use in making moral decisions. Examine your list for consistency. Where did you get these guidelines and values? Do they give you sufficient guidance in resolving difficult moral issues? Explain.
3. Choose a moral issue. Discuss how the guidelines and values you listed in the previous answer help shape your position on that issue.
RELATIVISM IN ETHICS
There is one thing a professor can be absolutely certain of: almost every student entering the university believes, or says he believes, that truth is relative.
—Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind
The fact of moral disagreement raises the question of whether there are objective or universal moral principles. Cultural and individual disagreements, fueled by popular clichés such as “morality is all relative,” “do what you feel is right,” “don’t force your values on me,” and “who4am I to judge?” create serious doubts in people’s minds about whether moral issues can ever be resolved, or whether meaningful dialogue between those holding opposing positions is even possible.
According to ethical relativists, there are no independent or objective moral standards. Instead, morality is created by people. In other words, humans, either individually or collectively, are the ultimate measure of what is right and wrong.
Ethical Subjectivism
What I feel is right is right. What I feel is wrong is wrong.
—Jean-Jacques Rousseau
Ethical relativism can be subdivided into ethical subjectivism and cultural relativism. Ethical subjectivists claim that individual people create their own morality. There are no objective, universal moral truths—only individuals’ opinions or preferences. What is right for you may be wrong for me, depending on our respective feelings. You may feel that racism is wrong; I may feel that white supremacy is morally right. You may feel that it is wrong to eat meat; I may feel it is right for me. The rightness or wrongness of our actions depends solely on how each of us feels about racism or meat-eating.
Do not confuse ethical subjectivism with the obviously true, descriptive statement that “whatever a person believes is right for him or her is what that person believes is right for him or her.” Ethical subjectivism goes beyond this by claiming that sincerely believing or feeling that something is right makes it right for the individual. Because morality is merely a matter of personal opinion, we can never be mistaken about what is right and wrong. In other words, my actions in terrorizing black students on campus are morally commendable and perhaps even morally obligatory, so long as I personally feel that what I am doing is right.
When asked if he thought what he did was wrong, convicted serial killer Craig Price calmly replied, “Morality is a private choice.” If morality is simply a matter of personal opinion, there is no point in trying to use rational arguments to convince the racist or the serial killer that what he did was wrong, any more than it would make sense to try to convince me that I really don’t like cashew nuts. Furthermore, there would not be any point in proceeding further in a moral-issues course.
When people’s views come into conflict, those who are strongest will be able to impose their agenda on others, as Craig Price did. Under ethical subjectivism we do not have to tolerate other people’s views or even their lives unless, of course, we feel that tolerance is right for us. Ethical subjectivism, in other words, provides no guidance for reaching moral decisions when there is a question of what to do. Returning to the metaphor of moral theories as a road map, ethics subjectivism is rather like a map that always says “You’re wherever you think you are.” Clearly, such a map would not be of much use, especially if we are lost and trying to get to a particular destination.
What Would the World Be Like If We Took Ethical Subjectivism Seriously? Ethical subjectivism is one of the weakest moral theories. If taken seriously, it permits people to exploit and hurt others without having to justify their actions. As a theory, it does not provide a satisfactory explanation for why certain actions are wrong. In real life we generally make moral judgments independently of anyone’s feelings toward the action. Indeed, the fact that a serial killer enjoys torturing and killing his victims or that a child molester sincerely believes that his young victims5enjoy being raped only makes their actions more horrific. If ethical subjectivism was true, the opposite would be the case: Our moral heroes would be sociopaths—people who act solely on their feelings, without concern for any universal moral principles.
Cultural Relativism
We recognize that morality differs in every society, and is a convenient term for socially approved habits.
—Ruth Benedict (1933)
The modern theory of cultural relativism developed primarily out of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century studies of “simple” cultures by prominent anthropologists such as Ruth Benedict, Emile Durkheim, William Graham Sumner, and Franz Boas. Like ethical subjectivists, cultural relativists maintain that standards of right and wrong are created by people. It is societal norms, however, rather than the opinions of isolated individuals, that form the basis of morality. Public opinion, not private opinion, determines what is right and wrong. There are no objective universal moral standards that hold for all people in all cultures, only different cultural customs.
Cultural relativists are not merely arguing that some moral values are relative to culture. They claim that all moral values are nothing more than cultural customs and laws. Because there are no universal moral standards, the moral values of one culture cannot be judged to be any better or worse than those of any other culture. Headhunting, for example, is right or wrong only within a particular cultural context. In some New Guinea cultures, it was once considered morally commendable for a young man to give his sweetheart a shrunken head as a trophy. In our country such an action would be regarded as highly immoral and evidence of serious mental illness. Similarly, if a culture believes that women should be kept in subjection, women have a moral obligation to be submissive to their fathers or husbands, and men have a moral right, and perhaps a moral duty, to use brute force should their women deviate from the cultural norm. While it is wrong in our culture for men to beat their wives, according to a cultural relativist it is wrong only because it goes against cultural norms.
Cultural Relativism Is Not the Same as Sociological Relativism Do not confuse cultural relativism with sociological relativism. Cultural relativism is a moral theory about what ought to be. Sociological relativism is a descriptive rather than normative theory. It is simply the observation that there is disagreement among cultures regarding moral values. Unlike cultural relativism, sociological relativism draws no conclusions about the rightness or wrongness of these values. Sociological relativists leave open the possibility that a culture may be mistaken about its moral values (such as Nazi Germany or the headhunting cultures) and that there may be universal moral principles that all cultures ought to respect. Cultural relativism, on the other hand, claims that if a culture believes something is morally right, that in itself makes it morally right. Because morality is nothing more than custom, there are no legitimate grounds for criticizing the practices of other cultures.
Under cultural relativism, morality may also change within a culture over time, much like fashions. Slavery is now considered immoral in the United States. Two hundred years ago, however, slavery was not only believed to be morally acceptable by the majority, it was, according to cultural relativists, morally acceptable. If morality is synonymous with conformity to cultural norms, it was the abolitionists, not the slaveholders, who were immoral. Similarly, Martin Luther King Jr. was immoral for protesting the segregation laws of the South.
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For cultural relativists, if something is legal or at least culturally acceptable, whether it be slavery, abortion, capital punishment, prostitution, or pornography, it is, by definition, morally acceptable. Things that are illegal—such as human cloning, polygamy, and nude bathing on public beaches—are immoral according to the cultural relativist.
Cultural Relativism Is Based on Faulty Reasoning Cultural relativism argues from the fact that a culture believes something, such as slavery, is moral, to the conclusion that that is the way things ought to be. In logic this type of faulty reasoning is known as the naturalist fallacy. The naturalist fallacy draws a conclusion about what ought to be, based on what is. As noted earlier, the fact that people believe something to be true, whether it be the flatness of the earth, creationism, or the morality of slavery, does not make it true or moral in itself.
What If Cultural Relativism Is True? Further analysis of cultural relativism reveals that, like ethical subjectivism, it is fraught with problems and contradictions.
Cultural relativism offers no criteria for distinguishing between reformers, such as Martin Luther King Jr. and Susan B. Anthony, who may break the law as an act of conscience, and common criminals. Both the social reformer and the criminal break cultural norms; however, identifying what is moral with what is legal is problematic, since some laws—such as laws supporting slavery or prohibiting women from voting—are clearly unjust and reasonable people believe they should be changed.
Because it identifies morality with maintaining the status quo, cultural relativism cannot explain moral progress. Yet most people believe that the abolition of slavery in the United States, and granting women full rights of citizenship all represented moral progress. Similarly, cultural relativism cannot account for the fact that most people believe that there are ways in which their own society can be improved. Not only does cultural relativism prevent criticism of other cultures, it also rules out the possibility of engaging in a rational critique of one’s own cultural customs.
Cultural relativism encourages blind conformity to cultural norms. Rather than using reason or dialogue, we resolve a moral issue simply by taking a poll or calling a lawyer. But surely this is not an accurate description of how we make moral decisions or resolve moral issues. Legalizing abortion and capital punishment did not stop moral debate over those two issues. Furthermore, the fact that most Americans eat meat is irrelevant to someone who is struggling with the morality of meat-eating.
Cultural relativism does not work in pluralistic cultures. Although it may have been possible a century ago for anthropologists to identify the cultural norms of relatively isolated and static cultures, in the rapidly changing modern world it is becoming more and more difficult to draw sharp distinctions between cultures or even to figure out what our own cultural norms are. Most of us are members of several cultures or subcultures. We may be members of a Catholic, Cambodian, Native American, African American, or homosexual subculture whose values may conflict with those of the wider culture. Indeed, the so-called dominant cultural values are sometimes simply the values held by a small group of people who happen to hold the power in that culture.
We also cannot assume that simply because the majority holds a certain value that it is desirable. In his essay On Liberty, at the end of Chapter 7, John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) argues that basing public policy on the will of the people can result in the “tyranny of the majority.” Suppression of freedom of speech and religion, censorship of the press, and discrimination against minorities have all, at some time, had the blessing of the majority.
The belief that there are no shared universal moral values can lead to suspicion and mistrust of people from other cultures or subcultures. We may feel that “they” do not share our values; that7people from other cultures may even have dangerous values. This contributes to the conviction that, as the source of moral values, our country or culture is morally superior to all others. In the United States this may be expressed in an uncritical belief in “American exceptionalism.” Because cultural relativism rules out the possibility of rational discussion when cross-cultural values come into conflict and persuasion fails, groups may resort to either apathy and isolationism when the values of other cultures are not a threat, or to violence when another culture’s values or actions create a threat to one’s own way of life.
This being said, even though relativist moral theories may not stand up under the scrutiny of critical analysis, they contain at least a grain of truth. Cultural relativism reminds us that culture and history are important in the moral life. Our traditions, our religious values, and our political and social institutions all shape the way in which we apply moral values. Although culture may not be the source of fundamental moral principles and values, it influences how they are interpreted and prioritized. In their concern to disavow ethical relativism, too many philosophers have divorced morality from the actual historical and cultural settings in which we make our moral decisions. On the other hand, but cultural relativism takes this observation too far. Although the application of specific moral principles may be relative to cultures (as noted in the Eskimo example later in this chapter), this does not imply that these moral principles are the creation of cultures.
Ethical Relativism and Doublethink The simplicity and popularity of the two types of ethical relativism make them particularly seductive. Ethical subjectivism absolves people of ever having to deliberate before making a moral judgment, whereas cultural relativism absolves people from moral responsibility so long as they follow the crowd. At the same time, almost everyone wants others to treat them with respect (a universal moral principle) and be held morally culpable for their hurtful actions.
In his book 1984, George Orwell coined the term doublethink to describe when people simultaneously hold two contradictory views and believe both to be true. Some people jump back and forth between the different theories, depending on what is more expedient in a particular situation. For example, some students may argue that morality is a private choice when it comes to something they are doing, such as binge drinking or cheating on a test or using hate speech. At the same time, they may be morally critical of teachers who break cultural norms by using sexist or racist language in class or who play favorites when it comes to grading tests. Ethical subjectivism and cultural relativism, however, are mutually exclusive theories. A person cannot consistently believe both that morality is created by individuals and that morality is a cultural creation.
Some people who claim that they are relativists may try to sneak universal moral principles concerning justice, fairness, and respect in through the back door. They may argue that sexist and racist language is disrespectful or that playing favorites in grading is unfair. However, the moral principal of justice as fairness cannot be used by an ethical relativist to criticize another person’s behavior as immoral. Because the two types of theories are based on contradictory claims regarding the source of morality, both forms of ethical relativism are incompatible with each other as well as with universalist theories.
What About Moral Disagreement?
But if ethical relativism is incorrect, how can we explain the lack of agreement among individuals and cultures? The fact that people disagree does not necessarily mean that there are no objective moral principles. People can disagree for a number of reasons. They may be mistaken about their facts.8At one time most people believed that the earth was flat, but it turns out they were mistaken. Physicians used to routinely lie to dying cancer patients, believing that the truth would be so upsetting that it might kill them. It wasn’t until the 1970s that studies were carried out that showed physicians to be wrong. Similarly, there may be objective moral standards, even though disagreement may exist regarding their application to particular situations and issues.
Disagreement can also occur because natural conditions and religious beliefs influence the expression of a particular universal moral value. In 1941 Gontran de Poncins wrote the following about the Kabloona, an Eskimo culture living in the Canadian arctic.
One observer was told of an Eskimo who was getting ready to move camp and was concerned about what to do with his blind and aged father, who was a burden to the family. One day the old man expressed a desire to go seal hunting again, something he had not done for many years. His son readily assented to this suggestion, and the old man was dressed warmly and given his weapons. He was then led out to the seal grounds and was walked into a hole in the ice into which he disappeared.6
Is cultural relativism the only way to explain the difference between the Kabloona and modern Americans? Modern Americans can hire caregivers or put their ailing parents or grandparents in nursing homes. The Kabloona, on the other hand, were a nomadic people. As such their lives depended on following the seal herds. To take a blind and ailing parent on one of these treks could have resulted in starvation, not just of the elderly parent, but of the whole family. In addition, the son, as was the tradition, respected his father’s autonomy (a universal moral principle), waiting until he requested the “hunting” trip.
What was different here, in other words, were not the fundamental moral values of respect for life, family loyalty, and personal autonomy, but different conditions that placed limitations on how these values could best be applied. In other words, the Kabloona practice can be explained as an example of sociological relativism. Saving the lives of many took precedence over prolonging the father’s life. The question of when, if ever, it is morally permissible to assist a terminally ill person in taking his or her life is not one limited to the Kabloona culture. The introduction of medical technology that can prolong the lives of the elderly and the dying has brought the issues of death with dignity and assisted suicide to the forefront in our own culture (see Chapter 3).
People may also disagree about moral issues not because they hold fundamentally different moral values, but because they rank or prioritize them differently. Both Aristotle and the Confucians give a high ranking to community and social values. Libertarians, on the other hand, place a higher value on individual autonomy and freedom. Moral theory helps us recognize and rank these values and in so doing helps us come to a resolution that honors as many moral values as possible.
Relativism, Personhood, and Moral Community
Variations in cultural norms can also occur because of differences in how cultures define their moral communities. According to anthropologist Clyde Kluckholn, there are universal moral values that are recognized by all cultures. No culture, for example, approves of indiscriminate lying, cheating, or stealing. Random violence is also prohibited universally. Every culture also makes arrangements for the care of its children. These moral values, however, apply only to members of a particular culture’s moral community—that is, to those who are seen as having moral value. Headhunters, for example, always select their victims from outside their immediate community.
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Beings who have moral worth are known in moral philosophy as persons. Persons are beings who are worthy of respect as valuable in themselves, rather than simply because of their usefulness or value to someone else. The widespread identification of person with human being in our culture betrays our anthropocentric bias; the use of the term man for all humans also shows our patriarchal bias. In coming up with a rational and consistent definition of the moral community, it is important to look beyond culturally biased terms.
Cultural Relativism and Ethnocentrism Cultural relativism defines moral community in terms of ethnocentrism: The belief that one’s culture or ethnic group is morally superior. According to this worldview, someone, or something, has moral value only because society grants this status. Those who are granted moral status by their culture receive the protection and support of the community. Moreover, those who are closer to the center of the moral community receive more privileges and protection. Those who are marginalized—such as blacks, women, and Muslim immigrants—have less access to economic and social benefits. When members of a marginalized group transgress cultural norms, they are not given the same protection as those in power. For example, in the United States, blacks are more likely to receive the death penalty.7 Beings who are outside the moral community—such as nonhuman animals, fetuses, and the environment in our culture—can be treated as a “means only” and disposed of, eaten, or exploited solely for the benefit of those within the moral community.
In Buddhist cultures and some Native American cultures, the moral community is defined very broadly to include all living beings—human and nonhuman. Other cultures define their moral community more narrowly. For a group of beings to be excluded from the moral community, they first have to be “depersonalized.” Before embarking on their “final solution,” the German Supreme Court in 1936 ruled that “the Jew is only a rough copy of a human being, with human like facial traits but nonetheless … lower than any animal … otherwise nothing.” In the 1857 Dred Scott v. Sanford decision, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed that the slave was “property in the strictest sense of the word” and an “inferior being that had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.” In the 1973 Roe v. Wade decision, which legalized abortion, the Court declared that “the word ‘person,’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn” (see pages 80–81).
The cultural definition of the moral community is, to a large extent, politically and economically motivated and serves to maintain the status quo. By protecting the interests of those in power and morally sanctioning the marginalization and exploitation of other groups, cultural relativism promotes ethnocentrism and legitimates hatred and discrimination. Problems such as racism and sexism exist in our culture, in part, because the majority of American adults are cultural relativists.
The power of our cultural worldview is more pervasive than most of us realize. Many people, while giving lip service to the universal principle of equality, tacitly adopt the prevailing cultural view of the moral community. In the 1991 study mentioned earlier of how college students judge social issues, slightly more than half of the students interviewed evaluated homosexuality in a positive light, stating that it was a personal preference just like heterosexuality.8 When the same students were presented with a hypothetical example of their own child being homosexual, however, 92 percent shifted their position, stating that this would not be morally acceptable or desirable. In other words, they shifted from a definition based on the principle of equality to the cultural definition of the moral community that marginalized homosexuals. To avoid getting mired in doublethink, it is important to be aware of how the cultural definition of the moral community shapes viewpoints on moral issues.
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Unlike cultural relativism, universalist theories of morality require rational criteria for personhood and that the exclusion of a particular group from the moral community be justified. Much of the dissension over abortion and animal rights stems from disagreement over the definition of moral community and personhood. Thus, any debate on these issues must be based on a rational and consistent definition of these key terms. Mary Anne Warren in her article on abortion (see Chapter 2), for example, devotes considerable space to defining personhood. Justifying practices such as meat-eating, abortion, or slavery on the grounds of tradition or legality just won’t do.
EXERCISES
1. Philosopher Stephen Satris argues that the ethical relativism of most college students is intended not as a well-thought-out philosophical theory but as an “invincible suit of armor” to “prevent or close off dialogue and thought.”9 Do you agree? Discuss an instance when you, or someone else, used ethical subjectivism as a means of ending the discussion on a moral issue.
2. Do your views on issues coincide, for the most part, with those of your culture or subculture? To what extent do you use widespread agreement as support for the “rightness” of your position on issues such as abortion or capital punishment?
3. George Orwell predicted that doublethink would become more and more prevalent as people lost the ability to think critically. Do you agree with Orwell? Identify instances of doublethink in debates on moral issues.
4. Make a list of criteria you use to decide who or what is included in and excluded from the moral community. Are you satisfied with your criteria? Discuss how your definition of personhood affects your views on the moral issues included in this text.
MOVING BEYOND ETHICAL RELATIVISM
Moral thought, then, seems to behave like all other kinds of thought. Progress through the moral levels and stages is characterized by increasing differentiation and increasing integration, and hence is the same kind of progress that scientific theory represents.
—Lawrence Kohlberg, The Philosophy of Moral Development (1981)
Just as children must one day leave their parents and strike out on their own if they are to continue maturing, so too must we put behind us the dictates of our peer group or culture as the ultimate moral authority and seek a more solid and reliable foundation for everyday moral decisions. Both types of ethical relativism—ethical subjectivism and cultural relativism—are inadequate as explanations of how we make real-life moral decisions and as guides for what we ought to do. Universalist moral theories offer an alternative to ethical relativism. These theories claim that morality is universal and objective and, as such, exists independently of personal or cultural opinions.
The Stage Theory of Moral Development
According to developmental psychologists, there are innate cognitive structures that are fundamental to all humans. These structures include—among others—causality, time and space, and moral excellence. In his study of moral reasoning, psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg (1927–1987) found that humans move through distinct stages of moral development (see chart on page 13). These stages are universal and cross-cultural and represent “transformations in the organization of11thought, rather than increasing knowledge of cultural values.” The earlier stages are not so much replaced by higher stages as incorporated into them—much as elementary school arithmetic becomes part of understanding complex statistical analysis. People move on to the next or “higher” stage only when they find their current type of moral reasoning inadequate. This generally occurs when they encounter a crisis that their current mode of thinking cannot satisfactorily resolve.
Young children use primarily egoistic or preconventional moral reasoning. Morality is simply a matter of satisfying their own needs. While they recognize basic moral principles such as justice, they apply this principle egocentrically, demanding fair treatment for themselves but not caring whether others are treated justly.
In the second or conventional stage of moral reasoning, people look to others, whether it be their peers or societal norms, for their moral values. In other words, they adopt cultural relativism. The transition to the conventional stage generally takes place during early adolescence. While egoistic reasoning may be effective in helping the young child get what he or she wants, in high school and college, egoism is more likely to alienate the egoist from his or her peers.
Conventional moral reasoners are concerned with pleasing others and respecting social rules. Their position on a moral issue is generally determined by what their peers believe, or, at the higher level of conventional reasoning, what is legal. As a developmental stage, conventional moral reasoning helps to socialize young people and move them beyond egoism to a concern for community values and the needs of others.
The final stage, according to Kohlberg, is that of principled reasoning. In justifying this as a more desirable or higher stage than the previous stages, he points out that people at this stage prefer it to their earlier stages. In addition, most world philosophers have long held that autonomous moral reasoning, universality and impartiality, and a concern for justice for all are the hallmarks of sound moral reasoning.
Kohlberg used only males in formulating his theory on moral development. Not surprisingly, his stage theory has been criticized for not taking into account the way women think about moral issues. Through her interviews with women and a study of women in literature, New York University psychologist Carol Gilligan concluded that women’s moral development tends to follow a different path than men’s: Men tend to be duty- and principle-oriented; women are more context-oriented and tend to view the world in a more emotional and personal way.10 Women’s moral judgment, Gilligan found, is characterized by concern for themselves and others, accepting and maintaining responsibility within relationships, attachment, and self-sacrifice.
Although Gilligan’s and Kohlberg’s theories emphasize different aspects of moral development, their stages are roughly parallel. The preconventional stage in both theories includes the egoists and ethical subjectivists who put their needs before those of others. Conventional moral reasoners, in both theories, are cultural relativists. The different descriptions of the conventional stage are not surprising given the different ways in which men and women are socialized in our culture. Men, for the most part, are socialized to be the upholders of law and order—whether it be the law of the land or the rules laid down by their peer culture. Women, on the other hand, are taught that being a good woman involves self-sacrifice and placing the welfare of others before her own. The #MeToo movement, in which women who have been sexually harassed or raped by men in positions of power, represents a shift from conventional to postconventional reasoning (for more on sexual harassment, see Chapter 6, 237–238).
The postconventional stage is represented by autonomous moral reasoning, in which a person looks to transcultural universal values—whether in the form of abstract principles of justice and respect or moral sentiments such as compassion and empathy. Developing an awareness that12respect applies to all persons involves being able to empathize with others. Sociopaths, who lack the ability to empathize, also lack any sense of moral duty. In addition, Gilligan’s postconventional stage entails that women realize that principles of justice and respect apply to themselves as well as to others. Recent research has shown that most people—men and women alike—use both the care and the justice perspective in their moral reasoning. Both Gilligan and Kohlberg came to acknowledge that moral maturity involves the development and integration of both perspectives.13
STAGES OF MORAL REASONING
|
Stage |
Kohlberg11 |
Gilligan12 |
|
Preconventional |
Punishment (avoid punishment) Egoist (satisfy one’s own needs; consider the needs of others only if it benefits you) |
Self-centered (view one’s own needs as all that matters) |
|
Conventional |
Good boy/nice girl (please others; concern for others’ approval; conformity to peer norms) Society-maintaining (respect authority and social rules; maintain the existing social order) |
Self-sacrificing (view others’ needs as more important) |
|
Postconventional |
Social contract (obey useful social rules as long as minimal basic rights are safeguarded) Conscience and universal principles (autonomously recognize universal rules, such as justice and equality; respect for equal dignity of each individual) |
Mature care ethics (balance one’s own needs and the needs of others) |
The preference for one of the two perspectives can show up in how students debate moral issues. Women, as well as some men, at the conventional stage of moral reasoning may fail to speak up or challenge someone for fear of offending them. Males at Kohlberg’s conventional stage may conform to the rules of their peer culture or confuse what is moral with what is legal. Studies of drinking on campuses, for example, show that freshmen men are more likely than women to succumb to peer pressure to engage in heavy drinking and drug use. Female freshmen, in contrast, are more likely to refrain from drinking and drug use, because of concern for how it will affect their families.14 (For more on the issue of drinking on campuses, see Chapter 5.)
Being wary of peer pressure and being concerned about the impact of our actions on our relationships are both important in moral decision making. Being aware of your own moral-decision-making style can help you cultivate your strengths and overcome your weaknesses, as well as appreciate the strengths and contributions of other perspectives in moral decision making and discussions of moral issues.
College and Moral Development
Moral maturity entails making our own well-reasoned moral decisions rather than simply following the dictates of the crowd or going with our selfish desires.
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When young people begin college, they may discover that what they thought were clear-cut cultural norms and values are not so uncontroversial after all. Their cherished worldviews may come into conflict with those of others, especially people from different cultural backgrounds. This, in turn, leads them to question some of their own cultural norms. During this transition period, students are torn between the rejection of moral values that are culturally relative and the reluctance to commit to universal moral principles (postconventional moral reasoning). This conflict can manifest itself in hedonistic disregard for any moral values—either relative or universal.15
Unfortunately, like the majority of Americans, most college students do not complete the transition to postconventional moral reasoning, but instead move into a higher level of conventional moral reasoning. Although they may become less dependent on the opinions of their peers, the trade-off is that they become more conforming to wider societal norms. The good news is that college experiences such as community service learning, contact with people from diverse backgrounds, and classes in which moral worldviews are challenged can significantly enhance a student’s moral development.16
The Importance of Moral Development and Ethics Education
Could culturally approved holocausts like the one that happened in Nazi Germany happen today in the United States? Most of us think that we would draw the line at participating in such atrocities. If laws were enacted ordering, let’s say, the euthanasia of all people over 75, or mandatory destruction of all genetically “imperfect” fetuses, would we go along with these laws? Although these practices may make us feel uncomfortable, if we identify morality with cultural norms, on what grounds are we going to oppose them?
One purpose of ethics education is to help us make the transition to postconventional moral reasoning by providing us with the resources to make effective moral decisions that we will not come to regret later. Unlike moral indoctrination, ethics education is not about telling people what is right and wrong. Most people “know” right from wrong.17 In the Milgram experiment, for example, many of the subjects were openly distressed and “knew” that what they were doing was wrong, but they were unable to say why. Ethics education helps us articulate moral values and apply moral theory and moral reasoning to a particular issue or real-life moral decision.18
The study of moral theory and the reasoning underlying moral issues also help motivate people. Research has found that people who are morally mature and better at moral reasoning are more motivated to act on their beliefs.19 People at the higher stages of moral development not only sympathize with those who are suffering, but take active steps to help alleviate that suffering. They are willing to speak out on behalf of themselves and others when they witness an injustice and will take effective and well-thought-out action to correct the injustice.
Moral action also involves striving to be the best person we can be. Virtuous people, those who regard morality as important to their self-identity, are more likely to do the right thing and to get involved in social action.20 Taking a class in ethics helps us on our journey to becoming the best people we can be.
EXERCISES
1. Which perspective—Kohlberg’s justice or Gilligan’s care perspective—best describes the way you approach discussions of moral issues? To what extent do you draw from both perspectives? Illustrate your answer with specific examples.14
2. Has the college experience enhanced your moral development and, if so, how? Discuss what motivated you to change. Explain, using specific examples.
3. Have your views on any of the issues covered in this chapter changed or been called into doubt as a result of your college experience? Explain.
4. Think of a time when you went along with others even though you “knew” that what they were doing was morally questionable. Discuss strategies you might have used that would have made it easier for you to resist peer pressure and to do the right thing (engage in moral action).
MORALITY AND RELIGION
A list of virtues or duties drawn up by a Buddhist would not differ very greatly from one drawn up by a Christian, a Confucianist, a Muhammadan or a Jew. Formally all of the ethico-religious systems are universalist in scope.
—Morris Ginsberg, Reason and Unreason in Society (1947)
Many people look to religion for moral guidance. The concept of God in the major world religions is intimately connected with that of moral goodness.21 People worship God, in part, because God represents perfect goodness. Worshipping reaffirms these moral values. This raises the question of the connection between religion and morality. Is morality dependent on religion, or does it exist independently of religion?
The Divine Command Theory
Divine command theory states that something is moral merely because God approves of it. Just as morality for the cultural relativist is relative to cultural norms, for the divine command theorist, morality is relative to what God commands or wills. There are no independent, universal moral standards by which to judge God’s commands. No other justification is necessary for an action to be right other than God’s commanding it. The story of Abraham and Isaac in the Bible, in which God commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son, is often used as an example of divine command theory. Abraham was not the last parent to claim that God commanded them to kill their child. In 2001, Texas housewife Andrea Yates drowned her five children, ranging in age from six months to seven years, to save them from Satan. Her justification: God commanded her to do so.
Even more disturbing is the use of divine command theory to justify terrorism. Radical Islamic terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda believe that God has commanded them to destroy infidels (see Chapter 9). The terrorists who flew the airplanes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, justified their actions using the divine command theory. Divine command was also invoked by former President George W. Bush, who believed that he was given a divine mandate to carry out God’s will in declaring war on these radical Islamic groups.22 If we respond that God would not have commanded anyone to do something horrible, we are implying that there are independent moral standards by which we can judge God’s commands.
If we accept the divine command theory, the only way to resolve a moral issue would be to wait for God to speak to us. There are no other criteria for deciding right from wrong. If someone claims that God spoke to her and commanded her to blow up a bus, we have no independent criteria for judging whether she, in fact, heard God or not. Most religious people reject divine command theory. They believe that actions such as genocide are not arbitrary but a matter of reason.
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Natural Law Theory
Natural law theorists maintain that God commands something because it is moral, not the other way around. Whereas religious teachings may affirm universal moral principles, morality exists independently of religion and God’s commands. According to the natural law theory, morality is grounded in rational human nature rather than in God’s commands or personal feelings or cultural norms. Morality is universally binding on everyone, no matter what their religion or lack thereof.
According to Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225–1274), it is through the “light of natural reason,” given to us by God, that humans discern moral or natural law (see page 372). These moral laws are very general and exist in the form of guidelines, such as the Golden Rule and the Ten Commandments (Decalogue). The Muslim Qur’an also contains a universal moral code similar to the Decalogue that is a universal “message to all the worlds” (81:27). Moral law is also teleological; it directs us toward a particular purpose or goal of the natural order. It is incumbent upon us as rational beings to discern how these moral laws apply at a particular time in history and in a particular case. In her article on the death penalty (see pages 172–176), Helen Prejean adopts this approach by asking if God (see reading by Helen Prejean at the end of Chapter 5) would return pain for pain and torture for torture. She concludes that God would not.
Although natural law theory is often identified with the Catholic Church, one need not be Catholic—or even believe in God—to subscribe to this theory. Martin Luther King Jr. subscribed to natural law theory and rejected divine command theory. Aristotle, on the other hand, believed that, rather than being created by God, the moral law has always been part of the natural order. Variations of natural law theory are also found in non-Western cultures, such as the Akan tribe of Ghana.23
Natural law ethicists reject cultural relativism. According to them a human or civil law (legislation) or a tradition is moral only to the extent that it is in accord with natural or moral law. If a law is unjust, we may have a moral obligation to disobey it. A human law is unjust if it is degrading to humans, such as laws that permit torture or slavery. Laws that are discriminatory, such as segregation laws and, perhaps, affirmative action, may also be unjust.
Civil disobedience, on the grounds of obedience to a higher moral law, has a long history in this country. In engaging in civil disobedience, the dissident can use only moral means and must be nonviolent and open about his or her actions. Members of animal liberation groups break into laboratories and set animals free; anti-abortionists block women from entering abortion clinics; anti-nuclear activists block roads leading to nuclear power plants and military establishments; and in the back of his Volkswagen van, Dr. Jack Kevorkian (1928–2011)—despite repeated warnings from the courts—continued to assist terminally ill people in ending their lives, until he was put in jail. In each of these cases, the people engaged in civil disobedience justified their actions on the grounds of a higher moral law. (For a more in-depth discussion of civil disobedience, see page 378.)
Universality and Religious Ethics
In discussing moral issues, it may be tempting to dismiss a particular position as a religious issue, especially if we are unsure of how to defend our own position. Antislavery arguments were dismissed for many years as the rantings of fanatic Quakers who were trying to force their religious views on the southerners. Today certain moral positions on abortion, stem cell research, and homosexuality are dismissed as religious views. The fact that a specific religion takes an official16stand on a certain moral issue, however, does not imply that the issue is religious rather than moral. In discussing these and similar issues, we must be careful to separate the moral issues involved from specific religious doctrines.
Most theologians and philosophers maintain that morality can exist independently of religion. Although a moral code is incorporated into and reinforced by the doctrine of most religions, moral issues can be discussed without appealing to religion. When people who are religious use the terms right and wrong, they generally mean the same thing as someone who is not religious. Religious differences tend to fall away in most serious discussions of moral issues because moral disputes can be discussed and even resolved without bringing religion into the equation.24
EXERCISES
1. Discuss how, if at all, your religious beliefs have shaped your morality. Is there a difference between religious and secular morality in your life? What happens when your religion and your culture take different positions on a particular moral issue? Explain how you resolved the conflict. Use specific examples.
2. Fyodor Dostoyevsky in The Brothers Karamazov (1880) writes, “If God doesn’t exist, everything is permissible.” Discuss his claim that morality is dependent on the existence of God. Discuss what, if anything, would be different about your moral beliefs and behavior if God did not exist.
3. Discuss a case in which someone justified a position that most people would consider immoral, such as an act of aggression against a particular group of people, on the grounds that God commanded him or her to take this position. How would you respond to such a person?
4. Choose a controversial topic, such as abortion, euthanasia, or genetically engineered babies, that is sometimes regarded as a religious issue. Can the morality of these practices be discussed without bringing in religious doctrine? Support your answer.
UNIVERSAL MORAL THEORIES
Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heavens above and the moral law within.
—Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (1788)
Like natural law theorists, most moral philosophers believe that there are moral principles that are universal. There are several different universalist theories, including natural law theory, ethical egoism, utilitarianism, deontology, rights ethics, and virtue ethics. They all agree, however, that there are universal moral principles that are impartial and binding on all people regardless of their personal opinions, culture, or religion and that these moral principles are discovered rather than created by people. Although individual interests or cultural customs, as noted in the example about the Kabloona, can influence how a particular moral principle is applied, fundamental moral principles are universal and transcultural.
Just as scientists disagree about the origin of the universe or the nature of gravity, people may disagree about the source and nature of these principles and sentiments. Some philosophers17believe that we intuitively know what is morally right and wrong; others argue that reason is the primary source of moral knowledge. The fact of disagreement, however, does not mean that universal moral principles do not exist, anymore than it follows that disagreement about the source of the universe or the nature of gravity means that the universe and gravity do not exist.
There is a lot of overlap between the different universalist theories. Instead of being mutually exclusive, like ethical subjectivism and cultural relativism, universalist theories, for the most part, emphasize particular aspects of morality.
ETHICAL EGOISM
The achievement of his own happiness is man’s highest moral purpose.
—Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness (1964)
Ethical egoists argue that morality involves the pursuit of our rational self-interests. It differs from ethical subjectivism in that it is concerned with a person’s best interests, not simply what each individual person feels is right for him or her. We may feel something is the right action for us only to later discover the error of our ways. Ethical egoists also maintain that egoism should be universalized and that the world would be a better place if we all pursued our rational self-interests.
Psychological Egoism and Ethical Egoism
The story of Gyges’s ring in Plato’s Republic is often used to illustrate psychological ethical egoism. In this dialogue, Glaucon tries to convince Socrates that it is better for people to do only that which benefits themselves. “Those who practice justice,” Glaucon argues, “do it unwillingly because they lack the power to do injustice.” To make his point, he tells the story of Gyges, a shepherd who finds a gold ring. Before long, Gyges notices that when he turns the setting of the ring so it faces the inside of his hand, he becomes invisible to those around him. When he realizes his power, he arranges to become a messenger to the king. When he arrives at the king’s residence, he seduces the queen, kills the king, and takes over the empire. (For the full text of Gyges’s ring, go to http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.3.ii.html.)
There are two main types of egoism: ethical egoism and psychological egoism. Ethical egoism is a normative or moral theory about how things ought to be. We ought to act in our own best self-interests. Psychological egoism, in contrast, is a descriptive theory about how things are. Humans by nature are selfish and out for themselves.
Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) was a psychological egoist. He believed that people are innately selfish, aggressive, and quarrelsome.25 Without society, he argued, we would all live in a “state of nature” in which life would be “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” We agree to live within a society and obey certain rules only because it benefits us. To those opponents of psychological egoism who point out people who do noble deeds, Hobbes replies that we perform great acts of charity and altruism only because we delight in demonstrating our powers and superiority by showing the world that we are more capable than those we serve. (To read Chapters 13–15 in Hobbes’s Leviathan, in which he discusses ethical egoism, go to http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/hobbes/leviathan-contents.html)
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Sociobiologists, such as E. O. Wilson, also believe that humans, like other animals, are genetically programmed to act in ways that further their own self-interests. Even altruism is fundamentally selfish, because it increases our chances of passing on our genes to future generations.
One of the problems with the theory or psychological egoism is that it is not falsifiable. No matter what happens, psychological egoism argues that it must have been motivated by self-interest. People smoke because it gives them pleasure; they sabotage relationships because it gets them off the hook; they commit suicide to escape a painful existence or, in the case of suicide bombers, to enter the bliss of heaven. Thus, as a theory, psychological egoism is based on circular reasoning and, as such, is useless in explaining human behavior or offering guidelines for what we should do.
Ayn Rand and Rational Ethical Egoism
According to Ayn Rand (1905–1982), humans are rational and fundamentally solitary individuals, each pursuing his or her own personal self-interests. Unlike psychological egoists, ethical egoists do not believe that we always act in our best self-interests. We need to use our reason to determine what is best for us. Also, we should do things for others only when we can expect to get something of similar value in exchange. This type of voluntary cooperation Rand referred to as the principle of trade or justice. When we each pursue our rational self-interests, we actually promote the common good. In line with this, Rand concluded that laissez-faire capitalism is the only economic system compatible with respect for the integrity of the individual human.
While E. O. Wilson believes that altruism is compatible with egoism, Rand maintained that altruism is a vice. Altruists, according to her, give things to people who have neither earned them nor deserve them. This turns the recipients of altruism or charity into parasites or second-handers. The only good people can do for each other, Rand writes, is “hands off.” Because of this she was opposed to the welfare state or any sort of handouts as degrading to both the giver and the receiver. Taxing people to redistribute resources to second-handers is, in her view, a form of theft. The sole purpose of government is to protect our individual rights to pursue our rational self-interests. If everyone were allowed to pursue their rational self-interests and engage in voluntary trade, the result would be the most efficient use of resources and human talent.
To learn more about Rand’s rational ethical egoism, see the reading in this chapter from her novel The Fountainhead.
ETHICAL EGOISM: CONSIDERATIONS FOR THINKING ABOUT MORAL ISSUES
§ Determine what is in your rational self-interests: What will bring me the greatest happiness? Am I being reasonable in considering what is in my best self-interests?
§ Act in ways that promote your rational self-interests: Which action or plan will best promote my goal of happiness?
§ Interact with others based on the principle of trade: Will this exchange give me back something of equal value? Or are other people asking for something that they neither have earned nor deserve?
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The Strengths and Limitations of Ethical Egoism
One of the strengths of ethical egoism is that it contains two important truths: (1) We all want to be happy, and (2) pursuing our interests is important to our happiness. Ethical egoism encourages us to stand up for ourselves, to take responsibility for our lives, and not to let other people take advantage of us.
But are there only two alternatives: self-sacrifice or the pursuit of our self-interests? Is the pursuit of our self-interests even the best path to happiness? By having individual happiness as its only goal, ethical egoism becomes self-defeating—a phenomenon known as the hedonist paradox. If we focus only on our own happiness, we often end up feeling frustrated and alienated. A review of studies worldwide on what makes people happy found that “self-actualization values” such as inner-directedness, independence, individualism, and productive work were not associated with greater happiness. Instead, values and activities that were not motivated by self-interest—such as helping others, sympathy, friendship, tolerance, and forgiveness—were most highly correlated with happiness.26
In addition, ethical egoism does not provide guidelines for resolving conflicts of interest between people. Protecting people’s liberty rights is insufficient to guarantee that everyone will have the freedom to pursue their rational self-interests. In a world of limited resources and opportunities, people’s self-interests sometimes come into conflict. When this happens, the rich and powerful will generally be able to assert their self-interests at the expense of those with less power. In the United States, the gap between the rich and the poor has grown steadily since 1980 with the top 1 percent of income earners now receiving 20 percent of the income—the equivalent of that received by the bottom 40 percent of income earners.27 Ethical egoism may work well in a community of equals. However, the world falls far short of this ideal. The devastating effects of this ideology on people and nations that are not in positions of economic power are becoming more evident with the increasing accumulation of wealth in the hands of fewer and fewer people and the destruction of the environment in the name of economic progress.
EXERCISES
1. Imagine that you found a ring that could make you invisible. Discuss how you might use such a ring. For example, would you use it to cheat on tests or to rob banks in order to distribute the money to the needy? Would the world be a better place if everyone had such a ring? Support your answers.
2. Discuss the claim by psychological egoists that people, by nature, are selfish as well as how you might go about proving or disproving the theory.
3. Discuss how your life would be affected if all your interactions with other people were based on “trade.” Do you agree with Rand that the principle of trade is the same as justice? Support your answer.
4. Are students who receive government-funded college scholarships parasites or second-handers under Rand’s definition? If so, do we have a moral obligation to get rid of any scholarship assistance? Support your answers.
5. Discuss the possible ramifications of ethical egoism and Rand’s principle of trade for globalization and economic trade between wealthy and developing countries. How about programs such as Social Security, unemployment insurance, and Medicare—should they be privatized or even dismantled?
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UTILITARIANISM
The happiness of the individuals, of whom a community is composed, that is their pleasures and their security, is the end and the sole end which the legislator ought to have in view.
—Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789)
Modern utilitarian theory was developed by English philosopher and social reformer Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) in response to the flagrant injustices and the desperate needs of workers during the Industrial Revolution. Bentham’s goal was to develop a practical ethical theory that could provide a secure, scientific foundation for developing social policy and legislation.
Jeremy Bentham: Father of Modern Utilitarian Theory
Bentham’s utilitarian theory was inspired primarily by the theories of Epicurus (341–270 B.C.E.) and David Hume (1711–1776). Hume and Epicurus both argued that certain traits are virtues because of their utility, or usefulness. Those traits that promote happiness have the greatest utility. Bentham took this one step further by arguing that utility provides the only source of political obligation; it is utility alone that proves the test of what a law ought to be and which laws ought to be obeyed.
Utilitarianism states that the morality of an action or policy is determined solely by its consequences. Utilitarians maintain that the desire for happiness is universal and that we intuitively recognize it as the greatest good. Happiness is synonymous with pleasure, unhappiness with pain. Actions are right to the extent that they tend to promote overall happiness, and wrong to the extent that they tend to promote overall unhappiness. Furthermore, what counts is not just individual or even human happiness, but the sum of the happiness of the whole community of sentient beings—that is, those beings who are capable of feeling pleasure and pain.
The Principle of Utility: Promoting Happiness and Minimizing Pain
Although the principle of utility is useful in making individual decisions, such as what major we should choose, Bentham intended the principle primarily for developing social policy. In determining which action or policy has the greatest utility (produces the greatest amount of happiness) we cannot rely on a majority vote, since people’s choices are not always well-informed. The majority, either because of ignorance about an issue or because of irrational traditions and prejudice, may be mistaken about what is the best course of action. Nor can we rely on feelings alone, such as sympathy, because feelings can also mislead us. Instead, we need a rational principle by which to guide our actions. This principle is the principle of utility, or the greatest happiness principle:
Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.28
In deciding which action or policy is the most morally compelling, we need only measure the total amount of pleasure and the total amount of pain involved in the alternatives, and choose the alternative with the greatest net pleasure. Because the interests of all sentient beings count, the pain caused by human practices to other animals—such as animal agriculture and research using nonhuman animals—also has to be taken into consideration (see reading by Jeremy Bentham at the end of this chapter).
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THE UTILITARIAN CALCULUS: SEVEN FACTORS TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION IN DETERMINING THE MOST MORAL ACTION OR DECISION
1. Intensity: Strength of the pleasure and pain. The greater the pleasure the higher the value; the greater the pain the lower the value.
2. Duration: Length of time the pain and pleasure will last.
3. Certainty: Level of probability that the pleasure or pain will occur.
4. Propinquity: How near in time the pleasure or happiness will occur.
5. Fecundity: Extent to which the pleasure will produce more pleasure.
6. Purity: The pleasure does not cause pain at the same time.
7. Extent: The number of sentient beings affected by the action.
John Stuart Mill’s Reformulation of Utilitarianism
Jeremy Bentham advocated equality and impartiality. He argued that all pleasures, whether those of a pig or a human, are equal. Equality, according to him, is not a description of actual equality of ability; rather, it is a moral ideal or prescription of how we ought to treat all sentient beings. The happiness of any one individual is no more or less important than that of any other.
Utilitarian John Stuart Mill disagreed with Bentham, arguing that intellectual pleasures, such as listening to a symphony or reading a great book, are qualitatively better than those of the body, such as eating or basking in the sun. In other words, the intellectual pleasures experienced by humans, though they may be less intense at times, are morally preferable to the simple pleasures of a pig (see reading by John Stuart Mill at the end of this chapter). This is not to say that the pleasures of the pig should not count at all. In fact, utilitarians continue to be in the forefront of the animal-welfare movement.
Utilitarianism and Social Reform
Utilitarian theory has had a profound influence on social reform and the shaping of public policy. Jeremy Bentham was an advocate of animal welfare and prison reform. John Stuart Mill spoke out eloquently on behalf of equal opportunities for women, freedom of the press, and the legalization of homosexual acts between consenting adults. Contemporary discussions of capital punishment, euthanasia, animal welfare, genetic engineering, stem cell research, pornography, legalization of drugs, and environmental ethics all have utilitarian components.
Unlike most moral theories, utilitarian theory adopts a practical bottom-up approach. It begins with the actual happiness of people and other sentient beings rather than imposing morality and social ideals on them from above. The principle of utility requires that we do not take refuge in ideological slogans, cultural traditions, or personal opinion, but that we instead examine our position on moral issues in light of the actual consequences. This entails overcoming our ignorance regarding the extent to which our lifestyle is built upon the suffering of other people or animals.
Utilitarianism requires that we first do our research. For example, is capital punishment, in fact, an effective deterrent? Does viewing pornography and violence, in fact, cause people to22behave more violently? Does permitting people who are openly homosexual to teach in schools, in fact, make children more likely to become homosexuals?
We also need to look at possible consequences of our decisions. Would censorship of hate speech and pornography cause more harm than allowing hate speech and pornography? Is assassination or a preemptive attack on another country ever justified if other avenues have failed to remove a leader who inflicts massive suffering on his people? Would legalizing recreational drugs result in more or in less drug abuse and drug-related crime? Would condoning voluntary euthanasia put us on the slippery slope toward involuntary euthanasia?
Finally, we need to balance harm and benefit. Is the harm that human activities cause to the environment and to other animals justified by the benefit the products bring to humans? Would permitting parents to genetically engineer their children result in more overall happiness for society, or less?
The Strengths and Limitations of Utilitarianism
Utilitarian theory is a powerful tool for formulating social policies. It is also a reminder that tradition alone cannot serve as a foundation for morality.
One of the strengths of utilitarian theory is that it challenges us to rethink our traditional notions about moral community. If we are going to exclude or marginalize people or other animals, we have to offer a rational justification for our decision. We cannot exclude other animals based on irrational religious doctrines that claim that only humans are created in the image of God. Nor can we justify expending expensive limited resources on humans who are no longer sentient simply on the grounds that they are human (see Chapter 2, pages 104–105).
The utilitarian insistence on equality and impartiality is both one of its greatest strengths and one of its weaknesses. Justice as impartiality assumes that people living in a community share a common conception of the good. In reality, however, people have different needs and goals. The capitalist’s idea of happiness, for example, is not the same as that of the religious contemplative. Philosopher John Rawls (1921–2002) pointed out that justice demands not only impartiality, but that we treat people fairly and in proportion to their needs and merits. A person who works hard deserves a raise or a good grade because he or she has done a good job. Utilitarians, in contrast, are not concerned with what a person deserves, but whether giving rewards based on merit produces the most utility.
There are other desirable goals in life besides pleasure. Most people agree that goals such as friendship, spiritual growth, and appreciation of the aesthetic are also desirable. On the other hand, utilitarian theory reminds us that one of the primary purposes of morality is not to make our lives more tedious or to make us feel more guilt-ridden, but to improve the quality of our lives by promoting ideals and behavior that provide optimal conditions for us to flourish, both as individuals and as a community.
By claiming that only consequences count, utilitarianism underplays the importance of individual integrity and personal responsibility. In considering only consequences utilitarian theory may require us to act in ways that violate our integrity and our conscience. For example, say that a particularly heinous murder, which the community believes to have been racially motivated, has created racial tension, looting, and killing in that community. The police have been unable to find the murderer. It also seems fairly certain that the community rampage will continue until someone is brought to “justice.” In desperation the police arrest a man—an unsavory character who has a history of petty crime—who they know is not guilty of the murder. As a judge, you can bring about more pleasure and restore social harmony by convicting the man and giving him the23death penalty. What should you do? The utilitarian would probably say we should send the man to death row. But our actions do not happen just as part of a wider context of the general good; each of us is also responsible for what we do as individuals.
UTILITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS FOR THINKING ABOUT MORAL ISSUES
§ Determine who or what will be affected: Who will be caused pain or pleasure?
§ Look at the possible consequences: What are both the long-term and short-term consequences of the different alternatives?
§ Maximize happiness: Which solution will bring about the greatest net happiness?
§ Minimize pain: Which solution will cause the least pain and suffering to those affected by the decision?
Because only pleasure has intrinsic value, utilitarian theory allows us to use people as a means toward that end, rather than requiring us to respect people as ends in themselves. In the previous example, the accused man was used as a means to social harmony. In addition, to pressure the judge into bringing about the death of an innocent person to prevent the death of others is also to treat the judge as a means only.
Utilitarian theory is not so much wrong as incomplete. Despite its limitations, utilitarian theory provides valuable guidelines for discussions of issues in social ethics. Although other moral philosophers may regard other moral considerations as more fundamental than the principle of utility, as John Rawls writes, “all ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.”29
EXERCISES
1. Utilitarian theory is frequently used to formulate social policies regarding issues like AIDS testing and distribution of social benefits such as scholarships and medical care. Find some examples of utilitarian thinking in current public or college policies. Explain why these policies represent utilitarian thinking.
2. President Donald Trump uses trickle-down theory, which is based on utilitarianism, to justify lowering taxes on corporations and businesses, arguing that the tax breaks given to rich business owners will benefit or “trickle down” to the middle and lower classes in the forms of more jobs and higher pay. Using the utilitarian calculus, critically analyze this policy. Remember to take into account human nature in your analysis.
3. Critically analyze Mill’s claim that human intellectual pleasures have greater moral value than the pleasures of other animals. Discuss how adopting either Bentham’s or Mill’s position would influence public policy on the use of nonhuman animals to benefit humans.
4. Both Confucianism and feminist care ethics teach that our concern should be strongest for our family and friends. Utilitarian theory, in contrast, teaches that our concern for others’ happiness should be impartial. Discuss these two competing concepts of moral obligation. Support your answer using examples from your own life as a college student.
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DEONTOLOGY: THE ETHICS OF DUTY
Look to your own duty; do not tremble before it.
—Bhagavad Gita
Deontological theories regard duty as the basis of morality. Duty, or doing what is right for its own sake, is the foundation of morality. There are strong strands of deontology in Confucianism and Hindu ethics as well as in many Western philosophies.
Immanuel Kant and the Categorical Imperative
Deontologist Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) believed that we should do our duty purely out of good will, not because of rewards or punishment or other consequences. A person of good will can be depended on to do what is right, even when other motives are absent.
Good will is related to proper self-esteem. For Kant, the development of good will and proper self-esteem is the only way to ensure that we will consistently do our duty. A person of good will can be counted on to do what is right independently of external pressures or emotions. An action that is done out of conformity to cultural or peer norms, or even out of sympathy or because one enjoys helping others, may be praiseworthy but it has no moral value. For example, a college student decides to volunteer helping homeless people living on the street because he feels sympathy toward them and because it makes him feel good to know his fellow students will see him as a kind and charitable person. But when the homeless people show little gratitude and a few even reject his offer of help, he may become angry or offended and quit. Persons of good will, such as Mother Teresa, on the other hand, will continue to offer their assistance to those in need, even in the face of adversity. Kant also argued that if there is a universal moral law and if it is to be morally binding, it must be based on reason. According to Kant, the most fundamental moral principle is the categorical imperative. He came up with two formulations of the categorical imperative. The first formulation states:
Act only on that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.
Kant believed that all rational beings would recognize the categorical imperative as universally binding. Because reason provides the foundation of morality, this makes humans and other rational beings very special in Kant’s mind. Whereas rational beings have free will, everything else in nature operates according to physical laws. Because autonomy is essential for dignity, only rational beings have intrinsic worth. Rational beings can therefore never be treated as expendable, but must be treated with dignity as ends in themselves. This ideal is summed up in the second formulation of the categorical imperative:
So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end in itself, never as a means only.
The categorical imperative is a formal principle that provides a framework for deriving moral maxims or duties, such as “Do not lie” and “Help others in distress,” that can be applied in specific situations. When deciding if a particular maxim creates a moral duty, we need only ask, keeping in mind that rational beings must be treated with dignity, whether we would will that it be a universal law.
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The Golden Rule in Judeo-Christian ethics, and the law of reciprocity in Confucian ethics are both similar to the categorical imperative. The Golden Rule states, “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.” Similarly, when Confucius (551–479 B.C.E.) was asked if there is a single principle that can be used as a guide to conduct in our lives, he replied, “Do not impose on others what you yourself do not desire.”30 (See reading by Confucius at the end of the chapter.)
Universalization
Universalization is one of the trademarks of morality: Moral maxims or duties, by their very nature, apply to everyone and under all circumstances. It is inconsistent, for example, to argue that it is wrong for others to lie but that it is okay for us. If it is wrong to lie, it is wrong for everyone. If we could make an exception of ourselves whenever it is to our advantage, the moral rule “Do not lie” would be meaningless. If we are unwilling to universalize a particular moral maxim—that is, apply it consistently in all similar cases—we should either modify the maxim or toss it out.
A good moral maxim must be consistent with the demands of the categorical imperative. But, unlike the categorical imperative itself, moral maxims are open for debate. For example, many people question whether we would want to universalize, as did Kant, a maxim that states, “Do not commit suicide.” Kant, of course, was writing in the days before medical technology could artificially extend the dying process. Some people believe that refusing to help someone die who is suffering terribly is disrespectful and, hence, violates the second formulation of the categorical imperative shown above. What moral maxims, then, can we come up with for shaping a policy on euthanasia and assisted suicide? Would we want to universalize a maxim that states, “Physicians have a duty to carry out the requests of their patients”? This may sound good in some situations, but what about one in which a student is temporarily depressed because she got a poor grade on an exam and requests medical assistance in committing suicide? Further consideration of this proposed maxim reveals so many exceptions that it proves to be of little use in making moral decisions.
W. D. Ross: Duties Are Prima Facie
Kant argued that universalizing moral maxims requires that they be absolutely binding in all circumstances. If it is wrong to lie, then, according to him, it is always wrong to lie, no matter what the circumstance. He also believed that because morality is based on reason, there could never be a conflict between moral duties.
Most moral philosophers, while agreeing with Kant that moral duties or maxims are universal, disagree that they are also absolute. Moral duties are prima facie rather than absolute. Prima facie duties are universal moral duties that may on occasion be overridden by stronger moral claims.
According to W. D. Ross (1877–1971), moral duties cannot be absolute, because there are particular situations in which they come into conflict. The moral duty of nonmaleficence or “do no harm,” for example, could conflict with the moral duty to keep a promise when keeping that promise could result in death or injury. Because duties are context-bound, the particular circumstances and possible consequences will affect which moral duties are most important in any given situation.
Unlike Kant, Ross also believed that consequences matter when applying moral principles. Moral duties, however, cannot be overridden by nonmoral duties or considerations such as26obeying the law or financial success. When there is a conflict between moral and nonmoral duties, we ought to do what is morally right.
Seven Prima Facie Duties
Ross came up with a list of seven prima facie duties that he claimed we intuitively know. These include duties concerning the consequences of our actions, such as the duty of nonmaleficence (do no harm) and the duty of beneficence (increase happiness)—two duties also recognized by utilitarians. Ahimsa, or the principle of nonviolence, in Buddhist ethics, is a version of the principle of nonmaleficence. Buddhists oppose meat-eating because it violates this principle.
Although almost all ethicists agree that we have a positive duty to refrain from harming others, they disagree about whether we have a positive duty of beneficence— that is, to perform altruistic actions. Margaret Pabst Battin in “The Case for Euthanasia” (Chapter 3) explores the question of whether we have a positive duty of beneficence to the unborn and those who are dying, and, if so, what the limits of this duty are.
We also have duties that stem from past obligations. The duty of fidelity arises from past commitments and promises. We have a commitment to our fellow students, to our parents, and to our children. The duty of fidelity or filial piety is particularly important in Confucian ethics and generally takes precedence over individual liberty rights. Some philosophers argue that part of the physician’s commitment to his or her patients is to assist dying patients who request assistance in committing suicide. Others argue that the duty of nonmaleficence is more compelling in this case and that physicians should refuse to carry out actions that cause lethal harm to their patients.
The duty of gratitude is evoked when we receive gifts or unearned favors and services from others. Some environmental ethicists argue that we have a duty of gratitude toward the earth because it nourishes and sustains us. (See Chapter 10, pages 416–420.)
The duty of reparation is also based on past actions. It requires making up for past harms we have caused others. Affirmative action is an attempt to make up for past harms to women and27minorities (see Chapter 8, pages 328–329). Some philosophers argue that affirmative action is unjust and that justice in this case is a more compelling duty than reparation.
W. D. ROSS’S SEVEN PRIMA FACIE DUTIES
Future-Looking Duties
Beneficence the duty to do good acts to promote happiness
Nonmaleficence the duty to do no harm and to prevent harm
Duties Based on Past Obligations
Fidelity duties arising from past commitments and promises
Reparation duties that stem from past harms to others
Gratitude duties based on past favors and unearned services
Ongoing Duties
Self-Improvement the duty to improve our knowledge and virtue
Justice the duty to give each person equal consideration
Finally, there are two ongoing duties: self-improvement and justice. Self-improvement entails striving to improve our moral knowledge and our virtue. Self-improvement requires that we work to overcome our ignorance by becoming well-informed about moral issues and that we be open to new ideas. In addition, being a virtuous person requires that we use our moral knowledge to make this world a better place.
Justice
Justice is the seventh prima facie duty. The ongoing duty of justice requires that we give each person equal consideration. Because laws and social institutions are generally the agencies for balancing conflicting interests, the issue of justice is closely tied with that of “the good society.” As noted earlier, however, not all laws are just, nor are all demands for justice addressed by law.
There are two types of justice: retributive justice and distributive justice. Retributive justice requires punishment for wrongdoing in proportion to the magnitude of the crime. Immanuel Kant argues that the only suitable punishment for murder is the death penalty. Hugo Adam Bedeau and Helen Prejean, on the other hand, claim that the death penalty is immoral because it violates the underlying moral principle of respect for persons. Buddhist philosophers also oppose the death penalty as being in conflict with the principle of nonviolence (ahimsa).
Distributive justice refers to the fair distribution of benefits and burdens in a society. Benefits include education, emergency medical care, police protection, legal representation, and economic opportunities. Taxes, jury duty, and military conscription are examples of shared burdens. Distributive justice becomes a concern when (1) there are conflicts of interest and (2) people have competing claims for certain limited or scarce societal goods. Because there are not enough good jobs and college scholarships for everyone, the distribution of these goods is an issue of justice. Other support euthanasia on the grounds that it is unjust that those who are dying long, lingering deaths get such a disproportionate share of medical and other resources. In cases such as these, we may have a duty to die.
Distributive justice also requires impartiality. We should treat equals equally and unequals in proportion to their differences. Defenders of military maintain that conscription is the best way of fairly distributing the responsibility of defending the country. In addition, in a just society, we all deserve a fair opportunity to pursue our goals. Charles R. Lawrence III argues that hate speech creates an atmosphere on campuses in which certain groups of people are denied this opportunity (see Chapter 7, pages 291–299). Aristotle focused more on merit as the key criterion in distributive justice. He was opposed to democracy, preferring instead an oligarchy, or an elitist political system based on merit. Those who are most talented and most virtuous, and who have contributed most to society, ought to get a greater share of the privileges and opportunities.
John Rawls and Justice as Fairness
In his book A Theory of Justice, John Rawls maintains that justice requires not only impartiality but also treating people fairly and in proportion to their needs as well as their merits. There are inequalities of birth and natural endowment (what Rawls calls the “natural lottery”) and historic circumstances, such as slavery, that create undeserved disadvantages for certain people.28Simply redistributing opportunities or wealth does not solve the root problem as long as the underlying conditions that disadvantage certain people still exist. What is needed, Rawls argues, is a change in the social system so that it does not permit these injustices to occur in the first place.
Rawls’s solution is to base justice upon a social contract that is unbiased and impartial. To do this, he proposes that we use a conceptual device that he calls the “veil of ignorance,” where everyone is ignorant of the advantages or disadvantages he or she will receive in this life. Under these conditions, Rawls argues, all rational people would agree upon the following two principles of justice:
1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.
2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that both are (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all.
While it is impossible to truly forget our advantages and disadvantages in this life, the “veil of ignorance” provides a conceptual tool for thinking impartially about moral issues. Rawls’s theory of justice has been used to reform social institutions and to develop policy in areas such as health care reform and education.
Moral Dilemmas and Resolving Moral Issues
Any of the above duties can come into conflict with one another. When moral duties conflict, we have a moral dilemma. Because moral duties are prima facie, when an issue involves a moral conflict, we must carefully weigh each duty, decide which are the most compelling, and try to arrive at a resolution that honors as many duties as possible.
According to W.D. Ross, there is no formula for determining what we should do in a moral dilemma. Whereas the general duties may be self-evident, judgment about our duties in a particular case is not. Because of this we need to use reason and creativity in making judgments. Ross believed that this lack of clarity is due to the nature of moral decision making, which, he claims, is more like creating a work of art than solving a mathematical problem. When there is a moral dilemma, no solution is going to be completely satisfactory. Different people may come to different solutions because they prioritize duties differently. The purpose of moral deliberation is to arrive at the best solution, given the circumstances.
DEONTOLOGY: CONSIDERATIONS FOR THINKING ABOUT MORAL ISSUES
§ Universality: Are we willing to universalize our rules and assumptions?
§ Reciprocity: How would we want to be treated in a similar situation?
§ Respect: Is our position on an issue respectful of all persons affected, or does it entail treating some as a means only?
§ Impartiality: Are we treating equals equally?
§ Identify relevant duties: What are the relevant duties in this particular situation?
§ Prioritize duties: If there is a conflict of duties, which duties are the most important?
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Strengths and Limitations of Deontology
Kant’s deontology suffered a decline in popularity during the past century. It is making a comeback, however, in part because of disillusionment with ethical relativism. Many contemporary philosophers, such as John Rawls, while adopting the basics of deontology, have revised it or combined it with the strengths of other theories, such as social contract theory and utilitarianism, so it is more useful in everyday moral decision making.
Kantian deontology, with its claim that duties are absolute and that there are no conflicts between moral rules, cannot provide guidance in situations where there is a moral dilemma. Although prima facie deontology has overcome this limitation to some extent, it has been criticized for failing to provide a strategy for ranking conflicting duties.
Deontology sacrifices community in the name of individual autonomy. In Kantian deontology in particular, the private life replaces the public life as the sphere of moral actions. Kant’s assumption that people are basically autonomous, private units who are free to carry out the moral law fails to take into consideration that we are all part of a wider social network of relationships that places restraints on the actions of some people and bestows privilege on others.
The deontologist’s overriding concern with duty and justice fails to take into account the important role of sentiment and care in morality. Feminist care ethicists, such as Carol Gilligan, claim that deontology, or what they call the “justice perspective,” ignores caring in relationships. Practical morality, they argue, is constructed dialectically through interaction with others, not merely by an autonomous examination of the dictates of reason. Indeed, as studies with sociopaths have shown, reason without the ability to empathize with others seems unable to produce the categorical imperative or to inspire us to respect others.
Deontology ignores consequences. Kant’s denial that consequences are morally relevant has been criticized by utilitarians as well as by modern deontologists. Even if we agree that consequences are not as important as duty, most philosophers still believe that they must be taken into consideration. Indeed, John Stuart Mill points out that the categorical imperative by its very nature requires that we take consequences into account when adopting moral rules. According to Mill, rational people would not universalize a moral rule that would harm, rather than benefit, the moral community.
Few philosophers accept Kant’s deontology in its entirety; nevertheless, Kantian deontology is one of the most influential moral philosophies in modern history. Despite its shortcomings, the strengths and richness of deontology far outshine its weaknesses.
It would be a mistake to consider any philosophical or scientific theory a complete statement about a phenomenon. One of the characteristics of a good theory is that it is open-ended and generates further thought. In this respect, deontology has made important contributions to the study of ethics. In particular, with its emphasis on the dignity of the individual, deontology has had a major influence on the development of rights ethics in Western and non-Western philosophies.
EXERCISES
1. List the fundamental moral assumptions or maxims that you use in discussing moral issues such as capital punishment, affirmative action, or use of nuclear weapons in war. Examine each of these maxims in light of universality.
2. Select a moral issue that involves a moral dilemma. List the duties that support the “pro” side of the issue, then list the moral duties that support the “con” side of the issue. Which duties are the most compelling? Discuss possible solutions that take the most duties into account.
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3. Is it morally acceptable to euthanize people who have terminal illnesses and who request physician-assisted suicide? Discuss the contributions both utilitarians and deontologists would make to a debate on this issue.
4. Discuss whether the use of torture on terrorist suspects, who in all likelihood have information that endangers the American public, violates Kant’s categorical imperative. Discuss also how a utilitarian would answer this question and how Kant might respond to their argument.
RIGHTS-BASED ETHICS
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness.
—United States Declaration of Independence (July 4, 1776)
The language of rights in Western philosophy emerged primarily in the context of the growing confrontation with the principle of absolute sovereignty. Moral rights are not the same as legal rights, although in a just society the two would overlap. Moral rights instead are generally seen as either (1) natural and existing independently or (2) derived from duties.
John Locke’s Natural Rights Ethics
The philosophical doctrine of natural rights first appeared in Western philosophy in the seventeenth century as a demand for equality for all people. According to natural rights ethicists such as John Locke (1632–1704), these rights stem from our human nature and are self-evident and God-given. (See reading by Locke at the end of this chapter.) Humans alone have moral rights because of our creation in the image of God. These natural rights include a right to own property, a right to marry and have children, and a right to punish someone who has wronged us. The right of private punishment, which exists in a state of nature, is turned over to the state when we agree to form a civil society.
The doctrine of natural rights had a profound influence on the thinking of Thomas Jefferson, who drafted the Declaration of Independence. The impact of natural rights in the United States is evident in the way that moral rights are generally equated with human rights and are discussed without any reference to correlative duties. For example, freedom of speech, in the cases of pornography and hate speech, is sometimes depicted as a natural right that exists independently of any duty of nonmaleficence or concerns for the harm caused to others by the speech.
Whether hate speech constitutes a legitimate interest that should be protected is up for debate. In Chapter 7, Charles R. Lawrence III argues that we do not have a right to use hate speech because it causes harm to those targeted by it.
Ayn Rand and Laissez-Faire Capitalism
Ayn Rand (1905–1982) was one of the foremost modern defenders of natural rights ethics. According to her, the United States is the first society created upon natural rights ethics. Only through free enterprise and laissez-faire capitalism, she argued, can individual rights and a free society be sustained (see reading by Rand at the end of this chapter).
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TWO TYPES OF MORAL RIGHTS
§ Liberty rights: The right to be left alone to pursue our legitimate interests. Legitimate interests are those that do not violate other people’s similar and equal interests. Examples include freedom of speech and freedom of religion.
§ Welfare rights: The right to receive certain social goods necessary for us to pursue our legitimate interests. Examples include public schools and police protection.
Like Locke, Rand believed that rights exist prior to and independently of duties. Moral rights define and protect our freedoms without imposing obligations on anyone else. For example, the right to own property does not entail an obligation to provide people with property. The ideal society is one that protects people’s individual liberty rights so they can freely pursue their interests.
Although she agreed with John Locke that rights exist prior to and independent of duties, she disagreed with him about the source of these rights. The source of our rights, she argued, is not God, but man’s rational nature.
Rights and Duties
Most philosophers maintain that moral rights do not stand on their own but are linked to or derived from duties. Utilitarians and deontologists both see rights as entailing duties. For example, the duty of nonmaleficence requires that people refrain from interfering with other people’s rights to pursue their legitimate interests. Rights, as noted earlier, are also limited by the duty of nonmaleficence. The duty of fidelity entails a right to expect others to keep their promises and the right of children to receive proper care from their parents. According to duty-based rights ethics, rights protect us as persons who ought to be treated with respect. Because we are entitled to certain rights, others have a duty to honor these rights. Not all duties have corollary rights. For example, as we noted earlier, we have a duty of beneficence to help those most in need; but, we do not have a right to expect gratitude from them.
Natural rights ethicists like Locke and Rand, in contrast, maintain that our possession of a right does not imply that someone else has a duty to honor that right. Under natural rights ethics, being able to actually claim our rights boils down to having the power—generally political or economic power—to assert ourselves. Because the environment and nonhuman animals lack the power of assertion, they lack rights.
Unlike John Locke, some right ethicists argue that rights stem from interests (see Chapter 10, pages 423–424). Because nonhuman animals have interests, such as not being confined or eaten, they also have rights that we have a duty to respect.
Liberty and Welfare Rights
Moral rights are generally divided into liberty rights and welfare rights. Welfare rights entail the right to receive certain social goods such as education, medical care, and police protection. Welfare rights are important because without a minimal standard of living or education, we cannot pursue our legitimate interests. For example, several states, including West Virginia, Tennessee, and Rhode Island, offer free education at a state community college to high school graduates. Socialist and Marxist countries place more emphasis on welfare rights.
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Liberty rights, in contrast, entail the right to be left alone to pursue our legitimate interests without interference from the government or other people. Liberty rights include autonomy, privacy, freedom of speech, freedom to own property, and freedom from harassment and confinement. Our legitimate interests are those that do not violate other people’s similar and equal interests. For example, a misogynist may have an interest in keeping women out of the workplace, but this does not give him the right to discriminate in hiring, because doing so would violate women’s rights to equal opportunity.
In the United States, we tend to place more emphasis on liberty rights. For example, most countries regard health care as a welfare right, arguing that without health people cannot pursue their legitimate interests. The United States, on the other hand, sees health care as a liberty right that should be available to people who wish to purchase it, but not as a welfare right, such as a public education that is universally available to everyone. People, such as Ayn Rand, who emphasize liberty rights as paramount are known as libertarians. Libertarians believe that personal autonomy—the freedom to make our own decisions—is the highest moral value. According to libertarians, respect for others means allowing them freedom to develop and exercise the capacities that are necessary for them to pursue their concept of the good. This includes freedom of speech and privacy as well as freedom from coercive interference from the government.
According to deontologists, our liberty rights are limited by our duty to respect others as well as ourselves; we do not have a right to harm ourselves or neglect our own welfare. Kant regarded suicide as “an abomination because it involves the misuse of freedom to destroy oneself and one’s freedom.”31 In contrast, Dr. Jack Kevorkian, a libertarian, considers suicide to be one of our most fundamental rights.
The emphasis on liberty rights at the expense of welfare rights tends to handicap those who are unable to assert their liberty rights either because of natural disadvantages or because of traditional roles that limit their options. Supporters of affirmative action, such as Bernard Boxill, point out that merely being granted access to societal goods, such as jobs and education, will not ensure that people will be able to purchase these goods without facing discrimination (see Chapter 8, pages 342–347).
Like duties, most rights are prima facie and may come into conflict with one another or with duties. A white man’s right to a college education may conflict with a duty of reparation toward African Americans who have been harmed (in terms of a poor quality of education) by our public education system. The welfare rights of nonhuman animals, if they have rights, may come into conflict with our search for a cure for cancer using animals as subjects.
The Strengths and Limitations of Rights Ethics
Rights ethics is an important component of a comprehensive moral theory. Nevertheless, there are some shortcomings, especially with natural rights ethics.
The theological basis of natural rights ethics, which privileges humans as a special creation, is difficult, if not impossible, to justify on either rational philosophical or empirical grounds. Natural rights ethics has given a moral blessing to the exploitation of other animals and the environment. The reduction of nonhuman animals and the environment to the status of resources for humans has had a devastating effect on the environment.
The separation of rights from duties fails to take into account the limitations placed on marginalized groups by societal traditions. Natural rights ethicists such as Rand and Locke assume that in a free society everyone is equally able to pursue their concept of the good life. Not all people33are equally capable of asserting their rights, however. Traditional roles, for example, give men and people born into wealthy families greater access to resources, thus disadvantaging women and poorer people in a free marketplace. If the right to accumulate property is not constrained by the duty of distributive justice, the gap between the haves and have-nots will become greater and greater, especially in developed countries.
RIGHTS ETHICS: CONSIDERATIONS FOR THINKING ABOUT MORAL ISSUES
§ Identify the relevant rights: What are the liberty rights in the moral issue? What welfare rights are at stake in the issue?
§ Identify the legitimate interests: Does exercising any of these rights infringe on the equal and similar rights of others?
§ Prioritize rights and duties: If there is a conflict of rights and/or duties, which ones are most important?
The claim that pursuing liberty rights does not impose obligations on others is false. The libertarian model of rights actually depends on the backing of an extensive and expensive legal and police system. Liberty rights to own property and businesses, for example, are protected by tax monies, some of which are forcibly taken from people who are too poor to own property.
The assertion by natural rights ethicists that rights are self-evident leaves us with no criteria for determining which claims are legitimate rights. The belief that rights need no justification has led to a proliferation of demands for certain rights. Former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick compares the current proliferation of rights declarations with “writing letters to Santa Claus”; they are based on wishful thinking rather than any reasonable expectations.32 Without any criteria for justifying rights, there is no way to decide which rights are frivolous and which should be taken seriously. For this reason, most philosophers argue that rights must be grounded in duties and, in particular, the fundamental duty of respect for the dignity of others.
Although rights ethics is problematic if it is used as a complete explanation of morality, rights are important because they protect our dignity as persons. If we do not have rights, all our claims to be treated with respect simply amount to requests for favors and privileges.
Although few philosophers deny that rights are morally meaningful, the origin and nature of rights have been the focus of considerable debate. The claim that rights are based on the principle of equality has prompted some animal rights advocates to question why this principle should not also be extended to other animals (see Chapter 10). Buddhist ethicists go even further and extend the concept of rights to all of nature. The extension of the concept of rights to all humans—and even to nonhumans—has been a difficult endeavor, but one that has been very fruitful in calling our attention to the dignity of those who are different from us.
EXERCISES
1. Are rights self-evident, as natural rights ethicists argue? List some rights that you consider to be important in making moral decisions. On what grounds do you justify these rights? Which are welfare rights? Which are liberty rights?
2. Using specific examples, analyze Ayn Rand’s claim that capitalism is the only system that can protect our individual freedoms. Use specific examples to support your answer.34
3. Discuss whether we have a moral right to property and inheritance acquired through someone else’s forced labor, such as slave labor and the exploitation of people living under conditions of poverty. If not, do we have a duty of reparation to those who were forced to work to provide us with our property? Explain.
4. Select a moral issue that involves a conflict between rights or between rights and duties. List the rights and duties that support the “pro” side of the issue, then list the rights and duties that support the “con” side of the issue. Which rights and/or duties are the most compelling? Discuss possible solutions that take the greatest number of rights into account.
5. Do young people have a moral right to a free or affordable college education? Support your answer.
6. In the current national debate on health care, some people believe that health care should be a welfare right rather than just a liberty right as it is currently, except for seniors and people who are poor. Critically analyze both positions. Develop a public health care policy based on your analysis.
VIRTUE ETHICS
The rule of virtue can be compared to the Pole Star which commands the homage of the multitude of Stars without leaving its place.
—Confucius, The Analects, book 4:4
Virtue ethics emphasizes right being over right action. The sort of people we are constitutes the heart of our moral life. More important than the rules or principles we follow is our character. Virtue ethics, however, is not an alternative to ethical theories that stress right conduct, such as utilitarianism and deontological theories. Rather, virtue ethics and theories of right action complement each other.
A virtue is an admirable character trait or disposition to habitually act in a manner that benefits ourselves and others. The actions of virtuous people, or people of good will to use Kant’s terminology, stem from a respect and concern for the well-being of themselves and others. Compassion, courage, generosity, loyalty, and honesty are all examples of virtues.
Virtues are often spoken of as though they were discrete, individual traits; but virtue is more correctly defined as an overarching quality of goodness that gives unity and integrity to a person’s character. “If the will be set on virtue,” Confucius taught, “there will be no practice of wickedness.”33 Because virtuous people are motivated to act in ways that benefit society, the cultivation of a virtuous character is an important aspect of social ethics. For example, generous people are more likely to act in ways that benefit those who are least well-off in society. Honesty is an important social virtue because without honest communication, society would soon collapse.
Buddhism, care ethics, and the moral philosophies of David Hume, Aristotle, and Jesus of Nazareth are often classified as virtue ethics. Confucian ethics has strong strands of both virtue ethics and deontology.
Aristotle: Reason and Virtue
Aristotle divided virtues into two categories: intellectual virtues and moral virtues. The intellectual virtues are cultivated through growth and experience, the moral virtues through habit. Wisdom is the most important virtue because it makes all other virtues (intellectual and35moral) possible. The role of habituation, including repeated exposure to particular types of stimuli and behavior, in the development of virtuous and vicious behavior is one of the questions involved in censorship of pornography and campus restrictions on drinking and drug use.
ARISTOTLE’S DOCTRINE OF THE MEAN34
|
Deficit (Vice) |
Mean (Virtue) |
Excess (Vice) |
|
cowardice |
courage |
foolhardiness |
|
inhibition |
temperance |
overindulgence/intemperance |
|
miserliness |
liberality |
prodigality/extravagance |
|
shabbiness |
magnificence |
bad taste/vulgarity |
|
poor spiritedness |
gentleness |
irascibility |
|
peevishness/surlyness |
friendliness |
obsequiousness/flattery |
|
malice |
righteous indignation |
envy |
|
boorishness |
wittiness |
buffoonery |
|
shamelessness |
modesty |
shame |
Aristotle believed that all life has a function that is peculiar to its particular life-form. The function peculiar to human life, he claimed, is the exercise of reason. The function of the excellent man, therefore, “is to exert such activities well.” Virtue, which is essential to the good life, involves living according to reason. Only by living in accord with reason can we achieve happiness and inner harmony.
Aristotle also believed that people by nature are political animals. The purpose of the state is to promote the virtuous or good life. Justice is the primary virtue of the state; unless a state is just and encourages the development of virtue in its citizens, it has no power to make its citizens good.
According to Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean, most virtues entail finding the mean between excess and deficiency. For example, courage is the mean between cowardice (a deficit) and foolhardiness (an excess); liberality lies between miserliness and extravagance. Aristotle writes, “virtue discovers the means and deliberately chooses it.”
This should not be misinterpreted as advising us to be wishy-washy or to compromise our moral standards. The doctrine of the mean is meant to apply to virtues, not to our positions on social issues. By suggesting that we seek the mean, Aristotle was not referring to being lukewarm or a fence-straddler but to seeking what is reasonable. In fact, the abolitionists and early feminists were considered extremists and fanatics.
The doctrine of the mean is found in moral philosophies throughout the world. Confucians as well as Buddhist ethicists teach that the mean is that which is consistent with harmony and equilibrium, or the Way (Tao).
Confucian Virtue Ethics
Confucius was one of the most important Chinese philosophers. Although he died one century before the birth of Aristotle, there are remarkable similarities between the two men. Both taught36that virtue, in general, involves hitting the mean between excess and deficit; both emphasized the role of habituation in the cultivation of virtue; and both believed that virtue is essential for individual and social harmony. Confucius also taught, as did Kant, that a virtuous person is a person of good will who puts duty first.
Like Aristotle, Confucius believed that a virtuous society and individual virtue are inseparable. People are happiest and most virtuous when they are living in a just and well-ordered society. It is the rulers, therefore, who have the greatest power to promote virtue in society and individuals. If the actions and policies of the government are consistent with the Way, the people will also be good, and there will be no need for the government to use punishment to maintain order.
Buddhist Virtue Ethics
Buddhist ethics affirms the absolute worth of all living beings. Buddhism rejects individualism as an illusion; we exist only as members of a community. Because we are all part of the same web of being, to be true to ourselves is to extend concern for everything that lies in our path of experience. The virtuous person is motivated not by self-interest, but by a concern to benefit all living beings.
Like Aristotle and Confucius, Buddhists believe that good and evil—virtue and vice—are expressed in our actions. Engaging in destructive actions makes it more likely that we’ll repeat that behavior; engaging in virtuous actions makes it more likely that we’ll repeat that behavior in the future. A good society encourages the development of virtue. We cannot resolve the problems that plague modern society by encouraging an individualism that allows people to pursue their concept of good at the expense of other human and nonhuman beings.
Nietzsche and the Übermensch
Friedrich Nietzsche was an outspoken critic of cultural relativism, what he called herd morality. He was particularly critical of traditional bourgeois Christian morality that, he claimed, forms the basis of modern Western morality. This morality, which extols meekness, unconditional forgiveness, self-sacrifice, and equality as virtues, he argued, is destructive to individual integrity and growth.
Nietzsche’s Übermensch, or superman, is a person of integrity and self-mastery who is able to rise above the morality of the crowd and exercise the “will to power,” which entails the will to37grow, courage, generosity toward the vanquished, and human nobility. In contrast, weak people extol humility and self-sacrifice as virtues. Thus, traditional Christian or Western bourgeois morality drags the best and strongest people down to the lowest common denominator.
VIRTUE ETHICS: CONSIDERATIONS FOR THINKING ABOUT MORAL ISSUES
§ Seeking the mean: Does the trait we are encouraging represent a balance between excess and deficiency?
§ Social policies: Does this social policy or resolution to a social issue encourage the development of virtue in the people affected by it?
§ Relationships: What relationships are involved in this moral issue?
§ Caring and caring for: How can we best nurture these relationships both as the “ones-caring” and the “ones-cared-for”?
Nietzsche’s ethics have often been misinterpreted as the will to dominate and subjugate others. However, truly strong or virtuous people are not cruel, nor do they desire to subjugate others. While Nietzsche apparently admired Jesus as an example of an Übermensch, he condemned modern Christianity, arguing that it bears little resemblance to that which was promoted by Jesus.
Care Ethics
Care ethics emphasizes caring over considerations of justice and impartiality. Care ethics, as a moral theory, developed primarily out of Carol Gilligan’s study of women’s moral reasoning. In her interviews with women and through her study of women in literature, Gilligan concluded that women’s moral development tends to follow a path different from men’s. Men, she found, tend to base their moral decisions on duty- and principle-oriented moral theories; women are more context-oriented and concerned with relationships.35
Care ethics has also been influenced by David Hume’s ethics, which emphasizes moral sentiment over moral reasoning. According to him, it is primarily sympathy rather than reason that motivates us to act morally. Sympathy opens us up to others by breaking down the “we/them” barriers that impede the development of caring relationships.
According to feminist care ethicists, we are at our moral best when we are “caring and being cared for.” Ecofeminists expand care ethics to include all living creatures and all of nature. Unlike abstract moral principles, sympathy joins us to others in a caring relationship. It is care, not an abstract sense of duty, that creates moral obligations. Caring is also ranked highly in Confucian ethics, where family ties and loyalty are very important.
Care, however, is not enough. When our personal inclination to care is lacking, our commitment to an ideal or principle of caring motivates us to do what is right. On this point care ethicists and deontologists find common ground. A person of good will—a person who is truly virtuous and caring—can be counted on to act out of a sense of duty even when the immediate emotional inclination to do so is lacking.
Care ethicists maintain that moral sentiments such as compassion and sympathy are forms of knowledge that should be taken seriously in formulating social policy. Philosopher Virginia Held, for example, disagrees with the traditional division wherein justice belongs to the public sphere and care to the private domain of family, friends, and charity.36 Just as justice is needed in the family, so is the care perspective needed in the public domain. Care ethics plays a central role in the hospice movement’s opposition to euthanasia and its belief that we should work on providing a more caring and supportive environment for those who are dying. In her article, Helen Prejean enjoins her us to see prisoners who are condemned to death row from a care perspective as well as a justice perspective (see Chapter 4, pages 172–176).
Like Prejean, care ethicists do not want to dispense with justice; rather, they want to see the two approaches used together in formulating social policy. Care ethics serves as a corrective to our traditional views by demanding that we recognize welfare rights as basic rights. It also requires that we respect others in relationships as individuals with their own needs, rather than adopting a paternalistic attitude. Although care ethics is often associated with feminism, some feminists reject it on the grounds that it reinforces traditional stereotypes of women’s roles in the family and in society.
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The Strengths and Limitations of Virtue Ethics
The primary criticism of virtue ethics is that it is incomplete. It has also been criticized for its lack of coherence as a bag-of-virtues approach. This criticism is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of virtue, however. Virtue ethicists do not mean virtue to imply a list of unrelated character traits, but rather a unity of character.
Virtue ethics does not offer sufficient guidance for making real-life moral decisions. While a virtuous character may be enough to motivate the saint and those at the higher stages of moral development, most of us also need formal guidelines.
On the other hand, virtue ethics gives abstract principles regarding duties and rights a personal face. Virtue ethicists are not suggesting that we ignore moral principles; they are saying that virtue is more fundamental than duty. Nor does virtue ethics entail discarding reason and relying solely on our “good” feelings. In the virtuous person, reason and feeling complement and confirm one another.
Virtue ethics goes beyond pure duty- and rights-based ethics. It directly challenges the individual to rise above ordinary moral demands and to work toward creating a society in which it is easier for everyone to be virtuous and enjoy the good life.
EXERCISES
1. Which motivates you more to take action, a sense of justice or a feeling of sympathy for other persons? Illustrate your answer with specific examples.
2. Make a list of possible social policies for dealing with an issue such as hate speech or alcohol and drug use on campus. Which policies are most likely to promote virtue in citizens? Support your answer.
3. Select a specific moral issue that is covered in this text. Discuss ways in which the care perspective might help in coming up with a resolution.
4. Examine the contemporary notion of nation-building in light of the Confucian concept of the virtuous society. Should virtue be imposed on the leadership of other nations, such as North Korea and Iran and, if so, do other nations have a moral obligation to impose virtue39in government in wayward nations? Discuss whether the use of armed conflict may be justified in achieving this end. Support your answer.
5. Some political conservative want to phase out government programs that assist seniors and the economically disadvantaged, including low income college students, arguing that these “entitlements” are best left to individuals and private charitable organizations. To what extent do governments have a moral obligation to model virtuous behavior in the form of helping those who are most in need? Discuss how both a rights ethicist and a virtue ethicist might respond to this question.
SUMMARY OF READINGS ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY
Aristotle, “Ethics.” Living the good life—the life of virtue—is our most important human activity.
Rand, “The Fountainhead.” Rational ethical egoism is the moral ideal.
Bentham, “An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.” A moral action or policy is one that maximizes pleasure and minimizes pain.
Mill, “Utilitarianism.” Some pleasures should count more than other pleasures.
Kant, “Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Ethics.” Moral laws should be logically consistent and universally binding.
Locke, “Two Treatises of Civil Government.” People unite into political societies to protect and enjoy their natural rights.
Confucius, “The Analects.” People are happier and more virtuous when they are living in a just, well-ordered society.
CONCLUSION
Moral issues are complex. No one theory offers the complete truth or perfect solution to a moral issue. On the other hand, universalist theories can work together to provide us with more comprehensive tools for effectively analyzing moral issues. Theories help us recognize and prioritize moral principles and concerns. We should not discard a theory because it has limitations, but instead adopt a multidimensional approach that draws from the strengths of each of the theories. Whether the theory is deontological and oriented toward autonomy and the careful delineation of rules and rights; or utilitarian and concerned with consequences and maximizing benefits; or virtue-based and focused on making us better, more caring people—all of the universalist theories have the same ultimate goal: to provide a rational basis for making better moral decisions.
Although moral theory offers guidance, theory alone does not offer specific solutions. An understanding of the relevant facts, cultural traditions and conditions, practical wisdom, and sound moral reasoning are all necessary adjuncts to theory.
ARISTOTLE
Ethics
Aristotle was born in Stagira, a Greek colony north of Athens. He was a scientist, philosopher, logician, poet, and psychologist who wrote hundreds of works, including poems, treatises, and books. Nicomachean Ethics is one of Aristotle’s best-known works. In it, Aristotle argues that living the good life—the life of virtue—is our most important human activity. Because the peculiar function of humans is the exercise of reason, virtue involves living according to reason. Only by doing so can we achieve happiness, inner harmony, and a well-ordered society.
After the death of his teacher Plato, Aristotle took on the education of Alexander the Great. After Alexander the Great’s death in 323 B.C.E., Aristotle was charged with impiety. He fled to Euboea, where he died in Babylon a year later.
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, translated by F.H. Peters. London: Oxford University Press, 1893.
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Aristotle is sometimes dismissed as being too much of an elitist to be relevant for today’s democracies. His critique of democracy, however, is a timely warning against the dangers of relying on majority rule as the criterion for deciding what is just.
Critical Reading Questions
1. How does Aristotle go about analyzing the term good?
2. According to Aristotle, what is the most important human activity? What is the final end of human activity?
3. What is the relationship between morality and happiness?
4. What is virtue? What are the two types of virtue?
5. What does Aristotle mean by habituation? What does habituation have to do with becoming virtuous? What is the role of the state in helping citizens become virtuous?
6. What does Aristotle mean when he says that goodness is the quality that hits the mean? Is virtue always a matter of hitting the mean?
7. What are some examples of excesses and deficits? How do we avoid them?
BOOK I
Every art, and every science reduced to a teachable form, and in like manner every action and moral choice, aims, it is thought, at some good: for which reason a common and by no means a bad description of the Chief Good is, “that which all things aim at.”
Now there plainly is a difference in the Ends proposed: for in some cases they are acts of working, and in others certain works or tangible results beyond and beside the acts of working: and where there are certain Ends beyond and beside the actions, the works are in their nature better than the acts of working. Again, since actions and arts and sciences are many, the Ends likewise come to be many: of the healing art, for instance, health; of the ship-building art, a vessel; of the military art, victory; and of domestic management, wealth; are respectively the Ends.
And whatever of such actions, arts, or sciences range under some one faculty (as under that of horsemanship the art of making bridles, and all that are connected with the manufacture of horse-furniture in general; this itself again, and every action connected with war, under the military art; and in the same way others under others), in all such, the Ends of the master-arts are more choice-worthy than those ranging under them, because it is with a view to the former that the latter are pursued.
(And in this comparison it makes no difference whether the acts of working are themselves the Ends of the actions, or something further beside them, as is the case in the arts and sciences we have been just speaking of.)
II] Since then of all things which may be done there is some one End which we desire for its own sake, and with a view to which we desire everything else; and since we do not choose in all instances with a further End in view (for then men would go on without limit, and so the desire would be unsatisfied and fruitless), this plainly must be the Chief Good, i.e. the best thing of all.
Surely then, even with reference to actual life and conduct, the knowledge of it must have great weight; and like archers, with a mark in view, we shall be more likely to hit upon what is right: and if so, we ought to try to describe, in outline at least, what it is and of which of the sciences and faculties it is the End.
1094b] Now one would naturally suppose it to be the End of that which is most commanding and most inclusive: and to this description, [Greek: politikae] plainly answers: for this it is that determines which of the sciences should be in the communities, and which kind individuals are to learn, and what degree of proficiency is to be required. Again; we see also ranging under this the most highly esteemed faculties, such as the art military, and that of domestic management, and Rhetoric. Well then, since this uses all the other practical sciences, and moreover lays down rules as to what men are to do, and from what to abstain, the End of this must include the Ends of the rest, and so must be The Good of Man. And grant that this is the same to the individual and to the community, yet surely that of the latter is plainly greater and more perfect to discover and preserve: for to do this even for a single individual were a matter for contentment; but to do it for a whole nation, and for communities generally, were more noble and godlike.
We must be content then, in speaking of such things and from such data, to set forth the truth roughly and in outline; in other words, since we are41speaking of general matter and from general data, to draw also conclusions merely general. And in the same spirit should each person receive what we say: for the man of education will seek exactness so far in each subject as the nature of the thing admits, it being plainly much the same absurdity to put up with a mathematician who tries to persuade instead of proving, and to demand strict demonstrative reasoning of a Rhetorician.
III] Such then are the objects proposed by our treatise, which is of the nature of [Greek: politikae]: and I conceive I shall have spoken on them satisfactorily, if they be made as distinctly clear as the nature of the subject-matter will admit: for exactness must not be looked for in all discussions alike, any more than in all works of handicraft. Now the notions of nobleness and justice, with the examination of which politikea is concerned, admit of variation and error to such a degree, that they are supposed by some to exist conventionally only, and not in the nature of things: but then, again, the things which are allowed to be goods admit of a similar error, because harm cornes to many from them: for before now some have perished through wealth, and others through valour.
Hence the young man is not a fit student of Moral Philosophy, for he has no experience in the actions of life, while all that is said presupposes and is concerned with these: and in the next place, since he is apt to follow the impulses of his passions, he will hear as though he heard not, and to no profit, the end in view being practice and not mere knowledge.
And I draw no distinction between young in years, and youthful in temper and disposition: the defect to which I allude being no direct result of the time, but of living at the beck and call of passion, and following each object as it rises. For to them that are such the knowledge comes to be unprofitable, as to those of imperfect self-control: but, to those who form their desires and act in accordance with reason, to have knowledge on these points must be very profitable.
1095a] Now each man judges well what he knows, and of these things he is a good judge: on each particular matter then he is a good judge who has been instructed in it, and in a general way the man of general mental cultivation.
Let thus much suffice by way of preface on these three points, the student, the spirit in which our observations should be received, and the object which we propose.
IV] And now, resuming the statement with which we commenced, since all knowledge and moral choice grasps at good of some kind or another, what good is that which we say [Greek: politikai] aims at? or, in other words, what is the highest of all the goods which are the objects of action?
So far as name goes, there is a pretty general agreement: for HAPPINESS both the multitude and the refined few call it, and “living well” and “doing well” they conceive to be the same with “being happy;” but about the Nature of this Happiness, men dispute, and the multitude do not in their account of it agree with the wise. For some say it is some one of those things which are palpable and apparent, as pleasure or wealth or honour; in fact, some one thing, some another; nay, oftentimes the same man gives a different account of it; for when ill, he calls it health; when poor, wealth: and conscious of their own ignorance, men admire those who talk grandly and above their comprehension. Some again held it to be something by itself, other than and beside these many good things, which is in fact to all these the cause of their being good.
1095b] And here we must not forget the difference between reasoning from principles, and reasoning to principles: for with good cause did Plato too doubt about this, and inquire whether the right road is from principles or to principles, just as in the racecourse from the judges to the further end, or vice versâ.
Now to sift all the opinions would be perhaps rather a fruitless task; so it shall suffice to sift those which are most generally current, or are thought to have some reason in them.
Of course, we must begin with what is known; but then this is of two kinds, what we do know, and what we may know: perhaps then as individuals we must begin with what we do know. Hence the necessity that he should have been42well trained in habits, who is to study, with any tolerable chance of profit, the principles of nobleness and justice and moral philosophy generally. For a principle is a matter of fact, and if the fact is sufficiently clear to a man there will be no need in addition of the reason for the fact. And he that has been thus trained either has principles already, or can receive them easily: as for him who neither has nor can receive them, let him hear his sentence from Hesiod:
He is best of all who of himself conceiveth all things; Good again is he too who can adopt a good suggestion; But whoso neither of himself conceiveth nor hearing from another Layeth it to heart;—he is a useless man.
Now of the Chief Good (i.e. of Happiness) men seem to form their notions from the different modes of life, as we might naturally expect: the many and most low conceive it to be pleasure, and hence they are content with the life of sensual enjoyment. For there are three lines of life which stand out prominently to view: that just mentioned, and the life in society, and, thirdly, the life of contemplation.
V But to return from this digression.
Now the many are plainly quite slavish, choosing a life like that of brute animals: yet they obtain some consideration, because many of the great share the tastes of Sardanapalus. The refined and active again conceive it to be honour: for this may be said to be the end of the life in society: yet it is plainly too superficial for the object of our search, because it is thought to rest with those who pay rather than with him who receives it, whereas the Chief Good we feel instinctively must be something which is our own, and not easily to be taken from us.
And besides, men seem to pursue honour, that they may *[Sidenote: 1096a] believe themselves to be good: for instance, they seek to be honoured by the wise, and by those among whom they are known, and for virtue: clearly then, in the opinion at least of these men, virtue is higher than honour. In truth, one would be much more inclined to think this to be the end of the life in society; yet this itself is plainly not sufficiently final: for it is conceived possible, that a man possessed of virtue might sleep or be inactive all through his life, or, as a third case, suffer the greatest evils and misfortunes: and the man who should live thus no one would call happy, except for mere disputation’s sake.
And for these let thus much suffice, for they have been treated of at sufficient length in my Encyclia.
A third line of life is that of contemplation, concerning which we shall make our examination in the sequel.
As for the life of money-making, it is one of constraint, and wealth manifestly is not the good we are seeking, because it is for use, that is, for the sake of something further: and hence one would rather conceive the forementioned ends to be the right ones, for men rest content with them for their own sakes. Yet, clearly, they are not the objects of our search either, though many words have been wasted on them. So much then for these.
VI] Again, the notion of one Universal Good (the same, that is, in all things), it is better perhaps we should examine, and discuss the meaning of it, though such an inquiry is unpleasant, because they are friends of ours who have introduced these [Greek: eidae]. Still perhaps it may appear better, nay to be our duty where the safety of the truth is concerned, to upset if need be even our own theories, specially as we are lovers of wisdom: for since both are dear to us, we are bound to prefer the truth. Now they who invented this doctrine of [Greek: eidae], did not apply it to those things in which they spoke of priority and posteriority, and so they never made any [Greek: idea] of numbers; but good is predicated in the categories of Substance, Quality, and Relation; now that which exists of itself, i.e. Substance, is prior in the nature of things to that which is relative, because this latter is an off-shoot, as it were, and result of that which is; on their own principle then there cannot be a common [Greek: idea] in the case of these.
In the next place, since good is predicated in as many ways as there are modes of existence [for it is predicated in the category of Substance, as God, Intellect—and in that of Quality, as The Virtues—and in that of Quantity, as The Mean—and in that of Relation, as The Useful—and in that of Time, as Opportunity—and in that of Place, as Abode; and other such like things], it manifestly cannot be something common and universal and one in all: else it would not have been predicated in all the categories, but in one only.
No. The Pythagoreans do seem to give a more credible account of the matter, who place “One” among43the goods in their double list of goods and bads: which philosophers, in fact, Speusippus seems to have followed.
But of these matters let us speak at some other time. Now there is plainly a loophole to object to what has been advanced, on the plea that the theory I have attacked is not by its advocates applied to all good: but those goods only are spoken of as being under one [Greek: idea], which are pursued, and with which men rest content simply for their own sakes: whereas those things which have a tendency to produce or preserve them in any way, or to hinder their contraries, are called good because of these other goods, and after another fashion. It is manifest then that the goods may be so called in two senses, the one class for their own sakes, the other because of these.
1096b] Thirdly, since those things which range under one [Greek: idea] are also under the cognisance of one science, there would have been, on their theory, only one science taking cognisance of all goods collectively: but in fact there are many even for those which range under one category: for instance, of Opportunity or Seasonableness (which I have before mentioned as being in the category of Time), the science is, in war, generalship; in disease, medical science; and of the Mean (which I quoted before as being in the category of Quantity), in food, the medical science; and in labour or exercise, the gymnastic science. A person might fairly doubt also what in the world they mean by very-this that or the other, since, as they would themselves allow, the account of the humanity is one and the same in the very-Man, and in any individual Man: for so far as the individual and the very-Man are both Man, they will not differ at all: and if so, then very-good and any particular good will not differ, in so far as both are good. Nor will it do to say, that the eternity of the very-good makes it to be more good; for what has lasted white ever so long, is no whiter than what lasts but for a day.
Very well then, let us separate the independent goods from the instrumental, and see whether they are spoken of as under one [Greek: idea]. But the question next arises, what kind of goods are we to call independent? All such as are pursued even when separated from other goods, as, for instance, being wise, seeing, and certain pleasures and honours (for these, though we do pursue them with some further end in view, one would still place among the independent goods)? or does it come in fact to this, that we can call nothing independent good except the [Greek: idea], and so the concrete of it will be nought?
If, on the other hand, these are independent goods, then we shall require that the account of the goodness be the same clearly in all, just as that of the whiteness is in snow and white lead. But how stands the fact? Why of honour and wisdom and pleasure the accounts are distinct and different in so far as they are good. The Chief Good then is not something common, and after one [Greek: idea].
But then, how does the name come to be common (for it is not seemingly a case of fortuitous equivocation)? Are different individual things called good by virtue of being from one source, or all conducing to one end, or rather by way of analogy, for that intellect is to the soul as sight to the body, and so on? However, perhaps we ought to leave these questions now, for an accurate investigation of them is more properly the business of a different philosophy. And likewise respecting the [Greek: idea]: for even if there is some one good predicated in common of all things that are good, or separable and capable of existing independently, manifestly it cannot be the object of human action or attainable by Man; but we are in search now of something that is so.
It may readily occur to any one, that it would be better to attain a knowledge of it with a view to such concrete goods as are attainable and practical, because, with this as a kind of model in our hands, we shall the better know what things are good for us individually, and when we know them, we shall attain them.
Some plausibility, it is true, this argument possesses, but it is contradicted by the facts of the Arts and Sciences; for all these, though aiming at some good, and seeking that which is deficient, yet pretermit the knowledge of it: now it is not exactly probable that all artisans without exception should be ignorant of so great a help as this would be, and not even look after it; neither is it easy to see wherein a weaver or a carpenter will be profited in respect of his craft by knowing the very-good, or how a man will be the more apt to effect cures or to command an army for having seen the [Greek: idea] itself. For manifestly it is not health after this general and abstract fashion which is the subject of the physician’s investigation, but the health of Man, or rather perhaps of this or that man; for he has to heal individuals.—Thus much on these points.
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VII
And now let us revert to the Good of which we are in search: what can it be? for manifestly it is different in different actions and arts: for it is different in the healing art and in the art military, and similarly in the rest. What then is the Chief Good in each? Is it not “that for the sake of which the other things are done?” and this in the healing art is health, and in the art military victory, and in that of house-building a house, and in any other thing something else; in short, in every action and moral choice the End, because in all cases men do everything else with a view to this. So that if there is some one End of all things which are and may be done, this must be the Good proposed by doing, or if more than one, then these.
Thus our discussion after some traversing about has come to the same point which we reached before. And this we must try yet more to clear up.
Now since the ends are plainly many, and of these we choose some with a view to others (wealth, for instance, musical instruments, and, in general, all instruments), it is clear that all are not final: but the Chief Good is manifestly something final; and so, if there is some one only which is final, this must be the object of our search: but if several, then the most final of them will be it.
Now that which is an object of pursuit in itself we call more final than that which is so with a view to something else; that again which is never an object of choice with a view to something else than those which are so both in themselves and with a view to this ulterior object: and so by the term “absolutely final,” we denote that which is an object of choice always in itself, and never with a view to any other.
And of this nature Happiness is mostly thought to be, for this we choose always for its own sake, and never with a view to anything further: whereas honour, pleasure, intellect, in fact every excellence we choose for their own sakes, it is true (because we would choose each of these even if no result were to follow), but we choose them also with a view to happiness, conceiving that through their instrumentality we shall be happy: but no man chooses happiness with a view to them, nor in fact with a view to any other thing whatsoever.
The same result is seen to follow also from the notion of self-sufficiency, a quality thought to belong to the final good. Now by sufficient for Self, we mean not for a single individual living a solitary life, but for his parents also and children and wife, and, in general, friends and countrymen; for man is by nature adapted to a social existence. But of these, of course, some limit must be fixed: for if one extends it to parents and descendants and friends’ friends, there is no end to it. This point, however, must be left for future investigation: for the present we define that to be self-sufficient “which taken alone makes life choice-worthy, and to be in want of nothing;” now of such kind we think Happiness to be: and further, to be most choice-worthy of all things; not being reckoned with any other thing, for if it were so reckoned, it is plain we must then allow it, with the addition of ever so small a good, to be more choice-worthy than it was before: because what is put to it becomes an addition of so much more good, and of goods the greater is ever the more choice-worthy.
So then Happiness is manifestly something final and self-sufficient, being the end of all things which are and may be done.
But, it may be, to call Happiness the Chief Good is a mere truism, and what is wanted is some clearer account of its real nature. Now this object may be easily attained, when we have discovered what is the work of man; for as in the case of flute-player, statuary, or artisan of any kind, or, more generally, all who have any work or course of action, their Chief Good and Excellence is thought to reside in their work, so it would seem to be with man, if there is any work belonging to him.
Are we then to suppose, that while carpenter and cobbler have certain works and courses of action, Man as Man has none, but is left by Nature without a work? or would not one rather hold, that as eye, hand, and foot, and generally each of his members, has manifestly some special work; so too the whole Man, as distinct from all these, has some work of his own?
What then can this be? not mere life, because that plainly is shared with him even by vegetables, and we want what is peculiar to him. We must separate off then the life of mere nourishment and growth, and next will come the life of sensation: but this again manifestly is common to horses, oxen, and every animal. There remains then a kind of life of the Rational Nature apt to act: and of this Nature there are two parts denominated Rational, the one as being obedient to Reason, the other45as having and exerting it. Again, as this life is also spoken of in two ways, we must take that which is in the way of actual working, because this is thought to be most properly entitled to the name. If then the work of Man is a working of the soul in accordance with reason, or at least not independently of reason, and we say that the work of any given subject, and of that subject good of its kind, are the same in kind (as, for instance, of a harp-player and a good harp-player, and so on in every case, adding to the work eminence in the way of excellence; I mean, the work of a harp-player is to play the harp, and of a good harp-player to play it well); if, I say, this is so, and we assume the work of Man to be life of a certain kind, that is to say a working of the soul, and actions with reason, and of a good man to do these things well and nobly, and in fact everything is finished off well in the way of the excellence which peculiarly belongs to it: if all this is so, then the Good of Man comes to be “a working of the Soul in the way of Excellence,” or, if Excellence admits of degrees, in the way of the best and most perfect Excellence.
And we must add, in a complete life; for as it is not one swallow or one fine day that makes a spring, so it is not one day or a short time that makes a man blessed and happy.
Let this then be taken for a rough sketch of the Chief Good: since it is probably the right way to give first the outline, and fill it in afterwards. And it would seem that any man may improve and connect what is good in the sketch, and that time is a good discoverer and co-operator in such matters: it is thus in fact that all improvements in the various arts have been brought about, for any man may fill up a deficiency.
You must remember also what has been already stated, and not seek for exactness in all matters alike, but in each according to the subject-matter, and so far as properly belongs to the system. The carpenter and geometrician, for instance, inquire into the right line in different fashion: the former so far as he wants it for his work, the latter inquires into its nature and properties, because he is concerned with the truth.
So then should one do in other matters, that the incidental matters may not exceed the direct ones.
And again, you must not demand the reason either in all things alike, because in some it is sufficient that the fact has been well demonstrated, which is the case with first principles; and the fact is the first step, i.e. starting-point or principle.
And of these first principles some are obtained by induction, some by perception, some by a course of habituation, others in other different ways. And we must try to trace up each in their own nature, and take pains to secure their being well defined, because they have great influence on what follows: it is thought, I mean, that the starting-point or principle is more than half the whole matter, and that many of the points of inquiry come simultaneously into view thereby.
BOOK II
Well: human Excellence is of two kinds, Intellectual and Moral: now the Intellectual springs originally, and is increased subsequently, from teaching (for the most part that is), and needs therefore experience and time; whereas the Moral comes from custom, and so the Greek term denoting it is but a slight deflection from the term denoting custom in that language.
From this fact it is plain that not one of the Moral Virtues comes to be in us merely by nature: because of such things as exist by nature, none can be changed by custom: a stone, for instance, by nature gravitating downwards, could never by custom be brought to ascend, not even if one were to try and accustom it by throwing it up ten thousand times; nor could file again be brought to descend, nor in fact could anything whose nature is in one way be brought by custom to be in another. The Virtues then come to be in us neither by nature, nor in despite of nature, but we are furnished by nature with a capacity for receiving them and are perfected in them through custom.
Again, in whatever cases we get things by nature, we get the faculties first and perform the acts of working afterwards; an illustration of which is afforded by the case of our bodily senses, for it was not from having often seen or heard that we got these senses, but just the reverse: we had them and so exercised them, but did not have them because we had exercised them. But the Virtues we get by first performing single acts of working, which, again, is the case of other things, as the arts for instance; for what we have to make when we have learned how, these we learn how to make by making:46men come to be builders, for instance, by building; harp-players, by playing on the harp: exactly so, by doing just actions we come to be just; by doing the actions of self-mastery we come to be perfected in self-mastery; and by doing brave actions brave.
And to the truth of this testimony is borne by what takes place in communities: because the law-givers make the individual members good men by habituation, and this is the intention certainly of every law-giver, and all who do not effect it well fail of their intent; and herein consists the difference between a good Constitution and a bad.
Again, every Virtue is either produced or destroyed from and by the very same circumstances: art too in like manner; I mean it is by playing the harp that both the good and the bad harp-players are formed: and similarly builders and all the rest; by building well men will become good builders; by doing it badly bad ones: in fact, if this had not been so, there would have been no need of instructors, but all men would have been at once good or bad in their several arts without them.
So too then is it with the Virtues: for by acting in the various relations in which we are thrown with our fellow men, we come to be, some just, some unjust: and by acting in dangerous positions and being habituated to feel fear or confidence, we come to be, some brave, others cowards.
Similarly is it also with respect to the occasions of lust and anger: for some men come to be perfected in self-mastery and mild, others destitute of all self-control and passionate; the one class by behaving in one way under them, the other by behaving in another. Or, in one word, the habits are produced from the acts of working like to them: and so what we have to do is to give a certain character to these particular acts, because the habits formed correspond to the differences of these.
So then, whether we are accustomed this way or that straight from childhood, makes not a small but an important difference, or rather I would say it makes all the difference.
II
Since then the object of the present treatise is not mere speculation, as it is of some others (for we are inquiring not merely that we may know what virtue is but that we may become virtuous, else it would have been useless), we must consider as to the particular actions how we are to do them, because, as we have just said, the quality of the habits that shall be formed depends on these.
Now, that we are to act in accordance with Right Reason is a general maxim, and may for the present be taken for granted: we will speak of it hereafter, and say both what Right Reason is, and what are its relations to the other virtues.
But let this point be first thoroughly understood between us, that all which can be said on moral action must be said in outline, as it were, and not exactly: for as we remarked at the commencement, such reasoning only must be required as the nature of the subject-matter admits of, and matters of moral action and expediency have no fixedness any more than matters of health. And if the subject in its general maxims is such, still less in its application to particular cases is exactness attainable: because these fall not under any art or system of rules, but it must be left in each instance to the individual agents to look to the exigencies of the particular case, as it is in the art of healing, or that of navigating a ship. Still, though the present subject is confessedly such, we must try and do what we can for it.
1104a
First then this must be noted, that it is the nature of such things to be spoiled by defect and excess; as we see in the case of health and strength (since for the illustration of things which cannot be seen we must use those that can), for excessive training impairs the strength as well as deficient: meat and drink, in like manner, in too great or too small quantities, impair the health: while in due proportion they cause, increase, and preserve it.
Thus it is therefore with the habits of perfected Self-Mastery and Courage and the rest of the Virtues: for the man who flies from and fears all things, and never stands up against anything, comes to be a coward; and he who fears nothing, but goes at everything, comes to be rash. In like manner too, he that tastes of every pleasure and abstains from none comes to lose all self-control; while he who avoids all, as do the dull and clownish, comes as it were to lose his faculties of perception: that is to say, the habits of perfected Self-Mastery and Courage are spoiled by the excess and defect, but by the mean state are preserved.
Furthermore, not only do the origination, growth, and marring of the habits come from and by the same47circumstances, but also the acts of working after the habits are formed will be exercised on the same: for so it is also with those other things which are more directly matters of sight, strength for instance: for this comes by taking plenty of food and doing plenty of work, and the man who has attained strength is best able to do these: and so it is with the Virtues, for not only do we by abstaining from pleasures come to be perfected in Self-Mastery, but when we have come to be so we can best abstain from them: similarly too with Courage: for it is by accustoming ourselves to despise objects of fear and stand up against them that we come to be brave; and [Sidenote(?): 1104_b_] after we have come to be so we shall be best able to stand up against such objects.
And for a test of the formation of the habits we must [Sidenote(?): III] take the pleasure or pain which succeeds the acts; for he is perfected in Self-Mastery who not only abstains from the bodily pleasures but is glad to do so; whereas he who abstains but is sorry to do it has not Self-Mastery: he again is brave who stands up against danger, either with positive pleasure or at least without any pain; whereas he who does it with pain is not brave.
For Moral Virtue has for its object-matter pleasures and pains, because by reason of pleasure we do what is bad, and by reason of pain decline doing what is right (for which cause, as Plato observes, men should have been trained straight from their childhood to receive pleasure and pain from proper objects, for this is the right education). Again: since Virtues have to do with actions and feelings, and on every feeling and every action pleasure and pain follow, here again is another proof that Virtue has for its object-matter pleasure and pain. The same is shown also by the fact that punishments are effected through the instrumentality of these; because they are of the nature of remedies, and it is the nature of remedies to be the contraries of the ills they cure. Again, to quote what we said before: every habit of the Soul by its very nature has relation to, and exerts itself upon, things of the same kind as those by which it is naturally deteriorated or improved: now such habits do come to be vicious by reason of pleasures and pains, that is, by men pursuing or avoiding respectively, either such as they ought not, or at wrong times, or in wrong manner, and so forth (for which reason, by the way, some people define the Virtues as certain states of impassibility and utter quietude, but they are wrong because they speak without modification, instead of adding “as they ought,” “as they ought not,” and “when,” and so on). Virtue then is assumed to be that habit which is such, in relation to pleasures and pains, as to effect the best results, and Vice the contrary.
The following considerations may also serve to set this in a clear light. There are principally three things moving us to choice and three to avoidance, the honourable, the expedient, the pleasant; and their three contraries, the dishonourable, the hurtful, and the painful: now the good man is apt to go right, and the bad man wrong, with respect to all these of course, but most specially with respect to pleasure: because not only is this common to him with all animals but also it is a concomitant of all those things which move to choice, since both the honourable and the expedient give an impression of pleasure.
Again, we adopt pleasure and pain (some of us more, and some less) as the measure even of actions: for this cause then our whole business must be with them, since to receive right or wrong impressions of pleasure and pain is a thing of no little importance in respect of the actions. Once more; it is harder, as Heraclitus says, to fight against pleasure than against anger: now it is about that which is more than commonly difficult that art comes into being, and virtue too, because in that which is difficult the good is of a higher order: and so for this reason too both virtue and moral philosophy generally must wholly busy themselves respecting pleasures and pains, because he that uses these well will be good, he that does so ill will be bad.
1105a] Again, it grows up with us all from infancy, and so it is a hard matter to remove from ourselves this feeling, engrained as it is into our very life.
Let us then be understood to have stated, that Virtue has for its object-matter pleasures and pains, and that it is either increased or marred by the same circumstances (differently used) by which it is originally generated, and that it exerts itself on the same circumstances out of which it was generated.
Now I can conceive a person perplexed as to the meaning of our statement, that men must do just actions to become just, and those of self-mastery to acquire the habit of self-mastery; “for,” he would say, “if men are48doing the actions they have the respective virtues already, just as men are grammarians or musicians when they do the actions of either art.” May we not reply by saying that it is not so even in the case of the arts referred to: because a man may produce something grammatical either by chance or the suggestion of another; but then only will he be a grammarian when he not only produces something grammatical but does so grammarian-wise, i.e. in virtue of the grammatical knowledge he himself possesses.
Again, the cases of the arts and the virtues are not parallel: because those things which are produced by the arts have their excellence in themselves, and it is sufficient therefore [Sidenote: 1105b] that these when produced should be in a certain state: but those which are produced in the way of the virtues, are, strictly speaking, actions of a certain kind (say of Justice or perfected Self-Mastery), not merely if in themselves they are in a certain state but if also he who does them does them being himself in a certain state, first if knowing what he is doing, next if with deliberate preference, and with such preference for the things’ own sake; and thirdly if being himself stable and unapt to change. Now to constitute possession of the arts these requisites are not reckoned in, excepting the one point of knowledge: whereas for possession of the virtues knowledge avails little or nothing, but the other requisites avail not a little, but, in fact, are all in all, and these requisites as a matter of fact do come from oftentimes doing the actions of Justice and perfected Self-Mastery.
The facts, it is true, are called by the names of these habits when they are such as the just or perfectly self-mastering man would do; but he is not in possession of the virtues who merely does these facts, but he who also so does them as the just and self-mastering do them.
We are right then in saying, that these virtues are formed in a man by his doing the actions; but no one, if he should leave them undone, would be even in the way to become a good man. Yet people in general do not perform these actions, but taking refuge in talk they flatter themselves they are philosophising, and that they will so be good men: acting in truth very like those sick people who listen to the doctor with great attention but do nothing that he tells them: just as these then cannot be well bodily under such a course of treatment, so neither can those be mentally by such philosophising.
By Feelings, I mean such as lust, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendship, hatred, longing, emulation, compassion, in short all such as are followed by pleasure or pain: by Capacities, those in right of which we are said to be capable of these feelings; as by virtue of which we are able to have been made angry, or grieved, or to have compassionated; by States, those in right of which we are in a certain relation good or bad to the aforementioned feelings; to having been made angry, for instance, we are in a wrong relation if in our anger we were too violent or too slack, but if we were in the happy medium we are in a right relation to the feeling. And so on of the rest.
V] Next, we must examine what Virtue is. Well, since the things which come to be in the mind are, in all, of three kinds, Feelings, Capacities, States, Virtue of course must belong to one of the three classes.
Now Feelings neither the virtues nor vices are, because in right of the Feelings we are not denominated either good or bad, but in right of the virtues and vices we are.
Again, both anger and fear we feel without moral choice, whereas the virtues are acts of moral choice, or at least certainly not independent of it.
1106_a_] Again, in right of the Feelings we are neither praised nor blamed (for a man is not commended for being afraid or being angry, nor blamed for being angry merely but for being so in a particular way), but in right of the virtues and vices we are.
Moreover, in right of the Feelings we are said to be moved, but in right of the virtues and vices not to be moved, but disposed, in a certain way.
And for these same reasons they are not Capacities, for we are not called good or bad merely because we are able to feel, nor are we praised or blamed.
And again, Capacities we have by nature, but we do not come to be good or bad by nature, as we have said before.
Since then the virtues are neither Feelings nor Capacities, it remains that they must be States.
In all quantity then, whether continuous or discrete, one may take the greater part, the less, or the exactly equal, and these either with reference to the thing itself, or relatively to us: and the exactly equal is a mean between excess and defect. Now by the mean of the thing, i.e. absolute mean, I denote that which is equidistant from either extreme (which of course is one and the same to all), and49by the mean relatively to ourselves, that which is neither too much nor too little for the particular individual. This of course is not one nor the same to all: for instance, suppose ten is too much and two too little, people take six for the absolute mean; because it exceeds the smaller sum by exactly as much as it is itself exceeded by the larger, and this mean is according to arithmetical proportion.
VI] Now what the genus of Virtue is has been said; but we must not merely speak of it thus, that it is a state but say also what kind of a state it is. We must observe then that all excellence makes that whereof it is the excellence both to be itself in a good state and to perform its work well. The excellence of the eye, for instance, makes both the eye good and its work also: for by the excellence of the eye we see well. So too the excellence of the horse makes a horse good, and good in speed, and in carrying his rider, and standing up against the enemy. If then this is universally the case, the excellence of Man, i.e. Virtue, must be a state whereby Man comes to be good and whereby he will perform well his proper work. Now how this shall be it is true we have said already, but still perhaps it may throw light on the subject to see what is its characteristic nature.
So then it seems every one possessed of skill avoids excess and defect, but seeks for and chooses the mean, not the absolute but the relative.
Now if all skill thus accomplishes well its work by keeping an eye on the mean, and bringing the works to this point (whence it is common enough to say of such works as are in a good state, “one cannot add to or take ought from them,” under the notion of excess or defect destroying goodness but the mean state preserving it), and good artisans, as we say, work with their eye on this, and excellence, like nature, is more exact and better than any art in the world, it must have an aptitude to aim at the mean.
1106_b_] But the mean relatively to ourselves must not be so found; for it does not follow, supposing ten minæ is too large a quantity to eat and two too small, that the trainer will order his man six; because for the person who is to take it this also may be too much or too little: for Milo it would be too little, but for a man just commencing his athletic exercises too much: similarly too of the exercises themselves, as running or wrestling.
It is moral excellence, i.e. Virtue, of course which I mean, because this it is which is concerned with feelings and actions, and in these there can be excess and defect and the mean: it is possible, for instance, to feel the emotions of fear, confidence, lust, anger, compassion, and pleasure and pain generally, too much or too little, and in either case wrongly; but to feel them when we ought, on what occasions, towards whom, why, and as, we should do, is the mean, or in other words the best state, and this is the property of Virtue.
In like manner too with respect to the actions, there may be excess and defect and the mean. Now Virtue is concerned with feelings and actions, in which the excess is wrong and the defect is blamed but the mean is praised and goes right; and both these circumstances belong to Virtue. Virtue then is in a sense a mean state, since it certainly has an aptitude for aiming at the mean.
Again, one may go wrong in many different ways (because, as the Pythagoreans expressed it, evil is of the class of the infinite, good of the finite), but right only in one; and so the former is easy, the latter difficult; easy to miss the mark, but hard to hit it: and for these reasons, therefore, both the excess and defect belong to Vice, and the mean state to Virtue; for, as the poet has it,
“Men may be bad in many ways, But good in one alone.” Virtue then is “a state apt to exercise deliberate choice, being in the relative mean, determined by reason, and as the man of practical wisdom would determine.”
It is a middle state between too faulty ones, in the way of excess on one side and of defect on the other: and it is so moreover, because the faulty states on one side fall short of, and those on the other exceed, what is right, both in the case of the feelings and the actions; but Virtue finds, and when found adopts, the mean.
And so, viewing it in respect of its essence and definition, Virtue is a mean state; but in reference to the chief good and to excellence it is the highest state possible.
But it must not be supposed that every action or every feeling is capable of subsisting in this mean state, because some there are which are so named as immediately to convey the notion of badness, as malevolence, shamelessness, envy; or, to instance in actions, adultery, theft, homicide; for all these and suchlike are blamed because they are in themselves bad, not the having too much or too little of them.
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In these then you never can go right, but must always be wrong: nor in such does the right or wrong depend on the selection of a proper person, time, or manner (take adultery for instance), but simply doing any one soever of those things is being wrong.
You might as well require that there should be determined a mean state, an excess and a defect in respect of acting unjustly, being cowardly, or giving up all control of the passions: for at this rate there will be of excess and defect a mean state; of excess, excess; and of defect, defect.
But just as of perfected self-mastery and courage there is no excess and defect, because the mean is in one point of view the highest possible state, so neither of those faulty states can you have a mean state, excess, or defect, but howsoever done they are wrong: you cannot, in short, have of excess and defect a mean state, nor of a mean state excess and defect.
Discussion Questions
1. Discuss Aristotle’s claim that every act and inquiry aims at some good (goal). Is there a single end toward which all human behavior is directed? If so, does this justify the regulation of people’s behavior, including media censorship, by the government so they are more likely to achieve this end? Use specific examples to support your answer.
2. Do colleges have a duty to help students become virtuous people by creating an atmosphere in which good behavior becomes habitual for them? Support your answer. Should campus administrations prohibit certain excessive behaviors in order to make it easier for students to become good people? Discuss your answer in light of regulations on hate speech, cheating, and drug and alcohol abuse.
3. Aristotle warned against the rule of the many, arguing that “the many are more corruptible than the few.” Discuss whether the fact that the United States is a democracy is an impediment to resolving our current financial problems.
AYN RAND
The Fountainhead
Philosopher, novelist, and playwright, Ayn Rand (1905–1982) was one of the foremost contemporary defenders of ethical egoism and natural rights ethics. Born in St. Petersburg, Russia, she immigrated to the United States in 1926. Strongly opposed to collectivism and Soviet communism, she championed rational ethical egoism and the capitalist system it supported.
In the selection from her novel The Fountainhead, Howard Roark is presented as her ideal of the moral person and rational ethical egoist. Roark, a successful architect, lives his life entirely for himself and his values.
Excerpt from The Fountainhead, by Ayn Rand. Copyright © 1943 The Bobbs-Merrill Company, copyright © renewed 1971 by Ayn Rand. Used with permission of The Ayn Rand Institute.
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Critical Reading Questions
1. What does Roark mean when he says, “Man cannot survive except through his mind”?
2. What is the relationship between “the mind” and individualism?
3. What is a “second-hander” and why does Roark view second-handers as immoral?
4. What is the nature of “proper relationships”?
5. Why does egotism offer a better alternative in living the good life than altruism?
Roark stood before them as each man stands in the innocence of his own mind. But Roark stood like that before a hostile crowd—and they knew suddenly that no hatred was possible to him. For the flash of an instant, they grasped the manner of his consciousness. Each asked himself: do I need anyone’s approval?—does it matter?—am I tied? And for that instant, each man was free— free enough to feel benevolence for every other man in the room.
It was only a moment; the moment of silence when Roark was about to speak….
“Man cannot survive except through his mind. He comes on earth unarmed. His brain is his only weapon. Animals obtain food by force. Man has no claws, no fangs, no horns, no great strength of muscle. He must plant his food or hunt it. To plant, he needs a process of thought. To hunt, he needs weapons, and to make weapons—a process of thought. From this simplest necessity to the highest religious abstraction, from the wheel to the skyscraper, everything we are and everything we have comes from a single attribute of man— the function of his reasoning mind.
“But the mind is an attribute of the individual. There is no such thing as a collective brain. There is no such thing as a collective thought. An agreement reached by a group of men is only a compromise or an average drawn upon many individual thoughts. It is a secondary consequence. The primary act—the process of reason—must be performed by each man alone….
“Nothing is given to man on earth. Everything he needs has to be produced. And here man faces his basic alternative: he can survive in only one of two ways—by the independent work of his own mind or as a parasite fed by the minds of others. The creator originates. The parasite borrows. The creator faces nature alone. The parasite faces nature through an intermediary….
“The basic need of the second-hander is to secure his ties with men in order to be fed. He places relations first. He declares that man exists in order to serve others. He preaches altruism.
“Altruism is the doctrine which demands that man live for others and place others above self.
“No man can live for another. He cannot share his spirit just as he cannot share his body. But the second-hander has used altruism as a weapon of exploitation and reversed the base of mankind’s moral principles. Men have been taught every precept that destroys the creator. Men have been taught dependence as a virtue.
“The man who attempts to live for others is a dependent. He is a parasite in motive and makes parasites of those he serves. The relationship produces nothing but mutual corruption. It is impossible in concept. The nearest approach to it in reality—the man who lives to serve others—is the slave. If physical slavery is repulsive, how much more repulsive is the concept of servility of the spirit? The conquered slave has a vestige of honor. He has the merit of having resisted and of considering his condition evil. But the man who enslaves himself voluntarily in the name of love is the basest of creatures. He degrades the dignity of man and he degrades the conception of love. But this is the essence of altruism….
“Here the basic reversal is most deadly. The issue has been perverted and man has been left no alternative—and no freedom. As poles of good and evil, he was offered two conceptions: egotism* and altruism. Egotism was held to mean the sacrifice of others to self. Altruism—the sacrifice of self to others. This tied man52irrevocably to other men and left him nothing but a choice of pain: his own pain borne for the sake of others or pain inflicted upon others for the sake of self. When it was added that man must find joy in self-immolation, the trap was closed. Man was forced to accept masochism as his ideal—under threat that sadism was his only alternative. This was the greatest fraud ever perpetrated on mankind.
*Rand is using the term egotism in the sense that the text is using egoism.
“This was the device by which dependence and suffering were perpetuated as fundamentals of life.
“The choice is not self-sacrifice or domination. The choice is independence or dependence. The code of the creator or the code of the secondhander. This is the basic issue. It rests upon the alternative of life or death. The code of the creator is built on the needs of the reasoning mind which allows man to survive. The code of the second-hander is built on the needs of a mind incapable of survival. All that which proceeds from man’s independent ego is good. All that which proceeds from man’s dependence upon men is evil.
“The egotist in the absolute sense is not the man who sacrifices others. He is the man who stands above the need of using others in any manner. He does not function through them. He is not concerned with them in any primary matter. Not in his aim, not in his motive, not in his thinking, not in his desires, not in the source of his energy. He does not exist for any other man—and he asks no other man to exist for him. This is the only form of brotherhood and mutual respect possible between men….
“In all proper relationships there is no sacrifice of anyone to anyone. An architect needs clients, but he does not subordinate his work to their wishes. They need him, but they do not order a house just to give him a commission. Men exchange their work by free, mutual consent to mutual advantage when their personal interests agree and they both desire the exchange. If they do not desire it, they are not forced to deal with each other. They seek further. This is the only possible form of relationship between equals. Anything else is a relation of slave to master, or victim to executioner….”
Discussion Questions
1. Analyze Rand’s argument that if we lived in a perfectly laissez-faire society, always following our own rational self-interest and not hindering others from following theirs, then conflicts between one person’s self-interest and another’s would not arise. Relate your answer to the growing gap in income between the rich and lower income earners.
2. Discuss Rand’s claim in the reading that the only good we can do for each other is hands-off. What effect would this approach have on people who now depend on others, a view which, she says, allows voluntary charity under certain circumstances, such as social service and government agencies, for certain services?
3. Is Rand’s depiction of the proper relationship between people in which there is “no sacrifice of anyone to anyone” an appropriate model for personal and family relationships? If not, discuss why not.
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JEREMY BENTHAM
An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
English jurist, philosopher, and social reformer, Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) was born in London and lived during a period of remarkable political and economic changes, including the American and French Revolutions and the Industrial Revolution. He developed his utilitarianism theory primarily as a tool of social reform in response to the injustices of his time and the desperate needs of the poor and exploited workers.
In the following excerpt, Bentham explains what he means by the principle of utility and how to determine if an action or policy conforms to the principle.
Critical Reading Questions
1. What does Bentham mean when he says that “nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters”?
2. What is utility and what is the principle of utility?
3. What is meant by the interest of the community, and who or what is included in this community?
4. How are the community and the individuals who comprise it related?
5. What ends should legislatures keep in mind when formulating laws and public policies?
I. Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire: but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while. The principle of utility recognises this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law. Systems which attempt to question it, deal in sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in darkness instead of light.
Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. London: Clarendon Press, 1907.
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II…. By the principle* of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness. I say of every action whatsoever; and therefore not only of every action of a private individual, but of every measure of government.
*The principle here in question may be taken for an act of the mind; a sentiment; a sentiment of approbation; a sentiment which, when applied to an action, approves of its utility, as that quality of it by which the measure of approbation or disapprobation bestowed upon it ought to be governed.
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III. By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, (all this in the present case comes to the same thing) or (what comes gain to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered: if that party be the community in general, then the happiness of the community: if a particular individual, then the happiness of that individual.
IV. The interest of the community is one of the most general expressions that can occur in the phraseology of morals: no wonder that the meaning of it is often lost. When it has a meaning, it is this. The community is a fictitious body, composed of the individual persons who are considered as constituting as it were its members. The interest of the community then is, what?—the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it.
V. It is in vain to talk of the interest of the community, without understanding what is the interest of the individual. A thing is said to promote the interest, or to be for the interest, of an individual, when it tends to add to the sum total of his pleasures: or, what comes to the same thing, to diminish the sum total of his pains.
VI. An action then may be said to be conformable to the principle of utility, or, for shortness sake, to utility, (meaning with respect to the community at large) when the tendency it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any it has to diminish it.
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… Pleasures then, and the avoidance of pains, are the ends which the legislator has in view: it behoves him therefore to understand their value. Pleasures and pains are the instruments he has to work with: it behoves him therefore to understand their force, which is again, in other words, their value.
Discussion Questions
1. Bentham argued that punishment is an evil because it increases pain. Discuss what policy a utilitarian would propose for dealing with hardened and dangerous criminals, school shooters, or people who are suspected terrorists.
2. Does social or public ethics require a different strategy than personal ethics? If so, how do the two strategies differ? On what grounds can you justify the difference?
3. Evaluate the current “No child left behind” policy using the principle of utility and the utilitarian calculus.
4. Discuss whether the practice of meat-eating can be morally justified in light of Bentham’s principle of utility.
JOHN STUART MILL
Utilitarianism
John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) was educated by his father James Mill, with the help of Jeremy Bentham, to carry on the utilitarian tradition. When Mill was about twenty, he experienced a nervous breakdown and sank into a deep depression that lasted for two years. During this time,55he began to question some of the tenets of utilitarian theory, particularly Bentham’s insistence on the equality of pleasures.
Originally published in three installments in Fraser’s Magazine, 1861. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism. London: Parker, Son & Bourn, 1863.
Like Bentham, Mill was interested in legislation and social reform. However, unlike Bentham, Mill believed that certain pleasures should count more than others.
Critical Reading Questions
1. What is the principle of utility, and what are the only things that the principle of utility regards as desirable moral ends?
2. Which pleasures does Mill regard as superior?
3. What method does Mill use for determining which pleasures are of a higher quality?
4. Whose interests should be taken into account when determining the utility of an action?
5. What is the relationship between the principle of utility and the Golden Rule?
The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. To give a clear view of the moral standard set up by the theory, much more requires to be said; in particular, what things it includes in the ideas of pain and pleasure; and to what extent this is left an open question. But these supplementary explanations do not affect the theory of life on which this theory of morality is grounded—namely, that pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain….
It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone.
If I am asked, what I mean by difference of quality in pleasures, or what makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, except its being greater in amount, there is but one possible answer. Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure. If one of the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account.
Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying, both, do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties. Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast’s pleasures; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs…. It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides.
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According to the Greatest Happiness Principle, as above explained, the ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable (whether we are considering our own good or that of other people), is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality; the test of quality, and the rule for measuring it against quantity, being the preference felt by those who in their opportunities of experience, to which must be added their habits of self-consciousness and self-observation, are best furnished with the means of comparison. This, being, according to the utilitarian opinion, the end of human action, is necessarily also the standard of morality; which may accordingly be defined, the rules and precepts for human conduct, by the observance of which an existence such as has been described might be, to the greatest extent possible, secured to all mankind; and not to them only, but, so far as the nature of things admits, to the whole sentient creation.
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I must again repeat, what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent’s own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as you would be done by, and to love your neighbour as yourself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality. As the means of making the nearest approach to this ideal, utility would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements should place the happiness, or (as speaking practically it may be called) the interest, of every individual, as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole; and secondly, that education and opinion, which have so vast a power over human character, should so use that power as to establish in the mind of every individual an indissoluble association between his own happiness and the good of the whole; especially between his own happiness and the practice of such modes of conduct, negative and positive, as regard for the universal happiness prescribes; so that not only he may be unable to conceive the possibility of happiness to himself, consistently with conduct opposed to the general good, but also that a direct impulse to promote the general good may be in every individual one of habitual motives of action, and the sentiments connected therewith may fill a large and prominent place in every human being’s sentient existence. If the impugners of the utilitarian morality represented it to their own minds in this its true character, I know not what recommendation possessed by any other morality they could possibly affirm to be wanting to it; what more beautiful or more exalted developments of human nature any other ethical system can be supposed to foster, or what springs of action, not accessible to the utilitarian, such systems rely on for giving effect to their mandates….
A selection from Mill’s On Liberty is included after Chapter 7, “Freedom of Speech.”
Discussion Questions
1. Analyze Mill’s argument that the life of a dissatisfied human is preferable to that of a satisfied pig. Is his distinction between the different pleasures justified? If so, on what basis?
2. Which concept of pleasure—Mill’s or Bentham’s—is more useful? Apply Mill’s concept of the quality of pleasures to moral issues involving nonhuman animals—for example, meat-eating, keeping animals in zoos, and the use of animals in experimentation.
3. Discuss Mill’s use of sentience as a criterion for determining whose interests should be taken into account. Using this criterion, what would Mill’s position most likely be regarding both voluntary and involuntary euthanasia?
4. Discuss the legalization of drugs and pornography in light of Mill’s theory.
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IMMANUEL KANT
Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Ethics
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) was born in Germany. In 1755 he got a job at the University of Konigsberg, making Kant the first of the major philosophers to be a professional university teacher. One of his students wrote that they “never left a single lecture in his ethics without having become better men.” He remained at the university until poor health forced him to retire in 1796. People came from all over to consult Kant on all sorts of issues. He died in 1804, having spent his entire life in Konigsberg.
Unlike the utilitarians, Kant was more concerned with establishing a metaphysical foundation for morality than in coming up with an ethical system that could be used for formulating social policy. He believed that only reason could provide this foundation. If moral law is to be morally compelling, he argued, it must be logically consistent as well as absolutely binding.
Critical Reading Questions
1. What is the Good Will? What is the relevance of the Good Will in making decisions regarding social policy?
2. What gives an action moral worth?
3. Why does Kant reject utilitarianism as the foundation of morality?
4. Why does Kant argue that moral maxims must be universal rather than relative?
5. What is the categorical imperative? How does it differ from a hypothetical imperative? Give examples of both types of imperatives.
6. What does it mean for a being to be an “end in itself”? What gives a being value as an end in itself?
7. What is the difference between treating a being as an end in itself and treating a being as a means only? Why is it wrong to treat persons as means only?
Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics, translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1907.
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BY IMMANUEL KANT TRANSLATED BY THOMAS KINGSMILL ABBOTT
1785 Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals
Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good, without qualification, except a good will. Intelligence, wit, judgement, and the other talents of the mind, however they may be named, or courage, resolution, perseverance, as qualities of temperament, are undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects; but these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad and mischievous if the will which is to make use of them, and which, therefore, constitutes what is called character, is not good. It is the same with the gifts of fortune. Power, riches, honour, even health, and the general well-being and contentment with one’s condition which is called happiness, inspire pride, and often presumption, if there is not a good will to correct the influence of these on the mind, and with this also to rectify the whole principle of acting and adapt it to its end….
A good will is good not because of what it performs or effects, not by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition; that is, it is good in itself, and considered by itself is to be esteemed much higher than all that can be brought about by it in favour of any inclination, nay even of the sum total of all inclinations. Even if it should happen that, owing to special disfavour of fortune, or the niggardly provision of a step-motherly nature, this will should wholly lack power to accomplish its purpose, if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve nothing, and there should remain only the good will (not, to be sure, a mere wish, but the summoning of all means in our power), then, like a jewel, it would still shine by its own light, as a thing which has its whole value in itself. Its usefulness or fruitlessness can neither add nor take away anything from this value….
To be beneficent when we can is a duty; and besides this, there are many minds so sympathetically constituted that, without any other motive of vanity or self-interest, they find a pleasure in spreading joy around them and can take delight in the satisfaction of others so far as it is their own work. But I maintain that in such a case an action of this kind, however proper, however amiable it may be, has nevertheless no true moral worth, but is on a level with other inclinations, e.g., the inclination to honour, which, if it is happily directed to that which is in fact of public utility and accordant with duty and consequently honourable, deserves praise and encouragement, but not esteem. For the maxim lacks the moral import, namely, that such actions be done from duty, not from inclination. Put the case that the mind of that philanthropist were clouded by sorrow of his own, extinguishing all sympathy with the lot of others, and that, while he still has the power to benefit others in distress, he is not touched by their trouble because he is absorbed with his own; and now suppose that he tears himself out of this dead insensibility, and performs the action without any inclination to it, but simply from duty, then first has his action its genuine moral worth….
Thus the moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect expected from it, nor in any principle of action which requires to borrow its motive from this expected effect. For all these effects- agreeableness of one’s condition and even the promotion of the happiness of others- could have been also brought about by other causes, so that for this there would have been no need of the will of a rational being; whereas it is in this alone that the supreme and unconditional good can be found. The pre-eminent good which we call moral can therefore consist in nothing else than the conception of law in itself, which certainly is only possible in a rational being, in so far as this conception, and not the expected effect, determines the will…
But what sort of law can that be, the conception of which must determine the will, even without paying any regard to the effect expected from it, in order that this will may be called good absolutely and without qualification?59As I have deprived the will of every impulse which could arise to it from obedience to any law, there remains nothing but the universal conformity of its actions to law in general, which alone is to serve the will as a principle, i.e., I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law. Here, now, it is the simple conformity to law in general, without assuming any particular law applicable to certain actions, that serves the will as its principle and must so serve it, if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a chimerical notion. The common reason of men in its practical judgements perfectly coincides with this and always has in view the principle here suggested. Let the question be, for example: May I when in distress make a promise with the intention not to keep it? I readily distinguish here between the two significations which the question may have: Whether it is prudent, or whether it is right, to make a false promise? The former may undoubtedly often be the case….The shortest way, however, and an unerring one, to discover the answer to this question whether a lying promise is consistent with duty, is to ask myself, “Should I be content that my maxim (to extricate myself from difficulty by a false promise) should hold good as a universal law, for myself as well as for others?” and should I be able to say to myself, “Every one may make a deceitful promise when he finds himself in a difficulty from which he cannot otherwise extricate himself?” Then I presently become aware that while I can will the lie, I can by no means will that lying should be a universal law. For with such a law there would be no promises at all, since it would be in vain to allege my intention in regard to my future actions to those who would not believe this allegation, or if they over hastily did so would pay me back in my own coin. Hence my maxim, as soon as it should be made a universal law, would necessarily destroy itself…
I do not indeed as yet discern on what this respect is based (this the philosopher may inquire), but at least I understand this, that it is an estimation of the worth which far outweighs all worth of what is recommended by inclination, and that the necessity of acting from pure respect for the practical law is what constitutes duty, to which every other motive must give place, because it is the condition of a will being good in itself, and the worth of such a will is above everything….
Everything in nature works according to laws. Rational beings alone have the faculty of acting according to the conception of laws, that is according to principles, i.e., have a will. Since the deduction of actions from principles requires reason, the will is nothing but practical reason….
The conception of an objective principle, in so far as it is obligatory for a will, is called a command (of reason), and the formula of the command is called an imperative.
All imperatives are expressed by the word ought [or shall], and thereby indicate the relation of an objective law of reason to a will, which from its subjective constitution is not necessarily determined by it (an obligation). They say that something would be good to do or to forbear, but they say it to a will which does not always do a thing because it is conceived to be good to do it….
Now all imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. The former represent the practical necessity of a possible action as means to something else that is willed (or at least which one might possibly will). The categorical imperative would be that which represented an action as necessary of itself without reference to another end, i.e., as objectively necessary.
Since every practical law represents a possible action as good and, on this account, for a subject who is practically determinable by reason, necessary, all imperatives are formulae determining an action which is necessary according to the principle of a will good in some respects. If now the action is good only as a means to something else, then the imperative is hypothetical; if it is conceived as good in itself and consequently as being necessarily the principle of a will which of itself conforms to reason, then it is Categorical….
Finally, there is an imperative which commands a certain conduct immediately, without having as its condition any other purpose to be attained by it. This imperative is categorical. It concerns not the matter of the action, or its intended result, but its form and the principle of which it is itself a result; and what is essentially good in it consists in the mental disposition, let the consequence be what it may. This imperative may be called that of morality….
When I conceive a hypothetical imperative, in general I do not know beforehand what it will contain until I am given the condition. But when I conceive a categorical imperative, I know at once what it contains. For as60the imperative contains besides the law only the necessity that the maxims * shall conform to this law, while the law contains no conditions restricting it, there remains nothing but the general statement that the maxim of the action should conform to a universal law, and it is this conformity alone that the imperative properly represents as necessary.
*A maxim is a subjective principle of action, and must be distinguished from the objective principle, namely, practical law. The former contains the practical rule set by reason according to the conditions of the subject (often its ignorance or its inclinations), so that it is the principle on which the subject acts; but the law is the objective principle valid for every rational being, and is the principle on which it ought to act, that is an imperative.
There is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely, this: Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law.
Now if all imperatives of duty can be deduced from this one imperative as from their principle, then, although it should remain undecided what is called duty is not merely a vain notion, yet at least we shall be able to show what we understand by it and what this notion means.
Since the universality of the law according to which effects are produced constitutes what is properly called nature in the most general sense (as to form), that is the existence of things so far as it is determined by general laws, the imperative of duty may be expressed thus: Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a universal law of nature …
A man reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes feels wearied of life, but is still so far in possession of his reason that he can ask himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself to take his own life. Now he inquires whether the maxim of his action could become a universal law of nature. His maxim is: “From self-love I adopt it as a principle to shorten my life when its longer duration is likely to bring more evil than satisfaction.” It is asked then simply whether this principle founded on self-love can become a universal law of nature. Now we see at once that a system of nature of which it should be a law to destroy life by means of the very feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the improvement of life would contradict itself and, therefore, could not exist as a system of nature; hence that maxim cannot possibly exist as a universal law of nature and, consequently, would be wholly inconsistent with the supreme principle of all duty….
We have thus established at least this much, that if duty is a conception which is to have any import and real legislative authority for our actions, it can only be expressed in categorical and not at all in hypothetical imperatives. We have also, which is of great importance, exhibited clearly and definitely for every practical application the content of the categorical imperative, which must contain the principle of all duty if there is such a thing at all….
If then there is a supreme practical principle or, in respect of the human will, a categorical imperative, it must be one which, being drawn from the conception of that which is necessarily an end for everyone because it is an end in itself, constitutes an objective principle of will, and can therefore serve as a universal practical law. The foundation of this principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself. Man necessarily conceives his own existence as being so; so far then this is a subjective principle of human actions. But every other rational being regards its existence similarly, just on the same rational principle that holds for me: * so that it is at the same time an objective principle, which as a supreme practical law all laws of the will must be capable of being deduced. Accordingly the practical imperative will be as follows: So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only. We will now inquire whether this can be practically carried out.
To abide by the previous examples:
Firstly, under the head of necessary duty to oneself: He who contemplates suicide should ask himself whether his action can be consistent with the idea of humanity as an end in itself. If he destroys himself in order to escape from painful circumstances, he uses a person merely as a mean to maintain a tolerable condition up to the end of life. But a man is not a thing, that is to say, something which can be used merely as means, but must in all his actions be always considered as an end in himself. I cannot, therefore, dispose in any way of a man in my own person so as to mutilate him, to damage or kill him. (It belongs to ethics proper to define this principle more precisely, so as to avoid all misunderstanding, e. g., as to the amputation of the limbs in order to preserve myself,61as to exposing my life to danger with a view to preserve it, etc. This question is therefore omitted here.)
Secondly, as regards necessary duties, or those of strict obligation, towards others: He who is thinking of making a lying promise to others will see at once that he would be using another man merely as a mean, without the latter containing at the same time the end in himself. For he whom I propose by such a promise to use for my own purposes cannot possibly assent to my mode of acting towards him and, therefore, cannot himself contain the end of this action. This violation of the principle of humanity in other men is more obvious if we take in examples of attacks on the freedom and property of others. For then it is clear that he who transgresses the rights of men intends to use the person of others merely as a means, without considering that as rational beings they ought always to be esteemed also as ends, that is, as beings who must be capable of containing in themselves the end of the very same action.
Discussion Questions
1. Kant formulated his views on suicide long before medical technology was developed that could be used to extend the dying process. What would Kant’s position most likely be on physician-assisted suicide? Is physician-assisted suicide always incompatible with the categorical imperative? Support your answers.
2. The categorical imperative requires that we treat persons as ends in themselves and never as means only. Develop a policy on affirmative action for college admissions that is based on the categorical imperative.
3. Can hate speech ever be compatible with the categorical imperative? If not, explain what your moral duty, as a person of good will, would be if you witness or are the victim of hate speech.
4. Although Kant excluded nonhuman animals from the moral community, he was opposed to cruelty to other animals on the grounds that it makes us more likely to be cruel to people. Using Kant’s criteria, discuss whether enjoying the products of animal agriculture is morally acceptable so long as we are not directly involved or do not witness the pain or extinction of other species.
JOHN LOCKE
Two Treatises of Civil Government
British philosopher John Locke (1632–1704) was born into a liberal Puritan family that was heavily involved in political activism. Locke’s theory of natural rights emerged primarily as a protest against the idea that the king possessed divine rights. Locke believed that God created the earth as a resource for humans. These natural rights ethics had a profound effect on the founders of the United States, especially Thomas Jefferson.
John Locke, “Natural Rights” from Two Treatises of Civil Government. London: A&J Churchill, 1698.
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In the following selection, from Two Treatises of Civil Government, Locke defends our right to own property and explains why people in a state of nature come together to form a political society.
Critical Reading Questions
1. How does Locke define political power?
2. What is the state of nature? What rights do humans have in a state of nature?
3. What is the law of nature?
4. Why does Locke argue that civil society is preferable to a state of nature?
5. According to Locke, why do humans have a right to the resources of the earth?
6. How do humans, as individuals, make these resources their property?
7. What are the limits on what we can claim as our property?
8. According to Locke, why do people come together to form a political society?
9. What are the advantages and disadvantages of living in a political society?
OF THE STATE OF NATURE
4. To understand political power aright, and derive it from its original, we must consider what estate all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of Nature, without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man.
A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another, there being nothing more evident than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of Nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another, without subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him by an evident and clear appointment an un-doubted right to dominion and sovereignty.
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6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of license; though man in that state have an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it. The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges everyone; and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that, being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions. For men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker, they are his property, …
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15…. “for as much as we are not by ourselves sufficient to furnish ourselves with competent store of things needful for such a life as our Nature doth desire, a life fit for the dignity of man, therefore to supply those defects and imperfections which are in us, as living single and solely by ourselves, we are naturally induced to seek communion and fellowship with others; this was the cause of men uniting themselves as first in politic societies.” But I, moreover, affirm that all men are naturally in that state, and remain so till, by their own consents, they make themselves members of some politic society, …
OF PROPERTY
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25. God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life and convenience. The earth and all that is therein is given to men for the support and63comfort of their being. And though all the fruits it naturally produces, and beasts it feeds, belong to mankind in common, as they are produced by the spontaneous hand of Nature, and nobody has originally a private dominion exclusive of the rest of mankind in any of them, as they are thus in their natural state, yet being given for the use of men, there must of necessity be a means to appropriate them some way or other before they can be of any use, or at all beneficial, to any particular men….
26. Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a “property” in his own “person.” This nobody has any right to but himself. The “labour” of his body and the “work” of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that Nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with it, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it that excludes the common right of other men. For this “labour” being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others.
OF THE BEGINNING OF POLITICAL SOCIETIES
95. Men being, as has been said, by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate and subjected to the political power of another without his own consent, which is done by agreeing with other men, to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living, one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any that are not of it. This any number of men may do, because it injures not the freedom of the rest; they are left, as they were, in the liberty of the state of Nature. When any number of men have so consented to make one community or government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest.
96. For, when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual, made a community, they have thereby made that community one body, with a power to act as one body, which is only by the will and determination of the majority.
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99. Whosoever, therefore, out of a state of Nature unite into a community, must be understood to give up all the power necessary to the ends for which they unite into society to the majority of the community, unless they expressly agreed in any number greater than the majority. And this is done by barely agreeing to unite into one political society, which is all the compact that is, or needs be, between the individuals that enter into or make up a commonwealth. And thus, that which begins and actually constitutes any political society is nothing but the consent of any number of free-men capable of majority, to unite and incorporate into such a society. And this is that, and that only, which did or could give beginning to any lawful government in the world….
Discussion Questions
1. Discuss Locke’s claim that there is a law of nature that gives individuals living in a state of nature the right to punish transgressors. Does the lack of an international government mean that nations are living in a state of nature? Discuss whether this justifies the use of war against nations that threaten our property rights.
2. Evaluate natural rights ethicists, claim that human equality is self-evident. Discuss the implications of this belief for public policy on the right of same-sex couples to marry.
3. Ralph Waldo Emerson once said that “people say law but they mean wealth.” In the United States 90 percent of the resources are owned by 10 percent of the people. Compare and contrast the capitalist system of property ownership, as supported by Ayn Rand, with Locke’s philosophy. Use specific examples to illustrate your answer.
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CONFUCIUS
The Analects
Confucius (551–479 B.C.E.) lived during the period of the “hundred philosophers” (the late sixth to the early third centuries B.C.E.), which paralleled the golden age in Greek philosophy. Much of the writing in The Analects is directed toward the rulers, since it is the rulers who have the most power to advance virtue in society and individuals.
As a teacher, Confucius radically changed Chinese philosophy by focusing on our duties to humanity rather than on spiritual concerns. Like Aristotle, Confucius believed that humans were happiest and found it easiest to be virtuous when they were living in a just and well-ordered society.
Critical Reading Questions
1. What does Confucius mean by “benevolence”?
2. Is virtue or benevolence relative or is it the same for all people?
3. Which does Confucius value more—personal freedom or social harmony?
4. What duties do children have toward their parents?
5. What does Confucius mean when he says that the “gentleman is not invariably for or against anything. He is on the side of what is moral”?
6. Why is trust the most important social virtue?
7. What is the root of injustice?
8. What does Confucius say about punishment?
9. Why do we have crime? What is the role of government and social policy in promoting virtuous behavior?
BOOK I
CHAP. III. The Master said, ‘Fine words and an insinuating appearance are seldom associated with true virtue.’
CHAP. IV. The philosopher Tsang said, ‘I daily examine myself on three points: whether, in transacting business for others, I may have been not faithful; whether, in intercourse with friends, I may have been not sincere; whether I may have not mastered and practised the instructions of my teacher.’
CHAP. VI. The Master said, ‘A youth, when at home, should be filial, and, abroad, respectful to his elders. He should be earnest and truthful. He should overflow in love to all, and cultivate the friendship of the good. When he has time and opportunity, after the performance of these things, he should employ them in polite studies.’
CHAP. VIII. 1. The Master said, ‘If the scholar be not grave, he will not call forth any veneration, and his learning will not be solid. 2. ‘Hold faithfulness and sincerity as first principles. 3. ‘Have no friends not equal to yourself. 4. ‘When you have faults, do not fear to abandon them.’
BOOK IV
CHAP. I. The Master said, ‘It is virtuous manners which constitute the excellence of a neighborhood. If a man in selecting a residence, do not fix on one where such prevail, how can he be wise?’
Confusius, The Analects, translated by James Legge. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1861.
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CHAP. IV. The Master said, ‘If the will be set on virtue, there will be no practice of wickedness.’
CHAP. V. 1. The Master said, ‘Riches and honours are what men desire. If it cannot be obtained in the proper way, they should not be held. Poverty and meanness are what men dislike. If it cannot be avoided in the proper way, they should not be avoided. 2. ‘If a superior man abandon virtue, how can he fulfill the requirements of that name? …
CHAP. VI. The Master said, ‘I have not seen a person who loved virtue, or one who hated what was not virtuous. He who loved virtue, would esteem nothing above it. He who hated what is not virtuous, would practise virtue in such a way that he would not allow anything that is not virtuous to approach his person….
CHAP. VII. The Master said, ‘The faults of men are characteristic of the class to which they belong. By observing a man’s faults, it may be known that he is virtuous.’
CHAP. X. The Master said, ‘The superior man, in the world, does not set his mind either for anything, or against anything; what is right he will follow.’
CHAP. XII. The Master said: ‘He who acts with a constant view to his own advantage will be much murmured against.’
CHAP. XIII. The Master said, ‘Is a prince is able to govern his kingdom with the complaisance proper to the rules of propriety, what difficulty will he have? If he cannot govern it with that complaisance, what has he to do with the rules of propriety?’
CHAP. XVIII. The Master said, ‘In serving his parents, a son may remonstrate with them, but gently; when he sees that they do not incline to follow his advice, he shows an increased degree of reverence, but does not abandon his purpose; and should they punish him, he does not allow himself to murmur.’
BOOK XII.
CHAP. II. Chung-kung asked about perfect virtue. The Master said, ‘It is, when you go abroad, to behave to every one as if you were receiving a great guest; to employ the people as if you were assisting at a great sacrifice; not to do to others as you would not wish done to yourself; to have no murmuring against you in the country, and none in the family.’…
CHAP. X. 1. Tsze-chang having asked how virtue was to be exalted, and delusions to be discovered, the Master said, ‘Hold faithfulness and sincerity as first principles, and be moving continually to what is right; this is the way to exalt one’s virtue. 2. ‘You love a man and wish him to live; you hate him and wish him to die…..
CHAP. XVI. The Master said, ‘The superior man seeks to perfect the admirable qualities of men, and does not seek to perfect their bad qualities. The mean man does the opposite of this.’
CHAP. XVII. Chi K’ang asked Confucius about government. Confucius replied, ‘To govern means to rectify. If you lead on the people with correctness, who will dare not to be correct?’
CHAP. XIX. Chi K’ang asked Confucius about government, saying, ‘What do you say to killing the unprincipled for the good of the principled?’ Confucius replied, ‘Sir, in carrying on your government, why should you use killing at all? Let your evinced desires be for what is good, and the people will be good. The relation between superiors and inferiors, is like that between the wind and the grass. The grass must bend, when the wind blows across it.’…
CHAP. XXI. 1. Fan Ch’ih rambling with the Master under the trees about the rain altars, said, ‘I venture to ask how to exalt virtue, to correct cherished evil, and to discover delusions.’ 2. The Master said, ‘Truly a good question! 3. ‘If doing what is to be done be made the first business, and success a secondary consideration; is not this the way to exalt virtue? To assail one’s own wickedness and not assail that of others; is not this the way to correct cherished evil? For a morning’s anger to disregard one’s own life, and involve that of his parents; is not this a case of delusion?’
CHAP. XXII. 1. Fan Ch’ih asked about benevolence. The Master said, ‘It is to love all men.’ He asked about knowledge. The Master said, ‘It is to know all men.’ 2. Fan Ch’ih did not immediately understand these answers. 3. The Master said, ‘Employ the upright and put aside all the crooked; in this way the crooked can be made to be upright.’…
CHAP. XXIII. Tsze-kung asked about friendship. The Master said, ‘Faithfully admonish your friend, and skillfully lead him on. If you find him impracticable, stop. Do not disgrace yourself.’
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BOOK XIII
CHAP. XI. The Master said, ‘“If good men were to govern a country in succession for a hundred years, they would be able to transform the violently bad, and dispense with capital punishments.”…
CHAP. XIII. The Master said, ‘If a minister make his own conduct correct, what difficulty will he have in assisting in government? If he cannot rectify himself, what has he to do with rectifying others?’
Discussion Questions
1. In light of what Confucius says about the relative importance of personal freedom and social harmony, discuss concerns he would have regarding the regulation of hate speech and pornography. Compare and contrast his approach with that of John Stuart Mill.
2. Discuss whether filial duty requires us to carry out a parent’s or grandparent’s wish for assistance in committing suicide. If so, is the duty to carry out these types of requests absolute or prima facie? Support your answer.
3. Compare the Confucian principle of reciprocity to Kant’s categorical imperative.
4. Why is Confucius opposed to capital punishment? Discuss alternatives to capital punishment that Confucius might propose.
NOTES
1. Obedience is available on video.
2. Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 6.
3. Elliot Turiel, Carolyn Hildebrandt, and Cecilia Wainryb, “Judging Social Issues: Difficulties, Inconsistencies, and Consistencies,” Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development 56, no. 2 (1991): pp. 104–116.
4. Lawrence Kohlberg, The Philosophy of Moral Development (New York: Harper & Row, 1981).
5. This is not to say that religious people are necessarily cultural relativists; many people who are religious believe that morality exists independently of religion; religious teachings confirm, rather than create, morality.
6. Gontran de Poncins, Kabloona (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1941).
7. Nancy L. Jacobs, Alison Landes, and Mark A. Siegel, eds. Capital Punishment—Cruel and Unusual (Wylie, Tex.: Information Plus, 1996), 85.
8. Turiel et al., “Judging Social Issues.”
9. Stephen A. Satris, “Student Relativism,” Teaching Philosophy 9, no. 3 (1986): 193–200.
10. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982).
11. Paul M. Valliant, “Personality, Peer Influence, and Use of Alcohol and Drugs by First-Year University Students,” Psychological Reports 77, no. 2 (1995): 401–402.
12. Eva Skoe and Rhett Diessner, “Ethic of Care, Justice, Identity, and Gender: An Extension and Replication,” Merrill-Palmer Quarterly 40, no. 2 (1994): 272–289.
13. See Norma Haan, On Moral Grounds: The Search for Practical Morality (New York: New York University Press, 1985).
14. Carol Gilligan and Jane Attanucci, “Two Moral Orientations: Gender Differences and Similarities,” Merrill-Palmer Quarterly 34, no. 3 (1988): 223–227; R. Blotner and D. J. Bearison, “Developmental67Consistencies in Socio-Moral Knowledge: Justice Reasoning and Altruistic Behavior,” Merrill-Palmer Quarterly 30, no. 4 (1984): 349–357; and Nancy Stiller and Linda Forrest, “An Extension of Gilligan and Lyon’s Investigation of Morality: Gender Differences in College Students,” Journal of College Student Development 31, no. 1 (1990): 54–63.
15. For more on moral development in college students, see Alexander Astin and Gregory Blimling, “Developing Character in College Students,” NASPA Journal 27, no. 4 (1990): 268; and Dwight Boyd, “The Condition of Sophomoritis and Its Educational Cure,” Journal of Moral Education 1 (1980): 24–39.
16. Judith Boss, “The Effect of Community Service Work on the Moral Development of College Ethics Students,” Journal of Moral Education 23 (1994): 183–198.
17. Children by the age of four, regardless of their culture, recognize the duty of justice, even though they mostly apply it egocentrically, protesting only when they are unjustly treated. William Damon, The Moral Child (New York: Free Press, 1993), 36.
18. The film Obedience on the Milgram study is an excellent example of this occurring.
19. James Rest, “Research on Moral Development: Implications for Training the Counseling Psychologist,” The Counseling Psychologist 12, no. 2 (1984): 26.
20. Study by William Damon of Stanford University.
21. Although Confucianism and Buddhism are sometimes included under the rubric of religion, they are philosophies.
22. David Domke, “Divine Dictates?” Baltimore Sun, February 6, 2005.
23. See Kwame Gyekye, An Essay on African Philosophical Thought: The Akan Conceptual Scheme (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1964), 184–185.
24. An exception here is fundamentalist religion, such as fundamentalist Christianity or Islam, in which the Bible and the Qur’an are interpreted literally and are regarded as the final word on certain moral issues such as drinking and homosexuality.
25. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (New York: Macmillan, 1962), 100.
26. Ruut Veenhoven, Conditions of Happiness (Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel, 1984).
27. Frank Sammartino, “Taxes and Income Inequality,” Tax Policy Center, June 15, 2017. https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/taxes-and-income-inequality.
28. John Stuart Mill, “Utilitarianism,” in Utilitarianism, ed. Mary Warnock (New York: Meridian Books, 1962), 257.
29. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1971), 30.
30. Chang Wing-tsit, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), bk. 3:1.
31. Immanuel Kant, “Duties to Oneself,” in Lectures on Ethics (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1775–1780/1963), 123.
32. Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Establishing a Viable Human Rights Policy,” World Affairs (Winter 1980/81): 323–334.
33. Confucius, The Analects, bk. 2:1.
34. Adapted from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, bk. 2.
35. Virginia Held, “The Meshing of Care and Justice,” Hypatia 10, no. 2 (1995): 128–132.
36. Virginia Held, The Ethics of Care (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).